UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 396 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1969 (Beginning of Term) October 9, 1969, Through February 13,1970 Together With In-Vacation Dismissals and Opinions of Individual Justices in Chambers HENRY PUTZEL, jr. REPORTER OF DECISIONS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1970 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $8.50 (Buckram) Errata 270 U. S. 243, line 5 of syllabus: “June 10, 1910” should be “June 25, 1910.” 340 U. S. lxxx, col. 2, line 3 from bottom: “227” should be “277.” 367 U. S. 818, line 18: “miniscule” should be “minuscule.” 395 U. S. 447, line 4: “omittted” should be “omitted.” JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice.* HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice. JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice. RETIRED EARL WARREN, Chief Justice. STANLEY REED, Associate Justice. TOM C. CLARK, Associate Justice. JOHN N. MITCHELL, Attorney General. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, Solicitor General. JOHN F. DAVIS, Clerk. HENRY PUTZEL, jr., Reporter of Decisions. T. PERRY LIPPITT, Marshal. HENRY CHARLES HALLAM, Jr., Librarian. *The Honorable Warren E. Burger, of Virginia, formerly a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, was nominated by President Nixon to be Chief Justice of the United States on May 21, 1969; the nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 9, 1969; he was commissioned on June 23, 1969, and took the oath and his seat on the same date. See also 395 U. S. xv. in SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices For the District of Columbia Circuit, Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, John M. Harlan, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, Potter Stewart, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. (For next previous allotment, see 389 U. S., p. v.) IV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1964 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Opinions reported on page 1201 et seq. are those written in chambers by individual Justices. Page Abel v. Beto............................................. 914 Abell Co.; Melfa v....................................... 933 Abney; Evans v......................................... 435 Abramson v. Exchange National Bank of Chicago............ 823 Abramson; Exchange National Bank of Chicago v............ 823 Acker v. United States.................................. 1003 Acting Commissioner of Patents; DeLevay v................ 871 Acuff v. United States................................... 830 Adams v. Board of Regents of Florida..................... 950 Adams v. California...................................... 935 Adams v. Minnesota....................................... 920 Adams; Ristuccia v..................................... 1,949 Adams v. United States................................... 913 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.; Scarselletti v.............. 987 Aetna Life Insurance Co.; Thorne v...................... 826 Agoranos v. United States................................ 824 A. H. Belo Corp. (WFAA-TV) v. Labor Board............... 1007 Akron Typographical Union; Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v... 959 Aktiebolaget Addo; Purer & Co. v......................... 834 Alabama; Alonzo v...................................... 931 Alabama; Austin v...................................... 855 Alabama; Crumley v................................. 831,949 Alabama v. Finch......................................... 552 Alabama; Florida v..................................... 490 Alabama; Graham v...................................... 279 Alabama; Hamilton v................................ 868,1024 Alabama; Lee v......................................... 871 Alabama; Lipscomb v................................... 1024 v VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Alabama; Trammell v............................................. 813,875 Alabama Agricultural Conservation Service; Barlow v...... 925 Alabama State Bar Board of Comm’rs; Alonzo v........................ 992 Alabama State Bar Board of Comm’rs; Griffith v...................... 826 Alabama State Bar Board of Comm’rs; Sullivan v...................... 826 Alamo v. New York................................................... 879 Alaska; Mead v...................................................... 855 Alaska; Roberts v......................................... 1022 Alaska; Sleziak v................................................... 921 Alaska; Soolook v................................................... 850 Alaska; Thessen v......................................... 1029 Alaska Comm’r of Fish & Game v. Bozanich............................ 811 Albright, In re..................................................... 869 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ... 19,802,883,976,1218 Alexander; Holmes County Bd. of Educ. v............................. 802 Alexander v. Ohio................................................... 945 Alford; North Carolina v........................................... 807 Allen v. Hardin........................................... 1013 Allen; Hardin v................................................. 168,805 Allen; Illinois v..................................... 955 Allen v. LaVallee..................................... 971 Allen; Zuber v.................................................. 168,805 Allied Industrial Workers of America v. Labor Board.. 1003 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.; White Consolidated Industries v... 1009 Allison v. United States.............................. 968 Almond v. United States............................... 932 Alonzo v. Alabama..................................... 931 Alonzo v. Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar.......... 992 Alston v. Follette.................................... 994 Alvarez v. Fitzharris................................. 967 Amalfitano v. LaVallee................................ 913 Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade. Amalgamated Transit Union v. San Diego Transit Corp.... 961 Amass v. United States................................ 932 Ambassador Steel Co.; Detroit v..................................... 833 Ambers v. United States.............................. 1039 Ambrose v. Wells...................................... 112 American Airlines; Audubon Park v.......... 845 American Book Service v. U. S. Post Office Dept....... 885,1035 American Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Com. Comm’n......... 842 American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Young........................... 997 American Empire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co........ 818 American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service................... 884 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED VII Page American Federation of Employees; Lewis v.............. 866,950 American Fire & Cas. Co.; First Nat. City Bk. of N. Y. v... 1007 American Importers Assn.; Federal Trade Comm’n v......... 910 American Importers Assn.; Nat. Knitted Outerwear Assn. v.. 910 American Safety Table Co.; Schreiber v.................... 1038 American Safety Table Co.; Schreiber & Goldberg v........ 1038 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Contra Costa County.. 273 American Water Works Service Co.; Gould v.................. 949 Anders v. Commissioner................................ 958,1031 Anderson v. Clay Circuit Court.......................... 9(55 Anderson v. Raimondi................................. 805,924 Anderson v. South Carolina........................... 870,948 Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co....... 57 Andrews v. United States............................... 1029 Angelus Funeral Home v. Commissioner....................... 824 Anthony v. New York....................................... 1025 Anthony v. United States.................................. 1019 Aoki; Weber v............................................... 959 Araya-Murchio v. United States............................ 1048 Archie v. New Mexico........................................ 993 Arellanes v. United States.................................. 975 Ariadne Shipping Co.; Longshoremen’s Assn, v............... 814 Ariel v. Massachusetts...................................... 276 A. R. Industries v. Superior Court of California.......... 820 Arizona; Bowen v........................................... 912 Arizona; Hunt v............................................ 845 Arizona; Madrid v......................................... 1016 Arizona; McAlvain v....................................... 1023 Arizona; Meek v............................................ 847 Arizona; Miranda v......................................... 868 Arizona; Rhodes v.......................................... 945 Arizona; Rockerfeller v.................................... 920 Arizona; Vinson v.......................................... 984 Arizona; Zappia v.......................................... 861 Arizona Attorney General; Jordan v........................... 5 Arizona Corporation Comm’n v. United States........... 27,1030 Arizona ex rel. Eyman; Gallegos v......................... 810 Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle......................... 1003 Arizona ex rel. Nelson; Jordan v........................... 5 Arizona State Bar; Baird v........................... 807, 998 Arizona Superior Court; Newlin v......................... 1025 Arkansas; Fuller v.......................................... 930 Arkansas v. Tennessee....................................... 873 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Armour & Co.; United States v............................... 811 Armstrong v. United States.................................. 870 Arnold v. United States.................................... 1021 Aros-Gonzales v. United States.............................. 898 Arrington v. Maxwell........................................ 944 A. S. Abell Co.; Melfa v.................................... 933 Ash; Rosenthal v............................................ 834 Asher v. Indiana............................................ 821 Associated General Contractors v. United States......... 115,1063 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp.... 808,924 Association of the Bar of New York City; Kaufman v........ 905 A & S Tropical, Inc. v. Hiram Walker, Inc................... 901 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Long Beach Banana Dist. v.... 819 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Railway Clerks v.............. 887 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States............... 275 Atkins v. Florida........................................... 859 Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp...................... 846 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers. 901,1054,1201 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hilton............................ 905 Attorney General : Bandy v.................................. 965 Attorney General; Cachoian v................................ 923 Attorney General; Jakalski v............................ 922,976 Attorney General; Konigsberg v............................. 1040 Attorney General ; Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v.. 844 Attorney General of Arizona ; Jordan v........................ 5 Auburn v. United States..................................... 491 Auditor of Cuyahoga County v. Ohio ex rel. Corrigan....... 113 Audubon Park v. American Airlines........................... 845 Aulton v. California........................................ 852 Austin v. Alabama........................................... 855 Austin v. Nelson............................................ 879 Austin v. United States..................................... 973 Avila v. United States..................................... 1033 Ayers v. Ciccone............................................ 943 Babb v. Marelli............................................. 823 Bacalis; Bessman v......................................... 1008 Bacalis; Bessman Insurance Agency v........................ 1008 Bachellar v. Maryland....................................... 816 Bagby v. California......................................... 856 Bahr v. Brewer.............................................. 946 Baird v. Massachusetts..................................... 1029 Baird v. State Bar of Arizona........................... 807,998 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED IX Page Baird v. United States.................................... 1005 Baker v. Beto.............................................. 884 Baker; Ortiz v........................................... 935 Baker v. United States................................... 1018 Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Kiva Corp......................... 927 Ballard v. Hughes.......................................... 946 Balthazar v. Mari Ltd.................................... 114 Bambulas v. Illinois....................................... 986 Bandy v. Attorney General.................................. 965 Bandy v. United States..................................... 890 Bandy v. U. S. Parole Board................................ 934 Bangor & Aroostook R. Co.; Locomotive Firemen v.......... 849 Bank of America; Saville v................................ 1038 Banks v. California........................................ 869 Banks v. Craven............................................ 860 Barash v. United States.................................... 832 Barbee v. Texas............................................ 870 Barber v. Oklahoma......................................... 945 Bard v. United States...................................... 855 Barfield; Swain v.......................................... 913 Barlow v. Collins.......................................... 925 Barnes v. Commissioner..................................... 836 Barnes v. Florida........................................ 969 Barnes v. New Jersey...................................... 1029 Barnes Corp. v. Labor Board................................ 840 Barnett v. Pontesso........................................ 992 Barnett v. Texas........................................... 910 Barrett v. McMann.......................................... 935 Barry Corp. v. Labor Board................................. 838 Bartlett v. Hollopeter.................................... 1021 Barton; Wainwright v...................................... 1014 Basan v. United States.................................... 1012 Bass v. North Carolina..................................... 917 Bass v. United States.................................. 863, 950 Bassick Co. v. Blake...................................... 1006 Batchelor v. Stein......................................... 954 Bates v. New York...................................... 893, 948 Battaglia v. United States................................. 848 Battle; Edmundson v........................................ 844 Bauer v. Stern Finance Co................................. 1008 Baumel v. Rosen........................................... 1037 Baumel; Rosen v........................................... 1037 Bayonne; International Nickel Co. v........................ Ill X TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States.......... 928,1031 Beacham v. Braterman........................................ 12 Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Akron Typographical Union.... 959 Beal v. Portsmouth Salvage Co......................... 886 Beals; Hall v........................................... 45,806 Beasley v. Kenosha County Court...................... 1042 Beauchamp; Chambers v................................. 942,1031 Beck v. California......................................... 973 Becker; Technograph, Inc. v................................ 951 Bedford v. United States................................... 972 Belk v. North Carolina..................................... 856 Bell v. North Carolina.................................... 1045 Bellei; Rogers v........................................... 811 Belo Corp. (WFAA-TV) v. Labor Board................... 1007 Belveal v. Socony Mobil Oil Corp........................... 825 Benn v. Sankin............................................ 1041 Bennett v. California...................................... 948 Bennett; Scalf v........................................... 887 Bennett; Wessling v........................................ 945 Benthiem v. U. S. District Court of Puerto Rico............ 945 Bentley; Preferred Insurance Co. v........................ 826 Berg v. California......................................... 991 Berggren & Sons, Inc. v. Labor Board....................... 823 Berkman v. United States.................................. 1014 Berman; Narragansett Racing Assn, v..................... 1037 Bernard v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System.. 9 Berne v. Virgin Islands................................ 837,937 Bernhard; Ross v........................................... 531 Bertrand; George v......................................... 974 Bessman v. Bacalis........................................ 1008 Bessman Insurance Agency v. Bacalis....................... 1008 Bethania Hospital; Brown v................................. 871 Beto; Abel v............................................... 914 Beto; Baker v.............................................. 884 Beto; Carroll v......................................... 854, 950 Beto; Miller v............................................. 975 Beto; North v.............................................. 953 Beto; Parrish v........................................... 1026 Beto; Pena v............................................... 893 Beto; Tucker v............................................. 947 Beto; Webb v.............................................. 1019 Beyer v. United States.................................... 1235 B. F. Diamond Construction Co. v. Labor Board............. 835 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XI Page Bilbao-Bastida v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.... 802 Bindulski v. Virginia....................................... 858 Birbeck v. California....................................... 970 Birmingham; Jones v........................................ 1011 Bishop; Courtney v..................................... 915 Bishop v. Huff.............................................. 863 Bishop; Maxwell v................................. 873,898 Black v. United States..................................... 1018 Black Ball Freight Service; American Farm Lines v........ 884 Black Ball Freight Service; Interstate Com. Comm’n v..... 884 Blackwell v. Burke.......................................... 858 Blackwell; Rawls v.......................................... 984 Blake; Bassick Co. v....................................... 1006 Blanchey v. Washington..................................... 1045 Blankenship v. Norvell..................................... 1025 Blincoe v. Watson........................................... 373 Bloombaum v. United States.................................. 863 Blount v. Postal Clerks..................................... 902 Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bk.. 870,949 Board of Adjustment of University Park; Swain v............. 277 Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar; Alonzo v...... 992 Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar; Griffith v..... 826 Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar ; Sullivan v.... 826 Board of Comm’rs of Howard County; Bowie v............... 928 Board of Education of Memphis Schools; Northcross v.... 1054 Board of Education of Okla. City Public Schools; Dowell v.. 269 Board of Regents of Florida; Adams v........................ 950 Board of Regents of the University of California ; Kirk v.... 554 Board of Zoning Appeals of Cleveland; Gettig Corp, v..... 3 Bob LeRoy’s, Inc.; Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Calif, v.. 939 Boddie v. Connecticut.................................. 807, 938 Bodine; Jackman v........................................... 822 Boenker v. Ohio............................................. 837 Bogart v. California.................................... 913,937 Boggus v. United States..................................... 919 Bolish v. Maroney........................................... 893 Bonomo v. Jones............................................. 278 Booker v. United States................................ 862, 938 Boone v. Wyman............................................. 1024 Borg-Warner Corp.; Charland v............................... 871 Boroski v. United States................................... 1013 Borough. See name of borough. Borrege v. Gabba............................................ 942 XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Boston & Maine R. Co. v. United States...................... 27 Boston Municipal Court; Silverio v......................... 878 Boughton; Sinclair v....................................... 909 Bounds; Watkins v.......................................... 899 Bourassa v. United States.................................. 915 Boutwell v. Simpson........................................ 894 Bowen v. Arizona........................................... 912 Bowen v. LaVallee.......................................... 914 Bowie v. Board of Comm’rs of Howard County................. 928 Bowles v. New York......................................... 865 Bowman v. Kropp............................................ 939 Boyd v. Florida............................................ 854 Boyden v. Curtis........................................... 916 Boyden v. United States.................................... 881 Boyles v. Mississippi..................................... 1005 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks....................... 1000 Bozanich; Reetz v.......................................... 811 Bradesku v. Bradesku......................................... 6 Brady v. United States..................................... 809 Brainard; DeBacker v.................................... 28, 805 Braniff Airways; Curtiss-Wright Corp, v.................... 959 Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc............ 840 Brantley; Hobbs v.......................................... 919 Braterman; Beacham v........................................ 12 Brauner; Oblatore v....................................... 1017 Brawner v. Smith........................................... 927 Breen v. Otis Elevator Co.................................. 835 Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16.............. 460 Bresler; Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn, v.......... 874 Brewer; Bahr v............................................. 946 Brewer; Edwards v.......................................... 854 Brewer; Harlin v........................................... 971 Brewer; Loney v............................................ 984 Brewer; Wright v........................................... 973 Bricker, In re............................................. 930 Bridges; Dickinson v....................................... 992 Brierley; Cunningham v..................................... 860 Brill v. Ohio............................................. 1018 Britt; Jarrett v........................................... 915 Brittain; Oden v.......................................... 1210 Broadhead v. United States................................ 1017 Broadnax v. California..................................... 923 Broadway Enterprise v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio.... 843 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XIII Page Brockett; Grove Press, Inc. v........................... 882 Brockington v. Rhodes................................ 41,806 Brook v. United States................................. 1060 Brooks v. Wilson........................................ 850 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brow v. Michigan....................................... 1044 Brown v. Bethania Hospital.............................. 871 Brown v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria......... 961,1047 Brown; Davis v.......................................... 863 Brown v. Hardin..................................... 909,976 Brown; Heyd v.......................................... 818 Brown; Jones v......................................... 855 Brown v. Keith......................................... 1026 Brown v. Maryland and/or Johnson....................... 1029 Brown; Matzner v....................................... 1015 Brown v. Pinto.......................................... 965 Brown; Richardson v..................................... 865 Brown v. Swenson........................................ 921 Brown v. United States......................... 932,965,1017 Brown v. Wainwright..................................... 943 Bruce; Ratcliff v.................................... 872, 937 Bruce Church, Inc.; Pike v.............................. 812 Brundage v. United States............................... 491 Bruner v. Republic Supply Co........................... 1037 Bruning; Cross v.................................... 970,1063 Bruno v. Louisiana...................................... 802 Brunswick County School Board; Walker v................ 1061 Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Labor Board............ 1002 Brussel v. United States............................... 1229 Bryant v. California................................... 1016 Bryant v. Maryland ..................................... 861 Bryson v. United States.................................. 64 Buchanon v. Michigan.................................... 871 Buchkoe; Mink v......................................... 920 Bugden v. Bugden..................................... 1005 Buie v. United States.................................... 87 Bullock v. Warden...................................... 1043 Bully v. United States.................................. 866 Buncher v. Labor Board.................................. 828 Buncher Co. v. Labor Board.............................. 828 Bunter v. United States................................. 804 Bureau of Employees’ Compensation; Teplitsky v.......... 863 Burge v. Texas.......................................... 934 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Burke; Blackwell v........................................... 858 Burke; Cobb v.................................................. 918 Burke; Copas v................................................ 1044 Burke; Cornelius v........................................... 850 Burke; Davis v................................................... 856 Burke v. Langlois................................................ 862 Burks v. Pate.................................................... 947 Burton v. Lloyd.................................................. 916 Busbee; Taite v.................................................. 879 Buscaglia v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co.................... 941 Bussie v. Illinois............................................... 819 Butler v. United States.......................................... 853 Butler v. Winter Garden......................................... 1042 Buttrey; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v................. 838 Byrne v. Karalexis............................................... 976 Cachoian v. Mitchell............................................. 923 Cady; Taylor v.................................................. 1026 Caffey v. Missouri............................................... 853 Cagle v. Ciccone................................................ 1027 Caldwell; Foster v............................................... 117 California; Adams v........................................... 935 California; Aulton v........................................... 852 California; Bagby v........................................... 856 California; Banks v........................................... 869 California; Beck v.............................................. 973 California; Bennett v........................................... 948 California; Berg v.............................................. 991 California; Birbeck v........................................... 970 California; Bogart v........................................ 913,937 California; Broadnax v....................................... 923 California; Bryant v........................................... 1016 California; Castruita v....................................... 880 California; Cavanaugh v......................................... 870 California; Chimel v.......................................... 869 California; Clinton v..................................... 23,1031 California; Cowgill v.......................................... 371 California; Cox v............................................... 973 California; Cuevas v......................................... 1045 California; Dalton v.......................................... 852 California; Daugherty v......................................... 866 California; Demes v............................................. 916 California; Dosskey v......................................... 855 California; Eli v.............................................. 1020 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page California; Evans v................................................ 993 California; Gonzales v...................................... 916,1044 California; Grant v................................................ 858 California v. Green......................................... 1001,1048 California; Green v............................................... 858 California; Gunning v............................................. 851 California; Hakeem v.............................................. 913 California; Harkins v............................................. 921 California; Harris v.............................................. 968 California; Hasten v.............................................. 934 California; Hector v.............................................. 948 California; Henderson v............................................ 991 California; Hill v....................................... 818,999,1036 California; Huerto v............................................... 973 California; Hutchinson v........................................... 994 California; Ingram v.............................................. 116 California; Jackson v........................................ 942,1031 California; Jaegers v............................................ 1020 California; Jones v............................................... 857 California; Kendrick v............................................ 947 California; King v............................................... 1028 California; Lassiter v............................................ 910 California; Lawrence v............................................ 892 California; Lopez v............................................... 935 California; Lugo v................................................ 915 California; Luna v................................................ 861 California; McClindon v........................................... 964 California; McDaniels v.......................................... 1026 California; Mendoza v............................................. 969 California; Mettler v........................................... 1001 California; Moore v........................................... 1015 California; Moreno v............................................ 880 California; Mullen v............................................ 911 California; Neal v................................................ 946 California; Nieto v............................................... 863 California; Padgitt v............................................. 892 California; Palmiter v............................................ 917 California; Pepitone v......................................... 921,968 California; Perez v.............................................. 1001 California; Phillips v........................................... 1021 California; Porter v.............................................. 1042 California; Randolph v............................................ 1039 California; Reyes v..................................... 1024 XVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page California; Risenhoover v....................................... 857 California; Roland v............................................ 935 California; Ronstadt v....................................... 1019 California; Rountree v....................................... 1026 California; Slaughter v.................................... 884,912 California; Smith v............................................ 1020 California; Steinlauf v........................................ 920 California; Stewart v........................................... 856 California; Sullivan v.......................................... 973 California; Sylvia v............................................ 894 California; Taylor v............................................ 890 California; Thomas v............................................ 892 California; Toliver v........................................... 895 California; Tudor v............................................. 935 California; Vaughn v........................................... 1016 California; Wane v............................................. 1015 California; Ward v.............................................. 935 California; White v............................................. 912 California Adult Authority; Conway v.................... 107,806,1030 California Adult Authority; Davidson v........................... 874 California Adult Authority; Park v.......................... 926,1016 California Adult Authority; Penrice v........................... 1046 California Adult Authority; Rogers v............................ 1022 California Adult Authority; Sturm v.............................. 870 California Co. v. Kuchenig....................................... 887 California Controller; Lyon v.................................... 274 California Dept, of Social Welfare Director; Lewis v.................. 900 California Governor; Hagan v....................................... 1 California State Bar; Johnson v.............................. 22,1030 California Superior Court; A. R. Industries v.................... 820 California Superior Court; Conti v............................... 881 California Superior Court; Haskin v.............................. 818 California Superior Court; Lifschutz v........................... 848 California Superior Court; Ortega v............................. 1023 Camacho v. United States......................................... 944 Camp; Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v.... 808,924 Camp v. Dickinson............................................ 122,805 Camp; Miller v............................................... 832,949 Camp v. United States............................................ 968 Campbell v. Gooch............................................ 840,949 Campbell v. United States....................................... 1045 Campbell Soup Co. v. Machinists.................................. 820 Canova v. Travelers Insurance Co............................. 832 Cantrell v. Oklahoma City....................................... 1010 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XVII Page Cantrell v. United States............................. 947,1031 Capital Electric Power Assn.; Miss. Power & Light Co. v.... 113 Cappetta; Wainwright v..................................... 846 Carliner v. Commissioner of District of Columbia........... 987 Carlos v. New York..................................... 119,926 Carlton v. Conner.......................................... 272 Carlton v. Gerstein................................... 992,1047 Carman v. New York......................................... 935 Carnation Co. v. General Foods Corp........................ 940 Carnegie v. Connecticut.................................... 992 Carolite, Inc.; K-S-H Plastics, Inc. v..................... 825 Carpenter v. Cox........................................... 996 Carpet Layers Union; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v................ 926 Carr v. United States..................................... 1030 Carrigan v. United States................................. 1028 Carril v. United States.................................... 832 Carrington, Ex parte........................................ 280 Carroll v. Beto........................................ 854,950 Carroll; First National Bank of Lincolnwood v............. 1003 Carroll v. U. S. District Court........................... 1011 Carson v. United States..................................... 865 Carter; Hall v............................................. 953 Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County................. 320 Carter v. United States.................................... 801 Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. 226,290,996,1032,1048,1053 Carter; W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. v............... 1032,1053 Caruso v. United States.................................... 868 Carvel Corp. v. Griswold................................... 940 Cass v. United States...................................... 876 Castle v. United States............................... 975,1063 Castruita v. California.................................... 880 Cavanaugh v. California.................................... 870 Caverly v. United States................................... 866 Cavitt v. Nebraska......................................... 996 Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Railroad Trainmen............ 1008 Cerrito v. United States.................................. 1004 Cerullo v. Follette....................................... 1232 Cervantes; A. R. Industries v.............................. 820 Chambers v. Beauchamp................................. 942,1031 Chambers v. Colonial Pipeline Co.......................... 1020 Chambers v. Maroney.................................... 900,983 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit........... 809 Chaney v. United States.................................... 867 Chapman v. United States................................... 903 XVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chapman, Inc. v. Shenk..................................... 827 Charland v. Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp............... 871 Charlottesville; Fowler v.................................. 901 Chase v. Pennsylvania...................................... 871 Chase v. Robbins........................................... 967 Chase v. United States..................................... 920 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Penn Central Co................... 1056 Chase Manhattan Bank; Serzysko v........................... 904 Chase Manhattan Bank v. United States..................... 1056 Chavez v. United States.................................... 867 Chavez-Martinez v. United States........................... 858 Chavis; Whitcomb v................................... 1055,1064 Cherokee Laboratories v. Pierson.......................... 1059 Cherokee Nation or Tribe of Indians v. Oklahoma....... 807,1034 Chevron Oil Co. v. Kuchenig................................ 887 Chicago; Lawrence v......................................... 39 Chicago; Odes v............................................ 914 Chicago; Shelton v......................................... 906 Chicago v. United States................................... 162 Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. St. Paul................ 985 Chief Disbursing Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank; Dreelan v.... 862 Chief Judge, U. S. District Court; Wilson v................ 922 Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Alaska; Mackay v........... 960 Chief of Police of Somerville; Doyle v..................... 277 Child v. Maine............................................ 1044 Chimel v. California....................................... 869 Chisholm v. New York....................................... 917 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma............................ 807,1034 Chontos v. United States................................... 896 Cho Po Sun v. United States................................ 864 Chromiak v. Field......................................... 1017 Chupich v. Illinois....................................... 1025 Church of God at Sharpsburg; Md. & Va. Eldership v... 367 Ciccone; Ayers v........................................... 943 Ciccone; Cagle v.......................................... 1027 Ciccone; Hiller v.......................................... 809 Cipolla v. Kansas.......................................... 967 Citizens & South. Nat. Bk.; Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v.... 870,949 City. See name of city. City Clerk of Atlanta; Matthews v......................... 1223 Clancy v. First National Bank of Colorado Springs.......... 958 Clancy v. New York......................................... 913 Clark v. Turner............................................ 881 Clark v. United States..................................... 919 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Clark Co.; James Talcott, Inc. v......................... 1006 Clarke v. New York........................................ 972 Clarke v. Redeker......................................... 862 Clark Equipment Co.; Posey v............................ 940 Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District v. Henry... 940 Clark’s Discount Dept. Store; Labor Board v................ 23 Clark’s Gamble Corp.; Labor Board v........................ 23 Clay Circuit Court; Anderson v............................ 965 Clerk and Recorder of El Paso County; Hall v........... 45,806 Clerk of U. S. Supreme Court; Waltz v..................... 984 Cleveland v. Illinois..................................... 986 Cleveland Board of Education v. Masheter.................. 878 Cleveland Board of Zoning Appeals; Gettig Corp, v........ 3 Clift v. Kansas........................................... 910 Clinchfield R. Co.; Railway Conductors & Brakemen v...... 841 Cline v. Nevada........................................... 849 Cline v. United States................................... 1025 Clinton v. California................................. 23,1031 Coastal Marine Service of Texas v. Grigsby............... 1033 Cobb v. Burke............................................. 918 Coffey v. Craven.......................................... 997 Coiner; Holland v........................................ 1022 Coiner; Young v........................................... 895 Coke; Rodriquez v......................................... 854 Cole v. Sunray DX Oil Co.................................. 907 Coleman v. Salisbury...................................... 892 Collette v. United States................................. 917 Colletti v. Illinois...................................... 927 Collins; Barlow v......................................... 925 Collins v. United States......................... 862,984,1025 Collins v. Washington..................................... 829 Colonial Pipeline Co.; Chambers v....................... 1020 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States................. 814 Colorado Public Utilities Comm’n; De Lue v................ 956 Columbia Broadcasting System; Sylvania Electric Products v. 1061 Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks; Swift v......... 1028 Commercial National Bank; Lyn-Bev Development, Inc. v... 905 Commercial National Bank of Peoria; Brown v........... 961,1047 Commissioner; Anders v............................... 958,1031 Commissioner; Angelus Funeral Home v.................. 824 Commissioner; Barnes v.................................... 836 Commissioner; Danica Enterprises, Inc. v................. 869 Commissioner; Gale wit z v................................ 906 Commissioner v. Gotthelf.................................. 828 XX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Commissioner; Gotthelf v................................... 828 Commissioner v. Guardian Agency, Inc..................... 956 Commissioner; Hayman v................................... 843 Commissioner; Leslie v.................................. 1007 Commissioner; Local Finance Corp, v...................... 956 Commissioner; Massengale v............................. 923 Commissioner; Mitchell v............................... 1060 Commissioner; Sanford v................................. 841 Commissioner; Scudder v................................. 886 Commissioner; Southeastern Canteen Co. v................ 833 Commissioner; Sullivan v................................ 827 Commissioner; Tyne v.................................... 833 Commissioner; Woodward v............................. 875 Commissioner Agr. & Mkts.; Glen & Mohawk Assn, v....... 1004 Commissioner, Bureau of Accounts; Richardson v........... 949 Commissioner of Agriculture of Florida; Carlton v........ 272 Commissioner of District of Columbia; Carliner v......... 987 Commissioner of Fish & Game of Alaska v. Bozanich...... 811 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Soc. Serv. of N. Y.; Boone v............ 1024 Commissioner of Soc. Serv. of N. Y.; Rosado v.. 815,874, 899,1213 Commissioner of Welfare of Connecticut v. Solman....... 5 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth’s Attorney for Richmond; Lee Art Theatre v. 985 Commonwealth’s Attorney for Richmond; Tyrone, Inc. v.... 985 Communications Commission. See Federal Com. Comm’n. Components, Inc. v. Western Electric Co.................. 876 Comptroller of Fla.; Camp v.......................... 122,805 Comptroller of Fla.; First Nat. Bk. in Plant City v.. 122, 805,1047 Comptroller of the Currency; Data Processing Assn. v.... 808, 924 Comptroller of the Currency v. Dickinson............. 122,805 Comptroller of the Currency; Miller v.................. 832, 949 Conklin v. Wainwright.................................... 867 Conley v. United States.................................. 853 Connecticut; Boddie v................................ 807,938 Connecticut; Carnegie v.................................. 992 Connecticut; Conte v..................................... 964 Connecticut Comm’r of Welfare v. Doe..................... 488 Connecticut Comm’r of Welfare v. Solman.................... 5 Conner; Carlton v........................................ 272 Conover v. Herold....................................... 1021 Conrad v. Graf Bros., Inc................................ 902 Conroy v. Miami Beach.................................... 962 Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.; Brann & Stuart Co. v....... 840 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXI Page Conte v. Connecticut....................................... 964 Conti v. Superior Court of California...................... 881 Continental Insurance Co. v. Labor Board................... 902 Contra Costa County; American Smelting & Refining Co. v.. 273 Controller of California; Lyon v........................... 274 Conversano v. United States................................ 905 Conway v. California Adult Authority.............. 107,806,1030 Conyers v. Herold.......................................... 919 Cook v. Craven............................................. 880 Cook v. United States...................................... 969 Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co................................... 821 Cooper v. New Jersey...................................... 1021 Copas v. Burke............................................ 1044 Copinger; Howard v......................................... 915 Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Assn.; Stuart v....... 923 Corallo v. United States................................... 958 Cornelius v. Burke......................................... 850 Cornitcher v. Dwyer........................................ 891 Cornman; Evans v........................................... 812 Cornman v. United States................................... 960 Corporation Counsel of New’ York City; Shanker v.......... 120 Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency................ 1022 Corrections Commissioner. See name of Commissioner. Corrigan; Perk v........................................... 113 Costello v. New Jersey..................................... 861 Cotton v. United States................................... 1016 County. See also name of county. County Court of Outagamie County; Lutchin v................ 856 County School Board of Brunswick County; Walker v......... 1061 Courtney v. Bishop......................................... 915 Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County; Delia v......... 886 Covello v. United States............................... 879,984 Cowgill v. California...................................... 371 Cox v. California.......................................... 973 Cox; Carpenter v........................................... 996 Cox; Foreman v............................................. 945 Cox; Goldstein v....................................... 471,873 Cox v. Illinois............................................ 857 Cox v. Jones............................................... 942 Cox; Leikett v............................................. 974 Cox; Minor v............................................... 923 Cox; Pietraru v........................................ 471,873 Cox; Speller v............................................. 947 XXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cox v. Tennessee, by and through its Attorney General... 18 Cox; Walters v......................................... 1025 Cox; Webster v.......................................... 892 Cox; Williams v.......................................... 993 Cox’s Food Center, Inc. v. Retail Clerks................ 1009 C & P Plaza Department Store v. Labor Board.............. 1058 C & P Shopping Center v. Labor Board..................... 1058 Crafton; Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co. v............. 827 Craig v. United States................................... 987 Craven; Banks v........................................ 860 Craven; Coffey v........................................ 997 Craven; Cook v........................................... 880 Craven; Finley v........................................ 891 Craven; Garza v.......................................... 921 Craven; Gilmore v....................................... 1026 Craven; Gross v......................................... 1023 Craven; Hill v.......................................... 1024 Craven; Hunt v........................................... 949 Craven; Huskey v........................................ 1026 Craven; Lambright v..................................... 991 Craven; Marquez v........................................ 864 Craven; Morales v................................... 994,1047 Craven; Rodriguez v..................................... 935 Craven; Sogoian v........................................ 984 Craven; Timmons v..................................... 914 Craven; Walker v......................................... 851 Craven; Wells v.......................................... 861 Crawford v. United States................................. 923 Crispin v. New York....................................... 851 Cross v. Bruning..................................... 970,1063 Cross v. Municipal Court of San Francisco................. 974 Croughan v. Murphy................................'....... 836 Crouse; Wharton v........................................ 1022 Crown Machine & Tool Co. v. D & S Industries.............. 824 Crumley v. Alabama.................................... 831,949 Crumley v. Tennessee...................................... 988 Cuevas v. California..........-.......................... 1045 Cullen v. Yeager......................................... 1055 Culotta v. United States................................. 1019 Cunningham v. Brierley.................................... 860 Cupp; Evans v............................................ 1026 Curiale v. United States.................................. 959 Curry v. Ohio............................................. 867 Curtis; Boyden v.......................................... 916 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXIII Page Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs v. Sabatino....... 1057 Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs; Sabatino v....... 1057 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Braniff Airways................... 959 Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Skil Corp.......................... 951 Cuty v. New York.......................................... 864 Cuyahoga Community College District; Weiner v............ 1004 Cuyahoga County Auditor v. Ohio ex rel. Corrigan......... 113 Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas; Delia v........... 886 Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney; Perk v.............. 113 Czako v. Maroney......................................... 1022 Czap v. United States..................................... 865 Czosek v. O’Mara...................................... 814,998 Dade County; Wright v.................................... 1008 Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press International........... 990 Dallas Public Transit Board; Transit Union v.............. 838 Dalton v. California...................................... 852 Dandridge v. Williams................................. 811,874 Danica Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner.................. 869 Daniel v. McMann.......................................... 881 Daniels v. Nelson......................................... 994 Darlington County School District v. Stanley............. 1065 Darnell v. Moseley........................................ 953 Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp............. 808 Daugherty v. California................................... 866 Daugherty v. United States............................ 947,1031 Davidson v. California Adult Authority.................... 874 Davidson; Parisi v....................................... 1233 Davis v. Brown............................................ 863 Davis v. Burke............................................ 856 Davis v. Gernert.......................................... 917 Davis; Kennelly v......................................... 916 Davis v. New York......................................... 856 Davis v. United States................................ 891,956 Davis; United States v.................................... 815 Davis; Waltz v............................................ 984 Day v. Page............................................... 974 Daye v. North Carolina.................................... 966 Dealers Transport Co.; Taylor v........................ 1008 DeAngelis v. United States................................ 857 Dearinger v. United States............................... 1030 Dearman v. Kansas......................................... 895 DeBacker v. Brainard................................... 28,805 Decker v. United States................................... 969 Deegan; Hall v............................................ 921 XXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Deegan; Marcus v........................................ 922 Deegan; Mintzer v........................................ 994 Deegan; Perkins v........................................ 859 Deegan; Ryan v........................................... 915 Deegan; Sanders v.......................................... 939 Defiance Industries, Inc. v. Tänzer........................ 877 DeJoris v. United States................................... 830 Delaware; Jenkins v........................................ 995 Delaware Superior Court; Steigler v........................ 880 DeLevay v. Reynolds........................................ 871 Delgado v. United States................................... 872 Delia v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County........ 886 De Lue v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Colorado.............. 956 DeLury v. New York City.................................... 872 Demes v. California........................................ 916 DeNarvaez v. United States................................. 822 Denver; Duffy Storage & Moving Co. v......................... 2 Denver; National Federation of Federal Employees v....... 273 De Palma v. United States................................. 1046 Department of Docks of Alabama v. United States............ 962 Department of Labor; Teplitsky v........................... 863 Department of Revenue of Ky.; Spalding Laundry v......... 2 Department of Welfare & Institutions Dir.; Davis v....... 863 Department of Welfare & Institutions Dir.; Jones v....... 855 Department of Welfare & Institutions Dir.; Richardson v.... 865 De Rosa v. La Vallee....................................... 854 Derrington v. Portland..................................... 901 Detroit v. Ambassador Steel Co............................. 833 Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. Transportation Union.......... 142 DeVargas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service....... 895 Development Corp, of America; United Bonding Ins. Co. v.. 957 DeVoe v. Duncan............................................ 893 Dewey v. New York.......................................... 937 Diamond Construction Co. v. Labor Board........... 835 Dickerson v. Michigan...................................... 944 Dickey v. Florida.......................................... 816 Dickinson v. Bridges....................................... 992 Dickinson; Camp v........................................ 122, 805 Dickinson; First National Bank in Plant City v.... 122, 805,1047 Differding; Ward v........................................ 1040 Dillin; Wendt v....................................... 899,1031 Dimsdle v. Oklahoma........................................ 966 Director, Dept, of Public Safety; McFadden v............... 944 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXV Page Director of Highways; Cleveland Board of Education v.... 878 Director of Immigration. See Immigration Director. Director of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Director of Penal or Correctional Institution. See name of director. Di Silvestro v. United States.............................. 964 Dispatch Printing Co.; Maroscia v......................... 1020 Disston Division-Danville Works v. Labor Board........... 817,998 District Attorney of Allegheny County; Lucas v............. 851 District Attorney of New York County; Puryear v.......... 11 District Attorney of Queens County; Samuels v.............. 898 District Attorney of Suffolk County v. Karalexis........... 976 District Attorney of the Parish of Orleans v. Sheridan... 1040 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Director of Immigration. See Immigration Director. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District Lodge. For labor union, see name of trade. District of Columbia Comm’r; Carliner v.................... 987 Dlutz v. Federal Trade Comm’n.............................. 869 Dobbins v. United States............................... 829,937 Doe; Shapiro v............................................. 488 Domer v. Smith............................................. 948 Dominguez v. United States................................. 867 Donaldson v. Illinois..................................... 1001 Donnelly Estate; United States v........................... 814 Donovan; Mitchell v....................................... 1000 Dorsey v. NAACP............................................ 847 Dosskey v. California...................................... 855 Dotson v. Duty............................................. 820 Dowell v. Board of Education of Okla. City Public Schools.. 269 Doyle v. O’Brien........................................... 277 Dozie v. Wisconsin......................................... 994 Dreelan v. Chief Disbursing Officer, Federal Reserve Bank... 862 D & S Industries; Crown Machine & Tool Co. v............... 824 Duarte v. Field............................................ 970 Duckett v. Marshall........................................ 965 Duffy v. Wharton........................................... 848 Duffy Storage & Moving Co. v. Denver.................... 2 Duggan; Lucas v............................................ 851 Dukes v. United States..................................... 897 Dunbar; Keys v............................................. 880 Duncan; DeVoe v............................................ 893 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Maloney v....................... 1030 XXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Montecatini Edison v.......... 836 Dupree v. Illinois...................................... 1047 Duran v. United States................................... 917 Durham v. Independence Homes, Inc........................ 952 Durham v. United States.................................. 839 Duty; Dotson v........................................... 820 Duval v. United States................................... 897 Dvorsky v. United States............................. 970,1031 Dwyer; Comitcher v....................................... 891 Dyman v. United States.................................. 1048 Eaton v. United States........................... 891, 913,1020 Eberlein; Popp v......................................... 909 Eckerstrom v. Field...................................... 930 Edelman v. United States................................ 1053 Edmondson v. United States............................... 966 Edmor Properties, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County...... 841 Edmundson v. Tennessee ex rei. Battle.................... 844 Ed Taussig, Inc.; Foy v.................................. 957 Edwards, In re........................................... 953 Edwards v. Brewer........................................ 854 Edwards v. United States................................. 894 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Maloney v............... 1030 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Montecatini Edison v.... 836 Eisdorfer; United States v.......................... 884,1066 Eisenhardt v. United States.............................. 953 Electric Auto-Lite Co.; Mills v.......................... 375 Elgin, J. & E. R. Co.; Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.. 886 Eli v. California....................................... 1020 Elkanich v. United States.......................... 1057,1065 Elkins v. Kelley......................................... 966 Elksnis v. United States............................. 918,932 El Paso County Clerk and Recorder ; Hall v............. 45, 806 El Ranco, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada.......... 875 Ely; Hamer v............................................. 942 Empresa Lineas Marítimas Argentinas; Nehring v........... 819 Endicott v. West Virginia................................ 964 Erhärt v. United States.................................. 860 Eschmann v. Moyer........................................ 845 Estate. See name of estate. Evans v. Abney.......................................... 435 Evans v. California.................................... 993 Evans v. Comman........................................ 812 Evans v. Cupp......................................... 1026 Evans v. United States................................. 1044 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXVII Page Ewing v. United States........................................ 858 Exchange Nat. Bank of Atchison v. Hibernia Nat. Bank.... 838 Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Abramson.................. 823 Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago; Abramson v.................. 823 Ex parte. See name of party. Eyman; Gallegos v.......................................... 810 Eyman; Gilreath v.......................................... 892 Eyman; Hitchcock v......................................... 953 Eyman; Hunt v.............................................. 883 Eyman; Rabon v............................................. 970 Eyman; Schmid v........................................... 983 Eyman; Sullivan v......................................... 1043 Fahey v. United States................................. 957,1063 Farley v. Kramer.............................................. 986 Farmers’ Cooperative Compress v. Packinghouse Workers.... 903 Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc............................. 840 Farrell v. Wyatt.............................................. 810 Fay; Smith v.................................................. 857 Fear v. Johnson............................................... 935 Feaster v. United States...................................... 962 Febre v. United States....................................... 1225 Feder; Martin Marietta Corp, v........................ 808,1036 Federal Broadcasting System v. Federal Com. Comm’n........ 888 Federal Com. Comm’n; American Broadcasting Co. v..... 842 Federal Com. Comm’n; Federal Broadcasting System v... 888 Federal Com. Comm’n; General Tel. Co. of Calif, v.... 888 Federal Com. Comm’n; Nat. Assn, of Broadcasters v.... 842 Federal Com. Comm’n; Nat. Assn, of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v.. 888 Federal Com. Comm’n; Nat. Broadcasting Co. v............. 842 Federal Com. Comm’n; Star Television, Inc. v............. 888 Federal Com. Comm’n; Tobacco Institute, Inc. v................ 842 Federal Reserve Bank Disbursing Officer; Dreelan v........ 862 Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Importers Assn........... 910 Federal Trade Comm’n; Dlutz v................................. 869 Federal Trade Comm’n; Floersheim v........................... 1002 Federal Trade Comm’n; Floersheim Sales Co. v................. 1002 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Textile & Apparel Group........... 910 Federal Trade Comm’n; Tri-Valley Growers v.................... 929 Federal Trade Comm’n; Tri-Valley Packing Assn, v.......... 929 Feliciano v. New York......................................... 860 Fellabaum v. United States.................................... 858 Ferguson v. Fountain.......................................... 959 Fernandez; Warriner v........................................ 1021 Ferrara v. United States...................................... 993 XXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ferrell v. United States...................................... 934 Fidanzi v. United States...................................... 929 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Grigsby.................. 1033 Fidelity & Deposit Co.; American Empire Ins. Co. v.......... 818 Fiedler v. New York.......................................... 1004 Field; Chromiak v............................................ 1017 Field; Duarte v............................................... 970 Field; Eckerstrom v........................................... 930 Field; Jaquish v............................................. 1043 Field; Pepitone v............................................. 881 Field; Sanchez v............................................. 1046 Field; Scanlan v.............................................. 995 Field; Scheimer v............................................. 850 Field; Scott v................................................ 973 Field; Stephens v............................................ 1023 Fields v. Mancusi............................................. 860 Fields v. United States....................................... 965 Finch; Alabama v.............................................. 552 Finch; Mississippi v.......................................... 553 Finch; Rome v................................................. 943 Finch; Ross v................................................. 890 Fink v. Heyd.................................................. 895 Fink v. New York.............................................. 880 Finley v. Craven.............................................. 891 Finn’s Liquor Shop; New York State Liquor Authority v.... 840 Fioravanti v. Yeager.......................................... 860 First Federal Savings & Loan of Providence v. Langton.... 374 First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson...... 122,805,1047 First National Bank of Colorado Springs; Clancy v............. 958 First National Bank of Cornelia v. Jackson................. 1063 First National Bank of Lincolnwood v. Carroll.............. 1003 First National Bank of Nevada; El Ranco, Inc. v........... 875 First National Bank of Nevada; Gerber v..................... 875 First National City Bk. of N. Y. v. American Fire & Cas. Co. 1007 Fish & Game Comm'r of Alaska v. Bozanich...................... 811 Fishkin v. U. S. Civil Service Comm’n......................... 278 Fitzgerald v. Freeman..................................... 875,976 Fitzgerald v. State’s Attorney for Florida.................... 951 Fitzharris; Alvarez v........................................ 967 Fitzharris; Green v......................................... 1043 Fitzharris; Klines v......................................... 926 Fitzharris; Meeks v......................................... 1044 Fitzharris; Mitchell v....................................... 891 Fitzpatrick; Stemgass v....................................... 939 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXIX Page Fleischman v. United States................................... 922 Flemming v. Wainwright....................................... 1027 Fletcher, In re............................................... 852 Fletcher v. Maroney...................................... 948,1031 Fletcher; Rossi v............................................ 1009 Floersheim v. Federal Trade Comm’n........................... 1002 Floersheim Sales Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n................. 1002 Florida v. Alabama............................................ 490 Florida; Atkins v............................................ 859 Florida; Barnes v............................................ 969 Florida; Boyd v.............................................. 854 Florida; Dickey v............................................ 816 Florida; Galtieri v.......................................... 955 Florida; Garner v............................................ 994 Florida; Hoskins v........................................... 897 Florida; Ludwig v....................................... 927,1030 Florida; Mason v............................................. 892 Florida; Pearsall v.......................................... 912 Florida; Reilly v........................................... 1046 Florida; Timmons v........................................... 970 Florida; Tudela v............................................ 969 Florida; Watson v............................................ 860 Florida; Weinshenker v....................................... 973 Florida; Welch v............................................. 892 Florida; Williams v.......................................... 955 Florida; Young v............................................. 853 Florida Board of Regents; Adams v......................... 950 Florida Citrus Exposition, Inc. v. Hungerford Const. Co.... 928 Florida Citrus Exposition, Inc.; Hungerford Const. Co. v.. 928 Florida Citrus Showcase, Inc. v. Hungerford Const. Co....... 928 Florida Citrus Showcase, Inc.; Hungerford Const. Co. v.... 928 Florida Commissioner of Agriculture; Carlton v................ 272 Florida Comptroller; Camp v............................... 122,805 Florida Comptroller; First Nat. Bk. in Plant City v.. 122,805,1047 Florida ex rei. Gerstein; Vernell v........................... 849 Florida Supreme Court; Restrepo v...................... 918,976 Flournoy; Lyon v.............................................. 274 Flowers v. Nebraska........................................... 964 Floyd v. Rockford............................................. 985 Flynn v. United States........................................ 851 FMC Corp.; Jefferson v........................................ 936 FMC Corp. v. Paper Converting Machine Co...................... 877 Foley; Wolff v........................................... 945,1031 Follette; Alston v............................................ 994 XXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Follette; Cerullo v........................................ 1232 Follette; Forella v......................................... 859 Follette; Halpern v......................................... 921 Follette; Lombardi v...................................... 864 Follette; Resseguie v................................. 971,1031 Fong v. United States....................................... 968 Forella v. Follette......................................... 859 Foreman v. Cox.............................................. 945 Fort v. Illinois........................................... 1040 Fort Worth; National Foundation v.......................... 1040 Foster v. Caldwell.......................................... 117 Foster; Magnetic Heating Corp, v............................ 829 Foster v. United States..................................... 862 Fouche; Turner v............................................ 346 Founding Church of Scientology v. United States............. 963 Fountain; Ferguson v........................................ 959 Fowler v. Charlottesville................................... 901 Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick................................. 1012 Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Thrifty Supply Co....................... 1012 Foy v. Ed Taussig, Inc...................................... 957 Fraiman; Mancuso v.......................................... 885 France v. Union Bank & Savings Co........................... 827 Franco v. United States..................................... 836 Frank v. United States...................................... 869 Franklin v. Shortman........................................ 919 Franko v. Mahoning County Bar Assn.......................... 821 Freedman; Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v................. 1035 Freeman; Fitzgerald v................................... 875,976 Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist. of Lincoln County.... 843 Freeman v. United States.................................... 933 Freije v. United States..................................... 859 Fried v. United States...................................... 958 Frilette v. Kimberlin...................................... 1002 Frye; Lewis v............................................... 912 Frye v. Pennsylvania........................................ 932 Fuller v. Arkansas.......................................... 930 Fuller v. United States..................................... 896 Fung Luk v. Rosenberg....................................... 801 Furman v. New York City....................................... 3 Furtak v. Mancusi........................................... 809 Furtak v. New York.......................................... 871 Gabba; Borrege v............................................ 942 Gable v. Oklahoma........................................... 879 Gabriel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.......... 1023 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXI Page Gadson v. United States..................................... 