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2. *Court of Appeals—Restoration of bail.*—Application for restoration of bail pending appeal granted. *Beyer v. United States* (HARLAN, J., in chambers), p. 1235.

3. *Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure—No written explanation for denial—Remand.*—Application for bail pending appeal from conviction held in abeyance and matter remanded to Circuit Court Judge. District Court denied bail without written explanation mandated by Fed. Rule App. Proc. 9 (b), and it does not appear why Court of Appeals did not remand matter to District Court for compliance with rule as it had done in case of a codefendant's similar bail application. *Febre v. United States* (HARLAN, J., in chambers), p. 1225.

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vagueness required by due process, and of First Amendment rights. While applicant's sentence will expire shortly, a live controversy will continue and applicant should be released on bail until the full Court can act on the application. *Levy v. Parker* (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers), p. 1204.

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2. *Branch banks—Place for receiving deposits—Armored cars and off-premises receptacles.*—Term "branch bank" in 12 U. S. C. § 36 (f) includes *any* place for receiving deposits apart from the chartered premises. Here, at the time a customer delivers money either to the armored car or to the stationary receptacle, the bank has received a deposit within the meaning of that provision, and the place of delivery is an "additional office or . . . branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received" within the federal definition of branch bank in the statute. *First National Bank v. Dickinson*, p. 122.

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- CHARITABLE TRUSTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.
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part of the lease and respondents' racially discriminatory refusal to approve the assignment to the lessee constituted a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1982, the right to lease being protected by that provision against the action of third parties as well as against the action of the lessor. *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, p. 229.

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1. *Totality of circumstances—Pre-Miranda confessions—Voluntariness.*—The determination that the confessions were voluntary is not disturbed, as the trial occurred prior to *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U. S. 436, and the totality of the circumstances shows that the confessions were not coerced. *Morales v. New York*, p. 102.

2. *Voluntariness—State criminal procedure—Post-conviction review.*—When a federal court finds a *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U. S. 368, error (failure of trial judge to find confessions voluntary before admitting them into evidence) in a state proceeding, it must allow State reasonable time to make an error-free determination of the voluntariness of the confessions. *Sigler v. Parker*, p. 482.

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I. Due Process.

1. *Confessions—State criminal procedure.*—When a federal court finds a *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U. S. 368, error (failure of trial judge to find confessions voluntary before admitting them into evidence) in a state proceeding, it must allow State reasonable time to make an error-free determination of the voluntariness of the confessions. *Sigler v. Parker*, p. 482.

2. *Juvenile court—Standard of evidence.*—It is not appropriate for this Court to decide whether Nebraska law providing for proof of delinquency in juvenile proceeding under preponderance-of-evidence standard violates due process where no objection to that standard was made at hearing by appellant, who took no direct appeal, and his counsel acknowledged that evidence was sufficient to support delinquency finding even under reasonable-doubt standard. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

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3. *Prosecutor's discretion—Barren record.*—Because standing alone the issue could not be subject to review by appeal, this Court declines, in view of barrenness of record, to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to pass on appellant's contention that prosecutor's assertedly unreviewable discretion under Nebraska case law, whether to proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings, violated due process. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

II. Equal Protection of the Laws.

1. *Freeholders—Qualifications for school boards.*—Appellants and members of their class have constitutional right to be considered for public service without burden of invidiously discriminatory qualifications, and, on this record, limitation of school-board membership to freeholders violates the Equal Protection Clause. *Turner v. Fouche*, p. 346.

2. *Grand jury lists—Racial discrimination.*—District Court erred in determining that new grand jury list had been properly compiled, as underrepresentation of Negroes on list as compared with population of county, absent countervailing explanation by appellees, warranted corrective action by court, and court should have responded to the elimination of 171 Negroes out of 178 citizens disqualified for lack of "intelligence" or "uprightness," and the elimination of 225 citizens for lack of information. *Turner v. Fouche*, p. 346.

3. *Jury commission—Racial discrimination.*—Apart from problems involved in federal court's ordering Governor to exercise discretion in specific way, it cannot be said on record here that absence of Negroes from jury commission amounted in itself to prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. Appellants are no more entitled to proportional representation by race on jury commission than on any particular grand or petit jury. *Carter v. Jury Commission*, p. 320.

4. *Mississippi schools—Immediate desegregation.*—Continued operation of racially segregated schools under standard of "all deliberate speed" is no longer constitutionally permissible. Court of Appeals is directed to enter an order, effective immediately, that schools in certain Mississippi districts be operated on unitary basis. *Alexander v. Board of Education*, p. 19.

5. *Qualifications for jurors—Racial discrimination.*—Alabama Code requirement that jury commissioners select for jury service persons "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent . . . and . . . esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment . . ." is not unconstitutional on its face, and al-

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though jury commissioners abused the statutory discretion in preparing jury roll that does not mean the statute was not "capable of being carried out with no racial discrimination whatsoever." *Carter v. Jury Commission*, p. 320.

6. *School board selection—Racial discrimination.*—Constitutional and statutory scheme by which Taliaferro County, Georgia, grand jury selects the school board is not unconstitutional on its face, as the scheme is not inherently unfair, or necessarily incapable of administration without regard to race. *Turner v. Fouche*, p. 346.

7. *School desegregation—Injunctions.*—Petitioners, who seek review of Court of Appeals' ruling authorizing delay in student desegregation in three Louisiana school districts until September 1970, are—pending disposition of their petition for certiorari—granted temporary relief requiring respondent school boards to take necessary preliminary steps to effectuate complete student desegregation by February 1, 1970. *Carter v. West Feliciana School Board*, p. 226.

8. *School desegregation—School boundaries.*—The District Court approved a school board's proposal to revise school boundaries effective at the start of the school year and ordered the board to submit a complete desegregation plan within two months thereafter. The Court of Appeals, which, upon an appeal by intervenors with respect to the boundary provision, summarily vacated the order as inappropriate except as part of an overall plan, should have allowed the implementation of the proposal, to which petitioners did not object, pending argument and decision of the appeal. *Dowell v. Board of Education*, p. 269.

9. *Testamentary trust—Park for exclusive use of white people.*—Georgia Supreme Court's action terminating testamentary trust, which provided for creation of park for exclusive use of white people, did not violate any constitutionally protected rights. Termination was not the imposition of a "penalty," the forfeiture of the park because of the city's compliance with the constitutional mandate of *Evans v. Newton*, 382 U. S. 296, but was the result of the construction of the will, and there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment where a state court without any racial animus applies its normal principles of construction to determine the testator's true intent and concludes that everyone is to be deprived of the benefits of the trust. *Evans v. Abney*, p. 435.

10. *Trial transcripts—Free copies.*—This Court need not decide whether the Constitution requires State to furnish indigent prisoners with free trial transcripts to aid in petitioning for collateral relief unless it appears that petitioner cannot again borrow a copy from

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the State, or procure one from codefendant or other custodian, or show that it would be significantly more advantageous for him to own rather than borrow a copy. *Wade v. Wilson*, p. 282.

III. Fourth Amendment.

Custodial questioning—Probable cause for arrest.—Issue of legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest, which goes beyond *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U. S. 1, and *Sibron v. New York*, 392 U. S. 40, is not decided in view of absence of a record which squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the factual context in which the question arises. *Morales v. New York*, p. 102.

IV. Self-Incrimination.

1. *False statements on wagering tax forms.*—By filing false statements appellee took a course other than the one that 26 U. S. C. § 4412 was designed to compel, a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take. *United States v. Knox*, p. 77.

