UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 385 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1966 October 3, 1966 (Beginning of Term) Through January 23, 1967 HENRY PUTZEL, jr. REPORTER OF DECISIONS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1967 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.75 (Buckram) JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS. EARL WARREN, Chief Justice. HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice. TOM C. CLARK, Associate Justice. JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice. RETIRED. STANLEY REED, Associate Justice. RAMSEY CLARK, Acting Attorney General.* THURGOOD MARSHALL, Solicitor General. JOHN F. DAVIS, Clerk. HENRY PUTZEL, jr., Reporter of Decisions. T. PERRY LIPPITT, Marshal. HENRY CHARLES HALLAM, Jr., Librarian. *The Honorable Ramsey Clark, of Texas, who had been Deputy Attorney General, became Acting Attorney General October 3, 1966, on which date former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach assumed the office of Under Secretary of State. in SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Allotment of Justices. It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, Earl Warren, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, Abe Fortas, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, John M. Harlan, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, Earl Warren, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, Potter Stewart, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. October 11, 1965. (For next previous allotment, see 371 U. S., p. v.) IV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1964 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Page Abdelkader v. California.............................. 891,980 Abston v. New York....................................... 867 Ach v. Commissioner...................................... 899 Ach Corp., Commissioner v................................ 899 Acme Industrial Co., Labor Board v....................... 432 Acme Process Equip. Co., United States v............ 138,1032 Acron Investments v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.... 970 Adams v. Holman.......................................... 888 Adams, Swann v............................... 440,808, 944, 997 Aday v. United States.................................... 984 Adderley v. Florida..........,....................... 39,1020 Addessi v. Shell Oil Co.................................. 970 Adley Corp., McFaddin Express v.......................... 900 Aero Corp. v. Labor Board................................ 973 Aetna Steel Prods. Corp., Sheet Metal Workers v....... 839 Afroyim v. Rusk.......................................... 917 Aguilar v. Oliver........................................ 917 Aircraft Specialties v. Labor Board...................... 957 Air Force Dept., Watts v................................ 862 Akerson v. United States................................. 946 Alabama, Caveny v..................................... 873 Alabama, Dowd v.......................................... 925 Alabama, Miller v....................................... 1043 Alabama, Sheridan v.................................. 1019 Alabama, Urban v...................................... 972 Alabama, Young v...................................... 879 Alabama Attorney General, Newsome v..................... 1015 Alabama Governor, Blankinship v.......................... 963 Alabama-Tennessee Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n........ 847,964 Alberti v. New York...................................... 860 Alcoholic Bev. Control Dir., Laird & Co. v............... 371 v VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Alcorcha v. California...................................... 923 Alexander v. Dept, of Labor & Industry of N. J.............. 536 Alexander, Hurley v......................................... 994 Alexander v. Pennsylvania.................................. 1019 Alexander v. United States.................................. 977 Alexander v. Virginia....................................... 998 Alicea v. La Vallee......................................... 853 Allan Drug Corp. v. United States........................... 899 Alleghany Corp. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp.............. 814 Allen v. Florida.......................................... 892 Allen v. Maryland........................................... 940 Allen, Union Barge Line Corp, v............................ 1006 Allen v. United States...................................... 832 Allen v. U. S. District Court............................. 808 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Labor Board v............. 810,943,1034 Allison v. Florida.......................................... 867 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier................................. 930 Altieri v. United States.................................... 835 Altman, Central of Georgia R. Co. v......................... 920 Altruda v. New York......................................... 875 Altus, Carr v................................................ 35 Aluminum Co. of America v. Woods Exploration Co........... 991 Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade. Ambrose Distrib. Co. v. Labor Board......................... 838 American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board................ 843 American Export Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm’n.......... 974 American Infra-Red Co. v. Lambert Industries................ 920 American Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. American Theatres................ 931 American Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co., Pennsylvania R. Co. v....... 1035 American Plan Corp., State Loan & Fin. Corp, v............. 1011 American Tel. & Tel. Co., Carter v......................... 1008 American Theatres, American Mfrs. Ins. Co. v................ 931 American Title Co. of Dallas, Sitton v................. 975,1033 American Truck Rental Corp. v. Commissioner................. 815 American Viscose Corp., Empire Yarn Co. v.................. 1002 Andeen, Country Mut. Ins. Co. v............................ 1036 Anderson v. California...................................... 926 Anderson, Halko v........................................... 833 Anderson v. New York...................................... 879 Anderson v. Tahash........................................ 880 Anderson v. United States................................. 840 Anderson v. Wainwright................................... 1042 Anderson, Williams v.................................... 931,988 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. vn Page Andre v. United States.................................... 1001 Andreadis v. United States................................ 1001 Andrews v. Holman...................................... 937,984 Annbar Assoc, v. West Side Redevelop. Corp................... 5 Anonymous v. La Burt....................................... 936 Anthony v. McMann.......................................... 888 Antilles Surveys v. De Jongh............................... 900 Appeal Bd. of Mich. Empl. Comm’n, General Motors v....... 373 Appellate Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., Hagan v.................. 823 A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. United States..................... 1003 Ard v. United States....................................... 863 Ardner v. United States.................................... 884 Arellanes v. United States................................. 870 Arizona, Cota v......................................... 878 Arizona, Gann v.......................................... 1028 Arizona, Janovic v....................................... 1036 Arizona, Kruchten v..................................... 1043 Arizona, Musgrove v........................................ 979 Arizona, Tillis v.......................................... 877 Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Hwy. Dept., Lassen v................. 458 Arkansas, Smith v.......................................... 980 Arkansas, Tumey v.......................................... 844 Arkansas Revenues Comm’r, Potts v.......................... 946 Armone v. United States.................................... 957 Armwood v. Brough......................................... 1028 Arnold v. Arnold........................................... 864 Arnone v. New York........................................ 1003 Arundel Supply Corp. v. Dovell............................. 841 Asberry v. Wilson.......................................... 942 Associated Press v. Walker................................. 812 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association of the Bar of N. Y., Jones v..................... 2 Association of the Bar of N. Y., Roehner v............ 818,953 Association of the Bar of N. Y., Ungar v.................. 1006 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., Canada Packers v.............. 182 Atkins v. Morgan........................................... 880 Atlantic Aviation Corp., Maryland for Use of Costas v.... 931 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Fla. E. C. R. Co.................. 950 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Hodges........................... 1011 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Railway Trainmen................... 20 Atlantic Nat. Bk., Lucom v............................. 898,984 Atlas Scraper & Eng. Co. v. Pursche................... 846,1020 Attorney General, Bandy v......................... 896,956,1021 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Attorney General, Honda v.................................. 917 Attorney General, Oyler v.................................. 965 Attorney General of Alabama, Newsome v.................... 1015 Attorney General of Louisiana, Watson v................. 1018 Attreau, Morris v.......................................... 832 Auditor of U. S. District Court, Brown v............... 988,1043 Austin v. California...................................... 1013 Austin v. Kentucky......................................... 804 Austin v. Wainwright....................................... 992 Avey v. Boslow............................................ 940 A. W. Fenton Co. v. United States....................... 970 Ayers v. Balkcom........................................... 872 Bache & Co., Colonial Realty Corp, v...................... 817 Badgley v. Hare....................................... 114,1021 Bafico v. Southern Pac. Co............................... 1025 Bailey, Coley v............................................ 952 Bailey, Lowe v..........■.................................. 824 Bailey v. YMCA of Atlanta............................. 868,1021 Baines v. Danville........................................ 890 Baird, Kelly v............................................ 965 Baird, Shannon v.......................................... 965 Baker, Federal Crop Ins. Corp, v........................... 801 Baker v. United States............................. 869,950,986 Baker County School Dist. 61, Grant v..................... 1010 Baldwin v. New Jersey...................................... 980 Baldwin v. United States.................................. 1014 Baldwin-Hall, Inc. v. New York............................. 818 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Jackson..................... 803 Bales v. California........................................ 865 Balkcom, Ayers v........................................... 872 Ballay v. Patterson........................................ 862 Ballentine Produce, Glick v.................................. 5 Ballou v. Massachusetts................................... 1031 Baltimore & O. R. Co., Geff Seed & Grain Co. v............. 946 Baltimore & O. R. Co., Spence v......................... 946 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States....................... 3 Bandy v. Attorney General.......................... 896,956,1021 Bane v. Supt. of Boston State Hospital..................... 842 Bank of Marin v. England.................................... 99 Bannister, Painter v....................................... 949 Banton v. Kentucky......................................... 879 Banzer v. United States................................... 1009 Bar Assn, of New York, Jones v............................... 2 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. IX Page Bar Assn, of New York, Roehner v...................... 818,953 Bar Assn, of N. Y., Ungar v.............................. 1006 Barber S. S. Lines, Mamiye Bros, v........................ 835 Barkan v. United States................................... 882 Barrett v. United States................................. 1001 Barrow v. United States.................................. 1001 Bates v. Meadows.......................................... 937 Bates v. Veterans Administration...................... 868,954 Battaglia v. United States................................ 115 Baxter v. United States................................... 834 Bazaure v. California..................................... 892 Beachem v. California..................................... 874 Beach Haven, Spiegle v.................................... 831 Bearden v. United States.................................. 856 Bear Sales Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n.................... 933 Beck v. Florida........................................... 958 Beck, Winters v._......................................... 907 Bedford-Nugent Corp. v. Teamsters......................... 821 Beech Aircraft Corp., Hurley v............................ 821 Belcher v. California................................. 886,943 Belk v. Kentucky...................................... 937,984 Bell v. Colorado.......................................... 892 Bell v. Texas............................................. 554 Bellamy v. Ohio........................................... 874 Bellard v. United States.................................. 856 Bendix Corp., Nyyssonen v................................. 846 Bennett v. Ford Motor Co.................................. 890 Bennett v. North Carolina................................ 1018 Bennett v. Pate........................................... 965 Bennett v. Texas.......................................... 892 Bennett v. United States................................ 4,903 Benoit v. Kentucky........................................ 870 Benson v. United States................................... 831 Bentvena v. LTnited States............................ 815,964 Berenyi v. Immigration Director........................... 630 Berger v. New York........................................ 967 Berkaw, Mayflower Congregational Church v................ 1035 Berman v. Warden.......................................... 805 Bernard v. United States.................................. 867 Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines........... 948 Berry v. Maroney.......................................... 860 Berry v. McGinnis......................................... 861 Berry v. New York...................................... 1017 X TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Betillo v. Warden.......................................... 887 Beto, McCutcheon v......................................... 963 Beto, Reed v........................................... 554,925 Beto, Reimer v........................................... 888 Beto, Webb v............................................ 940 Beto v. Welch........................................... 839 Beverly v. California................................. 891,896 Bey v. United States.................................. 905,984 Bianchi, Board of Supervisors v........................ 966,1023 Bickley v. Oliver....................................... 891 Biggs v. Campbell.......................................... 944 Billingsley v. Clayton.................................. 841 Biloxi, Mason v......................................... 370 Bingham v. Kentucky..................................... 904 Bingham, Riley v........................................ 974 Birmingham, Walker v.................................... 809 Birtcher Corp. v. Diapulse Corp, of America............. 801 Bishop, Maxwell v....................................... 650 Black v. Brando........................................... 990 Black, Brando v............................................ 990 Black v. Crocker......................................... 1019 Black v. Denver U. S. Nat. Bk............................. 990 Black v. New York...................................... 980,1044 Black v. Strand....................................... 805,990 Black v. United States.................................. 26 Blackwell, Hurley v..................................... 978 Blackwell, Ramseur v....................................... 993 Blair v. Crouse......................................... 861 Blankinship v. Wallace.................................. 963 Blau v. Lamb........................................... 1002 Blau v. Petteys........................................ 1006 Blockyou v. Crouse...................................... 952 Bloomfield S. S. Co. v. United States.................. 1004 Blue River Constructors, Ruth v.................... 920,984 Board of Education, Sailors v........................... 966 Board of Medical Examiners, Elder v................. 1001 Board of Pub. Works of Md. v. Horace Mann League.......... 97 Board of Pub. Works of Md., Horace Mann League v.......... 97 Board of Regents, Frank v.................................. 815 Board of Regents, Keyishian v.............................. 589 Board of Review, Alexander v............................... 536 Board of Road Supervisors, Eways v......................... 958 Board of Satanta Dist. 2 v. Grant County Bd.................. 6 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XI Page Board of Satanta Dist. 2 v. Haskell County Bd............... 96 Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi....................... 966,1023 Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County v. Griffin.... 960 Bogart v. California................................... 888,964 Bogart v. Traynor.......................................... 451 Bohanon, Joplin v.......................................... 808 Boies, Palmer v............................................ 854 Boles, Brown v......................................... 886, 954 Boles, Gholston v........................................ 950 Bond v. Floyd.............................................. 116 Bond v. Resor.............................................. 874 Bonomo v. United States.................................... 879 Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary................................ 12,943 Booth v. Rhay.............................................. 936 Booze v. Virginia...................................... 991,1044 Borough. See name of borough. Bosch Estate, Commissioner v.................. 968 Boslow, Avey v............................................. 940 Boslow, McCloskey v........................................ 951 Bosnich v. Minnesota....................................... 978 Boss Hotels Co. v. Des Moines.............................. 852 Bostick v. South Carolina.................................. 813 Boston State Hospital Supt., Bane v................ 842 Bottone v. United States................................... 974 Bourg v. Louisiana......................................... 866 Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service........ 927 Bowe v. United States...................................... 961 Bowen v. Follette.......................................... 963 Bowens v. California Adult Auth................. 805 Boyden, In re............................................. 1012 Boyden v. California....................................... 114 Boyden v. May............................................... 15 Boyden v. United States................................ 978,1021 Bradford v. Gavagan......................................... 22 Bradford v. Helman.......................................... 15 Bradford v. Postel.......................................... 16 Bradley v. United States................................... 878 Branch v. Johnson......................................... 1003 Brando v. Black............................................ 990 Brando, Black v............................................ 990 Brandt v. California....................................... 863 Braun v. Wilson............................................ 887 Brawner v. Georgia......................................... 936 XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Braxton v. Peyton........................................ 939 Breakey, Lathan v........................................ 859 Breault v. Feigenholtz................................... 824 Brennan v. Sellers................................... 828,984 Brent v. Louisiana....................................... 992 Brewton Fashions v. Labor Board.......................... 842 Bristol v. New York...................................... 887 British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Berner v.......... 948 Bronner v. Goldman....................................... 933 Brooklyn Bar Assn., Fischbein v.......................... 836 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brough, Arm wood v................................... 1028 Brown v. Boles...................................... 886,954 Brown v. Brown........................................ 868 Brown v. California................................... 993 Brown v. Follin..................................... 988,1043 Brown v. Louisiana.................................... 863 Brown, McCurdy v...................................... 903 Brown, Smith v........................................ 889 Brown, Tuggle v........................................ 941 Brown v. United States.................................. 1028 Brown v. Wainwright.................................. 954,992 Brunette Cheese Mfg. Corp. v. Gardner.................... 827 Bruni v. United States.............................. 821,826 Bruning, Cross v.................................... 14,964 Bryans v. United States.................................. 808 Bryant v. Texas.......................................... 858 Buatte v. United States.................................. 856 Buchanan v. Connell...................................... 807 Buchanan v. Rhodes......................................... 3 Buchkoe, Gemmel v................................... 962,1021 Buck, Morris Park, Inc. v.............................. 2 Budd v. California.................................... 909 Buono Sales, Chrysler Motors Corp, v.................. 971 Bureau of Unemployment Comp., Madisonville Cab Co. v... 959 Bureau of Unemployment Comp., Pharr v................. 959 Burke, Butler v....................................... 835 Burke, Cox v.......................................... 939 Burke, Thomas v....................................... 963 Burnett v. Commissioner............................... 832 Burris v. Texas....................................... 979 Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner...................... 1007 Bush v. California................................... 1043 Butler v. Burke....................................... 835 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XIII Page Butterfield v. Plastic Contact Lens Co....................... 1009 Butts, Curtis Pub. Co. v...................................... 811 Bynum v. New Jersey........................................... 861 Bynum v. United States........................................ 867 Byrd v. Pennsylvania.......................................... 886 Cachoian v. United States.................................... 1029 Cady v. Missouri ex rel. State Highway Comm’n................. 204 Cain v. Illinois............................................. 1042 Calcaterra v. Illinois......................................... 7 California, Abdelkader v....................................... 891,980 California, Alcorcha v................................... 923 California, Anderson v............................................. 926 California, Austin v......................................... 1013 California, Bales v........................................... 865 California, Bazaure v.................................... 892 California, Beachem v......................................... 874 California, Belcher v....................................... 886,943 California, Beverly v....................................... 891,896 California, Bogart v........................................ 888,964 California, Boyden v.......................................... 114 California, Brandt v.......................................... 863 California, Brown v........................................... 993 California, Budd v............................................ 909 California, Bush v........................................... 1043 California, Candelaria v...................................... 980 California, Cano v........................................... 1031 California, Carrillo v....................................... 1013 California, Daulby v.......................................... 980 California, Deal v............................................ 893 California, Demes v........................................... 805 California, Diehl v........................................... 858 California, Domingo v......................................... 859 California, Elliott v......................................... 941 California, Ellison v......................................... 888 California v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co............................. 985 California, Esparza v......................................... 882 California, Ford v........................................... 1018 California, Foss v............................................ 854 California, French v......................................... 370,1043 California, Gilmore v......................................... 961 California, Glaser v........................................ 880,965 California, Grant v.......................................... 1016 California, Graves v.......................................... 883 California, Hardke v.......................................... 994 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page California, Henry v................................................ 896 California, Hernandez v........................................... 860 California, Holguin v.............................................. 961 California, Howard v.............................................. 867 California, Hurst v............................................... 873 California, Huskey v.............................................. 942 California, Jacobson v............................................ 892 California, James v............................................... 905 California, Jimenez v............................................. 1028 California, Johnson v...................................... 21,872,873 California, King v................................................ 923 California, Laine v............................................... 894 California, LaManna v......................................... 1043 California, La Peluso v......................................... 829 California, Lascher v............................................... 928 California, Latimer v............................................... 887 California, La Vergne v......................................... 938 California, Lokey v............................................. 888 California, Lopez v................................................. 891 California, Magdaleno v............................................. 876 California, Magee v................................................. 855 California, Mathis v................................................ 857 California, McQuaid v............................................... 648 California, Mead v.................................................. 923 California, Michaels v.............................................. 879 California, Miller v...................................... 906 California, Mitchell v.......................................... 978,981 California, Montellano v............................................ 885 California, Muza v.................................................. 850 California, Nailor v............................................... 1030 California, Newhouse v...................................... 922,984 California, Nolan v................................................. 875 California, Omicini v............................................... 929 California, Osborne v.............................................. 1013 California, Padilla v........................................... 880,953 California, Pena v.................................................. 883 California, Perrea v................................................ 883 California, Reeves v................................................ 952 California, Riley v................................................. 892 California, Ross v.................................................. 892 California, Schlette v.............................................. 891 California, Shobe v................................................. 887 California, Smith v................................................ 1042 California, Solis v................................................ 1015 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xv Page California, Spears v............................................ 860 California v. Stewart........................................... 890 California, Summons v................................... 872 California, Switzer v........................................... 871 California, Talbot v........................................... 1015 California, Taylor v............................................ 962 California, Thomas v........................................... 1030 California, Wadley v............................................ 879 California, Weidemann v......................................... 998 California, Whelchel v.......................................... 953 California, Whitehorn v......................................... 878 California, Whitfield v......................................... 865 California, Wickham v........................................... 872 California, Wilkes v............................................ 921 California, Williams v.......................................... 882 California, Woods v............................................. 950 California, Wright v............................................ 892 California, Zucker v........................................ 855,964 California Adult Auth., Bowens v................................ 805 California Adult Auth., Hamlin v................................ 869 California Adult Auth., Hatfield v.............................. 983 California Adult Auth., Hays v.................................. 862 California Bd. of Medical Examiners, Elder v................... 1001 California Chief Justice, Bogart v.............................. 451 California Corporations Comm’r v. Elliott....................... 829 California Dept, of Corrections, Williams v..................... 986 California Fish and Game Dept. v. Fed. Power Comm’n........... 932 California Governor, Brown v................................... 868 California Mens Colony Supt., Chromiak v....................... 1029 California Pub. Util. Comm’n v. United States................... 816 California Secretary of State v. Weaver......................... 844 California State Bar, Lyons v.................................. 1017 California Super. Ct., Glouner v................................ 451 California Super. Ct., Hagan v............................. 823,1025 California Sup. Ct., Shipp v.................................... 925 Callahan v. Indiana............................................. 942 Callahan v. New York........................................... 1017 Callas v. Washington............................................ 995 Calumet Harbor Terminals v. Norfolk & W. R. Co................ 57 Calzavara v. United States........................................ 991 Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco........................ 808 Cambridge v. Rhay................................................. 857 Cameron v. New York............................................ 1015 Campbell, Biggs v................................................. 944 XVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Campbell v. Freeman....................................... 1028 Campbell v. Hamer.......................................... 851 Campbell, Norton v......................................... 839 Campbell v. Trans World Airlines........................... 824 Campbell v. United States.......................... 293,922,973 Campos v. United States.................................... 842 Canada Packers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co............... 182 Candelaria v. California................................... 980 Cannon v. Willingham....................................... 807 Cano v. California........................................ 1031 Canton v. Public Util. Comm’n of Ohio...................... 828 Cantrell v. Field.......................................... 952 Cantrell v. United States.................................. 937 Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co..................... 11,964 Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Kelly v........................ 1025 Capital Investors Co., Devers v....................... 934,1021 Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic Facilities............... 924 Carbo v. United States..................................... 823 Cargo Ships & Tankers v. Rush.............................. 842 Carr v. Altus............................................... 35 Carrillo v. California.................................... 1013 Carroll v. Crouse.......................................... 940 Car roll v. Texas.......................................... 903 Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co......................... 1008 Carter v. New Mexico...................................... 873 Carter v. Norfolk......................................... 870 Carter, Saverio v.......................................... 851 Caruso v. United States.................................... 862 Casados v. United States................................... 869 Casavina v. United States................................. 1006 Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co.............. 985 Casias v. Colorado......................................... 979 Cason v. North Carolina................................... 1019 Cassidy, Maslowsky v.................................... 11,924 Catanzaro v. New York...................................... 875 Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto Chemical Coatings............... 832 Cavell, Smith v............................................ 938 Caveny v. Alabama.......................................... 873 Caveny v. Dolnick.......................................... 805 C & C Plywood Corp., Labor Board v......................... 421 Cedillo v. United States............................... 805,954 Celotex Corp. v. Labor Board............................... 987 Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Rural Elec. Adm......... 815,964 Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Altman........................ 920 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XVII Page Cermak, Prusa v............................................ 1004 Cerny v. Rhay............................................... 939 Chafin v. Pratt............................................. 878 Chamberlain v. Ohio......................................... 844 Chamberlain v. Zink......................................... 987 Chancery Court of Greene County, Swindle v.................. 906 Chandler, O’Bryan v......................................... 889 Charles A. Wright, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co.................... 890 Chase v. Massachusetts...................................... 906 Chase v. Robbins............................................ 889 Chatterton v. Georgia....................................... 892 Chavez v. Oliver............................................ 861 Checker Cab Co. v. Labor Board............................. 1008 Checker Records, Peacock Records v......................... 1003 Chemical Bk. N. Y. Tr. Co. v. The Montauk Point.......... 921 Chemical Bk. N. Y. Tr. Co. v. The Westhampton............... 921 Chemical Nat. Resources v. Venezuela........................ 822 Cheney, Laird & Co. v....................................... 371 Chervy v. Peninsular & Oriental Nav. Co.................... 1007 Chevallier v. Texas......................................... 891 Chewning v. Commissioner.................................... 930 Chicago, Gibbons v.......................................... 829 Chicago, Railroad Transfer Serv. v....................... 810,996 Chicago Cutter-Karcher v. Maley............................. 847 Chick v. Kentucky........................................... 977 Chief Justice of California, Bogart v....................... 451 Chilcutt v. Johnson......................................... 871 Christiana v. Louisiana..................................... 835 Christiansen v. New York.................................... 877 Chromiak v. California Mens Colony Supt.................... 1029 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Buono Sales........................ 971 Chulick v. New York Central R. Co.......................... 1041 Cia. Mar. Adra v. Mosley.................................... 933 Ciccone, Evans v............................................ 896 Cichos v. Indiana........................................ 76,1020 Cipres v. United States..................................... 826 Cities Service Co., Waldron v.............................. 1024 City. See name of city. Civil Aeronautics Bd., American Airlines v.................. 843 Civil Service Comm’n Chairman, Stebbins v.................... 871 Civil Service Comm’n of Toledo, Genite v.................... 947 Clark v. Texas............................................. 1011 Clark v. United States....................................... 817 Clarke v. Tennessee.......................................... 942 XVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Clark Mfg. Co., Loren Specialty Mfg. Co. v................ 957 Clayton, Billingsley v.................................... 841 Clemons v. Texas.......................................... 894 Clemons v. Wilson..................................... 986,998 Cleveland Bar Assn., Hamilton v........................... 988 Clewis v. Texas....................................... 814,944 Clydesdale, Inc., Easter v................................ 891 Coates v. United States.................................. 1010 Cody v. Oklahoma.......................................... 979 Coffee v. Florida......................................... 997 Cohen, Finfer v........................................... 894 Cohen v. New York.................................... 976,1032 Cohen v. United States................................. 957,1035 Cohen v. Wisconsin........................................ 959 Colbert v. United States............................... 855, 954 Cole v. Russell.......................................... 853 Cole v. United States................................... 1027 Cole v. Washington....................................... 858 Cole v. Willingham...................................... 1033 Colella v. United States.................................. 829 Coleman v. Michigan...................................... 1030 Coleman v. Peyton......................................... 905 Coles v. Kentucky......................................... 959 Coley v. Bailey........................................... 952 Collier v. New York....................................... 869 Collier v. United States............................... 977,1042 Collins v. Wilson......................................... 808 Colonial Pipeline Co., Peck Iron & Metal Co. v............ 823 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co....................... 817 Colorado, Bell v.......................................... 892 Colorado, Casias v........................................ 979 Colorado, Kostal v........................................ 939 Colorado-Ute Elec. Assn. v. Western Colo. Power Co..... 22, 984 Columbus & G. R. Co. v. Commissioner...................... 827 Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Labor Board.................... 821 Combs v. Denno............................................ 872 Combs v. New York......................................... 878 Combs v. U. S. District Court............................. 805 Cominco Prods, v. Oregon Tax Comm’n....................... 830 Comley v. United States............................... 885,943 Commercial Sec. Bk., First Sec. Bk. of Utah v............. 252 Commercial Sec. Bk., Saxon v............................ 252 Commissioner, Ach v....................................... 899 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XIX Page Commissioner v. Ach Corp.................................. 899 Commissioner, American Truck Rental Corp, v............... 815 Commissioner v. Bosch Estate.............................. 968 Commissioner, Burnett v................................... 832 Commissioner, Burr Oaks Corp, v.......................... 1007 Commissioner, Chewning v.................................. 930 Commissioner, Columbus & G. R. Co. v...................... 827 Commissioner, Equitable Pub. Co. v...................... 822 Commissioner, F. & D. Rentals v.......................... 1004 Commissioner, Finfer v.................................... 894 Commissioner, Fortugno v.................................. 954 Commissioner, Fortugno Estate v........................... 954 Commissioner, Fruehauf Corp, v............................ 822 Commissioner, Glassner v.................................. 819 Commissioner, Goldstein v................................ 1005 Commissioner, Klitzner v.................................. 928 Commissioner, Madison Fund v............................. 1008 Commissioner, Martin v.................................... 920 Commissioner, Nash Miami Motors v...................... 918 Commissioner, Oil Base, Inc. v............................ 928 Commissioner, Parker v................................... 1026 Commissioner, Pennroad Corp, v........................... 1008 Commissioner v. Stidger................................ 809,925 Commissioner, Villafranca v............................ 840, 953 Commissioner, Wolfe v..................................... 838 Commissioner of Agriculture of N. Y., Swift & Co. v.... 1036 Commissioner of Ins., Allstate Co. v...................... 930 Commissioner of Ins., Ministers Life & Cas. Union v.... 205,1033 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Kemp v.................... 17 Commissioner of Police of N. Y., Bookcase, Inc. v..... 12,943 Commissioner of Police of N. Y., Redden v................ 827 Commissioner of Revenues of Ark., Potts v................ 946 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Community Service Co., N. M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v....... 933 Compania Mar. Adra v. Mosley.............................. 933 Compton v. United States................................... 956 Comptroller of New York, Federated Stores v.............. 454 Comptroller of the Currency v. Commercial Sec. Bk..... 252 Comptroller of Treasury of Md., Cree v................... 816 Comptroller of Treasury of Md., Murray v................. 816 Comulada v. Willingham................................... 1030 Confederated Tribes v. United States....................... 921 XX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Connecticut, De Joseph v................................... 982 Connell, Buchanan v........................................ 807 Conner v. Wingo............................................ 1012 Conole v. United States.................................... 1025 Conroy, Shott v............................................ 969 Continental Can Co. v. Donahue............................. 946 Continental Gas Co., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.... 825 Continental Grain Co. v. Defies............................ 969 Contract Carriers v. Markiewicz............................ 828 Converse v. Igel & Co...................................... 969 Conway, Watkins v.......................................... 188 Cook v. Massachusetts...................................... 981 Cook Broadcasting Co., Daniels v....................... 904,984 Coon v. United States...................................... 873 Cooper v. Holman........................................... 855 Cooper v. Oklahoma City.................................... 898 Cooper v. United States................................... 1030 Co-ordinating Com. on Discipline, Millstein v.............. 1026 Copeland v. Tennessee...................................... 880 Copinger, Lee v........................................... 1017 Copinger, Leek v........................................... 949 Corbean v. Xenia City Bd. of Educ......................... 1041 Corbett, Kelsey v........................................... 35 Corporations Comm’r of Cal. v. Elliott..................... 829 Cortinez v. Flournoy....................................... 925 Cosmic, The v. United States............................... 930 Costas v. Atlantic Aviation Corp........................... 931 Cota v. Arizona............................................ 878 Cota v. Eyman.............................................. 937 Cote v. United States...................................... 883 Cotton v. Yawn............................................. 894 Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andeen........................... 1036 County. See also name of county. County Clerk, Cross v................................... 14,964 Court Crim. App. Tex. Judges, Greer v...................... 807 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Cowan v. New York.......................................... 857 Cox v. Burke............................................... 939 Cox, Gallegos v............................................ 869 Cox, Sisneros v............................................ 856 Creamer v. United States................................... 819 Cree v. Goldstein.......................................... 816 Creighton v. United States................................. 872 Crocker, Black v.......................................... 1019 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXI Page Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bk., Scott v......................... 882 Crooke v. Wainwright...................................... 1022 Cross v. Bruning........................................ 14,964 Crouse, Blair v............................................ 861 Crouse, Blockyou v......................................... 952 Crouse, Carroll v.......................................... 940 Crouse, Engling v.......................................... 889 Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States...................... 811 Cruz, Patterson v.......................................... 975 Csobor v. New Jersey...................................... 1027 Cuba v. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba.................... 837 Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc........................ 1003 Cummins v. Price........................................... 869 Cumpian v. Oliver.......................................... 863 Cupo v. United States..................................... 1013 Curry v. United States..................................... 873 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts................................... 811 D’Ambrosio v. Follette.................................... 1018 D’Amico v. National Broadcasting Co........................ 648 Dana v. Tracy.............................................. 941 Daniels v. Cook Broadcasting Co........................ 904,984 Danks v. Utah............................................ 1016 D’Antonio v. United States................................. 900 Danville, Baines v......................................... 890 Darby v. Florida....................................... 896,984 Daskal v. Nena............................................. 874 Daugherty v. Maryland...................................... 859 Daughtry v. United States.............................. 881,965 Daulby v. California....................................... 980 David B. Findlay, Inc., Findlay v.......................... 930 Davis, Dusch v............................................. 999 Davis v. Kentucky.......................................... 831 Davis v. Missouri.......................................... 872 Davis v. Myers............................................. 905 Davis v. Negin............................................. 824 Davis v. Swenson........................................... 866 Davis v. Union Free School Dist. No. 7..................... 807 Davis v. United States................................. 868,927 Davis v. U. S. District Court.............................. 943 Dawkins, Scott v........................................... 999 Dayton Mayor, Otto v....................................... 930 Deal v. California......................................... 893 DeAlesandro v. United States............................... 842 Dean v. Florida............................................ 998 XXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page DeAngelis v. United States.............................. 834 Decker, Phelper v........................................ 18 Deesen v. Professional Golfers’ Assn................ 846,1032 Defies, Continental Grain Co. v......................... 969 Defies, Federal Barge Lines v........................... 969 DeFlumer v. New York.................................... 892 DeJongh, Antilles Surveys v............................. 900 DeJoseph v. Connecticut................................. 982 DeKalb, Nehring v....................................... 453 Delaney v. United Services Life Ins. Co............. 846,943 De La Paz v. Wilson.................................... 1015 Delaware v. New York................................ 895,964 Delaware Sports Serv. v. Diamond State Tel. Co.......... 817 DeLeon v. New York...................................... 877 Delespine v. Texas...................................... 893 Del Monico v. United States............................. 815 DeLoach, Urbano v...................................... 1017 Del Peschio v. Del Peschio.............................. 886 DeMaro v. United States................................ 1032 Demes v. California..................................... 805 Demko, United States v.................................. 149 Denberg, Frischman v.................................... 884 Denno, Combs v.......................................... 872 Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Railroad Trainmen.......... 1000 Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States........... 897,1034 Denver U. S. Nat. Bk., Black v.......................... 990 Department of Air Force, Watts v........................ 862 Department of Employment v. United States............... 355 Department of Finance Comm’r, Antilles Surveys v....... 900 Department of Fish and Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n....... 932 Department of Justice, Lopez v.......................... 839 Department of Labor & Industry of N. J., Alexander v... 536 Department of Rev. of Ill., National Bellas Hess v...... 809 D’Ercole v. United States........................... 995,1032 Derritt v. Real Estate Examiners........................ 900 DeSmedt v. Federal Maritime Comm’n...................... 974 Des Moines, Boss Hotels Co. v........................... 852 De Soto Chemical Coatings, Cataphote Corp, v............ 832 DeStefano v. Illinois............................... 821, 989 Devers v. Capital Investors Co...................... 934,1021 DeVoney v. Pate......................................... 873 Diamond State Tel. Co., Delaware Sports Serv. v........ 817 Diapulse Corp, of America, Birtcher Corp, v............. 801 Diaz-Rosendo v. United States........................... 856 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXIII Page Diehl v. California........................................ 858 D. I. Operating Co. v. United States..................... 1024 DiPalma v. New York........................................ 864 Director of Alcoholic Bev. Control, Laird & Co. v.......... 371 Director of Immigration. See Immigration Director. Director of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Director of Licenses of Washington, Treffry v............... 10 Directors Guild of America v. Hurwitz...................... 971 Dispatch Printing Co., Maroscia v.......................... 991 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Court of Iowa, Long v............................. 192 District Court of Montana, Sinfield v...................... 960 District Director of Immigration. See Immigration Director. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia, Greenwood & Majestic Co. v......... 830 District of Columbia Ct. of Gen. Sessions, Ruiz v........ 916 Doctor v. United States.................................... 818 Dodge v. Utah............................................. 1013 Dolnick, Caveny v.......................................... 805 Dombrowski v. Eastland..................................... 812 Domingo v. California...................................... 859 Donahue, Continental Can Co. v............................. 946 Double Eagle Lubricants v. Texas........................... 890 Douglas v. Maxwell......................................... 858 Dovell, Arundel Supply Corp, v............................. 841 Dove Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board............................... 820 Dowd v. Alabama............................................ 925 Dowdle v. New York........................................... 7 Downie v. U. S. Lines Co................................... 897 Dragor Shipping Corp., Union Tank Car Co. v................ 831 Driscoll v. Toledo Blade Co........................... 948,1021 Droste v. Kerner........................................... 456 Drummond v. United States.................................. 892 Duddleston v. Grills....................................... 455 Duke Power Co. v. United States........................... 1025 Dunbar, Hardison v......................................... 944 Dunbar, Johnson v.......................................... 906 Dunbar, Postell v.......................................... 864 Dunleavy v. New York....................................... 859 Dunn v. Virginia........................................... 885 DuPont de Nemours & Co., Searoad Shipping Co. v.......... 973 Durham Housing Auth., Thorpe v............................. 967 Dusch v. Davis............................................. 999 Dutton, Hoard v........................................ 881,943 XXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Duval v. United States.................................. 876,951 Dyer v. Wilson.............................................. 965 Dyson v. Maryland.......................................... 