890 Galewitz v. Commissioner.................................... 906 Gallegos v. Arizona ex rel. Eyman........................... 810 Galtieri v. Florida......................................... 955 Gambale v. Massachusetts.................................... 881 Gantt v. United States...................................... 992 Garner v. Florida........................................... 994 Gamer v. Yeager............................................. 926 Garrison v. Sheridan....................................... 1040 Garza v. Craven............................................. 921 Gaston v. Texas............................................. 969 Gates v. New York........................................... 851 Gay v. United States........................................ 823 Gayle; Liebendorfer v....................................... 863 Gearing v. Texas........................................... 1046 Gendron v. Illinois......................................... 889 General Electric Co. v. Labor Board........................ 1005 General Foods Corp.; Carnation Co. v........................ 940 General Insurance Co. of America; Moore v................... 902 General Metal Products Co. v. Labor Board................... 830 General Motors Corp.; Jackson v............................. $42 General Telephone Co. of Calif, v. Federal Com. Comm’n.... 888 George v. Bertrand.......................................... 974 George; Nelson v............................................ 955 George W. Chapman, Inc. v. Shenk............................ 827 Georgia; Sanks v............................................ 808 Georgia; Smith v........................................... 1045 Georgia Insurance Commissioner; Preferred Ins. Co. v...... 826 Georgia State Bar; Wilson v................................. 957 Georgia Superintendent of Banks; First National Bank v.... 1063 Geraldine, Inc.; Toro v.................................... 1010 Gerardi v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.... 856 Gerardi v. Sipos....................................... 880,1063 Gerardi v. United States.................................... 857 Gera way v. Massachusetts.................................. 911 Gerber v. First National Bank of Nevada.................... 875 Gernert; Davis v........................................... 917 Gerstein; Carlton v................................... 992,1047 Gerstein; Vernell v........................................ 849 Gettig Equipment Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals......... 3 Gibbons v. U. S. District Court............................ 1041 Gibbs v. Turner............................................ 1045 Gibson v. Washington....................................... 1019 Gifford-Hill-American, Inc.; United States v................ 984 XXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gillingham v. Supreme Court of Texas..................... 897 Gilmore v. Craven....................................... 1026 Gilreath v. Eyman........................................ 892 Ginzburg v. Goldwater................................... 1049 Gissel Packing Co.; Labor Board v................... 804,869 Gittlemacker v. Philadelphia County..................... 1046 Gladden; Hintz v......................................... 852 Glen & Mohawk Milk Assn. v. Wickham.................... 1004 Glenn v. Oklahoma........................................ 855 Gockley; Myers v......................................... 847 Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.............................. 828 Golden State Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Washington v...... 839,949 Goldstein v. Cox...................................... 471, 873 Goldwater; Ginzburg v................................ 1049 Gollaher v. United States............................. 960 Gonzales v. California............................... 916,1044 Gonzalez v. United States............................ 1033 Gooch; Campbell v................................... 840,949 Goode v. Sommers..................................... 1029 Gooding v. Wilson..................................... 112 Gordon v. Ohio........................................ 887 Gordon v. United States............................... 938 Gorlick; Fowler Mfg. Co. v................... 1012 Gotthelf v. Commissioner.............................. 828 Gotthelf; Commissioner v.............................. 828 Gould v. American Water Works Service Co.............. 949 Gould Special School Dist. of Lincoln County; Freeman v.... 843 Government of the Virgin Islands; Berne v........... 837,937 Government of the Virgin Islands; Lovell v............... 964 Governor. See name of State. Gowdy v. Tahash.......................................... 993 Gowdy v. United States............................... 960,1063 Grace Estate; United States v............................ 881 Graf Bros., Inc.; Conrad v............................... 902 Graham v. Alabama........................................ 279 Graham v. United States.................................. 994 Granderson v. Orleans Parish School Board................ 822 Grant v. California...................................... 858 Gray v. Michigan......................................... 914 Gray; Poggi v............................................ 999 Grayson v. United States................................ 1059 Great Western Sugar Co.; Levin v......................... 848 Green v. California...................................... 858 Green; California v................................ 1001,1048 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXIII Page Green v. Fitzharris...................................... 1043 Green v. Pate............................................ 1018 Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler......... 874 Greenblatt; King v......................................... 26 Greene County Jury Commission; Carter v................... 320 Greenville County School District v. Whittenberg......... 1065 Greenville Shipbuilding Corp.; Atkins v................... 846 Gregory v. United States.................................. 865 Griffith v. Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar....... 826 Grigsby; Coastal Marine Service of Texas v............... 1033 Grigsby; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v.............. 1033 Grigsby; Welder’s Supply Co. of Lake Charles v........... 1033 Griswold; Carvel Corp, v.................................. 940 Grix v. Herold........................................... 1026 Gross v. Craven.......................................... 1023 Gross v. Judges of the U. S. Court of Appeals............. 925 Grove Press, Inc. v. Brockett............................. 882 Gru de; Mead v............................................ 931 Guardian Agency, Inc.; Commissioner v..................... 956 Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States........................... 845 Gunning v. California..................................... 851 Gutknecht v. United States............................ 295,882 Gwin v. Henderson......................................... 918 Habig v. United States................................... 1014 Haden; United Fuel Gas Co. v.............................. 116 Haden v. United States................................... 1027 Hagan v. New York......................................... 886 Hagan v. Reagan............................................. 1 Hakeem v. California...................................... 913 Hale v. United States.................................... 902 Hall v. Beals..................................... 45,806 Hall v. Carter........................................ 953 Hall v. Deegan........................................ 921 Hall; St. Helena Parish School Board v.................... 904 Hall v. United States..................................... 970 Hall v. Wingo............................................. 999 Hallock v. United States.................................. 931 Hallowell v. Nelson....................................... 995 Halpern v. Follette....................................... 921 Hamer v. Ely.............................................. 942 Hamil; Public Service Co. of Indiana v................... 1010 Hamilton v. Alabama................................... 868,1024 Hamilton v. Municipal Court for Berkeley-Albany........... 985 Hammond Milling Co. v. United States..................... 1002 XXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hannigan; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v........................... 902 Hardin v. Allen........................................ 168,805 Hardin; Allen v........................................... 1013 Hardin; Brown v........................................ 909,976 Hardison v. United States.................................. 914 Harewood; Jones v.......................................... 857 Hargrave v. United States................................. 1059 Harkins v. California...................................... 921 Harlin v. Brewer........................................... 971 Harris v. California....................................... 968 Harris v. Illinois......................................... 870 Harris v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm’n.................... 1005 Harrison; Helsel v......................................... 933 Harrison; Mink v.......................................... 1027 Harrison; Ross v.......................................... 1034 Harrison; Simasko v........................................ 841 Harrison v. United States............................. 974,1031 Harry F. Berggren & Sons, Inc. v. Labor Board.............. 823 Hart; Powell v............................................ 1055 Hart v. United States...................................... 825 Haskin v. Superior Court of California..................... 818 Haskins; Huesdash v........................................ 115 Haston v. California....................................... 934 Hatchett v. Williams....................................... 963 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons....... 1062 Hay er v. New York......................................... 886 Hayes v. United States..................................... 835 Hayes v. Wainwright........................................ 926 Hayman v. Commissioner..................................... 843 Haynes v. United States................................... 1024 Haywood v. United States............................... 852,949 Hector v. California....................................... 948 Heilman v. United States................................... 860 Heine v. New Hampshire.................................... 1012 Heirens v. Pate........................................ 853,938 Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis.......................... 1000 Helsel v. Harrison......................................... 933 Hemminger v. Kansas....................................... 1045 Henderson v. California.................................... 991 Henderson; Gwin v.......................................... 918 Henderson; Monts v......................................... 931 Henderson v. Pate.......................................... 914 Henderson v. Pennsylvania.................................. 936 Henderson v. Pryor......................................... 847 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXV Page Hendler v. Wolozin......................................... 929 Henry; Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District v.... 940 Henry I. Siegel Co. v. Labor Board.................... 883,1015 Henry Valve Co.; Watsco, Inc. v..................... 821 Hernandez v. Texas......................................... 866 Herndon v. United States................................... 896 Herold; Conover v....................................... 1021 Herold; Conyers v........................................ 919 Herold; Grix v........................................... 1026 Herold v. Schuster......................................... 847 Heslip v. New Jersey....................................... 994 Hevi-Duty Electric Co. v. Labor Board................... 903 Heyd v. Brown.............................................. 818 Heyd; Fink v............................................... 895 Hibernia Nat. Bank of New Orleans; Exchange Nat. Bank v.. 838 Hickel; New Mexico State Game Comm’n v..................... 961 Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.............................. 817,1034 Hickel; Pruess v........................................... 967 Hickel; Snyder v........................................... 819 Hickel; Tate v......................................... 815,998 Hickman Garment Co. v. Labor Board....................... 838 Hilbert v. McMann.......................................... 947 Hilbrich v. United States.................................. 936 Hill v. California................................ 818,999,1036 Hill v. Craven............................................ 1024 Hiller v. Ciccone.......................................... 809 Hilton; Atlantic Richfield Co. v........................... 905 Hilton Hotels Corp.; United States v....................... 954 Hinds County School Board v. United States................ 1032 Hintz v. Gladden........................................... 852 Hiram Walker, Inc.; A & S Tropical, Inc. v................. 901 Hirschkop v. Virginia...................................... 845 Hitchcock v. Eyman......................................... 953 Hiyane v. House of Vision, Inc......................... 8 H. K. Porter Co. v. Labor Board.................. 817,998 Hoag v. Nelson............................................. 947 Hobbs v. Brantley.......................................... 919 Hocker; McGarry v.......................................... 899 Hocker; Pacheco v......................................... 1043 Hocker; Tellis v.......................................... 1020 Hocker; Wyatt v........................................... 1012 Hodge v. Russell........................................... 974 Hoenstine; Lockhart v...................................... 941 Hoffman v. United States................................... 958 XXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hogan; Puryear v........................................... 11 Holding v. Holding...................................... 889 Holland v. Coiner...................................... 1022 Holland v. Nasou........................................ 919 Holley v. United States................................... 919 Hollopeter; Bartlett v................................... 1021 Holmes County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander................... 802 Holmes County Bd. of Educ.; Alexander v.... 19, 802, 883,976,1218 Holochuck v. United Aircraft Corp.......................... 838 Hopper v. Louisiana...................................... 1012 Horelick v. New York....................................... 873 Hoskins v. Florida......................................... 897 House v. United States..................................... 870 House of Seagram v. State Liquor Authority................ 121 House of Vision, Inc.; Hiyane v............................. 8 Howard v. Copinger........................................ 915 Howard v. New York........................................ 917 Howard v. United States................................... 869 Howard County Board of Comm’rs; Bowie v................... 928 Howell v. Maryland........................................ 907 Hudson Oil Co. of Missouri; Walker Oil Co. v............. 1042 Huerto v. California...................................... 973 Huesdash v. Haskins....................................... 115 Huff; Bishop v............................................ 863 Huff v. United States................................. 857,967 Hughes; Ballard v......................................... 946 Hughes v. Standidge....................................... 887 Hughes v. United States................................... 867 Human Engineering Institute v. Welch Scientific Co...... 1003 Hungerford Construction Co. v. Fla. Citrus Exposition... 928 Hungerford Construction Co.; Fla. Citrus Exposition v... 928 Hungerford Construction Co. v. Fla. Citrus Showcase..... 928 Hungerford Construction Co.; Fla. Citrus Showcase v..... 928 Hunt v. Arizona......................................... 845 Hunt v. Craven......................................... 949 Hunt v. Eyman......................................... 883 Hunter v. Ohio ex rel. Miller............................. 879 Hunt Oil Co.; Scott v............................... 891,976 Huskey v. Craven......................................... 1026 Hutchinson v. California.................................. 994 Hutul v. United States................................... 1012 Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc.; Neiwirth v................... 823 Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc.; Starr v................... 823 Ideal Basic Industries; United States v............... 804,975 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXVII Page Illinois v. Allen................................................... 955 Illinois; Bambulas v................................................ 986 Illinois; Bussie v.................................................. 819 Illinois; Chupich v................................................ 1025 Illinois; Cleveland v........................... 986 Illinois; Colletti v................................................ 927 Illinois; Cox v..................................................... 857 Illinois; Donaldson v.......................... 1001 Illinois; Dupree v................................................. 1047 Illinois; Fort v................................................... 1040 Illinois; Gendron v................................................. 889 Illinois; Harris v.................................................. 870 Illinois; Jenkins v................................................. 856 Illinois; McFadden v.......................................... 1047 Illinois; McGuirk v................................................. 972 Illinois; Nicholls v............................................... 1016 Illinois; Roberts v................................................. 857 Illinois; Robinson v................................................ 946 Illinois; Ross v.................................................... 829 Illinois; Sarelli v................................................. 939 Illinois; Sawyer v.................................................. 928 Illinois; Smith v................................................... 852 Illinois; Stein v.................................................... 25 Illinois; Williams v............................................... 1036 Illinois Bell Telephone Co.; Kadlec v............................... 846 Illinois by its Electoral Board; Jones v............................ 898 Ulman v. Toledo Bar Assn............................................ 986 Immigration and Naturalization Service. See also Immigration Director. Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bilbao-Bastida v... 802 Immigration and Naturalization Service; DeVargas v................ 895 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Gabriel v................. 1023 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Lico v...................... 933 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Loos v...................... 877 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Manoloto v................ 947 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Ramirez v................. 929 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Yam Sang Kwai v.. 877 Immigration Director; Su Fung Luk v................................. 801 Imperial Refineries of Minnesota v. Rochester..................... 4,950 Independence Homes, Inc.; Durham v.................................. 952 Indiana; Asher v............................................... 821 Indiana; Lynch v............................................... 905 Indiana; Patterson v.................................... 829 Indiana; Young v.............................................. 1038 XXXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Indiana Governor v. Chavis............................. 1055,1064 Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist. v. United States.. 1011 Ingoglia v. Spitzer.......................................... 850 Ingram v. California......................................... 116 In re. See name of party. Insurance Commissioner of Georgia; Preferred Ins. Co. v.... 826 Interco Inc. v. Rhoden......................................... 7 Internal Revenue Service. See Commissioner. International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Business Machines; Stancato v.................. 922 International Business Machines; Stancato School v......... 922 International Nickel Co. v. Bayonne.......................... Ill Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Black Ball Freight Service....... 884 Interstate Com. Comm’n; Livingston Anti-Merger Com. v.. 491 Interstate Com. Comm’n; United States v...................... 491 Iowa Public Service Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n.... 826 Iowa State Commerce Comm’n; Iowa Public Service Co. v.. 826 Ivor B. Clark Co.; James Talcott, Inc. v.................... 1006 Jackman v. Bodine............................................ 822 Jackson v. California................................. 942,1031 Jackson; First National Bank of Cornelia v.................. 1063 Jackson v. General Motors Corp............................. 942 Jackson v. United States............................... 862,891 Jackson v. Warden.......................................... 862 Jackson Munie. Sep. School Dist. v. Singleton............... 1032 Jackson Munie. Sep. School Dist.; Singleton v. 290,1032,1048,1053 Jaegers v. California....................................... 1020 Jakalski v. Attorney General............................. 922,976 James v. New York............................................ 895 James Talcott, Inc. v. Ivor B. Clark Co..................... 1006 Jamison v. United States..................................... 870 Jaquish v. Field............................................ 1043 Jarrett v. Britt............................................. 915 Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic..................... 936 Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. United States..... 828 Jelinski v. United States................................... 943 Jenkins v. Delaware........................................ 995 Jenkins v. Illinois........................................ 856 Jenkins v. McKeithen....................................... 869 Jenkins v. United States..................................... 953 Jensen; Sostre v............................................. 931 Jernigan; Seguros Tepeyac v.................................. 905 Jernigan v. United States.................................... 927 Jessup v. United States...................................... 852 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXIX Page J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.; Labor Board v.............. 258,806 John Klann Moving & Trucking Co. v. Labor Board.......... 833 Johns v. Nelson.......................................... 1026 John S. Barnes Corp. v. Labor Board....................... 840 Johnson, In re............................................ 854 Johnson; Brown v......................................... 1029 Johnson; Fear v........................................... 935 Johnson v. Massachusetts............................. 990,1033 Johnson; Murphy v......................................... 896 Johnson; Nacirema Operating Co. v......................... 212 Johnson; Penrod Drilling Co. v......................... 1003 Johnson v. Sard.......................................... 1023 Johnson v. State Bar of California.................... 22,1030 Johnson v. Stucker........................................ 904 Johnson; Traynor v........................................ 212 Johnson v. United States.............. 822,915,993,1019 Johnson v. Virginia.................................... 801, 969 Johnson v. Wasserman...................................... 554 Joint Checker Labor Relations Committee; Law v............ 956 Jolly v. Morgan County Junior College District............. 24 Jones v. Birmingham...................................... 1011 Jones; Bonomo v............................................. 278 Jones v. Brown.......................................... 855 Jones v. California..................................... 857 Jones; Cox v.............................................. 942 Jones v. Harewood....................................... 857 Jones v. Illinois by its Electoral Board................ 898 Jones v. Jones......................................... 1013 Jones v. Lemond........................................ 1227 Jones v. Ohio........................................... 945 Jones v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc............................... 864 Jones v. State Board of Education of Tennessee............ 817 Jones v. United States.................................... 948 Jones; Vasquez v.......................................... 946 Jordan v. Arizona ex rei. Nelson............................ 5 Jorn; United States v................................. 810,899 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons; Hawaiian Oke & Liquors v.... 1062 Judges of the U. S. Court of Appeals; Gross v............. 925 Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit; Chandler v.......... 809 Julio E. Geraldino, Inc.; Toro v......................... 1010 Jury Commission of Greene County; Carter v................ 320 Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co..................... 846 Kagan v. Schneckloth.................................... 991 Kaine; Raderman v........................................ 976 XL TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kalish v. United States............................... 835, 937 Kamsler, In re........................................... 873 Kamsler v. Pate.......................................... 871 Kandall v. United States................................. 837 Kansas; Cipolla v........................................ 967 Kansas; Clift v.......................................... 910 Kansas; Dearman v........................................ 895 Kansas; Hemminger v............................... 1045 Kansas; McDermott v................................ 912 Kansas; Seven Slot Machines v........................... 1037 Kansas; Yates v.......................................... 996 Kansas State Board of Bar Examiners; Stice v............. 886 Karalexis; Byrne v....................................... 976 Kauffman v. Secretary of Air Force..................... 1013 Kaufman v. Assn, of the Bar of New York City............. 905 Keith; Brown v.......................................... 1026 Kellar v. Neal............................................. 7 Kelley; Elkins v......................................... 966 Kelley v. United States................................. 1019 Kemplen v. United States................................. 914 Kendrick v. California................................... 947 Kennelly v. Davis........................................ 916 Kenosha County Court; Beasley v......................... 1042 Kent; Mink v............................................ 1026 Kentucky; O’Leary v....................................... 40 Kentucky Dept, of Revenue; Spalding Laundry v.............. 2 Kenyatta v. Virginia..................................... 992 Kern v. Whirl............................................ 901 Ketron v. Tennessee...................................... 831 Key; United States v..................................... 874 Keyes v. School District No. 1................... 1215 Keys v. Dunbar........................................... 880 Keys v. Schneckloth...................................... 965 Kiki Undies Corp.; Promenade Hosiery Mills v............ 1054 Kimberlin; Frilette v................................... 1002 Kimberling; Patton Mfg. Co. v......................... 1004 Kimbrough; Williams v................................... 1061 King v. California...................................... 1028 King v. Greenblatt........................................ 26 King v. United States.................................... 974 Kirk v. Board of Regents of the University of California... 554 Kirk v. United States................................ 839,969 Kiva Corp.; Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v.................. 927 Klann Moving & Trucking Co. v. Labor Board............... 833 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLI Page Kleinhans v. Kleinhans................................... 1046 Klines v. Fitzharris...................................... 926 Klingler v. United States................................. 859 Knaack v. United States................................... 831 Knauff v. Utah Construction & Mining Co................... 831 Knight v. United States................................... 903 Knox v. Patuxent Institution Director..................... 995 Knox; United States v...................................... 77 Knoxville; Southern R. Co. v............................. 1002 Konigsberg v. Mitchell................................... 1040 Kovach v. Noyes........................................... 945 Krafft v. New York......................................... 24 Kramer; Farley v.......................................... 986 Kropp; Bowman v......................................... 939 Kropp; McDonald v..................................... 967 Kropp; Mink v........................................... 971 Kropp; Robinson v....................................... 969 K-S-H Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc..................... 825 Kuchenig; California Co. v................................ 887 Kuchenig; Chevron Oil Co. v............................... 887 Kunzman v. Union Pacific R. Co........................... 1039 Kwai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service............ 877 Labor Board; A. H. Belo Corp. (WFAA-TV) v................ 1007 Labor Board; Allied Industrial Workers of America v.... 1003 Labor Board; Berggren & Sons, Inc. v...................... 823 Labor Board; B. F. Diamond Construction Co. v............. 835 Labor Board; Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v.............. 1002 Labor Board; Buncher v.................................... 828 Labor Board v. Clark’s Discount Dept. Store................ 23 Labor Board v. Clark’s Gamble Corp......................... 23 Labor Board; Continental Insurance Co. v.................. 902 Labor Board; C & P Plaza Department Store v.............. 1058 Labor Board; Disston Division-Danville Works v......... 817,998 Labor Board; General Electric Co. v...................... 1005 Labor Board; General Metal Products Co. v............... 830 Labor Board v. Gissel Packing Co...................... 804,869 Labor Board; Harry F. Berggren A Sons, Inc. v............. 823 Labor Board; Henry I. Siegel Co. v................... 883,1015 Labor Board; Hevi-Duty Electric Co. v................... 903 Labor Board; Hickman Garment Co. v................... 838 Labor Board; H. K. Porter Co. v.................... 817,998 Labor Board v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co............. 258,806 Labor Board; John S. Barnes Corp, v....................... 840 Labor Board; Klann Moving & Trucking Co. v................ 833 XLII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Labor Board; Louisiana Industries, Inc. v................. 1039 Labor Board; Machinists v.................................. 889 Labor Board; Machinists & Aerospace Workers v............. 1058 Labor Board v. Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co.............. 904 Labor Board; Polymers, Inc. v............................. 1010 Labor Board; Portsmouth Times v........................... 1002 Labor Board; Presto Mfg. Co. v............................ 1004 Labor Board; Prudential Insurance Co. of America v....... 928 Labor Board v. Raytheon Co................................. 900 Labor Board; R. G. Barry Corp, v........................... 838 Labor Board; Ridgewood Management Co. v.................... 832 Labor Board; Sola Basic Industries v....................... 903 Labor Board; Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v.......... 820 Labor Board; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.. 832,958 Labor Board; Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp, v................ 834 Labor Board; Teamsters v.................................. 1038 Labor Board; Valleydale Packers of Bristol v.............. 825 Labor Board; Wheeler-Van Label Co. v................... 834 Laborers’ Union; Martire v................................. 903 Labor Union. See name of trade. Lacob v. United States.................................... 1059 Lacy v. United States...................................... 839 LaFlamme; Milne v.......................................... 915 Lainhart v. United States.................................. 890 Laird; Rudick v............................................ 918 Laird; Sellers v........................................... 872 Laird; Shoultz v........................................... 962 Lambright v. Craven........................................ 991 Landman v. United States................................... 994 Landman v. Virginia........................................ 855 Lane v. Pucci......................................... 943,1031 Lane; Sims v............................................... 943 Lang v. Maryland........................................... 971 Lang v. Thompson........................................... 903 Langlois; Burke v.......................................... 862 Langton; First Federal Sav. & Loan of Providence v..... 374 Laris v. Pennsylvania.................................. 849,937 Larsen; Scaggs v.......................................... 1206 LaSalle & Koch Co.; Retail Store Employees v............. 1039 Lassiter v. California..................................... 910 Latham; Phillips v......................................... 830 Laughlin v. United States................................. 1021 LaVallee; Allen v.......................................... 971 LaVallee; Amalfitano v..................................... 913 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLIII Page LaVallee; Bowen v........................................ 914 La Vallee; De Rosa v..................................... 854 LaVallee; Pagan v........................................ 881 LaVallee; Palmer v....................................... 893 LaVallee; Ruppert v..................................... 870 LaVallee; Surita v....................................... 964 Law v. Joint Checker Labor Relations Committee............ 956 Lawler v. United States.................................. 1046 Lawrence v. California.................................... 892 Lawrence v. Chicago........................................ 39 Lawson; Woodward v........................................ 889 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond... 999 Lazaroff v. United States................................. 891 Lee v. Alabama............................................ 871 Lee v. United States.................................. 916,1022 Lee Art Theatre v. Wilkinson.............................. 985 Lee Art Theatre; Wilkinson v.............................. 985 Leikett v. Cox............................................ 974 Lemke v. Newport News.................................... 1002 Lemond; Jones v.......................................... 1227 LeRoy’s, Inc.; Occidental Life Insurance Co. of Calif, v. 939 Leser v. United States................................. 983, 999 Leslie v. Commissioner................................... 1007 Leslie Salt Co.; Cooper v................................. 821 Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co........................... 848 Levinson v. United States................................. 869 Levy v. Parker........................................ 804,1204 Lewis v. American Federation of Employees............ 866,950 Lewis v. Frye........................................... 912 Lewis v. Mancusi......................................... 948 Lewis v. McMann......................................... 894 Lewis v. Montgomery..................................... 900 Lewis v. New Jersey...................................... 923 Leysith v. United States.................................. 922 Liberty National Bank & Trust Co.; Buscaglia v............ 941 Licata v. United States................................... 883 Licausi v. United States................................. 1006 Lico v. Immigration and Naturalization Service............ 933 Liebendorfer v. Gayle..................................... 863 Lifschutz v. Superior Court of California................. 848 Liley v. United States.................................... 896 Lints v. New York......................................... 921 Lipscomb, In re....................................... 993,1047 Lipscomb v. Alabama...................................... 1024 XLIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio; Broadway Enterprise v.... 843 Little; Matthews v........................................ 1223 Little Hunting Park, Inc.; Sullivan v.................. 229,806 Livingston Anti-Merger Com. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n... 491 Lizarraga v. Underwood..................................... 944 Lloyd; Burton v............................................ 916 Lloyd; West v.............................................. 899 Lluveras v. New York....................................... 994 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Local Finance Corp. v. Commissioner........................ 956 Lockhart v. Hoenstine...................................... 941 Locomotive Engineers; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. 901,1054,1201 Locomotive Engineers v. National Mediation Board.......... 878 Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co........ 849 Locomotive Firemen v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co.............. 886 Locomotive Firemen v. Seaboard C. L. R. Co............... 963 Lodwick v. United States................................... 841 Logan v. New York......................................... 1020 Lombardi v. Follette....................................... 864 Lombardi v. United States................................. 1012 Loney v. Brewer.............................................. 984 Long v. United States........................................ 924 Long Beach Banana Dist. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.... 819 Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Ariadne Shipping Co................ 814 Loos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service............... 877 Lopez v. California........................................ 935 Los Angeles-Yuma Freight Lines v. United States............. 18 Losieau; Sigler v............................................ 988 Louisiana; Bruno v........................................ 802 Louisiana; Hopper v.................................... 1012 Louisiana; Miller v...................................... 1021 Louisiana; Vale v..................................... 813,883 Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co..... 1060 Louisiana Governor; Jenkins v.............................. 869 Louisiana Industries, Inc. v. Labor Board................. 1039 Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District; Schwegmann v.... 279 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. National Mediation Bd.... 878 Lovell v. Virgin Islands.................................. 964 Lowe v. Weltner......................................... 820 Lucas v. Duggan.......................................... 851 Ludlow v. New Jersey....................................... 935 Ludwig v. Florida...................................... 927,1030 Lugo v. California...................................... 915 Luk v. Rosenberg........................................... 801 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLV Page Luken; Stein v......................................... 555 Luman v. Tanzler........................................ 929 Luna v. California...................................... 861 Lupino v. Young......................................... 872 Luse v. Warden.......................................... 860 Lutchin v. County Court of Outagamie County............. 856 Lyn-Bev Development, Inc. v. Commercial National Bank... 905 Lynch v. Indiana........................................ 905 Lyon v. Flournoy........................................ 274 Lyon v. United States.................................. 1023 Mac. See also Me. MacBride; Wilson v...................................... 922 Machinists; Campbell Soup Co. v......................... 820 Machinists v. Labor Board............................... 889 Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Labor Board.......... 1058 Mackay v. Nesbett....................................... 960 Mackell; Samuels v...................................... 898 Mackey v. United States................................. 954 Macy; Murray v.......................................... 937 Madison Square Garden Corp.; Peto v.................... 1062 Madkins v. O’Neil....................................... 991 Madrid v. Arizona...................................... 1016 Magnetic Heating Corp. v. Foster........................ 829 Mahoning County Bar Assn.; Franko v..................... 821 Mahoning County Bar Assn.; Buffalo v................... 1014 Maine; Child v......................................... 1044 Maine v. Shone............................................ 6 Maisonave v. Wainwright................................. 999 Malagon-Ramirez v. United States........................ 801 Malleck; Signorelli v................................... 997 Malley; Santa Barbara County v.......................... 950 Maloney v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co............... 1030 Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. Zirpoli........ 986 Mancusi; Fields v...................................... 860 Mancusi; Furtak v...................................... 809 Mancusi; Lewis v....................................... 948 Mancusi v. Pugach....................................... 889 Mancusi; Richmond v.................................. 923 Mancusi; Ruffin v...................................... 864 Mancusi; Shuford v...................................... 945 Mancusi; Solomon v...................................... 936 Mancusi; Stevenson v.................................... 995 Mancusi; Vann v........................................ 1043 Mancuso v. Fraiman...................................... 885 XLVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mann v. Vermont Educational Bldgs. Financing Agency..... 801 Manning v. New York...................................... 891 Manoloto v. Immigration and Naturalization Service...... 947 Manuel v. Manuel......................................... 948 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.; Penn Central Co. v..... 1056 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States........ 1056 Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.; Moses v................ 827 Marcus v. Deegan...................................... 922 Marelli; Babb v....................................... 823 Margoles v. United States............................. 833 Mari Ltd.; Balthazar v................................ 114 Marine v. United States.............................. 1001 Markham Advertising Co. v. Zahn...................... 1005 Maroney; Bolish v..................................... 893 Maroney; Chambers v................................. 900,983 Maroney; Czako v..................................... 1022 Maroney; Fletcher v.................................. 948,1031 Maroscia v. Dispatch Printing Co..................... 1020 Marquez v. Craven..................................... 864 Marshall; Duckett v................................... 965 Martin v. United States............................. 824,920 Martinez v. Oliver.................................... 918 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Feder....................... 808,1036 Martire v. Laborers’ Union............................ 903 Martone v. Morgan..................................... 869 Marvel v. United States.............................. 1020 Marvin, In re.......................................... 821 Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Church; Presbyterian Church v...... 1041 Maryland; Bachellar v................................. 816 Maryland; Bryant v.................................... 861 Maryland; Howell v.................................... 907 Maryland; Lang v...................................... 971 Maryland and/or Johnson; Brown v..................... 1029 Maryland Board of Public Welfare v. Williams........ 811,874 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rush Street Rugby Shop......... 827 Maryland Casualty Co.; Shikara v.....................8,937 Maryland National Insurance Co. v. 7th Judicial Dist. Ct... 25 Maryland Va. Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg.. 367 Masheter; Cleveland Board of Education v................. 878 Mason v. Florida......................................... 892 Massachusetts; Ariel v.................................. 276 Massachusetts; Baird v................................. 1029 Massachusetts; Gambale v............................... 881 Massachusetts; Gera way v............................... 911 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLVII Page Massachusetts; Johnson v........................ 990,1033 Massengale v. Commissioner........................... 923 Massey; William-McWilliams, Inc. v................... 1037 Mastrippolito v. United States.................... 952,1059 Mathewson v. McGrath................................. 931 Mathis v. Nelson...................................... 114 Matthews v. Little................................... 1223 Matz v. United States................................. 896 Matzner v. Brown..................................... 1015 Maui Publishing Co.; Wagawa v......................... 822 Maxwell; Arrington v................................. 944 Maxwell v. Bishop................................. 873,898 Mayes v. McKeithen................................... 868 Maynard v. United States............................. 834 Mazzochi v. New York................................. 1009 Me. See also Mac. McAlvain v. Arizona.................................. 1023 McBride v. United States.............................. 938 McCabe v. United States.............................. 1058 McCarty v. United States.............................. 836 McClindon v. California............................... 964 McCluskey v. Norfolk & Western R. Co.................. 831 McCrory; United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v......... 1039 McDaniel v. United States............................. 964 McDaniels v. California.............................. 1026 McDermott v. Kansas................................... 912 McDonald v. Kropp..................................... 967 McDonald v. New York.................................. 894 McDonald; Roberts v................................... 871 McEvers v. Washington................................. 944 McFadden v. Director, Dept, of Public Safety.......... 944 McFadden v. Illinois................................. 1047 McGarry v. Hocker..................................... 899 McGee; Young v....................................... 1047 McGrath; Mathewson v.................................. 931 McGucken v. United States............................. 894 McGuirk v. Illinois................................... 972 McGurrin v. Shovlin............................... 890,1024 McKee v. Nebraska..................................... 837 McKeithen; Jenkins v.................................. 869 McKeithen; Mayes v.................................... 868 McKendrick; Semidey v................................. 893 McLean v. United States.............................. 1028 McMann; Barrett v..................................... 935 XLVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McMann; Daniel v....................................... 881 McMann; Hilbert v..................................... 947 McMann; Lewis v........................................ 894 McMann; Mitchelson v..................................... 1046 McMann v. Richardson................................. 813,1034 McMann v. Ross........................................ 118,813 McMann; Westley v......................................... 916 McRoberts v. United States............................... 1014 Mead v. Alaska......................................... 855 Mead v. Grude......................................... 931 Meek v. Arizona........................................ 847 Meek v. Thomas......................................... 899 Meeks v. Fitzharris...................................... 1044 Meisinger v. Scully....................................... 876 Melfa v. A. S. Abell Co................................... 933 Memphis Board of Education; Northcross v................. 1054 Mendoza v. California..................................... 969 Merchants National Bank & Tr. Co. v. Prof. Men’s Assn.... 1009 Mergenthaler Linotype Co.; Saab Aktiebolag v.............. 831 Merrill v. Turtle........................................ 1003 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Buttrey.......... 838 Mesa Petroleum Co.; Mojave Uranium Co. v.................. 825 Mesch v. United States.................................... 826 Metropolitan Dade County; Edmor Properties, Inc. v...... 841 Mettler v. California.................................... 1001 Meyer; Ruderer v.......................................... 936 Meyers v. United States............................... 835,949 Miami Beach; Conroy v..................................... 962 Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. United States........... 275 Michaud; Schindelar v................................... 956 Michigan; Brow v........................................ 1044 Michigan; Buchanon v................................... 871 Michigan; Dickerson v................................... 944 Michigan; Gray v......................................... 914 Michigan; Washington v................................... 861 Michigan; Winegar v....................................... 946 Michigan Parole Board; Saunders v....................... 1025 Middlewest Motor Freight Bur.; Nat. Small Shpts. Conf, v.. Ill Migliore v. United States................................. 975 Milani v. United States................................... 917 Milford Municipal Authority; Rodes v.................. 861,950 Miller v. Beto............................................ 975 Miller v. Camp........................................ 832, 949 Miller; Hunter v.......................................... 879 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLIX Page Miller v. Louisiana........................................ 1021 Miller v. Miller........................................... 940 Miller v. United States............................. 830, 854, 938 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co............................. 375 Milne v. LaFlamme.......................................... 915 Milne v. Shell Oil Co...................................... 916 Mine Workers v. Riverside Coal Co.......................... 846 Minichiello; Rosenberg v................................... 844,949 Mink v. Buchkoe............................................ 920 Mink v. Harrison........................................... 1027 Mink v. Kent............................................... 1026 Mink v. Kropp.............................................. 971 Mink v. U. S. District Court............................... 892 Minneapolis Park Board v. Minnesota........................ 1011 Minnesota; Adams v......................................... 920 Minnesota; Minneapolis Park Board v........................ 1011 Minnesota; Russell v....................................... 850 Minnesota; Ware v.......................................... 875 Minnesota Secretary of State; Mitchell v................... 1000 Minor v. Cox................................................ 923 Minor; Shifflett v......................................... 844 Minor v. United States................................... 87,809 Mintzer v. Deegan........................................... 994 Mintzer v. Shivitz.......................................... 946 Miranda v. Arizona.......................................... 868 Mississippi; Boyles v...................................... 1005 Mississippi v. Finch........................................ 553 Mississippi; Sanders v...................................... 913 Mississippi; Turner v....................................... 834 Mississippi; White v........................................ 913 Mississippi-Alabama State Fair v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n.. 940 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Capital Elec. Power Assn.. 113 Mississippi Tax Comm’n; Mississippi-Alabama Fair v......... 940 Mississippi Tax Comm’n Chairman; Interco Inc. v............... 7 Missouri; Caffey v.......................................... 853 Missouri; Vitale v.......................................... 851 Missouri; Wilfong v......................................... 995 Missouri Pacific R. Co.; Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v.... 1060 Missouri Pacific R. Co.; United States v................... 1037 Mitchell; Cachoian v........................................ 923 Mitchell v. Commissioner................................... 1060 Mitchell v. Donovan........................................ 1000 Mitchell v. Fitzharris...................................... 891 Mitchell; Konigsberg v..................................... 1040 L TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mitchell v. United States............................ 930,1024 Mitchelson v. McMann.................................... 1046 Mobil Oil Corp.; Belveal v............................... 825 Mojave Uranium Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.................. 825 Molinaro v. New Jersey.................................... 365 Montecatini Edison v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours........... 836 Montgomery; Lewis v...................................... 900 Montgomery v. United States.............................. 859 Montgomery Ward & Co.; State Bd. of Equalization v..... 1040 Monts v. Henderson....................................... 931 Moore v. California..................................... 1015 Moore v. General Insurance Co. of America................ 902 Moore v. Nelson.......................................... 966 Moore v. New York.................................... 911,933 Moore v. Oklahoma........................................ 856 Moragne v. States Marine lanes, Inc............. 900,952,1034 Morales v. Craven................................... 994,1047 Morales v. New York...................................... 102 Morefield v. United States............................... 916 Moreno v. California..................................... 880 Morgan; Martone v........................................ 869 Morgan v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co................... 842 Morgan County Junior College District; Jolly v............ 24 Morris v. United States................................. 1017 Morton v. National Dairy Products Corp.................. 1006 M. O. Seckinger Co.; United States v..................... 815 Moseley; Darnell v....................................... 953 Moses v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co................. 827 Moskowitz v. Power................................... 373, 882 Moss v. United States.................................... 993 Motto v. United States................................... 963 Moyer; Eschmann v........................................ 845 Mullen v. California..................................... 911 Muller v. Oklahoma....................................... 987 Mulligan v. New Jersey................................... 922 Mullis v. Wainwright..................................... 953 Mulloy v. United States.................................. 1036 Municipal Authority of Milford; Rodes v.............. 861,950 Municipal Court for Berkeley-Albany ; Hamilton v......... 985 Municipal Court of Boston; Silverio v.................... 878 Municipal Court of San Francisco; Cross v................ 974 Murphy; Croughan v....................................... 836 Murphy v. Johnson........................................ 896 Murphy v. United States.................................. 896 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LI Page Murphy v. U. S. Commissioner of Detroit.................... 896 Murray v. Macy............................................. 937 Murray v. Pennsylvania..................................... 971 Myers v. Gockley........................................... 847 Myers; Rowles v........................................ 856,938 Myles v. Procunier......................................... 997 Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson.......................... 212 Nagelberg v. United States................................ 1010 Narragansett Racing Assn. v. Berman....................... 1037 Nash v. United States................................. 940,1000 Nasou; Holland v........................................... 919 National Assn, for Colored People; Dorsey v............ 847 National Assn, of Broadcasters v. Federal Com. Comm’n.... 842 National Assn, of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Com. Comm’n. 888 National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Com. Comm’n......... 842 National Dairy Products Corp.; Morton v............... 1006 National Dairy Products Corp.; Pennbrook Milk Co. v... 1006 National Federation of Federal Employees v. Denver....... 273 National Foundation v. Fort Worth..................... 1040 National Knitted Outerwear Assn. v. American Importers.... 910 National Knitted Outerwear Assn. v. Textile Group....... 910 National Labor Relations Board. See Labor Board. National Mediation Board; Locomotive Engineers v........ 878 National Mediation Board; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.. 878 National Savings & Trust Co.; Powell v.................. 849,950 National Small Shipments Conf. v. Middlewest Freight Bur... Ill Neal v. California......................................... 946 Neal; Kellar v............................................... 7 Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., S. A............................ 871 Neal v. United States..................................... 1022 Nebraska; Cavitt v....................................... 996 Nebraska; Flowers v...................................... 964 Nebraska; McKee v........................................ 837 Nebraska; Nicholson v.................................... 879 Needel v. Scafati.......................................... 861 Neely v. United States.................................. 917,1031 Nehring v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas........... 819 Neiwirth v. Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc.................... 823 Nelson; Austin v.......................................... 879 Nelson; Daniels v......................................... 994 Nelson v. George........................................... 955 Nelson; Hallowell v....................................... 995 Nelson; Hoag v............................................ 947 Nelson; Johns v.......................................... 1026 LU TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Nelson; Jordan v............................................. 5 Nelson; Mathis v........................................... 114 Nelson; Moore v............................................ 966 Nelson; O’Neil v........................................... 952 Nelson; Park v............................................. 939 Nelson v. Pinto............................................. 895 Nelson; Rodriquez v........................................ 966 Nelson; Smith v........................................... 1022 Nelson; Stevens v......................................... 1020 Nelson v. United States.................................... 1060 Nesbett; Mackay v.................................... 960 Nevada; Cline v....................................... 849 Nevada; Thompson v.................................... 893 Nevada; Williams v.................................... 916 Newark v. Port of New York Authority......................... 987 Newell; Parton v............................................. 946 New Hampshire; Heine v...................................... 1012 New Jersey; Barnes v...................................... 1029 New Jersey; Cooper v...................................... 1021 New Jersey; Costello v..................................... 861 New Jersey; Heslip v...................................... 994 New Jersey; Lewis v........................................ 923 New Jersey; Ludlow v......................................... 935 New Jersey; Molinaro v....................................... 365 New Jersey; Mulligan v....................................... 922 New Jersey; Owens v......................................... 1021 New Jersey; Pergolizzi v.................................. 1027 New Jersey; Russo v......................................... 1053 New Jersey; Stasilowicz v.................................. 975 New Jersey; Yough v.......................................... 855 New Jersey; Zicarelli v..................................... 1054 New Jersey Commission of Investigation; Sinatra v.......... 1063 Newlin v. Superior Court of Arizona...................... 1025 Newman v. United States...................................... 868 New Mexico; Archie v......................................... 993 New Mexico; Sanchez v........................................ 276 New Mexico State Game Comm’n v. Hickel....................... 961 New Mexico State Game Comm’n v. U. S. Court of Appeals.. 953 New Orleans Chap., Assoc. Gen. Contrs. v. United States.. 115,1063 Newport News; Lemke v....................................... 1002 New York; Alamo v..................................... 879 New York; Anthony v........................................ 1025 New York; Bates v..................................... 893,948 New York; Bowles v..................................... 865 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LIII Page New York; Carlos v............................... 119,926 New York; Carman v..................................... 935 New York; Chisholm v..................................... 917 New York; Clancy v................................... 913 New York; Clarke v................................... 972 New York; Crispin v................................... 851 New York; Cuty v....................................... 864 New York; Davis v...................................... 856 New York; Dewey v..................................... 937 New York; Feliciano v................................. 860 New York; Fiedler v.................................. 1004 New York; Fink v....................................... 880 New York; Furtak v..................................... 871 New York; Gates v..................................... 851 New York; Hagan v..................................... 886 New York; Hayer v..................................... 886 New York; Horelick v................................... 873 New York; Howard v.................................... 917 New York; James v...................................... 895 New York; Krafft v...................................... 24 New York; Lints v...................................... 921 New York; Lluveras v.................................. 994 New York; Logan v..................................... 1020 New York; Manning v................................... 891 New York; Mazzochi v.................................. 1009 New York; McDonald v................................... 894 New York; Moore v................................. 911,933 New York; Morales v................................... 102 New York; Roberts v................................... 915 New York; Rodriguez v................................. 912 New York; Rogers v.................................... 859 New York; Rossilli v................................... 865 New York; Ruffin v.................................... 890 New York; Schwartzman v............................... 846 New York; Sher v...................................... 837 New York; Smith v...................................... 860 New York; Spain v..................................... 937 New York; Swift v.................................... 1018 New York; Thibadoux v.................................... 922 New York; Transamerican Freight Lines v.................. 939 New York; Turpyn v....................................... 972 New York v. United States................................ 281 New York; Whitley v....................................... 10 New York; Withridge v.................................... 993 LIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page New York City; DeLury v...................................... 872 New York City; Furman v........................................ 3 New York City Bar Assn.; Kaufman v........................... 905 New York City Corp. Counsel; Shanker v....................... 120 New York City Employees’ Retirement System; Bernard v.. 9 New York City Tax Commission; Walz v......................... 925 New York Comm’r of Agr. & Mkts.; Glen & Mohawk Assn. v. 1004 New York Comm’r of Social Services; Boone v................. 1024 New York Comm’r of Social Services; Rosado v.. 815, 874, 899,1213 New York County District Attorney; Puryear v.................. 11 New York Governor; Stevenson v........................ 971 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Com. v. Smith... 1056 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Corn. v. U. S.... 1056 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Com.; U. S. v.... 1056 New York Police Commissioner; Croughan v..................... 836 New York State Broadcasters Assn. v. United States....... 1061 New York State Liquor Authority v. Finn’s Liquor Shop.... 840 New York Tax Comm’n; Walz v.................................. 874 Nicholls v. Illinois........................................ 1016 Nicholson v. Nebraska........................................ 879 Nieto v. California.......................................... 863 Nixon; Velvel v............................................. 1042 Noble Drilling Corp. v. Smith................................ 906 Noga v. United States........................................ 841 Nolan v. United States....................................... 873 Nolan v. U. S. District Court................................ 912 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; McCluskey v........................ 831 Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp.; Charland v................ 871 Norman v. United States................................ 809,1018 North v. Beto................................................ 953 North Carolina v. Alford................................... 807 North Carolina; Bass v..................................... 917 North Carolina; Belk v..................................... 856 North Carolina; Bell v.................................... 1045 North Carolina; Daye v..................................... 966 North Carolina; Parker v................................... 807 North Carolina; Ray v...................................... 964 North Carolina; Rogers v.................................. 1024 North Carolina; Swain v.................................... 993 North Carolina; Thompson v................................. 899 North Carolina; Wright v.................................... 934 Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis Schools...... 1054 Northeastern Consolidated Co. v. United States............... 819 Northern Lines Merger Cases.................................. 491 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Norvell; Blankenship v................................ 1025 Nowell v. Nowell.......................................... 844 Noyes; Kovach v......................................... 945 Nunley v. United States................................ 1028 Nus v. Texas............................................ 944 Oberhauser; Szijarto v................................... 898 Oblatore v. Brauner.................................... 1017 O’Brien; Doyle v........................................ 277 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Calif, v. Bob LeRoy’s, Inc....... 939 O’Connor v. Rodgers..................................... 924 Oden v. Brittain....................................... 1210 Oden v. United States................................... 863 Odes v. Chicago......................................... 914 Ohio; Alexander v....................................... 945 Ohio; Boenker v......................................... 837 Ohio; Brill v.......................................... 1018 Ohio; Curry v........................................... 867 Ohio; Gordon v.......................................... 887 Ohio; Jones v........................................... 945 Ohio; Pyle v........................................... 1007 Ohio; Rathburn v........................................ 967 Ohio; Sewell v.......................................... 958 Ohio; Valentine v....................................... 918 Ohio Citizens Trust Co.; Scott v........................ 985 Ohio ex ret. Corrigan; Perk v........................... 113 Ohio ex rel. Miller; Hunter v........................... 879 Ohio Governor; Brockington v......................... 41,806 Ohio Liquor Control Comm’n; Broadway Enterprise v............ 843 Oil Shale Corp.; Hickel v.......................... 817,1034 Oklahoma; Barber v...................................... 945 Oklahoma; Cherokee Nation or Tribe of Indians v.... 807,1034 Oklahoma; Choctaw Nation v.......................... 807,1034 Oklahoma; Dimsdle v..................................... 966 Oklahoma; Gable v.................................... 879 Oklahoma; Glenn v.................................... 855 Oklahoma; Moore v.................................... 856 Oklahoma; Muller v.................................... 987 Oklahoma; Stone v....................................... 893 Oklahoma City; Cantrell v.............................. 1010 Oklahoma City Board of Education; Dowell v.............. 269 O’Leary v. Kentucky...................................... 40 Oliver; Martinez v...................................... 918 O’Mara; Czosek v.................................... 814,998 O’Neal v. United States................................. 827 LVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page O’Neil; Madkins v........................................... 991 O’Neil v. Nelson............................................ 952 Onesti v. United States..................................... 904 Order of Railway Conductors v. Clinchfield R. Co............ 841 Orleans Parish School Board; Granderson v................... 822 Ortega v. Superior Court of California..................... 1023 Ortiz v. Baker.............................................. 935 Osborn v. United States.................................... 1015 Otis Elevator Co.; Breen v.................................. 835 Oughton v. United States.................................... 890 Outagamie County Court; Lutchin v....................... 856 Owens v. New Jersey........................................ 1021 Pacheco v. Hocker.......................................... 1043 Pacific Far East Lines; Reeves v............................ 908 Packinghouse Workers; Farmers’ Cooperative Compress v.. 903 Padgitt v. California....................................... 892 Pagan v. La Vallee.......................................... 881 Page; Day v................................................. 974 Palmer v. La Vallee......................................... 893 Palmiter v. California...................................... 917 Panaccione v. United States................................. 837 Paper Converting Machine Co.; FMC Corp, v................... 877 Parisi v. Davidson......................................... 1233 Park v. California Adult Authority..................... 926,1016 Park v. Nelson.............................................. 939 Parker; Levy v......................................... 804,1204 Parker v. North Carolina.................................... 807 Parker; Sigler v............................................ 482 Parker v. Virginia...................................... 887,976 Parrish v. Beto............................................ 1026 Parton v. Newell............................................ 946 Pate; Burks v............................................... 947 Pate; Green v.............................................. 1018 Pate; Heirens v......................................... 853,938 Pate; Henderson v........................................... 914 Pate; Kamsler v............................................. 871 Pate; Pennington v......................................... 1042 Pate; Simons v.............................................. 944 Pate; Sterling v............................................ 911 Pate; Wax v................................................. 830 Patterson v. Indiana........................................ 829 Patterson v. Wainwright................................. 857,938 Patton Mfg. Co. v. Kimberling.............................. 1004 Patuxent Institution Director; Knox v....................... 995 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LVII Page Mahoney v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp........ 837 Maine; Thoresen v........................................ 854 Major v. Massachusetts................................... 1109 Makah Indian Tribe v. Tax Comm’n of Washington.......... 8 Malagon-Ramirez v. United States......................... 1072 Malco Mfg. Co. v. National Connector Corp................ 923 Male; Accident Index Bureau v............................ 530 Malena v. California..................................... 931 Mancusi; Darling v....................................... 970 Mancusi; Furtak v............................. 1075,1105,1123 Mandask Compania de Vapores, S. A. v. Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari....................................... 828 Manni v. United States................................... 873 Manning v. Brierley...................................... 882 Maranze v. Terry......................................... 886 Marcan Products Corp. v. A. H. Emery Co................. 835 Marcelin v. New York..................................... 871 Marcum v. Kentucky....................................... 893 Marcus v. United States................................. 1023 Maresca; Smith v........................................ 1071 Mariani v. Foley........................................ 1081 Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn.; N. Y. Shipping Assn. v.. 960 Marion County Criminal Court; Haskett v.................. 888 Markel; Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v...................... 999 Markel; Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v............... 999 Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington............... 316,1112 Marks v. Commissioner.................................... 883 Marks v. United States................................... 