2. *Harrison Narcotics Act—Sale of heroin without order form.*—Petitioner seller's self-incrimination claim under the Harrison Narcotics Act is insubstantial, as his assumption that an order form would be forthcoming if he refused to sell without it is unrealistic, there being no substantial possibility that a buyer could have secured a form to obtain heroin, virtually all dealings in which are illicit; since his customer was not a registered buyer, the possibility of incrimination is purely hypothetical; and even if his customer were registered, the result would probably be the same, since it is unlikely that a registered dealer would enter the name of an unregistered seller on the form and record an illegal sale. *Minor v. United States*, p. 87.

3. *Marihuana Tax Act—Sale of marihuana without order form.*—Petitioner seller's claim of violation of his privilege against self-incrimination is not substantial, as there is no real possibility that purchasers would comply with the order form requirement even if the seller insisted on selling only pursuant thereto, in view of the \$100 per ounce tax on an unregistered transferee; the illegality under federal and state law; and the fact that the Fifth Amendment, as held in *Leary v. United States*, 395 U. S. 6, relieves unregistered buyers of any duty to pay the tax and secure the form. *Minor v. United States*, p. 87.

4. *Possession of heroin—Inference drawn by jury.*—Trial court's instructions on inference that might be drawn under 21 U. S. C. § 174 with respect to petitioner's possession of heroin did not vio-

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late his right to be convicted only on finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and did not place impermissible pressure on him to testify in his own defense. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

V. Seventh Amendment.

Stockholder's derivative suit—Jury trial.—Right to trial by jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment extends to a stockholder's derivative suit with respect to those issues as to which the corporation, had it been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury trial. *Ross v. Bernhard*, p. 531.

VI. Sixth Amendment.

Trial by jury—Juvenile court.—Juvenile's challenge in habeas corpus proceeding that he was unconstitutionally deprived of right to trial by jury is inappropriate for resolution by this Court since Nebraska juvenile court hearing at which he was adjudged delinquent was held before decisions in *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U. S. 145, and *Bloom v. Illinois*, 391 U. S. 194, which were held in *DeStefano v. Woods*, 392 U. S. 631, to apply only prospectively, and appellant would therefore have had no constitutional right to jury trial had he been tried as an adult. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

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- Violation of civil rights—Federal standards—Federal and state rules.*—Petitioners are entitled to compensatory damages for violation of their civil rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1982 and, though such damages are measured by federal standards, both federal and state rules on damages may be used. *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, p. 229.
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- DRUGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- DUAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 4; **School Desegregation**, 3-4.

DUE PROCESS. See **Bail**, 4; **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-3; II, 10; IV, 4; VI; **Evidence**, 1-4; **Habeas Corpus**; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Mootness**, 2; **Presumptions**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 3-4, 10, 14-15.

DURESS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1; **Perjury**, 2; **Procedure**, 5.

ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS. See **Appeals**.

ELECTIONS. See also **Injunctions**, 1-2; **Mootness**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 3.

1. *Municipal election—Change of form of government—Injunction.*—Application for injunction to prevent City of Anniston from holding election to choose members of new city council in accordance with statute authorizing change from commission to council-manager government denied. Election will not result in the severe irreparable harm needed to justify an injunction; nor has three-judge panel designated to hear the case as yet considered the injunction request. *Oden v. Brittain* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1210.

2. *Municipal ordinance—Filing fees—Injunction.*—Applicants claim that Atlanta ordinance will exclude political candidates who cannot afford filing fees it fixes and seek to enjoin an election on ground that ordinance violates Voting Rights Act of 1965, and on ground (upheld by District Court) that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. Since proximity of election practicably forecloses this Court's pre-election decision on the substantial constitutional issue involved, and a court-ordered postponement of the election could be disruptive, an injunction is denied, but applicants are temporarily relieved from paying the fee, and the candidates' filing time is extended. *Matthews v. Little* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1223.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See **Administrative Procedure**, 4; **Judicial Review**, 1; **Railway Labor Act**.

ENLISTMENT CONTRACTS. See **Habeas Corpus**.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See **Civil Rights**; **Constitutional Law**, II; **Damages**; **Elections**, 2; **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3, 7, 9, 11, 14-15; **School Desegregation**, 1-5; **Standing to Sue**; **Trusts**.

EQUITY. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Procedure**, 13; **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.

ESCROWED PAYMENTS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Milk Producers**.

ESTATES. See **Injunctions**, 3; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

EVIDENCE. See also **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Bail**, 1; **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-3; IV, 4; VI; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Presumptions**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 4, 10; **Railroad Mergers**.

1. *Juvenile court—Preponderance of evidence—Reasonable doubt.*—It is not appropriate for this Court to decide whether Nebraska law providing for proof of delinquency in juvenile proceeding under preponderance-of-evidence standard violates due process where no objection to that standard was made at hearing by appellant, who took no direct appeal, and his counsel acknowledged that evidence was sufficient to support delinquency finding even under reasonable-doubt standard. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

2. *Possession of heroin—Inference drawn by jury.*—Trial court's instructions on inference that might be drawn under 21 U. S. C. § 174 with respect to petitioner's possession of heroin did not violate his right to be convicted only on finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and did not place impermissible pressure on him to testify in his own defense. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

3. *Presumptions—Possession of cocaine.*—Presumption under 21 U. S. C. § 174 will not support conviction with respect to possession of cocaine, as facts show that more cocaine is lawfully produced in, than is smuggled into, this country, and that the amount that is stolen from legal sources is sufficiently large to negate the inference that petitioner's cocaine came from abroad or that he must have known that it did. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

4. *Presumptions—Possession of heroin—26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a).*—Evidence that petitioner possessed heroin packaged in 275 glassine bags without revenue stamps established that the heroin was in process of being distributed, an act proscribed by statute; and the conviction can also be sustained on basis of inference in § 4704 (a) of purchasing the heroin not in or from a package, as there is no reasonable doubt that possessor of heroin, who presumably purchased it, did not purchase it in or from an original stamped package in view of fact that no lawfully manufactured or imported heroin is found in this country. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

EXCHANGE RATIOS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.

EXEMPTIONS. See **Judicial Review**, 3; **Selective Service Act**, 2.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES. See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.

EXPENSES OF LITIGATION. See **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.

- EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE.** See Bail, 4.
- EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION ACT.** See Admiralty; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
- EXTENSION OF TIME.** See Procedure, 8.
- FAILURE OF TRUSTS.** See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.
- FAILURE TO OBJECT.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; VI; Evidence, 1.
- FAIRFAX COUNTY.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- FAIRNESS OF MERGER.** See Relief; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.
- FALSE AFFIDAVITS.** See National Labor Relations Act; Perjury, 1.
- FALSE STATEMENTS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; Perjury, 2; Procedure, 5.
- FARM LOCATION DIFFERENTIALS.** See Administrative Procedure, 1; Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937; Milk Producers.
- FEDERAL QUESTION.** See Appeals.
- FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.** See Bail, 3; Procedure, 8.
- FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS.** See Admiralty; Banks, 1-2; Civil Rights; Constitutional Law, II, 9; Damages; Elections, 1; Injunctions, 1, 4; Jurisdiction, 3; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue; Trusts.
- FEES.** See Elections, 2.
- FIFTH AMENDMENT.** See Bail, 1, 4; Constitutional Law, IV, 1-4; Evidence, 2-4; Perjury, 2; Presumptions, 1-2; Procedure, 5.
- FILING FEES.** See Elections, 2.
- FILLING STATIONS.** See Antitrust Acts; Procedure, 1.
- FIRST AMENDMENT.** See Appeals; Bail, 4; Stay, 2.
- FLORIDA.** See Banks, 1-2; Jurisdiction, 3.
- FORFEITURES.** See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.

- FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.** See **Civil Rights**; **Confessions**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, I-III; VI; **Damages**; **Elections**, 2; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3-4, 6, 9-11, 14-15; **School Desegregation**, 1-5; **Standing to Sue**; **Trusts**.
- FOURTH AMENDMENT.** See **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III.
- FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS.** See **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1.
- FREEDOM OF RELIGION.** See **Appeals**.
- FREEHOLDERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-2, 6.
- FREE TRANSCRIPTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Procedure**, 14-15.
- FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.** See **Procedure**, 7.
- GASOLINE DEALERS.** See **Antitrust Acts**; **Procedure**, 1.
- GENERAL ELDERSHIP.** See **Appeals**.
- GEORGIA.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.
- GOVERNOR.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 3, 5; **Procedure**, 9.
- GRAND JURIES.** See **Bail**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-3, 6; **Procedure**, 9.
- GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY CO.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.
- GREENE COUNTY.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 3, 5; **Procedure**, 9.
- GUIDELINES.** See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.
- HABEAS CORPUS.** See also **Bail**, 4; **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Procedure**, 14-15; **Stay**, 2-3.
- Military service—Scope of writ—Release from military custody.—*Motion by Army reservist for release from military custody pending Court of Appeals' review of District Court's denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus granted. Reservist's claims that the order requiring him to serve 17 months beyond his enlistment contract was without notice and opportunity to be heard, and in violation of his enlistment contract, are within the scope of the writ of habeas corpus. There is no statutory provision for a hearing, and the issue is substantial and should be resolved. *Scaggs v. Larsen* (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers), p. 1206.
- HARRISON NARCOTICS ACT.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.

- HEARINGS.** See **Habeas Corpus**; **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.
- HEIRS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Injunctions**, 3; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Trusts**.
- HEROIN.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- HOME OWNERS.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.
- HOUSES.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.
- ILLEGAL DETENTION.** See **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III.
- ILLEGAL MILITARY INDUCTION.** See **Habeas Corpus**.
- ILLICIT DRUGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.
- IMMEDIATE DESEGREGATION.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 4, 7; **Procedure**, 6; **School Desegregation**, 1, 3-4.
- IMMUNITY.** See **Bail**, 1.
- IMPORTATION OF DRUGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.** See **Mootness**, 1.
- INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.** See **Certiorari**; **Procedure**, 2.
- INDICTMENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- INDIGENT PRISONERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Procedure**, 14-15.
- INDUCTION.** See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.
- INFERENCES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS.** See **Patents**.
- INJUNCTIONS.** See also **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Civil Rights**; **Constitutional Law**, II, 7-8; **Damages**; **Elections**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Milk Producers**; **Procedure**, 6, 11; **Railway Labor Act**; **School Desegregation**, 1-2, 5; **Standing to Sue**.

1. *Municipal election—Change of form of government—Irreparable harm.*—Application for injunction to prevent City of Anniston from holding election to choose members of new city council in accordance with statute authorizing change from commission to

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council-manager government denied. Election will not result in the severe irreparable harm needed to justify an injunction; nor has three-judge panel designated to hear the case as yet considered the injunction request. *Oden v. Brittain* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1210.

2. *Municipal ordinance—Filing fees—Elections.*—Applicants claim that Atlanta ordinance will exclude political candidates who cannot afford filing fees it fixes and seek to enjoin an election on ground that ordinance violates Voting Rights Act of 1965, and on ground (upheld by District Court) that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. Since proximity of election practicably forecloses this Court's pre-election decision on the substantial constitutional issue involved, and a court-ordered postponement of the election could be disruptive, an injunction is denied, but applicants are temporarily relieved from paying the fee, and candidates' filing time is extended. *Matthews v. Little* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1223.

3. *Preliminary injunctive relief—Interlocutory orders—Jurisdiction to review.*—The only interlocutory orders that the Supreme Court has power to review under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 are those granting or denying *preliminary* injunctions, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court's interlocutory order, which involved no question of preliminary injunctive relief. *Goldstein v. Cox*, p. 471.

4. *Railway labor dispute—State court injunction—Federal court enjoinder.*—In view of long-standing policy embodied in 28 U. S. C. § 2283 that federal court, with limited exceptions, may not enjoin state court proceedings, and the difficult and important question presented here, the District Court's injunction, enjoining enforcement of state court injunction restraining union picketing in a railway labor dispute, is stayed pending disposition of petition for certiorari to be expeditiously filed in this Court. *Atlantic Coast Line v. Engineers* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1201.

5. *School desegregation—Public support—Judicial review.*—Application for vacation of Court of Appeals' stay of preliminary injunction entered by District Court which had the effect of requiring partial implementation of school desegregation plan is granted, Court of Appeals' order vacated, and District Court's order directed to be reinstated. A district court's order granting preliminary injunction should not be disturbed on review unless grant was an abuse of discretion, which Court of Appeals did not find here. Nor does desire to develop public support for the plan justify delay in its implementation. *Keyes v. Denver School District* (BRENNAN, J., in chambers), p. 1215.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.

INTEGRATION. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.

INTERIM AWARDS. See **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.

INTERIM RELIEF. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 7-8; **Procedure**, 1; **School Desegregation**, 1, 5.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS. See **Injunctions**, 3; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1-4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Perjury**, 2; **Presumptions**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 5.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See **Injunctions**, 4.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT. See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2; **Railroad Mergers**.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. See also **Judicial Review**, 2.

Termination of passenger trains—Discontinuing investigations—Judicial review.—Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations conducted under § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act with regard to the notice of rail carriers to terminate passenger services are judicially reviewable on the complaint of aggrieved persons. *City of Chicago v. United States*, p. 162.

INTERVENING AMENDMENT. See **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3.

INTERVENORS. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 8; **School Desegregation**, 5.

INVENTIONS. See **Patents**.

INVESTIGATIONS. See **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2.

INVESTMENT COMPANY. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Procedure**, 13.

JUDGES. See **Bail**, 3; **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; **Procedure**, 4.

JUDGMENTS. See **Antitrust Acts**; **Procedure**, 1.

JUDICIAL REVIEW. See also **Administrative Procedure**, 4; **Civil Rights**; **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III; **Damages**; **Injunctions**, 3, 5; **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Procedure**, 11; **Railroad Mergers**; **School Desegregation**, 2; **Selective Service Act**, 2; **Standing to Sue**.

1. *Administrative procedure—National Labor Relations Board—Inordinate delay.*—While delay in the administrative process is de-

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plorable, the Court of Appeals here exceeded the narrow scope of review provided for the Board's remedial orders when it shifted the cost of delay from the company to the employees. *NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.*, p. 258.

2. *Interstate Commerce Commission—Termination of passenger trains—Discontinuing investigations.*—Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations conducted under § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act with regard to the notice of rail carriers to terminate passenger services are judicially reviewable on the complaint of aggrieved persons. *City of Chicago v. United States*, p. 162.

3. *Military Selective Service Act of 1967—Delinquency reclassification—Pre-induction review.*—Section 10 (b)(3) of the Act does not bar pre-induction judicial review of petitioner's delinquency reclassification which deprived him of a deferment to which he was entitled under the Act. *Breen v. Selective Service Board*, p. 460.