1017 Easter v. Clydesdale, Inc................................... 891 Eastern Argo, The, Fukaya Trading Co. v..................... 971 Eastern Marine Corp., Fukaya Trading Co. v.................. 971 Eastland, Dombrowski v...................................... 812 Eaton, Schwartz v........................................... 921 Ebell v. McGee............................................. 1017 Edge v. Wainwright.......................................... 953 Edlin v. United States...................................... 846 Edwards v. Holman........................................... 891 Edwards v. New York........................................ 1043 Edwards v. Prasse........................................... 888 Edwards v. United States.................................... 994 E. Home’s Mkt., Switzerland Cheese Assn, v.................. 23 E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Searoad Shipping Co. v.... 973 Eisele Co., Keller Pier Drilling Co. v...................... 839 Eklund, Holman v............................................ 961 Elbel v. United States...................................... 1014 Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners........................ 1001 Eldridge v. Richfield Oil Corp.............................. 1020 Electrical Contractors Assn. v. Ordman..................... 1026 Electrical Workers v. General Electrical Co................. 533 Electrical Workers, Illinois Power Co. v.................... 850 Electrical Workers v. Labor Board........................... 898 Electrical Workers v. Ryan.................................. 935 Electronic & Missile Facilities, Capolino Sons v............ 924 Elgin, Olden v.............................................. 905 Eilenburg v. Georgia •...................................... 973 Elliott v. California....................................... 941 Elliott, Schutzbank v....................................... 829 Ellison v. California....................................... 888 El Paso Nat. Gas Co., California v.......................... 985 El Paso Nat. Gas Co., Cascade Nat. Gas Corp, v............ 985 El Paso Nat. Gas Co., Southern Calif. Edison Co. v........ 985 El Salvador, The, v. McAllister Bros....................... 1005 Emerson Institute v. United States.......................... 822 Eminente v. Johnson......................................... 929 Empire Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp................... 1002 Employment Dept. v. United States........................... 355 England, Bank of Marin v..................................... 99 England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners...................... 890 Engling v. Crouse........................................... 889 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXV Page Entsminger v. Iowa.......................................... 804 Equitable Gas Co., Pittsburgh Nat. Bk. v.................... 988 Equitable Pub. Co. v. Commissioner.......................... 822 Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States..................... 914 Errico, Immigration and Naturalization Service v............ 214 Esparza v. California....................................... 882 Estate. See name of estate. Evans v. Ciccone............................................ 896 Evans v. Follette.......................................... 1016 Evans v. General Motors Corp.............................. 836 Evans v. Georgia............................................ 953 Evans v. Montana............................................ 879 Evans v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.......... 959 Evans v. United States.................................. 863,951 Eways v. Board of Road Supervisors.......................... 958 E. W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port. Auth........ 947 Exeter Bd. of Road Supervisors, Eways v..................... 958 Exley Express v. United States.............................. 371 Exquisite Form Brassiere v. Federal Trade Comm’n.......... 890 Eyman, Cota v............................................... 937 Eyman, Foggy v.............................................. 854 Eyman, Rodgers v............................................ 881 Eyman, Smith v............................................. 1017 Fabian v. United States..................................... 821 Fabrizio, United States v............................... 263,894 Fagans v. Wilson............................................ 953 Fair v. Nuccio.............................................. 884 Fanelli v. New York......................................... 891 Farber v. Williams.......................................... 845 Farrell v. Massachusetts.................................... 836 Faulkner v. Patuxent Institution Director................... 869 Fauls v. United States...................................... 904 Fay, Jefferson v........................................... 1027 Fay, Ludwig v............................................... 940 F. & D. Rentals v. Commissioner........................... 1004 F. D. Rich Co., Charles A. Wright, Inc. v.................. 890 Federal Barge Lines v. Defies............................... 969 Federal Bur. of Investigation, Urbano v..................... 862 FBI Assistant Director, Urbano v..................... 1017 Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Baker............................ 801 Federal Ins. Co., Jamaica Time Petroleum v................. 1024 Federal Maritime Comm’n, DeSmedt v.......................... 974 Federal Power Comm’n, Alabama-Tennessee Gas Co. v.... 847, 964 Federal Power Comm’n, Fish and Game Dept, v............... 932 XXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Federal Power Comm’n, Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v... 972 Federal Power Comm’n, Louisiana Gas Serv. Co. v.............. 833 Federal Power Comm’n, Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.... 833 Federal Power Comm’n, Pacific Power Co. v.................... 932 Federal Power Comm’n, Udall v................................ 927 Federal Power Comm’n, United Gas Pipe Line v.................. 83 Federal Power Comm’n, Wash. Power Supply System v... 926,985 Federal Reserve Bk. of N. Y., Sardino v...................... 898 Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., Acron Investments v......... 970 Federal Trade Comm’n, Bear Sales Co. v....................... 933 Federal Trade Comm’n, Exquisite Form Brassiere v............ 890 Federal Trade Comm’n, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v......... 1002 Federal Trade Comm’n, Forster Mfg. Co. v.................... 1003 Federal Trade Comm’n, Guziak v.......................... 1007 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Jantzen, Inc......................... 810 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co.................. 897 Federal Trade Comm’n, Shell Oil Co. v....................... 1002 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Universal-Rundle Corp................ 809 Federated Dept. Stores v. Gerosa............................. 454 Feigenholtz, Breault v....................................... 824 Fein v. New York............................................. 649 Fenton Co. v. United States.................................. 970 Ferguson v. Kentucky......................................... 938 Fernanders v. Wallack........................................ 880 Fernicola v. United States............................... 836,964 Ferrante v. New York........................................... 9 Ferraro, Warriner v..................................... 995,1044 Ferron v. Homer.............................................. 958 Field, Cantrell v............................................ 952 Field, Hardwick v............................................ 976 Field, John v................................................ 805 Field, Laing v.............................................. 1043 Field, Luna v................................................ 801 Field, Tucker v.............................................. 986 Field, Williams v............................................ 868 Fields v. New York.......................................... 1031 Finance Dept. Comm’r, Antilles Surveys v..................... 900 Findlay v. David B. Findlay, Inc......................... 930 Findlay, Inc., Findlay v..................................... 930 Fine v. Woods Hole, M. V. & N. S. S. Auth.................... 845 Finfer v. Cohen............................................. 894 Fink, Warriner v............................................. 894 Finley v. Oliver........................................ 862,1043 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXVII Page Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n.......... 1002 First City Nat. Bk. of Houston, United States v.......... 1023,1033 First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. McNellis................. 970 First Hardin Nat. Bk. v. Fort Knox Nat. Bk..................... 959 First Nat. Bk. of Logan v. Walker Bk. & Tr. Co......... 252,1032 First Nat. Bk. of Oakland, Superior Ct. of Cal. v........... 829 First Sec. Bk. of Utah v. Commercial Sec. Bk................... 252 Fischbein v. Brooklyn Bar Assn................................. 836 Fish and Game Dept. v. Fed. Power Comm’n....................... 932 Fisher v. United States.................................... 819,920 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co............... 809 Fleishour v. United States..................................... 987 Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., Prima Paint Corp, v.................. 897 Florida, Adderley v....................................... 39,1020 Florida, Allen v............................................... 892 Florida, Allison v............................................. 867 Florida, Beck v................................................ 958 Florida, Coffee v.............................................. 997 Florida, Darby v.......................................... 896,984 Florida, Dean v................................................ 998 Florida, Granger v............................................. 993 Florida, Grant v............................................... 877 Florida, Hall v................................................ 950 Florida, King v................................................ 884 Florida, Mangel v.............................................. 991 Florida, Mills v.............................................. 857 Florida, Montgomer}’ v......................................... 892 Florida, Nixon v............................................... 853 Florida, Rainwater v........................................... 944 Florida, Ransom v.............................................. 951 Florida, Roberts v............................................. 869 Florida, Schack v.............................................. 887 Florida, Sesler v......................................... 805,965 Florida, Steppe v............................................. 1031 Florida, Thomas v.............................................. 992 Florida, Zuniga v.............................................. 962 Florida E. C. R. Co., Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v.................. 950 Florida ex rei. Farber v. Williams............................. 845 Florida ex rei. Moliver v. Williams............................ 845 Florida Secretary of State, Swann v............... 440,808,944, 997 Florida Sup. Ct., Hollingshead v............................... 944 Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Cuba v........................ 837 Flournoy, Cortinez v........................................... 925 XXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Flowers, Moody v............................................ 966 Flowers, Newsome v......................................... 1015 Floyd, Bond v............................................... 116 Floyd & Beasley Transfer Co. v. United States............... 647 Flying Tiger Line v. Murphy................................. 945 FMC Corp., Walker Process Equip, v...................... 824 Fogarascher v. Fricke....................................... 825 Foggy v. Eyman.............................................. 854 Fogliani, Lancaster v....................................... 938 Fogliani, Mitchell v........................................ 888 Fogliani, Morford v.................................... 963,1021 Follette, Bowen v........................................... 963 Follette, D’Ambrosio v..................................... 1018 Follette, Evans v.......................................... 1016 Follette, Leak v........................................... 1015 Follette, Romano v......................................... 1020 Follin, Brown v........................................ 988,1043 Fontana v. Schneckloth...................................... 998 Forbush v. United States................................... 1027 Ford v. California......................................... 1018 Ford Motor Co., Bennett v................................. 890 Forester v. United States............................... 837,953 Forman v. Montgomery........................................ 893 Forster Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n................... 1003 Forte, White v......................................... 871,954 Fort Knox Nat. Bk., First Hardin Nat. Bk. v.............. 959 Fortson v. Morris.............................. 231,955,986,1021 Fortugno v. Commissioner................................. 954 Fortugno Estate v. Commissioner.......................... 954 Foss v. California....................................... 854 Foster v. Oregon........................................ 1035 Foster v. United States.................................. 994 Foster, Uttech v.......................................... 956 Fox, Kahn v.............................................. 935 France v. United States..................................... 872 Frank v. Board of Regents................................... 815 Frayer v. Utah.............................................. 936 Freeman, Campbell v........................................ 1028 Freeman, General Mills v................................ 1024 Freeman v. Maxwell....................................... 896 Freeman, Morrison Milling Co. v.................. 1024 Freeman v. United States................................. 882 French v. California................................... 370,1043 Fricke, Fogarascher v.................................... 825 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXIX Page Friend v. Rhay............................................ 1018 Friendly Finance Co., Giles v............................... 21 Frischman v. Denberg....................................... 884 Fruehauf Corp. v. Commissioner............................. 822 Frye, Lehman v............................................ 1015 Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp.................. 971 Fulton, Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. v....................... 802 Fulton County, Weiner v.................................... 958 Furtak v. Mancusi...................................... 945,995 Gallagher v. Quinn......................................... 881 Gallegos v. Cox............................................ 869 Gamble v. Haskins......................................... 1042 Gann v. Arizona........................................... 1028 Garcia v. Morales.......................................... 449 Gardner, Brunetto Cheese Mfg. Corp, v...................... 827 Gardner, Gee v............................................. 856 Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn............................... 813 Gardner, Toilet Goods Assn, v.............................. 813 Garland v. United States................................... 978 Garrity v. New Jersey...................................... 493 Gascar v. United States.................................... 865 Gault, In re............................................... 965 Gavagan, Bradford v......................................... 22 Gaxiola v. United States................................... 906 Gay v. United States....................................... 898 Gee v. Gardner............................................. 856 Geff Seed & Grain Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.............. 946 Gemmel v. Buchkoe...................................... 962,1021 General Electric Co., Electrical Workers v................. 533 General Electric Co., McLeod v............................. 533 General Mills v. Freeman.................................. 1024 General Motors Corp., Evans v.............................. 836 General Motors Corp. v. Mich. Empl. Sec. Comm’n.......... 373 General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins....................... 899 Genite v. Civil Service Comm’n of Toledo................... 947 Gentry v. Johnson.......................................... 884 Georgia, Brawner v......................................... 936 Georgia, Chatterton v.................................... 892 Georgia, Eilenburg v.................... 973 Georgia, Evans v........................................... 953 Georgia, Massey v........................................... 36 Georgia, Moore v.......................................... 1028 Georgia, Roach v........................................... 935 Georgia, Sims v............................................ 538 XXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Georgia, Whisman v....................................... 893 Georgia, Whitus v....................................... 545,813 Georgia, Williams v....................................... 887 Georgia Secretary of State v. Morris........... 231, 955, 986,1021 Gerosa, Federated Dept. Stores v............................ 454 Gerry, Inc. v. Labor Board.................................. 820 Gershon v. Oklahoma......................................... 882 Gevinson v. United States................................... 823 Gholston v. Boles........................................... 950 Gibbons v. Chicago.......................................... 829 Gilbert v. Supreme Court of New York........................ 847 Gilbert v. United States.................................... 882 Gilbert, West v............................................. 919 Giles v. Friendly Finance Co................................. 21 Giles v. Johnston.......................................... 1020 Giles v. United States...................................... 870 Gillespie v. United States................................. 979 Gillespie v. Virginia....................................... 892 Gilmer v. Peyton............................................ 805 Gilmore v. California....................................... 961 Glacy v. United States...................................... 831 Gladden, Parker v........................................... 363 Gladden, Shannon v.......................................... 950 Glaser v. California.................................... 880,965 Glass v. Holman............................................ 1030 Glassner v. Commissioner.................................... 819 Glazewski v. New Jersey..................................... 884 Gleaton v. Warden.......................................... 1017 Glick v. Ballentine Produce................................... 5 Glouner v. Superior Court of Calif.......................... 451 Godel v. United States...................................... 838 Gohlke v. Wilson............................................ 882 Goldberg v. Hendrick........................................ 971 Goldblatt Bros., Scovill Mfg. Co. v........................ 970 Goldman, Bronner v.......................................... 933 Goldstein v. Commissioner.................................. 1005 Goldstein, Cree v........................................... 816 Goldstein, Murray v......................................... 816 Golson v. Illinois.......................................... 892 Gordon v. Worcester........................................ 1036 Government of Guam, Pacific Far East Line v............. 1002 Government of Virgin Islands, Marine Nat. Bk. v........... 903 Governor. See name of State. Grace Line v. Kanton....................................... 1007 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXI Page Graddy v. Tessel....................................... 885,954 Graham, Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v.............................. 889 Graham v. New York......................................... 922 Granade v. United States.................................. 1012 Grand Rapids, Lewis v...................................... 838 Granger v. Florida......................................... 993 Grant v. California....................................... 1016 Grant v. Florida........................................... 877 Grant v. School Dist. 61 of Baker County....,............. 1010 Grant County Planning Bd., Satanta School Dist. v........ 6 Graves v. California....................................... 883 Graves v. Kell-Dot Industries.............................. 842 Gray v. Kentucky........................................... 882 Gray v. U. S. Court of Appeals............................. 896 Grear v. Maxwell........................................... 893 Grear v. Ohio............................................. 1031 Great Dane Trailers, Labor Board v........................ 1000 Great Northern R. Co. v. Saskatchewan Minerals.............. 94 Greece v. Petrol Shipping Corp............................. 931 Green v. United States..................................... 905 Greene v. May.............................................. 805 Greene County Chancery Ct., Swindle v...................... 906 Greenhills, Greenhills Home Owners Corp, v................. 836 Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Greenhills................. 836 Greensboro Redevelop. Comm’n, Hagins v................ 952,1021 Greenville, McLaurin v.................................... 1011 Greenway v. United States.............................. 881,954 Greenwood & Majestic Co. v. Dist. of Columbia.............. 830 Greer, Kelly v............................................ 1035 Greer v. Morrison.......................................... 807 Gregg v. Montana........................................... 888 Gregoire v. National Bank of Alaska....................... 923 Gregory v. New York........................................ 893 Gregory v. United States.............................. 962,1029 Gremillion, Watson v...................................... 1018 Grene v. United States..................................... 978 Gresham v. Wilson.......................................... 805 Gretsinger v. Wilson....................................... 944 Griffin, Bd. of Supervisors of Prince Edward County v.... 960 Griffin v. Hendrick........................................ 981 Griffin, Taylor v......................................... 1016 Grills, Duddleston v....................................... 455 Grimes, In re............................................. 1035 Grossman v. Pearlman....................................... 890 XXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Grosso v. United States............................... 810,997 Groza v. Lemmon....................................... 876 Groza v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co...................... 883 Grubbs v. Oklahoma........................................ 873 Guam, Pacific Far East Line v............................ 1002 Gullo v. Lambert.......................................... 934 Gunston v. United States.............................. 893,964 Gural v. Homestead Constr. Co............................. 841 Gural v. Santella......................................... 841 Guy v. Tahash......................................... 12,1021 Guziak v. Federal Trade Comm’n........................... 1007 Haase, Ministers Life & Cas. Union v.................. 205,1033 Hackin v. Lockwood........................................ 960 Hagan v. Appellate Dept., Super. Ct. Cal.................. 823 Hagan v. Superior C ourt of Calif........................ 1025 Hagins v. Redeveloj . Comm’n......................... 952,1021 Haier v. United Stages.................................... 866 Haine v. United States.................................... 931 Halbert, Switzer v....................................... 1031 Hale, Taub v.............................................. 924 Hale-Alcazar Theatre, Taub v.............................. 924 Haley v. Wilson........................................... 806 Halko v. Anders* a........................................ 833 Hall v. Florida........................................... 950 Hall v. Mississippi........................................ 98 Hall v. New Yo.k.......................................... 879 Hamer, Campbell v......................................... 851 Hamilton v. Cleveland Bar Assn........................... 988 Hamilton v. Hamilton.................................... 924 Hamilton v. Kentucky.................................... 1014 Hamilton v. La Vallee.................................... 886 Hamlin v. California Adult Auth........................... 869 Hammond v. United States.................................. 918 Hampton v. Michigan....................................... 861 Hanchey, Rodriguez v...................................... 884 Harden v. Oregon.......................................... 902 Hardison v. Dunbar........................................ 944 Hardke v. California...................................... 994 Hardwick v. Field......................................... 976 Hare, Badgley v...................................... 114,1021 Harris v. Maroney.............................. 875,965 Harris v. Rhay.................................. 940 Harris v. Storie.................................. 865 Harris v. United States............................... 818,1010 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXIII Page Harrison, Masucci v........................................ 942 Hartford v. United States.............................. 883,954 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co..... 825 Haskell County Planning Bd., Satanta School Dist. v....... 96 Haskins, Gamble v......................................... 1042 Hatch v. Illinois.......................................... 862 Hatfield v. California Adult Auth.......................... 983 Hawkins v. Herold.......................................... 923 Hawkins v. North Carolina.................................. 949 Hayden, Warden v.................................... 926,985 Hayes v. Peyton............................................ 981 Haynes v. Rede ri A/S Aladdin............................. 1020 Hays v. California Adult Auth.............................. 862 Heath, Marathon Oil Co. v.............................. 824,953 Hegg v. United States.....................,................ 860 Heider v. Michigan Sugar Co............................ 362,1043 Heinze, Williams v......................................... 869 Heiberg v. United States.................................. 1010 Helman, Bradford v......................................... 15 Henderson, Wooten v........................................ 944 Hendrick, Goldberg v....................................... 971 Hendrick, Griffin v........................................ 981 Henry v. California........................................ 896 Henry Schein v. United States............................. 1009 Henson v. United States.................................... 974 Herlong-Sierra Homes v. United States...................... 919 Hernandez v. California.................................... 860 Herold, Hawkins v.......................................... 923 Herrera v. Wilson.......................................... 980 Herschel v. Wilson......................................... 973 Hiatt v. San Francisco Nat. Bk......................... 948,1021 Hickey v. United States.................................... 928 Higgins v. United States................................... 945 Higgins v. Washington...................................... 827 Highway Trailer Co., Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v......... 834 Hill, Time, Inc. v......................................... 374 Hilliard v. Texas..................................... 941,1021 Hillman v. Wainwright..................................... 1016 Hinton v. United States.................................... 878 Hite v. Holman............................................. 944 H. K. Porter Co. v. Labor Board............................ 851 Hoard v. Dutton........................................ 881,943 Hobbs v. Wilkins........................................... 879 Hodgdon v. United States.................................. 1029 233-653 0-67-3 XXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Hodges, Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v......................... 1011 Hoffa v. United States................................... 293 Hoffman v. Pennsylvania.................................. 942 Hogue v. United States................................... 940 Holguin v. California.................................... 961 Hollingshead v. Supreme Court of Florida................. 944 Hollins v. United States................................. 802 Holman, Adams v.......................................... 888 Holman, Andrews v.................................... 937,984 Holman, Cooper v......................................... 855 Holman, Edwards v..................................... 891 Holman v. Eklund......................................... 961 Holman, Glass v......................................... 1030 Holman, Hite v........................................... 944 Holman, Mills v.......................................... 806 Holman, Newsome v.................................... 1023 Holman, Singleton v..................................... 805 Holman, Smith v......................................... 1019 Holman, Varden v......................................... 805 Home Shipping Co. v. United States....................... 930 Homestead Constr. Co., Gural v........................... 841 Homestead Constr. Co., Wojton v.......................... 841 Honda v. Katzenbach...................................... 917 Hoover v. United States.................................. 822 Hopkins v. United States................................. 858 Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works................. 97 Horace Mann League, Board of Pub. Works v................. 97 Horne v. Peyton.......................................... 863 Horner, Ferron v......................................... 958 Home’s Market, Switzerland Cheese Assn, v................. 23 Horsley v. Simpson...................................... 1031 Horvath v. Milwaukee..................................... 970 Hot Shoppes, Inc., Williams v...................... 958 Housing Auth., Thorpe v.................................. 967 Houston Insulation Assn. v. Labor Board.................. 811 Houston Insulation Assn., Labor Board v.................. 811 Houston Oilers, Inc., Neely v........................ 840,942 Howard v. California..................................... 867 Howard v. Rhay....................................... 939,1031 Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co.................. 986 Howard, Smyth v.......................................... 988 Howard v. Yeager......................................... 859 Hughes v. Washington................................. 807,1000 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXV Page Hults, Kemp v......................................................... 17 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co............................ 1007 Hunt v. Oliver................................................... 904,954 Hunter v. New York............................................... 452,952 Hunter v. Prasse.................................................... 1012 Hurley v. Alexander.................................................. 994 Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp........................................ 821 Hurley v. Blackwell.................................................. 978 Hurley v. United States.............................................. 865 Hurst v. California.................................................. 873 Hurwitz, Directors Guild of America v................................ 971 Huskey v. California.............................................. 942 Hussey v. Utah.................................................... 854 Huston v. Kansas................................................. 999 Huston, McClellan v............................................... 13, 995 Hyde v. Maryland..................................................... 855 Hyde Constr. Co., Koehring Co. v..................................... 949 Hynning v. Partridge................................................. 922 Igel ■& Co., Converse v.............................................. 969 Illinois, Cain v.................................................... 1042 Illinois, Calcaterra v................................................. 7 Illinois, DeStefano v............................................ 821,989 Illinois, Golson v................................................... 892 Illinois, Hatch v.................................................... 862 Illinois, Krzyzewska v............................................... 893 Illinois, Marks v.................................................... 876 Illinois, McCray v.................................................. 1033 Illinois v. Michigan................................................. 996 Illinois, Michigan v................................................. 996 Illinois, Mitchell v................................................. 871 Illinois, Myers v................................................. 1019 Illinois, New York v................................................. 996 Illinois, Pierce v................................................... 876 Illinois, Pittman v.................................................. 854 Illinois, Reed v................................................. 10,964 Illinois, Richardson v............................................... 891 Illinois, Shockey v.................................................. 887 Illinois, Stacey v................................................... 998 Illinois, Walker v................................................... 859 Illinois, Wisconsin v................................................ 996 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co..................... 57 Illinois Central R. Co. v. United States.......................... 457 Illinois Dept, of Rev., National Bellas Hess v....................... 809 XXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Illinois Governor, Droste v.................................. 456 Illinois House of Rep. Comm’n, Maslowsky v................ 11,924 Illinois Power Co. v. Electrical Workers..................... 850 Immigration and Naturalization Service. See also Immigration Director. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Boutilier v........ 927 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico........... 214 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Lopez v........... 839 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Masucci v....... 886 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Plummer v....... 214 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Scott v............ 214 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Sherman v....... 276,924 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Woodby v............. 276 Immigration Director, Berenyi v.............................. 630 Indiana, Callahan v.......................................... 942 Indiana, Cichos v....................................... 76,1020 Indiana, McCrary v.......................................... 1016 Indiana, Noel v.............................................. 934 Indiana, Victor v............................................ 885 Indiana Lumbermens Ins. Co. v. Shorter....................... 972 Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n.......... 972 Indiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, New York C. R. Co. v...... 843 Industrial Electricians v. Labor Board....................... 975 Ingram v. Minnesota.......................................... 863 In re. See name of party. Insurance Comm’r, Ministers Life & Cas. Union v......... 205,1033 Insurance Co. of North America v. Keeling.................... 840 Internal Revenue Service. See also Commissioner. Internal Revenue Service, McGarry v.......................... 969 Internal Revenue Service, O’Donnell v........................ 969 International. For labor union, see name of trade. Interstate Com. Comm’n, Louisville & N. R. Co. v........... 830 Iowa, Entsminger v........................................... 804 Iowa District Court, Long v............................... 192 Iowa Sup. Ct., VanVoltenburg v............................... 807 Italian Line, Orsini v....................................... 874 Izzi v. Rezzolla........................................ 934,1021 Jackson, Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp, v....................... 803 Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co............................. 967 Jackson v. Page............................................ 854 Jackson v. Texas........................................... 938 Jackson v. United States................................ 825,877 Jackson v. Wilson.......................................... 998 Jacksonville Term. Co., Railroad Trainmen v.................. 935 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXVII Page Jacobson v. California........................................ 892 Jahn, Jones Coal Co. v........................................ 818 Jamaica Time Petroleum v. Federal Ins. Co.................. 1024 James v. California........................................... 905 Janovic v. Arizona......................................... 1036 Jantzen, Inc., Federal Trade Comm’n v......................... 810 J. C. Penney Co. v. Marston................................ 974 Jefferson v. Fay........................................... 1027 Jefferson v. Willingham.................................... 1018 Jefferson County Jury Bd., Billingsley v.................... 841 Jennings v. United States.................................. 1030 Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham............................... 889 Jimenez v. California...................................... 1028 John v. Field............................................... 805 John H. Eisele Co., Keller Pier Drilling Co. v.............. 839 Johnson, Branch v.......................................... 1003 Johnson v. California................................ 21,872,873 Johnson, Chilcutt v......................................... 871 Johnson v. Dunbar........................................... 906 Johnson, Eminente v......................................... 929 Johnson, Gentry v........................................... 884 Johnson v. NAACP.......................................... 820 Johnson v. New Jersey....................................... 890 Johnson v. New York......................................... 906 Johnson, Rucker v........................................... 941 Johnson v. United States................................ 857,976 Johnston, Giles v.......................................... 1020 Johnston, Rodriguez v...................................... 1020 Jolis v. New York........................................... 886 Jones, In re................................................ 866 Jones v. Assn, of the Bar of N. Y............................. 2 Jones v. Mancusi........................................ 992,1021 Jones v. Montana............................................ 952 Jones v. United States....... 868,885,913,936,954,984,1012,1014 Jones Coal Co. v. Jahn...................................... 818 Joplin v. Bohanon........................................... 808 Jordan v. Markley........................................... 924 Jordan v. Menomonee Falls..................................... 4 Jordan v. Weaver............................................ 844 Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. United States............... 37,1021 Juliano v. Ohio............................................. 893 Justice Department, Lopez v.............................. 839 Justice of N. Y. Sup. Ct., Bradford v................... 15,16,22 Kaelin v. University of Pittsburgh......................... 837 xxxvin TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Kahn v. Fox............................................... 935 Kahn v. United States................................. 948,984 Kansas, Huston v.......................................... 999 Kansas, Poulos v.......................................... 827 Kansas City, Kansas City Transit v....................... 1036 Kansas City Transit v. Kansas City....................... 1036 Kansas Hwy. Comm’n, Ray v................................. 820 Kanton, Grace Line v..................................... 1007 Kanzelberger v. Wisconsin................................. 867 Kastle v. Maroney......................................... 853 Katzenbach, Honda v....................................... 917 Katzenbach, Von Hardenberg v.............................. 828 Keeling, Insurance Co. of North America v................. 840 Keezer v. Tahash.......................................... 896 Kelberine v. Societe Internationale.................. 989,1044 Kelberine, Societe Internationale v....................... 989 Kell-Dot Industries, Graves v............................. 842 Kell-Dot Industries, Michiana Mills v..................... 842 Keller Pier Drilling Co. v. John H. Eisele Co............. 839 Kelly v. Baird............................................ 965 Kelly v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co........................ 1025 Kelly v. Greer........................................... 1035 Kelsey v. Corbett.......................................... 35 Kemp v. Hults.............................................. 17 Kent County Bd. of Education, Sailors v................... 966 Kentucky, Austin v...................................... 804 Kentucky, Banton v...................................... 879 Kentucky, Belk v..................................... 937,984 Kentucky, Benoit v...................................... 870 Kentucky, Bingham v..................................... 904 Kentucky, Chick v....................................... 977 Kentucky, Coles v....................................... 959 Kentucky, Davis v....................................... 831 Kentucky, Ferguson v.................................... 938 Kentucky, Gray v........................................ 882 Kentucky, Hamilton v................................... 1014 Kentucky, Kraus v....................................... 886 Kentucky, Levi v...................................... 956 Kentucky, Ohio v........................................ 803 Kentucky, Ramsey v...................................... 865 Kentucky, Thornsberry v................................. 868 Kentucky, Turner v...................................... 888 Kentucky, Warner v.................................. 858,885 Kentucky, Wheeler v..................................... 826 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXIX Page Kentucky, Yager v........................................ 1030 Keogh v. Washington Post Co.............................. 1011 Kerestes v. United States................................. 928 Kerner, Droste v........................................ 456 Kerrigan v. Scafati....................................... 953 Key v. Preston............................................ 881 Keyishian v. Board of Regents............................. 589 Kilgore, United States v.............................. 956,1033 Kindell v. Texas.......................................... 933 Kinderman v. Tahash....................................... 998 King v. California....................................... 923 King v. Florida......................................... 884 King v. Swenson...................................... 877,952 King v. United States................................ 293,867 King v. Vico Ins. Co................................. 841,983 King v. Wilson........................................... 1018 King County, Senfour Investment Co. v....................... 1 Kingdom of Greece v. Petrol Shipping Corp................. 931 King-Seeley Thermos Co., Tastee Freez Industries v....... 817 Kipfer, Perpetual Royalty Corp, v........................ 1025 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler................................... 450 Kirsner, Miami Beach v.................................... 920 Klein v. Klein....................................... 973,1032 Klein, Spevack v.......................................... 511 Klines v. Schneckloth..................................... 986 Klitzner v. Commissioner.................................. 928 Klopfer v. North Carolina................................. 916 Knoch, Skolnick v......................................... 999 Koehn v. Rhay............................................. 981 Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co........................... 949 Kohatsu v. United States.................................. 891 Kohlmeyer & Co., Rotwein v................................ 971 Kokin v. United States.................................... 987 Koiitch v. New York................................... 819,953 Kostal v. Colorado........................................ 939 Kraus v. Kentucky......................................... 886 Kronsbein v. Trustees of Schools of Township 3.............. 6 Kropp, Tsermengas v.................................. 805,943 Kroshinsky, Wolff v....................................... 981 Kruchten v. Arizona...................................... 1043 Kruidenier, McCulloch v................................... 851 Krzyzewska v. Illinois.................................... 893 Kyle v. Clerk, U. S. District Court....................... 979 Kyles v. Preston.......................................... 840 XL TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Labor Board v. Acme Industrial Co............................ 432 Labor Board, Aero Corp, v.................................... 973 Labor Board, Aircraft Specialties v.......................... 957 Labor Board v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co............... 810,943,1034 Labor Board, Ambrose Distrib. Co. v........................ 838 Labor Board, Brewton Fashions v.............................. 842 Labor Board v. C & C Plywood Corp............................ 421 Labor Board, Celotex Corp, v................................. 987 Labor Board, Checker Cab Co. v.............................. 1008 Labor Board, Columbus McKinnon Corp, v....................... 821 Labor Board, Dove Mfg. Co. v................................. 820 Labor Board, Electrical Workers v............................ 898 Labor Board v. General, Electric Co.......................... 533 Labor Board, Gerry, Inc. v............................... 820 Labor Board v. Great Dane Trailers.......................... 1000 Labor Board, H. K. Porter Co. v.............................. 851 Labor Board v. Houston Insulation Assn....................... 811 Labor Board, Houston Insulation Assn, v................... 811 Labor Board, Industrial Electricians v....................... 975 Labor Board, Mark J. Gerry, Inc. v........................... 820 Labor Board, Operating Engineers v.......................... 1004 Labor Board, Partin v.................................... 829,953 Labor Board, Poindexter v.................................... 857 Labor Board, Porter Co. v.................................... 851 Labor Board, Publishers’ Assn, of New York v................. 971 Labor Board, Sea-Land Service v.............................. 900 Labor Board, Sheridan Creations v........................... 1005 Labor Board, Sylvania Elec. Prods, v......................... 852 Labor Board, Teamsters v..................................... 929 Labor Board, Theatrical Stagehand Employees v................ 972 Labor Board, Winn-Dixie Stores v............................. 935 Labor union. See name of trade. La Burt, New York ex rel. Anonymous v......................... 936 Laine v. California........................................... 894 Laing v. Field.............................................. 1043 Laird & Co. v. Cheney........................................ 371 Lakas v. Wilson............................................. 1019 LaMacchio v. United States..........................;........ 992 LaManna v. California....................................... 1043 Lamb, Blau v................................................ 1002 Lambert, Gullo v.............................................. 934 Lambert Industries, American Infra-Red Co. v.................. 920 Lana v. New York.............................................. 904 Lancaster v. Fogliani......................................... 938 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XLI Page Lancey v. United States.................................... 922 Land v. Wainwright......................................... 896 Landman v. Peyton.......................................... 881 Landry, Simon v............................................ 838 Lane v. La Vallee.......................................... 950 Lane, Magee v.............................................. 840 Lane, Rogers v.......................................... 917 Lanier, Allstate Ins. Co. v. 930 La Peluso v. California.................................... 829 Lark v. United States...................................... 875 Larry & Katz v. Louisiana Board.............................. 8 Larry & Katz, Retail Liquor Dealers Assn, v................ 946 Lascher v. California...................................... 928 Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Hwy. Dept.................. 458 Lathan v. Breakey.......................................... 859 Latimer v. California...................................... 887 Laub, United States v...................................... 475 LaVallee, Alicea v......................................... 853 LaVallee, Hamilton v....................................... 886 LaVallee, Lane v........................................... 950 La Vergne v. California.................................... 938 Lawrence v. New York...................................... 1042 Lawrence v. Texas.......................................... 944 Layton v. Selb Mfg. Co................................ 929,1021 Leach v. United States..................................... 865 Lea County Elec. Coop. v. New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co...... 969 Leak v. Follette.......................................... 1015 Leary, Bookcase, Inc. v................................. 12,943 Ledbetter v. Utah.......................................... 922 Lee v. Copinger........................................... 1017 Lee, Rice v................................................ 977 Lee v. United States....................................... 947 Lee v. Wilson.............................................. 995 Lee County Dist. Ct., Webster v............................ 452 Leek v. Copinger........................................... 949 Lefkowitz, Schiller v...................................... 947 Lehman v. Frye............................................ 1015 Lejeune v. Louisiana....................................... 845 Lemmon, Groza v............................................ 876 Leser v. United States..................................... 802 Lester, Massengale v...................................... 1019 Lester v. United States................................... 1002 Lester v. Wilson.......................................... 1019 Levi v. Kentucky........................................... 956 XLII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp......................... 814 Levy v. Limandri............................................... 899 Levy v. United States.......................................... 832 Lewis v. Grand Rapids.......................................... 838 Lewis v. United States......................................... 206 Lifetime Siding v. United States............................... 921 Limandri, Levy v............................................... 899 Lindsey v. United States.................................... 1022 Lipsett Steel Prods, v. Mosley................................. 933 Lipshutz v. Mazer.............................................. 833 Littell v. Udall......................................... 1007 Little v. Oregon.......................................... 902 Little v. Rhay............................................ 96 Little v. United States.................................. 878,984 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lockwood, Hackin v........................................... 960 Lofland v. United States.................................... 1026 Lokey v. California.......................................... 888 Lombard v. United States..................................... 981 Long v. District Court of Iowa............................... 192 Lopez v. California.......................................... 891 Lopez v. Department of Justice............................... 839 Lopez v. McMann.............................................. 888 Loren Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Clark Mfg. Co.................... 957 Los Angeles, Southern Pac. Co. v............................. 647 Los Angeles County, Virtue Bros, v........................... 820 Louisiana, Bourg v........................................... 866 Louisiana, Brent v........................................... 992 Louisiana, Brown v........................................... 863 Louisiana, Christiana v................................... 835 Louisiana, Lejeune v........................................ 845 Louisiana, Ragsdale v....................................... 1029 Louisiana, Sharp v........................................... 818 Louisiana, Simpson v......................................... 892 Louisiana Alcoholic Bev. Bd., Larry & Katz v................... 8 Louisiana Alcoholic Bev. Bd., Reynolds v....................... 8 Louisiana Attorney General, Watson v........................ 1018 Louisiana Gas Serv. Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n.............. 833 Louisiana Medical Examiners, England v....................... 890 Louisiana Power & Light Co., Soape v......................... 970 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n............ 833 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n............. 830 Loving v. Virginia........................................... 986 Lowe v. Bailey............................................... 824 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XLIII Page Lucas v. United States.................................... 875 Lucky Lager Brewing Co., Walker Distrib. Co. v....... 976,1032 Lucom v. Atlantic Nat. Bk............................. 898,984 Ludwig v. Fay............................................. 940 Luna v. Field............................................. 801 Lutsky v. Lutsky.......................................... 952 Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., Jackson v.......................... 967 Lyles v. United States.................................... 952 Lyons v. Municipal Ct. of San Mateo County............... 1030 Lyons v. State Bar of Calif.............................. 1017 Mabe v. Pilson........................................ 884,954 Mac. See also Me. Mack v. Maxwell....................................... 906,984 Mackay, In re............................................. 890 MacKenzie v. Robbins...................................... 