839 Maroney; Cunningham v................................... 1045 Maroney; Dorian v........................................ 917 Maroney; Fletcher v...................................... 873 Maroney; Hart v......................................... 1040 Maroney; Hilberry v...................................... 969 Maroney; Martin v....................................... 1104 Maroney; Woollast on v................................... 878 Marsh v. Illinois........................................ 954 Marshak, Inc.; Juaire v.................................. 938 Marshall v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co............. 883 Marson v. United States........................... 1056,1124 Marter v. Georgia..................................... 1123 Martin v. California.................................. 1039 Martin v. Maroney..................................... 1104 Martin; Mayock v........................................ 1111 LVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Martin; Pagano v........................................ 1022 Martin v. United States.............................. 862,987 Martin v. Washington.................................... 1081 Martinez v. Colorado..................................... 990 Martinez v. Idaho........................................ 945 Martinez; McAbee v....................................... 904 Martone v. Morgan.................................... 12,1008 Marvel v. New Jersey..................................... 944 Marxuach v. United States................................ 982 Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Church; Presb. Church v...... 440,812,922 Maryland; Benton v....................................... 994 Maryland; Boone v.................................... 872,873 Maryland; Darby v....................................... 1105 Maryland; Edgerton v..................................... 871 Maryland; Green v........................................ 989 Maryland; Hubbard v...................................... 889 Maryland; Jackson v...................................... 927 Maryland; Keplinger v................................... 1040 Maryland; Kitt v......................................... 869 Maryland; Leyva v........................................ 875 Maryland; Loker v....................................... 1082 Maryland; Lynch v........................................ 915 Maryland; Parker v....................................... 903 Maryland; Robinson v..................................... 928 Maryland; Smith v........................................ 989 Maryland; Tender v...................................... 1096 Maryland; Tunstall v..................................... 886 Maryland; Williams v.................................... 1006 Maryland Petition Committee v. Johnson............. 835 Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg.. . 528 Mascaro; Snelling & Snelling of Baltimore, Inc. v........ 981 Massachusetts; Arsenault v................................ 5 Massachusetts; Bernier v............................... 1058 Massachusetts; Bumpus v........................... 1034,1112 Massachusetts; Englehart v.............................. 886 Massachusetts; Howie v.................................. 999 Massachusetts; Major v................................. 1109 Massachusetts; Nassar v................................ 1039 Massachusetts; Sullivan v............................... 1056 Massachusetts Port Authority; Loschi v................... 854 Massachusetts Secretary of State; Lyons v............... 1081 Masterson v. United States............................... 944 Matherne v. United States................................ 987 Matheson; Harbour Tower Development Corp, v.............. 886 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LIX Page Presto Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board.............................. 1004 Preston; Ware v.............................................. 1030 Prichard; Ray v.............................................. 931 Pritchard v. United States................................... 995 Proctor v. Proctor........................................... 839 Procunier; Myles v........................................... 997 Professional Men’s Assn.; Merchants Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. v.. 1009 Promenade Hosiery Mills v. Kiki Undies Corp............... 1054 Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County; Perk v............ 113 Providence Redevelopment Agency; Corrado v.............. 1022 Providence & Worcester Co. v. Smith...................... 1062 Providence & Worcester Co. v. United States........... 555,882 Providence & Worcester R. Co. v. Smith................... 1062 Providence & Worcester R. Co. v. United States............ 882 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Labor Board......... 928 Prudential Insurance Co. of America; Schroeder v............ 1058 Pruess v. Hickel............................................. 967 Pryor; Henderson v........................................... 847 Public Serv. Comm’n of Wyo. v. Tri-State Gen. & Tr. Assn.. 998 Public Serv. Co. of Indiana v. Hamil........................ 1010 Public Utilities Comm’n of Colorado; De Lue v................ 956 Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County v. Seattle.. 803 Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County; Seattle v.. 803 Pucci; Lane v........................................... 943,1031 Pugach; Mancusi v............................................ 889 Purer & Co. v. Aktiebolaget Addo............................. 834 Pursley v. United States..................................... 855 Puryear v. Hogan.............................................. 11 Pyle v. Ohio................................................ 1007 Pyne v. United States........................................ 818 Queens County District Attorney; Samuels v................... 898 Rabon v. Eyman............................................... 970 Raderman v. Kaine............................................ 976 Radio Corporation of America v. SCM Corp..................... 869 Railroad Trainmen; Central of Georgia R. Co. v.............. 1008 Railway Clerks v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co................. 887 Railway Conductors & Brakemen v. Clinchfield R. Co......... 841 Raimondi; Anderson v..................................... 805, 924 Rakshys v. Pennsylvania...................................... 1017 Ralls; Van Houten v.......................................... 962 Ramer v. United States....................................... 965 Ramirez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service............ 929 Rampton; Petuskey v.......................................... 983 Randolph v. California....................................... 1039 LX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rankin; Shanker v.......................................... 120 Ratcliff v. Bruce...................................... 872,937 Rathburn v. Ohio........................................... 967 Rawls v. Blackwell......................................... 984 Ray v. North Carolina...................................... 964 Ray v. Prichard............................................ 931 Ray Smith Transport Co. v. Schultz......................... 986 Raysor v. Pennsylvania..................................... 933 Raytheon Co.; Labor Board v................................ 900 Reagan; Hagan v.............................................. 1 Rech v. United States...................................... 970 Redeker; Clarke v.......................................... 862 Redeker; Twist v........................................... 853 Reed, In re.............................................. 274 Reetz v. Bozanich......................................... 811 Reeves v. Pacific Far East Lines........................... 908 Regan v. United States................................... 834 Reilly v. Florida........................................ 1046 Republic Supply Co.; Bruner v............................. 1037 Resseguie v. Follette................................. 971,1031 Restrepo v. Florida Supreme Court...................... 918,976 Retail Clerks; Boys Markets, Inc. v....................... 1000 Retail Clerks; Cox’s Food Center, Inc. v.................. 1009 Retail Store Employees v. LaSalle & Koch Co............... 1039 Reyes v. California....................................... 1024 Reynolds; DeLevay v........................................ 871 Reynolds; United States v.................................. 814 R. G. Barry Corp. v. Labor Board........................... 838 Rhay; Riley v.............................................. 972 Rhoden; Interco Inc. v....................................... 7 Rhodes v. Arizona.......................................... 945 Rhodes; Brockington v................................... 41,806 Rhoditis; Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.......................... 1000 Richard v. Travelers Insurance Co.......................... 824 Richardson v. Brown........................................ 865 Richardson; McMann v.................................. 813,1034 Richardson v. Sokol........................................ 949 Richardson v. South Carolina............................... 955 Richmond v. Mancusi........................................ 923 Ridgewood Management Co. v. Labor Board.................... 832 Riffe v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas......................... 843 Riley v. Rhay.............................................. 972 Risenhoover v. California.................................. 857 Rispo v. Pennsylvania...................................... 871 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXI Page Ristuccia v. Adams........................................ 1,949 Riverside Coal Co.; Mine Workers v.......................... 846 Rizzo v. United States...................................... 911 Robbins; Chase v............................................ 9Q7 Roberts v. Alaska......................................... 1022 Roberts v. Illinois........................................ 857 Roberts v. McDonald........................................ 871 Roberts v. New York........................................ 915 Roberts; Tannehill v........................................ 822 Robins v. United States..................................... 947 Robinson v. Illinois........................................ 946 Robinson v. Kropp........................................ 969 Robinson v. United States............................... 872 Rochester; Imperial Refineries of Minnesota v........... 4,950 Rockefeller: Stevenson v.................................... 971 Rockerfeller v. Arizona..................................... 920 Rockford; Floyd v........................................... 985 Rodes v. Municipal Authority of Milford................. 861,950 Rodgers; O’Connor v......................................... 924 Rodriguez v. Craven....................................... 935 Rodriguez v. New York...................................... 912 Rodriquez v. Coke......................................... 854 Rodriquez v. Nelson........................................ 966 Rogers v. Bellei............................................ 811 Rogers v. California Adult Authority....................... 1022 Rogers v. New York.......................................... 859 Rogers v. North Carolina................................... 1024 Rogers v. Schmidt.......................................... 1025 Roland v. California........................................ 935 Rome v. Finch............................................... 943 Ronstadt v. California..................................... 1019 Rosado v. Wyman................................ 815,874,899,1213 Rose v. United States..................................... 971 Rosen v. Baumel............................................ 1037 Rosen; Baumel v............................................ 1037 Rosenbaum. In re........................................... 1065 Rosenberg v. Minichiello................................ 844,949 Rosenberg; Siu Fung Luk v................................... 801 Rosenheck v. United States.................................. 911 Rosenthal v. Ash............................................ 834 Ross v. Bernhard........................................ 531 Ross v. Finch......................................... 890 Ross v. Harrison....................................... 1034 Ross v. Illinois........................................ 829 LXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ross; McMann v......................................... 118,813 Rossi v. Fletcher......................................... 1009 Rossilli v. New York....................................... 865 Rountree v. California.................................... 1026 Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Department................. 885, 1035 Rowles v. Myers........................................ 856,938 Royal Indemnity Corp.; Ware v............................. 1058 Rubin v. United States.................................... 1011 Ruderer v. Meyer........................................... 936 Rudick v. Laird............................................ 918 Ruffalo v. Mahoning County Bar Assn....................... 1014 Ruffin v. Mancusi.......................................... 864 Ruffin v. New York......................................... 890 Rundle; Poteet v.......................................... 1035 Rundle; Wallace v.......................................... 894 Ruppert v. La Vallee....................................... 870 Rural Electrification Admin.; Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v.... 1010 Rush Street Rugby Shop; Maryland Casualty Co. v.......... 827 Russell; Hodge v............................................ 974 Russell v. Minnesota........................................ 850 Russo v. New Jersey....................................... 1053 Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.; Labor Board v..................... 258,806 Ryan v. Deegan.............................................. 915 Ryder v. United States...................................... 865 Saab Aktiebolag v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co................. 831 Sabatino v. Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs....... 1057 Sabatino; Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs v....... 1057 Sachs v. United States..................................... 906 Sacks v. United States.................................... 1007 Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Freedman................ 1035 Saga Shipping Co., S. A.; Neal v........................... 871 Saia v. United States...................................... 859 Sailors Haven Fire Island, Inc. v. United States........... 906 St. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall..................... 904 St. Paul; Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v................ 985 Salisbury; Coleman v.................................... 892 Samuels v. Mackell......................................... 898 Sanchez v. Field.......................................... 1046 Sanchez v. New Mexico...................................... 276 Sancrant, In re............................................ 922 Sanders v. Deegan.......................................... 939 Sanders v. Mississippi..................................... 913 San Diego Transit Corp.; Amalgamated Transit Union v.... 961 Sanford v. Commissioner.................................... 841 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXIII Page Sanford v. United States..................................... 920 San Francisco Municipal Court; Cross v....................... 974 Sang Kwai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service........ 877 Sankin; Benn v.............................................. 1041 Sanks v. Georgia............................................. 808 Santa Barbara County v. Malley............................... 950 Sappington v. United States.................................. 876 Sard; Johnson v............................................. 1023 Sarelli v. Illinois.......................................... 939 Sarno v. United States....................................... 859 Saunders v. Michigan Parole Board........................... 1025 Saville v. Bank of America.................................. 1038 Sawyer v. Illinois........................................... 928 Scafati; Needel v............................................ 861 Scaggs v. Larsen............................................ 1206 Scalf v. Bennett............................................. 887 Scanlan v. Field............................................. 995 Scarselletti v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co................... 987 Schacht v. United States..................................... 984 Scheimer v. Field............................................ 850 Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. United States...................... 275 Schindelar v. Michaud........................................ 956 Schmid v. Eyman.............................................. 983 Schmidt; Rogers v........................................... 1025 Schmitt v. United States..................................... 959 Schneckloth; Kagan v......................................... 991 Schneckloth; Keys v.......................................... 965 Schneckloth; Williams v...................................... 880 Schoen; Sulton v............................................. 941 School District No. 1; Keyes v.............................. 1215 School District of Darlington County v. Stanley............. 1065 School District of Greenville County v. Whittenberg........ 1065 Schreiber v. American Safety Table Co...................... 1038 Schreiber & Goldberg v. American Safety Table Co........... 1038 Schroeder v. Prudential Insurance Co....................... 1058 Schultz; Ray Smith Transport Co. v........................... 986 Schuster; Herold v........................................... 847 Schwartz v. Victory Container Corp.......................... 1044 Schwartzman v. New York...................................... 846 Schwarzenbach-Huber Co.; Textile Workers v................... 960 Schwegmann v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District.... 279 SCM Corp.; Radio Corporation of America v.................... 869 Scott v. Field............................................... 973 Scott v. Hunt Oil Co..................................... 891, 976 LXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Scott v. Ohio Citizens Trust Co.................................... 985 Scott v. United States............................................ 1006 Scudder v. Commissioner............................................ 886 Scully; Meisinger v................................................ 876 Seaboard C. L. R. Co.; Locomotive Firemen v..................... 963 Seagram & Sons; Hawaiian Oke & Liquors v.................... 1062 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Union........................ 926 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hannigan................................... 902 Seattle v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County.. 803 Seattle; Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County v.. 803 Seckinger; United States v......................................... 815 Seckinger Co.; United States v..................................... 815 Secretary of Agriculture; Allen v................................. 1013 Secretary of Agriculture v. Allen.............................. 168,805 Secretary of Air Force; Kauffman v................................ 1013 Secretary of Air Force; Tooni v.................................... 870 Secretary of Defense; Rudick v..................................... 918 Secretary of Defense; Sellers v.................................... 872 Secretary of Defense; Shoultz v.................................... 962 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Alabama v.... 552 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Gerardi v.... 856 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Mississippi v.. 553 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Rome v. 943 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Ross v........ 890 Secretary of Interior; New Mexico Game Comm’n v........................ 961 Secretary of Interior v. Oil Shale Corp...................... 817,1034 Secretary of Interior; Pruess v................................... 967 Secretary of Interior; Snyder v................................... 819 Secretary of Interior; Tate v................................. 815,998 Secretary of Labor; Ray Smith Transport Co. v...................... 986 Secretary of State v. Bellei....................................... 811 Secretary of State of Minnesota; Mitchell v....................... 1000 Secretary of Wis. Dept, of Health and Social Serv.; Rogers v. 1025 Securities and Exchange Comm’n; Pennaluna & Co. v.......... 1007 Security Sewage Equipment Co. v. Woodie............................ 907 Seguros Tepeyac v. Jernigan........................................ 905 Selective Service Local Board No. 16; Breen v...................... 460 Sellers v. Laird................................................... 872 Sellers v. United States............................................. 9 Semel, In re....................................................... 905 Semidey v. McKendrick.............................................. 893 Service Bureau Corp.; Stancato v............................... 922 Service Bureau Corp.; Stancato School of Accordion v....... 922 Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank................................ 904 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXV Page Seven Slot Machines v. Kansas............................ 1037 Seventh Judicial Dist. Ct. of Okla. County; Md. Ins. Co. v.. 25 Seward v. United States................................... 1027 Sewell v. Ohio............................................ 958 Seymour-Heath v. United States............................ 877 Shanker v. Rankin......................................... 120 Shankey v. Staisey........................................ 1038 Shapiro v. Doe............................................. 488 Shapiro v. Solman......................................... 5 Sheehan; Zirinsky v........................................ 1059 Sheer v. United States..................................... 946 Sheiner v. United States................................... 825 Shell Oil Co.; Milne v..................................... 916 Shelton v. Chicago......................................... 906 Shenk; George W. Chapman, Inc. v........................... 827 Sher v. New York........................................... 837 Sheridan; Garrison v...................................... 1040 Sheridan v. United States.............................. 281,925 Shifflett v. Minor......................................... 844 Shikara v. Maryland Casualty Co.......................... 8,937 Shipp v. United States..................................... 864 Shivitz; Mintzer v......................................... 946 Shoemaker v. United States................................. 837 Shone; Maine v............................................... 6 Shore Line v. Transportation Union......................... 142 Shorter v. United States................................... 970 Shortman; Franklin v....................................... 919 Shoultz v. Laird........................................... 962 Shovlin; McGurrin v.................................... 890,1024 Shovlin; Wolenski v........................................ 926 Shuford v. Mancusi......................................... 945 Siegel Co. v. Labor Board.............................. 883,1015 Sierras v. United States................................... 899 Sigler v. Losieau.......................................... 988 Sigler v. Parker........................................... 482 Signorelli v. Malleck...................................... 997 Silverio v. Municipal Court of Boston...................... 878 Simasko v. Harrison........................................ 841 Simmons v. United States................................... 871 Simmons v. West Haven Housing Authority.................... 808 Simon v. United States..................................... 829 Simons v. Pate............................................. 944 Simpson; Boutwell v........................................ 894 Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California...................... 13 Sims v. Lane............................................... 943 LXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sinatra v. New Jersey Commission of Investigation.......... 1063 Sinclair v. Boughton........................................ 909 Singleton v. Jackson Munic. Sep. School Dist.. 290,1032,1048,1053 Singleton; Jackson Munic. Sep. School Dist. v.............. 1032 Sipos; Gerardi v....................................... 880,1063 Sirbu v. Sirbu............................................. 1006 Sisk v. United States.................................... 1018 Sisson; United States v................................ 812,1035 Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg................................... 801 Skil Corp.; Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v........................... 951 Skinner v. United States.................................... 967 Skolnick, In re............................................. 869 Slaughter v. California................................ 884,912 Slaughter v. Texas.......................................... 945 Sleziak v. Alaska........................................... 921 Smith; Brawner v............................................ 927 Smith v. California...................................... 1020 Smith; Domer v.............................................. 948 Smith v. Fay.............................................. 857 Smith v. Georgia......................................... 1045 Smith v. Illinois......................................... 852 Smith v. Nelson............................................. 1022 Smith v. New York......................................... 860 Smith; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Com. v.. 1056 Smith; Noble Drilling Corp, v............................... 906 Smith v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n................. 839 Smith; Providence & Worcester Co. v........................ 1062 Smith; Providence Worcester R. Co. v....................... 1062 Smith v. United States. 802,869,924,932,936,1008,1027 Smith Transport Co. v. Schultz.............................. 986 Smogor v. United States..................................... 972 Snyder v. Hickel............................................ 819 Snyder v. United States..................................... 907 Snyder v. Wisdom............................................ 953 Socony Mobil Oil Corp.; Belveal v......................... 825 Sogoian v. Craven........................................... 984 Sokol; Richardson v......................................... 949 Sola Basic Industries v. Labor Board........................ 903 Solman; Shapiro v............................................. 5 Solomon v. Mancusi.......................................... 936 Somerville Chief of Police; Doyle v......................... 277 Sommers; Goode v........................................... 1029 Soolook v. Alaska........................................... 850 Sostre v. Jensen........................................... 931 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXVII Page South Carolina ; Anderson v.............................. 870,948 South Carolina; Richardson v................................. 955 South Carolina; White v...................................... 987 Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner..................... 833 Southern California Edison Co. v. United States.............. 957 Southern R. Co. v. Knoxville................................ 1002 Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Labor Board............ 820 Spahr v. United States......................................... 840 Spain v. New York.............................................. 937 Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v. Dept, of Rev. of Ky. 2 Speller v. Cox................................................. 947 Spencer, In re.............................................. 1055 Spencer v. United States....................................... 876 Spillman v. United States.................................. 930 Spitzer; Ingoglia v......................................... 850 Stacy v. Van Curen.......................................... 1045 Staisey; Shankey v......................................... 1038 Stallings v. United States................................... 972 Stancato v. International Business Machines.................... 922 Stancato v. Service Bureau Corp................................ 922 Stancato School of Accordion v. Int’l Business Machines.... 922 Stancato School of Accordion v. Service Bureau Corp........ 922 Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v. United States.............. 820 Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc.... 885,1048 Standard Oil Co. of California; Perkins v.................... 871 Standidge; Hughes v.......................................... 887 Stanley; School District of Darlington County v............. 1065 Stanley v. United States..................................... 959 Starr v. Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc.......................... 823 Star Television, Inc. v. Federal Com. Comm’n................. 888 Stasilowicz v. New Jersey.................................... 975 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Arizona; Baird v........................... 807, 998 State Bar of California; Johnson v....................... 22,1030 State Bar of Georgia; Wilson v............................... 957 State Bd. of Education of Tennessee; Jones v................. 817 State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 1040 State Bd. of Examiners of Kansas; Stice v.................... 886 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Labor Board.. 832,958 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.; Stebbins v.......... 895 State Liquor Authority; House of Seagram v................... 121 State’s Attorney for Florida; Fitzgerald v................... 951 States Marine Lines, Inc.; Moragne v................ 900,952,1034 Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co........... 895 LXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Labor Board............... 834 Stedtnitz v. United States..................................... 893 Steigler v. Superior Court of Delaware....................... 880 Stein; Batchelor v............................................. 954 Stein v. Illinois............................................... 25 Stein v. Luken................................................. 555 Steinlauf v. California........................................ 920 Stephens v. Field............................................. 1023 Stephens v. Virginia.......................................... 1017 Sterling v. Pate............................................... 911 Stem Finance Co.; Bauer v............................... 1008 Sterngass v. Fitzpatrick....................................... 939 Stevens v. Nelson............................................. 1020 Stevenson v. Mancusi........................................... 995 Stevenson v. Rockefeller....................................... 971 Stewart v. California.......................................... 856 Stewart v. United States................................... 925,943 Stewart; United States v...................................... 1066 Stice v. State Board of Examiners of Kansas.................... 886 Stoeckle v. Wisconsin........................................... 10 Stolar, In re.............................................. 816,999 Stone v. Oklahoma.............................................. 893 Stonehill v. United States..................................... 870 Stuart v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Assn........... 923 Stucker; Johnson v............................................. 904 Sturm v. California Adult Authority............................ 870 Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. United States...................... 836 Suffolk County District Attorney v. Karalexis.................. 976 Sullivan, In re................................................ 810 Sullivan v. Board of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar.......... 826 Sullivan v. California......................................... 973 Sullivan v. Commissioner....................................... 827 Sullivan v. Eyman............................................. 1043 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc............... 229,806 Sulton v. Schoen............................................... 941 Sun v. United States........................................... 864 Sunray DX Oil Co.; Cole v...................................... 907 Superintendent of Banks of Georgia; First Nat. Bank v........ 1063 Superintendent of Penal or Correctional Institution. See name of superintendent. Superior Court of Arizona; Newlin v........................ 1025 Superior Court of California; A. R. Industries v............. 820 Superior Court of California; Conti v........................ 881 Superior Court of California; Haskin v....................... 818 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXIX Page Superior Court of California; Lifschutz v.................. 848 Superior Court of California; Ortega v.................... 1023 Superior Court of Delaware; Steigler v..................... 880 Supreme Court of Alaska Chief Justice; Mackay v........... 960 Supreme Court of Texas; Gillingham v..................... 897 Surita v. LaVallee........................................... 964 Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. 831 Swain v. Barfield............................................ 913 Swain v. Board of Adjustment of University Park.............. 277 Swain v. North Carolina...................................... 993 Swan v. Young................................................ 971 Swann v. United States....................................... 968 Swenson; Brown v............................................. 921 Swift v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks............. 1028 Swift v. New York..................................... 1018 Swindler v. United States............................. 1009 Sylvania Electric Products v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 1061 Sylvia v. California................................... 894 Szijarto v. Oberhauser................................. 898 Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co........................... 822 Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc........................ 813,983,997 Tahash; Gowdy v........................................ 993 Taite v. Busbee........................................ 879 Talcott, Inc. v. Ivor B. Clark Co........................... 1006 Tannehill v. Roberts......................................... 822 Tant v. United States........................................ 876 Tanzer; Defiance Industries, Inc. v.......................... 877 Tanzler; Luman v............................................. 929 Tate v. Hickel........................................... 815,998 Tauferner v. United States................................... 824 Taussig, Inc.; Foy v......................................... 957 Tax Comm’r of West Virginia; United Fuel Gas Co. v......... 116 Tax Commission of New York City; Walz v.................. 874,925 Taylor v. Cady............................................ 1026 Taylor v. California....................................... 890 Taylor v. Dealers Transport Co............................ 1008 Taylor; TV Pix, Inc. v................................... 556,808 Taylor v. United States.................................. 1010 Taylor; Washington Terminal Co. v............................ 835 Teamsters v. Labor Board.................................... 1038 Teasley v. United States..................................... 880 Technograph, Inc. v. Becker.................................. 951 Tellis v. Hocker............................................ 1020 Tennessee; Arkansas v........................................ 873 LXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Oughton v. United States................................. 1096 Overmyer Leasing Co.; LewRon Television v................ 1083 Overmyer Warehouse Co. v. Florida Steel Corp............. 1080 Overton v. New York.................................... 85,992 Owen v. Arkansas.......................................... 816 Owens v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co..................... 855 Owens v. Field......................................... 1041 Owens v. Russell....................................... 1003 Owens v. Traynor........................................ 962 Owens v. United States............................. 934,1038 Pacheco v. Carberry....................................... 882 Pacific Far East Line v. Pacific Seafarers............... 1093 Pacific Seafarers; Pacific Far East Line v............... 1093 Padgett v. Wainwright................................. 865,947 Pagano v. Martin......................................... 1022 Page; Nichols v........................................... 916 Page; Rapp v............................................. 1105 Page; Smith v............................................ 1047 Palmer v. Florida........................................ 1070 Palmieri v. Florida.................................. 218,1045 Palmisano v. Baltimore County Welfare Board............... 853 Pan American World Airways v. Allied Air Freight.......... 846 Pan American World Airways; American Soc. Travel Agts. v. 957 Pan American World Airways; Civil Aeronautics Board v... 956 Pan American World Airways; World Airways v............... 957 Paramount Pictures; Delta Theatres v..................... 1050 Park v. Georgia........................................... 980 Park v. Nelson............................................ 974 Parker v. California...................................... 938 Parker v. Maryland........................................ 903 Parker; O’Callahan v.............................. 822,931,996 Parker; Pelletier v....................................... 816 Parker; Rucker v.......................................... 919 Parker; Thompson v.................................. 1059,1124 Parker v. United States.................................. 1097 Parks v. Simpson Timber Co................................ 858 Parks; Simpson Timber Co. v............................... 858 Parman v. United States................................... 858 Paroutian v. United States............................... 1058 Parrish v. United States.................................. 823 Parzow v. United States................................... 823 Pasta v. United States................................... 1097 Patat v. Day Companies, Inc.............................. 1117 Pate; Bickman v.......................................... 1042 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXI Page Tomaiolo v. United States................................... 918 Tooni v. Zuckert............................................ 870 Toro v. Julio E. Geraldine, Inc............................ 1010 Toussie v. United States.................................... 875 Township. See name of township. Trade Commission. See Federal Trade Comm’n. Trammell v. Alabama...................................... 813, 875 Transamerican Freight Lines v. New York..................... 939 Transit Union v. Dallas Public Transit Board................ 838 Transportation Union; Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v........ 142 Transportation Unlimited of California v. .United States.... 22 Travelers Insurance Co.; Canova v........................... 832 Travelers Insurance Co.; Richard v.......................... 824 Traynor v. Johnson.......................................... 212 Tri-State Generation & Trans. Assn.; Public Serv. Comm’n v. 998 Tri-Valley Growers v. Federal Trade Comm’n.................. 929 Tri-Valley Packing Assn. v. Federal Trade Comm’n......... 929 Tri-Wall Containers, Inc. v. United States.................. 828 Tucker v. Beto.............................................. 947 Tudela v. Florida........................................... 969 Tudor v. California......................................... 935 Turner; Clark v............................................. 881 Turner v. Fouche............................................ 346 Turner; Gibbs v............................................ 1045 Turner v. Mississippi....................................... 834 Turner v. United States..................................... 398 Turpyn v. New York.......................................... 972 Turtle; Arizona ex rel. Merrill v.......................... 1003 TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor.................................. 556,808 Twist v. Redeker............................................ 853 Tyne v. Commissioner........................................ 833 Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson................................... 985 Tyrone, Inc.; Wilkinson v................................... 985 Underwood; Lizarraga v...................................... 944 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Bank & Savings Co.; France v.......................... 827 Union Carbide Corp.; Goett v................................ 828 Union Oil Co. of California; Simpson v....................... 13 Union Pacific R. Co.; Kunzman v............................ 1039 Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States.................... 27,1030 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Aircraft Corp.; Holochuck v.......................... 838 United Air Lines v. Thomas.................................. 991 United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. McCrory............... 1039 LXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Development Corp, of America.. 957 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Haden................................... 116 United Press International; Daily Press, Inc. v.............. 990 United States; Acker v........................................ 1003 United States; Acuff v......................................... 830 United States; Adams v......................................... 913 United States; Agoranos v...................................... 824 United States; Allison v.................................... 968 United States; Almond v.................................... 932 United States; Amass v......................................... 932 United States; Ambers v................................... 1039 United States; Andrews v................................... 1029 United States; Anthony v.................................... 1019 United States; Araya-Murchio v............................ 1048 United States; Arellanes v................................... 975 United States; Arizona Corporation Comm’n v............. 27,1030 United States v. Armour & Co................................... 811 United States; Armstrong v................................... 870 United States; Arnold v..................................... 1021 United States; Aros-Gonzales v............................... 898 United States; Associated General Contractors v......... 115,1063 United States; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.............. 275 United States; Auburn v...................................... 491 United States; Austin v...................................... 973 United States; Avila v..................................... 1033 United States; Baird v..................................... 1005 United States; Baker v..................................... 1018 United States; Bandy v...................................... 890 United States; Barash v...................................... 832 United States; Bard v........................................ 855 United States; Basan v...................................... 1012 United States; Bass v.................................... 863,950 United States; Battaglia v................................... 848 United States; Bay Sound Transportation Co. v........... 928,1031 United States; Bedford v..................................... 972 United States; Berkman v.................................... 1014 United States; Beyer v...................................... 1235 United States; Black v...................................... 1018 United States; Bloombaum v..................................... 863 United States; Boggus v...................................... 919 United States; Booker v.................................. 862,938 United States; Boroski v.................................... 1013 United States; Boston & Maine R. Co. v.......................... 27 United States; Bourassa v...................................... 915 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXIII Page United States; Boyden v....................................... 881 United States; Brady v........................................ 809 United States; Broadhead v................................... 1017 United States; Brook v....................................... 1060 United States; Brown v............................... 932,965,1017 United States; Brundage v..................................... 491 United States; Brussel v..................................... 1229 United States; Bryson v........................................ 64 United States; Buie v.......................................... 87 United States; Bully v........................................ 866 United States; Bunter v....................................... 804 United States; Butler v....................................... 853 United States; Camacho v...................................... 944 United States; Camp v......................................... 968 United States; Campbell v.................................... 1045 United States; Cantrell v................................ 947,1031 United States; Carr v........................................ 1030 United States; Carrigan v.................................... 1028 United States; Carril v....................................... 832 United States; Carson v....................................... 865 United States; Carter v....................................... 801 United States; Caruso v....................................... 868 United States; Cass v......................................... 876 United States; Castle v.................................. 975,1063 United States; Caverly v...................................... 866 United States; Cerrito v..................................... 1004 United States; Chaney v....................................... 867 United States; Chapman v...................................... 903 United States; Chase v........................................ 920 United States; Chase Manhattan Bank v........................ 1056 United States; Chavez v....................................... 867 United States; Chavez-Martinez v.............................. 858 United States; Chicago v..................................... 162 United States; Chontos v..................................... 896 United States; Cho Po Sun v................................. 864 United States; Clark v........................................ 919 United States; Cline v....................................... 1025 United States; Collette v..................................... 917 United States; Collins v............................. 862,984,1025 United States; Colonnade Catering Corp, v..................... 814 United States; Conley v..................................... 853 United States; Conversano v................................... 905 United States; Cook v......................................... 969 United States; Corallo v...................................... 958 LXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Cornman v.................................... 960 United States; Cotton v.................................... 1016 United States; Covello v................................ 879,984 United States; Craig v....................................... 987 United States; Crawford v................................... 923 United States; Culotta v................................... 1019 United States; Curiale v.................................... 959 United States; Czap v..................................... 865 United States; Daugherty v........................... 947,1031 United States v. Davis...................................... 815 United States; Davis v.................................. 891,956 United States; DeAngelis v.................................. 857 United States; Dearinger v.................................. 1030 United States; Decker v..................................... 969 United States; DeJoris v.................................... 830 United States; Delgado v.................................... 872 United States; DeNarvaez v................................. 822 United States; De Palma v................................ 1046 United States; Dept, of Docks of Alabama v.................. 962 United States; Di Silvestro v................................. 964 United States; Dobbins v................................ 829,937 United States; Dominguez v................................. 867 United States v. Donnelly Estate............................ 814 United States; Dukes v...................................... 897 United States; Duran v....................................... 917 United States; Durham v..................................... 839 United States; Duval v...................................... 897 United States; Dvorsky v............................... 970,1031 United States; Dyman v..................................... 1048 United States; Eaton v............................. 891,913,1020 United States; Edelman v................................... 1053 United States; Edmondson v.................................. 966 United States; Edwards v..................................... 894 United States v. Eisdorfer.............................. 884,1066 United States; Eisenhardt v.................................. 953 United States; Elkanich v............................. 1057,1065 United States; Elksnis v.................................918,932 United States; Erhart v..................................... 860 United States; Evans v..................................... 1044 United States; Ewing v....................................... 858 United States; Fahey v................................. 957,1063 United States; Feaster v..................................... 962 United States; Febre v..................................... 1225 United States; Fellabaum v.................................. 858 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXV Page United States; Ferrara v....................................... 993 United States; Ferrell v....................................... 934 United States; Fidanzi v....................................... 929 United States; Fields v........................................ 965 United States; Fleischman v.................................... 922 United States; Flynn v......................................... 851 United States; Fong v.......................................... 968 United States; Foster v........................................ 862 United States; Founding Church of Scientology v................ 963 United States; Franco v........................................ 836 United States; Frank v......................................... 869 United States; Freeman v....................................... 933 United States; Freije v........................................ 859 United States; Fried v......................................... 958 United States; Fuller v........................................ 896 United States; Gadson v....................................... 890 United States; Gantt v......................................... 992 United States; Gay v........................................... 823 United States; Gerardi v....................................... 857 United States v. Gifford-Hill-American, Inc.................... 984 United States; Gollaher v..................................... 960 United States; Gonzalez v....................................... 1033 United States; Gordon v.......................................... 938 United States; Gowdy v.............................. 960,1063 United States v. Grace Estate.................................... 881 United States; Graham v................................... 994 United States; Grayson v.................................. 1059 United States; Gregory v................................... 865 United States; Gulf Oil Corp, v............................... 845 United States; Gutknecht v............................... 295,882 United States; Habig v........................................ 1014 United States; Haden v........................................ 1027 United States; Hale v......................................... 902 United States; Hall v.......................................... 970 United States, Hallock v....................................... 931 United States; Hammond Milling Co. v.......................... 1002 United States; Hardison v.................................... 914 United States; Hargrave v.......................... 1059 United States; Harrison v.................................... 974,1031 United States; Hart v.......................................... 825 United States; Hayes v......................................... 835 United States; Haynes v....................................... 1024 United States; Haywood v..................................... 852,949 United States; Heilman v..................................... 860 LXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Herndon v.......................................... 896 United States; Hilbrich v......................................... 936 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp............................... 954 United States; Hinds County School Board v....................... 1032 United States; Hoffman v........................................ 958 United States; Holley v........................................ 919 United States; House v......................................... 870 United States; Howard v........................................ 869 United States; Huff v......................................... 857,967 United States; Hughes v......................................... 867 United States; Hutul v........................................ 1012 United States v. Ideal Basic Industries....................... 804,975 United States; Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist. v.. 1011 United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n....................... 491 United States; Jackson v................................ 862,891 United States; Jamison v.................................... 870 United States; Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v..... 828 United States; Jelinski v.................................... 943 United States; Jenkins v.................................... 953 United States; Jernigan v..................................... 927 United States; Jessup v....................................... 852 United States; Johnson v......................... 822,915,993,1019 United States; Jones v........................................ 948 United States v. Jorn........................................ 810, 899 United States; Kalish v................................... 835,937 United States; Kandall v...................................... 837 United States; Kelley v...................................... 1019 United States; Kemplen v...................................... 914 United States v. Key............................................ 874 United States; King v........................................... 974 United States; Kirk v........................................ 839,969 United States; Klingler v.................................... 859 United States; Knaack v..................................... 831 United States; Knight v..................................... 903 United States v. Knox.......................................... 77 United States; Lacob v....................................... 1059 United States; Lacy v......................................... 839 United States; Lainhart v....................................... 890 United States; Landman v................................... 994 United States; Laughlin v.................................. 1021 United States; Lawler v...................................... 1046 United States; Lazaroff v..................................... 891 United States; Lee v.................................... 916,1022 United States; Leser v.................................... 983,999 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXVII Page United States; Levinson v..................................... 869 United States; Leysith v.................................... 922 United States; Licata v..................................... 883 United States; Licausi v................................... 1006 United States; Liley v...................................... 896 United States; Lodwick v.................................. 841 United States; Lombardi v.................................. 1012 United States; Long v........................................ 924 United States; Los Angeles-Yuma Freight Lines v............... 18 United States; Lyon v....................................... 1023 United States; Mackey v..................................... 954 United States; Malagon-Ramirez v............................. 801 United States; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v.......... 1056 United States; Margoles v.................................... 833 United States; Marine v.................................... 1001 United States; Martin v................................. 824,920 United States; Marvel v.................................... 1020 United States; Mastrippolito v......................... 952,1059 United States; Matz v....................................... 896 United States; Maynard v.................................... 834 United States; McBride v.................................... 938 United States; McCabe v.................................... 1058 United States, McCarty v................................. 836 United States; McDaniel v.................................... 964 United States; McGucken v................................... 894 United States; McLean v.................................... 1028 United States; McRoberts v.................................. 1014 United States; Mesch v...................................... 826 United States; Meyers v................................. 835,949 United States; Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v............... 275 United States; Migliore v.................................... 975 United States; Milani v..................................... 917 United States ; Miller v.............................. 830,854, 938 United States; Minor v..................................... 87,809 United States v. Missouri Pacific R. Co...................... 1037 United States; Mitchell v............................. 930,1024 United States; Montgomery v.................................. 859 United States; Morefield v.................................. 916 United States; Morris v.................................... 1017 United States v. M. O. Seckinger Co........................... 815 United States; Moss v........................................ 993 United States; Motto v....................................... 963 United States; Mulloy v.................................... 1036 United States; Murphy v.................................. 896 LXXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Nagelberg v................................... 1010 United States; Nash v................................... 940,1000 United States; Neal v........................................ 1022 United States; Neely v................................... 917,1031 United States; Nelson v...................................... 1060 United States; Newman v....................................... 868 United States; New Orleans Chap., Assoc. Gen. Contrs. v.. 115,1063 United States; New York v....................................... 281 United States v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Com.. 1056 United States; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. Bondholders Com. v. 1056 United States; New York State Broadcasters Assn, v............ 1061 United States; Noga v........................................... 841 United States; Nolan v.......................................... 873 United States; Norman v............................. 809,1018 United States; Northeastern Consolidated Co. v.................. 819 United States; Nunley v...................................... 1028 United States; Oden v......................................... 863 United States; O’Neal v...................................... 827 United States; Onesti v...................................... 904 United States; Osborn v..................................... 1015 United States; Oughton v................................... 890 United States; Panaccione v................................... 837 United States; Pearce v....................................... 934 United States; Pence v........................................ 992 United States; Peterson v................................. 870,920 United States; Piacentile v................................... 859 United States; Pierce v....................................... 960 United States; Pittman v...................................... 914 United States; Pizzarello v................................... 986 United States; Pollard v...................................... 972 United States; Porter v....................................... 879 United States; Powell v....................................... 887 United States; Powers v....................................... 923 United States; Pritchard v.................................... 995 United States; Providence & Worcester Co. v................... 555 United States; Providence & Worcester R. Co. v................ 882 United States; Pursley v...................................... 855 United States; Pyne v......................................... 818 United States; Ramer v........................................ 965 United States; Rech v......................................... 970 United States; Regan v........................................ 834 United States v. Reynolds....................................... 814 United States; Rizzo v........................................ 911 United States; Robins v....................................... 947 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXIX Page United States; Robinson v.................................. 872 United States; Rose v....................................... 971 United States; Rosenheck v.................................. 911 United States; Rubin v..................................... 1011 United States; Ryder v...................................... 865 United States; Sachs v...................................... 906 United States; Sacks v...................................... 1007 United States; Saia v....................................... 859 United States; Sailors Haven Fire Island, Inc. v............ 906 United States; Sanford v.................................... 920 United States; Sappington v................................ 876 United States; Sarno v...................................... 859 United States; Schacht v.................................... 984 United States; Schmitt v.................................... 959 United States; Scott v..................................... 1006 United States v. Seckinger ................................... 815 United States; Sellers v........................................ 9 United States; Seward v...................................... 1027 United States; Seymour-Heath v.............................. 877 United States; Sheer v...................................... 946 United States; Sheiner v.................................... 825 United States; Sheridan v............................... 281,925 United States; Shipp v...................................... 864 United States; Shoemaker v................................ 837 United States; Shorter v.................................... 970 United States; Sierras v.................................... 899 United States; Simmons v..................................... 871 United States; Simon v...................................... 829 United States; Sisk v...................................... 1018 United States v. Sisson................................ 812,1035 United States; Skinner v.................................... 967 United States; Smith v............ 802,869,924,932,936,1008,1027 United States; Smogor v..................................... 972 United States; Snyder v..................................... 907 United States; Southern California Edison Co. v............. 957 United States; Spahr v...................................... 840 United States; Spencer v.................................... 876 United States; Spillman v................................... 930 United States; Stallings v.................................. 972 United States; Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v............. 820 United States; Stanley v.................................... 959 United States; Stedtnitz v.................................... 893 United States v. Stewart..................................... 1066 United States; Stewart v.................................. 925, 943 LXXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Stonehill v..................................... 870 United States; Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v...................... 836 United States; Swann v................................... 968 United States; Swindler v............................... 1009 United States; Tant v.................................... 876 United States; Tauferner v............................... 824 United States; Taylor v................................. 1010 United States; Teasley v................................. 880 United States; Theriault v............................. 870,933 United States; Thompson v............................... 1047 United States; Tijerina v.............................. 843,990 United States; Tinker v.................................. 864 United States; Tisnado v................................. 921 United States; Tomaiolo v................................ 918 United States; Toussie v................................. 875 United States; Transportation Unlimited of California v.... 22 United States; Tri-Wall Containers, Inc. v............... 828 United States; Turner v.................................. 398 United States; Union Pacific R. Co. v.................. 27,1030 United States v. Van Leeuwen............................... 885,952 United States; Venning v..................................... 965 United States; Villahermosa v................................ 918 United States; Vitamin Products Co. of Maryland v.......... 913 United States; Vivero v..................................... 1017 United States; Wainwright v................................. 1009 United States; Walden v.................................. 931 United States; Waldo v....................................... 915 United States; Walker v...................................... 971 United States; Walsh v....................................... 821 United States; Wartson v..................................... 892 United States; Washum v................................... 18 United States; Watkins v.............................. 921,946 United States; Wechsler v.................................. 870 United States; Weersing v.................................. 987 United States; Welsh v....................................... 816 United States; Wenner v..................................... 1047 United States; Weston v..................................... 1062 United States; Whiddon v.................................... 12 United States v. White...................................... 1035 United States; White v.................................. 957,1023 United States; Wick v........................................ 961 United States; Wien Alaska Airlines v........................ 924 United States; Williams v............. 870,894,966,973,1017,1047 United States; Willis v...................................... 864 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXI Page United States; Wilson v........................................ 869 United States; Windes v......................................... 933 United States; Winn v.......................................... 919 United States; Winters v....................................... 920 United States; Witt v........................................... 932 United States; Wolcott v....................................... 879 United States; Wolff v.......................................... 858 United States; Wood v.......................................... 924 United States; Wright v........................................ 919 United States; Wynn v.......................................... 1008 United States; Young v.......................................... 934 United States; Zubkoff v..................................... 1038 U. S. Circuit Judge; Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co. v............... 1035 U. S. Circuit Judge; Snyder v................................... 953 U. S. Civil Service Comm’n; Fishkin v........................... 278 U. S. Civil Service Comm’n Chairman; Murray v............ 937 U. S. Commissioner of Detroit; Murphy v......................... 896 U. S. Court of Appeals; New Mexico State Game Comm’n v.. 953 U. S. Court of Appeals Judges; Gross v.......................... 925 U. S. Disciplinary Barracks Commandant; Swift v........... 1028 U. S. District Court; Carroll v................................ 1011 U. S. District Court; Gibbons v................................ 1041 U. S. District Court; Mink v.................................... 892 U. S. District Court; Nolan v................................... 912 U. S. District Court; Walsh v..................................... 899 U. S. District Court Chief Judge; Wilson v........................ 922 U. S. District Court Clerk; Murphy v.............................. 896 U. S. District Court of Puerto Rico; Benthiem v.............. 945 U. S. District Judge; Ballard v................................... 946 U. S. District Judge; Boyden v.................................... 916 U. S. District Judge; Farrell v................................... 810 U. S. District Judge; Hall v...................................... 953 U. S. District Judge v. Judicial Council, 10th Circuit..... 809 U. S. District Judge; Manchester Band of Porno Indians v.. 986 U. S. District Judge; Mink v..................................... 1026 U. S. District Judge; Poggi v..................................... 999 U. S. District Judge; Powell v................................... 1055 U. S. District Judge; Technograph, Inc. v......................... 951 U. S. District Judges; Wendt v.............................. 899,1031 U. S. ex rel. See name of real party in interest. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.; Morgan v........................... 842 U. S. for the Use and Benefit of. See name of real party in interest. U. S. Medical Center Director; Cagle v........................... 1027 LXXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Parole Board; Bandy v................................. 934 U. S. Post Office Dept.; American Book Service v....... 885,1035 U. S. Post Office Dept.; Rowan v....................... 885,1035 U. S. Treasury Dept.; Richardson v.......................... 949 University of California Board of Regents; Kirk v........... 554 University Park Board of Adjustment; Swain v................ 211 Utah Construction & Mining Co.; Knauff v.................... 831 Utah Governor; Petuskey v................................... 983 Vale v. Louisiana....................................... 813,883 Valentine v. Ohio........................................... 918 Valleydale Packers of Bristol v. Labor Board................ 825 Van Curen; Stacy v..................................... 1045 Van Houten v. Ralls..................................... 962 Van Leeuwen; United States v............................ 885,952 Vann v. Mancusi........................................ 1043 Vasquez v. Jones........................................ 946 Vaughn v. California................................... 1016 Velvel v. Nixon........................................ 1042 Venning v. United States................................ 965 Vermont; Wheeler v..................................... 4,949 Vermont Educational Bldgs. Financing Agency; Mann v.... 801 Vernell v. Florida ex rel. Gerstein..................... 849 Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Attorney General... 844 Victory Container Corp.; Schwartz v.................... 1044 Villahermosa v. United States........................... 918 Vinson v. Arizona....................................... 984 Virginia; Bindulski v................................... 858 Virginia; Hirschkop v................................... 845 Virginia; Johnson v..................................... 801,969 Virginia; Kenyatta v.................................... 992 Virginia; Landman v..................................... 855 Virginia; Parker v.................................... 887,976 Virginia; Stephens v................................... 1017 Virginia; Watford v..................................... 801 Virgin Islands; Berne v................................. 837,937 Virgin Islands; Lovell v................................ 964 Vitale v. Missouri...................................... 851 Vitamin Products Co. of Maryland v. United States......... 913 Vivero v. United States................................ 1017 Wade v. Wilson.......................................... 282 Wade v. Yeager.......................................... 974 Wadmond; Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v.. 999 Wainwright v. Barton................................... 1014 Wainwright; Brown v..................................... 943 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Wainwright v. Cappetta.................................. 846 Wainwright; Conklin v................................... 867 Wainwright; Flemming v................................. 1027 Wainwright; Hayes v..................................... 926 Wainwright; Maisonave v................................. 999 Wainwright; Mullis v.................................... 953 Wainwright; Patterson v............................. 857,938 Wainwright v. United States............................ 1009 Wainwright; Walker v.................................... 894 Wainwright; Washington v............................... 1046 Walden v. United States................................. 931 Waldo v. United States.................................. 915 Walker v. County School Board of Brunswick County..... 1061 Walker v. Craven...................................... 851 Walker v. United States............................... 971 Walker v. Wainwright.................................. 894 Walker v. Willie...................................... 973 Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co. of Missouri........... 1042 Wallace v. Rundle....................................... 894 Wallace v. Wallace...................................... 939 Walsh v. United States.................................. 821 Walsh v. U. S. District Court........................... 