JURIES. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.

JURISDICTION. See also **Admiralty**; **Civil Rights**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3; VI; **Damages**; **Evidence**, 1; **Injunctions**, 3; **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act**; **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1; **Procedure**, 10-11; **Standing to Sue**; **Stay**, 1.

1. *Supreme Court—Certiorari—Barren record.*—Because standing alone the issue could not be subject to review by appeal, this Court declines, in view of barrenness of record, to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to pass on appellant's contention that prosecutor's assertedly unreviewable discretion under Nebraska case law, whether to proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings, violated due process. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

2. *Supreme Court—Interlocutory orders—Preliminary injunctions.*—The only interlocutory orders that the Supreme Court has power to review under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 are those granting or denying preliminary injunctions, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court's interlocutory order, which involved no question of preliminary injunctive relief. *Goldstein v. Cox*, p. 471.

3. *Supreme Court—Original jurisdiction—Suit by States.*—States' motions for leave to file complaints invoking Supreme Court's original jurisdiction fail to state claims warranting exercise of such jurisdiction. *Florida v. Alabama*, p. 490; *Alabama v. Finch*, p. 552; and *Mississippi v. Finch*, p. 553.

- JURY COMMISSIONERS.** See Constitutional Law, II, 1-3, 5-6; Procedure, 9.
- JURY ROLLS.** See Constitutional Law, II, 1-2, 6.
- JURY TRIALS.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; V-VI; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1; Procedure, 13.
- JUVENILE COURTS.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1.
- JUVENILE DELINQUENTS.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1.
- LABOR.** See Administrative Procedure, 4; Injunctions, 4; Judicial Review, 1; Railway Labor Act.
- LABOR UNIONS.** See National Labor Relations Act; Perjury, 1.
- LAND HOLDINGS.** See Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.
- LEASES.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- LITIGATION EXPENSES.** See Relief; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.
- LIVINGSTON, MONTANA.** See Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.
- LOCAL BOARDS.** See Procedure, 12; Selective Service Act, 1.
- LONG-HAUL COMPETITION.** See Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.
- LONGSHOREMEN.** See Admiralty; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
- LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT.** See also Admiralty.
- Navigable waters—Piers—Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act.*—Longshoremen's Act, which covers injuries occurring "upon navigable waters," and furnishes a remedy only "if recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law," does not provide compensation to workmen injured on a pier permanently affixed to land, and though the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship-caused injuries on a pier, it does not enlarge the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. *Nacirema Co. v. Johnson*, p. 212.
- LOUISIANA.** See Constitutional Law, II, 7; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1.

- MACON.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.
- MANDAMUS.** See **Mootness**, 1.
- MANDATES.** See **Procedure**, 8.
- MANUFACTURING DRUGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- MARIHUANA DEALERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.
- MARIHUANA TAX ACT.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.
- MARKETING AREAS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Milk Producers**.
- MARYLAND.** See **Appeals**.
- MATERIAL OMISSIONS.** See **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.
- McFADDEN ACT.** See **Banks**, 1-2.
- MEDIATION.** See **Railway Labor Act**.
- MEMBERSHIP SHARES.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.
- MEMBERS OF CLASS.** See **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3.
- MERGENTHALER LINOTYPE CO.** See **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.
- MERGERS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**; **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.
- MILITARY INDUCTION.** See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.
- MILITARY PRISONERS.** See **Bail**, 4.
- MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967.** See **Judicial Review**, 3; **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1-2.
- MILITARY SERVICE.** See **Habeas Corpus**; **Judicial Review**, 3; **Selective Service Act**, 2; **Stay**, 2-3.
- MILK PRODUCERS.** See also **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**.

Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937—Farm location differentials—Department of Agriculture regulations.—The statutory scheme, which was to provide uniform prices to all producers in the marketing area, subject only to specifically enumerated adjustments, contemplated that “market differentials . . . customarily applied” would be based on *cost* adjustments; and the “nearby”

MILK PRODUCERS—Continued.

differentials do not fall into the category of permissible adjustments, which are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service, and neither the Secretary of Agriculture nor the "nearby" farmers have advanced any economic justifications for them which have substantial record support. *Zuber v. Allen*, p. 168.

MILWAUKEE RAILROAD. See *Administrative Procedure*, 2-3; *Railroad Mergers*.

MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. See *Relief*; *Securities Exchange Act of 1934*; *Stockholders*, 1-2.

MISREPRESENTATION. See *Relief*; *Securities Exchange Act of 1934*; *Stockholders*, 1-2.

MISSISSIPPI. See *Constitutional Law*, II, 4; *Jurisdiction*, 3; *School Desegregation*, 3-4.

MOBILE DRIVE-INS. See *Banks*, 1-2.

MOOTNESS. See also *Bail*, 4; *Procedure*, 3; *Stay*, 3.

1. *Nominating petition—Congressional election—Mandamus.*—In view of limited nature of relief requested by appellant, whose nominating petition bore signatures of about 1% of those in the congressional district who had voted in the last gubernatorial election (although Ohio law then required 7%), and who sought, as his sole relief, writ of mandamus to compel Board of Elections to place his name on ballot as an independent candidate in the November 1968 election, case is dismissed as moot. *Brockington v. Rhodes*, p. 41.

2. *Residency requirements—Presidential election—Statutory amendment.*—Amendment of Colorado residency statute, under which appellants, who were refused permission to vote in the 1968 presidential election because they could not meet the State's six-month residency requirement, could have voted in that election, has mooted the case. *Hall v. Beals*, p. 45.

MOTION FOR STAY. See *Habeas Corpus*.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. See *Elections*, 1; *Injunctions*, 1.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. See *Elections*, 2.

MUSIC STUDENTS. See *Judicial Review*, 3; *Selective Service Act*, 2.

NARCOTICS. See *Constitutional Law*, IV, 2-4; *Evidence*, 2-4; *Presumptions*, 1-2.

NARCOTICS DEALERS. See *Constitutional Law*, IV, 2-3.

- NATIONAL BANKS.** See **Banks**, 1-2.
- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.** See also **Perjury**, 1.
Union officers—Non-Communist affidavit—Criminal conviction.—
 The constitutionality of § 9 (h) of the Act, since repealed, is legally irrelevant to the validity of union officer's conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001, which punishes making of fraudulent statements to the Government because none of the elements of proof for petitioner's conviction for filing a false non-Communist affidavit has been shown to depend on the validity of § 9 (h). *Bryson v. United States*, p. 64.
- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 4; **Judicial Review**, 1.
- NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD.** See **Railway Labor Act**.
- NAVIGABLE WATERS.** See **Admiralty**; **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act**.
- "NEARBY" FARMERS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Milk Producers**.
- NEBRASKA.** See **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-3; VI; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Procedure**, 4, 10.
- NEGROES.** See **Civil Rights**; **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-9; **Damages**; **Elections**, 1-2; **Injunctions**, 1-2, 5; **Procedure**, 6, 9, 11; **School Desegregation**, 1-5; **Standing to Sue**; **Trusts**.
- NEW YORK.** See **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III; **Injunctions**, 3; **Jurisdiction**, 2.
- NOMINATING PETITIONS.** See **Mootness**, 1.
- NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS.** See **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1.
- NON-PATENTED ARTICLES.** See **Antitrust Acts**; **Procedure**, 1.
- NONSTOCK CORPORATIONS.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.
- NORTHERN LINES.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.
- NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.
- NOTICE.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Habeas Corpus**; **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.