913 Macy, Stebbins v.......................................... 871 Maddaus v. New York....................................... 905 Madison Fund v. Commissioner............................. 1008 Madisonville Cab Co. v. Bur. of Unemployment Comp....... 959 Magdaleno v. California.................................. 876 Magee v. California....................................... 855 Magee v. Lane............................................. 840 Maguire v. United States.................................. 801 Maier Brewing Co., Fleischmann Distilling Corp, v....... 809 Maley, Chicago Cutter-Karcher v........................... 847 Malmstedt, In re.......................................... 976 Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S. S. Lines........................ 835 Mancusi, Furtak v..................................... 945,995 Mancusi, Jones v..................................... 992,1021 Mancusi, McCullough v..................................... 863 Mancusi, Moore v.......................................... 940 Mancusi, Senatore v....................................... 866 Mancusi, Stevenson v.................................. 864,939 Mandell, Spector, Rudolph Co. v. United States.......... 1008 Manderson v. New York..................................... 883 Mangel v. Florida......................................... 991 Manna v. United States.................................... 893 Marathon Oil Co. v. Heath............................. 824,953 Marchetti v. United States............................... 1000 Margeson v. United States................................. 830 Marienthal, Tietz v..................................... 8,964 Marina Mercante Nicaraguense v. McAllister Bros.......... 1005 Marin Bank v. England...................................... 99 Marine Nat. Exch. Bk. v. Virgin Islands................... 903 XLIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Maritime Union, Navios Corp, v........................... 900 Markiewicz, Contract Carriers v.......................... 828 Mark J. Gerry, Inc. v. Labor Board....................... 820 Markley, Jordan v........................................ 924 Marks v. Illinois........................................ 876 Marodis, Skrmetti v...................................... 979 Maroney, Berry v......................................... 860 Maroney, Harris v..................................... 875, 965 Maroney, Kastle v........................................ 853 Maroney, Nowakowski v.................................... 804 Maroney, Saddler v...................................... 1017 Maroney, Simcox v........................................ 865 Maroney, Storch v........................................ 941 Maroney, Wilson v........................................ 859 Maroscia v. Dispatch Printing Co......................... 991 Marquardt v. Texas....................................... 860 Marshall v. Oliver....................................... 945 Marshall v. Sawyer...................................... 1006 Marshall v. United States.............................. 815,964 Marston, J. C. Penney Co. v.............................. 974 Martin v. Commissioner................................... 920 Martin v. Phillips Pet. Co............................... 991 Martin v. Texas.......................................... 961 Martin v. United States................................. 1008 Martinez v. Wilson....................................... 852 Maryland, Allen v........................................ 940 Maryland, Daugherty v.................................... 859 Maryland, Dyson v....................................... 1017 Maryland, Hyde v......................................... 855 Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works v. Horace Mann League....... 97 Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, Horace Mann League v.............. 97 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Seminole Tribe...................... 918 Maryland Comptroller of Treas., Cree v................... 816 Maryland Comptroller of Treas., Murray v................. 816 Maryland for Use of Costas v. Atlantic Aviation Corp... 931 Maryland Governor, Whittle v......................... 806,964 Maslowsky v. Cassidy.................................. 11,924 Mason v. Biloxi.......................................... 370 Mason v. U. S. District Court............................ 999 Mason v. Wainwright...................................... 937 Massachusetts, Ballou v................................. 1031 Massachusetts, Chase v................................... 906 Massachusetts, Cook v.................................... 981 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XLV Page Massachusetts, Farrell v.................................. 836 Massachusetts, Mayer v.................................... 853 Massachusetts, Pratt v.................................... 836 Massachusetts Port Auth., E. W. Wiggins Airways v....... 947 Massengale v. Lester..................................... 1019 Massey v. Georgia.......................................... 36 Massey v. United States................................... 878 Massey v. Washington...................................... 904 Masters v. Stevens........................................ 864 Masterson v. United States................................ 833 Masucci v. Harrison....................................... 942 Masucci v. Immigration and Naturalization Service......... 886 Mathis v. California...................................... 857 Mathis v. Wainwright...................................... 995 Matlock v. United States.................................. 893 Matranga v. McDonnell...................................... 36 Maxfield v. United States............................. 830,964 Maxwell v. Bishop......................................... 650 Maxwell, Douglas v........................................ 858 Maxwell, Freeman v........................................ 896 Maxwell, Grear v.......................................... 893 Maxwell, Mack v......................................... 906,984 Maxwell, Trout v.......................................... 906 May, Boyden v.............................................. 15 May, Greene v............................................. 805 May v. Virginia........................................... 872 Maybee v. Weaver.......................................... 963 Mayer v. Massachusetts.................................... 853 Mayer, West Los Angeles Cancer Institute v............... 1010 Mayflower Congregational Church v. Berkaw................ 1035 Mayor of Dayton, Otto v................................... 930 Mayor of Tampa, Fair v.................................... 884 Mazer, Lipshutz v......................................... 833 Mazewski v. Rundle........................................ 845 Me. See also Mac. McAllister Bros., Marina Mercante Nicaraguense v......... 1005 McAllister Bros. v. Tankers & Tramps Corp................. 947 McAllister Bros., The El Salvador v...................... 1005 McCanna v. United States.................................. 879 McCastlain, Potts v....................................... 946 McClain v. Missouri...................................... 1016 McClellan v. Huston.................................... 13,995 McCloskey v. Boslow....................................... 951 XLVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page McClung v. Washington................................ 894 McConaghy v. McConaghy............................... 536 McCoy v. Preston.................................. 805,943 McCrary v. Indiana................................... 1016 McCray v. Illinois................................... 1033 McCulloch v. Kruidenier............................... 851 McCullough v. Mancusi................................. 863 McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys................ 990, 995 McCurdy v. Brown...................................... 903 McCutcheon v. Beto.................................... 963 McDonald v. United States............................. 936 McDonnell, Matranga v.................................. 36 McFaddin Express v. Adley Corp........................ 900 McGarry v. Riley...................................... 969 McGee, Ebell v....................................... 1017 McGill v. Ryals........................................ 19 McGinnis, Berry v..................................... 861 McGinnis v. United States............................. 831 McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co......... 919 McGregor v. New York.................................. 891 McInnes v. Port of New York Auth..................... 1006 McKenzie v. Tennessee................................. 880 McLaurin v. Greenville............................... 1011 McLeod v. General Electric Co......................... 533 McMann, Anthony v..................................... 888 McMann, Lopez v....................................... 888 McMann, Ward v........................................ 864 McMann, Williams v.................................... 866 McNellis, First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, v.............. 970 McNutt v. Texas...................................... 1043 McQuaid v. California................................. 648 Mead v. California.................................... 923 Meadows, Bates v...................................... 937 Meadows, Schack v..................................... 896 Medlin v. United States............................... 889 Medrano v. Wilson..................................... 894 Meeker, In re......................................... 449 Meier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co................. 875 Meister v. Wisconsin................................. 1005 Mene Grande Oil Co. v. Mobil Tankers Co............... 945 Menomonee Falls, Jordan v............................... 4 Mens Colony Supt., Rocha v............................ 866 Mersey v. United States............................... 831 Mesa v. Salt River Project Power Dist................ 1010 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XLVII Page Metcalf v. Pate............................................. 1042 Metcalfe v. United States.................................... 994 Meyer v. United States....................................... 837 Meyers, Wimberley v......................................... 1018 Miami Beach v. Kirsner....................................... 920 Michaels v. California....................................... 879 Michiana Mills v. Kell-Dot Industries........................ 842 Michigan, Coleman v......................................... 1030 Michigan, Hampton v.......................................... 861 Michigan v. Illinois......................................... 996 Michigan, Illinois v......................................... 996 Michigan Empl. Sec. Comm’n, General Motors Corp, v........ 373 Michigan Secretary of State, Badgley v.................. 114,1021 Michigan Sugar Co., Heider v............................ 362,1043 Milbradt v. Washington....................................... 905 Milk Drivers v. Old Dutch Farms.............................. 832 Miller v. Alabama........................................... 1043 Miller v. California......................................... 906 Miller v. Nebraska........................................... 917 Miller v. New York........................................... 878 Miller v. Ohio............................................... 874 Miller v. Oliver............................................. 917 Miller v. Udall......................................... 929,1021 Miller, Zschernig v.......................................... 998 Mills v. Florida............................................. 857 Mills v. Holman.............................................. 806 Millstein v. Co-ordinating Com. on Discipline............... 1026 Milwaukee, Horvath v......................................... 970 Milwaukee Braves, Wisconsin v........................... 990,1044 Milwaukee County, Oosterwyk v........................... 981,1021 Minchella v. Skillman Estate............................. 861,965 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase.................... 205,1033 Minnesota, Bosnich v......................................... 978 Minnesota, Ingram v.......................................... 863 Minnesota, Thompson v........................................ 817 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Norton Co. v................... 1005 Mississippi, Hall v........................................... 98 Mississippi, Powell v........................................ 845 Mississippi Governor v. NAACP................................ 820 Mississippi Milk Producers, Zero Mfg. Co. v.................. 841 Mississippi Power Co. v. South Miss. Power Assn.............. 823 Mississippi River Fuel Corp., Alleghany Corp, v.............. 814 Mississippi River Fuel Corp., Levin v........................ 814 Mississippi Valley Barge Co., Pittsburgh Towing Co. v..... 32,995 XLVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Missouri, Davis v......................................... 872 Missouri, McClain v..................................... 1016 Missouri ex rel. State Hwy. Comm’n, Cady v............... 204 Missouri Pac. R. Co., Suie v......................... 819,983 Missouri Secretary of State v. Preisler................. 450 Mitchell v. California............................... 978,981 Mitchell v. Fogliani..................................... 888 Mitchell v. Illinois..................................... 871 Mitchell v. Oliver....................................... 923 Mitchell Foods v. Rich Prods. Corp........................ 821 Mobil Tankers Co., Mene Grande Oil Co. v................. 945 Mohler v. United States.................................. 871 Moki Oil & Metals Co., United Nuclear Corp, v............ 960 Moliver v. Williams...................................... 845 Monastersky v. United States......................... 815,964 Mondakota Gas Co. v. Reed............................... 1005 Monning, Spindler Realty Corp, v......................... 975 Monon R. Co. v. United States............................ 457 Montalvo v. New Jersey............................. 886 Montana, Evans v......................................... 879 Montana, Gregg v......................................... 888 Montana, Jones v......................................... 952 Montana District Court, Sinfield v....................... 960 Montanaro v. United States............................... 920 Montante, Ortega v....................................... 999 Montauk Point, The Chemical Bk. N. Y. Tr. Co. v........ 921 Montayne v. Utah......................................... 939 Montellano v. California................................. 885 Montgomery v. Florida.................................... 892 Montgomery, Forman v..................................... 893 Montgomery v. Myers...................................... 963 Montrie v. Ohio.......................................... 918 Moody v. Flowers....................................... 966 Moore v. Georgia...................................... 1028 Moore v. Mancusi....................................... 940 Moore v. United States............................... 1001 Moore-McCormack Lines, Waldron v......................... 810 Moorman v. United States................................. 866 Morales, Garcia v........................................ 449 Morford v. Fogliani................................. 963,1021 Morgan, Atkins v......................................... 880 Morgan v. United States.................................. 893 Morgenthau, Weiss v.................................. 885, 965 Morris v. Attreau........................................ 832 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XLIX Page Morris, Fortson v............................. 231,955,986,1021 Morris v. Rousos........................................... 869 Morris v. West Virginia.................................... 891 Morrison, Greer v.......................................... 807 Morrison Milling Co. v. Freeman........................... 1024 Morris Park, Inc. v. Buck.................................... 2 Mosley, Cia. Mar. Adra v................................... 933 Mosley, Lipsett Steel Prods, v............................. 933 Motor Vehicles Comm’r, Kemp v............................... 17 Motte v. Ryan.............................................. 893 Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Highway Trailer Co........ 834 Mozley, Poly Industries v.................................. 958 Muckleshoot Indians v. United States....................... 847 Mueller v. Oliver.......................................... 864 Mulkey, Reitman v.......................................... 967 Mundt v. Zaluskey..................................... 871,1044 Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, Camara v................... 808 Municipal Ct. of San Mateo County, Lyons v................ 1030 Murphy, Flying Tiger Line v................................ 945 Murphy, Redden v........................................... 827 Murray v. Goldstein........................................ 816 Murray v. Wilson....................................... 896, 980 Musgrove v. Arizona........................................ 979 Muza v. California......................................... 850 Myers, Davis v........................................... 905 Myers v. Illinois......................................... 1019 Myers, Montgomery’ v....................................... 963 Nailor v. California...................................... 1030 Nailor v. New York........................................ 1015 Nash Miami Motors v. Commissioner.......................... 918 Nassau County, Roosevelt Raceway v......................... 453 NAACP, Johnson v........................................... 820 National Bank of Alaska, Gregoire v........................ 923 National Bellas Hess v. Dept, of Rev. of Ill............... 809 National Broadcasting Co., D’Amico v....................... 648 National Labor Relations Board. See Labor Board. National Maritime Union, Navios Corp, v.................... 900 National Mediation Board, Teamsters v...................... 929 National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch................. 948 National Screen Serv. Corp., U. S. Fid. & Gty. Co. v...... 958 Nave v. Seattle...........................................• 450 Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union.................... 900 Nealon v. United States.................................... 973 Nebraska, Miller v......................................... 917 233-653 0 - 67 -4 L TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Nebraska, Ninneman v....................................... 838 Nebraska Bar Assn., Nielsen v.............................. 983 Neely v. Houston Oilers, Inc........................... 840,942 Negin, Davis v............................................. 824 Nehring v. DeKalb.......................................... 453 Nena, Daskal v............................................. 874 Ness Produce Co., Short v.................................. 537 Neumann v. New York......................................... 13 Neumann, New York v......................................... 13 Nevada, Schnepp v.......................................... 939 Nevada Governor, Marshall v............................... 1006 Newark Ins. Co., Rafter v.................................. 828 Newell v. Page............................................ 1015 New England Motor Rate Bur. v. United States............... 203 New Hampshire, Titus v..................................... 941 Newhouse v. California................................. 922,984 New Jersey, Baldwin v...................................... 980 New Jersey, Bynum v........................................ 861 New Jersey, Csobor v...................................... 1027 New Jersey, Garrity v...................................... 493 New Jersey, Glazewski v.................................... 884 New Jersey, Johnson v...................................... 890 New Jersey, Montalvo v..................................... 886 New Jersey, Smith v........................................ 838 New Jersey, Taylor v....................................... 855 New Jersey, Trailor v...................................... 940 New Jersey, Wilson v....................................... 962 New Jersey, Wing v......................................... 960 New Jersey Dept, of Labor & Ind., Alexander v.............. 536 New Mexico, Carter v....................................... 873 New Mexico, Velasquez v.................................... 867 New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co., Lea County Elec. Coop, v..... 969 New Mexico Governor, Norton v.......................... 839 New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Community Serv. Co....... 933 New Orleans, Wainwright v................................. 1001 Newport News, Patterson v.................................. 650 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Evans v........ 959 Newsome v. Flowers........................................ 1015 Newsome v. Holman......................................... 1023 News Syndicate Co. v. Urbano............................... 831 Newton v. South Carolina Council of Milk Producers....... 934 New York, Abston v......................................... 867 New York, Alberti v........................................ 860 New York, Altruda v........................................ 875 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LI Page New York, Anderson v..................................... 879 New York, Arnone v...................................... 1003 New York, Baldwin-Hall, Inc. v........................... 818 New York, Berger v....................................... 967 New York, Berry v....................................... 1017 New York, Black v................................... 980,1044 New York, Bristol v...................................... 887 New York, Callahan v.................................... 1017 New York, Cameron v..................................... 1015 New York, Catanzaro v.................................... 875 New York, Christiansen v................................. 877 New York, Cohen v................................... 976,1032 New York, Collier v...................................... 869 New York, Combs v........................................ 878 New York, Cowan v........................................ 857 New York, DeFlumer v..................................... 892 New York, Delaware v................................. 895,964 New York, DeLeon v....................................... 877 New York, DiPalma v...................................... 864 New York, Dowdle v......................................... 7 New York, Dunleavy v..................................... 859 New York, Edwards v..................................... 1043 New York, Fanelli v...................................... 891 New York, Fein v......................................... 649 New York, Ferrante v....................................... 9 New York, Fields v...................................... 1031 New York, Graham v....................................... 922 New York, Gregory v...................................... 893 New York, Hall v......................................... 879 New York, Hunter v.................................... 452,952 New York v. Illinois..................................... 996 New York, Johnson v...................................... 906 New York, Jolis v........................................ 886 New York, Koiitch v.................................. 819, 953 New York, Lana v......................................... 904 New York, Lawrence v.................................... 1042 New York, Maddaus v...................................... 905 New York, Manderson v.................................... 883 New York, McGregor v..................................... 891 New York, Miller v....................................... 878 New York, Nailor v...................................... 1015 New York, Paduano v..................................... 1026 New York, Peace v....................................... 1032 New York, Pearlman v..................................... 881 LU TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page New York, Pearson v........................................ 863 New York, Pellicone v...................................... 883 New York, Pickett v........................................ 853 New York, Piracci v........................................ 904 New York, Piscitello v................................... 894 New York, Redrup v......................................... 804 New York, Robillard v...................................... 928 New York, Rodriguez v...................................... 802 New York, Roper v.......................................... 825 New York, Schildhaus v..................................... 906 New York, Simon v.......................................... 853 New York, Soviero v....................................... 1016 New York, Sprowal v........................................ 649 New York, Stevenson v.................................. 1042 New York, Stone v...................................... 1015 New York, Tarallo v.................................... 1031 New York, Turner v...................................... 917 New York, Walker v...................................... 864 New York, Williams v.................................... 881 New York, Witt v........................................ 862 New York Bar Assn., Jones v............................... 2 New York Bar Assn., Roehner v....................... 818,953 New York Bar Assn., Ungar v............................ 1006 New York Central R. Co., Chulick v..................... 1041 New York Central R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n.......... 843 New York City Comptroller, Federated Stores v.............. 454 New York ex rei. Anonymous v. La Burt...................... 936 New York Police Comm’r, Bookcase, Inc. v................ 12,943 New York Police Comm’r, Redden v........................ 827 New York State Bd. of Regents, Frank v.................. 815 New York State Bd. of Regents, Keyishian v.............. 589 New York Sup. Ct., Gilbert v............................ 847 New York Sup. Ct. Justice, Bradford v.............. 15,16,22 Nielsen v. Nebraska Bar Assn............................... 983 Ninneman v. Nebraska....................................... 838 Nixon v. Florida....................................... 853 Nixon v. United States.................................... 963 Noble v. Sigler....................................... 853 Noel v. Indiana............................................ 934 Nolan v. California..................................... 875 Nordstrom v. United States................................. 826 Norfolk, Carter v.......................................... 870 Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States..................... 919 Norfolk & W. R. Co., Calumet Harbor Terminals v........... 57 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LIII Page Norfolk & W. R. Co., Illinois Central R. Co. v............... 57 Norfolk & W. R. Co., United States v......................... 57 Norris v. United States................................. 871,943 North Carolina, Bennett v.................................. 1018 North Carolina, Cason v.................................... 1019 North Carolina, Hawkins v................................... 949 North Carolina, Klopfer v................................... 916 North Carolina, Virgil v.................................. 923 North Carolina Ins. Comm’r, Allstate Ins. Co. v............. 930 Northeastern Pennsylvania Bk. & Tr. Co. v. United States.... 967 Northern Illinois Gas Co., Wienrank v....................... 834 Norton v. Campbell.......................................... 839 Norton Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co................... 1005 Nowakowski v. Maroney....................................... 804 Nuccio, Fair v.............................................. 884 Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp.................................... 846 Oakes v. Rundle............................................. 865 Oberhauser, Spry v..................................... 940,995 O’Bryan v. Chandler......................................... 889 O’Connor v. Ohio............................................. 92 O’Connor v. United States................................... 870 O’Donnell, Schwaner v....................................... 837 O’Donnell v. Sullivan....................................... 969 Ogilvie, Townsend v......................................... 938 Ohio, Bellamy v............................................. 874 Ohio, Chamberlain v......................................... 844 Ohio, Grear v.............................................. 1031 Ohio, Juliano v............................................. 893 Ohio v. Kentucky............................................ 803 Ohio, Miller v.............................................. 874 Ohio, Montrie v............................................. 918 Ohio, O’Connor v............................................. 92 Ohio, Smith v............................................... 892 Ohio, Swiger v.............................................. 874 Ohio, United States v......................................... 9 Ohio, Werner v............................................. 1006 Ohio, Woodards v............................................ 930 Ohio Governor, Buchanan v..................................... 3 Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n, Canton v............................ 828 Ohio State Bar Assn., Rekeweg v............................. 988 Ohio Tax Comm’r, Continental Can Co. v...................... 946 Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner.............................. 928 Oklahoma, Cody v............................................ 979 Oklahoma, Gershon v......................................... 882 LIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Oklahoma, Grubbs v........................................... 873 Oklahoma City, Cooper v...................................... 898 Old Dutch Farms, Milk Drivers v.............................. 832 Old Dutch Farms, Teamsters v................................. 832 Olden v. Elgin............................................... 905 Oliver, Aguilar v............................................ 917 Oliver, Bickley v............................................ 891 Oliver, Chavez v.......................................... 861 Oliver, Cumpian v......................................... 863 Oliver, Finley v........................................ 862,1043 Oliver, Hunt v.......................................... 904,954 Oliver, Marshall v........................................ 945 Oliver, Miller v.......................................... 917 Oliver, Mitchell v........................................ 923 Oliver, Mueller v........................................ 864 Oliver, Perez v........................................... 884 Oliver, Ratten v.......................................... 861 Oliver, Sipult v.......................................... 998 Oliver v. United States................................. 904,1014 Oliver, Ward v............................................ 923 Oliver, Warnock v......................................... 886 Oliver, Wright v.......................................... 887 Omicini v. California........................................ 929 Oosterwyk v. County of Milwaukee........................ 981,1021 Opela v. United States....................................... 893 Operating Engineers v. Labor Board.......................... 1004 Order of Ry. Conductors, Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. v......... 1025 Ordman, Electrical Contractors Assn, v...................... 1026 Oregon, Foster v............................................ 1035 Oregon, Harden v............................................. 902 Oregon, Little v............................................. 902 Oregon Tax Comm’n, Cominco Prods, v.......................... 830 Orkin Exterminating Co., Capelouto v....................... 11, 964 Ornstein, Vassos v......................................... 840 Orsini v. Italian Line....................................... 874 Ortega, In re................................................ 926 Ortega v. Montante........................................... 999 Ortiz v. United States................................... 861,983 Osborn v. United States.................................. 323,804 Osborne v. California....................................... 1013 Otero, Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of P. R. v.................... 826 Otto v. Mayor of Dayton...................................... 930 Owings v. U. S. Court of Military Appeals.................... 893 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LV Page Oyler v. Attorney General.................................. 965 Pace, Sudan Oyster Co. v................................... 819 Pace, Venterella v......................................... 819 Pacelli v. United States............................... 948,957 Pace Marine Service, Sudan Oyster Co. v.................... 819 Pace Marine Service, Venterella v.......................... 819 Pacific Far East Line v. Government of Guam............... 1002 Pacific Greyhound Lines, Tarvin v.......................... 861 Pacific Maritime Assn., Williams v......................... 822 Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n............. 932 Pack, Zink v............................................... 987 Padilla v. California.................................. 880,953 Paduano v. New York....................................... 1026 Page, Jackson v............................................ 854 Page, Newell v............................................ 1015 Page, Walker v............................................. 963 Painter v. Bannister....................................... 949 Palmer v. Boies............................................ 854 Panczko v. United States.............................. 1009,1043 Parker v. Commissioner.................................... 1026 Parker v. Gladden.......................................... 363 Parker, Pope v............................................. 944 Parks v. United States..................................... 293 Partin v. Labor Board.................................. 829,953 Partridge, Hynning v....................................... 922 Passini v. United States.................................. 1024 Pate, Bennett v............................................ 965 Pate, DeVoney v............................................ 873 Pate, Metcalf v........................................... 1042 Pate, Walden v............................................. 892 Pate, Walker v............................................. 865 Patterson, Ballay v........................................ 862 Patterson v. Cruz.......................................... 975 Patterson v. Newport News.................................. 650 Patterson, Specht v..................................... 968, 997 Patterson v. Tennessee..................................... 870 Patterson, Watson v........................................ 876 Patuxent Institution Dir., Faulkner v...................... 869 Payton v. United States.................................... 993 Peace v. New York......................................... 1032 Peacock Records v. Checker Records........................ 1003 Pearlman, Grossman v....................................... 890 Pearlman v. New York....................................... 881 LVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Pearson v. New York........................................... 863 Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co................. 823 Peek v. United States......................................... 894 Pelletier v. United States.................................... 992 Pellicone v. New York......................................... 883 Pena v. California............................................ 883 Peninsular & Oriental Nav. Co., Chervy v..................... 1007 Penney .Co. v. Marston........................................ 974 Pennroad Corp. v. Commissioner............................... 1008 Pennsylvania, Alexander v................................ 1019 Pennsylvania, Byrd v.......................................... 886 Pennsylvania, Hoffman v....................................... 942 Pennsylvania, Sliva v...................................... 858,954 Pennsylvania, Slomanson v................................. 825 Pennsylvania, Wakin v.......................................... 14 Pennsylvania, Wirtshafter v................................. 854 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. American Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co.......... 1035 Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., Ruhl v................................. 998 Penn Township v. Yecko Bros................................... 826 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Columbia, Porter v................. 827 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of P. R. v. Otero..................... 826 Perez v. Oliver................................................ 884 Perpetual Royalty Corp. v. Kipfer......................... 1025 Perrea v. California........................................... 883 Petrol Shipping Corp., Greece v.............................. 931 Petteys, Blau v.............................................. 1006 Peyton, Braxton v.......................................... 939 Peyton, Coleman v.......................................... 905 Peyton, Gilmer v.............................................. 805 Peyton, Hayes v............................................... 981 Peyton, Home v................................................ 863 Peyton, Landman v............................................. 881 Peyton, Porter v.............................................. 941 Peyton v. Timmons............................................. 960 Pharr v. Bur. of Unemployment Comp, of Ohio................... 959 Phelper v. Decker.............................................. 18 Phillips Pet. Co., Martin v................................... 991 Pickett v. New York........................................... 853 Pierce v. Illinois............................................ 876 Pilson, Mabe v............................................ 884,954 Pioneer Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. United States................. 1022 Piracci v. New York........................................... 904 Piscitello v. New York........................................ 894 Pitchess, Sanchez v........................................... 806 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LVII Page Pittman v. Illinois......................................... 854 Pittsburgh Nat. Bk. v. Equitable Gas Co..................... 988 Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co....... 32,995 Pittsburgh University, Kaelin v............................. 837 Placid Oil Co. v. Union Prod. Co............................ 843 Plastic Contact Lens Co., Butterfield v.................... 1009 Plata v. United States...................................... 841 Plummer v. Immigration and Naturalization Service........... 214 Poindexter v. Labor Board................................... 857 Police Comm’r of New York, Bookcase, Inc. v.............. 12,943 Police Comm’r of New York, Redden v......................... 827 Polk County Auditor v. Kruidenier........................... 851 Poly Industries v. Mozley................................... 958 Pope v. Parker.............................................. 944 Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Columbia............... 827 Porter v. Peyton............................................ 941 Porter Co. v. Labor Board................................... 851 Port of New York Auth., McInnes v.......................... 1006 Postel, Bradford v........................................... 16 Postell v. Dunbar........................................... 864 Poster Exch., National Screen Serv. Corp, v................. 948 Pottawatomie Indians v. Udall............................... 831 Potts v. McCastlain........................................... 946 Poulos v. Kansas............................................ 827 Poulson v. Turner........................................... 905 Powell v. Mississippi....................................... 845 Power Commission. See Federal Power Comm’n. Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Indians v. Udall............... 831 Prasse, Edwards v............................................. 888 Prasse, Hunter v........................................... 1012 Pratt, Chafin v............................................. 878 Pratt v. Massachusetts........................................ 836 Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., Groza v....................... 883 Preformed Line Prods. Co., McGraw-Edison Co. v................ 919 Preisler, Kirkpatrick v..................................... 450 Preston, Key v................................................ 881 Preston, Kyles v............................................ 840 Preston, McCoy v..................................... 805,943 Preston, Whittington v...................................... 980 Price, Cummins v............................................ 869 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co................ 897 Primus v. Wainwright....................................... 1013 Prince Edward County Bd. of Supervisors v. Griffin........ 960 Procter & Gamble Co., Federal Trade Comm’n v................ 897 LVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Produce Transport Dispatch v. United States................ 115 Professional Golfers’ Assn., Deesen v................. 846,1032 Provident Nat. Bk., United States v....................... 1034 Prusa v. Cermak............................................ 1004 Public Serv. Comm’n of Ind., New York C. R. Co. v...... 843 Public Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States............. 816 Public Util. Comm’n of Ohio, Canton v.................... 828 Publishers’ Assn, of New York v. Labor Board............... 971 Pucetti, Skolnick v........................................ 942 Puerto Rico Sup. Ct., Santana v............................ 873 Pursche, Atlas Scraper & Eng. Co. v................... 846,1020 Putt v. United States...................................... 962 Pyles v. United States..................................... 994 Quinn, Gallagher v......................................... 881 Radford v. United States................................... 877 Rafter v. Newark Ins. Co................................... 828 Ragsdale v. Louisiana...................................... 1029 Railroad Trainmen, Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v............. 1000 Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Term. Co................. 935 Railroad Trainmen, Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar v...... 1027 Railroad Transfer Serv. v. Chicago..................... 810,996 Railway Conductors, Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. v............. 1025 Railway Trainmen, Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v................... 20 Rainwater v. Florida....................................... 944 Ralph v. Tidewater Constr. Corp............................ 931 Ramirez v. United States................................... 988 Ramseur v. Blackwell....................................... 993 Ramsey v. Kentucky......................................... 865 Randolph Hale-Alcazar Theatre, Taub v...................... 924 Random House, Rosemont Enterprises v...................... 1009 Ransom v. Florida.......................................... 951 Ratten v. Oliver........................................... 861 Rattikin, Sandoval v................................... 901,964 Ray v. Rhay................................................ 883 Ray v. State Hwy. Comm’n of Kansas......................... 820 Real Estate Examiners, Derritt v........................... 900 Redden v. Murphy........................................... 827 Rederi A/S Aladdin, Haynes v.............................. 1020 Redevelopment Comm’n, Hagins v........................ 952,1021 Redrup v. New York......................................... 804 Reed v. Beto........................................... 554,925 Reed v. Illinois........................................ 10,964 Reed, Mondakota Gas Co. v................................. 1005 Reese, In re............................................... 899 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LIX Page Reeves v. California....................................... 952 Register v. United States.................................. 817 Reimer v. Beto............................................. 888 Reimers v. Wisconsin....................................... 980 Reineke, Smith v........................................... 893 Reiss v. Swenson........................................... 859 Reitman v. Mulkey.......................................... 967 Rekeweg v. Ohio State Bar Assn............................. 988 Republic. See name of republic. Resor, Bond v.............................................. 874 Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Larry & Katz................ 946 Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Reynolds.................... 946 Reuss, Saunders v...................................... 925,984 Reyes v. Wainwright........................................ 997 Reynolds v. Louisiana Alcoholic Bev. Bd...................... 8 Reynolds, Retail Liquor Dealers Assn, v.................... 946 Rezzolla, Izzi v...................................... 934,1021 Rhay, Booth v.............................................. 936 Rhay, Cambridge v.......................................... 857 Rhay, Cerny v.............................................. 939 Rhay, Friend v............................................ 1018 Rhay, Harris v............................................. 940 Rhay, Howard v........................................ 939,1031 Rhay, Koehn v.............................................. 981 Rhay, Little v.............................................. 96 Rhay, Ray v................................................ 883 Rhay, Stiltner v...................................... 941,1044 Rhay, Woods v.............................................. 905 Rhodes, Buchanan v........................................... 3 Rice v. Lee................................................ 977 Richardson v. Illinois..................................... 891 Richardson v. United States................................ 844 Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Cudmore v....................... 1003 Rich Co., Charles A. Wright, Inc. v........................ 890 Richfield Oil Corp., Eldridge v........................... 1020 Richmond Professional Inst. Pres., Marshall v.............. 945 Rich Prods. Corp., Mitchell Foods v...................... 821 Rickey v. United States.................................... 835 Riley v. Bingham........................................... 974 Riley v. California........................................ 892 Riley, McGarry v........................ .................. 969 Riojas v. Utah............................................. 951 Rivera v. United States............................... 938,1032 Rivers v. Supreme Court of Tennessee....................... 980 LX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Roach v. Georgia.......................................... 935 Robbins, Chase v.......................................... 889 Robbins, MacKenzie v.................................. 913 Roberts v. Florida........................................ 869 Roberts v. Warden......................................... 876 Robillard v. New York..................................... 928 Robinson v. United States............................. 889,1009 Rocha v. Mens Colony Supt................................. 866 Rockford Trades Council, Suburban Tile Center v........... 890 Rodgers v. Eyman.......................................... 881 Rodgers v. United States.................................. 993 Rodriguez v. California................................... 951 Rodriguez, California v................................... 951 Rodriguez v. Hanchey...................................... 884 Rodriguez v. Johnston.................................... 1020 Rodriguez v. New York..................................... 802 Roehner v. Assn, of the Bar of N. Y................... 818,953 Rogers v. Lane............................................ 917 Rohlsen, Volkswagen Interamericana v.............. 919 Romano v. Follette....................................... 1020 Roos, Spiesel v........................................ 16,939 Roosevelt Raceway v. County of Nassau..................... 453 Roper v. New York......................................... 825 Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House..................... 1009 Ross v. California........................................ 892 Rotwein v. Kohlmeyer & Co............................. 971 Rougeron v. Rougeron.................................. 899 Rousos, Morris v...................................... 869 Royal Netherlands S. S. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co...... 1004 Royal Netherlands S. S. Co., Strachan Shipping Co. v..... 1004 Rucker v. Johnson..................................... 941 Ruhl v. Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania................... 998 Ruiz v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Gen. Sessions............ 916 Rule v. United States................................ 1018 Rummler v. Spelio..................................... 841 Rundle, Mazewski v..................................... 845 Rundle, Oakes v....................................... 865 Rundle, Walker v..................................... 1030 Rural Elec. Adm., Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v....... 815,964 Rush, Cargo Ships & Tankers v......................... 842 Rusk, Afroyim v....................................... 917 Ruskin v. United States............................... 828,964 Russ v. United States................................. 923 Russell, Cole v.......................................... 853 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXI Page Russell, Smith v......................................... 876 Ruth v. Blue River Constructors...................... 920,984 Rutherford v. United States............................ 987,1043 Ryals, McGill v......................................... 19 Ryan, Electrical Workers v............................. 935 Ryan, Motte v.......................................... 893 Ryan, Smith v.......................................... 875 Rybar v. Wilson........................................ 873 Saddler v. Maroney.................................... 1017 Sagansky v. United States.............................. 816 Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County............... 966 St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., Howard v............... 986 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. United States.................... 457 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., Tanos v......................... 971 Saib v. United States...................................... 974 Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States.................. 921 Salt River Project Power Dist., Mesa v.................... 1010 Sanchez v. Pitchess........................................ 806 Sandoval v. Rattikin................................... 901,964 San Francisco Mun. Ct., Camara v........................... 808 San Francisco Nat. Bk., Hiatt v........................ 948,1021 San Mateo County Clerk, Cross v........................ 14,964 San Mateo County Municipal Ct., Lyons v................... 1030 Santana v. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.................... 873 Santana v. United States................................... 848 Santella, Gural v.......................................... 841 Santella, Wojton v......................................... 841 Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bk. of N. Y..................... 898 Saskatchewan Minerals, Great Northern R. Co. v.............. 94 Saskatchewan Minerals, United States v...................... 94 Sasser v. United States.................................... 883 Satanta School Dist. 2 v. Grant County Bd.................... 6 Satanta School Dist. 2 v. Haskell County Bd................. 96 Saunders v. Reuss...................................... 925,984 Saverio v. Carter.......................................... 851 Sawyer, Marshall v........................................ 1006 Saxon v. Commercial Sec. Bk................................ 252 Scafati, Kerrigan v........................................ 953 Schabert v. United States.................................. 919 Schack v. Florida.......................................... 887 Schack v. Meadows.......................................... 896 Schawartzberg v. United States..................... 868,948,984 Schein v. United States................................... 1009 Schiffer v. United States.................................. 890 LXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Schildhaus v. New York................................... 906 Schiller v. Lefkowitz.................................... 947 Schipani v. United States........................... 372,934,965 Schlette v. California................................... 891 Schlitz Brewing Co. v. United States.................... 37,1021 Schneckloth, Fontana v................................... 998 Schneckloth, Klines v.................................... 986 Schnepp v. Nevada........................................ 939 School Dist. 61 of Baker County, Grant v................... 1010 Schultz v. United States................................. 977 Schutzbank v. Elliott.................................... 829 Schwaner v. O’Donnell....................................... 837 Schwartz v. Eaton........................................... 921 Scott v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bk........................... 882 Scott v. Dawkins............................................ 999 Scott v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.......... 214 Scott v. United States.................................. 862,1012 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Goldblatt Bros....................... 970 Scranton v. United States................................... 996 Sea-Land Serv. v. Labor Board............................... 900 Searoad Shipping Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co....... 973 Seattle, Nave v............................................. 450 Seattle, See v.............................................. 808 Sebring v. Texas............................................ 882 Second Nat. Bk. of New Haven v. United States............... 966 Secretary of Air Force, McCurdy v........................... 903 Secretary of Air Force, Tuggle v............................ 941 Secretary of Army, Bond v................................... 874 Secretary of HEW, Brunette Cheese Mfg. Corp, v............. 827 Secretary of HEW, Gee v.................................... 856 Secretary of HEW v. Toilet Goods Assn...................... 813 Secretary of HEW, Toilet Goods Assn, v..................... 813 Secretary of Interior v. Fed. Power Comm’n................. 927 Secretary of Interior, Littell v.......................... 1007 Secretary of Interior, Miller v........................ 929,1021 Secretary of Interior, Pottawatomie Indians v............... 831 Secretary of Labor, Sullivan v.............................. 852 Secretary of State, Afroyim v............................... 917 Secretary of State of Cal. v. Weaver........................ 