899 Walters v. Cox......................................... 1025 Waltz v. Davis.......................................... 984 Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City............... 874, 925 Wanamaker v. Pennsylvania............................... 948 Wane v. California..................................... 1015 Ward v. California...................................... 935 Ward v. Differding..................................... 1040 Ward v. Pennsylvania N. Y. Central Transportation Co.. 849,1031 Ward & Co.; State Board of Equalization of California v.... 1040 Warden. See also name of warden. Warden; Bullock v.................................... 1043 Warden; Jackson v..................................... 862 Warden; Luse v........................................ 860 Warden; Pisani v...................................... 880 Ware v. Minnesota..................................... 875 Ware v. Preston......................................... 1030 Ware v. Royal Indemnity Corp........................... 1058 Warnock v. Warnock.................................... 897 Warriner v. Fernandez................................. 1021 Wartson v. United States................................. 892 Washington; Blanchey v................................. 1045 Washington; Collins v.................................... 829 LXXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Washington; Gibson v.................................... 1019 "Washington v. Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Co.... 839, 949 Washington; McEvers v.................................... 944 Washington v. Michigan................................... 861 Washington; Thomas v..................................... 918 Washington v. Wainwright................................ 1046 Washington Terminal Co. v. Taylor........................ 835 Washum v. United States................................... 18 Wasserman; Johnson v..................................... 554 Waterford Park, Inc.; Wilkerson v....................... 906 Watford v. Virginia................................... 801 Watkins v. Bounds..................................... 899 Watkins v. Pennsylvania............................... 973 Watkins v. United States............................. 921, 946 Watkins v. Wingo..................................... 1035 Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co........................... 821 Watson; Blincoe v........................................ 373 Watson v. Florida........................................ 860 Wax v. Pate.............................................. 830 Webb v. Beto............................................ 1019 Webb v. Texas............................................ 968 Weber v. Aoki............................................ 959 Webster v. Cox........................................... 892 Wechsler v. United States................................ 870 Weersing v. United States................................ 987 Weinacker’s, Inc.; Taggart v..................... 813,983,997 Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District........... 1004 Weinshenker v. Florida................................... 973 Welch v. Florida......................................... 892 Welch Scientific Co.; Human Engineering Institute v.... 1003 Welder’s Supply Co. of Lake Charles v. Grigsby.......... 1033 Welfare Commissioner of Connecticut v. Doe............... 488 Welling v. Welling....................................... 929 Wells; Ambrose v......................................... 112 Wells v. Craven.......................................... 861 Welsh v. United States................................... 816 Weltner; Lowe v.......................................... 820 Wendt v. Dillin..................................... 899,1031 Wenner v. United States................................. 1047 Wenstley v. McMann....................................... 916 Wessling v. Bennett...................................... 945 West v. Lloyd............................................ 899 Western Electric Co.; Components, Inc. v................. 876 West Feliciana Par. Sch. Bd. v. Carter............. 1032,1053 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXV Page West Feliciana Par. Sch. Bd.; Carter v. 226,290, 996,1032,1048,1053 West Haven Housing Authority; Simmons v.................... 808 Weston v. United States................................... 1062 West Virginia; Endicott v................................. 964 West Virginia Tax Comm’r; United Fuel Gas Co. v........... 116 Wharton v. Crouse......................................... 1022 Wharton; Duffy v.......................................... 848 Wheeler v. Vermont........................................ 4,949 Wheeler-Van Label Co. v. Labor Board...................... 834 Whiddon v. United States.................................. 12 Whirl; Kern v.............................................. 901 Whitcomb v. Chavis.................................... 1055,1064 White v. California....................................... 912 White v. Mississippi....................................... 913 White v. South Carolina.................................... 987 White v. United States................................ 957,1023 White; United States v.................................... 1035 White Consolidated Industries v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.... 1009 Whitley v. New York......................................... 10 Whittenberg; School District of Greenville County v....... 1065 Wick v. United States...................................... 961 Wickham; Glen & Mohawk Milk Assn, v....................... 1004 Wien Alaska Airlines v. United States...................... 924 Wilfong v. Missouri........................................ 995 Wilkerson v. Waterford Park, Inc........................... 906 Wilkinson v. Lee Art Theatre............................... 985 Wilkinson; Lee Art Theatre v............................... 985 Wilkinson v. Tyrone, Inc................................... 985 Wilkinson; Tyrone, Inc. v.................................. 985 Williams v. Cox............................................ 993 Williams; Dandridge v.................................. 811,874 Williams v. Florida........................................ 955 Williams; Hatchett v....................................... 963 Williams v. Illinois..................................... 1036 Williams v. Kimbrough.................................... 1061 Williams v. Nevada........................................ 916 Williams v. Schneckloth................................... 880 Williams v. United States........... 870,894,966,973,1017,1047 Williams v. Wisconsin Barge Line......................... 1060 Williams; Wisconsin Barge Line v.......................... 1060 Williams-McWilliams, Inc. v. Massey....................... 1037 Willie; Walker v........................................... 973 Willingham; Wion v......................................... 926 Willis v. United States.................................... 864 LXXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas; Riffe v......................... 843 Wilson; Brooks v........................................... 850 Wilson; Gooding v........................................ 112 Wilson v. MacBride......................................... 922 Wilson v. Port Lavaca...................................... 830 Wilson v. State Bar of Georgia............................. 957 Wilson v. United States.................................... 869 Wilson; Wade v............................................. 282 Wilson; Yant v............................................. 911 Windes v. United States.................................... 933 Winegar v. Michigan........................................ 946 Wing v. Yeager............................................. 966 Wingo; Hall v.............................................. 999 Wingo; Watkins v........................................ 1035 Winn v. United States...................................... 919 Winship, In re............................................. 885 Winter Garden; Butler v................................. 1042 Winters v. United States................................... 920 Wion v. Willingham....................................... 926 Wisconsin; Dozie v....................................... 994 Wisconsin; Stoeckle v..................................... 10 Wisconsin; Zwicker v...................................... 26 Wisconsin Barge Line v. Williams........................ 1060 Wisconsin Barge Line; Williams v........................ 1060 Wisconsin Secretary of Health and Social Serv.; Rogers v.. 1025 Wisdom; Snyder v......................................... 953 Withridge v. New York...................................... 993 Witt v. United States.................................... 932 Wolcott v. United States................................. 879 Wolenski v. Shovlin...................................... 926 Wolff v. Foley...................................... 945,1031 Wolff v. United States................................... 858 Wolozin; Hendler v....................................... 929 Wood v. United States.................................... 924 Woodie; Security Sewage Equipment Co. v.................. 907 Woodward v. Commissioner................................. 875 Woodward v. Lawson....................................... 889 Wright v. Brewer......................................... 973 Wright v. Dade County................................... 1008 Wright v. North Carolina................................. 934 Wright v. United States.................................. 919 Wyatt; Farrell v......................................... 810 Wyatt v. Hocker......................................... 1012 Wyman; Boone v.......................................... 1024 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Wyman; Rosado v............................... 815,874,899,1213 Wynn v. United States..................................... 1008 Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Tri-State Gen. & Trans. Assn. 998 Yam Sang Kwai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.. 877 Yant v. Wilson............................................. 911 Yamel v. Pennsylvania...................................... 911 Yates v. Kansas............................................ 996 Yeager; Cullen v......................................... 1055 Yeager; Fioravanti v...................................... 860 Yeager; Garner v......................................... 926 Yeager; Wade v........................................... 974 Yeager; Wing v............................................ 966 Yough v. New Jersey........................................ 855 Young; American Casualty Co. of Reading v.................. 997 Young v. Coiner............................................ 895 Young v. Florida........................................... 853 Young v. Indiana.......................................... 1038 Young; Lupino v............................................ 872 Young v. McGee............................................ 1047 Young; Swan v.............................................. 971 Young v. United States..................................... 934 Zahn; Markham Advertising Co. v........................... 1005 Zappia v. Arizona.......................................... 861 Zicarelli v. New Jersey................................... 1054 Zirinsky v. Sheehan....................................... 1059 Zirpoli; Manchester Band of Porno Indians, Inc. v.......... 986 Zuber v. Allen......................................... 168,805 Zubkoff v. United States.................................. 1038 Zuckert; Tooni v........................................... 870 Zwicker v. Wisconsin........................................ 26 TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 164 Abrams v. Textile Realty, 197 Mise. 25 395 Adams v. Bass, 18 Ga. 130 442 Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607 183,196 Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 335,339 Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S. 229 1216 Alabama v. United States, 371 U. S. 37 336 Alabama v. United States, 304 F. 2d 583 340 Aiderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 9 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Ed., 396 U. S. 19 227, 228, 270, 271, 291, 293 294 Allen v. Chase Nat. Bk., 178 Mise. 536, 180 Mise. 259 394 Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138 365 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 1211 American Com. Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 66-68,71-75 American Power & Light v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90 193 Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F. 2d 492 316 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399 362 Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 329 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 535 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147 61 Page Attorney General v. Utica Ins., 2 Johns. Ch. 371 545 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U. S. 557 256 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 329,355,356,360,361 Az Din v. United States, 232 F. 2d 283 413 Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827 233, 245,247 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 407 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 49 Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 48 Bakery Workers v. Ratner, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 269 391,396 Bankers Life & Cas. v. Bel-lanca Corp., 288 F. 2d 784 387 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson’s Adm’r, 7 Cranch 299 534 Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318 534 Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 385 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 237,255 Barry v. White, 62 App. D. C. 69 487 Beacon Theatres v. West-over, 359 U. S. 500 537-540, 548,549 Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 238 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226 372 Bergdoll v. Drum, 107 F. 2d 897 316 Berger v. Amana Society, 253 Iowa 378 395 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U. S. 251 16,17 LXXXIX xc TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F. 2d 13 329 Blair v. Freeman, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 207 172,180,197 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 30,35,38 Bokulich v. Jury Comm’n, 298 F. Supp. 181 327 Bokulich v. Jury Comm’n, 394 U. S. 97 328 Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795 233,245 Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692 365,366 Bosch v. Meeker Light & Power, 257 Minn. 362 395 Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S. 160 429 Brannan v. Stark, 342 U. S. 451 172,183-185,207 Bransford, Ex parte, 310 U. S. 354 354 Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F. 2d 401 240 Breen v. Selective Service Bd., 396 U. S. 460 315 Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216 98 Brooks v. Beto, 366 F. 2d 1 331 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 332,333,361 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U. S. 483 454,1219,1220,1222 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 349 U. S. 294 1219 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 372 Browne & Bryan Lumber v. Mass. Bonding & Ins., 303 F. 2d 823 541 Bryson v. United States, 238 F. 2d 657 66,69 Bryson v. United States, 265 F. 2d 9 66 Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 79,80,83,84,86 Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 988-990 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U. S. 715 459 Page Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 329,336,339 Bynum v. Prudential Ins., 7 F. R. D. 585 541 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins., 370 U. S. 114 218, 220, 221, 224 California Water Service v. Redding, 304 U. S. 252 354 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 1205 Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U. S. 23 48 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 53, 55,330, 363,364 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320 355 Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 329 Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413 404, 424 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 329,332,335,339,343 Caudillo v. United States, 253 F. 2d 513 406 Cellino v. United States, 276 F. 2d 941 404 Central R. R. & Banking v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116 392 Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197 475 Charley Toy v. United States, 266 F. 326 404 Chavez v. United States, 343 F. 2d 85 406 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 191 244 Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84 71 Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U. S. 701 362 Citizens for Allegan County v. FPC, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 229 196 City. See name of city. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 248 Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140 420 Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329 353 TABLE OF CASES CITED xci Page Cleveland T. & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316 215 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan, 337 U. S. 541 544 Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 329 Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 22 328,360 Coleman v. Barton, No. 63-4 (N. D. Ala. 1964) 327 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 36 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62 38 Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 156,157 Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92 420 Continental Ore v. Union Carbide, 370 U. S. 690 17 Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20 455 Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, 207 Va. 815 233,245, 246 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 1217 Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 318 166 Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F. 2d 846 404 County. See name of county. Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625 420 Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp. 250 1208 Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 171 Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118 1230 Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U. S. 633 533 Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 1050 Dahnke-Walker Milling v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 79 Page Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 537-539,543, 548, 549 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298 236 Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 538 Davis v. Dept, of Labor & Industries, 317 U. S. 249 220,221 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 105 Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 336,337 Dear Check Quong v. United States, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 8 404 DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U. S. 28 372 DeBardeleben Coal v. Henderson, 142 F. 2d 481 224 Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co., 213 U. S. 435 534, 537 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 215 Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 66,68, 72, 73, 76, 79, 83, 86 Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 79 DePinto v. Provident Se- curity Life Ins., 323 F. 2d 826 532, 537, 546 DeRozario v. Commanding Officer, 390 F. 2d 532 1207 Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 34,35 DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 30,34,35 Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F. 2d 973 541 Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 534 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 534 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 978 Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 978 Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U. S. 125 52 XCII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 30,34,35,38,330 Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 353 Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 385 Eastside Church v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F. 2d 357 387 Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property, 1 App. Div. 2d 353 395 Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189 365 Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 145,148,149 Erwing v. United States, 323 F. 2d 674 406, 418 Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 137 F. 2d 62 544 Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 329,361 Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870 439 Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 436- 440, 444, 452, 455-458 Ex parte. See name of party. Fabiani, Ex parte, 105 F. Supp. 139 1207 Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F. 2d 731 536,537, 540 Farmers Co-op. Oil v. So-cony-Vacuum Oil, 43 F. Supp. 735 541 Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 288 Febre v. United States, 396 U. S. 1225 1236 Federal Glass v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936 475 Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88 408 Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 155,263 Fikes v. State, 263 Ala. 89 323 First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 134 First Nat. Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Tr., 385 U. S. 252 130-134,139 First Universalist Society v. Swett, 148 Me. 142 441 Page Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 354 Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U. S. 714 391,392 Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U. S. 27 535,536, 538, 547 Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 79 Florida E. C. R. Co. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993 508, 513 Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 354, 489 Flynn v. Bd. of Elections, 164 Ohio St. 193 44 Ford v. Thomas, 111 Ga. 493 442 Fox v. Brown, 402 F. 2d 837 1208 Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161 334 Friedman v. United States, 374 F. 2d 363 71, 74 Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70 32 Garcia v. United States, 373 F. 2d 806 404 Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367 285 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 372 Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 361 Gault, In re, 387 U. S. 1 30,33,37,38 Gee Woe v. United States, 250 F. 428 404 General Committee v. M-K-T R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 149 General Mgr., S. R. Co. v. Rangachari, All India Rptr., 1962 Sup. Ct. 36 344 General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F. 2d 159 384 George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U. S. 286 93 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780 336 TABLE OF CASES CITED xeni Page Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32 43 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 332, 336,339,363 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 989 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 979 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463 979 Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 186 Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 385 Goetz v. Manufacturers’ & Traders’ Tr. Co., 154 Mise. 733 537,544 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 48,50 Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F. 2d 422 387 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 453 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U. S. 1 369 Goodson v. Northside Bible Ch., 261 F. Supp. 99 370 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 61, 62 Grant v. Hartman Ranch, 193 Cal. App. 2d 497 395 Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 218 Gray v. Main, 309 F. Supp. 207 331 Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 140 Greater Iowa Corp. v. Mc- Lendon, 378 F. 2d 783 387 Green, In re, 156 F. Supp. 174 1208 Green v. Brown, 276 F. Supp. 753 387 Green v. County School Bd.. 391 U. S. 430 20, 270,292, 293, 1217, 1220, 1221 Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165 315 Greenough v. Coeur D’Alenes Lead, 52 Idaho 599 394 Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F. 2d 342 172,192,206 Page Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 336 Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. Ill 372 Griego v. United States, 298 F. 2d 845 406,417 Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 433 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U. S. 218 20, 453,1216,1219 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 284 Grimes v. Crouch, 175 Va. 126 245 Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 78, 80, 84, 85, 92 Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206 223 Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295 465, 466, 469, 470 Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 979 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 329 Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 47 Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 43 Halliday v. United States, 394 U. S. 831 34 Hamilton Shoe v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251 478 Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 341 U. S. 491 244 Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F. 2d 705 1208 Hanna v. Milburn, 170 Ohio St. 9 44 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528 55 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 50, 52 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 288 Harris v. United States, 359 U. S. 19 405,406,408 Hartman v. Oatman Gold Min. & Milling, 22 Ariz. 476 394 Haswell v. State, 167 Neb. 169 989 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 534 XCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Page Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 92 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 386 Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415 12 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 234,244 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 335,361 Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 220 F. Supp. 735 389 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 329,360 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 48 Hobbs, Ex parte, 280 U. S. 168 354 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 329 Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Co., 55 F. Supp. 945 394 Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 385 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 62 Houser v. O’Leary, 383 F. 2d 730 214 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 339 H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U. S. 588 172 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 330 Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 354 In re. See name of party. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 215 International. For labor union, see name of trade. ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 521 Interstate Investors v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 374 526 Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257 537 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 483-485 Jewell v. Stebbins, 288 F. Supp. 600 329 J. H. Rutter-Rex Co. v. NLRB, 399 F. 2d 356 262 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 256,377- 383, 386, 388, 391, 392 John Hancock Ins. v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185 542 Johnson v. Branch, 364 F. 2d 177 453 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 34 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 1208 Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 360 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 231, 235-238, 241, 248-250 Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 387 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 288 Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 83 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94 370 Kennedy v. State, 171 Neb. 160 989 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 306 Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541 37 Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231 69 King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 5 Knickerbocker Ice v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 216 Koster v. Lumbermens Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 535,538 Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552 362 Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 52-54,362 Labor Board. See NLRB. Labor union. See name of trade. LaFond v. Detroit, 357 Mich. 362 441 Landell v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 122 F. Supp. 253 528 Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 284 TABLE OF CASES CITED xcv Page Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531 381 Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 330,363 Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 385 Layne & Bowler v. Western Well Works, 261 U. S. 387 250 Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 86,90,92,93,96, 364, 403-405, 407, 408, 413, 416, 417, 419, 432 Leedom v. Mine Workers, 352 U. S. 145 71 Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States, 370 U. S. 76 172 Leikind, In re, 22 N. Y. 2d 346 474 Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 80,82,84,86 Liberty Nat. Life Ins. v. Brown, 119 F. Supp. 920 542 Liberty Oil v. Condon Nat. Bk, 260 U. S. 235 541 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 98 Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 544 Lincoln Co. v. Stewart- Warner Corp., 303 U. S. 545 60 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 34 List v. Fashion Park, 340 F. 2d 457 384 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Long v. District Court, 385 U. S. 192 284 Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres, 274 App. Div. 988 395 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145 336,337,340,341,354 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 354 Lucero v. United States, 311 F. 2d 457 404 Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 543 Page Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 444 Lynch v. Hershey, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 177 1207 Madras v. Dorairajan, All India Rptr., 1951 Sup. Ct. 226 344 Maestas v. United States, 372 U. S. 936 404 Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159 292 Maher v. J. R. Williston & Beane, 280 F. Supp. 133 387 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 433 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 78,80, 82-85,92, 93,98 Marin County v. United States, 356 U. S. 412 510 Marine Space Enclosures v. FMC, 420 F. 2d 577 196 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 214 Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 329,339 Martin Foundation v. Phillip-Jones Corp., 283 App. Div. 729 395 Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God, 393 U. S. 528 367 Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 263 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 453 McCollough v. Travelers Ins., 389 U. S. 1050 214 McCord v. Page, 124 F. 2d 68 1208 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 52,362 McIntyre v. United States, 380 F. 2d 746 406 McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 300, 317 McKiever v. Jack, 351 F. 2d 672 1208 McLean Trucking v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 504, 508,511 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 119,979 XCVI TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 386 Metcalf v. Shamel, 166 Cal. App. 2d 789 537, 544 Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161 538 Michigan Mut. Liability v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 224 Michigan Mut. Liability v. Arrien, 344 F. 2d 640 214 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157 243 Miller v. Weiant, 42 F. Supp. 760 544 Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651 48 Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 513 Minnesota v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 164 Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal, 295 U. S. 647 215 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 104 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 33 Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 323,329,340 Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35 409 Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 541 Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97 353 Moore v. Fidelity & De- posit Co., 272 U. S. 317 478 Moore v. Henslee, 276 F. 2d 876 339 Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 49-51 Morgenstern Chemical v. Schering Corp., 181 F. 2d 160 475 Morley Constr. v. Maryland Cas., 300 U. S. 185 381 Morton v. Morton Realty, 41 Idaho 729 537 Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188 441 Page Murphy v. North American Power, 33 F. Supp. 567 396 Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101 336 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S. 25 263 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 233,245,247 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278 264 NLRB v. Coca-Cola Co., 350 U. S. 264 140 NLRB v. Electric Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685 265 NLRB v. Gissel Packing, 395 U. S. 575 23 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. Ill 140 NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Co., 245 F. 2d 594 260 NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Co., 305 F. 2d 242 261 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 155,265 NLRB v. Mastro Plastics, 354 F. 2d 170 264 NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U. S. 344 261,263 National Union v. Arnold, 348 U. S. 37 365 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 329,332,336,339,363 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 981 Neff v. Barber, 165 Wis. 503 537 Nesbit v. Statesville City Bd. of Ed., 418 F. 2d 1040 293 New Hampshire v. Boston & Maine Corp., 251 F. Supp. 421 164 New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324 165 Newman v. Gates, 204 U. S. 89 244 New York v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 989 164 New York Central Securities v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 509,526 TABLE OF CASES CITED XCVII Page New York Times v. Sullivan, 386 U. S. 254 444,1050,1051 Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F. 2d 221 214 Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 38 Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 91, 98,100 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 329,360,361 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 527 Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 498, 509 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 1205 O. C. Wiley & Sons v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 542 526 Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233 302-304, 315, 462-469, 1207,1208 Ogden v. United States, 303 F. 2d 724 70 Oregon & C. R. Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 393 528 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 1208 Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F. 2d 311 541 Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F. 2d 1222 452 Pan American Fire & Cas. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 542 Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244 220, 221 Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614; 178 Neb. 1 486 Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 533 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 329,360 Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245 354 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 533 Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646 498 Page Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U. S. 585 315 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S. 486 503,513 Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Di- rectors, 353 U. S. 230 455 Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F. 2d 120 456 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. v. American Airlines, 180 F. Supp. 239 542 People v. Anonymous, 56 Mise. 2d 725 38 People v. Morales, 27 App. Div. 2d 904 103 People v. Morales, 22 N. Y. 2d 55 104 Perkins v. Standard Oil, 395 U. S. 642 17 Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 1207 Peyton v. Nord, 78 N. M. 717 38 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 265,266 Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246 476,478 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 329,361 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 76,448, 449 Plymouth, The, 3 Wall. 20 215 Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 53,330,363 Poresky, Ex parte, 290 U. S. 30 354 Power Reactor Co. v. Elec- tricians, 367 U. S. 396 192 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440 368-370,444 Price v. United States, 150 F. 2d 283 420 Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 12 Pullum v. Greene, 396 F. 2d 251 340 Queensboro Farm Prods, v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969 172,193 Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 354 XCVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 241 534,536 Quinn v. Laird, 89 S. Ct. 1491 1234 Railroad Comm’n v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331 508 Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U. S. 369 149,1202 Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238 143,149 Rainsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F. 2d 333 536 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 329 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 457,458 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 30,372 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 50 Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70 250 Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 537 Rindell, In re, 2 BNA Cr. L. 3121 38 Riverside Oil & Ref. v. Lynch, 114 Okla. 198 394 Robbins v. Banner Industries, 285 F. Supp. 758 385 Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 285 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U. S. 153 459 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 537,545 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 140,166,167 Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141 99 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. Co., 395 U. S. 352 215 Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 329 Rogers v. Missouri-Pac. R. Co., 352 U. S. 500 909 Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 93 Page Romero v. United States, 357 U. S. 931 406 Rorick v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 307 U. S. 208 353 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 1050,1051 Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788 981 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 119,979 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 403,406, 408 Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 210 387 Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91 394 Sailors v. Bd. of Education, 387 U. S. 105 353,359 St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 347 U. S. 298 509 Saks v. Gamble, 38 Del. Ch. 504 395 Savannah Bank & Tr. v. Block, 175 F. Supp. 798 542 Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 175, 200 Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F. 2d 537 395 Schnell v. Davis, 336 U. S. 933 336 Schoenthal v. Irving Tr. Co., 287 U. S. 92 539 Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F. 2d 371 1208 Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 521, 522 Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. United States, 382 U. S. 154 513 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 196 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 388 SEC v. New England Elec. System, 384 U. S. 176 140 Sellers v. Laird, 395 U. S. 950 343 Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping, 361 U. S. 107 908 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 1230 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 236,445,456,457 TABLE OF CASES CITED XCIX Page Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364 315 Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 105 Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 538 Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U. S. 13 13-15 Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538 483 Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 329,361 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 284 Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592 336 Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 329,330,335 Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 365,366 Smith v. United States, 234 F. 2d 385 420 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 390 Snead v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 850 246,247 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 362 South Carolina v. Katzen-bach, 383 U. S. 301 336,1211 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 216,219-221,223,224 Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498 50 Southern R. Co. v. Greenwood, 40 F. 2d 679 540, 547 Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93 165 Spielman Motor Sales v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 353 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bk., 307 U. S. 161 393 Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368 478 Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio St. 348 43 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 172,191 State. See also name of State. State v. Burnside, 181 Neb. 20 989 Page State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750 32 State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707 484, 486,487 State ex rel. Flynn v. Bd. of Elections, 164 Ohio St. 193 44 State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32 43 State ex rel. Hanna v. Mil- burn, 170 Ohio St. 9 44 State ex rel. Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio St. 348 43 State Industrial Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 215,216 Stein wav v. Griffith Theatres, 273 P. 2d 872 537 Stokely v. Owens, 189 Va. 248 245,246 Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 348 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 455 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 34 Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 282 U. S. 10 354 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 329,330, 332,336,363 Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 371 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 981 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 323,329,339, 343 Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 415 F. 2d 1326 384,385 Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U. S. 1 215,220,222 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 448 Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 456 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. Ill 354 Switzerland Assn. v. Horne’s Market, 385 U. S. 23 475, 478,480 Syres v. Oil Workers, 257 F. 2d 479 541 c TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 316 489 Tarble’s Case, 13 Wall. 397 1208 Taylor v. Wood, 201 Va. 615 245,246 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 105 Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 256 Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522 508 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 ‘ 148,149,239 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 270 U. S. 266 508 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 239 Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 429, 1231 Thorpe v. Housing Author- ity, 393 U. S. 268 48 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 372 Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 364, 404, 408, 421 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 429,431 Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F. 2d 376 1207 Travelers Ins. v. Shea, 382 F. 2d 344 214 Treves v. Servel, Inc., 38 Del. Ch. 483 395 Troutman v. United States, No. 623, O. T. 1969 315,317 Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 392,393 T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 215 Tungus, The v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588 256 Turner v. Fouche, 290 F. Supp. 648 352 Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 " 349 Turner v. Spencer, 261 F. Supp. 542 340 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1 140,141,192,194 Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143 140 Page Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400 385 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Mason City & F. D. R. Co., 199 U. S. 160 529 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Copper v. Amalgamated Copper, 244 U. S. 261 536,547 United States v. Adler, 380 F. 2d 917 71 United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602 48 United States v. American Ry. Exp., 265 U. S. 425 381 United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534 192 United States v. Baker, 416 F. 2d 202 318 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 81 United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 70 United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 316 United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 66, 67,75,76 United States v. Bruinier, 293 F. Supp. 666 316 United States v. Buie, 407 F. 2d 905 90 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 201 United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 81 United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 98 United States v. David But-trick Co., 15 F. Supp. 655 201 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 332 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 91,98,100 United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370 140 United States v. Eisdorfer, 299 F. Supp. 975 303,316 TABLE OF CASES CITED ci Page United States v. Feinberg, 123 F. 2d 425 406 United States v. Flynn, 216 F. 2d 354 332 United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 404, 406, 432, 433 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 14 United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14 71 United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U. S. 285 354 United States v. Gibson, 310 F. 2d 79 404 United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 70 United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 81 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 423 F. 2d 1264 293 United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 74 United States v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 563 238 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 80, 82, 84, 86, 98 United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 68, 71, 83 United States v. Liss, 105 F. 2d 144 404 United States v. Liss, 137 F. 2d 995 412 United States v. Lookretis, 398 F. 2d 64 82 United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 336,337 United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 508 United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74 318 United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 315 United States v. Minor, 398 F. 2d 511 90 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128 336 United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co, 311 U.S.317 527 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 372 Page United States v. Peeples, 377 F. 2d 205 406, 407 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 81 United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U. S. 515 521 United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 286 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U. S. 533 172,191,192,205 United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136 404,407, 408,421 United States v. Savage, 292 F. 2d 264 404 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 48 United States v. Sisson, 396 U. S. 812 79 United States v. Smith, 291 F. Supp. 63 318 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689 98 United States v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 853 495 U. S. ex rel. See name of real party in interest. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 209,266-268 Vermont v. Boston & Maine Corp, 269 F. Supp. 80 164 Vick v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 12 406 Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236 71 Virginia, Ex parte, 100 U. S. 339 330 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 330,332,336,339 Vought v. Wisconsin, 217 U. S. 590 363 Walker v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 388 526 Walker v. United States, 285 F. 2d 52 404,406 Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 17 256 Warden. See name of warden. Washington v. Dawson & Co, 264 U. S. 219 216 Cil TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 368-370 Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 453 Webb v. United States, 249 U. S. 96 98 Westinghouse Electric v. Electrical Workers, 99 F. Supp. 597 542 West Ohio Gas v. Comm’n, 294 U. S. 63 190 West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 372 White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 323,329,340 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 533 Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 329,331, 343, 352, 355, 356, 361 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375 244,356 Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386 156-158 Williams v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 320 1 Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425 71 Page Williamsport v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 899 164 Wills v. United States, 384 F. 2d 943 316 Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 1230 Winship, In re, 396 U. S. 885 31 Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U. S. 492 383 Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 79 Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F. 2d 725 331 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 1209 Yap v. Wah Yen Ki Tuk Tsen Nin Hue, 43 Haw. 37 395 Yates v. United States, 404 F. 2d 462 318 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 98,403,406,418 Yerbey v. Chandler, 194 Ga. 263 442 Young, Ex parte, 209 U. S. 123 978 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 354 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429 473,474 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED (A) Statutes of the United States Page 1789, Sept. 24, c. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73............ 531 1798, July 14, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596 ................ 976 1864, July 2, c. 217, § 3, 13 Stat. 365.................. 491 1866, Apr. 9, c. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27................... 229 July 18, c. 201, § 4, 14 Stat. 178............. 398 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, §§ 1, 5, 20a, 24 Stat. 379, as amended.................... 491 §§ 13a, 14, 15..... 162 1890, July 2, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended. 13,491 1909, Feb. 9, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as amended... 87 §§ 1, 2............ 398 1910, June 18, c. 309, §17, 36 Stat. 539............... 471 1911, Mar. 3, c. 231, §§238, 266, 36 Stat. 1087.. 471 § 267 ........... 531 1914, Oct. 15, c. 323, §7, 38 Stat. 730, as amended............. 491 Dec. 17, c. 1, §2, 38 Stat. 785............ 87 1915, Mar. 3, c. 90, 38 Stat. 956 ................ 531 Mar. 4, c. 153, §20, 38 Stat. 1164, as amended........... 212,908 1917, May 18, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76 ................. 295 Oct. 6, c. 97, 40 Stat. 395 212 1920, Feb. 28, c. 91, § 407, 41 Stat, 456........ 491 June 5, c. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988....... 212,908 1922, May 26, c. 202, § 1, 42 Stat. 596........... 398 Page 1922, June 10, c. 216,42 Stat. 634 ............... 212 1924, June 7, c. 352, 43 Stat. 657 ............... 398 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936.......... 471 1926, May 20, c. 347, §§ 1-3, 5, 6, 10, 44 Stat, 577, as amended......... 142 1927, Feb. 25, c. 191, §7, 44 Stat. 1224, as amended............ 122 Mar. 4, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 212 1933, May 12, c. 25, ’§§ U 2, 8, 8c, 48 Stat. 31, as amended......... 168 June 16, c. 89, 48 Stat. 162................ 122 June 16, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195................ 168 1934, June 6, c. 404, §§ 9, 14, 16, 18, 27, 29, 48 Stat. 881.......... 375 June 19, c. 651, 48 Stat, 1064......... 531 June 21, c. 691, § 1, 48 Stat. 1185........ 142 1935, July 5, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended.... 976 §9 64,77 §10 ........... 258 Aug. 14, c. 531, §§ 401- 410, 49 Stat. 620, as amended............ 488 Aug. 24, c. 641, § 5, 49 Stat. 750......... 168 Aug. 26, c. 687, § 26, 49 Stat. 803....... 375 1937, June 3, c. 296, §§ 1, 2, 4, 50 Stat. 246, as amended............ 168 Aug. 2, c. 553, § 6, 50 Stat. 551.......... 87 CHI CIV TABLE OF STATUTES CITED Page 1938, June 25, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060.................. 142 1940, Aug. 22, c. 686, 54 Stat. 789................... 531 §§47,215........... 375 Sept. 16, c. 720, §§ 3, 4, 11, 54 Stat. 885.. 295 Sept. 18, c. 722, § 7, 54 Stat. 898............. 491 1942, Dec. 11, c. 720, 56 Stat. 1045.......... 398 1946, June 11, c. 324, §§ 6, 10, 60 Stat. 237.... 258 July 5, c. 540, 60 Stat. 427 ................ 471 §35 .............. 375 1947, June 23, c. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136.. 64,77,258 1948, June 19, c. 526, 62 Stat. 496 ................ 212 June 24, c. 623, 62 Stat. 602............. 212 June 24, c. 625, §§ 5, 6, 10, 62 Stat. 604, as amended. ... 295, 460 §12 ................ 295 1951, June 19, c. 144, 65 Stat. 75, as amended.... 295 1956, July 18, c. 629, § 201, 70 Stat, 567........ 398 1958, Aug. 12, Pub. L. 85- 625, §5, 72 Stat. 568 ................ 162 1959, Sept. 14, Pub. L. 86- 257, § 504, 73 Stat. 519.................. 64 1960, Apr. 22, Pub. L. 86- 429, 74 Stat. 55.. 87,398 1964, July 2, Pub. L. 88-352, Tit, II, 78 Stat. 241. 229 § 703 ............ 320 1965, Aug. 6, Pub. L. 89- 110, §5, 79 Stat. 437 .......... 1210,1223 Nov. 3, Pub. L. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187......... 168 1967, June 30, Pub. L. 90-40, §1, 81 Stat, 100............ 295 §§ 5, 6, 10........ 460 1968, Apr. 11, Pub. L. 90- 284, Tits. VIII, IX, 82 Stat. 73......... 229 1969, Nov. 26, Pub. L. 91- 124, 83 Stat. 220... 295 Page Revised Statutes. §§722, 1977, 1978..... 229 §3082 ............... 398 §§5133 et seq., 5155.... 122 U. S. Code. Title 5, §§ 1005, 1009... 258 Title 5 (Supp. IV), §§551, 701, 702.... 162 §§555,706......... 258 Title 7, §§ 601, 602, 608, 608c................. 168 Title 7 (Supp. IV), §§602, 608c.......... 168 Title 10, §§890, 933, 934 ................ 1204 Title 12, §§ 21 et seq., 36................... 122 Title 15, § 1 et seq..... 13,491 §18 ............. 491 §§ 78i, 78n, 78p, 78r, 78aa, 78cc, 79z, 80a-46, 80b-15, 1117.............. 375 § 80a-1 et seq.... 531 § 1051 et seq.... 471 Title 18, §243 ............. 320 §§545, 1402....... 398 § 1001 ........ 64,77 § 1402 ........... 87 § 3006A.......... 809 § 3148 ......... 1225 §3731 ........ 77,812 Title 21, §§171, 176a, 176b, 188-188n.............. 398 §§ 173, 174, 501-517 ........... 87,398 Title 26, §§4411,4412,7203.. 77 §§ 4701-4705, 4721, 4722,4771,4773. 87, 398 §§ 4706, 4707, 4723-4736, 4772, 4774-4776 ................ 398 §§ 4742, 4751-4753, 7237 .............. 87 Title 28, § 1253 ........... 45,162, 320,346,471,488 § 1257.. 28,41,229,365 § 1292 ... 375,471,531 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED cv Page U. S. Code—Continued. Title 28—Continued. § 1336 ............. 162 § 1343 ............. 229 §2072 .............. 531 §2101 .............. 488 §2241 ............. 1206 §2243 .............. 482 § 2255 .............. 64 §2281 ... 320,346,471 §2282 .............. 471 § 2283 ...... 471,1201 § 2284 ............ 320, 346,471,491,1210 §2325 .......... 162,491 Title 29, § 159 .......... 64,77 § 160 .............. 258 § 504 ............... 64 Title 33, §§901-950... 212 Title 35, §§ 101, 103... 57 Title 42, §§601-609 ........ 488 §§ 1981, 1982, 1988. 229 §2000e-2 ........... 320 Title 42 (Supp. I), § 1973c ........ 1210,1223 Title 42 (Supp. IV), §§601-610 ........ 488 §§3601 et seq., 3631. 229 Title 45, §§ 151-153, 155, 156, 160......... 142 Title 46, §688 ........... 212,908 §740 ............... 212 Title 49, §§ 5, 20a......... 491 §§13a, 14, 15. 162 Title 50 App., § 456... 460 Title 50 App. (Supp. IV), §§455, 456.... 295,460 §460 ............... 460 §462 ............... 295 Administrative Procedure Act .............. 162,258 Agricultural Adjustment Act................... 168 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.. 168 Anti-Narcotic Act............ 87 Banking Act of 1933........ 122 Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1968 ................. 229 Page Civil Rights Act of 1964. 229,320 Clayton Act................. 491 Criminal Appeals Act... 77, 812 Criminal Justice Act....... 809 Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act............ 212 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938................. 142 Harrison Act (Narcotics)... 87 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §3228............... 398 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§4411, 4412, 7203....... 77 §§ 4701-4705, 4721, 4722, 4771, 4773......... 87,398 §§ 4706, 4707, 4723-4736, 4772, 4774-4776....... 398 §§4742,4751-4753,7237. 87 Interstate Commerce Act.. 162, 491 Investment Company Act of 1940 ............... 375,531 Jones Act........... 212,908 Judicial Code of 1911.. 471,531 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.............. 64 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 .................... 64 Lanham Act.............. 375 Law and Equity Act....... 531 Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act .................. 212 Mann-Elkins Act......... 471 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. 87 McFadden Act................ 122 Military Selective Service Act of 1967....... 295,460 Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act............. 87 Narcotics Manufacturing Act of 1960.............. 87,398 National Bank Act....... 122 National Industrial Recovery Act .................... 168 National Labor Relations Act ........ 64,77,258,976 Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942................. 398 Patent Act............... 57 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.... 375 CVI TABLE OF STATUTES CITED Page Railway Labor Act.......... 142 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ..................... 375 Selective Service Act of 1948 ............... 295,460 Selective Training and Serv- ice Act of 1940 ........ 295 Sherman Act............ 13,491 Smuggling Act of 1866..... 398 Page Social Security Act........ 488 Taft-Hartley Act.... 64,77,258 Transportation Act, 1920.. 491 Transportation Act of 1940. 491 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Arts. 90, 133, 134 .................... 1204 Voting Rights Act of 1965 ................ 1210,1223 (B) Constitutions and Statutes of the States Alabama. City Manager Act of 1953 ........... 1210 Pen. Code of 1841, c. X, §§ 1, 3.......... 320 Code, Tit. 30, §§ 1, 3-5, 8-10, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24 320 Code App. § 1124 et seq............. 1210 Arizona. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-201 ............. 320 Arkansas. Stat. Ann. §39-206... 320 California. Indeterminate Sentence Law.............. 107 Civ. Pro. Code § 198... 320 Penal Code §§ 671,1168, 3020 ............ 107 Colorado. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49-3-1, 49-4-2, 49-4-17, 49-13, 49-24-1.... 45 Rev. Stat. Ann. §78— 1-1.............. 320 Connecticut. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 51-217.............. 320 Florida. Stat. §40.01.......... 320 Stat. § 659.06........ 122 Georgia. Const., Art. II, § I, Art. VI, § III, Art. VIII, §V ............ 346 Code Ann. §§ 2-702, 2-3802, 2-6801, 2-6802, 32-902, 59-101, 59-106, 59-201.......... 346 Georgia—Continued. Code Ann. §§ 69-501 to 69-506, 108-106, 108-202, 108-203, 108-207, 113-815............... 435 Hawaii. Rev. Stat. § 609-1.... 320 Illinois. Rev. Stat., c. 78, § 2... 320 Iowa. Code § 607.1.......... 320 Kansas. Stat. Ann. §43-102.... 320 Kentucky. Rev. Stat. §29.025.... 320 Maine. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, § 1254 .......... 320 Maryland. Ann. Code, Art. 23, §§256-270 ....... 367 Ann. Code, Art. 51, §§1,9............ 320 Massachusetts. Gen. Laws, c. 272, § 28A ........... 976 Mississippi. Code Ann. § 1762-02... 320 Missouri. Ann. Stat. §494.010... 320 Montana. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1301 ................. 320 Nebraska. Const., Art. V, §2.... 28 Habitual Criminal Act. 988 Post Conviction Act... 482 Rev. Stat. § 25-1601... 320 Rev. Stat. § 28-601, 43-201, 43-205.04, 43-206.03 ................ 28 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED evil Page N ebraska—Continued. Rev. Stat. §29-2221... 988 Rev. Stat. §§29-3001 to 29-3004 .......... 482 New Hampshire. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500:29. 320 New York. Judiciary Law §§ 504, 596 ................. 320 Surrogate’s Court Act, § 269-a ............. 471 Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act, § 2218... 471 North Dakota. Cent. Code § 27-09-01. 320 Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. §§2307.21, 2721.01-2721.15, 3513.05, 3513.257 ............. 41 Oklahoma. Stat. Ann., Tit. 38, § 28. 320 Pennsylvania. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 1322 .............. 320 Page Rhode Island. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-9-1. 320 South Carolina. Code Ann. § 38-52 .... 320 Tennessee. Code Ann. § 22-102.... 320 Texas. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 2133............. 320 Utah. Code Ann. § 78-46-8... 320 Vermont. Stat. Ann., Tit. 4, §902. 320 Virginia. Const. §§87, 88........ 229 Code Ann. §§ 8-462, 8-610................. 229 Washington. Rev. Code §§2.36.070, 2.36.110 ............. 320 West Virginia. Code Ann. §52-1-2... 320 Wisconsin. Stat. Ann. §255.01.... 320 Wyoming. Stat. Ann. § 1-77...... 320 (C) Foreign Constitution India. Const., Arts. 15, 16, 330-332............................. 320 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPBEME COUBT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1969 RISTUCCIA et ux. v. ADAMS et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 191. Decided October 13, 1969 406 F. 2d 1257, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. HAGAN et al. v. REAGAN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. 279. Decided October 13, 1969 Affirmed. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed. Williams n. Virginia State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 320. 1 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 13, 1969 396 U. S. SPALDING LAUNDRY & DRY CLEANING CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY No. 123. Decided October 13, 1969 436 S. W. 2d 522, appeal dismissed. T. Kennedy Helm, Jr., for appellant. William S. Riley, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. DUFFY STORAGE & MOVING CO. et al. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO No. 132. Decided October 13, 1969 — Colo. —, 450 P. 2d 339, appeal dismissed. George Louis Creamer for appellants. Max P. Zall for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 3 396 U.S. October 13, 1969 GETTIG EQUIPMENT CORP, et al. v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF CLEVELAND et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 136. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Walter L. Greene for appellants. William T. McKnight for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. FURMAN v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 142. Decided October 13, 1969 23 N. Y. 2d 1011, 247 N. E. 2d 281, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Louis B. Scheinman for appellant. J. Lee Rankin, Stanley Buchsbaum, and Theodore R. Lee for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 13, 1969 396 U.S. IMPERIAL REFINERIES OF MINNESOTA, INC. v. CITY OF ROCHESTER APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA No. 171. Decided October 13, 1969 282 Minn. 481, 165 N. W. 2d 699, appeal dismissed. Marshall S. Snyder for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. WHEELER v. VERMONT APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT No. 199. Decided October 13, 1969 ---Vt.----,----, 249 A. 2d 887, 253 A. 2d 136, appeal dismissed. James C. Cleveland for appellant. Jerome R. Hellerstein for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 5 396 U. S. October 13, 1969 JORDAN v. ARIZONA ex rel. NELSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA No. 204. Decided October 13, 1969 104 Ariz. 193, 450 P. 2d 383, appeal dismissed. Stewart L. Udall for appellant. Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, appellee, pro se. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. SHAPIRO, COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF CONNECTICUT v. SOLMAN et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT No. 215. Decided October 13, 1969 300 F. Supp. 409, affirmed. Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Francis J. MacGregor, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Francis X. Dineen for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. See King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309. 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 13, 1969 396 U. S. BRADESKU v. BRADESKU APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 238. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. A. Albert Perelman for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. MAINE ET AL. V. SHONE APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 261. Decided October 13, 1969 District Court judgment and 406 F. 2d 844, vacated and remanded. James S. Erwin, Attorney General of Maine, and John W. Benoit, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Per Curiam. The motion of the appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Maine are vacated and the case is remanded to said United States District Court with directions to dismiss the case as moot. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 7 396 U.S. October 13, 1969 INTERCO INC. v. RHODEN, CHAIRMAN, MISSISSIPPI TAX COMMISSION APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI No. 306. Decided October 13, 1969 220 So. 2d 290, appeal dismissed. James Leon Young for appellant. John E. Stone for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. KELLAR v. NEAL et ux. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA No. 308. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 8 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 13, 1969 396 U.S. HIYANE et al. v. HOUSE OF VISION, INC. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS No. 320. Decided October 13, 1969 42 Ill. 2d 45, 245 N. E. 2d 468, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Leonard Rose for appellants. Lawrence J. West and Leo Spira for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. SHIKARA v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 324. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 9 396 U.S. October 13, 1969 BERNARD v. NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al. APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT No. 177, Mise. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed. J. Lee Rankin and Stanley Buchsbaum for New York City Employees’ Retirement System, and George N. Kanoff for Lipori, appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. SELLERS v. UNITED STATES ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 264, Mise. Decided October 13, 1969 Certiorari granted; 406 F. 2d 465, vacated and remanded to District Court. Howard Moore, Jr., for petitioner. Solicitor General Griswold for the United States. Per Curiam. Upon consideration of the suggestion of the Solicitor General and an examination of the entire record, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for further consideration in light of Aiderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165. 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 13, 1969 396 U. S. WHITLEY v. NEW YORK APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT No. 268, Mise. Decided October 13, 1969 Appeal dismissed. Henry B. Rothblatt and Emma A. Rothblatt for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. STOECKLE v. WISCONSIN APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN No. 272, Mise. Decided October 13, 1969 41 Wis. 2d 378, 164 N. W. 2d 303, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 11 396 U.S. October 13, 1969 PURYEAR v. HOGAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF NEW YORK COUNTY, et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 336, Mise. Decided October 13, 1969 24 N. Y. 2d 207, 247 N. E. 2d 260, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Frank S. Hogan, pro se, and Michael R. Juviler for Hogan, and Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Maria L. Marcus, Assistant Attorney General, for Lefkowitz, appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 12 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 20, 1969 396 U. S. BEACHAM v. BRATERMAN et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA No. 404. Decided October 20, 1969 300 F. Supp. 182, affirmed. Bruce S. Rogow for appellant. Earl Faircloth, Attorney General of Florida, and T. T. Turnbull and James McGuirk, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. WHIDDON v. UNITED STATES ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 267, Mise. Decided October 20, 1969 Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded to District Court. Solicitor General Griswold for the United States. Per Curiam. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for resentencing. Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322, and Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415. SIMPSON v. UNION OIL CO. 13 Per Curiam SIMPSON v. UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 419. Decided October 27, 1969 The reservation in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13, of the question whether there might be any equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule governing price fixing of nonpatented articles by the ‘‘consignment” device, announced therein, was not intended to deny the fruits of successful litigation to petitioner. The question was reserved for possible application in other cases where product distribution was structured on different considerations. Certiorari granted; 411 F. 2d 897, reversed. Maxwell Keith for petitioner. Moses Lasky for respondent. Per Curiam. This case represents the aftermath of our decision in Simpson n. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13, where we held that a “consignment” agreement for the sale of gasoline, required by Union Oil of lessees of its retail outlets, violated the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. The case was remanded for a hearing on other issues and for a determination of damages. The last sentence of the Court’s opinion stated: “We reserve the question whether, when all the facts are known, there may be any equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule governing price fixing by the ‘consignment’ device which we announce today.” Id., at 24-25. On remand, the District Court interpreted this sentence as an invitation to determine if any “equities” were 14 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U.S. present which would warrant precluding the imposition of damages on Union Oil. Its finding was that an application of the rule announced by this Court to the damages action would be unfair, on the ground that the decision in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, gave Union Oil a reasonable basis for believing that its actions were entirely lawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The petition for certiorari presents the question whether in this case the principles we announced in Simpson n. Union Oil Co. should be made prospective in the present litigation. We grant the petition on that question and deny it on the other questions tendered; and we reverse the judgment below. W’e held when the case was here before that on the facts of record the use of the “consignment” device was within the prohibited ban of price fixing for nonpatented articles, 377 U. S., at 16-24, and that “on the issue of resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act there is nothing left to try, for there was an agreement for resale price maintenance, coercively employed.” Id., at 24. The question we reserved was not an invitation to deny the fruits of successful litigation to this petitioner. Congress has determined the causes of action that arise from antitrust violations; and there has been an adjudication that a cause of action against respondent has been established. Formulation of a rule of law in an Article III case or controversy which is prospective as to the parties involved in the immediate litigation would be most unusual, especially where the rule announced was not innovative. Since parties in other cases might be shown to have structured product distribution on quite different considerations, we reserved the question whether in some of those other situations equity might warrant the conclusion that prospective application was the only fair course. Reversed. SIMPSON v. UNION OIL CO. 15 13 Opinion of Black, J. Mr. Justice Black, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I wholeheartedly concur with the decision of the Court that both courts below were in error in holding that petitioner was not entitled to any damages in this case. I dissent, however, from the Court’s denial of certiorari on another question that petitioner raises, the effect of which is to leave standing that part of the District Court’s judgment setting aside petitioner’s jury verdict as excessive and granting respondent a new trial on the issue of damages. The District Court’s grant of a new trial did not rest upon a finding that any of the evidence on the issue of damages was improperly admitted or that the instructions to the jury were erroneous. The judge granted the new trial on the ground that the $160,000 verdict “is against the weight of the evidence, shocks the conscience, is grossly and monstrously excessive, is the result either of passion and prejudice or of consideration by the jury of factors irrelevant to the litigation, is speculative, conjectural and a miscarriage of justice.” Civil No. 37,344 (D. C. N. D. Cal., filed May 23, 1967). I do not agree that under the facts of this case the verdict should have shocked the court’s conscience. Certainly the $160,000 award does not shock my conscience, nor does it seem to me monstrous or the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Petitioner’s growing filling station business was destroyed by respondent through conduct that this Court held to be in violation of the antitrust laws. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13 (1964). At the time the cause of action arose petitioner’s life expectancy was about 25 years. The jury had a right to believe that his business would have grown through those 25 years, and no one can say with any absolute assurance that the jury verdict was in excess of the immediate and long-term returns 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of Black, J. 396 U. S. he might have realized from his business during that period. Antitrust damages such as those involved here are bound to be “speculative’' and “conjectural” to some extent. When a person wrongfully takes government bonds worth $10,000 on the market, the damages can be precisely measured. But when as here a young man’s business is wiped out root and branch by a wrongdoer, the measurement of the victim’s damages is not so simple a matter. This is true because no one can infallibly predict how long that business would have continued to grow and flourish or precisely how much the business would have been worth to him in 25 years. But certainly a fair and just legal system is not required by difficulties of proof to throw up its hands in despair and leave the sufferer’s damage to be borne by him while the person who did the wrong goes scot free. This Court has refused under such circumstances to hold that our system of justice is so helpless to do justice. In this very antitrust field our Court has specifically and pointedly refused to permit antitrust violators to escape liability for their wrongs on the argument that damages must not be awarded because they are uncertain and speculative. The Court in a ringing opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U. S. 251 (1946), emphatically declined to acknowledge such judicial helplessness. There we held that the award of damages for the victim of an antitrust violation must not be denied on the spurious argument that they cannot be proved with the certainty of the value of stolen bonds. In that case this Court said: “[I]n the absence of more precise proof, the jury could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of defendants’ wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs’ business, and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits SIMPSON v. UNION OIL CO. 17 13 Opinion of Black, J. and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants’ wrongful acts had caused damage to the plaintiffs.” Id., at 264. “The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.” Id., at 265. Bigelow and other cases* clearly establish the rule that the existence of damages in antitrust actions is a question for the jury and that the inherent uncertainty in the amount of damages is to be resolved against the wrongdoer. In my opinion the jury below did exactly what we said it was entitled to do in Bigelow. I would therefore require that the jury verdict be reinstated without further ado. Mr. Justice Stewart would deny the petition for certiorari. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. *P er kins v. Standard OU Co. of California, 395 U. S. 642 (1969); Continental Ore Co. v. Onion Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690 (1962). 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 October 27, 1969 396 U.S. WASHUM, dba LOS ANGELES-YUMA FREIGHT LINES, et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA No. 374. Decided October 27, 1969 Affirmed. James W. Wrape and Robert E. Joyner for appellants. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Robert W. Ginnane, and Nahum Litt for the United States et al., and Robert Y. Schureman for Consolidated Copperstate Lines et al., appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. COX, GUARDIAN v. TENNESSEE, BY AND THROUGH ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE No. 430. Decided October 27, 1969 --- Tenn. --, 439 S. W. 2d 267, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Thomas F. Turley, Jr., for appellant. Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General of Tennessee, and C. Hayes Cooney, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. ALEXANDER v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 19 Syllabus ALEXANDER et al. v. HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 632. Argued October 23, 1969—Decided October 29, 1969 Continued operation of racially segregated schools under the standard of “all deliberate speed” is no longer constitutionally permissible. School districts must immediately terminate dual school systems based on race and operate only unitary school systems. The Court of Appeals’ order of August 28, 1969, delaying that court’s earlier mandate for desegregation in certain Mississippi school districts is therefore vacated and that court is directed to enter an order, effective immediately, that the schools in those districts be operated on a unitary basis. While the schools are being thus operated, the District Court may consider any amendments of the order which may be proposed, but such amendments may become effective only with the Court of Appeals’ approval. Vacated and remanded. Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were James M. Nabrit III, Norman C. Amaker, Melvyn Zarr, and Charles L. Black, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Leonard argued the cause for the United States. With him on the memorandum was Solicitor General Griswold. A. F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi, and John C. Satterfield argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents other than the United States. Louis F. Oberdörfer argued the cause for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were John W. Douglas, Bethuel M. Webster, Cyrus R. Vance, Asa Sokolow, John Schafer, John Doar, Richard C. Dinkel-spiel, Arthur H. Dean, Lloyd N. Cutler, Bruce Bromley, Berl I. Bernhard, Timothy B. Dyk, and Michael R. Klein. 20 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U.S. Richard B. Sobol and David Rubin filed a brief for the National Education Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. The Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government filed a brief as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. This case comes to the Court on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petition was granted on October 9, 1969, and the case set down for early argument. The question presented is one of paramount importance, involving as it does the denial of fundamental rights to many thousands of school children, who are presently attending Mississippi schools under segregated conditions contrary to the applicable decisions of this Court. Against this background the Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for additional time because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools. Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 234 (1964); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438-439, 442 (1968). Accordingly, It is hereby adjudged, ordered, and decreed: 1. The Court of Appeals’ order of August 28, 1969, is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court to issue its decree and order, effective immediately, declaring that each of the school districts here involved may no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color, and directing that they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color. ALEXANDER v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 21 19 Per Curiam 2. The Court of Appeals may in its discretion direct the schools here involved to accept all or any part of the August 11, 1969, recommendations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, with any modifications which that court deems proper insofar as those recommendations insure a totally unitary school system for all eligible pupils without regard to race or color. The Court of Appeals may make its determination and enter its order without further arguments or submissions. 3. While each of these school systems is being operated as a unitary system under the order of the Court of Appeals, the District Court may hear and consider objections thereto or proposed amendments thereof, provided, however, that the Court of Appeals’ order shall be complied with in all respects while the District Court considers such objections or amendments, if any are made. No amendment shall become effective before being passed upon by the Court of Appeals. 4. The Court of Appeals shall retain jurisdiction to insure prompt and faithful compliance with its order, and may modify or amend the same as may be deemed necessary or desirable for the operation of a unitary school system. 5. The order of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 1969, having been vacated and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this order, the judgment shall issue forthwith and the Court of Appeals is requested to give priority to the execution of this judgment as far as possible and necessary. 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 November 10, 1969 396 U. S. JOHNSON v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT No. 434. Decided November 10, 1969 268 Cal. App. 2d 437, 74 Cal. Rptr. 11, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. TRANSPORTATION UNLIMITED OF CALIFORNIA, INC. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. 451. Decided November 10, 1969 300 F. Supp. 474, affirmed. Samuel B. Picone for appellant. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Robert W. Ginnane, and Raymond M. Zimmet for the United States et al., Francis W. Mclnerny for Midwest Coast Transport, Inc., et al., and David Axelrod for Little Audrey’s Transportation Co., Inc., et al., appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 23 396 U. S. November 10, 1969 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CLARK’S GAMBLE CORP, dba CLARK’S DISCOUNT DEPARTMENT STORE, et al. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 439. Decided November 10, 1969 Certiorari granted; 407 F. 2d 199, vacated and remanded. Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come, and Leonard M. Wagman for petitioner. Earle K. Shawe for respondent M. N. Landau Stores, Inc. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. CLINTON v. CALIFORNIA APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA No. 632, Mise. Decided November 10, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 24 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 November 10, 1969 396 U. S. JOLLY v. MORGAN COUNTY JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICT et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO No. 453. Decided November 10, 1969 — Colo.----, 452 P. 2d 34, appeal dismissed. Albert W. Gebauer for appellant. Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, and John E. Bush, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. KRAFFT v. NEW YORK APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 474. Decided November 10, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Sidney Greenberg for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 25 396 U. S. November 10, 1969 MARYLAND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. et al. v. SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA No. 482. Decided November 10, 1969 455 P. 2d 690, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. O. B. Martin for appellants. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. STEIN v. ILLINOIS et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS No. 502. Decided November 10, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Yale Stein, appellant, pro se. Elmer C. Kissane for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 November 10, 1969 396 U. S. KING v. GREENBLATT et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS No. 615, Mise. Decided November 10, 1969 Affirmed. Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and John Wall and Edward W. Hanley III, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. ZWICKER v. WISCONSIN APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN No. 686, Mise. Decided November 10, 1969 41 Wis. 2d 497, 164 N. W. 2d 512, appeal dismissed. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Michael Meltsner, and Melvyn Zarr for appellant. Robert W. Warren, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and William A. Platz, Sverre 0. Tinglum, and William F. Eich, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 27 396 U. S. November 10, 1969 BOSTON & MAINE RAILROAD et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS No. 343. Decided November 10, 1969* No. 343, 297 F. Supp. 615; Nos. 480 and 497, 300 F. Supp. 318, affirmed. Carl E. Newton and M. Lauck Walton for appellants in No. 343. Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, Richard W. Sabin, Assistant Attorney General, and Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska, for appellants in No. 480. Howard J. Trienens, Martin M. Lucente, George L. Saunders, Jr., R. Ames, W. W. Dalton, K. A. Dobbins, J. H. Durkin, N. Melvin, T. A. Miller, A. B. Russ, Jr., R. D. Sickler, E. L. Van Dellen, R. W. Yost, and aS. R. Brittingham, Jr., for appellants in No. 497. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Howard E. Shapiro, Fritz R. Kahn, and Jerome Nelson for the United States et al. in all cases. Hugh B. Cox and William H. Allen for railroad appellees in all cases. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgments are affirmed. *Together with No. 480, Arizona Corporation Commission et al. v. United States et al., and No. 497, Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. United States et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. 28 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. DeBACKER v. BRAINARD, SHERIFF APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA No. 15. Argued October 13-14, 1969— Decided November 12, 1969 1. Appellant juvenile’s challenge in habeas corpus proceeding on ground that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to trial by jury is inappropriate for resolution by this Court since the hearing before a Nebraska juvenile court judge at which appellant was adjudged a delinquent was conducted before this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, which were held in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, to apply only prospectively, and appellant would therefore have had no constitutional right to a jury trial had he been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. 2. It is not appropriate for this Court to decide whether Nebraska law providing for proof of delinquency in a juvenile proceeding under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violates due process requirements where no objection to that standard was made at the hearing by appellant, who took no direct appeal, and his counsel acknowledged that the evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency finding even under a reasonable-doubt standard. 3. Because standing alone the issue could not be subject to review by an appeal, this Court declines, in view of the barrenness of the record, to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to pass on appellant’s contention that the prosecutor’s assertedly unreviewable discretion under Nebraska case law whether to proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings violated due process. 183 Neb. 461, 161 N. W. 2d 508, appeal dismissed; certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. William G. Line, by appointment of the Court, 394 U. S. 914, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Richard L. Kuhlman argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Melvin Kent Kammerlohr, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska. DeBACKER v. BRAINARD 29 28 Per Curiam Alfred L. Scanlan, by special leave of Court, argued the cause and filed a brief for the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges as amicus curiae. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Deraid E. Granberg and Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. After a hearing before a juvenile court judge, appellant DeBacker was found to be a “delinquent child” 1 and ordered committed to the Boys’ Training School at Kearney, Nebraska.1 2 DeBacker did not seek direct review of his commitment, but instead sought state habeas corpus. The Nebraska District Court dismissed appellant’s petition, a divided Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed,3 and last Term we noted probable jurisdiction over the present appeal, 393 U. S. 1076. Because we find that resolution of the constitutional issues presented by appellant would not be appropriate in the circum- 1 “Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-201 (4). Appellant was charged with having a forged check in his possession with the intent to utter it as genuine, an act which for an adult would be forgery under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-601 (2). 2 Appellant was 17 when committed, and it appears that under Nebraska law he could be kept in the training school until his 21st birthday. 3 Four of the seven justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court thought the Nebraska statutory provisions which require that juvenile hearings be without a jury, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (2), and be based on the preponderance of the evidence, Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-206.03 (3), were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Constitution provides, however, that: “No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges.” Neb. Const., Art. V, §2. 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. stances of this case, the appeal is dismissed. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549. 1. Appellant asks this Court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194; and In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, require a trial by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding based on an alleged act of the juvenile which, if committed by an adult, would, under the Duncan and Bloom cases, require a jury trial if requested. In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, we held that Duncan and Bloom “should receive only prospective application” and stated that we would “not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.” 392 U. S., at 633, 635. Because appellant’s juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968—prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom—appellant would have had no constitutional right to a trial by jury if he had been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. It thus seems manifest that this case is not an appropriate one for considering whether the Nebraska statute which provides that juvenile hearings be “without a jury,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (2), is constitutionally invalid in light of Duncan and Bloom * 4 Although a comment made by appellant’s counsel at oral argument before this Court (in response to a question) suggests reliance also on the Equal Protection Clause for the claim that a jury trial was constitutionally required (Tr. 5), an examination of the record clearly reveals that this was not any part of the basis on which probable jurisdiction was noted here. Appellant made no equal protection claim before the juvenile court, in his petition for habeas corpus to the state courts, or in his jurisdictional statement or brief in this Court. The Sixth Amendment as reflected in the Fourteenth was the exclusive basis for appellant’s claim that he had a right to a jury trial. (See “Questions Presented” in Jurisdictional Statement 3-4, and DeBACKER V. BRAINARD 31 28 Per Curiam 2. Appellant next asks this Court to decide whether the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for burden of proof in juvenile court proceedings, required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (3), satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, at the appellant’s juvenile court hearing, his counsel neither objected to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, nor asked the judge to make a ruling based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In explaining why he did not seek a direct appeal from the juvenile court’s determination that appellant had committed the act upon which rested the delinquent child finding, appellant’s counsel stated at oral argument before this Court: “[I]t has been pointed out that I did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence. “Of course, the reason for that is obvious. The evidence is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction of what he did. An appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence would have been close to frivolous.” (Tr. 41-42.) Later in oral argument counsel acknowledged that “[n]o matter what the standard was . . . [o]ur evidence just isn’t insufficient.” (Tr. 47.) And when specifically asked whether “[t]he evidence was sufficient even under a reasonable doubt standard,” counsel responded: “Even under a reasonable doubt standard . . . .” (Tr. 47.) Given this commendably forthright explanation by appellant’s counsel, this case is not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings.* 5 Appellant’s Brief 2.) Nor has any of the Nebraska courts below passed on any equal protection claim. 5 This Court has recently noted probable jurisdiction to consider this issue in In re Winship (No. 85, Mise.), probable jurisdiction noted, post, p. 885. 32 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. 3. Appellant finally asks us to decide whether due process is denied because, as it is claimed, the Nebraska prosecutor had unreviewable discretion whether he would proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings. The record shows (1) that appellant did not make this contention before the juvenile court judge; (2) that appellant raised the issue in his habeas corpus petition but that it was not passed on by the Nebraska District Court; (3) that appellant did not press the District Court’s failure to consider this issue in his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, and made only passing reference to the issue in his brief to that court; and (4) that the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court did not pass on the issue, or even refer to the contention. Given the barrenness of the record on this issue, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to pass on it. So far as we have been made aware, this issue does not draw into question the validity of any Nebraska statute.6 Therefore, it could not, standing alone, be subject to review in this Court by way of an appeal. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). “[IJnsofar as notation of probable jurisdiction may be 6 In his petition for state habeas corpus, appellant did not allege as to this issue that any Nebraska statutory provision was invalid. Instead he claimed: “Petitioner is deprived of his liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when his right to a jury trial and the protective procedures of the criminal code are left to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecutor as to whether petitioner should be proceeded against in juvenile court or should be informed against in District Court under the provisions of the code of criminal procedure.” If it can be fairly said that the prosecutor’s discretion under Nebraska law is “uncontrolled,” or not subject to review, this is not because of any explicit statutory provision making it such, cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.04, but because of language in Nebraska case law. See State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N. W. 2d 101 (1945); Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 75, 91 N. W. 2d 240, 243-244 (1958). DeBACKER V. BRAINARD 33 28 Black, J., dissenting regarded as a grant of the certiorari writ” as to this issue, we dismiss such writ as improvidently granted. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 513. For the foregoing reasons this appeal is Dismissed. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting. For the reasons set forth herein and in the dissenting opinion of my Brother Douglas, I dissent and would reverse the judgment below. In February 1968 appellant, who was then 17 years old, was charged under the laws of Nebraska with being a “delinquent child” 1 because he had a forged bank check which he intended to use for his own purposes.1 2 At the hearing on this charge he asked for a jury trial, arguing that this was a right guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and that a statute prohibiting juries in “delinquency” proceedings3 was therefore unconstitutional. This Court in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), held that juveniles charged with being “delinquents” as a 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-201 (4) provides that: “Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.” 2 The State charged that appellant “unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly [had] in his possession and custody a certain false, forged and counterfeited bank check . . . with the intent ... to utter and publish said false, forged and counterfeited bank check as true and genuine, knowing the same to be a false, forged and counterfeited bank check, and with the intent then and there and thereby to prejudice, damage and defraud . . . , well knowing the same to be falsely made, forged and counterfeited, contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nebraska.” App. 1-2. It is undisputed that such acts constitute the crime of forgery under state law. Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-601 (2). 3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (2) provides that juvenile hearings “shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner . . . .” 34 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Black, J., dissenting 396 U. S. result of committing a criminal act were entitled to certain constitutional safeguards—namely, notice of the issues involved, benefit of counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and confrontation of the witnesses against them. I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world. The Court here decides that it would not be “appropriate” to decide this issue in light of DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968). That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—made applicable to the States in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)—did not apply in state proceedings held prior to May 20, 1968. Mr. Justice Douglas and I dissented in that case as we have in every case holding that constitutional decisions would take effect only from the day they were announced.4 I think this doctrine of prospective-only application is nothing less than judicial amendment of the Constitution, since it results in the Constitution’s meaning one thing the day prior to a particular decision and something entirely different the next day even though the language remains the same. Under our system of government such amendments cannot constitutionally be made by judges but only by the action of Congress and the people. Depriving defendants of jury trials prior to Duncan violated the Constitution just as much as would similar deprivations after 4 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 640 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 736 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302, 303 (1967) (dissenting opinions); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Halliday v. United States, 394 U. S. 831, 835 (1969) (dissenting opinion); see also Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 254 (1969) (concurring in judgment). DeBACKER V. BRAINARD 35 28 Douglas, J., dissenting that decision, yet this Court treats these equal deprivations with clearly unequal justice. I cannot agree to such refusals to apply what appear to me to be the clear commands of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. In DeStejano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635, I stated my view that the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, which guaranteed to adults in serious criminal cases and contempts the right to a trial by jury, should be given retroactive effect.* In light of this view, I am unable to join the Court’s per curiam opinion in this case, holding that because appellant’s juvenile court hearing was held prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom the Court is precluded from deciding appellant’s right to a jury trial. I would reach the merits and hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial as a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury. Such is this case, for behind the façade of delinquency is the crime of forgery. As originally conceived, the juvenile court was to be a clinic, not a court; the judge and all of the attendants were visualized as white-coated experts there to supervise, enlighten, and cure—not to punish. These white-coated people were surrogates, so to speak, of the natural parent. As stated in one of the leading cases : “To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of crime, to end in maturer *This has been my position with respect to all comparable constitutional decisions. See, e. g., Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 255-256 (dissenting opinion) ; DeStejano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635 (dissenting opinion) ; and cases cited therein. 36 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. years in public punishment and disgrace, the legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s guardianship and protection. The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it and to shield it from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness, nor is the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it into one of its courts. When the child gets there and the court, with the power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there. The act simply provides how children who ought to be saved may reach the court to be saved.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). This new agency—which stood in the shoes of the parent or guardian—was to draw on all the medical, psychological, and psychiatric knowledge of the day and transform the delinquent. These experts motivated by love were to transform troubled children into normal ones, saving them from criminal careers. Many things happened that prevented this dream from becoming a widespread reality. First, municipal budgets were not equal to the task of enticing experts to enter this field in large numbers. Second, such experts as we had, notably the psychiatrists and analysts, were drawn away by the handsome fees they could receive for rehabilitating the rich. Third, the love and tenderness alone, possessed by the white-coated judge and attendants, were not sufficient to untangle the web of subcon- DeBACKER V. BRAINARD 37 28 Douglas, J., dissenting scious influences that possessed the troubled youngster. Fourth, correctional institutions designed to care for these delinquents often became miniature prisons with many of the same vicious aspects as the adult models. Fifth, the secrecy of the juvenile proceedings led to some overreaching and arbitrary actions. As Mr. Justice Fortas stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 556: “There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.” In Kent, the Court held that a valid waiver of the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia required “a hearing, including access by . . . counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and ... a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.” Id., at 557. Although the opinion in that case emphasized that “the basic requirements of due process and fairness” be satisfied in such proceedings, id., at 553, the decision itself turned on the language of a federal statute. The first expansive treatment of the constitutional requirements of due process in juvenile court proceedings was undertaken in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1. That case involved a 15-year-old boy who had been committed by an Arizona juvenile court to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law” for allegedly making lewd telephone calls. The Court in Gault abandoned the view that due process was a concept alien to the philosophy and work of the juvenile courts. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, stated: “Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” Id., at 28. The Court held that a juvenile is entitled to adequate and timely notice 38 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. of the charges against him, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Since the decision in Gault, lower courts have divided on the question whether there is a right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Those courts which have granted the right felt that it was implicit in Gault. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1968) ; Peyton v. Nord, 78 N. M. 717, 437 P. 2d 716 (1968); In re Rindell, 2 BNA Cr. L. 3121 (Providence, R. I., Fam. Ct., Jan. 1968). Those who have denied the right have reasoned either that jury trial is not a fundamental right applicable to the States or that it is not consistent with the concept of a juvenile court. People v. Anonymous, 56 Mise. 2d 725, 289 N. Y. S. 2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A. 2d 9 (1967). Duncan and Bloom have negated the former reason. Whether a jury trial is in conflict with the juvenile court’s underlying philosophy is irrelevant, for the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. Given the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial as expressed in Duncan and Bloom, there is, as I see it, no constitutionally sufficient reason to deprive the juvenile of this right. The balancing of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceeding with the due process requirement of a jury trial is a matter for a future Constitutional Convention. The idea of a juvenile court certainly was not the development of a juvenile criminal court. It was to have a healthy specialized clinic, not to conduct criminal trials in evasion of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Where there is a criminal trial charging a criminal offense, whether in conventional terms or in the language of delinquency, all of the procedural requirements of the Constitution and Bill of Rights come into play. I would reverse this judgment. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 39 396 U. S. November 17, 1969 LAWRENCE et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS No. 509. Decided November 17, 1969 42 Ill. 2d 461, 248 N. E. 2d 71, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. John M. Bowlus for appellants. Raymond F. Simon, Marvin E. Aspen, and John J. George for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. 40 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 November 17, 1969 396 U.S. O’LEARY et al. v. KENTUCKY APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY No. 526. Decided November 17, 1969 441 S. W. 2d 150, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Robert Allen Sedler for appellants. John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, and George F. Rabe, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. BROCKINGTON v. RHODES 41 Per Curiam BROCKINGTON v. RHODES, GOVERNOR OF OHIO, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 31. Argued October 22, 1909—Decided November 24, 1969 Appellant, whose nominating petition bore signatures of about 1% of those in the congressional district who had voted in the last gubernatorial election (although the Ohio statute then required 7% of the voters on the nominating petition for an independent candidate for Congress), sought, as his sole relief, a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of Elections to place his name on the ballot as an independent candidate for Congress in the November 1968 election. Held: In view of the limited nature of the relief requested the case is now moot. Vacated and remanded. Benjamin B. Sheerer argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Ralph Rudd. Robert D. Macklin, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Paul W. Brown, Attorney General, Charles S. Lopeman, First Assistant Attorney General, and Julius J. Nemeth, Assistant Attorney General. John T. Corrigan and John L. Dowling filed a brief for appellees Cipollone et al. Per Curiam. The appellant sought to run in the November 1968 election as an independent candidate for the United States House of Representatives from the Twenty-first Congressional District of Ohio. His nominating petition bore the signatures of 899 voters in the congressional district, a little over 1% of those in the district who had voted in the gubernatorial contest at the last election. The Board of Elections ruled that the appellant’s petition was insufficient to put his name on the November ballot, because it did not contain the signatures of 7% of the 42 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. qualified voters, as Ohio law then required? The appellant petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for a writ of mandamus, challenging the 7% requirement as “unreasonably high and excessive, . . . disproportionate when compared to the 100 signatures required for party candidates,1 2. . . arbitrary and capricious, . . . [and] an invidious discrimination without any relationship to constitutionally justified ends . . . .” He urged as the proper standard for determining the sufficiency of his nominating petition the 1% requirement that had prevailed for over 60 years until the enactment of the 7% rule in 1952. He prayed for an immediate order restraining the Board of Elections from printing the election ballots; also for a writ of mandamus commanding the Board “to certify the sufficiency of relator’s nominating petition” and directing the appellees “to do all things necessary to place relator’s name upon the ballot as an independent candidate for United States House of Representatives from the Ohio Twenty-First Congressional District in the November 5, 1968, general election . . . .” His suit did not purport to be a class action, and he sought no declaratory relief. On August 22, 1968, the Court of Common Pleas denied the writ of mandamus. On October 1 the Court of 1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.257 (Supp. 1968) provided in pertinent part: “The nominating petition of an independent candidate for the office of . . . district representative to congress, shall be signed by not less than seven per cent of the number of electors who voted for governor at the next preceding regular state election for the office of governor in the district.” 2 Under Ohio law a candidate for the nomination of a political party to the office of United States Representative must, in order to enter the party primary, obtain from the party membership within the congressional district the signatures of either 100 voters or 5% of those who voted in the last gubernatorial election, whichever is less. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.05 (Supp. 1968). BROCKINGTON v. RHODES 43 41 Per Curiam Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District affirmed that judgment, and on October 23 the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question. The appellant then appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 393 U. S. 1078. While the appeal was pending here, Ohio amended the controlling statute, effective October 30, 1969, reducing the signature requirement from 7% to 4%. We do not think the recent statutory amendment has rendered this case moot. For the appellant has consistently urged the unconstitutionality of any percentage requirement in excess of the 1% that Ohio imposed prior to 1952, and he obtained the signatures of only about 1% of the voters in his district. He thus could not have won a place on the ballot even under the statute as currently written. Cf. Hall v. Beals, post, p. 45. Rather, in view of the limited nature of the relief sought, we think the case is moot because the congressional election is over. The appellant did not allege that he intended to run for office in any future election. He did not attempt to maintain a class action on behalf of himself and other putative independent candidates, present or future. He did not sue for himself and others similarly situated as independent voters, as he might have under Ohio law. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.21 (1953). He did not seek a declaratory judgment, although that avenue too was open to him. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2721.01-2721.15 (1953). Instead, he sought only a writ of mandamus to compel the appellees to place his name on the ballot as a candidate for a particular office in a particular election on November 5, 1968. In Ohio mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available to a petitioner only on a showing of clear legal right. State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N. E. 2d 1; State ex rel. 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio St. 348, 66 N. E. 2d 207. The writ does not lie to review the determination by a Board of Elections that a candidate is ineligible to assume the office he seeks or that his petition is invalid, in the absence of allegations of fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or a clear disregard of statutes or applicable legal principles. State ex rel. Flynn n. Board of Elections, 164 Ohio St. 193, 129 N. E. 2d 623; cf. State ex rel. Hanna v. Milburn, 170 Ohio St. 9, 11, 161 N. E. 2d 891, 893. In the instant suit the Court of Common Pleas ruled that the appellant “must not only establish that the act which he seeks to compel respondents to perform is one that they are constitutionally bound to perform by virtue of their offices, but also that he, the relator, has a clear right to have the duty enforced.” The court, without passing on the merits of the legal issues raised by the parties, found that the appellant had not established a clear legal right to the writ on the basis of all the evidence. It is now impossible to grant the appellant the limited, extraordinary relief he sought in the Ohio courts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio must be vacated, without costs in this Court, and the cause remanded for such proceedings as that court may deem appropriate. It is so ordered. HALL v. BEALS 45 Syllabus HALL et ux. v. BEALS, CLERK AND RECORDER OF EL PASO COUNTY, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO No. 39. Argued October 14, 1969—Decided November 24, 1969 Appellants, who moved to Colorado in June 1968, were refused permission to vote in the November 1968 presidential election because they could not meet Colorado’s six-month statutory residency requirement. They brought this class action challenging the constitutionality of that restriction and seeking, inter alia, mandamus and injunctive relief. The District Court upheld the statute and dismissed the complaint. After appellants appealed to this Court, the residency period for presidential elections was reduced to two months, and appellants also challenge that requirement in this Court. Held: 1. The amendment of the residency statute, under which appellants could have voted in the 1968 election, has mooted this case. 2. Appellants cannot represent a class (here Colorado voters disqualified by the two-month requirement) to which they never belonged. 3. The contingencies which would have to occur before appellants could be disenfranchised in Colorado in the next presidential election are too speculative to warrant this Court’s passing on the substantive issues of this case. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, distinguished. 292 F. Supp. 610, vacated and remanded. Richard Hall argued the cause pro se and for other appellant. Bernard R. Baker argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Carroll E. Multz and Robert L. Russel. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Louis F. Claiborne, and Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., 46 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. for the United States; by William F. Reynard, Melvin L. Wulf, and Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, and Elliott C. Lichtman for the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting; and by Harvey M. Burg. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam. The appellants moved from California to Colorado in June 1968. They sought to register to vote in the ensuing November presidential election, but were refused permission because they would not on election day have satisfied the six-month residency requirement that Colorado then imposed for eligibility to vote in such an election.1 The appellants then commenced the present 1 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-24—1 (1963) provided: “Eligibility of new resident to vote.—Any citizen of the United States who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, shall have resided in this state not less than six months next preceding the election at which he offers to vote, in the county or city and county not less than ninety days, and in the precinct not less than fifteen days, and shall have been duly registered as required by the provisions of this article, shall have the right to vote as a new resident for presidential and vice-presidential electors.” The appellant Richard Hall went to the office of the appellee Beals on or about August 1, 1968, to request that his wife and he be allowed to vote in the presidential election. Upon denial of his application, he wrote to the Colorado Secretary of State to ask that his wife and he be allowed to vote despite the six-month residency requirement. On September 6 the State Election Office informed the appellants they would not be permitted to vote. Apart from the special provision relating to the eligibility of new residents to vote in a presidential election, Colorado requires that HALL v. BEALS 47 45 Per Curiam class action against the appellees, electoral officials of El Paso County, Colorado. Their complaint challenged the six-month residency requirement as a violation of the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privilege and Immunities Clauses of the Constitution. For relief they sought (1) a writ of mandamus compelling the appellees to register them for the upcoming presidential election; (2) an injunction restraining the enforcement and operation of the Colorado residency laws insofar as they applied to the presidential election; and (3) a direction that the appellees register the appellants and allow them to vote “on a conditional basis, so that should either party choose to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States and such appeal should run past the time of the National Election on November 5, 1968, . . . the relief sought by [the appellants will] not become moot.” * 2 On October 30 the three-judge District Court entered judgment for the appellees and dismissed the complaint, holding that the six-month requirement was not unconstitutional. Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. C. Colo.).3 As a result the appellants did not vote in the 1968 presidential election. They took a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted persons desiring to vote in general, primary, and special elections must have resided in the State for one year. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-3-1 (1) (c) (1963). 2 The request for relief continued: “Should Plaintiffs win an eventual appeal, the Defendant Election Officials shall be directed to count Plaintiffs’ votes as normally cast and valid ballots; should Plaintiffs lose on final appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Defendant Election Officials shall destroy Plaintiffs’ ballots as if they had never been cast. This conditional registration is the only way Plaintiffs’ sought-for relief can be preserved should an appeal by either party run past the date of the National Election in question.” 3 The opinion of the District Court was issued on November 29, 1968. 48 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U.S. probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 1011. Thereafter the Colorado Legislature reduced the residency requirement for a presidential election from six months to two months. The 1968 election is history, and it is now impossible to grant the appellants the relief they sought in the District Court. Further, the appellants have now satisfied the six-month residency requirement of which they complained. But apart from these considerations, the recent amendatory action of the Colorado Legislature has surely operated to render this case moot. We review the judgment below in light of the Colorado statute as it now stands, not as it once did. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282; United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60; Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U. S. 23, 26-27; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110. And under the statute as currently written, the appellants could have voted in the 1968 presidential election. The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 110; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653. The appellants object now to the two-month residency requirement as vigorously as they did to the sixmonth rule in effect when they brought suit. They say that such statutes, in Colorado and elsewhere, continue to have an adverse effect upon millions of voters throughout the Nation. But the appellants’ opposition to residency requirements in general cannot alter the fact that so far as they are concerned nothing in the Colorado legislative scheme as now written adversely affects either their present interests, or their interests at the time this litigation was commenced. Nor does the result differ HALL v. BEALS 49 45 Per Curiam because the appellants denominated their suit a class action on behalf of disenfranchised voters. The appellants “cannot represent a class of [which] they are not a part,” Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33—that is, the class of voters disqualified in Colorado by virtue of the new two-month requirement, a class of which the appellants have never been members. Nothing in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, is to the contrary. There we invalidated an Illinois statute requiring that independent candidates for presidential elector obtain signatures on their nominating petitions from voters distributed through the State. We noted that even though the 1968 election was over, “the burden . . . placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935.’' 394 U. S., at 816. The problem before us was “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ ” not only because the same restriction on Moore’s candidacy that had adversely affected him in 1968 could do so again in 1972, but because Illinois, far from having altered its statutory scheme for the future benefit of those situated similarly to Moore, had adhered for over 30 years to the same electoral policy with no indication of change. Here, by contrast, the appellants will face disenfranchisement in Colorado in 1972 only in the unlikely event that they first move out of the State and then re-establish residence there within two months of the presidential election in that year. Or they may take up residence in some other State, and in 1972 face disqualification under that State’s law. But such speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on the substantive issues the appellants would have us decide with respect 50 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Brennan, J., dissenting 396 U. S. to the now-amended law of Colorado. Golden v. Zwick-ler, supra. The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the cause as moot. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting. I dissent from the direction to dismiss this case as moot. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute which had been invoked to deny the appellants a place on the 1968 ballot. We were not persuaded in that case by the argument that the appeal should be dismissed since the 1968 election had been held and there was no possibility of granting any relief to appellants. Even though appellants did not allege they would seek a place on the ballot at future elections, we held that the constitutional question was one “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. n. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), and, therefore, that mootness would not prevent our decision of its merits. In my view the present case is an even stronger one for application of that principle. At stake here is the fundamental right to vote—the right “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964); see also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 670 (1966), and the constitutional challenge of the amended Colorado statute is peculiarly evasive of review. This is because ordinarily a person’s standing to make that challenge would not mature unless he had become a Colorado resident within two months prior to a presidential election. Barring resort to extraordinary expedients, that interval is obviously too short for the exhaustion of state administrative remedies and the completion of a lawsuit through filing of the HALL v. BEALS 51 45 Marshall, J., dissenting complaint in a federal district court, convening of a three-judge court, trial, and review by this Court.* True, today’s virtual foreclosure of any opportunity for definitive judicial review may in some measure be prevented by resort to waiver of the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, preferred calendar position, or even relaxation of the rules of ripeness to permit a person not yet a resident to challenge the statute on a showing of reasonable certainty that he would be moving to the State within the two-month period. But the difficulties which attend these expedients only buttress my conclusion that if mootness did not bar decision of the constitutional question in Moore v. Ogilvie, there is even more reason to hold that mootness does not bar decision of the constitutional question presented here. Reaching the merits, I would reverse for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion, which I join. Mr. Justice Marshall, whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. I agree with my Brother Brennan that this case is not moot. It involves one of those problems “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ ” that call for relaxation of traditional concepts of mootness so that appellate review of important constitutional decisions not be permanently frustrated. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969). Indeed, one of the unfortunate consequences of a rigid view of mootness in cases such as this is that the state and lower federal courts may well be left as the courts of last resort for challenges of relatively short state residency requirements. Those courts may, as the District Court apparently did in this case, consider them- *The proceedings would probably require even more time if the plaintiff sued in state court, for review in this Court would come only after one or more levels of state appellate review. 52 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Marshall, J., dissenting 396 U. S. selves bound by this Court’s summary per curiam affirmance in Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U. S. 125 (1965), aff’g 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. C. Md. 1964), which upheld a one-year residency requirement for voting in a presidential election. It seems to me clear that Drueding is not good law today. The difficulties of achieving review in this Court in cases of this sort, combined with this misleading precedent, lead me to indicate briefly my view of the merits of the case before us. In Drueding, the District Court tested the residency requirement there challenged by the equal-protection standard applied to ordinary state regulations: that is, restrictions need bear only some rational relationship to a legitimate end. 234 F. Supp., at 724-725, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961). But if it was not clear in 1965 it is clear now that once a State has determined that a decision is to be made by popular vote, it may exclude persons from the franchise only upon a showing of a compelling interest, and even then only when the exclusion is the least restrictive method of achieving the desired purpose. Harper n. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 667 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626-628 (1969). Close scrutiny is thus demanded of Colorado’s requirement that in order to vote for President and Vice President, one must not only be a resident of that State, but one must have been a resident for a certain time before the election—six months when this suit was brought; now, two months. In support of this requirement, it is urged that the electoral college system as embodied in the Constitution contemplates the election of the President and Vice President, not by the Nation as such, but rather by the individual States, each acting as a community. Hence, the argument goes, each State may legislate to ensure that those voting for its presidential electors are truly members of the state community. HALL v. BEALS 53 45 Marshall, J., dissenting The argument is surely correct as far as it goes, and this Court has often reaffirmed the power of the States to require their voters to be bona fide residents. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 93-94 (1965); Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 625. But this does not justify or explain the exclusion from the franchise of persons, not because their bona fide residency is questioned, but because they are recent rather than longtime residents.1 Nor is it a justification to say that the State has certain parochial interests at stake in the election of a President, and that it may require of its voters a period of residency sufficiently lengthy to impress upon them the local viewpoint. This is precisely the sort of argument that this Court, in Carrington v. Rash, supra, found insufficient to justify Texas’ exclusion from voting in state elections of servicemen who had acquired Texas residency after they had entered the service. The State argued that military men newly moved to Texas might not have local interests sufficiently at heart. This Court replied: “But if they are in fact residents, with the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely, they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation. . . . ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.” 380 U. S., at 94. Similarly here, the fact that newly arrived Coloradans may have a more national outlook than longtime residents, or even may retain a viewpoint characteristic of 1 Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904), upheld a one-year residency requirement for voting in state elections. The Court specifically reserved the question of durational residency requirements as applied to voting in presidential elections. Id., at 633. In any case, Pope was decided long before application of the “compelling interest” test to restrictions on the franchise. 54 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Marshall, J., dissenting 396 U. S. the region from which they have come, is a constitutionally impermissible reason for depriving them of their chance to influence the electoral vote of their new home State. Nor does it suffice to argue that a durational residency requirement ensures that voters have had the time to gain knowledge of local issues, as distinguished from indoctrination in local attitudes. Even if it can be assumed that new residents know less about local issues than old residents, issues of this sort play so small a part in the election of the President and Vice President today that this can hardly be considered a compelling interest sufficient to justify entirely depriving millions of Americans of any opportunity to vote for their most important leaders. Cf. Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 633. The appellees argue that the State’s durational residency requirement is necessary to ensure the purity of its elections. The impurities feared (“dual voting” and “colonization”) all involve the same evil—voting by nonresidents, either singly or in blocks. But it is difficult to see how the durational residency requirement in any way protects against nonresident voting. The qualifications of the would-be voter in Colorado are determined when he registers to vote, which he may do until 20 days before the election. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49-4-2 (1) (Supp. 1965). At that time, he establishes his qualifications, including durational residence, by oath. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-4-17 (Supp. 1965.) The nonresident, seeking to vote, can as easily falsely swear that he has been a resident for a certain time, as he could falsely swear that he is presently a resident. The requirement of the additional element to be sworn—the duration of residency—adds no discernible protection against “dual voting” or “colonization” by voters willing to lie. Insofar as appears from the Colorado election laws, and from HALL v. BEALS 55 45 Marshall, J., dissenting the record in this case, the State makes no independent attempt to go behind the voter’s oath to determine his qualifications. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-13 (Supp. 1965). Moreover, even if an enforcement effort were made to prevent nonresident voting, and the exclusion of those taking up residency within two months of the election were used as a method of eliminating cases on the borderline between new residents and mere visitors, such an approach would be constitutionally overbroad. In Carrington v. Rash, supra, the State similarly argued that it was in many instances difficult to tell whether persons moving to Texas while they were in the service had the genuine intent to remain that establishes residency. Thus, the argument went, the administrative convenience of avoiding difficult factual determinations justified a blanket exclusion of all those in the doubtful category. The Court rejected such a “conclusive presumption” approach, noting that “States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State.” 380 U. S., at 96. Cf. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 542-543 (1965). Similarly here, a conclusive presumption that a recently established resident is not a resident at all for voting purposes is simply an overbroad burden upon the right to vote. In most cases, it is no more difficult to determine whether one recently arrived in the community has sufficient intent to remain to qualify as a resident than it is to make a similar determination for an older inhabitant.2 That there are borderline cases among the new 2 For instance, the appellants in this case, before applying for their ballots, had bought a home in Colorado Springs, registered their car with the Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles, acquired Colorado drivers’ licenses, and registered their eldest child in a private nursery school; further, Mr. Hall had taken permanent employment with a law firm in Colorado Springs. 56 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Marshall, J., dissenting 396 U. S. arrivals is not a constitutionally sufficient reason for denying the vote to those who have settled in good faith. Finally, appellees argue that the logistics of preparing for an election require that there be some time between the close of registration and the election itself. This period serves as a kind of residency requirement, in that persons establishing residency after the voting lists are closed are barred from voting. Yet this requirement is justified by compelling administrative needs. And, it is argued, once some period of this sort is conceded to be required, it is arbitrary for the courts to determine as a matter of constitutional law how long it may be. But this argument is unconvincing here. Colorado has apparently judged that administrative needs require 20 days between the close of registration and election day. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-4—2 (2) (Supp. 1965). Appellants have not challenged this statute. What they have challenged is the separate and additional requirement that voters, all of whom register before the 20-day cutoff date, also must have been residents of the State at least six months—by recent amendment two months—before the election. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49-24-1 (1963). For the argument from logistical need to save the durational residency requirement, the State would have to show some additional administrative need for this further burden on the right to vote. No such showing has been made. In my view the Colorado durational residency requirement for voters for President and Vice President violates the Equal Protection Clause, and appellants are entitled to reversal of the District Court judgment that upheld that requirement. ANDERSON’S-BLACK ROCK v. PAVEMENT CO. 57 Opinion of the Court ANDERSON’S-BLACK ROCK, INC. v. PAVEMENT SALVAGE CO., INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 45. Argued November 10, 1969—Decided December 8, 1969 Respondent brought this action for infringement of a patent for “Means for Treating Bituminous Pavement.” The patent sought to solve the problem of a cold joint on “blacktop” paving by combining known elements, a radiant-heat burner, a spreader, and a tamper and screed, on one chassis. The District Court, finding that all the inventor had done was to construct known elements in the prior art on a single chassis, held the patent invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: While the combination of old elements performed a useful and commercially successful function it added nothing to the nature and quality of the previously patented radiant burner, and to those skilled in the art the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention under the standard of 35 U. S. C. § 103. Pp. 59-63. 404 F. 2d 450, reversed. Alan W. Borst argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Nathaniel L. Leek. Walter J. Blenko, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent brought this action against petitioner for infringement of United States Patent No. 3,055,280 covering “Means for Treating Bituminous Pavement.” The patent was assigned to respondent by one Neville. Bituminous concrete—commonly called asphalt or “blacktop”—is often laid in strips. The first strip laid usually has cooled by the time the adjoining strip is to be laid, creating what is known as a cold joint. 58 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Because bituminous concrete is pliable and capable of being shaped only at temperatures of 250° to 290° F., the cold joint results in a poor bonding between the strips. Water and dirt enter between the strips, causing deterioration of the pavement. Respondent’s patent sought to solve the problem of the cold joint by combining on one chassis (1) a radiant-heat burner for heating the exposed edge of the cold strip of pavement; (2) a spreader for placing bituminous material against that strip; and (3) a tamper and screed, for shaping the newly placed material to the desired contour and surface. The standard paving machine in use prior to respondent’s claimed invention combined on one chassis the equipment for spreading and shaping the asphalt, and it is unquestioned that this combination alone does not result in a patentable invention. Petitioner’s alleged infringement resulted from its placing of a radiant-heat burner on the front of a standard paving machine, thus allowing its machine to perform the same functions with the same basic elements as those described in respondent’s patent. The use of a radiant-heat burner in working asphalt pavement dates back to a patent issued in 1905 to one Morcom, United States Patent No. 799,014. The value of such a heater lies in the fact that it softens the asphalt without burning the surface. The radiant-heat burner on respondent’s claimed invention is essentially the same as that disclosed in a patent issued in 1956 to one Schwank, United States Patent No. 2,775,294. Thus the burner, by itself, is also not patentable. The placement of the radiant-heat burner upon the side of a standard bituminous paver is the central feature of respondent’s patent. The heater is used in this way for continuous paving along a strip to prevent a cold joint, whereas previously radiant-heat burners had ANDERSON’S-BLACK ROCK v. PAVEMENT CO. 59 57 Opinion of the Court been used merely for patching limited areas of asphalt. The operation of the heater is, however, in no way dependent on the operation of the other equipment on the paving machine. It is hung on the paver merely because that is a convenient place for it when heating the longitudinal joint of the pavement. A separate heater can also be used in conjunction with a standard paving machine to eliminate the cold joint, and in fact is so used for heating the transverse joints of the pavement. Respondent claims that its patent involves a combination of prior art which produces the new and useful result of eliminating the cold joint. Its claim of unobviousness is based largely on the testimony of two individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of asphalt paving, expressing their doubts to the inventor Neville that radiant heat would solve the problem of cold joints. The District Court rejected respondent’s claim of infringement, finding the patent invalid. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed. For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Each of the elements combined in the patent was known in the prior art. It is urged that the distinctive feature of the patent was the element of a radiant-heat burner. But it seems to be conceded that the burner, by itself, was not patentable. And so we reach the question whether the combination of the old elements created a valid combination patent. The District Court said: “All that plaintiff [respondent] has done is to construct four elements known in the prior art on one chassis.” That is relevant to commercial success, not to invention. The experts tendered by respondent testified that they had been doubtful that radiant heat would solve the problem of 60 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. the cold joint.1 But radiant heat was old in the art. The question of invention must turn on whether the combination supplied the key requirement. We conclude that the combination was reasonably obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art. There is uncontested evidence that the presence of the radiant-heat burner in the same machine with the other elements is not critical or essential to the functioning of the radiant-heat burner in curing the problem of the cold joint. For it appears that a radiant-heat burner operating in a tandem fashion would work as well. The combination of putting the burner together with the other elements in one machine, though perhaps a matter of great convenience, did not produce a “new or different function,” Lincoln Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U. S. 545, 549, within the test of validity of combination patents. 1 Mr. Francis C. Witkoski, an engineer, met the inventor, Charles Neville, between 1955 and 1960 while Witkoski was Director of Research for the Pennsylvania Department of Highways. Neville told Witkoski that he had invented a piece of equipment that would heat but not burn asphalt, and would thus eliminate cold joints. Witkoski replied that he did not believe that Neville had such a piece of equipment. Subsequently, Witkoski ordered from Neville some of the separate burner units and tested them. Thus the dialogue between Witkoski and Neville focused exclusively on the properties of the radiant-heat burner. Mr. Leslie B. Crowley, also an engineer, met Neville prior to 1954. Crowley was at that time the Chief of the Pavements and Railroads Section, Director of Installations, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Neville explained the advantages of using an “infra-red” heater for the maintenance and repair of asphalt pavements. Crowley testified that his interest was insufficient at that time to motivate him to take any action with regard to the device because he did not believe it would “do the job.” Thus the Crowley-Neville discussion also focused entirely on the radiant-heat burner, and not on the combination of the burner with the other elements of a bituminous paver. ANDERSON’S-BLACK ROCK v. PAVEMENT CO. 61 57 Opinion of the Court A combination of elements may result in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergistic result is argued here. It is, however, fervently argued that the combination filled a long felt want and has enjoyed commercial success. But those matters “without invention will not make patentability.” A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 153. The patent standard is basically constitutional, Article I, § 8, of the Constitution authorizing Congress “'[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts” by allowing inventors monopolies for limited times. We stated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 6, that under that power Congress may not “enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.” In this case the question of patentability of the combination turns on the meaning of 35 U. S. C. § 103 2 which 2 35 U. S. C. § 103 provides: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” 62 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. the Court reviewed in the Graham case, supra, at 13-17. We said: “We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revision was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention. We conclude that the section was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss 3 condition, with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.” Id., at 17. Obviousness, as an issue, is resolved as follows: “Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.” Ibid. We admonished that “strict observance” of those requirements is necessary. Id., at 18. We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function,4 it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art the use of the old elements in com- 3 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248. 4 35 U. S. C. § 101 provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Absent here is the element “new.” For as we have said, the combination patent added nothing to the inherent characteristics or function of the radiant-heat burner. ANDERSON’S-BLACK ROCK v. PAVEMENT CO. 63 57 Opinion of the Court bination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Use of the radiant-heat burner in this important field marked a successful venture. But as noted, more than that is needed for invention. Reversed. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case. 64 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. BRYSON v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 35. Argued October 14, 1969—Decided December 8, 1969 Petitioner challenges his 1955 conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for falsely and fraudulently denying affiliation with the Communist Party in an affidavit he filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), pursuant to § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 9 (h), later repealed, provided that a union could not draw upon the jurisdiction of the NLRB unless each union officer filed with the NLRB an affidavit stating "that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party . . . .” The District Court set aside the conviction. It distinguished Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855; decided that §9(h), which had been upheld in American Communications Assn. n. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, could no longer be thought constitutionally valid, particularly in light of United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437; and concluded that the Government had no right to ask the questions which petitioner answered falsely in his affidavit. The Court of Appeals reversed since it found “no significant differences” between this case and Dennis, supra, and therefore thought it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of§9(h). Held: 1. The constitutionality of § 9 (h) is legally irrelevant to the validity of petitioner’s conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001, which punishes the making of fraudulent statements to the Government, Dennis, supra, because none of the elements of proof for petitioner’s conviction under § 1001 has been shown to depend on the validity of § 9 (h). Pp. 68-72. (a) The statutory term “affiliated,” which petitioner claims is vague and overbroad and which he suggests he misunderstood, was narrowly defined by the trial court in an instruction later explicitly approved by this Court, and the jury’s verdict reflects a determination that petitioner’s false statement was knowingly and deliberately made. Pp. 69-70. (b) Petitioner’s false statement was made in a “matter within the jurisdiction” of the NLRB, as the NLRB received the affidavit pursuant to explicit statutory authority, which only a short time before had been upheld as constitutional in Douds, supra. Pp. 70-71. BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 65 64 Opinion of the Court 2. Dennis, supra, negates any general principle that a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked. P. 72. 3. This case is not distinguishable from Dennis, supra, which is followed here. Pp. 72-73. 403 F. 2d 340, affirmed. Richard Gladstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Norman Leonard. Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, and Lee B. Anderson. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner asks this Court to set aside his 1955 jury conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 10011 for having falsely and fraudulently denied affiliation with the Communist Party in an affidavit he had filed with the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to § 9 (hl of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.1 2 This collateral proceeding was 1 Title 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides: “Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 2 Until repealed in 1959, § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, provided that no labor organization could draw upon the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board unless each officer of such organization had filed with the Board an affidavit stating “that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or 66 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. brought in the District Court for the Northern District of California in 1967, some 10 years after his original conviction was upheld over a variety of challenges on direct review.* 3 The District Court distinguished Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966), and decided that § 9 (h), which had been upheld in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950), could no longer be thought constitutionally valid, particularly in light of United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965). Having concluded that the Government had no right to ask the questions which petitioner answered falsely in his affidavit, the District Court ruled that petitioner’s conviction under § 1001 should be “without effect.” It therefore set aside petitioner’s conviction and discharged his parole (unreported opinion).4 On the Government’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed because it found “no significant differences” between this case and Dennis, and it therefore thought it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of § 9 (h). 403 F. 2d 340 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 1079 (1969), and we now affirm. teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of [§§ 286, 287, 1001, 1022, and 1023 of Title 18] shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits.” 3 See Bryson v. United States, 238 F. 2d 657 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1956), rehearing denied, 243 F. 2d 837, cert, denied, 355 U. S. 817 (1957). After direct review, but before initiating this proceeding, petitioner’s application for reduction of sentence was rejected, Bryson v. United States, 265 F. 2d 9 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert, denied, 360 U. S. 919 (1959). 4 After his conviction, petitioner had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. He had served almost two years of his sentence before being paroled in December 1959. Because only $2,000 of his fine had been paid, however, petitioner had not yet been discharged from his parole status when he commenced the present proceedings in 1967. BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 67 64 Opinion of the Court I Petitioner bottoms his claim to relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies of § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, enacted by Congress in 1947 out of concern that Communist Party influence on union officers created the risk of “political strikes,” see American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S., at 387-389. Under § 9 (h), a union could participate in representation proceedings conducted by the NLRB or utilize the Board’s machinery to protest employer unfair labor practices only if each of the union’s officers had filed a “non-Communist” affidavit. See n. 2, supra. Petitioner filed such an affidavit in 1951, and his subsequent conviction under § 1001 was based on a jury’s determination that petitioner had knowingly and willfully lied in his affidavit by denying affiliation with the Communist Party.5 About one year before petitioner filed the false affidavit, this Court had upheld § 9 (h) after considering a variety of asserted constitutional deficiencies, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra. However, in 1959 Congress replaced § 9 (h) with a provision that simply made it a crime for one who was or had recently been a Communist Party member to be a union officer,6 and this successor statute was subsequently held unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, United States v. Brown, supra. Relying primarily on Brown, petitioner argues that § 9 (h) was also a bill of attainder, prohibited by Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution. Petitioner also argues that the statute abridged First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and association, and was so vague as 5 The jury acquitted petitioner of the separate charge that he had fraudulently denied that he was a “member” of the Communist Party. 6 Section 504, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 536, 29 U. S. C. § 504. 68 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We do not decide whether § 9 (h)—now repealed for over 10 years—would today pass constitutional muster and whether Douds would be reaffirmed. Guided by Dennis v. United States, supra, we hold that the question of whether § 9 (h) was constitutional or not is legally irrelevant to the validity of petitioner’s conviction under § 1001, the general criminal provision punishing the making of fraudulent statements to the Government. II In Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966), the petitioners had been convicted of a conspiracy to obtain fraudulently the services of the National Labor Relations Board by filing false affidavits in purported satisfaction of the requirements of § 9 (h). Those petitioners, like the petitioner here, asked the Court to reverse Douds and hold § 9 (h) invalid. Deciding that “the claimed invalidity of § 9 (h) would be no defense to the crime of conspiracy charged in [the] indictment,” the Court refused in Dennis to “reconsider Douds.” 384 U. S., at 867. The Court, drawing on United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937), and Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), stated: “The governing principle is that a claim of unconstitutionality will not be heard to excuse a voluntary, deliberate and calculated course of fraud and deceit. One who elects such a course as a means of self-help may not escape the consequences by urging that his conduct be excused because the statute which he sought to evade is unconstitutional. This is a prosecution directed at petitioners’ fraud. It is not an action to enforce the statute claimed to be unconstitutional.” 384 U. S., at 867. We find the principle of Dennis no less applicable in the case before us. First, none of the elements of proof BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 69 64 Opinion of the Court necessary for petitioner’s conviction under § 1001 has been shown to depend on the validity of § 9 (h). Petitioner suggests in this collateral proceeding that when he filed his affidavit he misunderstood the meaning of the statutory term “affiliated,” a word which he claims is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. But the trial court narrowly defined the term in an instruction 7 later explicitly approved by this Court in Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231, 254-258 (1961). Moreover, the jury’s verdict reflects a determination that petitioner’s false statement was knowingly and willfully made. This negates any claim that petitioner did not know the falsity of his statement at the time it was made, or that it was the product of an accident, honest inad- 7 The instructions of the court on affiliation were: “The verb ‘affiliated,’ as used in the Second Count of the indictment, means a relationship short of and less than membership in the Communist Party, but more than that of mere sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Communist Party. “A person may be found to be ‘affiliated’ with an organization, even though not a member, when there is shown to be a close working alliance or association between him and the organization, together with a mutual understanding or recognition that the organization can rely and depend upon him to cooperate with it, and to work for its benefit, for an indefinite future period upon a fairly permanent basis. “Briefly stated, affiliation as charged in the Second Count of the indictment, means a relationship which is equivalent or equal to that of membership in all but name. “I tried to think of some analogy which would make that possibly clearer to you, and the best one I can think of—we have all in our experience probably heard of a man and woman who live together but are not married. They are husband and wife in everything but name only. You have probably heard that expression. A person to be affiliated with the Communist Party within the meaning of that term as used in the Second Count of the indictment must be a member in every sense and stand in the relationship of a member in every sense but that of the mere technicality of being a member,— in everything but name.” Bryson v. United States, 238 F. 2d, at 664 n. 8. 70 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. vertence, or duress. Insofar as petitioner in this collateral proceeding attempts to suggest the contrary,8 he is simply trying to impeach the jury’s verdict, upheld after careful review on direct appeal. As another element of the offense, § 1001 requires that the false statement be made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” Petitioner argues that if § 9 (h) was unconstitutional, then the affidavit requirement was not within the “jurisdiction” of the Board, and therefore the false statement was not punishable under § 1001. Because there is a valid legislative interest in protecting the integrity of official inquiries, see United States v. Bram-blett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, 93 (1941),9 we think the term “jurisdiction” should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of § 1001, Ogden v. United States, 303 F. 8 Petitioner claims that he did not know that his relationship with the Communist Party amounted to affiliation, and that he signed the affidavit submitted to the Board after counsel had advised him that he was not at the time “affiliated.” This is apparently the same claim he made in an affidavit prepared in connection with his motion to reduce his sentence. At his trial, however, petitioner did not take the stand, and his unproved allegations are not even found in the record upon which the jury found him guilty. 9 In concluding that the Board had no jurisdiction for purposes of § 1001, the District Court reasoned that if § 9 (h) were unconstitutional, the Board was not performing one of its “authorized functions,” a phrase taken from United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S., at 93. By taking Gilliland’s unelaborated reference to “authorized functions” out of context, the District Court gave that phrase a meaning both unsupported by the holding and inconsistent with the spirit of that decision. The holding of Gilliland that there need be no “pecuniary . . . loss to the government” in order to punish fraudulent behavior was based on the Court’s concern that the statute be given a broad reading in order to protect the Government “from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described,” ibid. BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 71 64 Opinion of the Court 2d 724, 742-743 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Adler, 380 F. 2d 917, 921-922 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1967). A statutory basis for an agency’s request for information provides jurisdiction enough to punish fraudulent statements under § 1001.10 11 In this case, the Board received petitioner’s affidavit pursuant to explicit statutory authority, which only a short time before had been upheld as constitutional in Douds. Given that under § 9 (h) the Board’s “power to act on union charges [was] conditioned on filing of the necessary affidavits,” Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U. S. 145, 148-149 (1956), the Board certainly had the apparent authority, granted by statute, necessary for purposes of § 1001. Thus, we hold that irrespective of whether Douds would be reaffirmed today, petitioner made a false statement in a “matter within the jurisdiction” of the Board.11 10 We do not read previous decisions of this Court, in contexts other than prosecutions under § 1001, e. g., Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 453-462 (1908); United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14 (1913); Viereck n. United States, 318 U. S. 236 (1943); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84 (1949), as inconsistent with this conclusion. Petitioner has cited no cases of this Court, and we know of none, in which there existed statutory authority to require a statement but the Court nevertheless held that a prosecution for a false answer could not be maintained because the statute was later determined invalid. Friedman v. United States, 374 F. 2d 363 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1967), cited by the dissent, held that a false and fraudulent statement willfully and knowingly given to the FBI in order “to initiate a federal prosecution under the Civil Rights Laws” was not “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency” for purposes of § 1001 because the FBI “had no power to adjudicate rights, establish binding regulations, compel the action or finally dispose of the problem giving rise to the inquiry.” Id., at 365, 368. We have no occasion in the present context either to approve or disapprove Friedman’s holding. 11 We have no need to decide in this case whether jurisdiction would exist under § 1001 if at the time the request for information was made a court had already authoritatively determined that the statutory basis was invalid. Cf. United States v. Kapp, supra. 72 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Notwithstanding the fact that the Government has proved the elements necessary for a conviction under § 1001, the petitioner would have us say that the invalidity of § 9 (h) would provide a defense to his conviction. But after Dennis it cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked. Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions 12—lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. HI Petitioner argues, and the District Court also found, that Dennis is distinguishable, and that its teachings therefore have no relevance in this instance. The first distinction offered is that Dennis involved a conviction for conspiracy, whereas this petitioner was prosecuted under § 1001 for individually making a false statement.13 We see nothing in that fact that makes Dennis less applicable in this instance. The cases are indeed very similar in that both involve the use of false affidavits “to circumvent the law and not to challenge it— 12 For two examples of how the constitutional validity of § 9 (h) could be raised, see American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S., at 385-387. 13 In support of the contention that Dennis was meant to apply only to conspiracy charges and not simply to § 1001 violations, both the District Court and petitioner here quote the language in Dennis to the effect that: “It is the entire conspiracy, and not merely the filing of false affidavits, which is the gravamen of the charge.” 384 U. S., at 860. That language, however, was addressed to the threshold question that the Court faced in Dennis, namely, whether the facts alleged in the indictment were sufficient to warrant a conspiracy charge, which requires elements additional to those necessary for a violation of § 1001. BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 73 64 Douglas, J., dissenting a purported compliance with [§ 9 (h) was] designed to avoid the courts, not to invoke their jurisdiction.” 384 U. S., at 865. Petitioner also attempts to distinguish Dennis on the ground that the behavior involved in the present case was less culpable than that found punishable in Dennis, and that this petitioner, unlike the petitioners in Dennis, did not “flout” the law for he had “every right to believe” that he had not perjured himself. If apart from attempting to impeach the jury’s verdict, see n. 8, supra, petitioner is suggesting that the principles of Dennis depend on an assessment of moral culpability beyond the jury’s determination of guilt, he simply misconceives the basis of Dennis. Dennis can hardly be read as instructing courts to impose an extra punishment on a defendant found to have been dishonest by refusing to consider a constitutional argument that is legally relevant to his defense. Dennis refused to reconsider Douds because of the legal conclusion that the constitutionality of § 9 (h) was not relevant to the validity of the conspiracy prosecution. Petitioner finally contends that the Court should not follow Dennis because “its strictures . . . have no relevance at all to postconviction proceedings.” Of course, federal courts have jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims on collateral review, but a substantive defense that is not legally relevant on direct review becomes no more relevant because asserted on collateral review. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs, dissenting. This conviction was founded on an indictment which in the words of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 makes it a crime to file “any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 74 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting. 396 U.S. representations” in any matter “within the jurisdiction” of the National Labor Relations Board. Former § 9 (h) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (h) (1958 ed.), barred a union from using the services of the Board unless and until each of the union’s officers had filed his affidavit that he was neither a member of nor affiliated with the Communist Party. The basic question in this proceeding under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is whether constitutionally speaking it was “within the jurisdiction” of the Board to require the filing of those affidavits. Obviously the power of Congress to authorize prosecution for crimes of this character must rest on an interference with or obstruction of some “lawful” function of the agency in question. See United States n. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172. Apart from constitutional problems, the question of what is “within the jurisdiction” of an agency should be construed in a restrictive, not an expansive, way. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit so held in Friedman v. United States, 374 F. 2d 363, when it ruled that telling a falsehood to the FBI in its role as “investigator” was not “within the jurisdiction” of that agency in the sense of § 1001. If it were, then telling lies to agencies would carry heavier penalties than committing perjury in court. 374 F. 2d, at 367. The words “within the jurisdiction” must be read not only with the common-sense approach of Friedman but also in light of our constitutional regime. One of many mandates imposed on Congress by the Constitution is the prohibition against bills of attainder. Art. I, § 9. It was said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, that § 9 (h) was not a bill of attainder. The opinion was by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and it was called an “opinion of the Court.” It was, however, a six-man Court and the ruling on the bill of BRYSON v. UNITED STATES 75 64 Douglas, J., dissenting attainder point was in Part VII of the opinion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the opinion “except as to Part VII.” Id., at 415. Mr. Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part. Id., at 422. Section 9 (h) was vulnerable in his view because it proscribed opinion or belief which had not manifested itself “in any overt act.” Id., at 436. He said: “Attempts of the courts to fathom modern political meditations of an accused would be as futile and mischievous as the efforts in the infamous heresy trials of old to fathom religious beliefs.” Id., at 437. “[E]fforts to weed erroneous beliefs from the minds of men have always been supported by the argument which the Court invokes today, that beliefs are springs to action, that evil thoughts tend to become forbidden deeds. Probably so. But if power to forbid acts includes power to forbid contemplating them, then the power of government over beliefs is as unlimited as its power over conduct and the way is open to force disclosure of attitudes on all manner of social, economic, moral and political issues.” Id., at 438. From this opinion I conclude that Mr. Justice Jackson did not reach the bill of attainder point in Mr. Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion. And Mr. Justice Black dissented. Id., at 445. So I conclude that no more than three members of the Court (Vinson, C. J., and Reed and Burton, JJ.) ever held that § 9 (h) was constitutional against the challenge that it was a bill of attainder. In United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, we held that the successor of § 9 (h), § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, was a bill of attainder. It made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee (except in clerical or custodial positions) 76 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U.S. of a labor union. The Vinson opinion in Douds upheld § 9 (h) on the basis that it was “intended to prevent future action rather than to punish past action.” 339 U. S., at 414. In Brown, it was likewise argued that the statute there involved was “preventive rather than retributive in purpose.” 381 U. S., at 457. That view was rejected. The question, we said, was whether § 504 inflicted “punishment” which, we pointed out, “serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent— and preventive.” Id., at 458. The dissenters—Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White—concluded that Douds was “obviously overruled.” Id., at 464-465. Whatever may be said technically about any remaining vitality of the Douds case, it obviously belongs to a discredited regime, though, like Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, it has never been officially overruled. The rule invoked by the Court to deny petitioner the opportunity to challenge that bill of attainder in this proceeding is, as stated by Mr. Justice Black in his separate opinion in Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 878, “a new court-made doctrine.” As he pointed out in that opinion, the prior decisions of this Court relied on to deny the defense of unconstitutionality of a federal law were instances of false claims for benefits to which the complainant had “no possible right whether the statute was constitutional or unconstitutional.” Ibid. In this case, however, Congress installed an unconstitutional barrier to receipt of the benefits administered by the Labor Board. Since § 9 (h), in light of Brown, was plainly unconstitutional, petitioner’s union was entitled to those services without the filing of any affidavit. Therefore, unlike prior cases, the United States had been deprived of nothing and defrauded of nothing by the filing of any affidavit or other form of claim. I would reverse the judgment below. UNITED STATES v. KNOX 77 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. KNOX APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 17. Argued October 14, 1969— Decided December 8, 1969 This is an appeal by the Government from the dismissal of two counts of an indictment charging appellee with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1001 by making false statements in wagering tax forms required by 26 U. S. C. § 4412. The District Court dismissed the indictment, reasoning that appellee could not be prosecuted for “failure to answer the wagering form correctly” since his privilege against self-incrimination would have prevented prosecution for “failure to answer the form in any respect.” Held: 1. One who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself. Bryson v. United States, ante, p. 64. Pp. 79-80. 2. By filing false statements appellee took a course other than the one that § 4412 was designed to compel, a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take. Pp. 81-82. 3. Whether, as appellee argues, he gave the false information under the duress of §§ 4412 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, or his false statements were not made “willfully” as required by 18 U. S. C. §1001, must be determined initially at his trial. Pp. 82-84. 298 F. Supp. 1260, reversed. Mervyn Hamburg argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., and Beatrice Rosenberg. J. Edwin Smith argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. 78 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396U.S. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee Knox has been charged with six counts of violation of federal law in connection with his wagering activities. The first four counts of the indictment charge that between July 1964 and October 1965 he engaged in the business of accepting wagers without first filing Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C, the special return and registration application required by §4412 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and without first paying the occupational tax imposed by § 4411 of the Code. Counts Five and Six charge that when Knox did file such a form on October 14, 1965, and when he filed a supplemental form the next day, he knowingly and willfully understated the number of employees accepting wagers on his behalf—in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001, a general criminal provision punishing fraudulent statements made to any federal agency. Knox moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that this Court’s decisions in Marchetti n. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), had held invalid1 the provisions of the wagering tax laws that required him to file the special return. The Government in response stated that it would not pursue the first four counts but argued that Knox’s objections based on the Marchetti and Grosso decisions were “largely irrelevant” to Counts Five and Six. The District Court disagreed. It dismissed all six counts, reasoning that Knox could not be prosecuted for his “failure to answer the wagering form correctly” since his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would have prevented prosecution for “failure to answer the form in any respect.” 298 F. Supp. 1260, 1261. The United States filed a direct appeal to this Court 1 But see nn. 3, 6, infra. UNITED STATES v. KNOX 79 77 Opinion of the Court from the dismissal of the two counts charging violations of § 1001, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 971 (1969).2 In Bryson v. United States, ante, p. 64, decided today, we reaffirmed the holding of Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966), that one who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself. Bryson, like Dennis, 2 Such a direct appeal is authorized by the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, which provides: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded. “From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” The District Court sustained the claim of privilege not on the basis of facts peculiar to this case but on the basis of its conclusion that the Fifth Amendment provides a defense to any prosecution under § 1001 based on misstatements on a Form 11-C. This amounts to a holding that § 1001, as applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid. The generality of the impact of the District Court’s holding appears to us to render our jurisdictional holding a fortiori compared to analogous jurisdictional holdings in such cases as Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100, 102-104 (1947); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950); Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 356-357 (1966). We prefer to rest our jurisdiction on this aspect of § 3731 rather than, as advocated by the Government, the statute’s “motion in bar” provision, in light of the fact that the scope of the latter provision will be the subject of full-dress consideration, as will certain problems under the “dismissing any indictment” provision not present in this case, in United States v. Sisson, consideration of jurisdiction postponed, post, p. 812. 80 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. involved § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 146, which was attacked as an abridgment of First Amendment freedoms and as a bill of attainder forbidden by Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution. In contrast, Knox alleges infringement of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. We do not think that the different constitutional source for Knox’s claim removes his case from the ambit of the principle laid down in those decisions. The validity of the Government’s demand for information is no more an element of a violation of § 1001 here than it was in Bryson.3 The indictment charges that the forms Knox filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue contained false, material information,4 an accusation that con- 3 Knox argues that his false Forms 11-C were not filed “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States,” a necessary element of a violation of § 1001, because Marchetti and Grosso held that the Internal Revenue Service was not authorized to require the filing of the forms. Even if his reading of those decisions were correct, his argument would fail for the reasons explained in Bryson. The Internal Revenue Service has express statutory authority to require the filing, and when Knox submitted his forms this Court had held that such a requirement raised no self-incrimination problem. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1953); Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 (1955). Further, in Marchetti we did not hold that the Government is constitutionally forbidden to direct the filing of the form, but only that a proper assertion of the constitutional privilege bars prosecution for failure to comply with the direction. See n. 6, injra; see also Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S., at 69-70, n. 7. 4 Knox claims on appeal that neither Count Five nor Count Six charges any affirmative misstatements, but only omissions. Count Five charges that the statements on the form filed on October 14, 1965, “were not true, correct, and complete, in that the number of employees and/or agents engaged in receiving wagers in his behalf were misrepresented and understated, in that the number, name, special stamp number, street address, and city and state of em- UNITED STATES v. KNOX 81 77 Opinion of the Court cededly falls within the terms of § 1001. However, Knox claims that the Fifth Amendment bars punishing him for the filings because they were not voluntary but were compelled by §§ 4412 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code. He points out that if he had filed truthful and complete forms as required by § 4412, he would have incriminated himself under Texas wagering laws. On the other hand, if he had filed no forms at all, he would have subjected himself to criminal prosecution under § 7203.* 5 In choosing the third alternative, submission of a fraudulent form, he merely opted for the least of three evils, under a form of duress that allegedly makes his choice involuntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. ployees and/or agents engaged in receiving wagers in the said JAMES D. KNOX’s behalf had been omitted . . . .” Count Six contains language identical except for an apparently inadvertent difference in punctuation. Although the wording is not entirely clear, we need not decide whether on a fair reading the indictment encompasses affirmative misstatements. The District Court read the indictment as alleging that Knox violated § .1001 “by wilfully and knowingly making a false statement” on the forms, and it was on the basis of this construction that the court dismissed Counts Five and Six. We have no jurisdiction on this direct appeal to review the construction of the indictment. E. g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 193 (1939). But see United States n. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948). See also n. 2, supra. 5 Title 26 U. S. C. §7203 provides: “Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015 or section 6016), keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” 82 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. For this proposition Knox relies on United States v. Lookretis, 398 F. 2d 64 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1968), where, after this Court had remanded for reconsideration in light of Marchetti, see 390 U. S. 338 (1968), the Court of Appeals ruled that truthful disclosures made under the compulsion of § 4412 could not be introduced against their maker in a criminal proceeding. However, the Fifth Amendment was offended in Lookretis precisely because the defendant had succumbed to the statutory compulsion by furnishing the requested incriminatory information. Knox does not claim that his prosecution is based upon any incriminatory information contained in the forms he filed, nor that he is being prosecuted for a failure to supply incriminatory information. He has taken a course other than the one that the statute was designed to compel, a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take. This is not to deny that the presence of § § 4412 and 7203 injected an element of pressure into Knox’s predicament at the time he filed the forms. At that time, this Court’s decisions in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 (1955), established that the Fifth Amendment did not bar prosecution for failure to file a form such as 11-C. But when Knox responded to the pressure under which he found himself by communicating false information, this was simply not testimonial compulsion. Knox’s ground for complaint is not that his false information inculpated him for a prior or subsequent criminal act; rather, it is that under the compulsion of § § 4412 and 7203 he committed a criminal act, that of giving false information to the Government. If the compulsion was unlawful under Marchetti? Knox may have a defense to 6 We stressed in Marchetti “that we do not hold that these wagering tax provisions are as such constitutionally impermissible; we hold only that those who properly assert the constitutional privilege UNITED STATES v. KNOX 83 77 Opinion of the Court this prosecution under the traditional doctrine that a person is not criminally responsible for an act committed under duress. See generally Model Penal Code §§2.09, 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ; id., § 2.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). It is only in this sense that there is any relevance to Knox’s attempted distinction of this case from Dennis, Bryson, and their predecessors, United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937), and Kay n. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), on the ground that in those cases the false statements were voluntarily filed for the purpose of obtaining benefits from the Government. Knox argues that the criminal sanction for failure to file, coupled with the danger of incrimination if he filed truthfully, was more coercive in its effect than, for example, the prospect that the petitioners in Dennis would lose their jobs as union officers unless they filed nonCommunist affidavits. While this may be so, the question whether Knox’s predicament contains the seeds of a “duress” defense, or perhaps whether his false statement was not made “willfully” as required by § 1001, is one that must be determined initially at his trial.* 7 It as to these provisions may not be criminally punished for failure to comply with their requirements. If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is not confronted by substantial hazards of self-incrimina-tion, or if he is otherwise outside the privilege’s protection, nothing we decide today would shield him from the various penalties prescribed by the wagering tax statutes.” 390 U. S., at 61. Nothing before us indicates that the hazard of incrimination faced by Knox was less substantial than that faced by Marchetti, or that Knox would have been disqualified for any other reason from asserting the privilege in defense of a prosecution for failure to comply with § 4412. 7 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which cautions the trial judge that he may consider on a motion to dismiss the indictment only those objections that are “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue,” indicates that evidentiary questions of this type should not be determined on such a motion. 84 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. is not before us on this appeal from dismissal of the indictment, and we intimate no view on the matter. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs, dissenting. In this case, as in Bryson v. United States, ante, p. 64, the relevant inquiry is whether ‘‘constitutionally speaking it was ‘within the jurisdiction’ ” of a government agency to require the filing of certain information. Id., at 74 (dissenting opinion). In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 61, we held that the statutory requirement of filing Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C is not unconstitutional per se. It is clear, however, that under Marchetti, supra, and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, the “jurisdiction” of the Internal Revenue Service to require this form to be filed is subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This is not a case where an individual, with knowledge that he has a right to refuse to provide information, nonetheless provides false information. Under the decisions in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419, which were controlling at the time Knox filed his wagering form, Knox faced prosecution under 26 U. S. C. § 7203 for failure to file the form, despite claims of self-incrimination. The Government’s requirement to file the wagering form was unconditional. The majority argues that by the terms of Marchetti the Government is not prohibited from requesting the form, but is only prohibited from prosecuting an individual for his failure to comply with the request. Ante, at 80, n. 3. The question in this case, however, is not whether the Government has the power to request the form to be filed, but whether it has the power to require the form to be filed. If Knox had UNITED STATES v. KNOX 85 77 Douglas, J., dissenting merely been requested to file the form and, with full knowledge of his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment, had done so voluntarily, we would have quite a different case. That is not this case. Under the scheme then in effect, the Government demanded unconditionally that Knox file the form, regardless of the fact that it would incriminate him. Heavy penalties were placed on a failure to file the form. Marchetti and Grosso held that those in Knox’s position have the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent irrespective of the statutory command that they submit forms which could incriminate them. Had Knox asserted his right of silence under the Fifth Amendment, it is clear that the Internal Revenue Service could not, consistently with Marchetti and Grosso, have required him to file the wagering form.* Thus any argument that the Internal Revenue Service did have “jurisdiction” to require the form to be filed in this case would have to rest on a theory that Knox had “waived” his Fifth Amendment right by not asserting it in lieu of filing the form. A similar claim was made in Grosso, where the petitioner had not asserted his Fifth Amendment right as to certain counts concerning his failure to pay the special occupational tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. §4411. The Court there said: “Given the decisions of this Court in Kahriger and Lewis, supra, which were on the books at the time of petitioner’s trial, and left untouched by Albertson v. SACB [382 U. S. 70], we are unable to view his failure to present this issue as an effective waiver of the constitutional privilege.” 390 U. S., at 71. *As the majority opinion states: “Nothing before us indicates that the hazard of incrimination faced by Knox was less substantial than that faced by Marchetti, or that Knox would have been disqualified for any other reason from asserting the privilege . . . .” Ante, at 83 n. 6. 86 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. That reasoning is equally applicable here, for Kahriger and Lewis were still on the books at the time Knox filed his form. And see Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 27-29. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Bryson, ante, p. 73, and in Mr. Justice Black’s separate opinion in Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 875, if the Internal Revenue Service had no constitutional authority to require Knox to file any wagering form at all, his filing of a form which included false information in no way prejudiced the Government and is not, in my view, a matter “within the jurisdiction” of the Internal Revenue Service. I would affirm the judgment below. MINOR v. UNITED STATES 87 Syllabus MINOR v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 189. Argued October 15, 1969— Decided December 8, 1969* Petitioner in No. 189 was convicted of selling heroin to an undercover agent not pursuant to a written order on an official form, in violation of § 2 of the Harrison Narcotics Act, 26 U. S. C. §4705 (a). In No. 271, petitioner was convicted of selling marihuana to an agent who did not have the official order form required by § 6 of the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. § 4742 (a). The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions over objections that the statutory obligation to sell only pursuant to an official order form violated petitioners’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Held: 1. With respect to the Marihuana Tax Act, the petitioner seller’s claim of violation of his privilege against self-incrimination is not substantial. Pp. 91-94. (a) There is no real possibility that purchasers would comply with the order form requirement even if the seller insisted on selling only pursuant to the prescribed form, in view of the $100 per ounce tax on an unregistered transferee; the illegality under federal and state law; and the fact that the Fifth Amendment, as held in Leary n. United States, 395 U. S. 6, relieves unregisteted buyers of any duty to pay the tax and secure the order form. P. 92. (b) In Leary, supra, the statute purported to make all marihuana purchases legal from the buyer’s viewpoint at his option; but to exercise that option and avoid the federal penalty, he was forced to incriminate himself under other laws. Here, compliance by selling is foreclosed as a viable option, not because the seller might incriminate himself, but because he will seldom, if ever, encounter an unregistered purchaser willing and able to secure the order form. In such a case, “full and literal” com- *Together with No. 271, Buie v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. 88 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U.S. pliance by the seller with § 4742 (a) means simply that he cannot sell at all. Pp. 92-93. (c) That there is a small number of registered marihuana dealers does not change this result, since petitioner’s customer was not a registered dealer, and it is unlikely that even a registered dealer would present an order form to an unregistered seller. Pp. 93-94. 2. Petitioner seller’s self-incrimination claim under the Harrison Narcotics Act is likewise insubstantial. Pp. 94-98. (a) Petitioner’s argument which assumes that an order form would be forthcoming if he refused to sell without it, is unrealistic, there being no substantial possibility that a buyer could have secured an order form to obtain heroin, virtually all dealings in which are illicit. Pp. 96-97. (b) Since petitioner’s customer was not a registered buyer, the alleged possibility of incrimination is purely hypothetical. P. 97. (c) Even if petitioner’s customer were registered, the result would probably be the same, since it is unlikely that a registered dealer would enter the name of an unregistered seller on the order form and record what would surely be an illegal sale. Pp. 97-98. No. 189, 398 F. 2d 511, and No. 271, 407 F. 2d 905, affirmed. Phylis Skloot Bamberger, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 809, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 189. With her on the briefs was William E. Hellerstein. David A. Diamond argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 271. Peter L. Strauss argued the cause for the United States in No. 189. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Leonard H. Dickstein. Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for the United States in No. 271. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Miss Rosenberg, and Mervyn Hamburg. MINOR v. UNITED STATES 89 87 Opinion of the Court Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases raise related questions about the availability of the Fifth Amendment as a defense to convictions for selling narcotic drugs and marihuana without the written order forms required by law. James Minor, petitioner in No. 189, sold heroin on two separate occasions in 1967 to an undercover narcotics agent. Having wraived trial by jury, petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of selling narcotics not pursuant to a written order on an official form—a violation of § 2 of the Harrison Narcotics Act, now 26 U. S. C. §4705 (a).1 Michael Buie, petitioner in No. 271, sold five packages of marihuana in May 1967 to an undercover narcotics agent. The agent did not have the official order form required for such transactions by § 6 of the Marihuana Tax Act, now 26 U. S. C. §4742 (a).1 2 * * 5 A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted petitioner of violating § 4742 (a). 1 Section 4705 (a) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away narcotic drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Secretary or his delegate.” 2 Section 4742 (a) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person ... to transfer marihuana, except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such marihuana is transferred, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Secretary or his delegate.” Under 26 U. S. C. §7237 (b), any person who violates the provisions of §§ 4705 (a) or 4742 (a) “shall be imprisoned not less than 5 or more than 20 years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.” 90 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. In separate opinions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed both convictions over objections in each case that the statutory obligation to sell only in pursuance of an official order form violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Minor, 398 F. 2d 511 (1968); United States v. Buie, 407 F. 2d 905 (1969). We granted certiorari, 395 U. S. 932 and 976, to consider petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claims, particularly in light of our intervening decision in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments in both cases. We deal first with No. 271. Under pertinent provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 4751-4753, every person who sells, deals in, dispenses, or gives away marihuana must register with the Internal Revenue Service and pay a special occupational tax. The Act also imposes a tax on transfers of marihuana, to be paid by the transferee ; the rate for those who have registered and paid the occupational tax is $1 per ounce; for those who have not or who cannot register the rate is $100 per ounce. Under § 4742 (a) it is illegal to transfer marihuana except pursuant to a written order of the transferee on a form obtained by the latter at the time he pays the transfer tax. The order form when issued must carry the name and address of both buyer and seller and the amount of marihuana to be purchased. 26 U. S. C. § 4742 (c). Other provisions of § 4742 require the form to be issued in triplicate, one copy to be retained by the Internal Revenue Service, the other copy to be kept in the buyer’s files, and the original to be delivered to the seller and retained by him. 26 U. S. C. § 4742 (d). Both original and copies are open to inspection by federal and state law enforcement officers. 26 U. S. C. §§ 4742 (d), 4773. Buie argues that because the buyer’s order must be on the form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and MINOR v. UNITED STATES 91 87 Opinion of the Court because § 4742 (c) requires the seller’s name and address to be on the form before its issuance to the buyer, the seller is forced to incriminate himself: he is forced to insist on an order form linking him to an illicit transaction and in many instances must furnish one of those links himself by giving his name to the buyer so that the latter will have the data necessary to secure the form. Moreover, it is said that the very act of selling pursuant to the order form forces the seller to admit that he is the person named in the document and to acknowledge the sale of specified amounts of marihuana on a specified date; the sale also leads to the further requirement that both seller and buyer retain a copy of the form open to inspection by law enforcement officials. We have considerable doubt that any of these arguments would withstand close scrutiny,3 but we find it unnecessary to appraise them in detail because we have concluded that there is no real and substantial possibility that Buie’s purchaser, or purchasers generally, would be willing to comply with the order form requirement even if their seller insisted on selling only pursuant to the form prescribed by law. 3 The obligation to furnish the necessary information is in terms placed on the buyer; while his compliance with that obligation may “inform” on the seller, it would not ordinarily be thought to result in the latter’s “self-incrimination.” Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that buyers cannot get a seller’s name except through the seller himself, or that the simple act of selling pursuant to an order form—even assuming the act is “testimonial” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment—adds significantly to the information that the Government has already obtained from the buyer. Finally, whatever the merits of a seller’s attempt to assert the privilege in a prosecution for failure to keep and exhibit the order forms, it need not follow that he can similarly dispense with the requirement that he sell only to buyers who first identify themselves, via the order form, as lawful purchasers. Cf. Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 351 (1928); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 94 (1919). 92 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. The situation of the buyer is this: if he applies for the order form he must announce his intention to purchase marihuana—a transaction that, if he is unregistered, will involve a tax of $100 for each ounce of marihuana involved in the impending sale and that is illegal under both federal and state law. We have great difficulty in believing, and nothing in this record convinces us, that one who wishes to purchase marihuana will comply with a seller’s request that he incriminate himself with federal and local authorities and pay $100 per ounce in taxes in order to secure the order form. The possibility is particularly unlikely in view of the fact that the Fifth Amendment relieves unregistered buyers of any duty to pay the transfer tax and secure the incriminating order form. Leary n. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969). Except that they are sources of marihuana, sellers have no magic power over buyers; and the characteristics of marihuana do not suggest that buyers would be driven by such urgent need that to get the drug they would incriminate themselves at the seller’s behest and pay the prohibitive tax imposed on the transfer. As insistent as sellers might be, it is extremely unlikely that buyers would comply. Buie’s situation thus bears little resemblance to the situation that confronted Leary. The vice of the statute in that case—as in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, and Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968)—stemmed from the dilemma that confronted the buyer. The statute purported to make all purchases of marihuana legal from the buyer’s viewpoint at his option; all he had to do to avoid the federal penalty was to secure the form and pay the tax. But to exercise that option and avoid the federal penalty, he was forced to incriminate himself under other laws. In the present case, the first horn of this dilemma does not confront the seller. In the MINOR v. UNITED STATES 93 87 Opinion of the Court face of a buyer’s refusal to secure the order form, the option of making a legal sale under federal law is foreclosed by the buyer’s decision, and “full and literal compliance” with the law by the seller means simply that he cannot sell at all.4 There is no real and substantial possibility that the § 4742 (a) order form requirement will in any way incriminate sellers for the simple reason that sellers will seldom, if ever, be confronted with an unregistered purchaser who is willing and able to secure the order form. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that there is a tiny number of registered marihuana dealers—some 83 in the entire country according to government figures for 1967.5 In order to register, dealers must show that they are in compliance with local laws6 and, when 4 It would have been no answer in Leary to suggest that the buyer avoid his dilemma by not buying. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 51-52. But the buyer in Leary, unlike the seller here, was presented with the possibility of both purchasing and complying with the federal law, if he would only incriminate himself. In the present case, compliance by selling is foreclosed as a viable option, not because the seller might incriminate himself, but because the buyer refuses to meet a specified condition. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment prevents Congress from restricting a seller’s market to specified classes of duly licensed buyers. And although the buyer’s refusal to comply with the Act’s requirements may stem from his fear of incrimination, the buyer’s personal privilege cannot be raised by the seller as an excuse for evading the clear statutory requirement. See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U. S. 286 (1968); Rogers v. United. States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951). 5 U. S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 42 (1968). 6 The regulations, 26 CFR §§ 152.22, 152.23, which limit registration to persons whose dealings are legal under relevant state and local laws, are supported by the legislative history and represent what is by now long-established administrative practice. See Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 24 n. 38 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 792, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); S. Rep. No. 900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937); Hearings on H. R. 6906 before a subcommittee of 94 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. registered, can get order forms by paying a transfer tax of only $1 per ounce. A registered dealer is thus not subject to the deterrent pressures operating on the unregistered dealer. But the possibility that a registered dealer would present an order form to an unregistered seller like Buie is itself a hypothesis more imaginary than real; any buyer who can purchase marihuana from a legitimate source is hardly likely to find it to his advantage to secure the drug instead on the illegal market. In any event, it is quite clear in this case that Buie’s customer was not a registered dealer. Nor is there anything to suggest that he would have been willing or able to get an order form had he been asked. No. 189. The same result must follow in Minor’s case and for similar reasons. The Harrison Narcotics Act, 26 U. S. C. § 4701 et seq., applies to various drugs, including heroin. Dealers must register and pay an occupational tax, 26 U. S. C. §§ 4721-4722; producers or importers who sell must purchase stamps and affix them to the package, 26 U. S. C. §§4701, 4703, 4771 (a)(1); and it is illegal to purchase or sell except from the original stamped package, 26 U. S. C. §4704 (a). As in the case of the Marihuana Tax Act, all transfers, with exceptions not relevant here, must be made pursuant to a written order form issued by the Government. 26 U. S. C. § 4705 (a). Only dealers who are in compliance with state law may register, and only registered dealers may secure order forms. 26 U. S. C. §§ 4705 (f), (g) ; see 26 U. S. C. § 4721; 26 CFR § 151.24. Order forms are issued in triplicate to proper applicants and are stamped only with the name of the prospective purchaser. 26 U. S. C. § 4705 (f); 26 CFR §151.161. the Senate Committee on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1937); Hearings on H. R. 6385 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1937). MINOR v. UNITED STATES 95 87 Opinion of the Court When a purchaser decides to execute a form, he fills in the exact date of the order and the number and type of drugs requested and signs his name to the form. 26 CFR §§ 151.163-151.165, 151.167. The purchaser retains the duplicate and delivers the original and the triplicate thus executed to the seller, who enters the number and size of the stamped packages furnished and the date when each item is filled. 26 CFR §§ 151.161 (a), 151.185. A regulation, 26 CFR § 151.201, requires the seller to forward the triplicate to the Internal Revenue Service at the end of the month. Section 4705 (d) of the Act requires both seller and buyer to keep their respective copies for a period of two years and to make them accessible to inspection by law enforcement officers. The order form provisions for narcotic drugs thus differ from the marihuana provisions in three principal respects. First, the prospective seller’s name does not have to be given to the Government when the order form is secured, but is filled in only when the form is subsequently executed.7 Second, although the marihuana seller apparently does not have to add anything to the order form in making the sale, the seller of narcotics must enter the amounts sold and the dates. Finally, unlike the Marihuana Tax Act, which at least in theory permits any person to buy as long as the transfer tax is paid, the Harrison Narcotics Act explicitly forbids the sale of order forms to any but registered dealers and permits registra- 7 It is not specified in either the statute or the regulations when the blank for the seller’s name is filled in or by whom. But the form itself is addressed “to” the seller, and the form and the regulations contain provisions that enable a form “made out to” one seller, to be endorsed by him to another if the first seller cannot fill the order. See 26 CFR § 151.189. This suggests that it is the buyer who fills in the seller’s name when he sends in the order. Whether or not that is the case in fact is irrelevant under the analysis in the text. 96 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. tion only by those “lawfully entitled” under the laws of their State to deal in the drug.8 Like Buie, Minor argues that compliance with the order form provision would compel him to give incriminating information to be preserved in his and the buyer’s files and to be made readily accessible to law enforcement agents. Like Buie’s argument, Minor’s argument assumes that an order form would otherwise be forthcoming if he refused to sell without it9 and founders if in reality there is no substantial possibility that the buyer would or could have secured an order form. As in Buie’s case, we are convinced that this possibility is an unreal one. Prospective buyers who have either failed to register or cannot register because their dealings in the drug are illicit—and petitioner himself strenuously argues that virtually all dealings in heroin are illicit10—simply 8 The difference between the availability of order forms under the Harrison Narcotics Act and the Marihuana Tax Act was explicitly recognized by Congress when it passed the latter Act. See Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 21-22 (1969). The regulation restricting registration to those “lawfully entitled” to deal in narcotic drugs, 26 CFR § 151.24, finds specific support in the language of the Act. See 26 U. S. C. §§4705 (g), 4721. 9 Even if order forms could realistically be secured, Minor’s Fifth Amendment arguments are no more persuasive than Buie’s. See n. 3, supra. 10 See Brief for Petitioner 22-23. Convinced that “[h]eroin has no medical value that is not better served by legitimate drugs,” S. Rep. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1956), Congress in 1956 required the surrender of all theretofore lawfully possessed heroin, to be distributed only as approved by the Secretary for purposes of scientific research. 18 U. S. C. § 1402. The Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 35 Stat. 614, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §§ 173, 174, effectively prohibits the importation of heroin or of opium for the purpose of manufacturing heroin, and makes it a felony to traffic in drugs knowing them to have been unlawfully imported. The Narcotics Manufacturing Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 55, 21 U. S. C. § 501 et seq., prohibits the manufacturing of heroin except as authorized for limited scientific purposes. Given the resulting absence of orig MINOR v. UNITED STATES 97 87 Opinion of the Court are not among the class of persons to whom sellers are permitted to sell under any condition. When dealing with buyers in this class, the seller faces no risk of incrimination by reason of § 4705 (a) since there will be and can be no order form involved. Confronted with would-be buyers in this class, “full and literal compliance” with § 4705 (a) leaves the seller only one alternative: not to sell. Since from this record it is clear that Minor’s customer was not a registered buyer, the alleged possibility of incrimination is purely hypothetical. We doubt that our conclusion would be different even if Minor’s customer were registered. It is true that there were some 400,000 registered dealers under the Harrison Narcotics Act in 196711 and that registered dealers can readily get order forms issued in blank. It is conceivable, of course, that a registered dealer would seek to buy heroin on the illegal market, but it is difficult to imagine that he would enter the name of an unregistered seller on the order form and make a record of what would surely be an illegal sale.11 12 Such unlikely possibilities inal stamped packages of heroin, 26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a) effectively forbids buying, selling, dispensing, or distributing the drug. Since for ail practical purposes there is thus no legitimate dealing in heroin, any attempt to use an order form to purchase the drug would almost certainly subject the buyer to prosecution under 26 U. S. C. §4705 (g): “It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain by means of said order forms narcotic drugs for any purpose other than the use, sale, or distribution thereof by him in the conduct of a lawful business in said drugs or in the legitimate practice of his profession.” 11 See U. S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 22, 42 (1968). 12 Even if the hypothetical became a reality, it is doubtful that the incriminating information would get back to the Government via the buyer, who would himself be guilty of a violation of the narcotics laws. See n. 10, supra. See also 26 CFR § 151.181, which provides that order forms may be filled only by registered sellers— a class to which Minor does not belong. It is significant that of the 98 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. present only “imaginary and insubstantial” hazards of incrimination, rather than the “real and appreciable” risks needed to support a Fifth Amendment claim.13 The judgments in both cases are affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent in No. 271. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs, dissenting in No. 189. The guilt of petitioner on this record seems plain. Two counts charge sales of heroin on two different dates in 1967 “not in pursuance of a written order . . . form.” He was found guilty on each count by the District Court, a trial by jury having been waived. The basis of his nearly 400,000 registered dealers in 1967, only four were reported during that year for a violation of the narcotics laws. See U. S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 22 (1968). 13 The dissent suggests that the courts should refuse to enforce § 4705 (a) as part of a revenue measure. But these very order form provisions were upheld long ago as valid revenue laws even though they operated to prevent large classes of people from obtaining order forms—and hence from acquiring drugs—at all. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); v. United States, 249 U. S. 96 (1919); see Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928). A statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure because it deters the activity taxed, because the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the activity is otherwise illegal. See, e. g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 44 (1968); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28 (1953); License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (1867). Even viewing § 4705 (a) as little more than a flat ban on certain sales, it is sustainable under the powers granted Congress in Art. I, §8. See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 183 (1925). Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216, 222 (1915); cf. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689 (1948); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). MINOR v. UNITED STATES 99 87 Douglas, J., dissenting attack upon his conviction in this Court is that the requirement of an order form violates his privilege against self-incrimination. But that is not the end of the matter for me. Mr. Justice Holmes used to say that one dealing with the Government should turn square corners. See Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143. When the present all-powerful, all-pervasive Government moves to curtail the liberty of the person, it too should turn square corners. The statute involved in this case, 26 U. S. C. § 4705 (a), was derived from the Anti-Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 785, commonly called the Harrison Narcotics Act. This Act, as amended, imposes an occupational tax on registered dealers in narcotics, 26 U. S. C. §§4721-4722, and also imposes a commodity excise tax on narcotics sold or removed for consumption or sale, 26 U. S. C. §4701. Under §4705 (a), with certain exceptions not relevant here, all transfers of narcotics must be made pursuant to an official order form given to the transferor by the transferee. The order form can be obtained only by persons properly registered to deal in narcotics. It was conceded by the Government on oral argument, however, that ‘fit is impossible to secure an order form for the purchase of heroin. . . . The order forms may only be used to purchase a lawful drug for a lawful purpose. Heroin is an unlawful drug for which there is no lawful purpose/’ The Federal Government does not have plenary power to define and punish criminal acts. Its power in this regard derives from other powers specifically delegated to it by the Constitution, as the Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 100 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. Section 4705 (a) derives from the power to “lay and collect Taxes?’ Art. I, § 8. Its constitutionality on this basis was sustained in United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86—a five-to-four decision. It was there said that the “order form” requirement tended “to keep the traffic aboveboard and subject to inspection by those authorized to collect the revenue,” and also tended “to diminish the opportunity of unauthorized persons to obtain the drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed by the federal law.” Id., at 94. As I view this case, the Government is punishing an individual for failing to do something that the Government has made it impossible for him to do—that is, obtain an order form from the prospective purchaser prior to making a sale of heroin. Petitioner did, of course, have the option not to sell the heroin, and in that sense his compliance with the statute was indeed quite possible. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the statute does not simply outlaw all sales of heroin. The critical interest of the Government is necessarily in the collecting of the tax imposed by the Act, and it is the order form which provides the crucial link to this proper constitutional purpose. In Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 341, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, said: “In interpreting the Act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress and must be regarded as invalid . . . Thus it is the order form—not the mere sale—that constitutes the heart of the offense for which this petitioner was convicted. I do not see how the Government can make a crime out of not receiving an order form MINOR v. UNITED STATES 101 87 Douglas, J., dissenting and at. the same time allow no order forms for this category of sales. Nor is it relevant to suggest, as does the majority opinion, ante, at 98 n. 13, that a statute imposing a flat ban on sales of heroin might be sustainable under the Commerce Clause. We are concerned in this case with what the Congress did, not with what it might have done or might yet do in the future. It is clear that what Congress did in § 4705 (a) was to enact a taxing measure. And the crime charged was not selling heroin, but selling it “not in pursuance of a written order . . . form,” as prescribed in § 4705 (a). I would reverse this judgment of conviction. 102 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. MORALES v. NEW YORK CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 86. Argued November 20, 1969—Decided December 8, 1969 Petitioner went to his mother’s place of business after his mother told him by telephone that the police wished to talk with him. He was apprehended and taken to a police station, where within 15 minutes he confessed to a murder by stabbing. He wrote and signed a statement and later repeated the substance of the statement in response to further police questioning. A separate hearing on the voluntariness of the confessions was held, and the trial judge found them voluntary and admitted them into evidence. Petitioner was convicted and the conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. In the New York Court of Appeals, petitioner for the first time raised a Fourth Amendment issue, claiming that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that the confessions, even if voluntary, were inadmissible fruits of the illegal detention. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State could conduct brief custodial interrogation of “those persons reasonably suspected of possessing knowledge of the crime under investigation in circumstances involving crimes presenting a high degree of public concern affecting the public safety.” Held: 1. The determination that the confessions were voluntary is not disturbed, as the trial occurred prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and the totality of the circumstances shows that the confessions were not coerced. 2. The question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest, which goes beyond Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and Sibron v. Nero York, 392 U. S. 40, is not decided in view of the absence of a record which squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the factual context in which the question arises. 22 N. Y. 2d 55, 238 N. E. 2d 307, vacated and remanded. Richard T. Farrell argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Burton B. Roberts argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Daniel J. Sullivan. MORALES v. NEW YORK 103 102 Per Curiam Per Curiam. On October 4, 1964, a murder by stabbing took place in an elevator of an apartment building where petitioner Morales’ mother lived and where Morales frequently visited. On October 13, his mother informed Morales by telephone that the police wished to talk with him; petitioner said that he would come that evening to his mother’s place of business. This he did. He was apprehended by police officers and taken to the police station, arriving at 8:30 p. m. Within 15 minutes he had confessed to the crime and by 9:05 p. m. he had written and signed a statement. In response to subsequent questioning by police officers, Morales later repeated the substance of this confession. At the trial, the court held a separate hearing on the voluntariness of the confessions, found them voluntary, and admitted them over Morales’ objection. Morales was convicted, the jury apparently rejecting his alibi defense that he was with his mother at the time of the murder. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. People v. Morales, 27 App. Div. 2d 904, 280 N. Y. S. 2d 520 (1967). In the New York Court of Appeals, Morales for the first time raised a Fourth Amendment issue, claiming that there was no probable cause for his detention at the time of his confessions and that the confessions, even if voluntary, were inadmissible fruits of the illegal detention. The State asserted that the issue had not been decided below and that there had hence been no opportunity to make a record of the relevant facts; moreover, the State claimed that Morales had voluntarily surrendered himself for questioning and that in any event the voluntary confessions were the result of an independent choice by Morales such that the legality of the detention was irrelevant to the admissibility of the confessions. 