OFFICERS. See Relief; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.

OFF-PREMISES SERVICES. See Banks, 1-2.

OHIO. See Mootness, 1.

OKLAHOMA CITY. See Constitutional Law, II, 8; School Desegregation, 5.

OPEN RESTRICTED BARRACKS. See Stay, 2.

ORDER FORMS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2-3.

ORDER-OF-CALL PROVISION. See Procedure, 12; Selective Service Act, 1.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 3.

ORIGINAL PACKAGES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.

ORIGIN OF DRUGS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.

OUTLYING WORK ASSIGNMENTS. See Railway Labor Act.

OVERBREADTH. See National Labor Relations Act; Perjury, 1.

OWNERSHIP OF CHURCH PROPERTY. See Appeals.

PACIFIC NORTHWEST GATEWAYS. See Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.

PARKS. See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.

PASSENGER TRAINS. See Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review, 2.

PATENTABILITY. See Patents.

PATENT INFRINGEMENT. See Patents.

PATENTS.

Combination patent—Useful and commercially successful—Invention.—While combination of old elements performed a useful and commercially successful function it added nothing to the nature of the previously patented radiant-heat burner, and to those skilled in the art the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention under the standard of 35 U. S. C. § 103. *Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Co.*, p. 57.

PAVING MATERIALS. See Patents.

PENALTIES. See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.

PERFECTING APPEALS. See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.

PERJURY. See also **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1; **National Labor Relations Act**; **Procedure**, 5.

1. *Conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001—Filing false affidavit.*—The decision in *Dennis v. United States*, 384 U. S. 855, negates any general principle that a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked, and petitioner's conviction for filing a false non-Communist affidavit is affirmed. *Bryson v. United States*, p. 64.

2. *Violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001—Wagering tax forms.*—One who furnishes false information on wagering tax forms submitted to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself. *United States v. Knox*, p. 77.

PETIT JURIES. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 3, 5; **Procedure**, 9.

PICKETING. See **Injunctions**, 4.

PIERS. See **Admiralty**; **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act**.

PLANS FOR DESEGREGATION. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 7-8; **Injunctions**, 5; **Procedure**, 6; **School Desegregation**, 1-2, 5.

PLAYGROUND FACILITIES. See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.

POLICE INTERROGATION. See **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III.

POSSESSION OF DRUGS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.

POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS. See **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; **Procedure**, 4.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 10. **Procedure**, 14-15.

POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION. See **Elections**, 2.

PRE-INDUCTION REVIEW. See **Judicial Review**, 3; **Selective Service Act**, 2.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS. See **Injunctions**, 3, 5; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **School Desegregation**, 2.

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3; VI; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. See **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3.

PRESUMPTIONS. See also **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4.

1. *Possession of cocaine*—21 U. S. C. § 174.—Presumption under § 174 will not support conviction with respect to possession of cocaine, as facts show that more cocaine is lawfully produced in, than is smuggled into, this country, and that the amount that is stolen from legal sources is sufficiently large to negate the inference that petitioner's cocaine came from abroad or that he must have known that it did. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

2. *Possession of heroin*—26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a).—Evidence that petitioner possessed heroin packaged in 275 glassine bags without revenue stamps established that the heroin was in process of being distributed, an act proscribed by statute; and the conviction can also be sustained on basis of inference in § 4704 (a) of purchasing the heroin not in or from a package, as there is no reasonable doubt that possessor of heroin, who presumably purchased it, did not purchase it in or from an original stamped package in view of fact that no lawfully manufactured or imported heroin is found in this country. *Turner v. United States*, p. 398.

PRICE DIFFERENTIALS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Milk Producers**.

PRICE FIXING. See **Antitrust Acts**; **Procedure**, 1.

PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.

PRIORITIES. See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.

PRISONERS. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Procedure**, 14-15.

PRIVATE SOCIAL CLUBS. See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE. See **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3.

PROBABLE CAUSE. See **Confessions**, 1; **Constitutional Law**, III.

PROCEDURE. See also **Administrative Procedure**, 1-4; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Antitrust Acts**; **Appeals**; **Bail**, 1-4; **Certiorari**; **Civil Rights**; **Confessions**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-3; II, 4, 7-8; III; IV, 1, 4; VI; **Damages**; **Elections**, 1; **Evidence**, 1-4; **Habeas Corpus**; **Injunctions**, 1, 3-5; **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 1-3; **Jurisdiction**, 1-2; **Milk Producers**; **Mootness**, 1-2; **Perjury**, 2; **Presumptions**, 1-2; **School Desegregation**, 1-5; **Selective Service Act**, 1-2; **Standing to Sue**; **Stay**, 1-3.

1. *Antitrust Acts*—*Damages*—*Prospective application of rule*.—The reservation in *Simpson v. Union Oil Co.*, 377 U. S. 13, of

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question whether there might be any equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of rule governing price fixing of non-patented articles by "consignment" device, announced therein, was not intended to deny fruits of successful litigation to petitioner. Question was reserved for possible application in other cases where product distribution was structured on different considerations. *Simpson v. Union Oil Co.*, p. 13.

2. *Certiorari—Facts do not support issue—Writ dismissed.*—Writ of certiorari, granted to consider petitioner's contention that his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had been infringed by California prison authorities, dismissed as improvidently granted as respondents have presented documentary evidence in their brief that actual facts do not present the issue for which certiorari was granted. *Conway v. Adult Authority*, p. 107.

3. *Class actions—Members of class—Contingencies.*—Appellants, who were refused permission to vote in the 1968 presidential election because they could not meet Colorado's six-month residency requirement, cannot represent a class (here Colorado voters disqualified by the subsequently enacted two-month requirement) to which they never belonged. The contingencies that would have to occur before appellants could be disenfranchised in the next election are too speculative to warrant this Court's passing on the substantive issues of this case. *Hall v. Beals*, p. 45.

4. *Confessions—Voluntariness—State criminal procedure.*—When a federal court finds a *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U. S. 368, error (failure of trial judge to find confessions voluntary before admitting them into evidence) in a state proceeding, it must allow State reasonable time to make an error-free determination of the voluntariness of the confessions. *Sigler v. Parker*, p. 482.

5. *Defenses of duress and lack of willfulness—False statement on wagering tax forms.*—Appellee's arguments raised on the Government's appeal from the dismissal of an indictment for violating 18 U. S. C. § 1001 that he gave the false statements under the duress of §§ 4412 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, or that his false statements were not made "willfully" as required by 18 U. S. C. § 1001, must be determined initially at his trial. *United States v. Knox*, p. 77.

6. *Delay in school desegregation—Temporary injunctive relief.*—Petitioners, who seek review of Court of Appeals' ruling authorizing delay in student desegregation in three Louisiana school districts until September 1970, are—pending disposition of their petition for certiorari—granted temporary injunctive relief requiring respond-

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ent school boards to take necessary preliminary steps to effectuate complete student desegregation by February 1, 1970. *Carter v. West Feliciana School Board*, p. 226.

7. *Dismissal of appeal—Fugitive from justice.*—Supreme Court, absent any contrary provision in statute under which this criminal appeal was made, declines to adjudicate merits since appellant who was free on bail refused to surrender himself to state authorities and is now a fugitive from justice. *Molinario v. New Jersey*, p. 365.