844 Secretary of State of Fla., Swann v............. 440,808,944,997 Secretary of State of Ga. v. Morris............ 231,955,986,1021 Secretary of State of Mich., Badgley v................. 114,1021 Secretary of State of Mo. v. Preisler....................... 450 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXIII Page Securities and Exch. Comm’n v. United Benefit Ins....... 918,1022 See v. Seattle............................................... 808 Selb Mfg. Co., Layton v.............................. 929,1021 Sellers, Brennan v....................................... 828,984 Seminole Tribe, Maryland Cas. Co. v.......................... 918 Semple, Weldon v............................................. 826 Senatore v. Mancusi.......................................... 866 Senfour Investment Co. v. King County.......................... 1 Sesler v. Florida............................:........... 805,965 Shaffer, Williams v......................................... 1037 Shannon v. Baird............................................. 965 Shannon v. Gladden........................................... 950 Sharff v. United States...................................... 974 Sharp v. Louisiana........................................... 818 Sharp v. United States....................................... 864 Sheet Metal Workers v. Aetna Steel Prods. Corp............... 839 Shell Oil Co., Addessi v..................................... 970 Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n....................... 1002 Sheridan v. Alabama......................................... 1019 Sheridan Creations v. Labor Board........................... 1005 Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service....... 276,924 Shipp v. Supreme Court of California......................... 925 Shipp v. United States....................................... 903 Shobe v. California.......................................... 887 Shockey v. Illinois.......................................... 887 Short v. Ness Produce Co..................................... 537 Shorter, Indiana Lumbermens Ins. Co. v....................... 972 Shott v. Conroy.............................................. 969 Shott v. Tehan.............................................. 1012 Sigler, Noble v.............................................. 853 Simcox v. Maroney............................................ 865 Simmons v. Wainwright........................................ 806 Simon v. Landry.............................................. 838 Simon v. New York............................................ 853 Simpson, Horsley v.......................................... 1031 Simpson v. Louisiana......................................... 892 Simpson v. U. S. District Court.............................. 806 Sims v. Georgia.............................................. 538 Sinfield v. District Court of Montana........................ 960 Singleton v. Holman.......................................... 805 Sipes, Vaca v......................................... 895,925 Sipult v. Oliver............................................. 998 Sisneros v. Cox.............................................. 856 LXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Sitton v. American Title Co........................... 975,1033 Skillman Estate, Minchella v........................... 861,965 Skolnick v. Knoch.......................................... 999 Skolnick v. Pucetti........................................ 942 Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Spanos........................... 987 Skrmetti v. Marodis........................................ 979 Sliva v. Pennsylvania.................................. 858,954 Slomanson v. Pennsylvania.................................. 825 Smalls v. United States................................... 1027 Smith v. Arkansas.......................................... 980 Smith v. Brown............................................. 889 Smith v. California....................................... 1042 Smith v. Cavell............................................ 938 Smith v. Eyman............................................ 1017 Smith v. Holman........................................... 1019 Smith v. New Jersey........................................ 838 Smith v. Ohio.............................................. 892 Smith v. Reincke........................................... 893 Smith v. Russell........................................... 876 Smith v. Ryan.............................................. 875 Smith v. Stanley........................................... 999 Smith v. Texas............................................. 816 Smith v. Union Oil Co...................................... 931 Smith v. United States................................. 820,1017 Smith, Von Clemm v......................................... 975 Smith Mfg. Co. v. United States........................... 1003 Smyth v. Howard............................................ 988 Snead v. Warden............................................ 872 Sniedzins v. United States................................. 937 Snow v. Wainwright......................................... 926 Soape v. Louisiana Power & Light Co........................ 970 Societe Internationale v. Kelberine........................ 989 Societe Internationale, Kelberine v.................... 989,1044 Solis v. California....................................... 1015 Sopher v. United States.................................... 928 South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Newton v........ 934 Southern Calif. Edison Co. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co......... 985 Southern Pac. Co., Bafico v............................... 1025 Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles........................... 647 Southern Pac. Co., Switchmen’s Union v..................... 803 Southern R. Co., Swacker v................................. 837 Southern R. Co., Walker v............................. 196,1020 South Miss. Power Assn., Miss. Power Co. v................. 823 Soviero v. New York....................................... 1016 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXV Page Spanos, Skouras Theatres Corp, v............................. 987 Spears v. California......................................... 860 Specht v. Patterson...................................... 968,997 Spelio, Rummler v............................................ 841 Spence v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co............................... 946 Spencer v. Texas......................................... 554,896 Spevack v. Klein............................................. 511 Spiegle v. Beach Haven....................................... 831 Spiesel v. Roos........................................... 16,939 Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning............................. 975 Splitt v. United States..................................... 1019 Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. v. Railway Conductors............... 1025 Sprenz v. United States...................................... 962 Sprowal v. New York.......................................... 649 Spry v. Oberhauser....................................... 940,995 Stacey v. Illinois........................................... 998 Stalcup v. Tennessee......................................... 880 Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. v. Fulton......................... 802 Standard Oil Co., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v................... 1007 Stanley, Smith v............................................. 999 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Calif., Lyons v................................ 1017 State Bd. of Hairdressers, Vance v........................... 959 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire........................ 811 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., Meier v....................... 875 State Hwy. Comm’n of Kansas, Ray v........................... 820 State Hwy. Comm’n of Mo., Cady v............................. 204 State Loan & Fin. Corp. v. American Plan Corp............... 1011 Stayner v. United States.................................... 1004 Stebbins v. Macy............................................. 871 Steelworkers v. United States............................... 1036 Stein v. United States....................................... 934 Steppe v. Florida........................................... 1031 Stevens, Masters v........................................... 861 Stevens v. Warden........................................... 1031 Stevenson v. Mancusi..................................... 864,939 Stevenson v. New York....................................... 1042 Stevenson v. Warden.......................................... 860 Stewart, California v........................................ 890 Stidger, Commissioner v.................................. 809,925 Stidham v. Swenson........................................... 951 Stiltner v. Rhay........................................ 941,1044 Stiltner v. Washington....................................... 886 Stinson v. United States..................................... 859 233-653 0-67-5 LXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Stone v. New York......................................... 1015 Storch v. Maroney............................................ 941 Storie, Harris v............................................. 865 Strachan Shipping Co. v. Royal Netherlands S. S. Co...... 1004 Strachan Shipping Co., Royal Netherlands S. S. Co. v..... 1004 Strand, Black v....................................... 805, 990 Strauss v. United States................................... 989 Suburban Tile Center v. Rockford Trades Council............ 890 Sudan Oyster Co. v. Pace................................... 819 Sudan Oyster Co. v. Pace Marine Serv....................... 819 Suffolk County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bianchi.......... 966,1023 Sule v. Missouri Pac. R. Co............................ 819,983 Sullivan, O’Donnell v...................................... 969 Sullivan v. Wirtz.......................................... 852 Summons v. California...................................... 872 Sunflower County Circuit Clerk v. Hamer.................... 851 Superintendent of Boston State Hosp., Bane v............. 842 Superior Court of Calif, v. First Nat. Bk. of Oakland.... 829 Superior Court of Calif., Glouner v........................ 451 Superior Court of Calif., Hagan v..................... 823,1025 Supreme Court of Calif., Shipp v........................... 925 Supreme Court of Fla., Hollingshead v...................... 944 Supreme Court of Iowa, VanVoltenburg v..................... 807 Supreme Court of N. Y., Gilbert v.......................... 847 Supreme Court of N. Y. Justice, Bradford v.... 15,16,22 Supreme Court of Pa., Ruhl v............................... 998 Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Santana v.................... 873 Supreme Court of Tennessee, Rivers v....................... 980 Sutton v. United States................................... 1014 Swacker v. Southern R. Co.................................. 837 Swann v. Adams................................. 440,808,944,997 Swenson, Davis v........................................... 866 Swenson, King v.......................................... 877,952 Swenson, Reiss v........................................... 859 Swenson, Stidham v......................................... 951 Swift & Co. v. Wickham.................................... 1036 Swiger v. Ohio............................................. 874 Swindle v. Chancery Court of Greene County................. 906 Switchmen’s Union v. Southern Pac. Co...................... 803 Switzer v. California...................................... 871 Switzer v. Halbert........................................ 1031 Switzerland Cheese Assn. v. E. Horne’s Mkt.................. 23 Sylvania Elec. Prods, v. Labor Board....................... 852 Taft v. United States...................................... 835 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXVII Page Tahash, Anderson v.......................................... 880 Tahash, Guy v........................................... 12,1021 Tahash, Keezer v............................................ 896 Tahash, Kinderman v......................................... 998 Talbot v. California....................................... 1015 Tampa Mayor, Fair v......................................... 884 Tankers & Tramps Corp., McAllister Bros, v.................. 947 Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co........................... 971 Tarallo v. New York........................................ 1031 Tarvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines.......................... 861 Tashire, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v....................... 811 Tastee Freez Industries v. King-Seeley Thermos Co........ 817 Taub v. Hale................................................ 924 Taub v. Randolph Hale-Alcazar Theatre...................... 924 Tawes, Whittle v........................................ 806,964 Tax Comm’r of Ohio, Continental Can Co. v................... 946 Taylor v. California....................................... 962 Taylor v. Griffin........................................ 1016 Taylor v. New Jersey....................................... 855 Taylor, Treffry v............................................ 10 Taylor v. United States.................................... 806 Teamsters, Bedford-Nugent Corp, v........................ 821 Teamsters v. Labor Board.................................... 929 Teamsters v. National Mediation Bd.......................... 929 Teamsters v. Old Dutch Farms................................ 832 Teamsters v. United States................................... 38 Tehan, Shott v............................................. 1012 Telephone Workers v. Telephone Workers.................... 947 Tennessee, Clarke v......................................... 942 Tennessee, Copeland v..................................... 880 Tennessee, McKenzie v.................................... 880 Tennessee, Patterson v..................................... 870 Tennessee, Stalcup v........................................ 880 Tennessee, Van Zandt v.................................... 884 Tennessee, Webb v........................................... 825 Tennessee Supreme Court, Rivers v........................... 980 Terry v. United States..................................... 1029 Tessel, Graddy v......................................... 885,954 Texas, Bell v.............................................. 554 Texas, Bennett v........................................... 892 Texas, Bryant v............................................ 858 Texas, Burris v............................................ 979 Texas, Carroll v........................................... 903 Texas, Chevallier v........................................ 891 LXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Texas, Clark v........................................... 1011 Texas, Clemons v.......................................... 894 Texas, Clewis v....................................... 814,944 Texas, Delespine v........................................ 893 Texas, Double Eagle Lubricants v.......................... 890 Texas, Hilliard v.................................... 941,1021 Texas, Jackson v.......................................... 938 Texas, Kindell v.......................................... 933 Texas, Lawrence v......................................... 944 Texas, Marquardt v........................................ 860 Texas, Martin v......................................... 961 Texas, McNutt v.......................................... 1043 Texas, Sebring v.......................................... 882 Texas, Smith v............................................ 816 Texas, Spencer v....................................... 554,896 Texas, Walker v........................................... 864 Texas, Washington v....................................... 812 Texas Ct. Crim. App. Judges, Greer v...................... 807 Theatrical Stagehand Employees v. Labor Board............. 972 Thibodeau v. United States............................... 1028 Thomas v. Burke........................................ 963 Thomas v. California.................................. 1030 Thomas v. Florida...................................... 992 Thomas, Worrell v....................................... 805 Thompson v. Minnesota..................................... 817 Thornsberry v. Kentucky................................... 868 Thorpe v. Housing Auth.................................... 967 Tidewater Constr. Corp., Ralph v........................ 931 Tietz v. Marienthal..................................... 8,964 Tillis v. Arizona........................................ 877 Time, Inc. v. Hill........................................ 374 Timmons, Peyton v......................................... 960 Titus v. New Hampshire.................................. 941 Todd v. United States..................................... 994 Todd v. Visentine......................................... 965 Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner............................. 813 Toilet Goods Assn., Gardner v............................. 813 Toledo Blade Co., Driscoll v......................... 948,1021 Toledo Civil Serv. Comm’n, Genite v....................... 947 Tomaiolo v. United States................................. 906 Torres v. Wilson......................................... 1015 Townsend v. Ogilvie....................................... 938 Township. See also name of township. Township Three School Trustees, Kronsbein v................. 6 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXIX Page Tracy, Dana v............................................. 941 Trade Commission. See Federal Trade Comm’n. Trailor v. New Jersey..................................... 940 Transit Union v. United States............................. 38 Transportation-Com. Union v. Union Pac. R. Co......... 157,1032 Trans World Airlines, Campbell v.......................... 824 Travers v. United States.................................. 834 Travis v. United States............................... 491,885 Traynor, Bogart v......................................... 451 Treasurer of the United States, Von Clemm v............... 975 Treffry v. Taylor.......................................... 10 Troiano v. United States.................................. 958 Trout v. Maxwell.......................................... 906 Trustees of Schools of Township Three, Kronsbein v....... 6 Tsermengas v. Kropp................................... 805,943 Tucker v. Field................................... 986 Tucker v. United States................................... 801 Tuggle v. Brown................................... 941 Tug Russell, The, Marina Mercante Nicaraguense v......... 1005 Turner v. Kentucky................................... 888 Turner v. New York................................... 917 Turner, Poulson v......................................... 905 Tumey v. Arkansas......................................... 844 Tyree v. United States.................................... 871 Udall v. Fed. Power Comm’n................................ 927 Udall, Littell v......................................... 1007 Udall, Miller v...................................... 929,1021 Udall, Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Indians v............. 831 Uhlhorn v. U. S. Gypsum Co.................... 1026 Ungar v. Assn, of the Bar of N. Y........................ 1006 Unger v. United States.................................... 814 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Barge Line Corp. v. Allen.................. 1006 Union Free School Dist. No. 7, Davis v.................... 807 Union Oil Co., Smith v.................................... 931 Union Pac. R. Co., Transportation-Com. Union v........ 157,1032 Union Prod. Co., Placid Oil Co. v......................... 843 Union Tank Car Co. v. Dragor Shipping Corp................ 831 Union Tank Car Co. v. Ward Industries Corp................ 831 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Benefit Ins., Securities and Exch. Comm’n v.... 918,1022 United Gas Pipe Line v. Fed. Power Comm’n.................. 83 United Nuclear Corp. v. Moki Oil & Metals Co.............. 960 United Services Life Ins. Co., Delaney v................ 846,943 LXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co........................ 138,1032 United States, Aday v........................................... 984 United States, Akerson v........................................ 946 United States, Alexander v....................................... 977 United States, Allan Drug Corp, v............................... 899 United States, Allen v.......................................... 832 United States, Altieri v........................................ 835 United States, Anderson v....................................... 840 United States, Andre v......................................... 1001 United States, Andreadis v..................................... 1001 United States, A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v........................... 1003 United States, Ard v............................................ 863 United States, Ardner v......................................... 884 United States, Arellanes v...................................... 870 United States, Armone v......................................... 957 United States, A. W. Fenton Co. v.................................. 970 United States, Baker v.................................... 869, 950, 986 United States, Baldwin v.......................................... 1014 United States, Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v............................... 3 United States, Banzer v......................................... 1009 United States, Barkan v......................................... 882 United States, Barrett v....................................... 1001 United States, Barrow v........................................ 1001 United States, Battaglia v...................................... 115 United States, Baxter v.......................................... 834 United States, Bearden v........................................ 856 United States, Bellard v........................................ 856 United States, Bennett v.................................... 4,903 United States, Benson v......................................... 831 United States, Bentvena v.................................. 815,964 United States, Bernard v...................................... 867 United States, Bey v........................................... 905,984 United States, Black v.............................................. 26 United States, Bloomfield S. S. Co. v............................. 1004 United States, Bonomo v...................................... 879 United States, Bottone v....................................... 974 United States, Bowe v.............................................. 961 United States, Boyden v........................................ 978,1021 United States, Bradley v...................................... 878 United States, Brown v........................................ 1028 United States, Bruni v.................................... 821,826 United States, Bryans v....................................... 808 United States, Buatte v....................................... 856 United States, Bynum v........................................ 867 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXXI Page United States, Cachoian v................................... 1029 United States, Calzavara v................................... 991 United States, Campbell v........................... 293, 922,973 United States, Campos v...................................... 842 United States, Cantrell v................................ 937 United States, Carbo v.................................. 823 United States, Caruso v...................................... 862 United States, Casados v..................................... 869 United States, Casavina v................................... 1006 United States, Cedillo v................................. 805, 954 United States, Cipres v.................................... 826 United States, Clark v.................................... 817 United States, Coates v................................... 1010 United States, Cohen v................................ 957,1035 United States, Colbert v................................... 855, 954 United States, Cole v...................................... 1027 United States, Colella v.................................... 829 United States, Collier v................................. 977,1042 United States, Comley v................................. 885,943 United States, Compton v.................................... 956 United States, Confederated Tribes v....................... 921 United States, Conole v................................. 1025 United States, Coon v....................................... 873 United States, Cooper v............................:....... 1030 United States, Cosmic, The v............................ 930 United States, Cote v....................................... 883 United States, Creamer v.................................... 819 United States, Creighton v.................................. 872 United States, Crown Coat Front Co. v................. 811 United States, Cupo v.................................... 1013 United States, Curry v.................................... 873 United States, D’Antonio v................................ 900 United States, Daughtry v............................... 881,965 United States, Davis v................................... 868, 927 United States, DeAlesandro v.............................. 842 United States, DeAngelis v................................ 834 United States, Del Monico v............................... 815 United States, DeMaro v.................................. 1032 United States v. Demko.................................... 149 United States, Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v.............. 897,1034 United States, Department of Employment v................. 355 United States, D’Ercole v............................... 995,1032 United States, Diaz-Rosendo v............................. 856 United States, D. I. Operating Co. v..................... 1024 LXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page United States, Doctor v........................................... 818 United States, Drummond v......................................... 892 United States, Duke Power Co. v.................................. 1025 United States, Duval v........................................ 876,951 United States, Edlin v............................................ 846 United States, Edwards v.......................................... 994 United States, Elbel v........................................... 1014 United States, Emerson Institute v................................ 822 United States, Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v........................... 914 United States, Evans v........................................ 863,951 United States, Exley Express v.................................... 371 United States, Fabian v........................................... 821 United States v. Fabrizio..................................... 263,894 United States, Fauls v............................................ 904 United States, Fenton Co. v....................................... 970 United States, Femicola v..................................... 836,964 United States v. First City Nat. Bk. of Houston............. 1023,1033 United States, Fisher v....................................... 819,920 United States, Fleishour v........................................ 987 United States, Floyd & Beasley Transfer Co. v..................... 647 United States, Forbush v....................................... 1027 United States, Forester v................................... 837,953 United States, Foster v........................................... 994 United States, France v........................................ 872 United States, Freeman v........................................ 882 United States, Garland v........................................ 978 United States, Gascar v........................................ 865 United States, Gaxiola v....................................... 906 United States, Gay v........................................... 898 United States, Gevinson v......................................... 823 United States, Gilbert v.......................................... 882 United States, Giles v............................................ 870 United States, Gillespie v........................................ 979 United States, Glacy v............................................ 831 United States, Godel v............................................ 838 United States, Granade v......................................... 1012 United States, Green v............................................ 905 United States, Greenway v..................................... 881,954 United States, Gregory v.................................... 962,1029 United States, Grene v............................................ 978 United States, Grosso v....................................... 810,997 United States, Gunston v...................................... 893,964 United States, Haier v............................................ 866 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. lxxiii Page United States, Haine v...................................... 931 United States, Hammond v.................................... 918 United States, Harris v.................................... 818,1010 United States, Hartford v................................... 883,954 United States, Hegg v....................................... 860 United States, Heiberg v................................... 1010 United States, Henry Schein v.................. 1009 United States, Henson v..................................... 974 United States, Herlong-Sierra Homes v.................... 919 United States, Hickey v......................................... 928 United States, Higgins v........................................ 945 United States, Hinton v....................................... 878 United States, Hodgdon v....................................... 1029 United States, Hoffa v.......................................... 293 United States, Hogue v.......................................... 940 United States, Hollins v........................................ 802 United States, Home Shipping Co. v.......................... 930 United States, Hoover v......................................... 822 United States, Hopkins v........................................ 858 United States, Hurley v......................................... 865 United States, Illinois Central R. Co. v........................ 457 United States, Jackson v.................................... 825,877 United States, Jennings v...................................... 1030 United States, Johnson v.................................... 857,976 United States, Jones v. 868,885,913,936,954,984,1012,1014 United States, Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v................... 37,1021 United States, Kahn v....................................... 948,984 United States, Kerestes v....................................... 928 United States v. Kilgore................................... 956,1033 United States, King v....................................... 293, 867 United States, Kohatsu v........................................ 891 United States, Kokin v.......................................... 987 United States, LaMacchio v...................................... 992 United States, Lancey v......................................... 922 United States, Lark v........................................... 875 United States v. Laub........................................... 475 United States, Leach v.......................................... 865 United States, Lee v............................................ 947 United States, Leser v.......................................... 802 United States, Lester v...................................... 1002 United States, Levy v........................................... 832 United States, Lewis v.......................................... 206 United States, Lifetime Siding v................................ 921 LXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page United States, Lindsey v................................... 1022 United States, Little v.................................. 878,984 United States, Lofland v.................................... 1026 United States, Lombard v.................................... 981 United States, Lucas v....................................... 875 United States, Lyles v....................................... 952 United States, Maguire v..................................... 801 United States, Mandell, Spector, Rudolph Co. v.............. 1008 United States, Manna v....................................... 893 United States, Marchetti v.................................. 1000 United States, Margeson v.................................... 830 United States, Marshall v............................... 815,964 United States, Martin v..................................... 1008 United States, Massey v...................................... 878 United States, Masterson v.................................. 833 United States, Matlock v..................................... 893 United States, Maxfield v................................ 830,964 United States, McCanna v..................................... 879 United States, McDonald v.................................... 936 United States, McGinnis v................................... 831 United States, Medlin v.................................. 889 United States, Mersey v...................................... 831 United States, Metcalfe v................................... 994 United States, Meyer v.................................... 837 United States, Mohler v................................... 871 United States, Monastersky v............................ 815,964 United States, Monon R. Co. v............................. 457 United States, Montanaro v................................ 920 United States, Moore v................................... 1001 United States, Moorman v.................................. 866 United States, Morgan v................................... 893 United States, Muckleshoot Indians v...................... 847 United States, Nealon v................................... 973 United States, New England Motor Rate Bur. v.............. 203 United States, Nixon v.................................... 963 United States, Nordstrom v................................ 826 United States, Norfolk Dredging Co. v.................. 919 United States v. Norfolk & W. R. Co....................... 57 United States, Norris v................................. 871,943 United States, Northeastern Pennsylvania Bk. & Tr. Co. v... 967 United States, O’Connor v................................. 870 United States v. Ohio...................................... 9 United States, Oliver v................................... 904,1014 United States, Opela v.................................... 893 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXXV Page United States, Ortiz v..................................... 861,983 United States, Osborn v.................................... 323, 804 United States, Pacelli v................................... 948,957 United States, Panczko v................................. 1009,1043 United States, Parks v.................................. 293 United States, Passini v..................................... 1024 United States, Pay ton v....................................... 993 United States, Peek v.......................................... 894 United States, Pelletier v..................................... 992 United States, Pioneer Nat. Title Ins. Co. v.................. 1022 United States, Plata v......................................... 841 United States, Produce Transport Dispatch v.................... 115 United States v. Provident Nat. Bk............................ 1034 United States, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v.................... 816 United States, Putt v.......................................... 962 United States, Pyles v...................................... 994 United States, Radford v................................... 877 United States, Ramirez v................................... 988 United States, Register v................................... 817 United States, Richardson v.................................... 844 United States, Rickey v........................................ 835 United States, Rivera v................................ 938,1032 United States, Robinson v.............................. 889,1009 United States, Rodgers v....................................... 993 United States, Rule v......................................... 1018 United States, Ruskin v................................. 828,964 United States, Russ v.......................................... 923 United States, Rutherford v............................ 987,1043 United States, Sagansky v...................................... 816 United States, St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v...................... 457 United States, Saib v.......................................... 974 United States, Salish & Kootenai Tribes v...................... 921 United States, Santana v....................................... 848 United States v. Saskatchewan Minerals.......................... 94 United States, Sasser v........................................ 883 United States, Schabert v...................................... 919 United States, Schawartzberg v......................... 868,948,984 United States, Schein v....................................... 1009 United States, Schiffer v...................................... 890 United States, Schipani v.............................. 372,934,965 United States, Schlitz Brewing Co. v.................... 37,1021 United States, Schultz v....................................... 977 United States, Scott v................................. 862,1012 United States, Scranton v...................................... 996 LXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page United States, Second Nat. Bank of New Haven v........ 966 United States, Sharff v................................... 974 United States, Sharp v....................................... 864 United States, Shipp v....................................... 903 United States, Smalls v..................................... 1027 United States, Smith v....................................... 820,1017 United States, Smith Mfg. Co. v............................. 1003 United States, Sniedzins v..................................... 937 United States, Sopher v....................................... 928 United States, Splitt v.......................................... 1019 United States, Sprenz v....................................... 962 United States, Stayner v...................................... 1004 United States, Steelworkers 'v................................ 1036 United States, Stein v............................................ 934 United States, Stinson v.......................................... 859 United States, Strauss v.......................................... 989 United States, Sutton v.......................................... 1014 United States, Taft v............................................. 835 United States, Taylor v........................................... 806 United States, Teamsters v......................................... 38 United States, Terry v........................................... 1029 United States, Thibodeau v....................................... 1028 United States, Todd v............................................. 994 United States, Tomaiolo v......................................... 906 United States, Transit Union v..................................... 38 United States, Travers v.......................................... 834 United States, Travis v....................................... 491,885 United States, Troiano v.......................................... 958 United States, Tucker v........................................... 801 United States, Tyree v........................................ 871 United States, Unger v........................................ 814 United States, Vincent v....................................... 993 United States, Viscardi v....................................... 957 United States, Von Der Ahe Van Lines v............................ 837 United States, Vuckson v..................................... 893 United States v. Wade............................................. 811 United States, Waldon v..................................... 939 United States, Wallace v.......................................... 977 United States, Weaver v..................................... 825 United States, Webb v........................................ 824,904 United States, Weigand v..................................... 903 United States, Welch v........................................ 876,957 United States, West v............................................. 867 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXXVII Page United States, White v..................................... 877,979 United States, Williams v..................... 823,836,945,981,1042 United States, Wilson v...................................... 978 United States, Wood v................................. 866,978 United States, Woods v......................................... 972 United States, Wright v................................. 861 United States, Young v......................................... 993 United States, Ziak v.......................................... 834 U. S. Attorney, Schack v....................................... 896 U. S. Attorney, Weiss v.................................... 885,965 U. S. Court of Appeals, Gray v................................. 896 U. S. Court of Military Appeals, Owings v...................... 893 U. S. District Court,. Allen v................................. 808 U. S. District Court, Combs v.................................. 805 U. S. District Court, Davis v.................................. 943 U. S. District Court, Mason v.................................. 999 U. S. District Court, Simpson v................................ 806 U. S. District Court Auditor, Brown v................... 988,1043 U. S. District Court Chief Judge, Biggs v................... 944 U. S. District Court Chief Judge, Motte v................... 893 U. S. District Court Chief Judge, Smith v................... 875 U. S. District Court Clerk, Kyle v........................ 979 U. S. District Judge, Black v................................. 1019 U. S. District Judge, Buchanan v............................... 807 U. S. District Judge, Campbell v.............................. 1028 U. S. District Judge, General Tire Co. v....................... 899 U. S. District Judge, Scott v................................. 999 U. S. District Judge, Skolnick v............................. 999 U. S. District Judge, Smith v................................. 999 U. S. District Judge, Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. v......... 802 U. S. District Judge, Switzer v.............................. 1031 U. S. ex rel. See name of real party in interest. U. S. Fidelity & Gty. Co. v. Nat. Screen Serv.................. 958 U. S. for the Use and Benefit of. See name of real party in interest. U. S. Gypsum Co., Uhlhom v.................................... 1026 U. S. Lines Co., Downie v...................................... 897 Universal-Rundle Corp., Federal Trade Comm’n v................. 809 University of Pittsburgh, Kaelin v........................... 837 Urban v. Alabama............................................... 972 Urbano v. DeLoach............................................. 1017 Urbano v. Federal Bur. of Investigation........................ 862 Urbano, News Syndicate Co. v................................... 831 lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Utah, Danks v............................................... 1016 Utah, Dodge v............................................... 1013 Utah, Frayer v............................................... 936 Utah, Hussey v......................................... 854 Utah, Ledbetter v............................................ 922 Utah, Montayne v............................................. 939 Utah, Riojas v............................................... 951 Uttech v. Foster............................................. 956 Vaca v. Sipes............................................ 895,925 Vance v. State Bd. of Hairdressers........................... 959 VanVoltenburg v. Supreme Ct. of Iowa....................... 807 Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg............................... 833 Van Zandt v. Tennessee..................................... 884 Varden v. Holman........................................... 805 Vassos v. Ornstein......................................... 840 Velasquez v. New Mexico.................................... 867 Venezuela, Chemical Nat. Resources v......................... 822 Venterella v. Pace........................................... 819 Venterella v. Pace Marine Serv............................... 819 Veterans Administration, Bates v........................ 868,954 Vico Ins. Co., King v.................................. 841,983 Victor v. Indiana............................................ 885 Villafranca v. Commissioner.............................. 840,953 Village. See name of village. Vincent v. United States................................... 993 Virgil v. North Carolina..................................... 923 Virginia, Alexander v........................................ 998 Virginia, Booze v....................................... 991,1044 Virginia, Dunn v............................................. 885 Virginia, Gillespie v........................ 892 Virginia, Loving v........................................... 986 Virginia, May v.............................................. 872 Virginia, Wallace v.......................................... 890 Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar v. Railroad Trainmen........ 1027 Virgin Islands, Marine Nat. Exch. Bk. v...................... 903 Virtue Bros. v. Los Angeles County........................... 820 Viscardi v. United States.................................... 957 Visentine, Todd v............................................ 965 Volkswagen Interamericana v. Rohlsen......................... 919 Von Clemm v. Smith........................................... 975 Von Der Ahe Van Lines v. United States....................... 837 Von Hardenberg v. Katzenbach................................. 828 Vuckson v. United States..................................... 893 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXXIX Page Wade, United States v.................................... 811 Wadley v. California..................................... 879 Wainwright, Anderson v.................................. 1042 Wainwright, Austin v.................................. 992 Wainwright, Brown v.................................. 954,992 Wainwright, Crooke v................................. 1022 Wainwright, Edge v.................................... 953 Wainwright, Hillman v................................ 1016 Wainwright, Land v.................................... 896 Wainwright, Mason v. 937 Wainwright, Mathis v.................................. 995 Wainwright v. New Orleans............................... 1001 Wainwright, Primus v................................. 1013 Wainwright, Reyes v................................... 997 Wainwright, Simmons v............................... 806 Wainwright, Snow v.................................... 926 Wainwright, Wellington v................................. 870 Wakin v. Pennsylvania..................................... 14 Walden v. Pate........................................... 892 Waldon v. United States.................................. 939 Waldron v. Cities Service Co............................ 1024 Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines......................... 810 Walker, Associated Press v............................... 812 Walker v. Birmingham..................................... 809 Walker v. Illinois....................................... 859 Walker v. New York..................................... 864 Walker v. Page........................................... 963 Walker v. Pate........................................... 865 Walker v. Rundle........................................ 1030 Walker v. Southern R. Co............................. 196,1020 Walker v. Texas.......................................... 864 Walker v. Wilson......................................... 896 Walker Bk. & Tr. Co., First Nat. Bk. of Logan v...... 252,1032 Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co........ 976,1032 Walker Process Equip, v. FMC Corp........................ 824 Wallace, Blankinship v................................... 963 Wallace v. United States................................. 977 Wallace v. Virginia...................................... 890 Wallace v. Washington.................................... 874 Wallack, Femanders v..................................... 880 Ward v. McMann........................................... 864 Ward v. Oliver........................................... 923 Ward v. Willingham...................................... 1014 LXXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Warden. See also name of warden. Warden, Berman v...................................... 805 Warden, Betillo v...................................... 887 Warden, Gleaton v..................................... 1017 Warden v. Hayden.................................. 926,985 Warden, Roberts v...................................... 876 Warden, Snead v.......................................... 872 Warden, Stevens v..................................... 1031 Warden, Stevenson v...................................... 860 Ward Industries Corp., Union Tank Car Co. v.............. 831 Warner v. Kentucky................................... 858,885 Warnock v. Oliver........................................ 886 W’arriner v. Ferraro................................ 995,1044 Warriner v. Fink......................................... 894 Washington, Callas v..................................... 995 Washington, Cole v....................................... 858 Washington, Higgins v.................................... 827 Washington, Hughes v................................ 807,1000 Washington, Massey v..................................... 904 Washington, McClung v.................................... 894 Washington, Milbradt v................................... 905 Washington, Stiltner v................................... 886 Washington v. Texas...................................... 812 Washington, Wallace v.................................... 874 Washington, Wells v..................................... 1016 Washington Director of Licenses, Treffry v................ 10 Washington Post Co., Keogh v............................ 1011 Washington Power Supply System v. Fed. Power Comm’n.. 926,985 Watkins v. Conway........................................ 188 Watkins, General Tire & Rubber Co. v..................... 899 Watson v. Gremillion.................................... 1018 Watson v. Patterson...................................... 876 Watts v. Department of Air Force......................... 862 Weaver, Jordan v......................................... 844 Weaver, Maybee v......................................... 963 Weaver v. United States.................................. 825 Webb v. Beto............................................. 940 Webb v. Tennessee........................................ 825 Webb v. United States................................ 824,904 Webster v. Lee County Dist. Ct........................... 452 Weidemann v. California.................................. 998 Weigand v. United States................................. 903 Weiner v. Fulton County.................................. 958 Weiss v. Morgenthau.................................. 885,965 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. LXXXI Page Welch, Beto v............................................... 839 Welch v. United States.................................. 876,957 Weldon v. Semple............................................ 826 Wellington v. Wainwright.................................... 870 Wells v. Washington........................................ 1016 Well Surveys, McCullough Tool Co. v..................... 990,995 Werner v. Ohio............................................. 1006 West v. Gilbert............................................. 919 West v. United States....................................... 867 Western Colo. Power Co., Colorado-Ute Elec. Assn, v...... 22,984 Westhampton, The, Chemical Bk. N. Y. Tr. Co. v.............. 921 West Los Angeles Cancer Institute v. Mayer................. 1010 West Side Redevelop. Corp., Annbar Assoc, v.............. 5 West Virginia, Morris v................................. 891 Wheeler v. Kentucky..................................... 826 Whelchel v. California.................................. 953 Whisman v. Georgia.......................................... 893 White v. Forte.......................................... 871,954 White v. United States.................................. 877,979 Whitehorn v. California................................. 878 Whitfield v. California................................. 865 Whittington v. Preston.................................. 980 Whittle v. Tawes........................................ 806,964 Whitus v. Georgia....................................... 545,813 Wickham v. California....................................... 872 Wickham, Swift & Co. v.............................. 1036 Wienrank v. Northern Illinois Gas Co........................ 834 Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth.............. 947 Wilkes v. California.................................... 921 Wilkins, Hobbs v............................................ 879 Williams v. Anderson.................................... 931,988 Williams v. California...................................... 882 Williams v. California Dept, of Corrections................. 986 Williams, Farber v...................................... 845 Williams v. Field....................................... 868 Williams, Florida ex rei. Farber v...................... 845 Williams, Florida ex rei. Moliver v......................... 845 Williams v. Georgia......................................... 887 Williams v. Heinze.......................................... 869 Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc................................ 958 Williams v. McMann.......................................... 866 Williams, Moliver v......................................... 845 Williams v. New York........................................ 881 Williams v. Pacific Maritime Assn........................... 822 233-653 0 - 67 -6 LXXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Williams v. Shaffer........................................ 1037 Williams v. United States.................. 