104 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. The Court of Appeals affirmed, accepting without discussion the trial court’s finding as to the voluntariness of Morales’ confessions. People v. Morales, 22 N. Y. 2d 55, 238 N. E. 2d 307 (1968). The court dealt with and rejected the Fourth Amendment claim not on the ground that there was probable cause to arrest but rather on the ground that the police conduct involved was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Although Morales was not free to leave at the time he was apprehended and would have been restrained had he attempted to flee, the Court of Appeals stated that his detention was not a formal arrest under New York law and that had he refused to answer questions in the police station (where he was entitled to have a lawyer if he desired one) he would have been free to leave. The Court of Appeals held that the State had authority under the Fourth Amendment to conduct brief custodial interrogation of “those persons reasonably suspected of possessing knowledge of the crime under investigation in circumstances involving crimes presenting a high degree of public concern affecting the public safety.” 22 N. Y. 2d, at 65, 238 N. E. 2d, at 314. We granted certiorari, 394 U. S. 972 (1969). After considering the full record, we do not disturb the determination of the trial court, affirmed by the New York appellate courts, that Morales’ confessions were voluntarily given. The trial occurred prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confessions shows that the confessions were voluntary, not coerced. We should not, however, decide on the record before us whether Morales’ conviction should otherwise be affirmed. The ruling below, that the State may detain for custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a traditional arrest, is manifestly important, goes beyond MORALES v. NEW YORK 105 102 Per Curiam our subsequent decisions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), and is claimed by petitioner to be at odds with Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969). But we have concluded after considering the parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument that there is merit in the State’s position that the record does not permit a satisfactory evaluation of the facts surrounding the apprehension and detention of Morales. A lengthy hearing was held on the question of the voluntariness of the confessions, but the basis for the apprehension of Morales does not appear to have been fully explored since no challenge to the lawfulness of the apprehension was raised until the case came to the Court of Appeals. Although that court stated that “[i]t may be conceded that the apprehending detectives did not have probable cause to justify an arrest of defendant at the time they took him into custody,” 22 N. Y. 2d, at 58, 238 N. E. 2d, at 310, the court later said that “[t]he checkerboard square of the police investigation, although resting upon circumstantial evidence, pointed only to defendant. ... In fact, defendant was the only person the police could have reasonably detained for questioning based upon the instant record.” 22 N. Y. 2d, at 64, 238 N. E. 2d, at 313. Given an opportunity to develop in an evidentiary hearing the circumstances leading to the detention of Morales and his confessions, the State may be able to show that there was probable cause for an arrest or that Morales’ confrontation with the police was voluntarily undertaken by him or that the confessions were not the product of illegal detention. In any event, in the absence of a record that squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the factual context in which the question arises, we choose not to grapple 106 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. with the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest. We accordingly vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black dissents and would affirm. CONWAY v. ADULT AUTHORITY 107 Per Curiam CONWAY v. CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 40. Argued November 12, 1969—Decided December 8, 1969 Certiorari was granted to consider petitioner’s contention that his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had been infringed by the California prison authorities. Petitioner, who was serving consecutive sentences of not less than five years each, attacked the constitutionality of his confinement pursuant to the California Indeterminate Sentence Law. He asserted that respondent Adult Authority extended his term beyond the date tentatively set for his discharge solely because he refused to admit his guilt. Respondents filed no response to the petition for habeas corpus in the District Court, and in response to the petition for certiorari merely argued that petitioner’s claim was legally insubstantial. In their brief on the merits here they have presented documentary evidence that the actual facts do not present the issue for which certiorari was granted. Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Certiorari dismissed. Charles Stephen Ralston, by appointment of the Court, 394 U. S. 941, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Arlo E. Smith, Chief Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and George R. Nock, Deputy Attorney General. Per Curiam. The petition for habeas corpus in this case, which was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of California and which was prepared by petitioner pro se, attacked the constitutionality of petitioner’s confinement in the state prison system pursuant to the California 108 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U. S. Indeterminate Sentence Law.1 Petitioner recited that he was convicted in 1952 on two counts of first-degree robbery and was given consecutive sentences of not less than five years each, with no maximum prescribed by law. California law provides that where no maximum term is set, the punishment shall be life imprisonment subject to the power of the California Adult Authority to “determine and redetermine” the length of time that a prisoner shall be required to serve. Cal. Penal Code §§ 671 (1955), 1168, 3020 (1956). Petitioner asserted that in June 1961 he appeared before the Adult Authority for parole consideration, as he had done on a yearly basis during his confinement. According to petitioner, during that appearance the members of the Authority evinced an intention to extend his term beyond March 1962, the date that had been tentatively set for his discharge, solely because petitioner refused to admit his guilt.1 2 Shortly after the appearance, the Adult Authority rescinded its earlier action scheduling petitioner for release in 1962; no new date for release was fixed, and petitioner has remained in custody continuously since that time. The petition for habeas corpus stated flatly that the appearance before the Authority in June 1961 was for routine parole consideration; petitioner claimed that he had been free from infractions of prison rules for at least 1 See Cal. Penal Code § 1168 (1956) and provisions there listed. 2 Petitioner claimed that his discussion with the members of the Authority had turned to what he planned to do if released. When petitioner stated that he expected to go “to Bakersfield,” one member responded: “But that is where you got into this trouble. What are you planning to do there?” Petitioner declared, “I’m going to fight my case,” prompting the member to ask whether petitioner had not admitted to the Authority, two years earlier, that he was guilty. After petitioner denied the previous admission, the members raised—assertedly for the first time—the possibility of extending petitioner’s term. CONWAY v. ADULT AUTHORITY 109 107 Per Curiam a year prior to the appearance. He further declared that he was given no reason for the redetermination of his sentence, and received no notice or hearing concerning any possible basis for such action. In conclusion, petitioner stated that, “obviously, the only reason for this action was to coerce petitioner to plead guilty and not challenge his conviction after being released on discharge.” Respondents filed no response to the petition in the District Court. That court denied the writ without a hearing, in a brief order stating that no federal questions had been presented. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal for the reasons expressed by the District Court, and petitioner applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari. On the facts recited by petitioner, we granted certiorari to consider his contention that his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had been infringed by the prison authorities. 393 U. S. 1062 (1969). In its brief on the merits, respondents have brought to our attention a series of prison documents, whose accuracy has in no way been drawn into question by petitioner, that cast petitioner’s detention in a light wholly different from that shed by his petition for certiorari. These documents show that in December 1960 Conway was served with a notice charging him with violation of prison rules and informing him that the violation might result in a refixing of his prison term; he attended a hearing at which he was found guilty of fighting with another prisoner and was sentenced to three days in isolation, with a recommendation that his Adult Authority appearance be postponed until June 1961. Following that appearance, as petitioner notes, the Authority rescinded its earlier action fixing a determinate sentence, thereby reinstating by operation of law his initial indeterminate sentence. Thus, it now appears respondents have documentary evidence that the actual facts simply do not 110 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Per Curiam 396 U.S. present the issue for which certiorari was granted by us. That this imposition on this Court has been revealed only at this late stage seems to have been the result of the policy of the Attorney General of California, as explained in the respondents’ brief, to make no response to habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners unless the court in which a petition is filed requests a response, as for example, so respondents say, by issuing an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Since no response eventuated in this instance and respondents also failed to flush the problem at the certiorari stage,3 both this Court and the attorney appointed by the Court to represent petitioner here have unwittingly been placed in the unfortunate posture of addressing a situation that does not exist. In this state of affairs we decline to adjudicate this case. Were we to pass upon the purely artificial and hypothetical issue tendered by the petition for certiorari we would not only in effect be rendering an advisory opinion but also lending ourselves to an unjustifiable intrusion upon the time of this Court. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. 3 In response to the petition for certiorari respondents merely locked horns with the allegations of the petition as filed, without drawing the Court’s attention to the actual facts as subsequently revealed in its brief on the merits. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 111 396 U. S. December 8, 1969 NATIONAL SMALL SHIPMENTS TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, INC., et al. v. MIDDLEWEST MOTOR FREIGHT BUREAU et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA No. 539. Decided December 8, 1969 Appeal dismissed. Arthur A. Arsham and John J. C. Martin for appellants. Roland Rice for Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau et al., and Solicitor General Griswold and Fritz Kahn for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. INTERNATIONAL NICKEL CO., INC. v. CITY OF BAYONNE APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY No. 542. Decided December 8, 1969 54 N. J. 94, 253 A. 2d 545, appeal dismissed. Prospero DeBona for appellant. Nicholas A. Panepinto for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 112 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 December 8, 1969 396 U. S. AMBROSE et al. v. WELLS et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK No. 580. Decided December 8, 1969 Appeal dismissed. John M. Armentano for appellants. Robert B. McKay for Wells, and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorney General, for Rockefeller et al., appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. GOODING, WARDEN v. WILSON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA No. 582. Decided December 8, 1969 303 F. Supp. 952, appeal dismissed. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon and Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorneys General, and Franklin Pierce for appellant. Per Curiam. The motion of the appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 113 396U.S. December 8, 1969 PERK, AUDITOR OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY v. OHIO ex rel. CORRIGAN, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 590. Decided December 8, 1969 19 Ohio St. 2d 1, 249 N. E. 2d 525, appeal dismissed. Gerald A. Donahue and Donald M. Robiner for appellant. John T. Corrigan, pro se, and John L. Dowling for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CAPITAL ELECTRIC POWER ASSN. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI No. 611. Decided December 8, 1969 222 So. 2d 399, appeal dismissed. Bernard G. Segal, Samuel D. Slade, Sherwood W. Wise, Garner W. Green, and Joshua Green for appellant. T. Harvey Hedgepeth for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 114 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 December 8, 1969 396 U.S. BALTHAZAR et ux. v. MARI LTD. et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS No. 593. Decided December 8, 1969 301 F. Supp. 103, affirmed. Marshall Patner for appellants. Maurice P. Raizes for Mari Ltd. et al., and Daniel P. Coman, Thomas E. Brannigan, and Dean H. Bilton for Boyle, appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. MATHIS v. NELSON, WARDEN APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA No. 620, Mise. Decided December 8, 1969 70 Cal. 2d 467, 450 P. 2d 290, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 115 396U.S. December 8, 1969 NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, INC. v. UNITED STATES APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA No. 599. Decided December 8, 1969 Affirmed. R. Emmett Kerrigan, Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr., and George W. Wise for appellant. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, and Irwin A. Seibel for the United States. Per Curiam. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. HUESDASH v. HASKINS, CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 816, Mise. Decided December 8, 1969 Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 116 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 December 8, 1969 396 U.S. UNITED FUEL GAS CO. v. HADEN, TAX COMMISSIONER OF WEST VIRGINIA APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 617. Decided December 8, 1969 --- W. Va. --, 167 S. E. 2d 890, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. C. E. Goodwin for appellant. Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, and William F. Carroll, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. INGRAM v. CALIFORNIA APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT No. 1017, Mise. Decided December 8, 1969 272 Cal. App. 2d 435, 77 Cal. Rptr. 423, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 117 396 U. S. December 8, 1969 FOSTER v. CALDWELL, INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTE SUPERINTENDENT APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA No. 72, Mise. Decided December 8, 1969 225 Ga. 1, 165 S. E. 2d 724, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Reber F. Boult, Jr., Charles Morgan, Jr., Melvin L. Wulf, and Eleanor Holmes Norton for appellant. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Marion 0. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 118 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 December 8, 1969 396 U. S. McMANN, WARDEN, et al. v. ROSS et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 153. Decided December 8, 1969 409 F. 2d 1016, vacated and remanded as to respondent Ross. Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Lillian Z. Cohen and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorneys General, for petitioners. Thomas D. Barr for respondent Ross. Frank S. Hogan, pro se, and Michael R. Juviler for the District Attorney of New York County as amicus curiae urging reversal. Per Curiam. Upon consideration of the suggestion of mootness by reason of the death of respondent Ross the judgment of the Court of Appeals, as to Ross, is vacated and the case as to him is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with directions to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus as moot. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 119 396 U. S. December 8, 1969 CARLOS v. NEW YORK ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 524. Decided December 8, 1969 Certiorari granted; 24 N. Y. 2d 865, 248 N. E. 2d 924, reversed. Herald Price Fahringer and Eugene Gressman for petitioner. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed, Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied. However, the case having been taken for review, they would affirm the judgment of the state court upon the premises stated in Mr. Justice Harlan’s separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496 (1957), and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455 (1966). 120 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 December 8, 1969 396 U. S. SHANKER et al. v. RANKIN, CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 552. Decided December 8, 1969 25 N. Y. 2d 780, 250 N. E. 2d 584, appeal dismissed. Ralph P. Katz for appellants. J. Lee Rankin, pro se, Frederic S. Nathan, and Stanley Buchsbaum for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. DECISIONS PER CURIAM 121 396 U. S. December 8, 1969 HOUSE OF SEAGRAM, INC. v. STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK No. 563. Decided December 8, 1969 25 N. Y. 2d 865, 250 N. E. 2d 873, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. H. Gardner Ingraham and Emanuel Becker for appellant. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Ruth Kessler Toch, Solicitor General, and Grace K. Banoff for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. 122 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN PLANT CITY v. DICKINSON, COMPTROLLER OF FLORIDA, et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 19. Argued October 16, 1969—Decided December 9, 1969* Petitioner in No. 19, a national bank in Florida, having been granted permission by the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, operated two off-premises services. (1) The bank operated an armored car (a “mobile drive-in”), equipped with a glass window and customer’s service counter and staffed by a driverguard and teller (both bank employees). The armored car delivered cash in exchange for checks and received cash and checks at the depositors’ premises, the bank insuring the funds during transit. (2) In a shopping center about a mile from the home premises the bank maintained a secured receptacle, to which customers had keys, equipped with a writing table and bank forms. Monies and night bags were left at this facility, which was serviced daily by the armored car, the teller recording deposits by the customer’s number and the driver-guard verifying all items collected by the teller. For these off-premises services the bank used a “Comprehensive Dual Control Contract” and transmittal slips which specified that in transporting funds the bank acted as agent for the customer and that funds would not be deemed deposited until delivered at the bank. Under § 7 of the McFadden Act a national bank may establish and operate a “branch” only under such conditions as state law would authorize a state bank to establish and operate such a branch. The Florida Comptroller requested petitioner bank to cease both services as violative of Florida law, which prohibits branch banking altogether. Thereupon the bank brought suit in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States Comptroller intervened on the bank’s side and several state banks intervened in support of the Florida Comptroller. The District *Together with No. 34, Camp, Comptroller of the Currency v. Dickinson, Comptroller of Florida, et al., also on writ of certiorari to the same court. FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 123 122 Syllabus Court held for petitioners, concluding that the services did not constitute branching within the meaning of § 7 (f) of the McFadden Act, which as set forth in 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) defines a “branch” as including “any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business ... at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: 1. The policy of “competitive equality” between national and state banks is firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national banking system, and under the McFadden Act a national bank may establish a “branch” within the meaning of the federal definition in 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) only under the same conditions as state law would authorize a state bank to do so, First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252. Pp. 130-133. 2. The term “branch bank” in 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) includes any place for receiving deposits apart from the chartered premises. Here (regardless of the formal arrangements between the bank and its contracting customers) at the time a customer delivers money either to the armored car or the stationary receptacle, the bank has received a deposit within the meaning of that provision, and the place of the delivery is an “additional office or . . . branch place of business ... at which deposits are received” within the federal definition of a branch bank in the statute. Pp. 134-137. 3. Since Florida does not permit branching privileges to state banks, the congressional policy of competitive equality forecloses the Comptroller of the Currency from modifying that standard. P. 138. 400 F. 2d 548, affirmed. Robert S. Edwards argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 19. Deputy Solicitor General Springer argued the cause for petitioner in No. 34. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Robert V. Zener, and Robert E. Kopp. William Reece Smith, Jr., argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was V. Carroll Webb. 124 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. James F. Bell, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief was Brian C. Elmer. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., filed a brief for the First National Bank of Cornelia, Georgia, et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed by Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, J. Robert Coleman and Robert J. Castellani, Assistant Attorneys General, Robert Morgan, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Millard R. Rich, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the States of Georgia and North Carolina, and by Horace R. Hansen for the Independent Bankers Association of America et al. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases we are called upon to construe § 7 of the McFadden Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 36, as it relates to the definition of a branch bank for the purpose of determining the scope of branch banking available to a national bank in a State that prohibits branches for state banks. 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) provides in pertinent part: “(f) The term ‘branch’ as used in this section shall be held to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business ... at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” Florida prohibits all branch banking by state chartered banks; by statute a Florida bank may “have only one place of doing business,” and all the business of the FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 125 122 Opinion of the Court bank is to be carried on at that place “and not elsewhere.” 1 The issue must be resolved by determining what constitutes a “branch” or “additional office”; there is a threshold question of the extent to which this is governed by federal law. The First National Bank in Plant City, Florida, is a national banking association organized and operated pursuant to the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 21 et seq.; it sought and received from the United States Comptroller of the Currency permission to operate two services for the convenience of customers; one wras an armored car messenger service and the other an off-premises receptacle for the receipt of packages containing 1 Florida Stat. § 659.06 (1) (a) (1965) provides: “659.06 Place of transacting business; school savings; drive-in facilities.— “(1) (a) Any bank or trust company shall have only one place of doing business, which shall be located in the community specified in its original articles of incorporation, and the business of the bank or trust company shall be transacted at its banking house so located in said community specified, and not elsewhere. . . . “(2) With the prior written approval of the commissioner a bank may operate a drive-in facility or walk-up facility providing one or more tellers to serve patrons in vehicles and on foot. It shall not be necessary that such facility be a part of or physically connected to the main banking room or building of the bank if the facility is located on the property on which the main banking house is situated or on property contiguous thereto. Property which is separated from the property on which the main banking house is situated only by a street, walkway or alley way shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed contiguous to the property on which the main banking house is situated. “The operation of any drive-in or walk-up facility which is not located on the property on which the main banking house is situated or on property contiguous thereto shall constitute a violation of subsection (1); provided, however, subsection (2) shall not apply to any facilities existing on or prior to January 1, 1965.” 126 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. cash or checks for deposit. The Comptroller’s letter authorizing the armored car messenger service relied upon paragraph 7490 of the Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks,2 a relatively recent ruling which specifically authorizes such a service. A second letter authorizing construction of an off-premises receptacle authorized such a service “as an incident to” the bank’s ordinary business. Both letters contained explicit instructions to First National designed to insure that deposits so received would not become bank liabilities until actually in the hands of the bank teller at the chartered office or regular “banking house”; and that checks cashed for customers would be deemed paid at the bank when the cash was handed to the messenger, not when the cash was delivered to the customer by the armored car teller. Relying on these letters, First National offered an armored car service and a secured receptacle for receipt of monies intended as deposits. The bank advertised “Full Service Banking at your doorstep . . .” and a “mobile drive-in . . . where customers may be served . . . .” A more detailed examination of the services shows that customers having an account with First National could, upon signing a “Comprehensive 2 Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks 7490. “Messenger Service “To meet the requirements of its customers, a national bank may provide messenger service by means of an armored car or otherwise, pursuant to an agreement wherein it is specified that the messenger is the agent of the customer rather than of the bank. Deposits collected under this arrangement are not considered as having been received by the bank until they are actually delivered to the teller at the bank’s premises. Similarly, a check is considered as having been paid at the bank when the money is handed to the messenger as agent for the customer.” FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 127 122 Opinion of the Court Dual Control Contract/’3 arrange to have the armored car call at their place of business to pick up cash and checks for deposit, or to bring cash to them in exchange for checks delivered to the armored car teller. The contract provided that in each situation the bank’s armored car messenger would be the agent of the customer. Additionally, proffered deposits were accompanied by a transmittal slip upon which the customer itemized the funds being deposited in the same manner as with deposits made at the chartered office of the bank. The transmittal slip contained a “Contract” which provided that in this off-premises transaction the bank was the agent of the customer, and that “the transmittal of said currency, coin and checks, shall not be deemed to be a deposit until delivered into the hands of the bank’s tellers at the said banking house.” 4 Sums 3 “Comprehensive Dual Control Contract “As agent for the undersigned depositor, The First National Bank Messenger will transport monies of the depositor to and from the banking house. “Under the Comprehensive Dual Control Contract, all monies, transported solely in padlocked money bags furnished by bank, shall be opened only under the dual control of two bank’s tellers. For this purpose, bank will retain a pass key for depositor’s bag(s); a key for each bag will be furnished depositor. The depositor expressly authorizes the service described and agrees to accept the bank’s count of monies as final. “The First National Bank in Plant City maintains hazard insurance covering holdup, employee fidelity, etc., for the benefit of the depositor for all amounts delivered to bank’s messenger for delivery to bank and for all amounts requisitioned by depositor for delivery from bank to depositor. Unless otherwise authorized in writing, only the undersigned shall be permitted to receipt the bank’s messenger for monies delivered to depositor. . . .” 4 “Contract “First National Bank, Plant City, Fla., as messenger and agent for Principal named on front side hereof, agrees to transmit 128 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. of cash for transmission to the customer were accompanied by a charge slip indicating that the customer’s account had been charged for the amount of the order. The armored car was owned and controlled by the bank; the teller and driver-guard in the car were bank employees. The bank paid the cost of armored car operations and assumed complete responsibility for the monies, checks, and deposits during transit by means of an insurance policy bought and paid for by it to protect the customer and the bank. The armored car service operated six days per week in Plant City and the surrounding trade area in Hillsborough and Polk Counties. The armored car had a plate glass window, a sliding drawer, and a counter on one side where customers might be served. The truck bore the name of the bank and had two-way radiophone communication with the bank. All movements and routing of the armored car were directed by the bank. First National handled about $1,000,000 per week through the armored car. The stationary off-premises receptacle for receipt of monies intended for deposit was located in a shopping center one mile from First National’s banking house in a space leased by the bank. The facility consisted of a secured receptacle for monies and night bags, together the currency, coin and checks detailed on the front side hereof to the bank’s offices at 302 West Haines Street, Plant City, Fla. for deposit to Principal’s account. It is agreed and understood by Principal and the bank that in transmitting said currency, coin and checks, the bank is acting solely as agent for said Principal and that the transmittal of said currency, coin and checks, shall not be deemed to be a deposit until delivered into the hands of the bank’s tellers at the said banking house. “The bank maintains hazard insurance covering holdup, employee fidelity, etc. for the protection of the Principal for all amounts and items delivered to the bank’s messenger by said Principal.” FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 129 122 Opinion of the Court with a writing table supplied with envelopes and transmittal slips identical to those used by the armored car messenger service. The envelopes recited that the funds transported were accepted in accordance with the contract printed on the transmittal slip. A sign at the receptacle recited that the messenger who collected the funds acted as agent for the customer, that funds would not be deemed to have been deposited until delivered at the bank’s premises, and that insurance on the funds was provided by the bank. Customers maintaining an account with the bank who had signed the Comprehensive Dual Control Contract were issued a key to open the off-premises depository to drop off the night pouches in the receptacle. The armored car serviced the receptacle daily. The armored car teller, upon making pickups of such night pouches, promptly identified all monies and other items placed in the depository and immediately recorded them by the depositor’s number. The driver-guard verified all items collected by the teller and signed the written bank record identifying the monies obtained at the stationary depository. On September 28, 1966, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, respondent herein, addressed a letter to First National advising it that the proposed depository then under construction and the provision of an armored car messenger service would each violate the prohibition under Florida law against branch banking. The letter requested that First National cease and desist all such operations. First National then sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against respondent. The United States Comptroller intervened as plaintiff on the side of First National; several state banks intervened to support the Florida Comptroller. The District Court granted judgment for petitioners, 274 F. 130 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Supp. 449 (D. C. N. D. Fla. 1967). The Court of Appeals reversed, 400 F. 2d 548 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968). We affirm the Court of Appeals. Federal Statute and Policy The conditions under which national banks may establish branches are embodied in § 7 of the McFadden Act, 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, codified in 12 U. S. C. § 36. One such condition is that a “branch” may be established only when, where, and how state law would authorize a state bank to establish and operate such a branch, 12 U. S. C. § 36 (c).5 First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252 (1966). We have noted that the State of Florida permits no branch banking under a statute providing that banks are to “have only one place of doing business”; the business of the bank may be transacted at that place “and not elsewhere.”6 The parties agree generally that the McFadden Act permits national banks to branch if and only if the host State would permit one of its own banks to branch; the Florida Bank Comptroller insists that the State of Florida unequivocally forbids off-premises bank- 5 The National Bank Act, 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U. S. C. §§36 (c)(1) and (2) provides: “(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks.” 6 See n. 1, supra. FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 131 122 Opinion of the Court ing of any kind. Thus the lines are clearly drawn; the question presented is whether the activities of First National authorized by the United States Comptroller are branch banking. At the outset we note that, while Congress has absolute authority over national banks, the federal statute has incorporated by reference the limitations which state law places on branch banking activities by state banks. Congress has deliberately settled upon a policy intended to foster “competitive equality.” Walker Bank, 385 U. S., at 261. State law has been utilized by Congress to provide certain guidelines to implement its legislative policy. We need not review the legislative history of the McFadden Act and prior national bank legislation as it relates to this problem; that task was performed by Mr. Justice Clark in Walker Bank, supra, where a unanimous Court noted that the McFadden Act was a response to the competitive tensions inherent in a dual banking structure where state and national banks coexist in the same area. That Act reflects the congressional concern that neither system have advantages over the other in the use of branch banking. A House Report shows that in 1926 there was congressional concern to protect national banks from the unrestricted branch bank competition of state banks: “The present situation is intolerable to the national banking system. The bill proposes the only practicable solution by stopping the further extension of state-wide branch banking in the Federal reserve system by State member banks and by permitting national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws.” H. R. Rep. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1926). 132 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. The bill to which this report was addressed failed to pass in the Senate. In tracing the legislative history of the bill which passed the following year, this Court in Walker Bank, supra, observed: “The intent of the Congress to leave the question of the desirability of branch banking up to the States is indicated by the fact that the Senate struck from the House bill the time limitation, thus permitting a subsequent change in state law to have a corresponding effect on the authority of national banks to engage in branching. The Senate Report concluded that the Act should permit ‘national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws.’ ” 385 U. S., at 258, quoting from S. Rep. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1926). At the time of its enactment into law, Representative McFadden stated that: “As a result of the passage of this act, the national bank act has been so amended that national banks are able to meet the needs of modern industry and commerce and competitive equality has been established . . . .” 68 Cong. Rec. 5815 (1927). (Emphasis supplied.) When the economic depression of the 1930’s brought on widespread bank failures, Congress responded by amending the McFadden Act with the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, which further strengthened the policy of competitive equality. Some Members argued that bank failures were due to the undercapitalization of small rural banks and sought to authorize national banks to engage in branch banking without regard to state law; but that approach was rejected. As finally passed, the Act was reported to the House by one of FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 133 122 Opinion of the Court the members of the Conference Committee, Representative Luce, with this statement: “In the controversy over the respective merits of what are known as ‘unit banking’ and ‘branch banking’ . . . branch banking has been steadily gaining in favor. It is not, however, here proposed to give the advocates of branch banking any advantage. We do not go an inch beyond saying that the two ideas shall compete on equal terms and only where the States make the competition possible by letting their own institutions have branches.” 385 U. S., at 260, quoting from 77 Cong. Rec. 5896 (1933). (Emphasis supplied.) The policy of competitive equality is therefore firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national banking system. The mechanism of referring to state law is simply one designed to implement that congressional intent and build into the federal statute a self-executing provision to accommodate to changes in state regulation. We reject the contention made by amicus curiae National Association of Supervisors of State Banks to the effect that state law definitions of what constitutes “branch banking” must control the content of the federal definition of § 36 (f).7 Admittedly, state law comes into play in deciding how, where, and when branch banks may be operated, Walker Bank, supra, for in § 36 (c) Congress entrusted to the States the regulation of branching as Congress then conceived it. But to allow the States to define the content of the term “branch” would make them the sole judges of their own powers. Con- 7 In their briefs before this Court, the litigants are all in agreement that federal law alone applies to resolve the threshold question whether the challenged activity falls within the definition of “branch.” Reply Brief for the Comptroller of the Currency 2; Respondents’ Brief 41, 44. 134 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. gress did not intend such an improbable result, as appears from the inclusion in § 36 of a general definition of “branch.” On this point the language of the Court of Appeals perhaps overstated the relation of state law to the problem, since the threshold question is to be determined as a matter of federal law, having in mind the congressional intent that so far as branch banking is concerned “the two ideas shall compete on equal terms and only where the States [allow] their own institutions [to] have branches.” In short, the definition of “branch” in § 36 (f) must not be given a restrictive meaning which would frustrate the congressional intent this Court found to be plain in Walker Bank, supra* Federal Definition of Branch Bank Against this background, we turn to the question whether the off-premises business activities conducted by First National amounted to “branch” banking within the meaning of the McFadden Act. Since national banks are “necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States,” First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 656 (1924), we consult that part of the McFadden Act that defines the term “branch.” 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) provides: “(f) The term ‘branch’ as used in this section shall be held to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business ... at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” 8 Representative McFadden described the definitional section of the Act as providing that: “Any place outside of or away from the main office where the bank carries on its business of receiving deposits, paying checks, lending money, or transacting any business carried on at the main office, is a branch.” 68 Cong. Rec. 5816 (1927). FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 135 122 Opinion of the Court Although the definition may not be a model of precision, in part due to its circular aspect, it defines the minimum content of the term “branch”; by use of the word “include” the definition suggests a calculated indefiniteness with respect to the outer limits of the term. However, the term “branch bank” at the very least includes any place for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending money apart from the chartered premises; it may include more. It should be emphasized that, since § 36 (f) is phrased in the disjunctive, the offering of any one of the three services mentioned in that definition will provide the basis for finding that “branch” banking is taking place. Thus not only the taking of deposits but also the paying of checks or the lending of money could equally well provide the basis for such a finding. Although the District Court briefly discussed the possibility that checks were being paid, we confine ourselves to the question of whether deposits were received. Specifically, we must resolve the question whether the mobile armored car service and stationary deposit receptacle singly or together fall within the ambit of that section. As to the receiving of deposits, the functions of the two facilities are essentially the same, hence they may be considered together. First National and the Comptroller of the Currency urge that the challenged activity does not amount to branch banking under § 36 (f). First National relies heavily, if indeed not entirely, upon carefully drawn contracts with its customers who use armored car or deposit receptacle services. The bank urges that, “deposit” being a word of art, the determination of when a deposit is made is not a casual one inasmuch as that determination fixes important legal relationships of the parties. The bank also urges that creation of a deposit being purely a matter of intent, the issue is governed exclu- 136 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. sively by the private contract. Since these contracts must be interpreted under state law, the argument runs, no “deposit” is actually received as such until monies delivered to the armored car or the receptacle are physically delivered into the hands of a bank teller at the chartered premises. Until such time the bank may not, under the contracts, be held to account for the customer’s funds. We have no difficulty accepting the bank’s argument that the debtor-creditor relationship is a creature of contract and that the parties can agree that until monies are physically delivered to the bank no deposit will be credited to the customer’s account.9 We are satisfied, however, that the contracts have no significant purpose other than to remove the possibility that the monies received will become “deposits” in the technical and legal sense until actually delivered to the chartered premises of the bank. We do not challenge the right of the contracting parties to fix rights and risks as between themselves; nothing in the law precludes the parties from agreeing, for example, that the bank does not assume the status of bailee, with liability for loss of money in transit. But while the contracting parties are free to arrange their private rights and liabilities as they see fit, it does not follow that private contractual arrangements, binding on the parties under state law, determine the meaning of the language or the reach of § 36 (f). Because the purpose of the statute is to maintain competitive equality, it is relevant in construing “branch” to consider, not merely the contractual rights and liabilities created by the transaction, but all those aspects of the transaction that might give the bank an advantage 9 5A A. Michie on Banks and Banking §§ 4a, 5, 14, 15 and 17 (1950); 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks §358 (1963); 9 C. J. S. Banks and Banking §269 (1938). FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 137 122 Opinion of the Court in its competition for customers. Unquestionably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides the service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from its main office; the convenience to the customer is unrelated to whether the relationship of debtor and creditor is established at the moment of receipt or somewhat later. We need not characterize the contracts as a sham or subterfuge in order to conclude that the conduct of the parties and the nature of their relations bring First National’s challenged activities within the federal definition of branch banking. Here, penetrating the form of the contracts to the underlying substance of the transaction, we are satisfied that at the time a customer delivers a sum of money either to the armored truck or the stationary receptacle, the bank has, for all purposes contemplated by Congress in § 36 (f), received a deposit. The money is given and received for deposit even though the parties have agreed that its technical status as a “deposit” which may be drawn on is to remain inchoate for the brief period of time it is in transit to the chartered bank premises. The intended deposits are delivered and received as part of a large-scale continuing mode of conducting the banking business designed to bring basic bank services to the customers. Since the putative deposits are in fact “received” by a bank facility apart from its chartered place of business, we are compelled, in construing § 36 (f), to view the place of delivery of the customer’s cash and checks accompanied by a deposit slip as an “additional office, or . . . branch place of business ... at which deposits are received.” 10 10 We need not here try to draw fine distinctions around relatively isolated, sporadic, and inconsequential transactions where a bank employee carries cash to a customer to cash a check, or secures a signature on a note in exchange for a check delivered off premises. 138 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U. S. Here we are confronted by a systematic attempt to secure for national banks branching privileges which Florida denies to competing state banks. The utility of the armored car service and deposit receptacle are obvious; many States permit state chartered banks to use this eminently sensible mode of operations, but Florida’s policy is not open to judicial review any more than is the congressional policy of “competitive equality.” Nor is the congressional policy of competitive equality with its deference to state standards open to modification by the Comptroller of the Currency.11 Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. It will come as a shock, where common sense is the guide, to learn that an armored car picking up merchants’ cash boxes and checks is a branch bank. Conceivably a bank could use an armored car as a place of business by stationing it at designated places during designated hours for opening accounts, receiving deposits, making 11 In 1963 Comptroller Saxon, author of If 7490 in the Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks, supra, n. 2, declared that “[t]he branching powers of National Banks should, in my judgment, not be limited according to those policies which the individual States find appropriate to meet their local needs through State-chartered banks.” Saxon, Branching Powers and the Dual Banking System, 101 Comp. Currency Ann. Rep. 316, 318 (1963). During the course of the congressional debates over what became the McFadden Act, Representative Stevenson remarked: “[Y]ou have branches in the Federal reserve system established by the dictum of the Comptroller of the Currency, who has assumed to say that he can allow a national bank to establish as many agencies for receiving deposits and paying checks as he sees fit. . . . I will show presently that we cut that out, root and branch.” 66 Cong. Rec. 1627. FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 139 122 Douglas, J., dissenting loans, and the like. But no armored car was so used in these cases. Federal law stated in the McFadden Act, 12 U. S. C, §36 (f), defines “branch” as any facility “at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” And Congress provided that national banks may establish “branches” whenever, wherever, and however state banks may do so. First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252, 261-262. The opinion of the Court leaves the impression that the McFadden Act created “competitive equality” between national and state banks across the board. But as we stated in the Walker Bank case, that Act “intended to place national and state banks on a basis of ‘competitive equality’ insofar as branch banking was concerned.” Id., at 261. (Italics added.) There was no other or additional overriding principle of “competitive equality” that limited off-premises services of national banks to those that state banks could provide. Among those off-premises activities of national banks was the furnishing of armored car messenger services, which, we are advised by the Comptroller of the Currency, antedated by many years the 1927 McFadden Act. One can read the legislative history of the Act without finding any hint that Congress was providing “competitive equality” as respects armored car messenger services. As stated by the District Court, “If no branch is involved here, there is no requirement that the national bank’s practice must conform to that of the state banks.” 274 F. Supp. 449, 453. The services rendered in these cases were undertaken only after approval by the Comptroller of the Currency who attached a condition that “the messenger is the 140 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Douglas, J., dissenting 396 U.S. agent of the customer rather than of the bank.” 1 I thought it was elemental law that a bank deposit cannot arise without some unequivocal act whereby both parties express their consent to the creation of the status of debtor and creditor. The District Court, which is a more faithful exponent of local law than are we, so ruled. 274 F. Supp., at 454. Certainly the Comptroller, who is the supervisory agent for policing § 36, has some authority to define “deposits” as used in § 36 (f), and this case affords no excuse for disparaging him. This is not a government by administrative fiat; the exercise of administrative discretion is normally subject to judicial review. When it comes to an administrator’s construction of a statutory term in the law that he supervises, however, we have allowed his expertise great leeway in the definition,1 2 only rarely disturbing it. 1 Par. 7490, Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks. This paragraph provides: “To meet the requirements of its customers, a national bank may provide messenger service by means of an armored car or otherwise, pursuant to an agreement wherein it is specified that the messenger is the agent of the customer rather than of the bank. Deposits collected under this arrangement are not considered as having been received by the bank until they are actually delivered to the teller at the bank’s premises. Similarly, a check is considered as having been paid at the bank when the money is handed to the messenger as agent for the customer.” 2 See SEC v. New England Electric System, 384 U. S. 176, 185; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16; United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 374-376; NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U. S. 264, 269; Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. Ill, 130-131; Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 411-413; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145-146; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239, 261 (1955); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470, 490-491 (1950). FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DICKINSON 141 122 Stewart, J., dissenting The Comptroller’s definition of “deposits” should be honored here. For where the risk is on the customer that his cash and checks may never reach the bank, he cannot in good sense or in good law be deemed to have made a deposit while the funds are in transit. By the standards of administrative law honored until today, the Comptroller was justified in defining “deposits” to make the armored cars messengers of the customers, not agents of the bank. So whether common sense or the law is our standard, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. The Comptroller’s authorization of these armored car activities as being permissible under the National Bank Act was an interpretation of the Act which, as Mr. Justice Stewart says in his dissent, cannot be said to be “not a reasonable one.” Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting. I wholly agree with the Court that federal law is to be applied in determining whether the activities of a national bank constitute branch banking under the exclusive definition contained in the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f). Whether the activities here in question constitute branch banking under that standard seems to me an extremely close question. That being so, I would defer to the determination of the Comptroller of the Currency. He is the official charged with administering these provisions of the Act, and I cannot say his determination was not a reasonable one. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18. 142 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. DETROIT & TOLEDO SHORE LINE RAILROAD CO. v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 29. Argued October 20, 1969—Decided December 9, 1969 A labor dispute arose between petitioner railroad and respondent railroad union over petitioner’s proposal to establish new “outlying work assignments” away from its principal yard. There was nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement that prohibited such assignments. The union filed a notice under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act of a proposed change in the agreement, and after the failure of the parties to negotiate a settlement, invoked the services of the National Mediation Board. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad announced the creation of the disputed work assignments, and the union threatened to strike. Petitioner brought this action to enjoin a strike and the union counterclaimed for an injunction prohibiting the establishment of the outlying assignments on the ground that § 6, which provides that “where . . . the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party . . . , rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon ... by the Mediation Board,” forbids such unilateral action by the carrier. The District Court dismissed the railroad’s complaint, but granted the union’s request for an injunction restraining the railroad from establishing any new outlying assignments, despite the absence of a provision prohibiting such assignments in the collectivebargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The status quo that is to be maintained pursuant to § 6 of the Railway Labor Act while the procedures of the Act are being exhausted consists of the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, whether or not those conditions are covered in an existing collective-bargaining agreement. Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, and Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, distinguished. Pp. 148-159. 401 F. 2d 368, affirmed. SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 143 142 Opinion of the Court Francis M. Shea argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ralph J. Moore, Jr., David W. Miller, James A. Wilcox, and John M. Curphey. Richard R. Lyman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Clarence M. Mulholland. Milton Kramer filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a question concerning the extent to which the Railway Labor Act of 1926 1 imposes an obligation upon the parties to a railroad labor dispute to maintain the status quo while the “purposely long and drawn out” 1 2 procedures of the Act are exhausted. Petitioner, a railroad, contends that the status quo which the Act requires be maintained consists only of the working conditions specifically covered in the parties’ existing collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent railroad brotherhood contends that what must be preserved as the status quo are the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, irrespective of whether these conditions are covered in an existing collective agreement. For the reasons stated below, we think that only the union’s position is consistent with the language and purposes of the Railway Labor Act. The facts involved in this case are these: The main line of the Detroit and Toledo Shore Line (Shore Line), petitioner’s railroad, runs from Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio, 50 miles north to Dearoad Yard near Detroit, Michigan. For many years prior to 1961, Lang Yard was the terminal at which all train and engine crews reported for 144 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 2 Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S, 238, 246 (1966). 144 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. work and from which they left at the end of the day. As the occasions arose, the Shore Line transported crews from Lang Yard to perform switching and other operations at various points to the north, assuming the costs of transportation and overtime for the crew members. On February 21, 1961, the railroad advised respondent, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (BLF&E),3 of its intention to establish “outlying work assignments” 4 at Trenton, Michigan, a point on the main line about 35 miles north of Lang Yard. These new assignments would have required many employees to report for work at Trenton rather than Lang Yard where they had been reporting. The BLF&E responded to this announcement by filing a notice under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act5 proposing an amendment to the collective- 3 The United Transportation Union, the successor organization to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, was substituted as party respondent by order of the Court, March 3, 1969. Respondents also include two officers of the BLF&E named in the original complaint. 4 The parties treat the term “outlying work assignment” as meaning a work assignment with a reporting point for going on and off duty located elsewhere than at the Shore Line’s principal yard, Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio. We adopt that usage here. 5 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 156. Section 6, in its entirety, provides: “Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 145 142 Opinion of the Court bargaining agreement to cover the changed working conditions of the employees who would work out of Trenton. Section 6 requires both the carrier and union to give the other party a 30-day notice of an “intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” * 6 Since the union thus invoked the “majordispute” settlement procedures of the Railway Labor Act,7 the dispute first went to conference and, when the parties failed to agree between themselves, then to the National Mediation Board. While the case was pending before the National Mediation Board, the Shore Line announced two new outlying assignments at Dearoad, Michigan, at the northern end of the line. Because work crews could be taken by cab from Dearoad south to Trenton, the railroad concluded that it no longer needed to establish assignments at Trenton and so advised the Mediation Board. When the Dearoad assignments were announced, the union withdrew from the Mediation Board proceedings, and, before a Special Board of Adjustment convened under § 3 of the Act,8 challenged the railroad’s right under the parties’ collective agreement to establish outlying assignments. finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.” 6 See n. 5, supra. 7 A “major dispute” is one arising out of the formation or change of collective agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 722-727 (1945). 8 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 153. At this point, the BLF&E was considering the controversy as a “minor dispute,” i. e., a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of collective agreements. Under § 3 of the Railway Labor Act such disputes are settled by an Adjustment Board whose interpretation of the collective agreement is binding on the parties. See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, at 722-727. 146 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. On November 30, 1965, the Special Board ruled that the Shore Line-BLF&E agreement did not prohibit the railroad from making the assignments.9 Relying in part on the ruling of the Special Board, the railroad notified the union on January 24, 1966, that it was reviving its plan for work assignments at Trenton. Again the union responded by filing a § 6 notice of a proposed change in the parties’ collective agreement. This time the union sought to amend the agreement to forbid the railroad from making any outlying assignments at all. The parties were again unable to negotiate a settlement themselves, and on June 17, 1966, the union invoked the services of the National Mediation Board. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad posted a bulletin definitely creating the disputed work assignments at Trenton effective September 26, 1966. Faced with this unilateral change in working conditions, the union threatened a strike. The railroad then brought this action in the United States District Court to enjoin the BLF&E10 from calling and carrying out the allegedly illegal strike. The union counterclaimed for an injunction prohibiting the Shore Line from establishing outlying assignments on the ground that the status quo provision of § 6 of the Railway Labor Act forbids a carrier from taking 9 The Special Board of Adjustment found: “What took place here was not a change in the recognized terminal, but simply amounted to an outlying assignment. There is nothing in the rules of agreement which precludes this carrier from establishing an outside assignment.” App. 110. 10 The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was also named a defendant, as were several officers of both unions. The causes of action against the two brotherhoods were completely different, however, and the cases were treated as distinct at trial and on appeal. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is not involved in the present litigation at this stage. SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 147 142 Opinion of the Court unilateral action altering “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” while the dispute is pending before the National Mediation Board. The pertinent part of § 6 provides: 11 “In every case where . . . the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party . . . , rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon ... by the Mediation Board . . . .” 45 U. S. C. § 156. The District Court dismissed the railroad’s complaint, from which no appeal has been taken, but it granted the injunction sought by the union restraining the railroad from establishing any new outlying assignments at Trenton or elsewhere.11 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction against the railroad. 401 F. 2d 368 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 1116 (1969). In granting the injunction the District Court held that the status quo requirement of § 6 prohibited the Shore Line from making outlying assignments even though there was nothing in the parties’ collective agreement which prohibited such assignments. The Shore Line vigorously challenges this holding. It contends that the purpose of the status quo provisions of the Act is to guarantee only that existing collective agreements continue to govern the parties’ rights and duties during efforts to change those agreements. Therefore, the railroad argues, what Congress intended by writing in § 6 that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall 11 The full section is set out in n. 5, supra. 12 The order of the District Court is unreported. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, No. C 66-207 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, filed Nov. 15, 1966). The opinion of the District Court on motion to vacate the judgment is reported at 267 F. Supp. 572 (1967). 148 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. not be altered” was that rates of pay, rules, or working conditions as expressed in an agreement shall not be altered. And since nothing in the railroad’s agreement with the union precluded the railroad from altering the location of work assignments, this working condition was not “expressed in an agreement.” Thus, the argument runs, the railroad could make outlying assignments without violating the status quo provision of § 6, and the judgments below must be reversed. We note at the outset that the language of § 6 simply does not say what the railroad wrould have it say. Instead, the section speaks plainly of “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” without any limitation to those obligations already embodied in collective agreements. More important, we are persuaded that the railroad’s interpretation of this section is sharply at variance with the overall design and purpose of the Railway Labor Act. The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent, if possible, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce.13 The problem of strikes was considered to be particularly acute in the area of “major disputes,” those disputes involving the formation of collective agreements and efforts to change them. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 722-726 (1945). Rather than rely upon compulsory arbitration, to which both sides were bitterly opposed, the railroad and union representatives who drafted the Act chose to leave the settlement of major disputes entirely to the processes of noncompulsory adjustment. Id., at 724. To this end, the Act established rather elaborate machinery for negotiation, mediation, volun- 13 In Texas it* N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 565 (1930), the Court said: “The Brotherhood insists, and we think rightly, that the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was ‘to provide a machinery to prevent strikes.’ ” SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 149 142 Opinion of the Court tary arbitration, and conciliation. General Committee, B. L. E. v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323, 328-333 (1943). It imposed upon the parties an obligation to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to refrain from altering the status quo by resorting to self-help while the Act’s remedies were being exhausted.14 Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969); Elgin, J. de E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, at 721-731; Texas de N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 565-566 (1930). A final and crucial aspect of the Act was the power given to the parties and to representatives of the public to make the exhaustion of the Act’s remedies an almost interminable process. As we noted in Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966), “the procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute.” 14 The Act’s major-dispute procedures and status quo requirement were concisely stated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan only last Term, Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969): “The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens 'substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,’ who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.” 150 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. The Act’s status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout. Moreover, since disputes usually arise when one party wants to change the status quo without undue delay, the power which the Act gives the other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise with the interests of the other side and thus reach agreement without interruption to commerce. There are three status quo provisions in the Act, each covering a different stage of the major dispute settlement procedures. Section 6, the section of immediate concern in this case, provides that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” during the period from the first notice of a proposed change in agreements up to and through any proceedings before the National Mediation Board.15 Section 5 First provides that for 30 days following the closing of Mediation Board proceedings “no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose,” unless the parties agree to arbitration or a Presidential Emergency Board is created during the 30 days.16 Finally, §10 15 Section 6 is set out in its entirety in n. 5, supra. 16 Section 5 First, 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 155 First, provides in part: “If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 151 142 Opinion of the Court provides that after the creation of an Emergency Board and for 30 days after the Board has made its report to the President, “no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose.” 17 These provisions must be read in conjunction with the implicit status quo requirement in the obligation imposed upon both parties by § 2 First, “to exert every reasonable effort” to settle disputes without interruption to interstate commerce.18 unless in the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under section 10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose.” 17 Section 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 160, provides in part: “After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such board has made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose.” 18 Section 2 First, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 152 First, provides: “It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.” The relationship between the status quo provisions and § 2 First, was made explicit in the testimony of Donald Richberg who spoke as the unions’ representative when the proposed railroad legislation was presented to Congress jointly by the railroads and the unions: “As to maintaining the status quo from the time that a dispute is engendered, it is a violation of the duties imposed by this law for either party to take any action to arbitrarily change the conditions until that dispute has been adjusted in accordance with the law. Their primary duty is to exert every reasonable effort to avoid 152 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. While the quoted language of §§ 5, 6, and 10 is not identical in each case, we believe that these provisions, together with § 2 First, form an integrated, harmonious scheme for preserving the status quo from the beginning of the major dispute through the final 30-day “cooling-off” period. Although these three provisions are applicable to different stages of the Act’s procedures, the intent and effect of each is identical so far as defining and preserving the status quo is concerned.19 The obligation interruptions of commerce through disputes. The ‘reasonable efforts’ are set forth here that all disputes shall be considered and decided in conference, if possible; that, second, if conference fails a certain type of disputes shall be carried to the board of adjustment; the other type of disputes, or those not decided by the board of adjustment, may be carried to the board of mediators, and it shall be the duty of the board of mediators to act.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 92-93 (1926). 19 This interpretation of the status quo provisions is supported by the legislative history of the Act. See, e. g., the testimony of Donald Richberg set out in n. 18, supra. Mr. Richberg also testified: “[T]he only thing that can provoke an arbitrary action [referring to strikes] is the power to arbitrarily change the rates of pay or rules of working conditions before the controversy is settled, and it is provided that they shall not be altered during the entire period of utilization of this law.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926). Moreover, when the status quo provision of § 5 was added to that section in 1934, its purpose was to provide continuity between §§ 6 and 10 by preserving the status quo for 30 days following the end of proceedings before the Mediation Board. Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, the principal draftsman and proponent of the 1934 amendments, testified: “As the present act reads, a railroad, by rejecting the Board of Mediation’s final recommendation to arbitrate the dispute, is enabled to change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions arbitrarily, prior to the issuance of an order by the President appointing a fact-finding board and maintaining the status quo for 60 days. . . . The SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 153 142 Opinion of the Court of both parties during a period in which any of these status quo provisions is properly invoked is to preserve and maintain unchanged those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute.20 It is quite apparent that under our interpretation of the status quo requirement, the argument advanced by the Shore Line has little merit. The railroad contends that a party is bound to preserve the status quo in only those working conditions covered in the parties’ existing collective agreement, but nothing in the status quo provisions of § § 5, 6, or 10 suggests this restriction. We have stressed that the status quo extends to those actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, and clearly these conditions need not be covered in an existing agreement. Thus, the mere fact that the collective agreement before us does not expressly railroads have taken advantage of this unintentional hiatus in the present law in several instances. The change now proposed is designed to plug this hole.” Hearings on S. 3266 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934). 20 The status quo provision of § 10 was the only one discussed in any depth at the 1926 congressional hearings on the bill. Donald Richberg, n. 19, supra, testified as follows when questioned about the intended scope of the status quo provision: “The thought was to include in the broadest way all the factors which contributed to what is commonly called the status quo. In other words, the conditions may depend upon the dispute, whether it is with regard to rules or with regard to wages.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1926). “What broader phrase could be used than ‘conditions out of which the dispute arose’ which comprehends all the elements affecting the controversy? It is intended to make it clear that the parties are going to wait and give the Government full opportunity to adjust the controversy.” Hearings on S. 2306 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 88-89 (1926). 154 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. prohibit outlying assignments would not have barred the railroad from ordering the assignments that gave rise to the present dispute if, apart from the agreement, such assignments had occurred for a sufficient period of time with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees to become in reality a part of the actual working conditions. Here, however, the dispute over the railroad’s establishment of the Trenton assignments arose at a time when actual working conditions did not include such assignments. It was therefore incumbent upon the railroad by virtue of § 6 to refrain from making outlying assignments at Trenton or any other place in which there had previously been none, regardless of the fact that the railroad was not precluded from making these assignments under the existing agreement.21 The Shore Line’s interpretation of the status quo requirement is also fundamentally at odds with the Act’s primary objective—the prevention of strikes. This case provides a good illustration of why that is so. The goal of the BLF&E was to prevent the Shore Line from making outlying assignments, a matter not covered in their existing collective agreement. To achieve its goal, the union invoked the procedures of the Act. The railroad, however, refused to maintain the status quo and, instead, proceeded to make the disputed outlying assignments. It could hardly be expected that the union would sit idly by as the railroad rushed to accomplish the very result the union was seeking to prohibit by agreement. The union undoubtedly felt it could resort to self-help if the railroad could, and, not unreasonably, it threatened to strike. Because the railroad prematurely resorted to self-help, the primary goal of the Act came very close to being defeated. The example of this case could no doubt be multiplied many times. It would be virtually impossible to include all working conditions in a col- 21 See n. 9, supra. SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 155 142 Opinion of the Court lective-bargaining agreement. Where a condition is satisfactorily tolerable to both sides, it is often omitted from the agreement, and it has been suggested that this practice is more frequent in the railroad industry than in most others.22 When the union moves to bring such a previously uncovered condition within the agreement, it is absolutely essential that the status quo provisions of the Act apply to that working condition if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled. If the railroad is free at this stage to take advantage of the agreement’s silence and resort to self-help, the union cannot be expected to hold back its own economic weapons, including the strike. Only if both sides are equally restrained can the Act’s remedies work effectively.23 We now turn to answer some of the arguments advanced by the Shore Line in support of its position. The first of these involves § 2 Seventh of the Act. That section forbids a carrier from changing “the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act.”24 (Emphasis added.) The Shore Line argues that this section is a status quo provision and that the “as embodied in agreements” restriction it contains 22 Brief of Railway Labor Executives’ Association as amicus curiae 17. 23 Respondent BLF&E has urged in its brief that we also consider the question whether the Shore Line violated a duty to bargain in good faith, citing Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964), and NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). Deciding the case as we do under the status quo provisions of the Act, we find it unnecessary to reach this argument. 24 Section 2 Seventh, 48 Stat. 1188, 45 U. S. C. §152 Seventh, provides as follows: “No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act.” 156 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. should be read into the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10. We find no merit in this argument. Section 2 Seventh, which was added to the Act in 1934, does not impose any status quo duties attendant upon major dispute procedures. It simply states one category of cases in which those procedures must be invoked. The purpose of § 2 Seventh is twofold: it operates to give legal and binding effect to collective agreements, and it lays down the requirement that collective agreements can be changed only by the statutory procedures. The violation of this section is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment or fine or both.25 Violations of the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10 are only civil wrongs. Second, the Shore Line contends that the interpretation of § 6 which we adopt today is at variance with the position we have taken on two previous occasions, citing Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 (1946), and Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386 (1942). Although these cases do contain statements which out of context tend to support petitioner’s position, neither dealt with the question we have before us today. Pitney involved a suit brought by a union to enjoin the reorganization trustees of a bankrupt railroad from transferring certain job assignments to another union. The plaintiff’s contention was that the disputed jobs belonged to its members by both custom and agreement. The trustees were therefore prohibited from reassigning the jobs, the union argued, since they had never filed the appropriate notice of “intended change in agreements” required by § 6. The railroad disputed that the reassignments of the jobs would require a “change in agreements” and thus put the meaning of the parties’ agreements in issue. We held that the proper forum for 25 Railway Labor Act, §2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189, 45 U. S. C. §152 Tenth. SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 157 142 Opinion of the Court interpreting the agreements was the Adjustment Board provided by Congress in the Railway Labor Act, § 3 First (i), for that purpose, and directed the District Court to stay its proceedings accordingly. 326 U. S., at 567-568. Thus, Pitney, at most, involved a question of the necessity of filing a § 6 notice and was not at all concerned with the status quo provision of that section. The Williams case is equally inapposite. In that case “redcaps” brought suit through their union representative against the Dallas railroad terminal to recover wages allegedly owed them and retained by the terminal in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Railway Labor Act. The redcaps’ argument under the Fair Labor Standards Act was that Congress had not intended that tips be included in their wages for purposes of satisfying minimum wage requirements. Yet, that is what the terminal had done under its “accounting and guarantee” plan from October 1938, when the F. L. S. A. became effective, until March 1940. The majority of the Court rejected the redcaps’ argument, holding that the F. L. S. A. neither prohibited nor required the inclusion of tips within wages. The question was held to be one for contract between the parties. 315 U. S., at 407-408. The redcaps’ claim under the Railway Labor Act was that the terminal’s “accounting and guarantee” plan under which tips were considered as part of wages was put into operation unilaterally by the terminal on the effective date of the F. L. S. A., despite the fact that the redcaps had two weeks earlier asked for a conference to negotiate an agreement which would include the subject of wages. This, the redcaps argued, violated the status quo provisions of § 6 since prior to the F. L. S. A. tips had not been included in wages. The Court concluded, however, that § 6 was not applicable to the dispute between the parties. The Court reasoned that when the redcaps continued to work after being individ- 158 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. ually notified of the “accounting and guarantee” plan, new and independent contracts were formed between each redcap and the terminal. The Court held that these contracts were not affected by the pending request for collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. The decision rested partially on the ground that “[independent individual contracts are not affected by the Act.” 315 U. S., at 399. And the Court also said more narrowly that the status quo requirements of § 6 were inapplicable since that section applies only when a “change in agreements” is involved. 315 U. S., at 400. In Williams there was absolutely no prior history of any collective bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter. Without pausing to comment upon the present vitality of either of these grounds for dismissing the redcaps’ Railway Labor Act claim, it is readily apparent that Williams involved only the question of whether the status quo requirement of § 6 applied at all. The Court in Williams therefore never reached the question of the scope of the status quo requirement in a dispute, such as the one before the Court today, to which that requirement concededly applies. Finally, the Shore Line points out, quite correctly, that its position on § 6 is identical to that taken by the National Mediation Board in several of its Annual Reports.26 However, the Mediation Board has no adjudicatory authority with regard to major disputes, nor 26 The 34th Annual Report of the National Mediation Board stated: “Section 6 states that where notice of intended change in an agreement has been given, rates of pay, rules, and working conditions as expressed in the agreement shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon in accordance with specified procedures.” NMB, 34th Ann. Rep. 23 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1968). (Emphasis added.) See also NMB, 33d Ann. Rep. 36 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1967); NMB, 31st Ann. Rep. 25 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1965). SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 159 142 Opinion of Harlan, J. has it a mandate to issue regulations construing the Act generally. Certainly there is nothing in the Act which can be interpreted as giving the Mediation Board the power to change the plain, literal meaning of the statute, which would be the result were we to adopt its interpretation of § 6. The judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I fully agree that the application of § 6 should not be restricted to only those terms of employment that the parties have seen fit to embody in a written agreement. Section 6 may properly, in some circumstances, be extended to “freeze” de facto conditions of employment. I cannot, however, accept what appears to be the majority’s test for determining when a § 6 freeze is appropriate.1 Any work practice is, in the words of the majority, an “actual, objective working condition.” However, the practice of today may not be the accepted condition of yesterday, but rather a temporary expedient in which neither party acquiesces. I find it difficult to think that Congress intended that either party, by serving a § 6 notice, should be able to shackle his adversary and tie him to a condition that has been historically and consistently controverted. Rather, what persuades me to countenance the extension of § 6 beyond the terms of a written collective-bargaining agreement is the fact, observed by the Court, that “[w]here a condition is satisfactorily tolerable to both sides, it is often omitted from the agreement . . . ,” ante, at 155. Taking this observation as a point of de- 1 The majority first announces a test looking to “actual, objective working conditions,” ante, at 153. This is later qualified by a durational requirement, but no general principle of decision is set forth. 160 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of Harlan, J. 396 U. S. parture, I favor a more subjective approach than the objective and mechanical one implicit in the majority’s language. The question that should be asked is whether in the context of the relationship between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for implying an understanding on the particular practice involved. To this end it is necessary to consider not only the duration of the practice but also all the dealings between the parties, as for example, whether the particular condition has been the subject of prior negotiations. While I recognize, of course, that any subjective test is not easily applied, I cannot subscribe to a rule that may have the incongruous effect of perpetuating what both parties in fact view as a disputed practice, simply because neither party, for reasons of convenience, has exercised a recognized option of resorting to self-help. Under this standard I consider that the proper disposition of the case before us is to remand to the District Court for additional findings.2 While the District Court found that “[f]or many years prior to 1961” Lang Yard was the established terminal point for reporting to duty, that finding alone would not satisfy a subjective test in light of subsequent events that may have negatived any understanding that might have existed prior to 1961.3 In 1961 the Shore Line advised the union of a contemplated shifting of reporting to its Trenton terminal some 30 miles north. The proposal apparently met with employee resistance and the union served a § 6 2 While the District Court and the Court of Appeals both properly rejected petitioner’s theory, restricting § 6 to terms embodied in a written agreement, it is by no means clear to me precisely what standard they followed in concluding that the Act was applicable. 3 The District Court, as I read its findings, does not appear to have considered the possible impact of the train of events revealed by the record in connection with 1961-1963 proceedings before the Board. SHORE LINE v. TRANSPORTATION UNION 161 142 Opinion of Harlan, J. notice seeking to modify the agreement with the railroad. By 1963 the parties had exhausted the statutory mediation route without reconciling their differences and the Mediation Board recommended arbitration to break the impasse. This proposal was rejected by the company which declared the dispute moot since, by that time, it had abandoned its Trenton project. Meanwhile, the company embarked on a practice of transporting employees at its own expense and on company time from its Dearoad terminal, 11 miles north of Trenton, a practice which is the subject of a separate § 6 notice. In my opinion a remand is called for to determine whether the company’s voluntary abandonment of its Trenton project, coupled w’ith its undertaking to transport employees from Dearoad at its own cost and the long-established practice prior to 1961, amounted to acceptance in principle of Lang Yard as the reporting location. For that reason I respectfully dissent from the Court’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals. 162 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. CITY OF CHICAGO et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS No. 101. Argued November 20, 1969—Decided December 9, 1969* Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations conducted under § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act with regard to the notice of rail carriers to terminate interstate passenger services held judicially reviewable on the complaint of aggrieved persons. Pp. 164-167. 294 F. Supp. 1103 and 1106, reversed. Gordon P. MacDougall argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the brief were Raymond F. Simon, Charles E. Griffith III, Robert E. Kendrick, Arthur K. Bolton, Harold N. Hill, Jr., J. Robert Coleman, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., William G. Mahoney, Bernard Rane, Mark Goldstein., Eugene W. Ward, Chester L. Rigsby, Weldon A. Cousins, and Leon M. Despres. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. urging reversal in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, and Robert W. Ginnane. James W. Hoeland argued the cause for appellees Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Clifford T. Coomes, Joseph L. Lenihan, Harry R. Begley, and P. C. Mullen. Paul Rodgers filed a brief for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. *Together with No. 102, City of Chicago et al. v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same court. CITY OF CHICAGO v. UNITED STATES 163 162 Opinion of the Court Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in these cases is whether orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations respecting the notice of rail carriers to terminate or change the operation or services of interstate passenger trains are judicially reviewable on the complaint of aggrieved persons. Section 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), provides, with details not important here, that a rail carrier may file notice of such discontinuance or change with the Commission and that within 30 days the Commission may make an investigation of the proposed discontinuance or change. Apart from interim relief, the Commission may order continuance of the operation and service for a period not to exceed one year.1 One of the present cases involves two interstate passenger trains between Chicago and Evansville, Indiana, discontinued by the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 331 I. C. C. 447, and the other involves two interstate passenger trains between New Orleans and Cincinnati discontinued by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 333 I. C. C. 720. In each case the Commission, addressing itself to the standards in § 13a (1), found that continued operation of the trains was not required by public convenience and necessity and that continued operation would unduly burden interstate commerce. It thereupon entered in each case an order terminating its investigation of the proposed discontinuance. 1 Section 13a (2), applicable to discontinuance of intrastate trains, provides that where a State bars discontinuance or change in operation or service of a train, or where the state authority has not acted on a carrier’s application for such discontinuance or change within 120 days, the carrier may petition the Commission for a grant of such authority. 164 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Appellants in each case—cities, state regulatory agencies, and other interested parties—brought these suits before the same three-judge court to review the Commission’s decisions. It is provided by 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a): “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend, in whole or in any part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” The District Court held that decisions terminating investigations under § 13a (1) are not “orders” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a).2 294 F. Supp. 1103, 1106. The cases are here on direct appeal, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2325, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 395 U. S. 957. As stated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140, we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions unless there is “persuasive reason to believe” that Congress had no such purpose. Certainly under § 13a (1) the carrier, if overruled by the Commission, could obtain review. We can find no talismanic sign indicating that Congress desired to deny review to opponents of interstate discontinuances alone. Section 13a in its present form came into the Act in 1958 and was designed to supersede the prior confused and time-consuming procedure under which the States 2 There is a conflict among the District Courts. Minnesota v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 (D. C. Minn.), and New Hampshire v. Boston & Maine Corp., 251 F. Supp. 421 (D. C. N. H.), are in accord with the District Court in the instant cases. Opposed to that view are Vermont v. Boston & Maine Corp., 269 F. Supp. 80 (D. C. Vt.), and New York v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 989 (D. C. N. D. N. Y.). And see City oj Williamsport v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 899, 282 F. Supp. 46 (D. C. M. D. Pa.), aff’d, 392 U. S. 642. CITY OF CHICAGO v. UNITED STATES 165 162 Opinion of the Court supervised the discontinuance of passenger trains. Accordingly, Congress provided a uniform federal scheme to take the place of the former procedure.3 A single federal standard was to govern train discontinuances whether interstate or intrastate, though the procedure of § 13a (1) for discontinuance of an interstate train was made somewhat different from the procedure for discontinuance of intrastate trains.4 But the Commission is to have the final say in each case and “precisely the same substantive standard” now governs discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate operations. Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93, 103. Whether the Commission should make an investigation of a § 13a (1) discontinuance is of course within its discretion, a matter which is not reviewable. New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, aff’d, 359 U. S. 27. 3 “Without reciting individual cases the subcommittee is satisfied that State regulatory bodies all too often have been excessively conservative and unduly repressive in requiring the maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities. Even when allowing the discontinuance or change of a service or facility, these groups have frequently delayed decisions beyond a reasonable time limit. In many such cases, State regulatory commissions have shown a definite lack of appreciation for the serious impact on a railroad’s financial condition resulting from prolonged loss-producing operations. “To improve this situation, the subcommittee proposes to give the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction in the field of discontinuance or change of rail services and facilities similar to the jurisdiction it now has over intrastate rates under section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act so that when called upon to do so it may deal with such matters that impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. This, the subcommittee believes, would protect and further the broad public interest in a sound transportation system and would prevent undue importance being attached to matters of a local nature.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22. For a review of the legislative history of § 13a (2), see Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93, 100-103. 4 See n. 1, supra. 166 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. But when the Commission undertakes to investigate, it is under a statutory mandate: “Whenever an investigation shall be made by said Commission, it shall be its duty to make a report in writing in respect thereto, which shall state the conclusions of the Commission, together with its decision, order, or requirement in the premises . . . .” 49 U. S. C. §14(1). A decision to investigate indicates that a substantial question exists under the statutory standards. The Commission’s report therefore deals with the merits. We cannot say that an answer that discontinuance should not be allowed is agency “action,” while an answer saying the reverse is agency “inaction.” The technical form of the order is irrelevant. In each case the Commission is deciding the merits. The present cases are kin to the “negative orders” 5 which we dealt with in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 142-143: “An order of the Commission dismissing a complaint on the merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise of administrative function, no more and no less, than an order directing some change in status. The nature of the issues foreclosed by the 5 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551 (6) (1964 ed., Supp IV), defines “order” as including a “negative” form of “a final disposition” by agency action. And that kind of “order” is subject to judicial review. 5 U. S. C. §§551 (13), 701 (b)(2), 702 (1964 ed, Supp. IV). When carriers file new rates, the Commission has authority on its own initiative or on complaint to make an investigation either with or without suspension of the new rates. 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7). Where the Commission finds the proposed rates lawful, its order reads: “(T]he investigation proceedings [are] discontinued.” See Eastern Central Motor Carriers Assn. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 314 I. C. C. 5, 51. Such orders are reviewable. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 318, aff’d, 379 U. S. 6. CITY OF CHICAGO v. UNITED STATES 167 162 Opinion of the Court Commission’s action and the nature of the issues left open, so far as the reviewing power of courts is concerned, are the same. . . . We conclude, therefore, that any distinction, as such, between ‘negative’ and ‘affirmative’ orders, as a touchstone of jurisdiction to review the Commission’s orders, serves no useful purpose, and insofar as earlier decisions have been controlled by this distinction, they can no longer be guiding.” The District Court reasoned that since “the statute is self-implementing,” only an “order” requiring action is reviewable. 294 F. Supp., at 1106. But that theory is of the vintage we discarded in Rochester Telephone. Reversed. 168 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Syllabus 396 U. S. ZUBER et al. v. ALLEN et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 25. Argued October 16, 1969— Decided December 9, 1969* Respondent Vermont dairy farmers (“country” milk producers) brought this action to invalidate the so-called farm location differential provided for by order of the Secretary of Agriculture as contrary to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. The effect of the order is to require milk distributors to pay milk producers situated close to milk marketing areas (“nearby” farmers) higher prices than are paid to producers located at greater distances from such areas. In the 1920’s, prior to federal regulation, nearby farmers received higher prices for their milk in the Boston area than farmers at more distant points. The 1935 amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, carried forward into § 8 (c) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, provides, in part, for the payment to all producers “delivering milk to all handlers of uniform prices for all milk . . . subject only to adjustments for (a) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (b) the grade or quality of the milk delivered, (c) the locations at which delivery of such milk is made.” The Department of Agriculture regulations provide a price differential for “nearby” farmers, and a lesser differential for intermediate nearby zones. The District Court granted an injunction against further payments of the differentials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The statutory scheme, which was to provide uniform prices to all producers in the marketing area, subject only to specifically enumerated adjustments, contemplated that “market differentials . . . customarily applied” would be based on cost adjustments. Pp. 179-187. *Together with No. 52, Hardin, Secretary oj Agriculture v. Allen et al., also on certiorari to the same court. ZUBER v. ALLEN 169 168 Syllabus (a) The particularity and specificity of the enumerated differentials negate the conclusion that Congress was thinking only in terms of historical considerations. P. 183. (b) The other statutory differentials, for “volume,” “grade or quality,” “location,” and “production,” all compensate the producer for providing an economic service benefiting the milk handler. Pp. 183-184. (c) In a statute whose purpose was to avoid the infirmity of the overbroad delegation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, it would have been simple to include “nearby” payments in the list of enumerated differentials, or at least to allude to them in the draftsmen’s report. P. 185. 2. The “nearby” differentials do not fall into the category of the permissible adjustments, which are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service, and neither the Secretary of Agriculture nor the “nearby” farmer petitioners have advanced any economic justifications for them that have substantial record support. Pp. 188-191. 3. This holding does not depart from the Court’s precedents. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, distinguished. To the extent that Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F. 2d 342, contravenes this holding, it is disapproved. Pp. 191-192. 4. While according great weight to a department’s contemporaneous construction of its own enabling legislation, the Court cannot abdicate its ultimate responsibility to construe the statutory language. Pp. 192-194. 5. Although the Secretary’s orders have been specifically approved by the farmers concerned in accordance with § 9 (B) (i) of the Act, such approval does not legitimize the regulation which is not authorized by statute. Pp. 195-196. 6. A reversal for trial on the merits is not warranted since the Department of Agriculture acted on a formal record, and a remand to the Secretary is inappropriate in the absence of a request by the Government, which has advanced no new theory for sustaining the regulation. Pp. 196-197. 7. The Court of Appeals’ award to “nearby” farmer petitioners of the escrowed differential payments collected before the District Court entered final judgment will not be disturbed. P. 197. 131 U. S. App. D. C. 109, 402 F. 2d 660, affirmed. 170 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Lawrence D. Hollman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 25. With him on the briefs was Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 52. On the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Peter L. Strauss, Alan S. Rosenthal, and Walter H. Fleischer. Charles Patrick Ryan argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Edward J. Ryan. Edwin H. Amidon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Vermont as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief was James M. Jeffords, Attorney General. Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, pro se, Walter H. Mayo III, Assistant Attorney General, Herbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General of Rhode Island, pro se, Charles G. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, pro se, and Michael J. Scanlon, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut as amici curiae urging reversal in both cases. C. Wayne Smyth filed a brief for Lorton Blair et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was brought by respondent Vermont dairy farmers, “country” milk producers, seeking a judgment invalidating as contrary to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. §601 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), the so-called farm location differential provided for by order ZUBER v. ALLEN 171 168 Opinion of the Court of the Secretary of Agriculture.1 The effect of that order is to require milk distributors to pay to milk producers situated at certain distances from milk marketing areas, “nearby” farmers, higher prices than are paid to producers located at greater distances from such areas. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction on January 16, 1967, against further payments and on respondents’ motion for summary judgment transformed its decree into a permanent injunction on June 15, 1967. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 131 U. S. App. D. C. 109, 402 F. 2d 660 (1968). We granted certiorari to resolve the important issue of statutory construction involved in this aspect of the administration of the federal milk regulation program. 394 U. S. 958 (1969). 1 The Secretary has promulgated comprehensive regulations to govern the marketing of milk, 7 CFR § 1002.1 et seq. (1969), pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The provisions relevant to this cause are set forth in Part I of this opinion, at 178, infra. The action was originally brought against the Secretary only. Petitioners Zuber et al., nearby farmers, unsuccessfully sought leave to intervene before the District Court in support of the Secretary’s regulations. When judgment was rendered against the Secretary, petitioners sought leave to intervene for the purposes of appeal. Leave was granted and the Secretary also decided to take an appeal. The parties have devoted a good deal of energy to disputing what constitutes the record in this litigation. Petitioners at various times have referred us to the testimony and record compiled in an action brought in the Northern District of New York, Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (1968). Respondents have objected, noting that the record in Cranston is not formally before this Court, and have included in the appendix various materials that were not of record below. The Court need not pause over the controversy since none of the materials in respondents’ appendix is decisive of the action before us. As for the references to the Cranston record, they too are not decisive of the dispute. 172 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. I BACKGROUND Once again this Court must traverse the labyrinth of the federal milk marketing regulation provisions.2 While previous decisions have outlined the operation of the statute and the pertinent regulations, a brief odyssey through the economic and regulatory background is essential perspective for focusing the issue now before the Court. A. The Economics of the Milk Industry The two distinctive and essential phenomena of the milk industry are a basic two-price structure that permits a higher return for the same product, depending on its ultimate use, and the cyclical characteristic of production. Milk has essentially two end uses: as a fluid staple of daily consumer diet, and as an ingredient in manufactured dairy products such as butter and cheese. Milk used in the consumer market has traditionally commanded a premium price, even though it is of no higher quality than milk used for manufacture. While cost differences account for part of the discrepancy in price, they do not explain the entire gap. At the same time the milk industry is characterized by periods of seasonal overproduction. The winter months are low in yield and 2 See, e. g., Lehigh Valley Cooperative v. United States, 370 U. S. 76 (1962); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U. S. 451 (1952); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 (1944); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533 (1939); H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U. S. 588 (1939). The lower courts have also been plagued by the milk problem. See especially Judge Frank’s lament, Queensboro Farm Prods. v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1943); see also Blair v. Freeman, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 370 F. 2d 229 (1966); Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F. 2d 342 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1939). ZUBER v. ALLEN 173 168 Opinion of the Court conversely the summer months are fertile. In order to meet fluid demand which is relatively constant, sufficiently large herds must be maintained to supply winter needs. The result is oversupply in the more fruitful months. The historical tendency prior to regulation was for milk distributors, “handlers,” to take advantage of this surplus to obtain bargains during glut periods. Milk can be obtained from distant sources and handlers can afford to absorb transportation costs and still pay more to outlying farmers whose traditional outlet is the manufacturing market.3 To maintain income farmers increase production and the disequilibrium snowballs. To protect against market vicissitudes, farmers in the early 1920’s formed cooperatives. These cooperatives were effective in eliminating the self-defeating overproduction by pooling the milk supply and refusing to deal with handlers except on a collective basis.4 During 3 For fluid use, milk must be transported in its natural state and as such is a bulky and highly perishable commodity. Thus cost of shipment to a consumer market is greater than transporting an equal supply to a manufacturing plant. These factors, combined with more rigid sanitary requirements for plants distributing the fluid product, see Agricultural Adjustment Administration Report, May 1933-Feb. 1934, p. 154, explain part of the disparity between the price for Class I (fluid milk) and Class II (other uses) milk. Nearby producers, given equilibrium of supply and demand, are logical fluid suppliers to the urban areas. See generally J. Cassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices (1937). 4 The cooperative system amounted to a pooling arrangement wherein participating producers would bargain collectively with the handlers and threaten to withhold their milk if the handlers refused to agree to purchase a certain minimum percentage of their Class I fluid milk from the pool. Without this supply the handlers would be unable to meet their winter requirements. Essential to this arrangement of course was a sufficiently wide membership to insure no alternative source of supply to recalcitrant handlers. The second aspect of the arrangement was the division of the profits among the producer members of the cooperative. Frequently 174 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. the 1920’s era of relative market stability the nearby farmers enjoyed premium prices for their product. These favorable prices were apparently attributable to reduced transportation costs and also the nearby farmer’s historic position as a fluid supplier.* 5 B. The First Federal Program The drop in commodity prices during the depression years destroyed the equilibrium of the 1920’s and utter chaos ensued. Congress, in an effort to restore order to the market and boost the purchasing power of farmers, enacted the licensing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31, 35. Under § 8 (3) the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered “(t]o issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers, and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity or product thereof. Such licenses shall be subject to such terms and conditions, not in conflict with existing Acts of employed was a base-rating plan whereby each producer would be assigned a percentage of his milk for which he could claim payment at the Class I fluid price. For the remaining production he would be paid at the Class II rate. Apparently bases were assigned according to the anticipated participation of the producer in the fluid market. As a result, nearby producers received more favorable bases in view of their historical role as fluid suppliers in an equilibrium market. For descriptions of the cooperative systems see Cassels, supra, n. 3, at 56-70; J. Black, The Dairy Industry and the AAA 49-51 (1935). 5 Because they were historically fluid suppliers the nearby producers apparently maintained at all times production sufficient to service the consumer fluid market. In addition their close proximity enabled them to deliver to small retailers. As such they were potential competitors. ZUBER v. ALLEN 175 168 Opinion of the Court Congress or regulations pursuant thereto, as may be necessary to eliminate unfair practices or charges that prevent or tend to prevent the effectuation of the declared policy and the restoration of normal economic conditions in the marketing of such commodities or products and the financing thereof. The Secretary of Agriculture may suspend or revoke any such license, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, for violations of the terms or conditions thereof. . . .” Under the licensing system base-rating plans not unlike the private arrangements that obtained in the 1920’s were adopted.6 Producers were assigned bases which fixed the percent of their output that they would be permitted to sell at the Class I price that was paid for fluid milk.7 The viability of the licensing scheme was jeopardized, however, by judicial decisions disapproving a similarly broad delegation of power under the National Industrial Recovery Act provisions, 48 Stat. 195. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 ( 1935). With its agricultural marketing program resting on quicksand, Congress moved swiftly to eliminate the defect of overbroad delegation and to shore up the void in the agricultural marketing provisions. Section 8 (3) of the 1933 Act was amended in 1935 and the pertinent language has been carried forward without significant 6 See Agricultural Adjustment Administration Report, supra, n. 3, at 159-161; G. Barnhart, The Development of the Licenses and Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in the Greater Boston, Massachusetts, Marketing Area, Nov. 3, 1933-June 1, 1946 (unpublished dissertation on file with Department of Agriculture and Harvard University). 7 License 38 for the Boston area provided more favorable bases for the nearby producers. See Barnhart, supra, n. 6, at 95-96. 176 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. change into § 8c of the present Act. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 608c (1964 ed. and Supp. IV).8 8 “(5) Milk and its products; terms and conditions of orders. “In the case of milk and its products, orders issued pursuant to this section shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions, and (except as provided in subsection (7) of this section) no others : “(A) Classifying milk in accordance with the form in which or the purpose for which it is used, and fixing, or providing a method for fixing, minimum prices for each such use classification which all handlers shall pay, and the time when payments shall be made, for milk purchased from producers or associations of producers. Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers: “(B) Providing: “(i) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to the same handler of uniform prices for all milk delivered by them: Provided, That except in the case of orders covering milk products only, such provision is approved or favored by at least three-fourths of the producers who, during a representative period determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, have been engaged in the production for market of milk covered in such order or by producers who, during such representative period, have produced at least three-fourths of the volume of such milk produced for market during such period; the approval required hereunder shall be separate and apart from any other approval or disapproval provided for by this section; or “(ii) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to all handlers of uniform prices for all milk so delivered, irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual handler to whom it is delivered; “subject, in either case, only to adjustments for (a) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (b) the grade or quality of the milk delivered, (c) the locations at which delivery of such milk is made, and (d) a further adjustment, equitably to apportion the total value of the ZUBER v. ALLEN 177 168 Opinion of the Court C. The Present Regulatory Scheme The present system, which differs little in substance from the scheme conceived in 1937 for regulating the Boston market,9 provides for a uniform market price payable to all producers by all handlers.10 Prices are established for Class I and Class II uses. The total volume of milk channeled into the market in each category is multiplied by the appropriate coefficient price and the two results are totaled and then divided by the total number of pounds sold. The result represents the average value of milk sold in the marketing area and is the basic “uniform” price. Were all producers to receive this price they would share on an equal basis milk purchased by any handler, or by all handlers, among producers and associations of producers, on the basis of their marketings of milk, which may be adjusted to reflect sales of such milk by any handler or by all handlers in any use classification or classifications, during a representative period of time which need not be limited to one year.” 9 The Boston order of 1937, 2 Fed. Reg. 1331, established uniform prices for all producers at $3.19 and $3.01 per cwt. of milk, depending on the place of delivery, with a further adjustment for transportation to the handler’s plant in the marketing area. Article VIII, §4 (1) also provided for an adjustment based on the cost of transporting milk from outlying plants to the primary Boston market. The present regulations calculate price with reference to the purchasing power of milk based on the 1958 cost-of-living index. No transportation adjustment is provided for in calculation of the uniform price under § 1001.62 of the order. Differentials to compensate for zone of delivery are retained as separate adjustments. See infra. 10 The Secretary has three alternative modes of proceeding under the Act. He may establish “use” prices which all handlers must pay to all producers according to the actual amount of milk used in each category, § 8c (5) (A); individual handler pools where all producers or cooperatives selling to an individual handler shall be paid a uniform price for milk delivered to that handler; or a marketwide pool where all handlers must pay all producers a uniform price for all milk delivered irrespective of end use. 178 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. the profits of Class I marketing and assume equally the costs of disposing of the economic surplus in the Class II market. The actual price to the producer is, however, the “blended” price which is computed by adding and subtracting certain special differentials provided for by statute and order. See 7 CFR § 1001.64 (1969). The deduction for differential payments withheld for the benefit of nearby producers reduces the uniform “blended” price to those producers ineligible to collect this particular adjustment.11 The provision is contained in § 1001.72 of the order and provides: “In making the payments to producers . . . each handler shall add any applicable farm location differential specified in this section. “(a) With respect to milk received from a producer whose farm is located within any of the places specified in this paragraph, the differential shall be 46 cents per hundredweight, unless the addition of 46 cents gives a result greater than the Class I price determined under §§ 1001.60, 1001.62, and 1001.63 which is effective at the plant at which the milk is received. In that event there shall be added a rate which will produce that price.” A differential of 23$ is provided for deliveries from farms in intermediate nearby zones. § 1001.72 (b). The foregoing provisions appear in the so-called 1964 Massachusetts-Rhode Island Order, which consolidated into one region the four sub-markets which were pre 11 Also included is an adjustment for delivery to a nearby plant. The location of handler plants is classified by zones. 7 CFR § 1001.62. Delivery to a plant located nearby the consumer market is, of course, advantageous to the handler and the producer is compensated for this service. The handler also saves the cost of handling and processing at his country plant in addition to saving transportation cost. Conversely, depositing milk at handlers’ plants in outlying districts results in a negative adjustment. ZUBER v. ALLEN 179 168 Opinion of the Court viously regulated separately under the so-called four “New England” orders: the 1951 Boston order which carried forward the order adopted for the Boston area in 1937; the Springfield order promulgated in 1949; and the Southeastern New England order of 1958. Each order included a provision for a nearby differential payment to farmers within a stated radius of a designated market center. For example the differential under the Boston order was payable to farmers located within a 40-mile radius of the State House in Boston; a slightly lower differential was paid to farmers within an 80-mile radius. Under the 1964 order there is no central point for the computation of the radius for payment of the differential; the Secretary has retained the differential provisions as they appeared in the previous four orders. Farmers who would have been entitled to the differential under any one of the previous four marketing regulations continue to receive those payments under the present order. These nearby farmers are eligible for the differential on any shipments within the New England marketing area, even though their milk may actually be used outside the radius of their particular nearby zone. II THE STATUTORY SCHEME The foundation of the statutory scheme is to provide uniform prices to all producers in the marketing area, subject only to specifically enumerated adjustments. The question before the Court, stated most simply, is whether payment of farm location differentials, set forth above, is a permissible adjustment under § 8c (5)(B) to the general requirement of uniformity of price.12 12 Section 8c (5) (B) (ii) requires all uniform prices to be paid “irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual handler to whom it is delivered.” Respondents contend that the nearby differ 180 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U.S. The Secretary has in the past labeled the “nearby” differential a “location” differential and defended its inclusion in his orders on that ground. The justification and argument are now, however, pitched in a different key. The Government has apparently abandoned all but one of the numerous theories advanced below, and pressed most vigorously in the Blair v. Freeman litigation (125 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 370 F. 2d 229 (1966)), and it now stresses the provision in §8c(5)(B) for “volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order.” While the proper resolution of the issue is by no means self-evident, we are persuaded that “market . . . differentials customarily applied” contemplates cost adjustments. The plain thrust of the federal statute was to remove ruinous and self-defeating competition among ential is merely a disguised payment for the nearby suppliers’ greater share of fluid milk sales. Such was apparently the case in the New Jersey order invalidated by the Court of Appeals in Blair v. Freeman, supra, where the payment of the differential was explicitly linked to the percentage of nearby milk actually supplied to the fluid market. We share respondents’ skepticism and our doubts are reinforced by the explicit connection of differential payments with the share of fluid milk supplied in the 1936 Boston order. Further cause for skepticism is found in the present zone differential structure which undercompensates the handlers for transportation from outlying districts and thus encourages them to buy from nearby farmers. See Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10 J. Law & Econ. 51, 64-65 (1967). Here, however, unlike the situation in Blair v. Freeman, supra, the producer receives the differential irrespective of the use to which his milk is ultimately put. Since the nearby differential in the present order is not directly tied to the percentage of fluid milk sales, although the order limits differential payments to 46^ or the Class I price, whichever is higher, we accept the Government’s contention that, as a matter of strict logic, the payment of differentials based on the historical position of nearby producers as fluid suppliers, is not inconsistent with the irrespective-of-end-use requirement. ZUBER v. ALLEN 181 168 Opinion of the Court the producers and permit all farmers to share the benefits of fluid milk profits according to the value of goods produced and services rendered. The Government’s proposed reading of the Act, bottomed, as it is, on the historical payment of a premium to nearby farmers during the monopolistic era of the cooperative pools, would come to perpetuate economic distortion and freeze the milk industry into the competitive structure that prevailed during the 1920’s. Without the benefit of government muscle to eliminate crippling price warfare in the summer months, neither nearby nor country producers could share in the monopoly-type profits that accrue from fluid milk sales. Absent regulation only the handlers, if anyone, would stand to benefit from the “fluid” monopoly. While we cannot project what would be the case today if a free market prevailed, we might well anticipate that the nearby producers’ winter advantages would be negligible in view of reduced transportation costs and more reliable refrigeration. Thus even in winter handlers might be free to play nearby and outlying farmers against each other since handlers would be free of the leverage exercised by the nearby cooperatives during the 1920’s. Nearby producers now seek the best of both worlds. Having achieved the security that comes with regulation, they seek under a regulatory umbrella to appropriate monopoly profits that were never secure in the unregulated market. We are reluctant to attribute such intent to Congress and, simply in the name of administrative expertise, to follow a path not marked by the language of the statute. Indeed, such signposts as may be discerned from the legislative history point in a very different direction. The legislative history strongly suggests that “market differentials,” as well as all the other differentials, contemplated particular understood economic adjustments. The House Report, in discussing the allowable adjust- 182 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. ments characterizes the market differential as a payment over and above the transportation costs, i. e., a location differential, for delivery to the primary market.13 Thus farmers would share with handlers the savings from bypassing country-station processing and handling the milk only at the city plant. The significance of the legislative history emerges upon study of the subsequent administrative practice. The original Boston order obscures the market differential payment by providing in place of a labeled adjustment a two-price structure which allowed an additional 180 per cwt. for city-delivered milk over and above the costs of transporting the milk from the country plant. However, the testimony of Mr. Aplin for the Market Administrator erases any doubt that those responsible for administering the Act fully understood the meaning of the Committee’s explanation of market differential.14 13 “The market differential is a differential which is given to the producer to compensate him for delivering his milk to a city market instead of to a country plant. These differentials vary with the markets and cannot be qualified as a 'location’ differential, because of the fact that location is usually determined on the distance from a primary market whereas market differentials are usually paid in secondary markets.” H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). 14 The relevant excerpts from the hearing are included in the Joint Appendix and appear at 258-259: “Section 4 . . . provides for location differentials. . . . Now, the price which is arrived at from the calculation of the pool is a blended price for all milk f. o. b. the market with country station allowances deducted. Now, Paragraph 1 [of § 4] here provides that there shall be deducted from that blended price in the case of milk delivered to a plant more than 40 miles from the State House an amount equal to the carlot freight rate from that plant to Boston, so that that deduction would be different for each freight zone, and the price would be smaller by the amount of difference in freight from each zone as we go out from the market. Now, Paragraph 2 [of § 4] provides that in the case of milk delivered from a producer ZUBER v. ALLEN 183 168 Opinion of the Court Subsequent orders have combined the country station handling adjustment, properly the market differential, and the location-transportation differential into the so-called zone differential.15 The statute before us does not contain a mandate phrased in broad and permissive terms. Congress has spoken with particularity and provided specifically enumerated differentials, which negatives the conclusion that it was thinking only in terms of historical considerations. The prefatory discussion in the House Report emphasizes the congressional purpose to confine the boundaries of the Secretary’s delegated authority.16 In these circumstances an administrator does not have “broad dispensing power.” See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607, 617 (1944). The congressional purpose is further illumined by the character of the other statutory differentials for “volume,” to a plant located within forty miles of the State House there should be added 18 cents per hundredweight. That.is added for the reason that in the case of country stations there is allowed the dealers on Class I milk 20 cents a hundredweight as a country station charge, and we are allowing for containers in which to ship the milk three cents in the case of milk received at city plants, instead of having a 20 cent and a three cent deduction, which would be 23 cents. There is a receiving station allowance of only five cents. The difference is 18 cents per hundredweight. We add back in here 18 cents to the producer whose milk does not pass through a country station.” (Emphasis added.) 15 See Barnhart, supra, n. 6, at 620. 16 “To eliminate questions of improper delegation of legislative authority raised by the decisions in Schechter et al. v. United States, the provisions relating to orders enumerate the commodities to which orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture may be applicable, prescribe fully the administrative procedure to be followed by the Secretary in issuing, enforcing, and terminating orders, and specify the terms which may be included in orders dealing with the enumer-ated commodities.” H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 8. See Brannan v. Stark, 342 U. S. 451, 465 (1952). 184 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. “grade or quality,” “location,” and “production,”17 all of which compensate or reward the producer for providing an economic service of benefit to the handler.18 The general language of the committee report indicating that Congress intended to carry forward the basic regulatory approach adopted under the 1933 Act, following the precedent of the 1920’s, is stressed by the dissent to this opinion. This committee language, it is argued, reinforces the continuity connotations of the “customarily applied” language, a thrust that is not blunted 17 In this connection it should be noted that the production differential authorized for maintaining an adequate supply for fluid use during the lean winter months is not, strictly speaking, a handler cost but a general cost of the market. It is, however, an essential cost that cannot be eliminated by looking to an alternative supplier. Viewed in this context, it is of course a cost to the handler; for in a nonregulated equilibrium market, a handler would be forced to pay a premium during the winter months when supply is limited and demand constant. 18 “The volume differential is a differential which is paid when the operations of several country plants are consolidated into one plant. The inconvenience which is caused to producers by closing up plants to which they have been delivering and requiring that all of their milk be handled by one plant, is compensated by an additional payment to the producers. The production differential is the differential which is paid to a producer, compensating him for keeping his farm and milk qualified for a city market even though his milk may actually be going into manufactured use. . . . The production differential is a payment to the farmer for performing this function in the market.” (Emphasis supplied.) H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 9-10. In Brannan v. Stark, supra, this Court invalidated regulations providing certain payments to cooperatives that had the effect of reducing the blended price to nonmember producers. The premise underlying our holding was that these payments would have to represent compensation for rendering of economic services of benefit to all producers. Even the dissenters took as a point of departure the proposition that the payments could be sustained only if justified in terms of services rendered. ZUBER v. ALLEN 185 168 Opinion of the Court by any specific language indicating a legislative purpose to treat all farmers equally. Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route. For here the light illumines two different roads. If nearby payments had the notoriety and significance in the milk distribution industry attributed to them by the dissent, Congress could have given its blessing by carving out another specific exception to the uniform price requirement. In an Act whose very purpose was to avoid the infirmity of overbroad delegation and to set forth with particularity the details for a comprehensive regulatory scheme, it would have been a simple matter to include in a list of enumerated differentials, “nearby” payments, or at least allude to them in the report of the draftsmen. It is clear that Congress was not conferring untrammeled discretion on the Secretary and authorizing him to proceed in a vacuum. This was the very evil condemned by the courts that the 1935 amendments sought to eradicate.19 It would be perverse to assume that congressional drafters, in eliminating ambiguity from the old Act,20 were careless in listing their exceptions and selecting the illustrations from the committee report from which their words would ultimately derive content.21 19 See Brannan v. Stark, supra. 20 “The proposed amendments, insofar as they relate to marketing agreements and orders, are primarily intended to implement and spell out in more detail and with greater freedom from ambiguity the powers which were provided for in the original act. The present language of the statute is, unfortunately, subject to serious mis-construction. This has given rise to obstacles in connection with the enforcement of the marketing agreements and licenses which have seriously endangered their successful operation.” H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 7. 21 The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible. This Court has many times reconsidered statutory constructions that have been passively abided by Congress. Congressional inaction frequently 186 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. We consider our conclusions in no way undermined by the colloquy on the floor between Senator Copeland and Senator Murphy upon which the dissent places such emphasis. A committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report in this instance. There is no indication, however, that the question of nearby differentials and the meaning of “market . . . differentials customarily applied” were precisely considered in the floor dialogue. The exchange is not only brief but also inconclusive as to meaning.22 Indeed, Senator Murphy apparently acqui- betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis. “It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946). Its significance is greatest when the area is one of traditional year-by-year supervision, like tax, where watchdog committees are considering and revising the statutory scheme. Even less deference is due silence in the wake of unsuccessful attempts to eliminate an offending interpretation by amendment. See, e. g., Girouard v. United States, supra. Where, as in the case before us, there is no indication that a subsequent Congress has addressed itself to the particular problem, we are unpersuaded that silence is tantamount to acquiescence, let alone the approval discerned by the dissent. 22 The floor exchange is reported at 79 Cong. Rec. 11139-11140. “Mr. COPELAND. What has the Senator to say to the suggestion that in a number of communities in up-State New York there is not a sufficient supply of milk surrounding the market to take care of the demand; therefore, milk must be brought into the market from more distant points ? The provisions of the equalization which we are now discussing provide that a producer who is producing his milk on farms near to cities would receive the same price for his product as a farmer who produces his milk, say, 40 or 50 miles away from the same community. “Mr. MURPHY. If they were embraced in the same marketing area, that would be true. Let us keep in mind what the situation is. There is a deficiency of consumer demand. There is a surplus of ZUBER v. ALLEN 187 168 Opinion of the Court esced in Senator Copeland’s implied criticism of the statute for providing uniform prices for distant and nearby producers within the marketing region. When Senator Copeland pursued his inquiry, asking whether the Act recognized the higher cost for taxes on nearby lands, Senator Murphy merely recited the differential provisions of the Act and suggested that they “adopt the present practice of business,” but conspicuously lacking is an affirmative statement that any specific differential covered these costs. This is not impressive legislative history especially in light of Senator Murphy’s earlier agreement with Senator Copeland’s statement that “[t]he provisions of the equalization . . . provide that a producer who is producing his milk on farms near to cities would receive the same price for his product as a farmer who produces his milk, say, 40 or 50 miles away from the same community,” and the specific business illustrations of the House Report. milk. The price is greatly depressed, and has been for 5 years. The only way in which one can determine how each one of the producers included in the plan provided here shall bear his share of the cost of effecting a higher price is to divide the milk by classification uses. “Mr. COPELAND. I do not think the Senator has quite stated all the conditions. He does not take into consideration the difference in the cost of production. Taxes and values of property near the city are very much higher than in the case of property farther away from the city. The transportation differential does not compensate for the difference in cost, as I see it. “Mr. MURPHY. If the Senator will refer to page 12, line 13, he will see that there is this qualification: “ 'Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order—’ “They adopt the present practice of business— “‘(2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers.’ ” 188 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. Ill SCOPE OF MARKET DIFFERENTIAL While market differentials customarily applied need not be restricted to the sole illustration in the House Report, that illustration, taken in conjunction with the discussion of all the statutory differentials, suggests that the permissible adjustments are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service.23 The challenged nearby differentials do not fall into this category.24 Nor has the Secretary advanced any economic justification for these differential payments. It is plain from the administrative record that the nearby differential was included in the original Boston order as a recognition of the favored position of nearby producers in the fluid market and as an inducement to nearby farmers to approve the Secretary’s order. (J. A. 237.25) The only sense 23 The market differential does not, strictly speaking, compensate the producer for absorbing a cost to the handler for it may be no additional cost to the producer to deliver to a city plant. A nearby farmer, for example, would not incur additional costs by delivering to a preferred city plant as opposed to a country station. The savings to the handler are nevertheless plain and the market differential should properly be viewed as an adjustment that permits the producer to share in the handler’s profits resulting from reduced costs. 24 See Kessel, supra, n. 12, at 65-66 (1967). After criticizing the present undercompensation for transportation costs from faraway zones as a disguised subsidy to nearby producers, resulting in an inefficient allocation of economic resources, the author draws a comparison with the nearby differential lamenting, “However weak the case for zone differentials that fail to depict transportation costs, it is infinitely stronger than the case for location differentials.” 25 The Secretary’s 1964 findings include the following: “The farm location differential provisions under the present New England orders should be continued under the Massachusetts-Rhode Island order and the Connecticut order. “A group of nine cooperative associations, which represents principally producers whose farms are located outside any of the speci- ZUBER v. ALLEN 189 168 Opinion of the Court in which the handler may be said to gain economically is by virtue of the elimination of the nearby producer as a potential competitor. While this factor is mentioned in the findings accompanying the 1937 order, it has not tied farm location differential areas, proposed that farm location differentials be eliminated under the New England orders. Three other cooperative associations proposed that a producer whose farm is located wdthin New England and who is presently eligible to receive a farm location differential . . . under any New England order be eligible to receive the same differential irrespective of the New England order under which his milk is pooled. Another cooperative association proposed that the farm location differentials be increased .... “. . . [F]arm location differentials have been in effect under the several New England orders since the inception of the orders. The differentials were adopted to reflect in the pricing structure of the orders historical price relationships by location which prevailed in these markets. It was found that customarily somewhat higher values, above those which normally reflected transportation costs, attached to milk produced near the principal consumption centers as compared to the market value of milk produced in the more distant areas of the milkshed. “While considerable testimony in support of removal of the provisions was received, it was not established that the farm location differential provisions are resulting in unstable or disruptive marketing conditions which warrant their deletion from the orders at this time. Although certain marketing problems in the nearby and intermediate market areas were referred to in the testimony, these problems are not the result of production increases on farms in these areas which logically might be attributable to the higher returns to producers in these areas. Such increases have not been significantly different from those on farms not eligible for the farm location differentials.” (J. A. 349-351). There is no reason to dispute the Secretary’s finding that the differentials have no disruptive effect on the market. The issue, however, is whether the provisions are authorized by statute. The Secretary’s order is devoid of any economic justification and relies solely on the historical factor of the nearby producer’s favorable share of the fluid use market. See also Report to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Federal Milk Order Study Committee 74-75 (1962). 190 OCTOBER TERM, 1969 Opinion of the Court 396 U. S. been emphasized in the 1964 findings and the testimony at the 1963 hearings suggests that support in the record is indeed scant. That entry of the nearbys into the distribution market would bring unwanted competition, is irrelevant if it does not jeopardize market stability. We think the analysis of the court below was correct: if there is any economic benefit here, producers should receive their compensation directly from the handlers and not out of the marketwide pool. 131 U. S. App. D. C., at 114, 402 F. 2d, at 665. While petitioner nearby farmers do not concede so readily the absence of economic foundation for the differential, no justifications are advanced that find any substantial support in the record. The allusion to the evenness of production on nearby farms would not justify the exclusive payment of this differential to nearby farmers. If the Secretary intended a production differential, all producers who qualify would be eligible. Some amici and petitioners point to higher taxes on nearby lands and opportunity costs as reason for retaining the differential. These are, admittedly, additional costs of nearby production, but they are of no concern to handlers who seek only to obtain reliably milk at the cheapest price. See Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10 J. Law & Econ. 51 (1967). This Court has been slow to attribute to Congress an intent to compensate for inefficient allocation of economic resources. Cf. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm’n, 294 U. S. 63, 72 (1935). While petitioners argue that the differential is a necessary inducement to keep the nearby farmers in business, the record does not reveal that the Secretary acted out of concern that the nearby farmers would quit the market, nor is there any evidence demonstrating the present necessity for nearby producers. In an era where efficient transportation is ZUBER v. ALLEN 191 168 Opinion of the Court available this may be of nominal concern. At most this may have been an unspoken consideration in 1937.26 Since the Secretary made no findings to that effect, the Court need not consider whether they would justify payment of the nearby differential in view of the legislative history indicating that the statute contemplates adjustments primarily for economic costs to handlers that are absorbed or reduced by the producers. Further if the representations of respondents are correct—and they are not without support in the record—it appears that the elimination of the 40-mile zone nearby differential payments of 46<, even with the suspension of the intermediate differential payments of 23