8. *Extension of time—Motion for stay—Application for bail.*—Time extension for filing petition for certiorari denied since sufficient time remains for that purpose. Stay of Court of Appeals mandate denied as that mandate has already issued. Application for bail pending action on petition for certiorari denied since initial ruling on such application should be made by Court of Appeals, under Fed. Rule App. Proc. 23 (b). *United States v. Follette (HARLAN, J., in chambers)*, p. 1232.

9. *Jury discrimination—Attack by civil suit.*—There is no jurisdictional or procedural bar to an attack upon systematic jury discrimination by way of civil suit brought by Negro citizens of Greene County, Alabama, alleging that they were qualified and willing to serve as jurors, but had never been summoned. *Carter v. Jury Commission*, p. 320.

10. *Juvenile court—Trial by jury.*—Juvenile's challenge in habeas corpus proceeding that he was unconstitutionally deprived of right to trial by jury is inappropriate for resolution by this Court since Nebraska juvenile court hearing at which he was adjudged delinquent was held before decisions in *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U. S. 145, and *Bloom v. Illinois*, 391 U. S. 194, which were held in *DeStefano v. Woods*, 392 U. S. 631, to apply only prospectively, and appellant would therefore have had no constitutional right to jury trial had he been tried as an adult. *DeBacker v. Brainard*, p. 28.

11. *Perfecting appeals—Notice to opposing counsel to correct transcripts—Virginia court rule.*—Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' rule requiring that opposing counsel must be given reasonable notice and opportunity to examine and correct transcripts is discretionary and not jurisdictional, not having been so consistently applied by that court as to deprive it of jurisdiction to entertain the federal claim presented here or to bar this Court's review by certiorari. *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, p. 229.

12. *Selective Service regulations—Declaration of delinquency—Failure to take administrative appeal.*—Petitioner's failure to appeal

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administratively from order declaring him delinquent does not deprive him of standing to contest conviction, as regulations conferring hearing rights apply to those contesting classifications made by local boards and not to those like petitioner declared delinquent and whose induction has been accelerated. *Gutknecht v. United States*, p. 295.

13. *Trial by jury—Stockholder's derivative suit.*—Right to trial by jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment extends to a stockholder's derivative suit with respect to those issues as to which the corporation, had it been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury trial. *Ross v. Bernhard*, p. 531.

14. *Trial transcripts—Collateral relief—Free copies.*—This Court need not decide whether the Constitution requires State to furnish indigent prisoners with free trial transcripts to aid in petitioning for collateral relief unless it appears that petitioner cannot again borrow a copy from the State, or procure one from codefendant or other custodian, or show that it would be significantly more advantageous for him to own rather than borrow a copy. *Wade v. Wilson*, p. 282.

15. *Trial transcripts—State court rules—On loan.*—Petitioner may not attack state court rules, which concern only furnishing of transcripts for direct appeal, since he had transcript for that purpose and did not complain that having it only on loan impaired its use on appeal. *Wade v. Wilson*, p. 282.

PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION. See **Antitrust Acts**; **Procedure**, 1.

PROPERTY. See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.

PROPERTY DISPUTE. See **Appeals**.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 3, 5; **Procedure**, 9.

PROSECUTORS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3; VI; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1.

PROSPECTIVITY. See **Antitrust Acts**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3; VI; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Procedure**, 1, 10.

PROTECTIVE CONDITIONS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.

PROTECTIVE ORDERS. See **Stay**, 3.

PROXY STATEMENTS. See **Relief**; **Securities Exchange Act of 1934**; **Stockholders**, 1-2.

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS. See **Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.**

PUBLIC INTEREST. See **Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.**

PUBLIC PARKS. See **Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.**

PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See **Constitutional Law, II, 4, 7-8; Injunctions, 5; Jurisdiction, 3; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1-5.**

PUBLIC SUPPORT. See **Injunctions, 5; School Desegregation, 2.**

PURCHASING DRUGS. See **Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.**

QUALIFICATIONS FOR JURORS. See **Constitutional Law, II, 3, 5; Procedure, 9.**

QUALIFICATIONS FOR SCHOOL BOARDS. See **Constitutional Law, II, 1-2, 6.**

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. See **Civil Rights; Constitutional Law, II, 9; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue; Trusts.**

RACIAL SEGREGATION. See **Constitutional Law, II, 4, 7-8; School Desegregation, 1-5.**

RADIANT-HEAT BURNER. See **Patents.**

RAILROAD CHARTERS. See **Administrative Procedure, 2-3; Railroad Mergers.**

RAILROAD MERGERS. See also **Administrative Procedure, 2-3.**

Northern Lines merger—Interstate Commerce Act—Public interest.—ICC's conclusion that the merger comported with the public interest under § 5 of the Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, is supported by findings that the ICC made on basis of substantial evidence after measuring the competitive consequences of the merger against its resulting benefits. *Northern Lines Merger Cases*, p. 491.

RAILROADS. See **Injunctions, 4; Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review, 2; Railway Labor Act.**

RAILWAY LABOR ACT.

Outlying work assignments—Unilateral action by carrier—Injunction.—The status quo which is to be maintained pursuant to § 6 of the Act while the Act's procedures are being exhausted consists of the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, whether or not those conditions are covered in an existing collective-bargaining agreement. *Shore Line v. Transportation Union*, p. 142.

- RAILWAY LABOR DISPUTE.** See Injunctions, 4.
- REASONABLE DOUBT.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; VI; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1.
- RECESS.** See Bail, 4.
- RECLASSIFICATION.** See Judicial Review, 3; Selective Service Act, 2.
- RECORD.** See Confessions, 1; Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; III; VI; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1; Procedure, 4, 10.
- RECORDS.** See Bail, 1.
- REFUSAL TO BARGAIN.** See Administrative Procedure, 4; Judicial Review, 1.
- REGISTERED DEALERS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 2-3.
- REGISTRATION.** See Judicial Review, 3; Procedure, 12; Selective Service Act, 1-2.
- REGULATIONS.** See Administrative Procedure, 1; Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937; Judicial Review, 3; Milk Producers; Procedure, 12; Selective Service Act, 1-2.
- REINSTATEMENT.** See Administrative Procedure, 4; Judicial Review, 1.
- RELEASE FROM MILITARY CUSTODY.** See Habeas Corpus.
- RELIEF.** See also Antitrust Acts; Constitutional Law, II, 7-8; Injunctions, 3; Jurisdiction, 2; Mootness, 1; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1, 5; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.
- Stockholders' derivative suits — Violation of proxy rules — Mergers.*—In devising retrospective relief for corporate violation of proxy rules federal courts should be guided by principles of equity. Fairness of the merger may be a relevant consideration in determining relief, and merger should be set aside only if court of equity concludes from all circumstances that it would be equitable to do so, and damages should be recoverable only to extent they can be proved. *Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.*, p. 375.
- RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS.** See Appeals.
- RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE.** See Appeals.
- REMAND.** See Bail, 3.
- REMEDIAL ORDERS.** See Administrative Procedure, 4; Judicial Review, 1.