823,836,945,981,1042 Willingham, Cannon v........................................ 807 Willingham, Cole v......................................... 1033 Willingham, Comulada v..................................... 1030 Willingham, Jefferson v.................................... 1018 Willingham, Ward v......................................... 1014 Willmore v. Willmore........................................ 898 Wilson, Asberry v........................................... 942 Wilson, Braun v............................................. 887 Wilson, Clemons v........................................ 986, 998 Wilson, Collins v........................................... 808 Wilson, De La Paz v........................................ 1015 Wilson, Dyer v.............................................. 965 Wilson, Fagans v............................................ 953 Wilson, Gohlke v............................................ 882 Wilson, Gresham v........................................... 805 Wilson, Gretsinger v........................................ 944 Wilson, Haley v............................................. 806 Wilson, Herrera v........................................... 980 Wilson, Herschel v.......................................... 973 Wilson, Jackson v........................................... 998 Wilson, King v............................................. 1018 Wilson, Lakas v............................................ 1019 Wilson, Lee v............................................... 995 Wilson, Lester v........................................... 1019 Wilson v. Maroney........................................... 859 Wilson, Martinez v.......................................... 852 Wilson, Medrano v........................................... 894 Wilson, Murray v.......................................... 896,980 Wilson v. New Jersey...................................... 962 Wilson, Rybar v............................................. 873 Wilson, Torres v........................................... 1015 Wilson v. United States....................................... 978 Wilson, Walker v...................................„........ 896 Wimberley v. Meyers.......................................... 1018 Wing v. New Jersey............................................ 960 Wingo, Conner v............................................ 1012 Winhoven, In re............................................. 891 Winn-Dixie Stores v. Labor Board............................ 935 Winters v. Beck............................................... 907 Wirtshafter v. Pennsylvania................................... 854 Wirtz, Sullivan v............................................. 852 Wisconsin, Cohen v............................................ 959 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED, lxxxiii Page Wisconsin v. Illinois................................... 996 Wisconsin, Kanzelberger v............................... 867 Wisconsin, Meister v.................................... 1005 Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves........................ 990,1044 Wisconsin, Reimers v.................................... 980 Witt v. New York.......................................... 862 Wojton v. Homestead Constr. Co............................ 841 Woj ton v. Santella....................................... 841 Wolfe v. Commissioner..................................... 838 Wolff v. Kroshinsky....................................... 981 Wood v. United States................................. 866,978 Woodards v. Ohio.......................................... 930 Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.......... 276 Woods v. California..................................... 950 Woods v. Rhay............................................. 905 Woods v. United States.................................... 972 Woods Exploration Co., Aluminum Co. of America v........ 991 Woods Hole, M. V. & N. S. S. Auth., Fine v................ 845 Wooten v. Henderson....................................... 944 Worcester, Gordon v...................................... 1036 Worrell v. Thomas......................................... 805 Wright v. California...................................... 892 Wright v. Oliver.......................................... 887 Wright v. United States................................... 861 Wright, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co............................. 890 Xenia City Bd. of Educ., Corbean v....................... 1041 Yager v. Kentucky........................................ 1030 Yawn, Cotton v............................................ 894 Yeager, Howard v.......................................... 859 Yecko Bros., Penn Township v.............................. 826 Young v. Alabama.......................................... 879 Young v. United States.................................... 993 YMCA of Atlanta, Bailey v............................ 868,1021 Zaluskey, Mundt v.................................... 871,1044 Zegers, Zegers, Inc. v.................................... 948 Zegers, Inc. v. Zegers.................................... 948 Zero Mfg. Co. v. Mississippi Milk Producers............... 841 Ziak v. United States..................................... 834 Zink, Chamberlain v....................................... 987 Zink v. Pack.............................................. 987 Zschemig v. Miller........................................ 998 Zucker v. California................................... 855 964 Zuniga v. Florida......................................... 962 TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Abie State Bk. v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 499 Adler v. Bd. of Education, 342 U. S. 485 593-595, 605,606,622,624-627 Aeronautical Indus. Bist. Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 103 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ha- worth, 300 U. S. 227 112 Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F. 2d 649 383 Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 1000 Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528 111 Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124 101 Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 211 Anastaplo, In re, 366 U. S. 82 399,528,625 Anderson Nat. Bk. v. Luck- ett, 321 U. S. 233 101,261 Andrews v. United States, 162 U. S. 420 209 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 481, 607, 609 Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 982 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 901 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 379 U. S. 642 95 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 348,508 Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S. W. 2d 671 401 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Aubrey v. United States, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 65 151 Page Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 551 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 402, 599, 601,604,606,625 Bain, Ex parte, 121 U. S. 1 275 Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 247 Balancio v. United States, 267 F. 2d 135 151 Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176 24 Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637 225 Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A. 2d 773 384 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 399 Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U. S. 442 523 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121 80,82 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 56,523 Baty v. Holston, 108 Ga. App. 359 189,190 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 285 Beard v. Stahr, 200 F. Supp. 766 343 Beaufort Concrete Co. v. At- lantic States Constr., 352 F. 2d 460 849 Beaufort Concrete Co. v. At- lantic States Constr., 384 U. S. 1004 34,849 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 408 Beebe v. Union R. Co., 205 Pa. Super. 146 200 Beilan v. Bd. of Education, 357 U. S. 399 507,508,528,623-625 Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 384 LXXXV LXXXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 399,564 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 147 App. Div. 783 403 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51 384 Black v. United States, 385 U. S. 26 307,317 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199 496 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403 348 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 213, 350,351,413,496,515 Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450 573 Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431 399 Bradley, Ex parte, 7 Wall. 364 524 Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 414 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 415 Breen v. Beto, 341 F. 2d 96 559 Bregman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 351 F. 2d 401 287 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 388 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424 82 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 412 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 507,529,584 Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216 UI Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427 564 Buchanan v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 400 S. W. 2d 362 200 Burnette v. Davis, 382 U. S. 42 444 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 194,1039 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 397 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U. S. 715 370 Page Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402 447 Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191 384 Caffery v. New York C. R. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 1075 200 Caldwell v. United States, 92 U. S. App. D. C. 355 306-308 Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. S. 263 535 California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 112 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 42,54,55,406 Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U. S. 261 164,177,426,436 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 552 Castaldi v. United States, 251 F. Supp.681 369 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 496,501,504,505 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3 560 Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197 24,25 Chas. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 430 Chase Securities Corp. v. Husband, 302 U. S. 660 261 Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 285,636 Chavira v. State, 167 Tex. Cr. R. 197 560 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S.373 563 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35 67 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois Com. Comm’n ex rel. Illinois C. R. Co., 414 Ill. 134 60 City. See name of city. Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1 409 Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U. S. 511 430 TABLE OF CASES CITED. LXXXVII Page Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 513, 514,516,519,521,523 Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 518 Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297 382 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 187 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U. S. 607 69 Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542 187 Copion v. United States, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 103 306,307 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 41,42,47,48,51,56 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S.569 53,54 Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. In- struction, 368 U. S. 278 604, 606, 625 Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433 505 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 585 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 351 F. 2d 702 401 Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 557 Davis v. Dept, of Labor, 317 U. S. 249 447 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737 505,506 Davis v. State, 216 Ga. 110, 222 Ga. 114 547 Davis v. United States, 328 U. S.582 523 Davis v. United States, 385 U. S. 927 26,27,29,31 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 55,56, 602 Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 562 Denenberg v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 401 151 Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 623,627, 628 Page Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 523 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 401,601,609 Donahue v. Warner Bros., 2 Utah 2d 256 381 Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 583,584,588 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 430 Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619 541 Doyle v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 39 560 Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 194 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F. 2d 761 913 Easter v. District of Columbia, 124 U. S. App. D. C. 33 913 Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263 344 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 41, 42,48,49,53-56 Electrical Workers v. Gen- eral Elec. Co., 341 F. 2d 571 429 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 606,607,609 Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 177 Ellisor v. State, 162 Tex. Cr. R. 117 560 Elmhurst v. Pearson, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 372 384 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 351 Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41 467 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 309,310 Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U. S. 214 194 Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 365,368,564 Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 553 Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 106 Ex parte. See name of party. LXXXVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F. 2d 716 438 Fagan v. Bently, 32 Ga. 534 189 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 112 Fallen v. United States, 378 U. S. 139 849 Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 187 Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936 24 FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464 89 FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U. S. 1 89 Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501 404 Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S.315 56 Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 49,414 First Nat. Bk. v. Saxon, 352 F. 2d 267 254 First Nat. Bk. v. Staake, 202 U. S.141 105 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Corp., 328 U. S. 275 103 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 636 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 447 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6 225 Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U. S. 621 244,245 Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly v. Lucas, 379 U. S. 693 444 Foster-Milbum Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424 385 Frady v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 78 568 France v. United States, 164 U. S. 676 269 Francis v. United States, 188 U. S. 375 269 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 344 Frank v. Wolf, 17 Ga. App. 468 191 Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963 385 Page Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583 496 Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U. S. 716 623-625, 628 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 44 Garner v. Triangle Pubs., 97 F. Supp. 546 383,385 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 384,390,405 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 516,520,529-532 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U. S. 469 637 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431 382 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 560 Giacone v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. R. 141 561 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 399, 524,564,583, 584,588,908, 982, 983 Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U. S. 18 291 Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 186 Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 278 U. S. 349 147 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 130 Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U. S. 920 285 Gonzales v. United States, 364 U. S. 59 348 Good Shot v. United States, 179 U. S. 87 291 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 209, 211, 301, 303, 314, 316, 344, 347, 351, 352 Gradall v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 714 151 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 560,566 Granade v. United States, 356 F. 2d 837 150 Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271 322, 348,635, 643 TABLE OF CASES CITED. LXXXIX Page Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 233,235,239,240, 241, 243-247, 249, 251 Great Northern R. Co. v. Sullivan, 294 U. S. 458 184,185 Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S. 329 190 Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 77,80,81 Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 92,93,515,523,529 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 194,564, 583, 584, 588, 1039, 1040 Grimm v. United States, 156 U. S. 604 209 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 341,352,381,414 Grosjean v. American Press Co, 297 U. S. 233 397 Grvger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 560 Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co, 382 U. S. 257 202 Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 53,54,609 Haley v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 519 561 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314 560 Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 43 Hannah v. Lärche, 361 U. S. 910 915 Hanover Nat. Bk. v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 110 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 285 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528 500 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 247,248 Harris v. State, 369 P. 2d 187 586 Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 211,351 Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U. S.269 444 Harrison v. State, 394 S. W. 2d 713 586 Page Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 908 Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S.189 523 Hayford v. Bangor, 102 Me. 340 406 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 313, 349, 496, 501, 504, 505 Hazlitt v. Fawcett Pubs, 116 F. Supp. 538 385 Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54 586 Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359 101,111 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 186,187 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 55,600,627 Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844 81,82 Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296 105 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 553 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362 102 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U S 293 326, 340, 347, 348, 636 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 313,348 Hubbard v. Journal Pub. Co, 69 N. M. 473 384 Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co, 189 App. Div. 467 382 In re. See name of party. Internal Revenue Service. See Commissioner. International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Products Co. v. Erie R. Co, 244 N. Y. 331 409 ICC v. Ore.-Wash. R. & Nav. Co, 288 U. S. 14 66 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 367,368 Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 342 Jackson, Ex parte, 96 U. S. 727 397 xc TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Jackson, In re, 61 Cal. 2d 500 910 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 539,541-544, 564,565,583-585,588 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 313,349 Jacova v. Southern ’Radio & T. V. Co., 83 So. 2d 34 384 James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213 187 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 54 Jarvis v. United States, 342 F. 2d 799 151 Jenkins v. Dell Pub. Co., 251 F. 2d 447 384 Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427 151,152,154 Johnson v. Cox, 72 N. M. 55 586 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 584 Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189 487 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 211 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 161 Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 570 Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 384 Jones v. Springer, 226 U. S. 148 108 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 211,300 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 397 Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F. 2d 210 527 Kelley v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275 384 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 481 Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 287 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F. 2d 236 606 Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U. S. 405 514,526 King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225 291 Page Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47 365 Klor, In re, 64 Cal. 2d 816 910 Kohn v. Myers, 266 F. 2d 353 110 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U. S. 36 523,528,625 Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 188 Mise. 479 382,384,403 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 415 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440 562,575 Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 54 Labor Board. See NLRB. Labor union. See name of trade. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Mise. 776 382,384 Laird v. Pittsburg, 205 Pa. 1 406 Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F. 2d 394 110 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 500 Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 194 Lane v. Warden, 320 F. 2d 179 559,567,585 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 267,487 Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 54 Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177 409 League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357 446 Lederman v. Bd. of Education, 276 App. Div. 527 608 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 565 Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468 528,624,625 Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F. 2d 974 385 Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U. S. 559 261 Lewis v. United States, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 21 151 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xci Page Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 1000 Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 302,303,315- 317,326,340,344,345 Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U. S. 654 184,185 Leyra v. Benno, 347 U. S. 556 496 Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301 1039 Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626 34,849 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 583,585,588 Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 496 Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547 113 Local. For labor union, see also name of trade. Local No. 861 v. Stone & Webster Corp., 163 F. Supp. 894 429 Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U. S. 423 172 Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 452 Lopez v. Dept, of Justice, 356 F. 2d 986 291 Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 302, 303,317, 327,329, 330, 342, 349 Lord v. Helmandollar, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 168 33,849 Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251 113 Love v. Griffith, 266 U. S. 32 1039 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 397,500, 609 Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 574 Lowe v. United States, 292 F. 2d 501 151 Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 242,445 Lvnumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528 505 Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 187 Page Mac. See also Me. Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U. S. 682 199 Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 348 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 513-515,521,523,527 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 18,404,413 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302 284 Marshall v. United States, 360 U. S. 310 368,562,573 Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668 384 Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 527 Maryland Citizens Comm. v. Tawes, 253 F. Supp. 731 446 Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386 331 Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374 190 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 209,309-311,314 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 428,429 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 560 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 499 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347 261 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 256,356 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311 560 McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106 908 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264 369 McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 211 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 189 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 320,327 Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U. S. 324 113 Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S. C. 330 384 XCII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U. S. 1 320 Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671 190 Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304 384 Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469 561,563,573 Miller v. N. B. C., 157 F. Supp. 240 384 Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836 586 Mills v. Panama Canal Co., 272 F. 2d 37 151 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 303,304,497, 506,508,516,529,564 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 248 Molony v. Boy Comics Pubs., 277 App. Div. 166 382 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 358 Montgomery v. Eyman, 96 Ariz. 55 587 Moore v. Illinois C. R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 196-201 Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 560 Moses v. State, 168 Tex. Cr. R. 409 561 Moss v. State, 364 S. W. 2d 389 560 Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1 106,107 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bk., 339 U. S. 306 100,102,112,901 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 500 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52 532 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 112 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 313,349, 636 Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 350 Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. Co., 163 Mass. 574 409 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 56 Page NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 50,55, 56, 402,412,603,604,609 National Labor Relations Board. See NLRB. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U. S. 421 433,436, 438 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling Co., 306 U. S. 292 66 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 425 NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U. S. 938 436 NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F. 2d 766 425 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 425 NLRB v. Radio Engineers, 364 U. S. 573 165,177 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149 436 Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F. 2d 722 200 Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U. S. 1 508,528, 625 News Syndicate Co. v. New York C. R. Co, 275 U. S. 179 183-185 New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co, 344 U. S. 293 102 New York County Nat. Bk. v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 109 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 136, 381, 387-391, 394, 397-399, 401, 405-408, 410, 415, 598 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 ‘ 54,56 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 129 285 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 974 67 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 313,348,550,551 Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290 600,607 Nowak v. United States, 356 U. S. 660 285, 636 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xeni Page Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 187 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613 560 O’Connor v. Ohio, 382 U. S. 286 92 Oliver f In re, 333 U. S. 257 365 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 248,343,413 On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 350 Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84 562, 565 Order. For labor union, see name of trade. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 523,526-528 Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 314,316,317 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448 560,566 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 675 89 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 364 Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495 151,154 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 553 Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245 357 Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 446 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 505 Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 385 Penn-Texas Corp. v. Murat Anstalt, [1964] 2 Q. B. 647 186 People v. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 205 Mise. 818 397 People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119 333 People v. Hobbs, 37 Cal. App. 2d 8 587 People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497 333 People v. McBride & Co., 159 Mise. 5 397 People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 574 Page Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 103 Perkins v. State, 152 Tex. Cr. R. 321 561 Peter Pan Fabrics v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F. 2d 800 25 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 550 Pitcock v. State, 367 S. W. 2d 864 556,581 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 4.14 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 365,367 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 54 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 524 Powell v. United States, 35 F. 2d 941 559 Power Commission. See FPC. Publishers’ °Assn. v. New York Mailers, 317 F. 2d 624 429 Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 357 Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330 181 Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 229 F. 2d 59 159 Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S.30 198 Railton v. United States, 127 F. 2d 691 574 Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 162-164, 166,172,173,175,180 Railway Conductors v. Southern R. Co., 339 U. S. 255 164 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423 487 Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F. 2d 784 426 Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 505 Reg. v. Shuttleworth, 3 Car. & K. 375 586 XCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Reiss v. Murchison, 383 U. S. 946 33,849 Rename r v. United States, 347 U. S. 227 28,31,369 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 196,197,199,200 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 244,245,247,441, 444,445,447,448, 455 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 369 Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 211 Rizzuto v. United States, 298 F. 2d 748 151 Roberson v. Rochester Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538 380,381 Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 911,913 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 348,564, 585 Rogers v. State, 227 Ind. 709 78 Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695 444 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 391 398,401,405,407,414 Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bk. & Tr. Co., 139 F. Supp. 730 100,104 Ross v. State, 401 S. W. 2d 844 582 Ross v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyo., 30 Wyo. 433 462 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115 285,289,290,636, 637 Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 275 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 282 Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 609 Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 384 Santana v. United States, 385 U. S. 848 34,902 Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317 901 Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 600, 607 Page Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487 574 Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 522 Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609 384 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 54,609 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 285,290, 607, 636 Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208 102 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Ex- aminers, 353 U. S. 232 523,606,607 Scranton v. Drew, 379 U. S. 40 535 Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 402 Seay v. State, 395 S. W. 2d 40 574 SEC v. U. S. Realty Co., 310 U. S. 434 103 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 516,517,520,523, 530 Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 586 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 289 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 56,602, 603,606,609, 624 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 364,564 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 606 Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369 208,316,331, 332, 343 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 54,56 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 382, 383,404 Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 212,301,317, 327, 349 Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190 539 Sims v. State, 388 S. W. 2d 714 582 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkin- son, 370 U. S. 195 429 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xcv Page Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F. 2d 569 437 Slochower v. Bd. of Education, 350 U. S. 551 499,507, 508,516,527,528, 606 Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 163,164,175,196-198 Smayda v. United States, 352 F. 2d 251 342 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 250 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 194,1039 Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 389,397 Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250 384 Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 187 Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252 78 Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 384 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 564 Somma v. United States, 283 F. 2d 149 151 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 208,209,332,343 South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U. S. 300 112 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N. Y. 2d 324 380, 381, 383-387, 396, 397, 403, 419 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 216 396,419 Spears v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 14 561 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 389,604,606,608,624 Spencer v. Texas, 389 S. W. 2d 304 556 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 497,500,501,507,531 Springfield v. United States, 99 F. 2d 860 358 Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 190 Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F. 2d 360 426 Page State. See also name of State. State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176 78 State v. Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167 78 State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160 567,586 State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51 586 State v. Kirkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313 587 State v. Klapprott, 127 N. J. L. 395 408 State v. Kristich, 226 Ore. 240 367 State v. Long, 256 Iowa 1304 192 State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326 587 State v. Murray, 164 La. 883 366 State v. Myrick, 181 Kan. 1056 574 State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9 574 State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203 587 State v. Walker, 61 N. M. 374 461,462 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 161 Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 435 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593 436 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574 161,435,437 Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 369 Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234 496,498 Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 275 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 550 Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 368 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 55,604 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137 89 XCVI TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels, 383 U. S. 363 849 Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 App. Div. 155 384 Swann v. Adams, 378 U. S. 553 441 Swann v. Adams, 383 U. S. 210 442 Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440 455 Swann v. United States, 195 F. 2d 689 574 Sweenek ’v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 382 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 603 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. Ill 357 Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 550 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 429 Tedesco v. United States, 118 F. 2d 737 574 Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 93,583-585 Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1 427 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 134 Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U. S. 529 500 Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 250 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 270 U. S. 266 67 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 199 Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U. S. 390 348 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 500 Thompson v. Curtis Pub. Co., 193 F. 2d 953 384 Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 44 Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867 242 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 388 Page Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U. S. 210 235,244,245 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 606 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 186,187 Transcontinental & W. Air v. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653 196,197,199 Transportation - Com. Employees v. Union Pac. R. Co., 385 U. S. 157 202 Travis v. United States, 385 U. S. 491 485 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 209 Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, 80 S. D. 104 384 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510“ 564 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 364,365,367,368 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 248 U. S. 67 498 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 111 United States v. Arlington County, 326 F. 2d 929 358 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 603 United States v. Banmiller, 310 F. 2d 720 559,575, 585 United States v. Barnard, 255 F. 2d 583 146 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 266 United States v. Bur. of Rev. of N. M., 291 F. 2d 677 358 United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174 487 United States v. Comvns, 248 U. S. 349 266 United States v. Currv, 358 F. 2d 904 567 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 311 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCVIl Page United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277 467 United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 81 United States v. Field, 193 F. 2d 92 509 United States v. Firth, 207 F. 2d 665 151 United States v. Forfari, 268 F. 2d 29 151 United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U. S. 285 357 United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 266 United States v. Healy, 376 U. S. 75 480 United States v. Hvass, 355 U. S. 570 270 United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F. 2d 574 574 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 301 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 1000 United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 266 United States v. Laub, 385 U. S. 475 491,492 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 351 United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 358 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 607 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 637 United States v. Mississippi Valley Co., 364 U. S. 520 145-147 United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150 153,154 United States v. Munsing-wear, 340 U. S. 36 112,113 United States v. Norris (D. C. E. D. Pa., Apr. 14, 1956) 142 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 351 United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 397 Page United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138 333 United States v. Schipani, 362 F. 2d 825 317 United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233 28,31 United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 516 United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U. S. 86 270 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 480 United States v. Wood- worth, 170 F. 2d 1019 358 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338 322 U. S. ex rel. See name of real party in interest. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 69, 75,292 Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 9 Pet. 692 481 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 381,405 Wagner v. Fawcett Pubs., 307 F. 2d 409 383 Waldon v. Dist. Ct. of Lee County, 130 N. W. 2d 728 193 Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U. S.112 102 Walker v. Southern R. Co., 354 F. 2d 950 200 Walker Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Saxon, 352 F. 2d 90 254,256 Walling v. Reuter Co., 321 U. S. 671 111 Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 17 1039 Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161 384 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 313,348,349 Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428 101 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 300,327 Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 248 233-653 0-67-7 XCVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Weinzorpflin v. State, 7 Blackf. 186 79 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 247,250,455 Western & Atl. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639 901 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 500 White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 193 Whitehouse v. Illinois C. R. Co., 349 U. S. 366 159, 160,164,176,179,201 Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F. 2d 496 548, 553 Whitus v. Balkcom, 370 U. S. 728 548 Whitus v. State, 216 Ga. 284, 222 Ga. 103 547 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U. S. Ill 9 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 601,606 Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 161 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375 551 Willie, In re, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 304 Winters v. Beck, 385 U. S. 907 982 Page Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 388,404 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 413 Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F. 2d 393 559 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 213,300,303,308 Wong Yang Sung v. Mc- Grath, 339 U. S. 33 287-289 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 134 Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U. S. 276 636 Worthy v. United States, 328 F. 2d 386 485 Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 134,600,607, 627 Young, Ex parte, 209 U. S. 123 358 Youssoupoff v. CBS, 41 Mise. 2d 42 403 Youssoupoff v. CBS, 19 App. Div. 2d 865 384 Zartman v. First Nat. Bk., 216 U. S. 134 101 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 479,481,482,487 Zerbe, In re, 60 Cal. 2d 666 910 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED (A) Statutes of the United States. Page 1798, July 14, c. 74, 1 Stat. 596 ............... 589 1863, Feb. 25, c. 58, 12 Stat. 665 ............... 252 1864, June 3, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99 252 1875, Mar. "1, c. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335 ......... 545 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, §1, 24 Stat. 379, as amended......... 57,182 §3 .............. 94 1898, July 1, c. 541, §§2a, 18, 18f, 63b, 67c, 70, 70a, 70d, 30 Stat. 544, as amended.... 99 1905, Jan. 5, c. 23, 33 Stat. 599, as amended.... 355 1910, June 20, c. 310, §28, 36 Stat. 557, as amended................... 458 1916, Sept. 7, c. 458, 39 Stat. 742, as amended.... 149 1917, Feb. 5, c. 29, §19, 39 Stat. 874, as amended................... 276 1918, May 22, c. 81, 40 Stat. 559, as amended.... 475 1919, Oct. 28, c. 85, § 29, 41 Stat. 305 ................ 554 1920, Mar. 9, c. 95, 41 Stat. 525 ............... 149 June 5, c. 250, 41 Stat. 988 ............... 149 1921, Mar. 3, c. 136, 41 Stat. 1359 ............. 475 1925, Mar. 3, c. 428, 43 Stat. 1112 ............. 149 1926, May 20, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended.... 196 §§2,3 First....... 157 July 3, c. 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887....... 475 Page 1927, Feb. 25, c. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224................. 252 1930, Feb. 7, c. 42, §§ 1, 5, 46 Stat. 66, as amended. 355 May 27, c. 340, 46 Stat. 391........... 149 1932, Mar. 23, c. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70........... 157 §7 ........... 421 §§ 8, 13.......... 157 1933, June 16, c. 89, 48 Stat. 162 ................ 252 1934, June 19, c. 652, §§ 308, 312, 48 Stat. 1064.. 511 §605 ............. 323 June 21, c. 691, §§ 2, 3, 48 Stat. 1185....... 157 June 23, c. 736, § 4, 48 Stat. 1211.......... 149 1935, July 5, c. 372, §8, 49 Stat. 449, as amended .. 421,432,533 § 10 .... 157,432,533 1936, June 5, c. 517, 49 Stat. 1477 ............... 458 1938, June 21, c. 556, §§ 1, 7, 16, 52 Stat. 821 .... 83 June 22, c. 575, §1, 52 Stat. 840......... 99 1940, June 28, c. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670........... 589 1941, June 21, c. 210, 55 Stat. 252........... 475 1942, Feb. 7, c. 49, 56 Stat. 83 .................. 83 1945, Dec. 28, c. 591, 59 Stat. 659........... 214 1946, Mar. 8, c. 80, §§ 1, 4, 60 Stat. 37, as amended............. 138 June 11, c. 324, § 7, 60 Stat. 237........... 276 § 10 .......... 57,276 XCIX c TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page 1946, July 5, c. 540, 60 Stat. 427 ....................... 23 Aug. 2, c. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 812..... 149 1947, June 23, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136...... 196,293 §101 ........... 157, 421,432,533 §301 ........ 421,432 1948, June 24, c. 625, § 12, 62 Stat. 604 ............. 116 June 25, c. 647, §10, 62 Stat. 1009........ 214 1950, Sept. 30, c. 1125, 64 Stat. 1109, as amended................... 355 1952, Apr. 14, c. 204, 66 Stat. 54 .......... 475 May 28, c. 339, 66 Stat. 96........... 475 June 14, c. 437, 66 Stat. 137.......... 475 June 27, c. 477, § 101, 66 Stat. 163... 475,630 §106 ............... 276 §211 ............ 214 §212 .........214,276 §215 ........ 475,491 §241 ........ 214,276 §242 ............ 276 §§ 313, 316, 335, 336 .......... 630 §349 ............ 276 July 3, c. 570, 66 Stat. 330 ................. 475 1954, Sept. 1, c. 1214, §2, 68 Stat. 1142 ........ 511 1955, Aug. 9, c. 664, 69 Stat. 595 ................ 475 1957, Sept. 11, Pub. L. 85-316, §7, 71 Stat. 639 ............... 214 1959, June 23, Pub. L. 86-64, §2, 73 Stat. 109. 99 1960, Sept. 2, Pub. L. 86- 695, 74 Stat. 740... 138 1961, Sept. 26, Pub. L. 87- 301, §5,75 Stat. 650. 276 §16 ............. 214 §19 ............. 276 Sept. 26, Pub. L. 87- 317, 75 Stat. 681... 149 Page 1964, July 2, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241........ 39 1965, Oct. 3, Pub. L. 89-236, §9, 79 Stat. 911.... 214 1966, June 20, Pub. L. 89- 456, 80 Stat. 208... 196 §2 ............. 157 July 4, Pub. L. 89-488, 80 Stat. 252.. 149 Revised Statutes. §5155 ................ 252 §5240 ................ 511 U. S. Code. Title 5, § 751 et seq...... 149 § 1006 ........... 276 § 1009 ........ 57,276 §2283 ............ 511 Title 8, § 155 (1946 ed.)... 276 § 1101 ....... 475,630 § 1105a .......... 276 §1181 ............ 214 § 1182 ....... 214,276 § 1185 ....... 475,491 § 1251 ....... 214,276 § 1252 ........... 276 §§ 1424, 1427, 1446, 1447 .......... 630 § 1481 ........... 276 Title 10, §2602...... 355 Title 11, §§ 11, 41, 103, 107, 110................ 99 Title 12, §36 .............. 252 §481 ........ 511 Title 15, §§717, 717f, 717o.. 83 § 1051 et seq... 23 Title 18, §243 ............. 545 §371 ............. 475 § 1084 ........... 263 § 1503 ....... 293,323 §§ 1952, 1953...... 263 §2114 ............ 554 §2385 ............ 589 §3731 ........ 263,475 §4126 ............ 149 Title 22, §21 la...... 475 Title 26, § 3301 et seq..... 355 §4742 ............ 206 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. ci Page Page U. S. Code—Continued. Enabling Act (New Mexico- Title 28, Arizona) ................ 458 rr 294 295........ 802 Federal Communications §1253 ..''.7.7116,355 Act ...................... 323,511 g 19^7 1493 Federal Employees Com- g19Q9 ....... ’ 9o pensation Act.................... 149 ........... Federal Tort Claims Act.. 149 | .......... Federal Unemployment Tax § 1346 .......... 149 Act r 355 § 2103 ...... 493,554 Immigration and National- §2281 ....... 116,355 ity Act 214,276,475,491,630 §2671 etseq...... 149 Internal Revenue Code of Title 29, 1954. §§ 104, 108, 113.... 157 §3301 et seq........... 355 § 158 .... 421,432,533 §4272 ................... 206 § 160 ....... 157,432 Interstate Commerce Act... 57, § 185 ....... 421,432 94,182 Title 36, §§ 1-9, 13.... 355 Jones Act... ....... 149 Title 41, §§ 51, 54.... 138 Judjad Code (See also Title 42, §§ 1855-1855g. 355 _ *ltle § U. b. Code) . 23 Title 45, §§ 151-188... 157 Management^Rela- 88 398 312 511 McFadden Act............... 252 312......... So National Bank Act........ 252 § 005 ........... 323 National Labor Relations Title 49, Act 157,421,432,533 § 1 ......... 57,182 National Prohibition Act... 554 §3 94 Natural Gas Act............. 83 Title 50 App., §462... 116 Norris-LaGuardia Act. 157,421 Administrative Procedure Passport Act.............. 475 Act ................ 57,276 Public Vessels Act....... 149 Anti-Kickback Act......... 138 Railway Labor Act.... 157,196 Banking Act of 1933....... 252 Sedition Act............... 589 Bankruptcy Act............. 99 Smith Act.................. 589 Chandler Act............... 99 Suits in Admiralty Act.... 149 Civil Rights Act of 1964.... 39 Taft-Hartley Act......... 293 Criminal Appeals Act...... 263 Universal Military Training Displaced Persons Act of and Service Act 116 1948 .................. 214 War Brides Act............. 214 (B) Constitutions and Statutes of the States and the District of Columbia. Alabama. Arkansas. Code, Tit. 7, §574.... 188 Stat. Ann. §19-2416 Alaska (1956 ReP1- Vol.), Stat. § 12.55.060.... 554 Iio v’ it 097 Stat. § 23.20.525.... 355 p ... 509 (1964 Repl. Vol.). 907 Arizona. ’ Civil* Code §3265e.... 99 Code Ann. §44-1004... 554 Commercial Code Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12- § 3409 ............... 99 1122 .............. 458 Penal Code § 647..... 909 Rule Crim. Proc. 180.. 554 Penal Code § 1025..... 554 CH TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page Colorado. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 82-6-1 ..................355 Employment Security Act ................ 355 Delaware. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 3912 (Supp. 1964). 554 District of Columbia. Code §22-104......... 554 Florida. Stat. §821.18......... 39 Stat. Ann. §§48.01, 95.11 .............. 188 Stat. Ann. §775.11.... 554 Georgia. Const. 1789, Art. II, §2 ................. 231 Const. 1798, Art. II, §2 ................. 231 Const., Art. 2, § 2, Art. 3, §§ 4, 6, 7...... 116 Const., Art. 5, §1... 231 Code Ann. §§ 2-801, 2-1605, 2-1606, 2-1801, 2-1901........ 116 Code Ann. §2-3004... 231 Code Ann. §3-701.... 188 Code Ann. § 6-701.... 545 Code Ann. §§34-1514, 34-1515 (Supp. 1965), 40-1801 ............ 231 Code Ann. §§59-106, 59-108, 59-109, 59-124 ................ 545 Code Ann. §§61-301— 61-305 ............ 1037 Code Ann. §§92-6302, 92-6307 ............ 545 Code Ann. §§ 110-1001, 110-1002 ........... 188 Election Code......... 231 Hawaii. Rev. Laws §93-7 (Supp. 1963) .............. 355 Illinois. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §§ 22- 43, 603.1-603.9.... 554 Indiana. Const., Art. I, § 14.... 76 Stat. Ann. §§ 10-3405 (1956), 47-2001, 47-2002 (1965).......... 76 Page Kansas. Gen. Stat. Ann. §21— 107a ................ 554 Louisiana. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15: 529.1D (Supp. 1962). 554 Maryland. Rule Crim. Proc. 713.. 554 Massachusetts. Const., Art. 19 (1780). 39 Michigan. Stat. Ann. § 28.1085.... 554 Minnesota. Stat. Ann. § 609.16.... 554 Mississippi. Const., Art. 5, §§ 140, 141 ................. 231 Laws 1964, c. 366.... 554 Code Ann. § 4004-03 (Supp. 1964)......... 554 Missouri. Rev. Stat. §556.280... 554 Nebraska. Rev. Stat. §29-2221.. 554 New Hampshire. Const., Art. 32 (1784). 39 Rev. Stat. Ann. §284: 21-o ................ 263 New Jersey. Rev. Stat. §2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965)......... 493 Rev. Stat. §2A: 85-13 (Supp. 1966)......... 554 Stat. Ann. §30:4-123.12. 554 New York. Const., Art. I, §9....263 Laws 1965, c. 1030, §240.15 ............. 589 Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51 .................. 374 Civil Service Law §§ 12-a, 23-a (1939), 105.. 589 Education Law §§ 3021, 3022 ................ 589 Feinberg Law........... 589 Penal Law §§ 160, 161. 589 Penal Law §§ 1373, 1382 ................ 263 Penal Law § 1943..... 554 North Carolina. Const., Art. 18 (1776). 39 North Dakota. Cent. Code § 12-06-23. 554 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. cm Page Page Ohin T AilTlPQQPP Rev. Code Ann. Code Ann. §40-2801.. 554 §2961.13 ........... 554 Texas. Oklahoma. Code Crim. Proc., Arts. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 860 36.01, 642............ 554 (Supp. 1964)........ 554 Penal Code, Arts. 62, Oregon. 63, 64, 1257, 1408.... 554 Rev. Stat. § 138.550... 363 Utah. Rev. Stat. §§ 168.040, Code Ann. §§ 7-3-6 168.065 ............ 554 (Supp. 1965), 10-1-1. 252 Pennsylvania. Code Ann. § 76-1-19... 554 Const., Art. IX, § 20 Vermont. (1790) ............. 39 Const., c. II, §39............ 231 Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, Virginia. §5108 .............. 554 Code Ann. §53-296... 554 South Dakota. West Virginia. Code § 13.0611........ 554 Code Ann. §6131....... 554 (C) Proclamations and Resolutions. 1911, Aug. 22, 37 Stat. 1950, Dec. 16, 64 Stat. a454. 