- REMEDIES.** See Admiralty; Constitutional Law, II, 3, 5; Long-shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; Procedure, 9.
- RENTALS.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- RESERVED QUESTION.** See Antitrust Acts; Procedure, 1.
- RESERVISTS.** See Habeas Corpus.
- RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS.** See Mootness, 2; Procedure, 3.
- RESIDENTS.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- RESTORATION OF BAIL.** See Bail, 2.
- RETROACTIVITY.** See Antitrust Acts; Constitutional Law, I, 2-3; VI; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1; Procedure, 1, 10.
- REVENUE STAMPS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.
- REVERTER.** See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.
- REVOCAION OF BAIL.** See Bail, 2.
- ROMANIAN HEIRS.** See Injunctions, 3; Jurisdiction, 2.
- RULES.** See Civil Rights; Constitutional Law, II, 10; Damages; Procedure, 11, 14-15; Standing to Sue.
- RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.** See Bail, 3; Procedure, 8.
- SCHOOL BOARDS.** See Constitutional Law, II, 1-2, 4, 6-8; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1-5.
- SCHOOL BOUNDARIES.** See Constitutional Law, II, 8; School Desegregation, 5.
- SCHOOL DESEGREGATION.** See also Constitutional Law, II, 4, 7-8; Injunctions, 5; Jurisdiction, 3; Procedure, 6.

1. *Injunctions—Delay in student desegregation.*—Petitioners, who seek review of Court of Appeals' ruling authorizing delay in student desegregation in three Louisiana school districts until September 1970, are—pending disposition of their petition for certiorari—granted temporary injunctive relief requiring respondent school boards to take necessary preliminary steps to effectuate complete student desegregation by February 1, 1970. *Carter v. West Feliciana School Board*, p. 226.

2. *Judicial review—Injunctions.*—Application for vacation of Court of Appeals' stay of preliminary injunction entered by Dis-

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trict Court that had the effect of requiring partial implementation of school desegregation plan is granted, Court of Appeals' order vacated, and District Court's order directed to be reinstated. A district court's order granting preliminary injunction should not be disturbed on review unless grant was an abuse of discretion, which Court of Appeals did not find here. Nor does desire to develop public support for the plan justify delay in its implementation. *Keyes v. Denver School District* (BRENNAN, J., in chambers), p. 1215.

3. *Mississippi schools—Delay in submission of plans*—"All deliberate speed."—On motion of Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals suspended its July 3, 1969, order requiring the submission of new plans to be effective this fall to accelerate desegregation in 33 Mississippi school districts, and postponed the date for submission of new plans to December 1, 1969. Although Mr. JUSTICE BLACK believes that the "all deliberate speed" standard is no longer relevant and that unitary school systems should be instituted without further delay, he recognizes that in certain respects his views go beyond anything the Court has held, and he reluctantly upholds the lower court's order. *Alexander v. Board of Education* (BLACK, J., in chambers), p. 1218.

4. *Mississippi schools—Immediate desegregation*.—Continued operation of racially segregated schools under standard of "all deliberate speed" is no longer constitutionally permissible. Court of Appeals is directed to enter an order, effective immediately, that schools in certain Mississippi districts be operated on unitary basis. While the schools are being thus operated, District Court may consider any proposed amendments to the order, but such amendments may become effective only with Court of Appeals' approval. *Alexander v. Board of Education*, p. 19.

5. *School boundaries—Overall plan—Court of Appeals*.—The District Court approved a school board's proposal to revise school boundaries effective at the start of the school year and ordered the board to submit a complete desegregation plan within two months thereafter. The Court of Appeals, which, upon an appeal by intervenors with respect to the boundary provision, summarily vacated the order as inappropriate except as part of an overall plan, should have allowed the implementation of the proposal, to which petitioners did not object, pending argument and decision of the appeal. *Dowell v. Board of Education*, p. 269.

SCOPE OF REVIEW. See *Administrative Procedure*, 4; *Judicial Review*, 1.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE. See Confessions, 1; Constitutional Law, III.

SECESSIONIST CONGREGATIONS. See Appeals.

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. See Administrative Procedure, 1; Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937; Milk Producers.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE. See Jurisdiction, 3.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. See Stay, 3.

SECURED RECEPTACLES. See Banks, 1-2.

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934. See also Relief; Stockholders, 1-2.

Solicitation of proxies—Material omission—Merger.—Fairness of merger terms does not constitute defense to private action for violation of § 14 (a) of the Act complaining of materially misleading solicitation of proxies that authorized merger. *Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.*, p. 375.

SEGREGATED SCHOOLS. See Constitutional Law, II, 4, 7-8; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1-5.

SEGREGATION. See Constitutional Law, II, 3, 5, 9; Jurisdiction, 3; Procedure, 9; Trusts.

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT. See also Judicial Review, 3; Procedure, 12.

1. *Military Selective Service Act of 1967—Delinquency regulations—Not authorized.*—Delinquency regulations under which petitioner was deprived of order-of-call preference are not authorized by the Act and are void, as Congress intended to punish delinquents through criminal law and not delinquency procedure, which has no statutory sanction, and power to declare registrant "delinquent" lacks statutory standards or guidelines without which legality of declaration cannot be judged. *Gutknecht v. United States*, p. 295.

2. *Student deferments—Delinquency reclassification—Military Selective Service Act of 1967.*—Section 6 (h)(1) of the Act makes undergraduate student deferments mandatory when the student, as here, has met the statutory criteria, and the reference in that section to "rules and regulations" only authorizes such additional administrative procedures as necessary to ensure that qualified students are given deferment. Congress did not authorize induction by local boards as a penalty for violation of administrative regulations. *Breen v. Selective Service Board*, p. 460.

- SELF-INCRIMINATION.** See Bail, 1; Certiorari; Constitutional Law, IV; Evidence, 2-4; Perjury, 2; Presumptions, 1-2; Procedure, 2, 5.
- SELLING MARIHUANA.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 2-3.
- SELLING NARCOTICS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 2-3.
- SENTENCES.** See Bail, 4; Certiorari; Procedure, 2.
- SEVENTH AMENDMENT.** See Constitutional Law, V; Procedure, 13.
- SHAREHOLDERS.** See Constitutional Law, V; Procedure, 13; Relief; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.
- SHARES.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- SHERMAN ACT.** See Antitrust Acts; Procedure, 1.
- SHIP'S CRANES.** See Admiralty; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
- SITUS OF INJURY.** See Admiralty; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
- SIXTH AMENDMENT.** See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence, 1; Jurisdiction, 1; Procedure, 10.
- SMUGGLED DRUGS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.
- SOCIAL CLUBS.** See Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11; Standing to Sue.
- SOLICITATION OF PROXIES.** See Relief; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Stockholders, 1-2.
- STAMPED PACKAGES.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4; Evidence, 2-4; Presumptions, 1-2.
- STANDING.** See Procedure, 12; Selective Service Act, 1.
- STANDING TO SUE.** See also Civil Rights; Damages; Procedure, 11.
- Civil rights—Discriminatory refusal to approve assignment of membership share to lessee.*—Lessor has standing under 42 U. S. C. § 1982 to maintain this action as the "effective adversary" in the lessee's behalf. *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, p. 229.
- STATE BANKS.** See Banks, 1-2.
- STATE COURT INJUNCTIONS.** See Injunctions, 4.
- STATE COURT RULES.** See Constitutional Law, II, 10; Procedure, 14-15.

STATE COURTS. See **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; II, 9; **Procedure**, 4; **Trusts**.

STATEMENTS. See **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1.

STATE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-2, 6.

STATUS OF LONGSHOREMEN. See **Admiralty**; **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act**.

STATUS QUO. See **Railway Labor Act**.

STATUTORY AMENDMENTS. See **Mootness**, 2; **Procedure**, 3.

STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.

STATUTORY STANDARDS. See **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1.

STAY. See also **Habeas Corpus**; **Injunctions**, 5; **Procedure**, 8.

1. *Action by individual Justice—Accelerated schedule.*—Application for interim stay and other relief should be passed on by full Court, since factors involved in granting stay call for Court's collective judgment, the Court has denied a similar stay at different stage of the case, and an individual Justice cannot order an accelerated schedule which is importantly related to the stay request. *Rosado v. Wyman* (HARLAN, J., in chambers), p. 1213.

2. *Courts-martial—Discharge from service—Conscientious objector.*—Applicant, who had been court-martialed for unauthorized absence, and having exhausted all military administrative remedies, sought habeas corpus relief in District Court, claiming that improper processing of his application for discharge from service should have barred his conviction. Court of Appeals denied a broad and sweeping stay. Pending disposition of appeal on merits of case, which involves contention that matter of conscientious objection is one of First Amendment proportions, stay is granted directing that applicant be confined in "open restricted barracks" and not in the brig. *Jones v. Lemond* (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers), p. 1227.

3. *Military service—Conscientious objector—Deployment outside district.*—Application by member of Armed Forces claiming conscientious objector status for stay of deployment outside district denied where (1) District Court issued protective order against his having to engage in combat activities greater than his present duties required, pending Army board's review of his classification and further court order; (2) Court of Appeals specified that he will be produced in District Court if he wins his habeas corpus case; and (3) fact that Secretary of the Army is party to case precludes mootness of case by applicant's deployment. *Parisi v. Davidson* (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers), p. 1233.

- STAY OF DEPLOYMENT OUTSIDE DISTRICT.** See *Stay*, 3.
- STOCK EXCHANGE RATIOS.** See *Administrative Procedure*, 2-3; *Railroad Mergers*.
- STOCKHOLDERS.** See also *Administrative Procedure*, 2-3; *Railroad Mergers*; *Relief*; *Securities Exchange Act of 1934*.
1. *Derivative actions—Violation of securities laws—Expenses and attorneys' fees.*—Where minority stockholders have established a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, they are entitled to an interim award of litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in proving the violation, since the expenses incurred were for the benefit of the corporation and the other stockholders. *Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.*, p. 375.
2. *Solicitation of proxies—Material omission—Merger.*—Fairness of merger terms does not constitute defense to private action for violation of § 14 (a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 complaining of materially misleading solicitation of proxies that authorized merger. *Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.*, p. 375.
- STOCKHOLDER'S SUIT.** See *Constitutional Law*, V; *Procedure*, 13.
- STOLEN DRUGS.** See *Constitutional Law*, IV, 4; *Evidence*, 2-4; *Presumptions*, 1-2.
- STRIKES.** See *Administrative Procedure*, 4; *Judicial Review*, 1; *Railway Labor Act*.
- STUDENT DEFERMENTS.** See *Judicial Review*, 3; *Selective Service Act*, 2.
- SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.** See *Administrative Procedure*, 2-3; *Railroad Mergers*.
- SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.** See *Constitutional Law*, IV, 4; *Evidence*, 2-4; *Presumptions*, 1-2.
- SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.** See *Injunctions*, 3; *Jurisdiction*, 2; *Relief*; *Securities Exchange Act of 1934*; *Stockholders*, 1-2.
- SUPREME COURT.** See *Injunctions*, 3; *Jurisdiction*, 2; *Procedure*, 7; *Stay*, 1.
- SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT.** See *Injunctions*, 3; *Jurisdiction*, 2.
- SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION.** See *Constitutional Law*, II, 1-3, 5-6; *Procedure*, 9.
- TALIAFERRO COUNTY.** See *Constitutional Law*, II, 1-2, 6.
- TAXES.** See *Constitutional Law*, IV, 1-3; *Perjury*, 2; *Procedure*, 5.

- TAX STAMPS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 4; **Evidence**, 2-4; **Presumptions**, 1-2.
- TERMINATION OF TRAIN SERVICE.** See **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2.
- TERMINATION OF TRUSTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.
- TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 9; **Trusts**.
- THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.** See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.
- TITLE TO RAILROAD.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.
- TORTS.** See **Admiralty**; **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act**.
- TRAINS.** See **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2.
- TRANSCRIPTS.** See **Civil Rights**; **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11, 14-15; **Standing to Sue**.
- TRANSFER TAXES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.
- TRANSPORTATION.** See **Interstate Commerce Commission**; **Judicial Review**, 2.
- TRANSPORTATION ACTS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.
- TRIAL BY JURY.** See **Constitutional Law**, V-VI; **Evidence**, 1; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Procedure**, 10, 13.
- TRIAL JUDGES.** See **Confessions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II, 10; **Procedure**, 14-15.
- TRUSTS.** See also **Constitutional Law**, II, 9.

Testamentary trust—Racial restrictions—Failure of the trust.—Georgia Supreme Court's action terminating testamentary trust, which provided for creation of park for exclusive use of white people, did not violate any constitutionally protected rights. Termination was not the imposition of a "penalty," the forfeiture of the park because of the city's compliance with the constitutional mandate of *Evans v. Newton*, 382 U. S. 296, but was the result of the construction of the will, and there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amend-

TRUSTS—Continued.

ment where a state court without any racial animus applies its normal principles of construction to determine the testator's true intent and concludes that everyone is to be deprived of the benefits of the trust. *Evans v. Abney*, p. 435.

UNDERCOVER AGENTS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 2-3.

UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS. See **Judicial Review**, 3; **Selective Service Act**, 2.

UNDERREPRESENTATION. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-2, 6.

UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. See **Bail**, 4.

UNILATERAL ACTION. See **Railway Labor Act**.

"UNINTELLIGENT" CITIZENS. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-2, 6.

UNION OFFICERS. See **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1.

UNIONS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 4; **Injunctions**, 4; **Judicial Review**, 1; **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1; **Railway Labor Act**.

UNITARY SCHOOLS. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 4; **School Desegregation**, 3-4.

"UPRIGHT" CITIZENS. See **Constitutional Law**, II, 1-2, 6.

USEFULNESS OF PROCESS. See **Patents**.

VACATION OF STAY. See **Injunctions**, 5; **School Desegregation**, 2.

VAGUENESS. See **Bail**, 4; **National Labor Relations Act**; **Perjury**, 1.

VALIDITY OF PATENTS. See **Patents**.

VALUATION OF PROPERTY. See **Administrative Procedure**, 2-3; **Railroad Mergers**.

VERMONT. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1; **Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937**; **Milk Producers**.

VIETNAM. See **Judicial Review**, 3; **Procedure**, 12; **Selective Service Act**, 1-2; **Stay**, 3.

VIRGINIA. See **Civil Rights**; **Damages**; **Procedure**, 11; **Standing to Sue**.

VOLUNTARINESS. See **Confessions**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; III; **Procedure**, 4.

VOTERS. See Elections, 2.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. See Elections, 1; Injunctions, 1.

WAGERING TAX FORMS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; Perjury, 2; Procedure, 5.

WEST FELICIANA PARISH. See Constitutional Law, II, 7; Procedure, 6; School Desegregation, 1.

WILLFULNESS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; Perjury, 2; Procedure, 5.

WILLS. See Constitutional Law, II, 9; Trusts.

WORDS.

1. "*Affiliated.*"—§ 9 (h), National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (h) (1958 ed.). Bryson v. United States, p. 64.

2. "*Branch bank.*"—12 U. S. C. § 36 (f). First National Bank v. Dickinson, p. 122.

WORK ASSIGNMENTS. See Railway Labor Act.

WORKING CONDITIONS. See Railway Labor Act.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. See Admiralty; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

WRITTEN EXPLANATION. See Bail, 3.





