475 1716 ................... 355 1953, Jan. 17, 67 Stat. c31.. 475 1918, Aug. 8, 40 Stat. 1829.. 475 1956, June 6, H. Con. Res. 1941, Nov. 14, 55 Stat. 232, 70 Stat. B32......... 355 1696 ................... 475 (D) Treaties and Conventions. 1864, Aug. 22 (Geneva Con- the Wounded and the Sick vention for the Ameliora- of Armies in the Field), 47 tion of the Wounded in Stat. 2074................ 355 Armies in the Field), 22 1949, Aug. 12 (Geneva Con- Stat. 940............... 355 vention for the Multilat- 1929, July 27 (Geneva Con- eral Protection of War vention for the Ameliora- Victims), T. I. A. S. No. tion of the Condition of 3362 ..................... 355 (E) Foreign Statutes. England. Magna Carta, c. 61....................................... 39 Coinage Offences Act, 1861.............................. 554 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. Ill................................... 554 24 & 25 Viet., c. 99.................................... 554 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1966. SENFOUR INVESTMENT CO., INC. v. KING COUNTY. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. No. 93. Decided October 10, 1966. 66 Wash. 2d 644, 404 P. 2d 760, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Jerome M. Johnson for appellant. James E. Kennedy and William L. Paul, Jr., for appellee. Solicitor General Marshall and Philip A. Loomis, Jr., for the United States, as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 1 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U.S. JONES v. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 102. Decided October 10, 1966. 16 N. Y. 2d 829, 210 N. E. 2d 461, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Ralph B. Raukx for appellant. John G. Bonomi for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. MORRIS PARK, INC. v. BUCK. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT. No. 113. Decided October 10, 1966. 153 Conn. 290, 216 A. 2d 187, appeal dismissed. Francis B. Feeley and James T. Healey for appellant. Robert H. Alcorn for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 3 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 104. Decided October 10, 1966. 249 F. Supp. 712, affirmed. Samuel P. Delisi and Edward A. Kaier for appellants. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Charles L. Marinaccio and Robert W. Ginnane for the United States et al. James M. Carter for appellee Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Co. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. BUCHANAN et al. v. RHODES, GOVERNOR OF OHIO, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. No. 115. Decided October 10, 1966. 249 F. Supp. 860, appeal dismissed. Richard M. Markus for appellants. William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of Ohio, and Gerald A. Donahue, First Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. JORDAN ET AL V. VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. No. 122. Decided October 10, 1966. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442, appeal dismissed. Emil Hersh, Arthur Magidson, Joseph A. Fanelli and James H. Mann for appellants. Patrick T. Sheedy for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. BENNETT v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS. No. 143. Decided October 10, 1966. Certiorari granted; 174 Ct. Cl. 492, 356 F. 2d 525, vacated and remanded. Carl L. Shipley for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. Per Curiam. In light of the suggestion of the Solicitor General and upon an examination of the papers filed in this case, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the United States Court of Claims is vacated and the case is remanded to that court. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 5 385 U. S. October 10, 1966, ANNBAR ASSOCIATES et al. v. WEST SIDE REDEVELOPMENT CORP, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI. No. 152. Decided October 10, 1966. 397 S. W. 2d 635, appeal dismissed. William M. Kufeld for appellants. Guy W. Rice for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. GLICK et al. v. BALLENTINE PRODUCE, INC., ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI. No. 168. Decided October 10, 1966. 396 S. W. 2d 609, appeal dismissed. Elwyn L. Cady, Jr., for appellants. Morris H. Kross, John R. Caslavka, Harry P. Thomson, Jr., and E. E. Thompson for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. KRONSBEIN v. TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS OF TOWNSHIP THREE et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. No. 183. Decided October 10, 1966. 33 Ill. 2d 575, 213 N. E. 2d 261, appeal dismissed. Kenneth F. Kelly for appellant. G. William Horsley for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. BOARD OF SATANTA JOINT RURAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 et al. v. GRANT COUNTY PLANNING BOARD et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. No. 192. Decided October 10, 1966. 195 Kan. 640, 408 P. 2d 655, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Dale M. Stucky for appellants. Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, and J. Richard Foth, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 7 385 U.S. October 10, 1966. DOWDLE et al. v. NEW YORK et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 204. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. John Manning Regan for appellants. William J. Stevens for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. CALCATERRA v. ILLINOIS. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. No. 267. Decided October 10, 1966. 33 Ill. 2d 541, 213 N. E. 2d 270, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Charles A. Bellows for appellant. William. G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard A. Michael, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 8 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. TIETZ et AL. V. MARIENTHAL et al. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT. No. 217. Decided October 10, 1966. 238 Cal. App. 2d 905, 48 Cal. Rptr. 245, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. J. B. Tietz for appellants. Harold W. Kennedy and Henry F. Walker for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. REYNOLDS, dba LARRY & KATZ, et al. v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA. No. 229. Decided October 10, 1966. 248 La. 639, 181 So. 2d 377, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Saul Stone and Paul O. H. Pigman for appellants. George A. Bourgeois, Clem H. Sehrt and Peter J. Butler for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 9 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. UNITED STATES v. OHIO. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 271. Decided October 10, 1966. Certiorari granted; 354 F. 2d 549, reversed. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Morton Hollander and J. F. Bishop for the United States. William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of Ohio, and Gerald A. Donahue, First Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111. FERRANTE v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 277. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Henry Mark Holzer for appellant. J. Lee Rankin for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 233-653 0 - 67 -8 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. REED v. ILLINOIS. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. No. 282. Decided October 10, 1966. 33 Ill. 2d 535, 213 N.’ E. 2d 278, appeal dismissed. Mort A. Segall for appellant. William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard A. Michael and Philip J. Rock, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. TREFFRY et al. v. TAYLOR, DIRECTOR OF LICENSES FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. No. 291. Decided October 10, 1966. 67 Wash. 2d 487, 408 P. 2d 269, appeal dismissed. Francis J. Conklin for appellants. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 11 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. CAPELOUTO v. ORKIN EXTERMINATING CO. OF FLORIDA, INC. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. No. 316. Decided October 10, 1966. 183 So. 2d 532, appeal dismissed. Wilfred C. Yarn for appellant. J. Lewis Hall for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. MASLOWSKY et al. v. CASSIDY, CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMISSION, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. No. 574. Decided October 10, 1966. 34 Ill. 2d 456, 216 N. E. 2d 669, appeal dismissed. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and Thomas P. Sullivan for appellants. Owen Rall for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. 12 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. BOOKCASE, INC., et al. v. LEARY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 332. Decided October 10, 1966. 18 N. Y. 2d 71, 218 N. E. 2d 668, appeal dismissed. Emanuel Redfield and Benjamin E. Winston for appellants. J. Lee Rankin and Frank 8. Hogan for appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. GUY v. TAHASH, WARDEN, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA. No. 169, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 13 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. NEUMANN v. NEW YORK. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 40, Mise. Decided October 10,1966. 15 N. Y. 2d 979, 207 N. E. 2d 531, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. McClellan v. huston. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. No. 96, Mise. Decided October 10,1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Albert E. Savoy for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 14 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 10, 1966. 385 U. S. CROSS v. BRUNING, COUNTY CLERK OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 134, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. WAKIN v. PENNSYLVANIA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 293, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 15 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. BOYDEN v. MAY, WARDEN. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON. No. 351, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Appellant pro se. Solicitor General Marshall for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. BRADFORD v. HELMAN, JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 389, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Appellant pro se. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 385 U. S. October 10, 1966. SPIESEL v. ROOS. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 390, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Appellant pro se. Anthony L. Schiavetti for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. BRADFORD v. POSTEL, JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 402, Mise. Decided October 10, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Appellant pro se. Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Solo fl, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 17 385 U. S. October 17, 1966. KEMP v. HULTS, COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 125. Decided October 17, 1966. 17 N. Y. 2d 191, 216 N. E. 2d 592, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Emanuel Redfield for appellant. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Michael H. Rauch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 17, 1966. 385 U. S. PHELPER v. DECKER, SHERIFF. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 374. Decided October 17,1966. Certiorari granted; order reversed. Charles W. Tessmer and Emmett Colvin, Jr., for petitioner. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The order of May 5, 1966, denying the motion for a certificate of probable cause is reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart concurs for the reasons stated in his separate memorandum in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 672. Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent and would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 19 385 U. S. October 17, 1966. McGILL ET AL. V. RYALS, SHERIFF, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA. No. 381, Mise. Decided October 17, 1966. 253 F. Supp. 374, appeal dismissed. Vernon Z. Crawford, Morton Stavis, William M. Kunstler, Arthur Kinoy and Benjamin E. Smith for appellants. Truman Hobbs for appellees. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the case was not appropriate for a three-judge court. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that a three-judge court was properly convened and would affirm the judgment of the lower court. 20 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 24, 1966. 385 U. S. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 220. Argued October 10, 1966.—Decided October 24, 1966. 362 F. 2d 649, affirmed. Paul A. Porter and Dennis G. Lyons argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the briefs were Abe Krash and Daniel A. Rezneck. Neal Rutledge and Allan Milledge argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief was Lester P. Schoene. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 21 385 U. S. October 24, 1966. GILES ET AL. V. FRIENDLY FINANCE CO. OF BILOXI, INC., ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI. No. 426. Decided October 24, 1966. 185 So. 2d 659, 664, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., for appellants. Charles B. Henley for appellees Guaranty Loan Corp, of Mississippi et al. Per Curiam. The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 88, Mise. Decided October 24, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Appellant pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Edward P. O'Brien and Lawrence R. Mansir, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. October 24, 1966. 385 U. S. COLORADO-UTE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. WESTERN COLORADO POWER CO. et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO. No. 437. Decided October 24, 1966. 159 Colo. 262, 411 P. 2d 785, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. John A. Hughes, Raphael J. Moses and John J. Conway for appellant. Francis M. Shea, William H. Dempsey, Jr., and John R. Barry for appellees Western Colorado Power Co. et al. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. BRADFORD v. GA VAGAN, JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 574, Mise. Decided October 24, 1966. Appeal dismissed. Appellant pro se. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Solofi, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. SWITZERLAND ASSN. v. HORNE’S MARKET. 23 Opinion of the Court. SWITZERLAND CHEESE ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. E. HORNE’S MARKET, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. No. 42. Argued October 17, 1966.—Decided November 7, 1966. Petitioners sought a preliminary and permanent injunction in this trademark infringement suit. Following joinder of issues before trial, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment granting a permanent injunction, which the District Court denied because of unresolved factual issues. The Court of Appeals held that the order denying summary judgment was not an “interlocutory” one under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1), which provides for an appeal from an interlocutory order “refusing” an injunction, and dismissed the appeal. Held: Since the denial of the motion for summary judgment related only to pretrial procedures and not to the merits, it was not “interlocutory” and therefore not appealable under § 1292 (a)(1). 351 F. 2d 552, affirmed. David Toren argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John J. McGlew and Alfred E. Page. Harold E. Cole argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners brought this suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the trademark laws. 60 Stat. 427, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. They sought a preliminary injunction during the pendency of the action, a permanent injunction, and damages. After issue was joined, petitioners moved for a summary judgment granting a permanent injunction and awarding damages against respondent. The District Court could not say that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact” 24 385 U. S. OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. within the meaning of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which governs summary judgments and accordingly denied the motion. Petitioners appealed, claiming that order to be an “interlocutory” one “refusing” an injunction within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1).1 The Court of Appeals held that the order denying the motion for a summary judgment was not an “interlocutory” one within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 351 F. 2d 552. We granted certiorari because of a conflict between that decision and those from the Second Circuit. See, e. g., Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936.1 2 Unlike some state procedures, federal law expresses the policy against piecemeal appeals. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S' 176. Hence we approach this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders. It is earnestly argued, however, that, although this order denied a permanent injunction, it was nonetheless “interlocutory” within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) because the motion for summary judgment did service for a motion for a preliminary injunction (see Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, supra, at 938) and that therefore “interlocutory” must also include a denial of a permanent injunction. 1 That section provides: “(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: “(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 2 Subsequent to the grant of certiorari in this case, the Second Circuit, en banc, reversed its position and held that such an order is not appealable. Chappell & Co., Inc. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197. SWITZERLAND ASSN. v. HORNE’S MARKET. 25 23 Opinion of the Court. We take the other view not because “interlocutory” or preliminary may not at times embrace denials of permanent injunctions, but for the reason that the denial of a motion for a summary judgment because of unresolved issues of fact does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim. It is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing—that the case should go to trial. Orders that in no way touch on the merits of the claim but only relate to pretrial procedures are not in our view “interlocutory” within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1). We see no other way to protect the integrity of the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals.3 Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan would affirm the judgment below on the basis of the reasoning set forth in Judge Waterman’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Chappell & Co., Inc. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197. Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the result. * I 3 As Judge Charles E. Clark said, in dissent, in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F. 2d 800, at 805-806: “A district judge’s orders advancing a case to trial ought not to be critically examined and re-examined by the cumbersome method of appeal before he has approached the stage of adjudication. . . . I believe this an intolerable burden for us, an improper and uncertain interference with trial court discretion, and a confusing invitation to indiscriminate appeals in the future—all contrary to settled federal law against piecemeal appeals.” 233-653 0-67-9 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Per Curiam. 385 U. S. BLACK v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING. No. 1029, October Term, 1965. Certiorari denied May 2, 1966.— Rehearing and certiorari granted and case decided November 7, 1966. After denial of certiorari in this case, the Solicitor General voluntarily advised that, in connection with another matter, monitoring petitioner’s room disclosed conversations between petitioner and his attorney at the time this case was being presented to the Grand Jury. Notes and reports made therefrom were forwarded later to Tax Division attorneys for use in preparation for trial in the case. The Solicitor General also advised that these attorneys did not regard the material as relevant and did not know it included attorney-client conversations and suggested that the judgment be vacated and remanded to the District Court for a hearing at which the material would be produced and the court could determine whether the conviction should stand. In view of the report of the Solicitor General and in order to make certain that petitioner be accorded a trial free from any inadmissible evidence, held: The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. Rehearing and certiorari granted; 122 U. S. App. D. C. 347, 353 F. 2d 885, vacated and remanded. Hans A. Nathan, Warren E. Magee and Bert B. Rand for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. Per Curiam. In Davis v. United States, post, p. 927, we today denied the petition for certiorari. The sole question raised there (but not passed upon by the Court of Appeals because not necessary to its disposition) involved petitioners’ claim that conferences between petitioners and their counsel were surreptitiously overheard BLACK V. UNITED STATES. 27 26 Per Curiam. and intercepted by law enforcement officials through concealed monitorial devices built into the jail where petitioners were being held for federal authorities. The Solicitor General did not deny the existence of the devices but said that there were no recordings of the conversations in question. He pointed out that since the case has been remanded by the Court of Appeals for a new trial on other grounds, a full exploration of this question could be made on retrial. In the light of these representations we denied the petition for certiorari so that the question might be fully explored at the new trial, as suggested by the Solicitor General. In the instant case, Black v. United States, the petition for rehearing now raises a similar question and while Davis v. United States, supra, is not controlling, its relation is obvious. In Black the Solicitor General advised the Court voluntarily on May 24, 1966, after the petition for certiorari had been denied, 384 U. S. 927, but before an application for rehearing had been filed, that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a matter unrelated to this case, on February 7, 1963, installed a listening device in petitioner’s hotel suite in Washington, D. C. The device monitored and taped conversations held in the hotel suite during the period the offense was being investigated and beginning some two months before and continuing until about one month after the evidence in this case was presented to the Grand Jury. During that period, “the monitoring agents,” the Solicitor General advised, “overheard, among other conversations, exchanges between petitioner and the attorney who was then representing him [Black]” in this case. In a supplemental memorandum filed July 13, 1966, the Solicitor General, in response to an inquiry by the Court, stated that the recordings of such interceptions had been erased from the tapes but that notes summarizing and sometimes 28 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Per Curiam. 385 U. S. quoting the conversations intercepted were available, and that reports and memoranda concerning the same had been made. “Neither the reports nor the memoranda,” he reported, “were seen by attorneys of the Tax Division responsible for the prosecution of” this case until January 1964, when in preparing for trial they were included in material transmitted to them; the reports and memoranda of the intercepted conversations were examined by the Tax Division attorneys and retained by them until April 15, 1964, when petitioner’s trial began; and the attorneys never realized until April 21, 1966, that any conversations between Black and his attorney had been overheard and included in the transcriptions. The Solicitor General advised further that the “Tax Division attorneys found nothing in the F. B. I. reports or memoranda which they considered relevant to the tax evasion case.” He suggests that the judgment be vacated and remanded to the District Court in which the “relevant materials would be produced and the court would determine, upon an adversary hearing, whether petitioner’s conviction should stand.” We have sometimes used this technique in federal criminal cases, United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233. However, its use has never been automatic. Indeed, in Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227, we found it necessary, despite the hearing in the District Court, to subsequently order a new’ trial on the merits, 350 U. S. 377. There are other complicating factors here that were not present in Remmer. There the judge had been informed of the alleged jury tampering, but here neither the judge, the petitioner nor his counsel knew of the action of the federal agents. Moreover, the Solicitor General advises that the Tax Division attorneys did not know at the time of the trial that conversations between Black and his attorney were included in the transcriptions. In view of these facts it appears that justice requires that a BLACK V. UNITED STATES. 29 26 Harlan, J., dissenting. new trial be held so as to afford the petitioner an opportunity to protect himself from the use of evidence that might be otherwise inadmissible. This Court has never been disposed to vacate convictions without adequate justification, but, under the circumstances presented by the Solicitor General in this case we believe that a new trial must be held. This will give the parties an opportunity to present the relevant evidence and permit the trial judge to decide the questions involved. It will also permit the removal of any doubt as to Black’s receiving a fair trial with full consideration being given to the new evidence reported to us by the Solicitor General. The petition for rehearing is therefore granted, the order denying certiorari vacated, certiorari granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for a new trial. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Harlan, whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting. The denial of certiorari in No. 245, Davis v. United States—where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has already ordered a new trial on grounds wholly unrelated to alleged eavesdropping and at which trial petitioners will have a full opportunity to explore their contentions that the Government interfered with their constitutionally protected right to counsel—bears no solid relation to, still less furnishes justification for, what the Court has done in the present case. A brief statement of the circumstances of the Black disposition will reveal that in summarily vacating this final conviction and ordering a completely new trial the Court has acted prematurely. 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Harlan, J., dissenting. 385 U.S. In 1964, petitioner Black was convicted in the District Court of federal income tax violations. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on November 10, 1965. 122 U. S. App. D. C. 347, 353 F. 2d 885. Certiorari was denied by this Court on May 2, 1966. 384 U. S. 927. Before Black’s petition for rehearing was filed here, the Solicitor General filed a memorandum bringing to the Court’s attention the fact that in the course of an unrelated criminal investigation Black’s hotel suite had been “bugged" by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and conversations between Black and his attorney electronically recorded. The Solicitor General further stated that in consequence of an investigation, instituted by him following his discovery of this occurrence, he was able to represent to the Court that none of the information so procured had been utilized in Black’s aforesaid prosecution. In a further memorandum, filed in compliance with a request from this Court, the Solicitor General has represented that it was not until late August 1965 that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice learned that a listening device had been installed in Black’s hotel suite and not until April 21, 1966, that attorneys in the Tax Division, responsible for the prosecution, learned that any conversations between Black and his counsel had been overheard. The Solicitor General recognizes that Black is entitled to a full exploration of the matter, and to that end suggests that the case be remanded to the District Court for a hearing and findings on the episode in question as it may bear on the validity of Black’s conviction. Black responds that this course is inadequate and contends that this Court should, without more, forthwith order dismissal of the indictment in this income tax prosecution. Without anything more before it than the representations made by both sides, the Court today orders a totally BLACK V. UNITED STATES. 31 26 Harlan, J., dissenting. new trial in spite of the fact that the disclosures commendably made by the Solicitor General reveal no use of “bugged” material in Black’s prosecution, and no knowledge by prosecuting attorneys that material may have been improperly obtained. I agree, of course, that petitioner is entitled to a full-scale development of the facts, but I can see no valid reason why this unimpeached conviction should be vacated at this stage. In Davis, supra, exploration of the alleged eavesdropping episode is appropriate upon the retrial of the case since the original conviction has already fallen on other grounds. In the Black case, however, a new trial is not an appropriate vehicle for sorting out the eavesdropping issue because until it is determined that such occurrence vitiated the original conviction no basis for a retrial exists. The Court’s action puts the cart before the horse. The orderly procedure is to remand the case to the District Court for a hearing and findings on the issues in question. See United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233. See also Remmer n. United States, 347 U. S. 227, 350 U. S. 377. Unless and until the facts on this issue have been resolved and their legal effect assessed favorably to petitioner, this conviction should remain undisturbed. The only basis I can think of for justifying this decision is that any governmental activity of the kind here in question automatically vitiates, so as at least to require a new trial, any conviction occurring during the span of such activity. But I cannot believe that the Court, without even briefing or argument, intends to make any such sweeping innovation in the federal criminal law by today’s peremptory disposition of this case. 32 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Per Curiam. 385 U. S. PITTSBURGH TOWING CO. v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY BARGE LINE CO. et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. No. 319. Decided November 7, 1966. Court’s exercise of discretion held not warranted to overlook 22-day delay beyond time fixed by its Rule 13 (1) for docketing of appeals, where such delay was inadequately accounted for. 252 F. Supp. 162, appeal dismissed. Ernie Adamson for appellant. Arthur L. Winn, Jr., Samuel H. Moerman, J. Raymond Clark and James M. Henderson for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted for failure of appellant to comply with the time requirement of Rule 13 (1) of the Rules of this Court in docketing its appeal. This appeal was docketed 22 days after expiration of the 60-day period provided by the Rule. During that period, appellant made no application for an enlargement of time, either to the District Court or to a Justice of this Court (see Rule 13(1)), nor did any explanation accompany the untimely docketing of the appeal. The jurisdictional statement itself is silent on the subject. Not until appellee moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 14 (2) did appellant comment upon its default. Its reply to the Motion to Dismiss states that the “delay was occasioned by a misunderstanding between Counsel for appellant.” It does not elaborate. This Court has been generous in excusing errors of counsel, but if there are to be rules, there must be some limit to our willingness to overlook their violation. While we are inclined to be generous in exercising our discretion to forgive a mistake and waive the consequences PITTSBURGH TOWING v. BARGE LINE. 33 32 Black, J., dissenting. of negligence, fairness to other counsel and to parties with business before the Court as well as due regard for our own procedures leads us to believe that this case does not warrant our indulgence. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting. Due to a misunderstanding among appellant’s lawyers this case was not docketed nor was the record filed until 22 days after the 60-day period prescribed by this Court’s Rule 13 (1). The Court now, quite contrary to its recent practices, dismisses the case pursuant to Rule 14 (2) because of this error of appellant’s lawyers. Rule 14 (2) permits, but does not require, such a harsh court order to be made. Appellant’s counsel, upon reporting the misunderstanding to a member of this Court, could unquestionably have obtained an enlargement of the time to docket the case extending even beyond the 22 days within which the record was actually filed. There is no indication whatever that the appellees, their counsel or other parties with business before this Court have been injured—as the Court seems to intimate without record support—by this slight formalistic delinquency. On the contrary, the appellant is denied review of a judgment setting aside an Interstate Commerce Commission order, a type of three-judge district court judgment from which Congress has seen fit to give aggrieved persons a direct appeal to this Court. Thus, for a mere paper-filing negligence of appellant’s counsel, the purpose of Congress to grant reviews of this special category of administrative orders is frustrated. This case is now to take its place among a growing number of others where mere procedural rules have been used to prevent the consideration and determination of cases on their merits. See, e. g., Lord v. Helmandollar, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 168, 348 F. 2d 780, cert, denied, 383 U. S. 928, Black, J., dissenting; Riess v. Murchison, 34 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Black, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. cert, denied, 383 U. S. 946, Black, J., dissenting; Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 636, Black, J., joined by The Chief Justice, dissenting; Beaufort Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 384 U. S. 1004, Black, J., dissenting; Santana v. United States, post, p. 848, Black, J., dissenting. I find it inconsistent with a fair system of justice to throw7 out a litigant’s case because his lawyer, due to negligence, or misunderstanding, or some other reason fails to satisfy one of many procedural time limits. If a pound of flesh is required because of negligence of a lawyer, why not impose the penalty on him and not his innocent client? As I have previously stated, “The filing of court papers on time is, of course, important in our court system. But lawsuits are not conducted to reward the litigant whose lawyer is most diligent or to punish the litigant whose lawyer is careless. Procedural paper requirements should never stand as a series of dangerous hazards to the achievement of justice through a fair trial on the merits.” Beaufort Concrete Co., supra, at 1006, Black, J., dissenting. The conflict between the interest of the court clerk in the timely filing of papers and the interest of the citizen in having his lawsuit tried should be resolved in favor of the citizen, not the court clerk. I would not dismiss this case for violation of Rule 13 (1). DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 35 385 U.S. November 7, 1966. KELSEY et al. v. CORBETT et al. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF TEXAS, EIGHTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT. No. 475. Decided November 7, 1966. 396 S. W. 2d 440, appeal dismissed. Boyd Laughlin for appellants. Thomas C. Wicker, Jr., for appellees Corbett et al. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. CARR v. CITY OF ALTUS et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 481. Decided November 7, 1966. 255 F. Supp. 828, affirmed. Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, pro se, Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attorney General, T. B. Wright, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. Arthur Sandlin, George C. Black, Jr., and Roger Tyler, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. A. W. Walker, Jr., for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. 36 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. November 7, 1966. 385 U. S. MASSEY v. GEORGIA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. No. 630, Mise. Recided November 7, 1966. 222 Ga. 143, 149 S. E. 2d 118, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Floyd H. Wardlow, Jr., and John R. Rogers for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. MATRANGA v. McDONNELL, SHERIFF. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI. No. 686, Mise. Decided November 7, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Albert Sidney Johnston and John M. Sekul for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 37 385 U. S. November 7, 1966. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 486. Decided November 7, 1966. 253 F. Supp. 129, affirmed. Leslie Hodson, Hammond E. Chaffetz, Joseph DuCoeur and Richard J. Archer for appellant. Solicitor General Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Turner for the United States, and Burnham Enersen and Stephen Grant for General Brewing Corp., appellees. Godfrey L. Munter, Jr., for Ray et al., as amici curiae, in support of appellant. Per Curiam. The motion of Philip A. Ray et al., for leave to file a brief, as amici curiae, is granted. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and would set the case for argument. 38 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. November 7, 1966. 385 U.S. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 496. Decided November 7, 1966* 253 F. Supp. 481, affirmed. I. J. Gromfine and Herman Sternstein for appellant in No. 496. David Previant and Herbert S. Thatcher for appellants in No. 497. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Charles L. Marinaccio, Robert W. Ginnane and Leonard S. Goodman for the United States et al. in both cases. James E. Wilson and Warren Woods for American Buslines, Inc., and Robert J. Corber for National Association of Motor Bus Owners, appellees in No. 496. William T. Croft for Overnite Transportation Co. etal., appellees in No. 497. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. *Together with' No. 497, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America et al. v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same court. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 39 Syllabus. ADDERLEY et al. v. FLORIDA. CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT. No. 19. Argued October 18, 1966.—Decided November 14, 1966. Petitioners, 32 students, were members of a group of about 200 who on a nonpublic jail driveway, which they blocked, and on adjacent county jail premises had, by singing, clapping, and dancing, demonstrated against their schoolmates’ arrest and perhaps against segregation in the jail and elsewhere. The sheriff, the jail’s custodian, advised them that they were trespassing on county property and would have to leave or be arrested. The 107 demonstrators refusing to depart were thereafter arrested and convicted under a Florida trespass statute for “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent.” Petitioners contend that their convictions, affirmed by the Florida Circuit Court and the District Court of Appeal, deprived them of their “rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: 1. The Florida trespass statute, here applied to a demonstration on the premises of a jail, which is built for security purposes and is not open to the public, is aimed at conduct of a limited kind and is not unconstitutionally vague as were the common-law, breach-of-the-peace statutes invalidated in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 559. Pp. 41-43. 2. The doctrine of abatement is inapplicable here. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, distinguished. P. 43. 3. The abstract proposition that petty criminal statutes may not be used to violate minorities’ constitutional rights is irrelevant to this case. P. 44. 4. There was ample evidence to support petitioners’ trespass convictions for remaining on jail grounds reserved for jail uses after they had been directed to leave by the sheriff. There was no evidence at all that petitioners were arrested or convicted for their views or objectives. Pp. 44—48. 175 So. 2d 249, affirmed. Richard Yale Feder argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Tobias Simon. 40 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. William D. Roth, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief was Earl Faircloth, Attorney General. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, Harriett Louise Adderley and 31 other persons, were convicted by a jury in a joint trial in the County Judge’s Court of Leon County, Florida, on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” upon the premises of the county jail contrary to § 821.18 of the Florida statutes set out below.1 Petitioners, apparently all students of the Florida A. & M. University in Tallahassee, had gone from the school to the jail about a mile away, along with many other students, to “demonstrate” at the jail their protests of arrests of other protesting students the day before, and perhaps to protest more generally against state and local policies and practices of racial segregation, including segregation of the jail. The county sheriff, legal custodian of the jail and jail grounds, tried to persuade the students to leave the jail grounds. When this did not work, he notified them that they must leave, that if they did not leave he would arrest them for trespassing, and that if they resisted he would charge them with that as well. Some of the students left but others, including petitioners, remained and they were arrested. On appeal the convictions were affirmed by the Florida Circuit Court and then by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 175 So. 2d 249. That being the highest state court to which they could appeal, petitioners applied to us for certiorari 1 “Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.” Fla. Stat. §821.18 (1965). ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 41 39 Opinion of the Court. contending that, in view of petitioners’ purpose to protest against jail and other segregation policies, their conviction denied them “rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” On this “Question Presented” we granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 1023. Petitioners present their argument on this question in four separate points, and for convenience we deal with each of their points in the order in which they present them. I. Petitioners have insisted from the beginning of this case that it is controlled by and must be reversed because of our prior cases of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 559. We cannot agree. The Edwards case, like this one, did come up when a number of persons demonstrated on public property against their State’s segregation policies. They also sang hymns and danced, as did the demonstrators in this case. But here the analogies to this case end. In Edwards, the demonstrators went to the South Carolina State Capitol grounds to protest. In this case they went to the jail. Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not. The demonstrators at the South Carolina Capitol went in through a public driveway and as they entered they were told by state officials there that they had a right as citizens to go through the State House grounds as long as they were peaceful. Here the demonstrators entered the jail grounds through a driveway used only for jail purposes and without warning to or permission from the sheriff. More importantly, South Carolina sought to prosecute its State Capitol demonstrators by charging them with the common-law crime of breach of the peace. 233-653 0 - 67 - 10 42 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. This Court in Edwards took pains to point out at length the indefinite, loose, and broad nature of this charge; indeed, this Court pointed out at p. 237, that the South Carolina Supreme Court had itself declared that the “breach of the peace” charge is “not susceptible of exact definition.” South Carolina’s power to prosecute, it was emphasized at p. 236, would have been different had the State proceeded under a “precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed” such as, for example, “limiting the periods during which the State House grounds were open to the public . . . The South Carolina breach-of-the-peace statute was thus struck down as being so broad and all-embracing as to jeopardize speech, press, assembly and petition, under the constitutional doctrine enunciated in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307-308, and followed in many subsequent cases. And it was on this same ground of vagueness that in Cox v. “Louisiana, supra, at 551-552, the Louisiana breach-of-the-peace law used to prosecute Cox was invalidated. The Florida trespass statute under which these petitioners were charged cannot be challenged on this ground. It is aimed at conduct of one limited kind, that is, for one person or persons to trespass upon the property of another with a malicious and mischievous intent. There is no lack of notice in this law, nothing to entrap or fool the unwary. Petitioners seem to argue that the Florida trespass law is void for vagueness because it requires a trespass to be “with a malicious and mischievous intent . . . But these words do not broaden the scope of trespass so as to make it cover a multitude of types of conduct as does the common-law breach-of-the-peace charge. On the contrary, these words narrow the scope of the offense. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 43 39 Opinion of the Court. The trial court charged the jury as to their meaning and petitioners have not argued that this definition, set out below,2 is not a reasonable and clear definition of the terms. The use of these terms in the statute, instead of contributing to uncertainty and misunderstanding, actually makes its meaning more understandable and clear. II. Petitioners in this Court invoke the doctrine of abatement announced by this Court in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306. But that holding was that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, which made it unlawful for places of public accommodation to deny service to any person because of race, effected an abatement of prosecutions of persons for seeking such services that arose prior to the passage of the Act. But this case in no way involves prosecution of petitioners for seeking service in establishments covered by the Act. It involves only an alleged trespass on jail grounds—a trespass which can be prosecuted regardless of the fact that it is the means of protesting segregation of establishments covered by the Act. 2 “ ‘Malicious’ means wrongful, you remember back in the original charge, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt there was a malicious and mischievous intent. The word ‘malicious’ means that the wrongful act shall be done voluntarily, unlawfully and without excuse or justification. The word ‘malicious’ that is used in these affidavits does not necessarily allege nor require the State to prove that the defendant had actual malice in his mind at the time of the alleged trespass. Another way of stating the definition of ‘malicious- is by ‘malicious’ is meant the act was done knowingly and willfully and without any legal justification. “ ‘Mischievous,’ which is also required, means that the alleged trespass shall be inclined to cause petty and trivial trouble, annoyance and vexation to others in order for you to find that the alleged trespass was committed with mischievous intent.” R. 74. 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. III. Petitioners next argue that “petty criminal statutes may not be used to violate minorities’ constitutional rights.” This of course is true but this abstract proposition gets us nowhere in deciding this case. IV. Petitioners here contend that “Petitioners’ convictions are based on a total lack of relevant evidence.” If true, this would be a denial of due process under Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, and Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. Both in the petition for certiorari and in the brief on the merits petitioners state that their summary of the evidence “does not conflict with the facts contained in the Circuit Court’s opinion” which was in effect affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. 175 So. 2d 249. That statement is correct and petitioners’ summary of facts, as well as that of the Circuit Court, shows an abundance of facts to support the jury’s verdict of guilty in this case. In summary both these statements show testimony ample to prove this: Disturbed and upset by the arrest of their schoolmates the day before, a large number of Florida A. & M. students assembled on the school grounds and decided to march down to the county jail. Some apparently wanted to be put in jail too, along with the students already there.3 A group of around 200 marched 3 The three petitioners who testified insisted that they had not come to the jail for the purpose of being arrested. But both the sheriff and a deputy testified that they heard several of the demonstrators present at the jail loudly proclaim their desire to be arrested. Indeed, this latter version is borne out by the fact that, though assertedly protesting the prior arrests of their fellow students and the city’s segregation policies, none of the demonstrators carried any signs and upon arriving at the jail, no speeches or other verbal protests were made. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 45 39 Opinion of the Court. from the school and arrived at the jail singing and clapping.4 They went directly to the jail-door entrance where they were met by a deputy sheriff, evidently surprised by their arrival. He asked them to move back, claiming they were blocking the entrance to the jail and fearing that they might attempt to enter the jail. They moved back part of the way, where they stood or sat, singing, clapping and dancing, on the jail driveway and on an adjacent grassy area upon the jail premises. This particular jail entrance and driveway were not normally used by the public, but by the sheriff’s department for transporting prisoners to and from the courts several blocks away and by commercial concerns for servicing the jail. Even after their partial retreat, the demonstrators continued to block vehicular passage over this driveway up to the entrance of the jail.5 Someone called the sheriff who was at the moment apparently conferring with one of the state court judges about incidents connected with prior arrests for demonstrations. When the sheriff returned to the jail, he immediately inquired if all was safe inside the jail and was told it was. He then engaged in a conversation with two of the 4 There is no evidence that any attempt was made by law enforcement officers to interfere with this march, or, for that matter, that such officers even knew of the march or its ultimate destination. 5 Although some of the petitioners testified that they had no intention of interfering with vehicular traffic to and from the jail entrance and that they noticed no vehicle trying to enter or leave the driveway, the deputy sheriff testified that it would have been impossible for automobiles to drive up to the jail entrance and that one serviceman, finished with his business in the jail, waited inside because the demonstrators were sitting around and leaning against his truck parked outside. The sheriff testified that the time the demonstrators were there, between 9:30 and 10 Monday morning, was generally a very busy time for using the jail entrance to transport weekend inmates to the courts and for tradesmen to make service calls at the jail. 46 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. leaders. He told them that they were trespassing upon jail property and that he would give them 10 minutes to leave or he would arrest them. Neither of the leaders did anything to disperse the crowd, and one of them told the sheriff that they wanted to get arrested. A local minister talked with some of the demonstrators and told them not to enter the jail, because they could not arrest themselves, but just to remain where they were. After about 10 minutes, the sheriff, in a voice loud enough to be heard by all, told the demonstrators that he was the legal custodian of the jail and its premises, that they were trespassing on county property in violation of the law, that they should all leave forthwith or he would arrest them, and that if they attempted to resist arrest, he would charge them with that as a separate offense. Some of the group then left. Others, including all petitioners, did not leave. Some of them sat down. In a few minutes, realizing that the remaining demonstrators had no intention of leaving, the sheriff ordered his deputies to surround those remaining on jail premises and placed them, 107 demonstrators, under arrest. The sheriff unequivocally testified that he did not arrest any persons other than those who were on the jail premises. Of the three petitioners testifying, two insisted that they were arrested before they had a chance to leave, had they wanted to, and one testified that she did not intend to leave. The sheriff again explicitly testified that he did not arrest any person who was attempting to leave. Under the foregoing testimony the jury was authorized to find that the State had proven every essential element of the crime, as it was defined by the state court. That interpretation is, of course, binding on us, leaving only the question of whether conviction of the state offense, thus defined, unconstitutionally deprives petitioners of their rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition. We hold it does not. The sheriff, as jail custodian, ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 47 39 Opinion of the Court. had power, as the state courts have here held, to direct that this large crowd of people get off the grounds. There is not a shred of evidence in this record that this power was exercised, or that its exercise was sanctioned by the lower courts, because the sheriff objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the objectives of their protest. The record reveals that he objected only to their presence on that part of the jail grounds reserved for jail uses. There is no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large groups of the public been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for any purpose.6 Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff’s order to remove themselves from what amounted to the curtilage of the jailhouse. The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners’ argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian’s objections, because this “area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only ‘reasonable’ but also particularly appropriate . . . .” Such an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption 6 In Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 558, the Court emphasized: “It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion is ‘exercised with “uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination” . . . [and with] a “systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with reference to the convenience of public use of the highways 48 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Douglas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 554-555 and 563-564/ We reject it again. The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose. These judgments are Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Fortas concur, dissenting. The First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth (Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235), provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” These rights, along with religion, speech, and press, are preferred rights of the Constitution, made so by reason of that explicit guarantee and 7 “The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. . A group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations ” 379 U. S., at 554-555. “The conduct which is the subject of this statute—picketing and parading—is subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association. The examples are many of the application by this Court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited.” Id., at 563. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 49 39 Douglas, J., dissenting. what Edmond Cahn in Confronting Injustice (1966) referred to as “The Firstness of the First Amendment.” 1 With all respect, therefore, the Court errs in treating the case as if it were an ordinary trespass case or an ordinary picketing case. The jailhouse, like an executive mansion, a legislative chamber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself (Edwards v. South Carolina, supra) is one of the seats of government, whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or a small county jail. And when it houses political prisoners or those who many think are unjustly held, it is an obvious center for protest. The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history1 2 and 1 “Where would we really find the principal danger to civil liberty in a republic? Not in the governors as governors, not in the governed as governed, but in the governed unequipped to function as governors. The chief enemies of republican freedom are mental sloth, conformity, bigotry’, superstition, credulity, monopoly in the market of ideas, and utter, benighted ignorance. Relying as it does on the consent of the governed, representative government cannot succeed unless the community receives enough information to grasp public issues and make sensible decisions. As lights which may have been enough for the past do not meet the needs of the present, so present lights will not suffice for the more extensive and complex problems of the future. Heretofore public enlightenment may have been only a manifest desideratum; today it constitutes an imperative necessity. The First Amendment, says Justice Black, ‘reflects the faith that a good society is not static but advancing, and that the fullest possible interchange of ideas and beliefs is essential to attainment of this goal.’ [From Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 501 (dissenting opinion).]” Cahn, supra, at 102. 2 The historical antecedents of the right to petition for the redress of grievances run deep, and strike to the heart of the democratic philosophy. C. 61 of the Magna Carta provided: “[T]hat if we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any of our servants shall have done wrong in any way toward any one, or shall have transgressed any of the articles of peace or security; and the wrong shall have been shown to four barons of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, let those four barons come to us or to our justiciar, if we 50 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Douglas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor. See N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-431. Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control television are out of the kingdom, laying before us the transgression, and let them ask that we cause that transgression to be corrected without delay.” Sources of Our Liberties 21 (Perry ed. 1959). The representatives of the people vigorously exercised the right in order to gain the initiative in legislation and a voice in their government. See Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament 329-331 (1964). By 1669 the House of Commons had resolved that “it is an inherent right of every commoner of England to prepare and present Petitions to the house of commons in case of grievance,” and “That no court whatsoever hath power to judge or censure any Petition presented . . . .” 4 Pari. Hist. Eng. 432-433 (1669). The Bill of Rights of 1689 provided “That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.” Adams & Stephens, Select Documents of English Constitutional History 464. The right to petition for a redress of grievances was early asserted in the Colonies. The Stamp Act Congress of 1765 declared “That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies, to petition the king or either house of parliament.” Sources of Our Liberties 271 (Perry ed. 1959). The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, adopted October 14, 1774, declared that Americans “have a right peaceably to assemble, consider their grievances, and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are illegal.” Id., at 288. The Declaration of Independence assigned as one of the reasons for the break from England the fact that “Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.” The constitutions of four of the original States specifically guaranteed the right. Mass. Const., Art. 19 (1780); Pa. Const., Art. IX, §20 (1790); N. H. Const., Art. 32 (1784); N. C. Const., Art. 18 (1776). ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 51 39 Douglas, J., dissenting. and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are peaceable, as these were. There is no question that petitioners had as their purpose a protest against the arrest of Florida A. & M. students for trying to integrate public theatres. The sheriff’s testimony indicates that he well understood the purpose of the rally. The petitioners who testified unequivocally stated that the group was protesting the arrests, and state and local policies of segregation, including segregation of the jail. This testimony was not contradicted or even questioned. The fact that no one gave a formal speech, that no elaborate handbills were distributed, and that the group was not laden with signs would seem to be immaterial. Such methods are not the sine qua non of petitioning for the redress of grievances. The group did sing “freedom” songs. And history shows that a song can be a powerful tool of protest. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 LT. S. 536, 546—548. There was no violence; no threat of violence; no attempted jail break; no storming of a prison; no plan or plot to do anything but protest. The evidence is uncontradicted that the petitioners’ conduct did not upset the jailhouse routine; things went on as they normally would. None of the group entered the jail. Indeed, they moved back from the entrance as they were instructed. There was no shoving, no pushing, no disorder or threat of riot. It is said that some of the group blocked part of the driveway leading to the jail entrance. The chief jailer, to be sure, testified that vehicles would not have been able to use the driveway. Never did the students locate themselves so as to cause interference with persons or vehicles going to or coming from the jail. Indeed, it is undisputed that the sheriff and deputy sheriff, in 52 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Douglas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. separate cars, were able to drive up the driveway to the parking places near the entrance and that no one obstructed their path. Further, it is undisputed that the entrance to the jail was not blocked. And whenever the students were requested to move they did so. If there was congestion, the solution was a further request to move to lawns or parking areas, not complete ejection and arrest. The claim is made that a tradesman waited inside the jail because some of the protestants were sitting around and leaning on his truck. The only evidence supporting such a conclusion is the testimony of a deputy sheriff that the tradesman “came to the door . . . and then did not leave.” His remaining is just as consistent with a desire to satisfy his curiosity as it is with a restraint. Finally, the fact that some of the protestants may have felt their cause so just that they were willing to be arrested for making their protest outside the jail seems wholly irrelevant. A petition is nonetheless a petition, though its futility may make martyrdom attractive. We do violence to the First Amendment when we permit this “petition for redress of grievances” to be turned into a trespass action. It does not help to analogize this problem to the problem of picketing. Picketing is a form of protest usually directed against private interests. I do not see how rules governing picketing in general are relevant to this express constitutional right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. In the first place the jailhouse grounds were not marked with “NO TRESPASSING!” signs, nor does respondent claim that the public was generally excluded from the grounds. Only the sheriff’s fiat transformed lawful conduct into an unlawful trespass. To say that a private owner could have done the same if the rally had taken place on private property is to speak of a different case, as an assembly and a petition for redress of grievances run to government, not to private proprietors. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 53 39 Douglas, J., dissenting. The Court forgets that prior to this day our decisions have drastically limited the application of state statutes inhibiting the right to go peacefully on public property to exercise First Amendment rights. As Mr. Justice Roberts wrote in Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 515-516: . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; blit it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” Such was the case of Edwards v. South Carolina, where aggrieved people “peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government” to express their grievances to the citizens of the State as well as to the legislature. Supra, at 235. Edwards was in the tradition of Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, where the public streets were said to be “immemorially associated” with “the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions.” Id., at 574. When we allow Florida to construe her “malicious trespass” statute to bar a person from going on property knowing it is not his own and to apply that prohibition to public property, we discard Cox and Edwards. Would the case be any different if, as is common, the demonstration took place outside a building which housed both the jail and the legislative body? I think not. 54 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Douglas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to other purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous. There may be some instances in which assemblies and petitions for redress of grievances are not consistent with other necessary purposes of public property. A noisy meeting may be out of keeping with the serenity of the statehouse or the quiet of the courthouse. No one, for example, would suggest that the Senate gallery is the proper place for a vociferous protest rally. And in other cases it may be necessary to adjust the right to petition for redress of grievances to the other interests inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put. See Cox v. New Hampshire, supra; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395. But this is quite different from saying that all public places are off limits to people with grievances. See Hague v. C. I. 0., supra; Cox v. New Hampshire, supra; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 415-416; Edwards v. South Carolina, supra. And it is farther yet from saying that the “custodian” of the public property in his discretion can decide when public places shall be used for the communication of ideas, especially the constitutional right to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. See Hague v. C. I. 0., supra; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163-164; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268; Shuttles-worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87. For to place such discretion in any public official, be he the “custodian” of the public property or the local police commissioner (cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290), is to place those who assert their First Amendment rights at his mercy. It gives him the awesome power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who shall be denied a place to air their claims and petition their government. Such power is out of step with all our decisions prior to ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA. 55 39 Douglas, J., dissenting. today where we have insisted that before a First Amendment right may be curtailed under the guise of a criminal law, any evil that may be collateral to the exercise of the right, must be isolated and defined in a “narrowly drawn” statute (Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 307) lest the power to control excesses of conduct be used to suppress the constitutional right itself. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258-259; Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 238; N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, supra, at 433. That tragic consequence happens today when a trespass law is used to bludgeon those who peacefully exercise a First Amendment right to protest to government against one of the most grievous of all modern oppressions which some of our States are inflicting on our citizens. What we do today disregards the admonition in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364-365: “These [First Amendment] rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.” 56 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Douglas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a constitutional right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach-of-the-peace statute, a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end.3 It is said that the sheriff did not make the arrests because of the views which petitioners espoused. That excuse is usually given, as we know from the many cases involving arrests of minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful assemblies, and parading without a permit. The charge against William Penn, who preached a nonconformist doctrine in a street in London, was that he caused “a great concourse and tumult of people” in contempt of the King and “to the great disturbance of his peace.” 6 How. St. Tr. 951, 955. That was in 1670. In modern times, also, such arrests are usually sought to be justified by some legitimate function of government.4 Yet by allowing these orderly and civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed, we only increase the forces of frustration which the conditions of second-class citizenship are generating amongst us. 3 In 1932 over 28,000 veterans demanding a bonus marched on Washington, D. C., paraded the streets, and camped mostly in parks and other public lands in the District, Virginia, and Maryland only to be routed by the Army. See Waters, B. E. F. (1933). 4 See, e. g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87. The same is true of other measures which inhibit First Amendment rights. See, e. g., N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479; N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. If the invalidity of regulations and official conduct curtailing First Amendment rights turned on an unequivocal showing that the measure was intended to inhibit the rights, protection would be sorely lacking. It is not the intent or purpose of the measure but its effect on First Amendment rights which is crucial. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 57 Syllabus. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. et al. v. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY CO. et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. No. 15. Argued October 11, 1966.—Decided November 14, 1966* Appellants, seven railroads, applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for authority to provide direct service to the Lake Calumet Harbor Port, which is being developed by the Chicago Regional Port District as a major deep water port facility for traffic via the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Port area is now served directly by only Rock Island, which along with the nearest rail facility, Nickel Plate (later merged into the Norfolk & Western), intervened in opposition to the proposed expansion of rail service. The applications sought approval of trackage extension as well as an unexecuted agreement between appellants and the Port District for operations within the Port area. After a full hearing, the Hearing Examiner recommended approval of appellants’ entire project. The ICC adopted the recommendations but ruled that the applicants should file supplemental applications covering Port area operations as provided in the proposed lease with the Port District. The supplemental applications covering the lease were filed, an exclusive operating clause to which the ICC had objected having been eliminated. The ICC, finding that the public convenience and necessity required the additional services applied for by appellants, approved the applications, as supplemented, without a further hearing which the Rock Island and Nickel Plate had requested, the ICC having concluded that the previous hearing record was adequate to support the entire project. A second supplemental application was later filed clarifying the rental provision which in the ICC’s view required no further hearing as requested by those railroads. The Rock Island and Nickel Plate sued to enjoin the ICC’s orders, which a three- *Together with No. 17, Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., et al. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al. and No. 20, United States et al. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. 233-653 0 - 67 - 11 58 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. judge District Court set aside as not supported by sufficient evidence. The District Court also found that due process required that Rock Island and Nickel Plate be granted a hearing on the rental provisions. The court ordered a hearing on all the issues. Held: 1. The ICC’s action granting appellant railroads’ applications to provide additional service was supported by “substantial evidence” on the record viewed as a whole as to the Port’s future potential and the need for providing competitive rail service at the outset of the Port’s development. It was not the District Court’s function to substitute its own conclusions for those which the ICC had fairly drawn from its findings. Pp. 65-69. 2. During the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and the ICC, the operations of the appellants within the Port area were fully considered as an integral part of their overall plan, and the District Court had no basis for concluding that due process required a new hearing on the issues. Pp. 70-75. 241 F. Supp. 974, reversed and remanded. William J. O’Brien, Jr., argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 15 and 17. With him on the brief in No. 15 were Robert H. Bierma and Edmund A. Schroer. With him on the brief in No. 17 was Charles B. Myers. Richard A. Posner argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 20. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro and Robert W. Ginnane. Theodore E. Desch argued the cause for appellees in all cases. With him on the brief were Martin L. Cassell, Don McDevitt, John L. Bordes, Reuben L. Hedlund and Robert A. Deane. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, 241 F. Supp. 974, setting aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 307 I. C. C. 493, 312 I. C. C. 277, 317 I. C. C. 502, which granted the ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 59 57 Opinion of the Court. applications of seven railroads1 to provide additional rail service to the Lake Calumet Harbor Port near the southern limits of Chicago, Illinois. The service was to be provided through the construction of a single line of track into the Chicago Regional Port District for the joint use of the seven railroads. At present the port is served directly by only one railroad, appellee Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company (Rock Island). Appellee New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company (Nickel Plate),1 2 has facilities on the east side of Lake Calumet which has been reserved for future commercial development, but at present its facilities do not reach the port. The court, with one judge dissenting, rejected as not having “ample support” in the record, the findings of the Commission that the public convenience and necessity required the additional service applied for by the seven roads. It further found, unanimously, that the requirements of due process were violated by the Commission in its refusal to give Rock Island and Nickel Plate a hearing before approving a nonexclusive agreement, subsequently executed between the applicant roads and the Port District, covering the use of the latter’s facilities. The court ordered a new hearing on all the issues, one judge concluding that such hearing should be limited to the subsequently executed nonexclusive use agreement. We noted probable jurisdiction, 382 U. S. 913, and reverse the judgment. 1 Illinois Central Railroad Company; Pennsylvania Railroad Company; Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad; Belt Railway Company of Chicago; the New York Central Railroad Company; and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company. The Michigan Central Railroad Company sought additional trackage approval but had not signed a proposed lease with the Port District as the other appellants had. 2 The Nickel Plate has merged into the Norfolk and Western Railway Company since this proceeding began. GO OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. I. Background of Lake Calumet Harbor Port. Lake Calumet Harbor Port is one of seven facilities within the Port of Chicago available for the handling of water-borne freight. It is a shallow lake approximately two miles in length and covers approximately 1,250 acres. It is accessible by water from Lake Michigan via the Calumet River into the heart of the Chicago switching district, a distance of some six miles. As early as 1880 one of the Pullman companies constructed trackage that first brought rail service to Lake Calumet. Pullman reserved some 300 to 500 acres for the. development of a harbor and later donated some acreage to the United States for the development of a turning basin. Comprehensive plans for dredging Lake Calumet harbor and the filling of submerged lands were prepared in 1916 by an engineer for the City of Chicago. In 1917 Pullman waived riparian rights to some four miles of Lake Calumet shoreline to the City of Chicago and in 1935 gave additional land to the United States for the purpose of widening the Calumet River. In 1947 the Illinois Central, an appellant here, attempted to enter the port area. Pullman and two of the seven appellants here, New York Central and the Belt Railway Company of Chicago, opposed the application which was addressed to the Illinois Commerce Commission. In 1949, during the pendency of the proceeding, Rock Island acquired the common stock and certain industrial property of Pullman for $2,200,000. Rock Island then entered the proceedings in opposition to Illinois Central. The application of the latter was approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission but the Circuit Court of Cook County rejected it and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in 1953. Chicago, R. I. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 61 57 Opinion of the Court. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission ex rei. Illinois Central R. Co., 414 Ill. 134, 111 N. E. 2d 136. The Interstate Commerce Commission in approving the acquisition of Pullman by Rock Island—over the objections of Illinois Central and the Belt Railway Company, each of which also sought to acquire Pullman or a portion of its trackage on the lake—imposed certain conditions on Rock Island designed to guarantee fair practices, assure nondiscriminatory handling of the traffic of other railroads to and from the lake and guarantee the mutuality of traffic and operating relationships theretofore existing between Pullman and the other roads. Rock Island, however, continued to be the only line providing direct service to the port. The Chicago Regional Port District was created as a municipal corporation by the State of Illinois in 1951. Its purpose was the development of Lake Calumet into a major deep water port facility for both domestic and import-export traffic via the St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1954 the Port District declared by resolution that the public’s, as well as the port’s, interest required that its trackage be accessible to as many railroads as possible. In 1955 the Port District acquired the lake and some adjoining property from the City of Chicago and began dredging the lake and constructing port facilities at its southern end; it also built 14 miles of railroad yard “hold” tracks in the port, docks, two 6,500,000-bushel grain elevators, three transit sheds occupying 300,000 square feet of space, a back-up warehouse with 200,000 square feet of space, and streets. These facilities cost $24,000,000 and were paid for by the sale of Port District revenue bonds. By contract with the Port District the Rock Island operates over the trackage of the Port District and also serves the Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., a private harbor facility. No other railroads reach the port on their own tracks. The Nickel 62 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. Plate is the nearest rail facility. As previously noted, it has trackage on the east side of the lake which has been reserved for future development by the Port District. Any railroad wishing to service the port must use the facilities of Rock Island. II. The Applications Before the Commission. On October 22, 1956, the appellants Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, requested authority from the Commission under the provisions of 49 U. S. C. § 1 (18) to construct 1.431 miles of new track that would connect their lines to the present trackage of an affiliate of Illinois Central that passes near Lake Calumet’s southwestern shore. Similar applications were subsequently filed by the Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad, the Belt Railway Company of Chicago, the Michigan Central Railroad Company, the New York Central Railroad Company and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company. All of the applicants sought to operate directly to and from the Lake Calumet port, rather than use the facilities of the Rock Island. The latter, as well as the Nickel Plate, requested and was given leave to intervene as were other parties.3 The Rock Island and Nickel Plate were the only objectors, the remaining intervenors all supporting the applications. The original applications of the seven railroads did not specifically request authority from the Commission to operate over the Port District’s tracks. It appears that appellants were under the impression that formal Commission authority was not necessary because of the 3 Others included: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Port District, the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, and two private companies operating on the lake, Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., and North Pier Terminal Company. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 63 57 Opinion of the Court. fact that Rock Island was currently operating without it. Nevertheless, the applications covered the entire plan of operations proposed by appellants, including activity within the Port District as well as an unexecuted agreement covering the leasing of the Port District facilities which was attached to the application as an exhibit. This lease was before the Hearing Examiner during the 12-day joint hearing he conducted and was the subject of testimony and consideration. The appellants advised, and the Hearing Examiner concluded, that the appellants sought approval to operate within the Port District, as well as authority for the track extension. Accordingly, the Hearing Examiner recommended to the Commission that the entire project of the appellants be approved. On October 5, 1959, the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner’s recommendations but ruled that the applicants should file supplemental applications covering their proposed operations within the Port District, as provided in the proposed lease with the District. The Commission discussed the lease and indicated that it was satisfactory. It did, however, feel that the exclusive right of operation clause should be eliminated. The Commission also ruled that Rock Island’s service to Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., was not to be disrupted and that every industry located at Lake Calumet Harbor was to have direct rail service, not only from the applicants but the Rock Island and Nickel Plate, if they so elected. In April 1960, the appellants, pursuant to the Commission’s requirement, filed supplemental applications for specific authority to operate within the Port District. The proposed lease covered by these applications eliminated the exclusionary provisions to which the Commission had objected. Despite the request of Rock Island and Nickel Plate for a hearing on the new lease the Com- 64 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. mission found that the “technical deficiency” existing in appellants’ original applications had been corrected by the filing of their supplemental applications; that the record of the previous hearing was adequate to support approval of the entire proposal of the appellants; and the applications, as supplemented, were approved. In June 1961, however, the appellants and the Port District found it necessary to amend their operating agreement and appellants filed a second supplemental application asking for approval of the same. This agreement modified the one previously approved by the Commission. The old agreement had provided for a 5% annual rental for the use of the Port District’s rail facilities based upon the valuation of the latter, but not to exceed $2 per car, loaded or empty, including locomotives. The new agreement provided for a flat charge of $2 for each loaded freight car; it also specifically eliminated industry-owned tracks within the Port District from the agreement; and provided that it did not affect the right of Rock Island to operate in the Port District nor grant any exclusive privilege to the appellants. The Commission, after once again denying appellees’ request for a hearing, approved this final agreement on November 26, 1962. The Commission found that the changes merely clarified the rights and responsibilities of the parties. As to the rentals it found that “rentals generally may be considered reasonable where, as here, the facts of record disclose that nonafliliated parties, after bargaining at arm’s length, have entered into an agreement under which increased service will be offered to the public, all parties to the agreement will benefit financially, and the interveners’ ability to continue to serve the public will not be impaired.” 4 4 317 I. C. C. 502, 505. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 65 57 Opinion of the Court. III. Proceedings in the District Court. The Rock Island and Nickel Plate then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the Commission’s orders and the three-judge District Court vacated the orders on the grounds we have stated. The court found that it was faced with two basic problems: (1) whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the order of the Commission and (2) whether the refusal of the Commission to have a hearing on the lease agreement between the applicants and the Port District denied Rock Island and Nickel Plate due process of law. With respect to the first problem the court found “substantial support” for some of the “important findings” of the Commission. However, it found that the record did not “offer ample support” for certain of its conclusions. These conclusions appeared to have been drawn by the Commission from the prior findings which the court had found to have “substantial support” in the record. On the supplemental application for authority to operate within the Port District the court held there was insufficient evidence to support the order of approval; that the rental under the final contract was materially different from the provisions of the original plan and bound the Rock Island and Nickel Plate to operate under the same condition without affording them the right of a hearing. By a divided court it ordered a complete rehearing on all issues. We cannot agree with either the findings of the District Court or with its disposition of the case. IV. Applicable Standard on Review. At the outset the Commission and the appellant railroads contend that the court did not apply the correct standards in reviewing the Commission’s action. As we 66 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. have noted, the court did reject certain “conclusions” of the Commission, as above indicated, with respect to the public convenience and necessity for additional rail service to Lake Calumet port on the ground that they did not have “ample support” in the record. The test on judicial review is, of course, whether the action of the Commission is supported by “substantial evidence” on the record viewed as a whole, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e)(5). Substantial evidence is “enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300 (1939). A careful reading of the opinion leads us to conclude that the court was applying the test of substantiality. Indeed, at four separate places in the opinion it uses the term “substantial evidence” as being the necessary requirement. As unfortunate as it is that the “ample support” language crept into the decision, we do not believe that the court was creating a “novel formulation” but rather inadvertently used the “ample support” terminology merely to meet the same language in the dissent referring to the conclusions of the Commission. We have concluded that the court erred in setting aside the conclusions of the Commission. The Act authorizes the issuance of certificates such as the ones sought here when the Commission finds that the future public convenience and necessity will require additional railroad service. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (18). This Court has repeatedly held that if a railroad, voluntarily proposing the extension of its lines, can show that its proposal “either presently or in the reasonably near future will be self-sustaining, or so nearly so as not unduly to burden interstate commerce, the Commission may issue a certificate authorizing the proposed line,” Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Wash. R. de Nav. Co., ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 67 57 Opinion of the Court. 288 U. S. 14, 37 (1933). The Commission, however, “must be convinced that the proposed venture will not drain the railroad’s resources and disable it from performing those duties of public service under which it then rested, with consequent detriment to the public in the matter of service and rates.” Ibid. Also see Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277 (1926); Chesapeake 0. R. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35, 42 (1931). Rock Island and Nickel Plate contend that the “evidence [of appellants] adduced before the Commission was so totally devoid of factual possibility as to be no evidence at all.” As we read it, the evidence as to the future possibilities of the port was somewhat conflicting. The Commission, in keeping with its duty, resolved this conflict. Indeed, the findings of the Commission, which were upheld by the District Court, completely refute the Rock Island and Nickel Plate claims. Among the findings approved by the court5 are the following: The port was “the major deepwater port facility of the port of Chicago,” with “unparalleled access” to barge, rail, lake steamer and motor transportation and “complete access to ocean transportation” in the immediate future, with 71,490,510 tons of water-borne traffic in 1955 and with “material increases” 6 in tonnages predicted for the future from 5 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. United States, 241 F. Supp 974 977. 6 The testimony was that rail traffic to and from the port in 1960 would be 27,000 carloads which could easily increase to 76,500 carloads in 1962, 115,000 carloads in 1968 and anywhere from 250,000 to 350,000 carloads a year when both sides of the lake are completed. There was also much testimony as to grain shipments. The seven States of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado in 1956 produced 43% of all the wheat and 51% of the corn grown in the United States. The existing disparity in rates will divert much grain from Atlantic and Gulf ports for movement via Chicago and the St. Lawrence Seaway. Service to the port by 68 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 385 U. S. Opinion of the Court. among an estimated 600 to 900 vessels coming to the Chicago port each season, that “will necessitate a substantially broadened railroad service into and out of the Lake Calumet port”; appellants’ combined yard capacity was 61,601 cars, more than 12 times that presently available at the port; appellants’ routing would be “more direct,” entail less handling, expedite shipments and be less expensive than the present operation of Rock Island; and, finally, it was “imperative . . . that at the very beginning of this new era of development a plan and system for handling the transportation needs of the port be established which will assure the type of service that is expected and will provide for steady progress and expansion.” We believe that these findings, in the light of others not overturned by the District Court, are sufficient to sustain the Commission’s action in issuing the certificates. Moreover, we believe that the District Court erred in striking down the conclusions of the Commission. These conclusions * 7 included: Consideration of the whole record warranted the finding that the applications should be granted; granting them would result in greater rail competition, better service, greater car supply and lower rates for the industries served by the port; appellants would be “on a par” with the Rock Island in solicitation of grain traffic, and by having control of their cars they could return empties in a fast shuttle service to country elevators without interchange with Rock Island; the time has come when additional freight service is required for the future development of the Port District; better service can be given through elimination of delays, by single-line hauls or more direct hauls; a single trunkline rail- one railroad does not appear adequate since the railroads serving the midwest grain-producing States terminate in Chicago and have extensive switching and classification yards which could be utilized. 7 241 F. Supp. 974, 979. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 69 57 Opinion of the Court. road service would be detrimental and a hindrance to the development of the harbor, and, although the port is served by some 100 common carrier trucklines, the Rock Island is the only railroad presently serving the port; the future convenience and necessity must be given “a higher value” than the present convenience and necessity; the proposed construction either presently or in the reasonably near future is necessary to meet a public need and will be reasonably profitable; and, finally, considering the expansion program at the port and the increased rail traffic to be made available the Commission is “of the opinion that the additional service ... is warranted.” As we have said, these conclusions were largely based upon previous Commission findings which the District Court approved. The Commission’s function is to draw such reasonable conclusions from its findings as in its discretion are appropriate. As we said in Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966), “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” It is not for the court to strike down conclusions that are reasonably drawn from the evidence and findings in the case. Its duty is to determine whether the evidence supporting the Commission’s findings is substantial, Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). Having found that there was substantial support in the record for the Commission’s findings as to the port’s future potential and the necessity of providing competitive rail service at the outset of the port’s development, it was not the District Court’s function to substitute its own conclusions for those which the Commission had fairly drawn from such findings. Its agreement with the controlling subsidiary findings required the District Court to sustain the Commission’s conclusions. 70 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. The court also erred, we believe, in ordering a new hearing on the issues. It found that the Commission’s order issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate within the Port District was not supported by sufficient evidence and violated due process in that a hearing was not afforded the appellees thereon. As we view the original applications of the appellants they proposed “to extend their operations to serve the Lake Calumet Harbor District near Chicago, in Cook County, Illinois . . . future industries, elevators, warehouses, docks and piers in the Calumet Harbor Port area.” The prayer was that “your Commission issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction and operation for which authority is herein sought.” 8 The proceeding came on for a hearing before the Hearing Examiner on September 30, 1957, and counsel for the Rock Island stated for the record that his understanding was “the issue in this case is that all applications are for the purpose of handling import and export business only to and from the Port District Harbor of Chicago . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) And counsel for the appellants stated that the plan was “to handle interstate business to and from the area over which the port has jurisdiction. We have no such limitation at all as to import or export trade.” Likewise, the “Return to Questionnaire” executed by appellants stated: “The line proposed to be constructed and operated will receive material revenue from freight traffic to be handled to and from industries, elevators, warehouses, docks, and piers presently operating in the Calumet Harbor Port area, in addition to those facilities to be constructed with the 8 Application of Illinois Central, Pennsylvania, and Chicago South Shore and South Bend railroads filed October 19, 1956, with the Interstate Commerce Commission. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 71 57 Opinion of the Court. further development of the area.” 9 To make it crystal clear paragraph 10 of the same answer to the questionnaire stated: “The Lake Calumet Port District, which the proposed line will serve is currently served by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company by virtue of its acquisition of the Pullman Railroad Company, through purchase of capital stock, and lease by the former of the railroad property of the latter approved and authorized by the Commission in Finance Docket No. 16252, Pullman Railroad Company Control, decided November 17, 1949.” The other applications had similar allegations and the other appellants’ questionnaire returns contained like statements. Moreover, the answers filed on May 16, 1957, by Rock Island and Pullman to the applications, addressed themselves solely to the proposition that “applicant’s extension of its line of railroad and operations through trackage rights to serve territory [the Port District] heretofore served exclusively and adequately by petitioners cannot be supported by public convenience and necessity, could mean only a duplication of rail service, and would create unsound and uneconomic conditions in transportation.” As we read the record before the Hearing Examiner the case was tried on the theory that the applications included the proposed operations within the Port District. During the presentation of appellants’ evidence objection was made to the introduction of the proposed lease between appellants and the Port District on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the application. The Hearing Examiner overruled the objection. The testimony of virtually all of the appellants’ witnesses was 9 Return of Illinois Central, Pennsylvania, and the Chicago South Shore and South Bend, R. 17. 72 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. directed to some phase of the operations of the Port District. It should also be noted that the appellees sought to rebut this testimony in voluminous detail. For example, 40 pages of the record detail the testimony of Mr. R. C. Davidson, a witness for Rock Island. His testimony is devoted to Rock Island’s operation in the United States with specific reference to the Port District. It compares Rock Island’s operation in the Port District with that proposed by the appellants and answers in detail the statistics of the appellants as to charges, rates, switching problems, etc., involved in operations within the Port District. Page after page of prepared statistics on the costs, profits, etc., of the proposed operation were included in the testimony, together with forecasts as to the impact of the same, if permitted, on Rock Island’s operations. Another witness for Rock Island, Professor Marvin L. Fair, testified for some 15 pages on the potential of the Port District. His research was in great depth and included comparisons with other Great Lakes ports; estimated traffic of the Port District, including iron ore, grain, and general cargo; physical conditions of navigation at the port; the effect of tolls; the capacity of the Welland Canal (in the St. Lawrence Seaway) and its impact on the port; the efficiency of the port facilities; established movement of exports and imports; the effect of political, military, and economic conditions at home and abroad and the adequacy of Rock Island’s service. The record establishes beyond a doubt that the appellants were in fact seeking Commission approval of the entire project. Their offering of the unexecuted, proposed contract into evidence is one of many indications of this fact. The Hearing Examiner specifically noted, at the time the contract was received in evidence, that its approval by the Commission was necessary in order for the appellants to serve the Port District as they proposed. It would, indeed, have been a futile act for the appellants ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 73 57 Opinion of the Court. to seek and attain approval to extend their lines to the Port District but not be able to enter it! It is true that appellees objected to the introduction of the proposed agreement because they felt, and rightly so, that the application which the appellants had submitted was not technically broad enough for the authority they sought. The Hearing Examiner overruled them and they were obliged to—and did—offer their evidence on the matter. When the question came before the Commission for decision, it ruled that the applications were technically deficient and permitted the parties to correct the same through the filing of supplemental applications. At no time did the Commission find that the proposal to operate within the Port District had not been adequately explored and examined. Rather, a careful reading of the Commission’s entire opinion leads us to the opposite conclusion. At every stage of the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and also before the Commission, operations of the appellants within the Port District were considered an integral part of the overall plan which they submitted. The ruling of the Commission that the supplemental applications should be considered in “conjunction with the original application,” did not, in our view, deprive appellees of due process of law. When appellees requested a full hearing on the supplemental applications the grounds they alleged were that they were adequately serving the port; that they were prepared to spend further sums of money in the construction of facilities to serve it; that they were entitled to retain the traffic of the Port District; that there was no adequate reason for extension of the railroad lines of appellants into territory heretofore served exclusively by appellees; and that the extension of the railroad lines of appellants was not justified by public convenience and necessity. As the Commission itself found, “Examination of the record discloses 233-653 0-67-12 74 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. that these are the same arguments and contentions that were set forth in protestants’ original briefs, exceptions to the examiner’s proposed report, in their petitions for reconsideration, and in their oral arguments.” Illinois Central R. Co. Construction and Trackage, 312 I. C. C. 277, 280. The changes in the proposed lease agreement which the Commission approved without a further hearing involved the removal of the “exclusive right to operate within the Port” clause, which that document had given the appellants, and the formula for determining the annual rental to be charged by the Port District. As to the former, it can hardly be maintained that this worked a hardship or detriment upon the appellees. The removal of the clause, in fact, made certain that appellees were not precluded from continuing their present operations. As to the rental clause, it will be remembered that the original proposed agreement provided for 5% annual rental based on the value of the land and tracks, but not to exceed $2 per car. This was changed in the first supplemental application to a charge of not to exceed $2 per revenue car or locomotive. The final contract merely provided for a charge of $2 for each revenue car, which was much more favorable to the appellants than either of the former clauses. Moreover, the final charge compared favorably to other per-car rates previously approved by the Commission. In the light of these considerations, as well as the fact that appellees were invited and refused to sit in on the negotiation of the contract; had ample opportunity and did present their evidence as to the reasonableness of the charge for the use of Port District property; were, and are, in nowise bound by the contract; and, finally, in view of the insignificance of the changes in the final agreement compared with the former ones, we are led to conclude that appellees were not entitled to another hearing. ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO. 75 57 Black, J., dissenting. Appellees also insist that a new hearing be held so that evidence of “present conditions” could be presented to the Commission rather than “speculation.” It is true that this case has been pending for 10 years but this, rather than being a reason for holding additional hearings, operates to the contrary. We have concluded that the orders of the Commission were proper under the circumstances. We have found substantial support for its actions. Accordingly, it is our view that this matter be concluded. The judgment is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to sustain the Commission’s orders. It is s0 ordered. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting. The District Court set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the ground that the evidence failed to support its findings of fact. I dissent from the Court’s reversal of that holding. In Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 488, it was said that “Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view.” In the case here the District Court found that it could not conscientiously support the Commission’s findings and I would affirm its judgment, adhering to the principles so firmly announced in Universal Camera, supra. 76 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Syllabus. 385 U.S. CICHOS v. INDIANA. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA. No. 45. Argued October 19, 1966.—Decided November 14, 1966. Following trial of petitioner on two counts for reckless homicide and for involuntary manslaughter, the jury found him guilty of reckless homicide. The State Supreme Court granted him a new trial and he was retried on both counts, the second jury returning the same verdict as the first. The same prison sentence as before and a lower fine were imposed. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the first jury’s silence on the manslaughter charge constituted an acquittal and that retrial on that count had unconstitutionally subjected petitioner to double jeopardy. Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvi-dently granted. Pp. 77-80. (a) Under Indiana law the acknowledgedly overlapping offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide (which carries a lesser penalty) are treated more as one offense with different penalties than as a greater and an included offense. A final judgment of conviction of one bars prosecution for the other, and if there is a conviction for both offenses, a penalty can be imposed for only one. Pp. 78-79. (b) As the Indiana Supreme Court held, because of the identity of the elements of the two crimes and the known trial court practice of instructing the jury to return a verdict on but one of the charges, the jury’s silence on the involuntary manslaughter count was not tantamount to acquittal, the reckless homicide verdict encompassed the elements of involuntary manslaughter, and petitioner was given the lesser penalty. Pp. 79-80. Reported below: --- Ind. ---, 208 N. E. 2d 685; — Ind. ----, 210 N. E. 2d 363. John P. Price argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Cleon H. Foust and John B. McFaddin. Douglas B. McFadden, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief was John J. Dillon, Attorney General. CICHOS v. INDIANA. 77 76 Opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Following petitioner’s trial in the Circuit Court for Parke County, Indiana, under a two-count affidavit charging him with reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter, the jury returned a verdict reciting only that he was guilty of reckless homicide. Petitioner was sentenced to one to five years in prison and was fined $500 plus court costs. He appealed, and the Supreme Court of Indiana granted a new trial. Petitioner was retried on both counts, and the second jury returned the same verdict as the first. He was again sentenced to one to five years in prison but was fined only $100 plus court costs. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed this reckless homicide conviction, rejecting petitioner’s contention that his retrial on the involuntary manslaughter count had subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the Indiana and United States Constitutions.1 Asserting that the first jury’s silence with respect to the manslaughter charge amounted to an acquittal under Indiana law and that his retrial on that charge placed him twice in jeopardy, compare Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, petitioner, in his petition for certiorari which we granted, presented a single question: Is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against placing an accused in double jeopardy applicable to state court prosecutions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Because of the following considerations, which have more clearly emerged after full briefing and oral argument, we do not reach the issue posed by the petitioner and dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 1“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amend. 5. “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const., Art. I, § 14. 78 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. 1. The Indiana statutes define involuntary manslaughter as the killing of “any human being ... involuntarily in the commission of some unlawful act.” Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3405 (1956). The statutory penalty is two to 21 years’ imprisonment.2 The crime of reckless homicide, created in 1939 as part of Indiana’s comprehensive traffic code, is committed by anyone “who drives a vehicle with reckless disregard for the safety of others and thereby causes the death of another person.” Ind. Stat. Ann. § 47-2001 (a) (1965). For this crime, a fine and a prison term of from one to five years are authorized. Recognizing the inherent overlap between these two crimes in cases of vehicular homicide, the Indiana Legislature has provided that “[A] final judgment of conviction of one [1] of them shall be a bar to a prosecution for the other; or if they are joined in separate counts of the same indictment or affidavit, and if there is a conviction for both offenses, a penalty shall be imposed for one [1] offense only.” Ind. Stat. Ann. §47-2002 (1965). The Indiana courts have also recognized that reckless homicide “is a form of involuntary manslaughter,” Rogers v. State, 227 Ind. 709, 715, 88 N. E. 2d 755, 758. Proof of reckless homicide necessarily establishes an unlawful killing that amounts to involuntary manslaughter. Both crimes require proof of the same elements to sustain a conviction under Indiana law. See Rogers v. State, supra; State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176, 37 N. E. 2 Indiana adopted the common-law crime of involuntary man-slaughter early in its history. The crime has traditionally been applied by the Indiana courts to cases of vehicular accidents resulting in death. E. g., Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252, 115 N. E. 943 (auto accident); State v. Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167, 20 N. E. 777 (railroad accident). CICHOS v. INDIANA. 79 76 Opinion of the Court. 2d 531. Thus, the effect of charging the two crimes in a single affidavit, as occurred in this case, was to give the jury the discretion to set the range of petitioner’s sentence at two to 21 years by convicting him of involuntary manslaughter or at one to five years by convicting him of reckless homicide. As the Indiana Supreme Court in the case before us explained, “[t]he offenses here involved are statutorily treated more as one offense with different penalties rather than viewing reckless homicide as an included offense in involuntary manslaughter.” ------Ind.-----,----, 208 N. E. 2d 685, 688. 2. Petitioner does not assert that he should not have been tried again for reckless homicide. His only claim is that he should not have been tried again for involuntary manslaughter as well as reckless homicide because the jury’s silence at his first trial with respect to involuntary manslaughter was legally an acquittal on this charge. However, the Indiana Supreme Court squarely rejected this interpretation of the first jury’s verdict. The court distinguished a long line of Indiana cases which have held that a jury’s silence must be deemed an acquittal.3 Because of the identity of the elements of these two crimes, and because the Indiana Supreme Court knew of “the trial court practice of telling the jury to return a verdict on only one of the charges in view of the limitation on penalty,” 4 id., at---, 208 N. E. 3 This doctrine developed in response to contentions that silence on any count required the setting aside of the entire verdict under the common-law rule that a defendant has an absolute right to a jury verdict on all charges for which he is tried. See Weimorpflin v. State, 7 Blackf. 186 (Ind. 1844). Since a reckless homicide conviction is a statutory bar to further prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, § 47-2002, supra, petitioner cannot be adversely affected by the jury’s silence with respect to the involuntary manslaughter count. 4 The judge’s charge to the jury in the first trial is not a part of the record in this case. 80 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. 2d, at 687, the court concluded that “a verdict of guilty of reckless homicide does not logically exclude the possibility of such a verdict on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.” Id., at ----, 208 N. E. 2d, at 688-689. Therefore, “[T]he logic of the principle which states silence is equal to an acquittal is perhaps made inappropriate to charges of these offenses, related to the same unlawful transaction .... Rather than treat the silence of the jury in the involuntary manslaughter count in this case as an acquittal, the better result would seem to be to hold that the reckless homicide verdict encompassed the elements of involuntary manslaughter, and that appellant was simply given the lesser penalty.” Id., at---, 208 N. E. 2d, at 687. In the light of the Indiana statutory scheme and the rulings of the Indiana Supreme Court in this case, we cannot accept petitioner’s assertions that the first jury acquitted him of the charge of involuntary manslaughter and that the second trial therefore placed him twice in jeopardy. Consequently, we do not reach or decide the question tendered by the petition for certiorari, and the writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. While concurring in the Court’s opinion, Mr. Justice Blac adheres to his dissent in Bartkos v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 150, to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States. Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas join, dissenting. If this were a federal case, it would, in my view, be covered by Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). In Green, the defendant was not acquitted of the first degree murder charge at the first trial. Just as in the CICHOS v. INDIANA. 81 76 Fortas, J., dissenting. present case, the jury did not return a verdict on that count, but convicted Green on the lesser charges of arson and second degree murder. But this Court held that Green could not be retried on the first degree murder charge. It clearly and unmistakably held that whether Green was “acquitted” of the greater offense wTas of no consequence. He had been exposed to jeopardy. See 355 U. S., at 188, 190-191. So, in the present case, it is of no consequence whether the silence of the jury on the involuntary manslaughter count amounted to acquittal. Petitioner was put in jeopardy on that count and cannot again be tried on that charge. The only difference between Green and the present case—except as to the jurisdictions—is that in Green, on the second trial, the defendant was convicted on the aggravated count. In the present case, petitioner was again convicted on the less serious charge. I cannot see that this can justify a difference in result. Petitioner should not have been retried on an affidavit including the more serious charge, which was not involved in the appeal. That charge was dead—beyond resuscitation. Its wrongful inclusion in the affidavit was materially harmful to petitioner. First, it exposed him to the hazards of prosecution and conviction for the more onerous offense. Second, it again gave the prosecution the advantage of offering the jury a choice—a situation which is apt to induce a doubtful jury to find the defendant guilty of the less serious offense rather than to continue the debate as to his innocence. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi n. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 383 U. S. 913 (1966). And beyond the question of injury to the petitioner in this particular case is the fact that the procedure which Indiana used chills the right of appeal. It “has the necessary effect of unlawfully burdening and penalizing the exercise of the right to seek review of a criminal conviction.” United States 82 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 130 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Defendants in Indiana in this type of case are admonished that if they appeal from a conviction on the less onerous charge they do so at the peril that on the next trial they may be tried, and possibly convicted, on the more serious count. This is a state case. But the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of due process, in my view, certainly and clearly includes a prohibition of this kind of heads-you-lose, tails-you-lose trial and appellate process. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 150 (1959); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424, 429, 440 (1953) (dissenting opinions of Vinson, C. J., and Douglas, J.). The Second Circuit’s views are in accordance with the position stated herein. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, supra. I would reverse and remand. UNITED GAS PIPE LINE v. FPC. 83 Syllabus. UNITED GAS PIPE LINE CO. v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 49. Argued October 19-20, 1966.—Decided November 14, 1966. Petitioner, United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United), contracted to buy gas produced by respondent Continental Oil Co. (Continental) from the Johnson Bayou Field in Louisiana. Continental constructed delivery facilities, and United provided facilities to receive the gas into its interstate system. The contract parties on application to respondent Federal Power Commission (FPC) were granted certificates of public convenience and necessity. Continental’s certificate covered sale of Johnson Bayou gas; United’s certificate covered construction of its facilities and continued transportation of the gas. Continental elected to terminate at the end of the contract’s primary term, refused United’s offer to continue purchasing on a day-to-day basis at the old contract rate, and filed with the FPC a rate increase effective on the contract expiration date which was accepted over United’s protest. United, after notice to Continental, ceased purchasing Johnson Bayou gas on the contract expiration date. Following Continental’s petition for a show-cause order and a full hearing, the FPC found United’s ceasing to take gas from that field an abandonment of its facilities for that purpose and of its service rendered thereby, in violation of § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, which forbids such abandonments without the FPC’s prior consent. The FPC issued an order, thereafter upheld by the Court of Appeals, that United renew operation of its Johnson Bayou facilities and buy gas at Continental’s new rate. Held: Petitioner’s refusal to continue receiving Johnson Bayou gas for transportation in interstate commerce constituted an abandonment of “facilities” and “service” which, under § 7 (b) of the Act, required FPC approval. Pp. 86-91. (a) The “facilities subject to the jurisdiction” of the FPC to which § 7 (b) applies are those required for the interstate transportation of natural gas and for the interstate sale of gas for resale to the ultimate consumer. P. 87. 84 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. (b) “Abandonment” of facilities does not require their physical alteration but can be accomplished, as here, by allowing them to become operationally dormant for an indefinite time. Pp. 87-88. (c) “Service” includes the taking and transportation of gas from a. particular field as well as its sale. Pp. 88-89. (d) The FPC has powfer to regulate the purchase of gas where necessary to the exercise of its authority over the transportation and sale thereof. Pp. 89-90. (e) Though United must reactivate its Johnson Bayou facilities and restore service, it may ask the FPC to permit abandonment upon a proper showing of justification therefor. P. 91. 350 F. 2d 689, affirmed. Vernon W. Woods argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Peter H. Schiff argued the cause for respondent Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Posner, Richard A. Solomon and Howard E. Wahrenbrock. Bruce R. Merrill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Continental Oil Co. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. United Gas Pipe Line Company and Continental Oil Company executed a contract effective January 31, 1953, providing for the sale by Continental and the purchase by United of gas produced from the Johnson Bayou Field in the State of Louisiana, at prices stated in the contract. The contract was to run for 10 years and from year to year thereafter unless terminated by either party on 90 days’ notice. To effectuate delivery to United’s nearby Mud Lake transmission line for transportation of the gas into the Beaumont, Texas, area, Continental constructed several thousand feet of pipeline, separators and storage tanks. United, for its part, constructed a UNITED GAS PIPE LINE v. FPC. 85 S3 Opinion of the Court. short length of pipeline, a separator, a meter station and valves. United sought, was granted and accepted a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the continued transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field and the construction and operation of the facilities necessary therefor. 14 F. P. C. 582. Likewise, Continental was issued a certificate authorizing the sale of gas to United under the terms of the contract. 15 F. P. C. 1650. In October 1962 Continental elected to terminate the contract at the end of the primary term. Negotiations for a new contract were fruitless. Continental, after refusing United’s offer to continue purchasing on a day-to-day basis at the old contract rate, filed a rate increase with the Commission asking for an effective date of January 31, 1963. The Commission accepted the filing over United’s protest.1 United, after advance notice to Continental, then ceased purchasing gas from the Johnson Bayou Field on January 31, 1963, and has since refused to purchase gas from that source. Following a petition by Continental, an order to show cause issued by the Commission to United and a full hearing, the Commission found that United, by ceasing to take gas from the Johnson Bayou Field, had abandoned its facilities used for this purpose as well as the service rendered by these facilities, contrary to the provisions of § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act which forbid such abandonment without the consent of the Commission being first obtained.1 2 Accordingly, the Commission ordered United 1 United unsuccessfully petitioned for rehearing of the Commission’s order approving the rate increase, 29 F. P. C. 525, but did not seek judicial review of the order. 2 Section 7 (b) of the Act provides that “No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Com 86 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 385 U. S. Opinion of the Court. to “renew operation of its Johnson Bayou Field facilities used to purchase gas from Continental” and directed that the purchases by United were to be at Continental’s new rate and in volumes consistent with the terms of the contract previously in force. 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1086. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s order, 350 F. 2d 689, and we granted certiorari, 383 U. S. 924, because the case involved an important question concerning the Commission’s jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. We affirm. We agree with the Commission and the Court of Appeals that United’s refusal to continue receiving gas from the Johnson Bayou Field constituted an abandonment of “facilities” and a “service” to which § 7 (b) applies. That section places conditions on the abandonment of facilities or of any service rendered thereby. The facilities covered by the section are those “subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” the further identification of which requires resort to other sections of the Act. Section 1 (b)3 declares that the provisions of the Act are to apply to: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (2) the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption and (3) natural gas companies engaged mission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.’' 52 Stat. 824, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b). 3 The text of the section provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. §717 (b). 87 UNITED GAS PIPE LINE v. FPC. S3 Opinion of the Court. in such transportation or sale. Under § 7 (c)4 no natural gas company is permitted to engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, or to undertake the construction or extension of facilities therefor without a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing such acts or operations. Thus the “facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission” which are reached by the abandonment provisions of § 7 (b) are those facilities required for the interstate transportation of natural gas and for the interstate sale of gas for resale to the ultimate consumer. Conversely, it would seem beyond argument that the proscription of abandoning “any service” rendered by those facilities wTould include both transportation and sale, the twin functions which subject the facilities to the provisions of the Act. We are convinced that United’s Johnson Bayou Field facilities were subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. They were constructed solely for the purpose of the taking and interstate transportation of Johnson Bayou gas. They could not, therefore, be abandoned without the consent of the Commission and we do not understand United’s position in this Court to be otherwise. United, however, insists that there has not in fact been a § 7 (b) “abandonment.” It is true that the Johnson Bayou Field facilities were neither removed nor disconnected. Their use could have been resumed at 4 The text of the section, in relevant part, provides that “No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . .” Added bv the Act of February 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 83, 15 U. S. C. § 7,17f (c). 88 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. any time had United so desired. But the physical alteration of facilities is not a sine qua non restricting the Commission’s jurisdiction under § 7 (b). Here United ceased taking and transporting gas from the Johnson Bayou Field on January 31, 1963, has not taken that gas or used its facilities constructed for that purpose since that time and has no intention of doing so as long as Continental’s present rates continue in effect. United, the Commission found, had by its own action rendered its facilities “operationally dormant for a period of indefinite duration.” 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1083. In addition, the Commission found that its interest went beyond the physical alteration of facilities. “We have a regulatory responsibility to assure that gas once dedicated to the interstate market will continue to be available to that market so long as the public interest demands . . . .” 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1082. As the instant proceeding unmistakably revealed, the responsibility of the Commission could not adequately be met if it were powerless to assure that facilities “certificated to transport this gas,” ibid., continued to operate. To hold United’s conduct an abandonment within the meaning of § 7 (b) is a reasonable interpretation of the Act and we shall not disturb it. The corollary conclusion, inescapably presented on the face of the Act itself, is that the consent of the Commission is necessary before United can cease taking and transporting Johnson Bayou gas, since this is a service United rendered through the facilities it constructed for that very purpose. United, however, contends that the words “any service” in § 7 (b) include only the sale of natural gas, not the taking and transportation of gas from any particular field. In its view it is free at any time to abandon the interstate transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field, and to decide for itself wholly apart from the Commission what gas it will continue to transport interstate. But nothing in the Act, its UNITED GAS PIPE LINE v. FPC. 89 83 Opinion of the Court. legislative history or in our cases has been called to our attention which persuasively supports this narrow view or which would justify recognizing the sale of gas as a service but not the preceding transportation without which there would be no sale at all. The Act gives the Commission jurisdiction over interstate transportation of natural gas as a separate and distinct matter, whether the transportation is for hire or for sale and whether the sale is for consumption or resale. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464; FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 675. Here, of course, the transportation is not for hire but for sale, some for consumption and some for resale. What is more, in Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137, 149-150, the Court clearly recognized that the term “service” is not confined to sales but extends to the “movement of gas in interstate commerce” and that one who engages in either the sale or the transportation of gas is performing a service within the meaning of both §§ 7 (e) and 7 (b). It could not be more clear that United here abandoned a “service,” the taking of Johnson Bayou Field gas and its transportation in interstate commerce. The statutory necessity of prior Commission approval, with its underlying findings, cannot be escaped. Even so, United argues that the Act gives the Commission no authority over the purchase of natural gas, and that the Commission therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering United to continue purchasing gas from Continental in amounts specified in an expired contract and at prices set unilaterally by Continental. It is true that the Act does not in so many words grant the same express authority over purchases to the Commission that it does over sales. Neither is there a blanket exemption of Commission jurisdiction over the purchase of 233-653 0 - 67 - 13 90 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. gas, and there is express authority over transportation as well as sale. Under § 16, the Commission has the power “to perform any and all acts, and to . . . issue . . . such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 52 Stat. 830, 15 U. S. C. § 717o. Where it is necessary to regulate the purchase of gas in some respects to carry out its expressly granted authority over transportation and sale, the Commission must have the power to do so. In the case before us, there has been a § 7 (b) abandonment of facilities or services without Commission consent. It is therefore quite proper for the Commission to order the facilities reactivated and the abandoned service restored, even though the resumption by United of the transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field will entail the purchase of gas from Continental at the legally established price. Undoubtedly, the continued purchase of gas has been ordered but only as an incident to regulating transportation or sale. This is no more than the Act authorizes and no more than United undertook to do when it sought and received certification for the service it sought to perform.5 After United had begun to purchase gas from the Johnson Bayou Field in 1953 and to transport it to markets in the State of Texas, United sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction and use of the facilities it had built and the continued transportation of the Johnson Bayou gas. United then asserted that the public convenience and necessity required the issuance of such a certificate.6 5 What we have said, of course, does not imply that the Commission has the power to compel initial purchases of gas. We reach only the question of the Commission’s power under § 7 (b) to order reactivation of abandoned facilities and service. 6 United’s application for the certificate, docketed September 20, 1954, appears in FPC Docket No. G-2818, United Gas Pipe Line Company. UNITED GAS PIPE LINE v. FPC. 91 83 Opinion of the Court. Both the construction and operation of the facilities and the transportation of gas by means thereof were found by the Commission to be required by the public convenience and necessity. United was found “able and willing ... to perform the service . . .” for which it had volunteered.7 A certificate was accordingly issued and formally accepted by United. United now wishes to abandon the express service it agreed to perform—the continued transportation of Johnson Bayou gas—without a § 7 (b) finding by the Commission “that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit[s] such abandonment.” This is precisely what the Act forbids. United claims that it does not need the Johnson Bayou gas to serve its customers and that the forced purchase of gas at prices set by Continental and approved by the Commission without regard to the prices at which United under contract or competition is bound to sell the gas deprives it of property without due process of law. In our view, these claims are premature. We do not hold that it would be inappropriate for the Commission to permit abandonment in this case if it is asked to do so and the necessary findings are made. We hold only that United has abandoned facilities and service without the consent of the Commission and that it must reactivate those facilities and restore the service until and unless the statutory consent is obtained. If United now resorts to the Commission, it will have every opportunity to present its economic and constitutional grounds for abandonment. For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 7 The Commission’s complete order appears in Docket G-2818, supra, n. 6; an abbreviated version appears in 14 F. P. C. 582. (Emphasis added.) 92 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Per Curiam. 385 U. S. O’CONNOR v. OHIO. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. No. 477. Decided November 14, 1966. Petitioner’s failure at trial and during his first appeal in the state courts to object to prosecutor’s comment on his not testifying in criminal trial which resulted in his conviction, review of which was being sought in this Court when Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, was decided, held not to foreclose petitioner’s right to attack as unconstitutional the practice of making such comment following its invalidation in Griffin. Certiorari granted; 6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 217 N. E. 2d 685, reversed. James W. Cowell for petitioner. Harry Friberg for respondent. Per Curiam. This is the second time petitioner has come before this Court with the claim that the prosecutor’s comment upon his failure to testify during his trial for larceny violated the constitutional right to remain silent. In O’Connor v. Ohio, 382 U. S. 286, we considered this contention when we granted certiorari, vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Ohio for further proceedings in light of our decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609. Following remand, the Ohio court by a closely divided vote upheld petitioner’s conviction solely on the ground that he failed to object to the proscribed comment at his trial and during his first appeal in the state courts. That failure was held to preclude the Ohio appellate courts from considering the claim that petitioner’s federal constitutional rights had been infringed. The State does not contest the fact that the prosecutor’s remarks violated the constitutional rule announced O’CONNOR v. OHIO. 93 92 Per Curiam. in Griffin. Moreover, it is clear the prospective application of that rule, announced in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, does not prevent petitioner from relying on Griffin, since his conviction was not final when the decision in Griffin was rendered. Indeed, in Tehan we cited our remand of petitioner’s case as evidence that Griffin applied to all convictions which had not become final on the date of the Griffin judgment. 382 U. S., at 409, n. 3. Thus, the only issue now before us is the permissibility of invoking the Ohio procedural rule to defeat petitioner’s meritorious federal claim. We hold that in these circumstances the failure to object in the state courts cannot bar the petitioner from asserting this federal right. Recognition of the States’ reliance on former decisions of this Court which Griffin overruled was one of the principal grounds for the prospective application of the rule of that case. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 417. Defendants can no more be charged with anticipating the Griffin decision than can the States. Petitioner had exhausted his appeals in the Ohio courts and was seeking direct review here when Griffin was handed down. Thus, his failure to object to a practice which Ohio had long allowed cannot strip him of his right to attack the practice following its invalidation by this Court. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is so ordered. 94 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Per Curiam. 385 U. S. UNITED STATES et al. v. SASKATCHEWAN MINERALS. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON. No. 525. Decided November 14, 1966.* District Court’s order setting aside on the merits ICC’s dismissal of appellee’s complaint that railroad rates were preferential and ordering ICC to grant appellee relief held unduly limited ICC’s duty to reconsider the entire case. 253 F. Supp. 504, vacated and remanded. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane, Fritz R. Kahn and Betty Jo Christian for the United States et al. in No. 525. Charles W. Burkett, W. Harney Wilson, Arthur A. Arsham and Willard P. Scott for appellants in No. 526. Wayne W. Wright for appellee in both cases. Per Curiam. These appeals are from an amended judgment of a three-judge district court, 253 F. Supp. 504, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dismissing appellee’s complaint, 325 I. C. C. 621, and remanded the case to the Commission “for further proceedings with instructions to grant relief” to the appellee “in accordance with the opinion heretofore entered by this court on December 8. 1965, and the Supplemental Memorandum Decision entered by this Court on March 3, 1966.” Accepting the District Court’s decision to set aside the Commission’s order on the merits, appellants challenge that portion of the judgment which instructs *Together with No. 526, Great Northern Railway Co. et al. v. Saskatchewan Minerals, also on appeal from the same court. U. S. v. SASKATCHEWAN MINERALS. 95 94 Per Curiam. the Commission to grant relief to the appellee and precludes the Commission from reopening the proceedings for the receipt of additional evidence relevant to the question whether the rates challenged by the appellee are in fact unreasonably preferential in violation of § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1). We agree with the appellants that, under the circumstances present here, this restriction is an improper limitation on the Commission’s duty to reconsider the entire case. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. cfc T. P. R. Co., 379 U. S. 642. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cases are remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter an order remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with the District Court’s opinion of December 8, 1965. It is so ordered. 96 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. November 14, 1966. 385 U. S. BOARD OF SATANTA JOINT RURAL HIGH SCHOOL, DISTRICT NO. 2, et al. v. HASKELL COUNTY PLANNING BOARD et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. No. 560. Decided November 14, 1966. 197 Kan. 321, 416 P. 2d 791, appeal dismissed. Dale M. Stucky for appellants. Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, and J. Richard Foth, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. LITTLE v. RHAY, PENITENTIARY SUPERINTENDENT. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. No. 669, Mise. Decided November 14, 1966. 68 Wash. 2d 353, 413 P. 2d 15, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Francis Conklin for appellant. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 97 385 U. S. November 14, 1966. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF MARYLAND et al. v. HORACE MANN LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC, et al. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. No. 473. Decided November 14, 1966.* 242 Md. 645, 220 A. 2d 51, certiorari denied in No. 473; appeal dismissed in No. 590. Thomas B. Finan, former Attorney General of Maryland, for the Board of Public Works of Maryland, and William L. Marbury for Saint Joseph College et al, petitioners in No. 473. Leo Pfeffer for appellants in No. 590. Robert C. Murphy, Attorney General of Maryland, and Edward L. Blanton, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Board of Public Works of Maryland, and Parsons Newman for Hood College, appellees in No. 590. John Holt Myers for the Association of American Colleges, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition in No. 473. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 473 is denied. The motion to dismiss in No. 590 is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that in No. 473 certiorari should be granted and the case set for plenary consideration, and that in No. 590 probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set down for oral argument. ^Together with No. 590, Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc., et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland et al., on appeal from the same court. 98 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. November 14, 1966. 385 U. S. HALL v. MISSISSIPPI. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI. No. 672, Mise. Decided November 14, 1966. 187 So. 2d 861, appeal dismissed. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Fortas are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 99 Syllabus. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 63. Argued October 20, 1966.—Decided November 21, 1966. Petitioner, a bank, honored checks drawn before, but presented for payment after, the depositor had filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition, the bank being unaware of the bankruptcy proceeding. On the trustee’s application for a turnover order, the referee held the bank and the payee jointly liable to the trustee for the amount of the checks. The payee fully paid the joint judgment and served demand upon the bank for contribution. From the District Court’s affirmance of the referee’s order only the bank appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that regardless of whether the bank knew of the bankruptcy the bankrupt’s checking account became frozen when the bankruptcy petition was filed by virtue of § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, which “by operation of law” as of the date of the filing of the petition vests the trustee with the bankrupt’s title to described kinds of property “including rights of action.” Held: 1. The payee’s payment of the joint judgment does not moot the case since the payee can still sue the petitioner for contribution. Pp. 100-101. 2. Absent revocation of its authority or knowledge of the bankruptcy, a bank cannot be held liable for honoring checks drawn before a depositor filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Pp. 101-103. (a) The bank is the depositor’s debtor and, unless there has been revocation giving the bank notice, must honor checks drawn upon it. P. 101. (b) The act of filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition does not per se constitute notice to the bank. P. 102. (c) It would be inequitable to hold the bank liable for an invalid transfer under §§ 70d (5) and 18f of the Act when the force of those provisions can be maintained by imposing liability on the payee of the checks, the creditor of the bankrupt which benefited from the transaction. Pp. 102-103. 352 F. 2d 186, reversed. 100 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. Edgar B. Washburn argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Carlos R. Freitas and Bryan R. McCarthy. Thomas B. Donovan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John Walton Dinkelspiel. Johm, P. Austin filed a brief for the California Bankers Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether a bank which honored checks of a depositor drawn before its bankruptcy but presented for payment after it had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, is liable to the trustee for the amount of the checks paid where the bank had no knowledge or notice of the proceeding. The trustee applied to the referee for a turnover order requiring petitioner bank to pay to the trustee the amount of the checks and in the alternative asking the same relief against the payee. The referee determined that petitioner and the payee were jointly liable to the trustee. The District Court affirmed. Only petitioner appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. 352 F. 2d 186. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question presented. Cf. Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306. I. We were advised on oral argument that the joint judgment rendered against petitioner, the bank, and the payee of the checks was paid in full by the payee and that at present respondent’s sole financial interest in this litigation is protection against imposition of costs under our Rule 57. It is therefore suggested that the case is moot. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 101 99 Opinion of the Court. We do not agree. Whatever might be the result if costs alone were involved (cf. Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359, 362) this case should not be dismissed. We are advised that the payee has paid the joint judgment and has filed with the bankruptcy court and served on petitioner a demand for contribution from it respecting sums paid in satisfaction of the judgment. Thus petitioner is still subject to a suit because of the original judgment as to its liability. We would, therefore, strain the concepts of mootness if we required petitioner to start all over again when the payee sues it for contribution. II. Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 879, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (a), provides that a trustee in bankruptcy is vested “by operation of law” with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition to described kinds of property “including rights of action.” § 70a (5). But we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the bankrupt’s checking accounts are instantly frozen in the absence of knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy on the part of the drawee. The trustee succeeds only to such rights as the bankrupt possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and defenses which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the filing of the petition. See Zartman v. First National Bank, 216 U. S. 134, 138. The relationship of bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract. The bank has the right and duty under that contract to honor checks of its depositor properly drawn and presented (Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 136 P. 2d 345, 347; Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 431, 380 P. 2d 644, 647; and see Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233), absent a revocation that gives the bank notice prior to the time the checks are accepted or paid by the bank. 102 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. See Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 369, 248 P. 947, 950. The Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy of a drawer operates without more as a revocation of the drawee’s authority. 352 F. 2d, at 191. But that doctrine is a harsh one that runs against the grain of our decisions requiring notice before a person is deprived of property (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at 314-318; Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208), a principle that has been recognized and applied in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293, 296-297. The kind of notice required is one “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at 314. We cannot say that the act of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy per se is reasonably calculated to put the bank on notice. Absent revocation by the drawer or his trustee or absent knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy by the bank, the contract between the bank and the drawer remains unaffected by the bankruptcy and the right and duty of the bank to pay duly presented checks remain as before. In such circumstances the trustee acquires no rights in the checking account greater than the bankrupt himself. Section 70d (5), 52 Stat. 882, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (d)(5), provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that “no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee.” And in case of a voluntary petition (with exceptions not material here) the filing operates as an adjudication. § 18f, 73 Stat. 109, 11 U. S. C. §41 (f). It is therefore argued with force that payment by the drawee of a drawer bankrupt’s checks after the date of that filing is a “transfer” within the meaning of § 70d (5). BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 103 99 Harlan, J., dissenting. Yet we do not read these statutory words with the ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Section 2a, 52 Stat. 842, 11 U. S. C. § 11 (a); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 304-305; Securities & Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455. We have said enough to indicate why it would be inequitable to hold liable a drawee who pays checks of the bankrupt duly drawn but presented after bankruptcy, where no actual revocation of its authority has been made and it has no notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy. The force of §§ 70d (5) and 18f can be maintained by imposing liability on the payee of the checks where he has received a voidable preference or other voidable transfer. The payee is a creditor of the bankrupt, and to make him reimburse the trustee is only to deprive him of preferential treatment and to restore him to the category of a general creditor. To permit the trustee under these circumstances to obtain recovery only against the party that benefited from the transaction is to do equity. Reversed. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting. The Court, in its haste to alleviate an indisputable inequity to the bank, disregards, in my opinion, both the proper principles of statutory construction and the most permanent interests of bankruptcy administration. I must dissent.1 The Act itself is unambiguous. Section 70a vests title to the bankrupt’s property in the trustee “as of the date of the filing of the petition.” 52 Stat. 879, 11 1 Like the Court, I believe that this case is not moot. In addition to what has been said by the majority, compare Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, and Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521. 104 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Harlan, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. U. S. C. § 110 (a). Section 70d nonetheless sustains bona fide transfers of the property made after filing and “before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession . . . whichever first occurs. . . .” 52 Stat. 881, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (d). Transactions excluded from the shelter of § 70d are, so far as pertinent, within § 70d (5), which provides that “no [such] transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt . . . shall be valid against the trustee . . . .” 52 Stat. 882, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (d)(5). The adjudication of voluntary petitions results by operation of law from filing. § 18f, 73 Stat. 109, 11 U. S. C. §41 (f). In the situation before us, the remaining issue is accordingly whether this transfer occurred before or after September 26, the day on which Seafoods filed its petition in bankruptcy and was perforce adjudicated bankrupt. I do not understand petitioner to contend, or the Court to suggest that this occurred at a time other than presentment of the checks, October 2. Given the law of California, by which a check is not a pro tanto transfer of the drawer’s rights until presentment, I cannot see that another moment is possible. California Civil Code § 3265e; California Commercial Code § 3409. In sum, I find it unavoidable that the Act’s plain words hold the bank liable to the trustee for the value of its payment on Seafoods’ behalf.2 I do not suggest that this Court should confine its attention to the unadorned terms of the Bankruptcy 2 It is true that the negotiability proviso to § 70d (5) has once been held to protect a bank in analogous circumstances. Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730. The proviso’s legislative history throws little light on its intended scope. It appears inapplicable here. First, presentment is not strictly a negotiation. Second and more important, other constructions are more consonant with the balance of § 70d. Cf. 70 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 550. 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 170.68, at 1502, n. 3 (14th ed. 1964). I do not understand the Court to rely upon the proviso. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 105 99 Harlan, J., dissenting. Act. Nonetheless, where Congress has pointed so unmistakably in one direction, prudence and simple propriety surely require that we examine carefully the impulses which beckon us to another. The Court explains its resolution of this case by two apparently alternative contentions. I am unpersuaded that either permits us to circumvent the Act’s demands. The Court first intimates, without expressly deciding, that the bank is shielded by its contractual right to a seasonable revocation of its duty to honor checks drawn upon it. The Court vouches for this the doctrine that a trustee in bankruptcy takes rights no wider or more complete than his bankrupt had. It is doubtless true that a trustee is not a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer, and that he ordinarily assumes the bankrupt’s property subject to existing claims, liens, and equities. Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296. Unfortunately, these maxims scarcely suffice to decide this case. They are interstitial rules, valid no further than the Act’s positive requirements permit. First National Bank v. Staake, 202 U. S. 141. 4 Collier, Bankruptcy If 70.04, at 954.2. The Act in several respects clothes the trustee in powers denied to his bankrupt: A trustee may thus avoid, although his bankrupt may not, transactions deemed fraudulent under the Act, liens obtained and preferential transfers completed within four months of bankruptcy, and statutory liens within the prohibition of § 67c (2). 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 1f 70.04, at 957. The Court does not assert that this transfer is protected by § 70d. I understand it instead to concede that, equitable considerations aside, the bank’s payment is invalid against the trustee. I must conclude that the Court has reasoned that a contractual defense retained against the bankrupt suffices to preclude use of a power expressly conferred upon the trustee. If this is the Court’s meaning, it has traversed both logic and author- 233-653 0 - 67 - 14 106 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Harlan, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. ity, and has emasculated the powers given to trustees under the Act. The Court’s principal contention seems to be that equitable considerations oblige it to release the bank from liability. Its premise plainly is that equity is here a solvent to which we may appropriately resort; I am unable to accept that premise. This is not a case in which the statute is imprecise. Nor is it a case in which the legislature’s intentions have been misshapen by the statute’s words; even a cursory examination of the history of § 70 will evidence that its terms faithfully reflect Congress’ purposes. The Act of 1898 vested title to the bankrupt’s property in the trustee at adjudication, but contained nothing to prevent its dissipation in the interval after filing.3 The courts were therefore left free to devise protective rules to reconcile the competing interests of the estate and of those who dealt with the bankrupt in this period. The fulcrum of those rules was the proposition that a “petition [in bankruptcy] is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction.” Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14. The courts softened its severity by a series of exceptions, either employing or distinguishing it as equity or convenience suggested. The result, as a principal draftsman of the Chandler Act reforms described it, was that “no consistent theory of protected transactions has been developed,” and the situation was “conducive to confusion and uncertainty, with potentialities for argument, ‘bluffing,’ litigation, expense and de- 3 This Court had held that despite the cleavage at adjudication, the trustee took the title as it was at filing. Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474. The situation is summarized in McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev 369, 383. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 107 99 Harlan, J., dissenting. lay.”4 The law consisted essentially of “nebulous vagaries.” 5 The Chandler Act stemmed chiefly from a sustained investigation of these and other problems by the National Bankruptcy Conference.6 Its members were the Act’s principal draftsmen. The revisions they made to § 70 entirely restructured the basis both of the trustee’s title and of the protection given to transactions which occur after filing. Their purpose, as one of them explained to the Chandler subcommittee, was to provide “a clear statutory basis” to the issues of title and protected transactions, in “lieu of a crazy quilt of contradictory judicial statements.” 7 The effect of their revisions was to define “the full extent to which bona fide transactions with the bankrupt, after bankruptcy, will be protected.” 8 Adjudication and receivership were plainly expected to mark the perimeters of this protection. Various factors determined this choice. First, none of the several exceptions to Mueller v. Nugent reached transactions 4 McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act (pts. 1 & 2), 40 Harv. L. Rev. 341, 583, at 615. The same conclusions are reached by Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, at 161. 5 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 170.66, at 1495. 6 A brief history of the Conference’s work may be found in McLaughlin, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 375. 7 Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 212. Professor McLaughlin quoted from his article in 40 Harv. L. Rev. 341. He subsequently acknowledged that § 70 would permit an area in which the courts could continue to balance the competing interests of the parties. Ibid. In light of the importance attached to adjudication as a line of cleavage, and the comparative insignificance intended for § 70d in voluntary proceedings, see infra, I do not believe that this acknowledgment can be taken to reach this case. 8 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 70.67, at 1500. 108 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Harlan, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. which occurred after adjudication.9 More important, once the draftsmen had elected to vest title in the trustee from filing, they were chiefly anxious to shield debtors from the consequences of unwarranted involuntary petitions.10 11 They feared that such a petition might ruin a debtor by inducing others to avoid dealings with him. Section 70d was expected to immunize bona fide transactions after filing, and thus to encourage dealings with the solvent debtor. There is no need for such protection after adjudication. Finally, adjudication and receivership signal the beginning of bankruptcy administration, and they are therefore both appropriate moments at which to forbid all further meddling with the estate.11 It is equally plain that the protection offered by § 70d must have been intended principally for involuntary proceedings. There are several indications of this. Most important, the hazard to which the section was chiefly directed, the consequences of an unwarranted petition upon a debtor’s credit, is entirely absent from voluntary proceedings. Thus, the discussion of this problem before the Chandler subcommittee was explic- 9 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 70.66, at 1498. In the one apparent exception, Jones v. Springer, 226 U. S. 148, a dredge had been placed in the hands of a receiver under an attachment levied before filing. The Court concluded that this sufficed to avoid the ordinary limitations imposed by adjudication. 10 Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 211. Professor McLaughlin described this to the subcommittee as “the next most pressing problem.” He concluded that “[w]e have put in a provision [70d] to cover that [the problem of unwarranted petitions].” His explanation to the subcommittee of § 70d was based entirely on this problem. There is of course evidence that the draftsmen also expected to alleviate unfairness which § 70a might otherwise produce. See Analysis of H. R. 12889, House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 230 (Comm. Print 1936). 11 MacLachlan, Handbook of the Law of Bankruptcy 346. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 109 99 Harlan, J., dissenting. itly confined to involuntary petitions.12 Further, the protection offered by § 63b, which closely supplements § 70d, extends only to involuntary proceedings.13 Finally, the draftsmen must surely have known that the adjudication of voluntary petitions ordinarily followed quickly and routinely after filing.14 It was certainly not unknown for adjudication to occur on the day of filing.15 The draftsmen could only have intended that any protection given in voluntary proceedings by § 70d be fleeting and minimal.16 In short, § 70 was tailored to provide carefully measured protection to bona fide transfers. It was intended to preclude further confusion and uncertainty. There is every indication that its terms faithfully reflect its purposes. I fully sympathize with the discomfort of the bank’s position, but I cannot escape the impact of what 12 Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 211. 13 52 Stat. 873, 11 U. S. C. § 103(b). Section 63b provides that “In the interval after the filing of an involuntary petition and before the appointment of a receiver or the adjudication, whichever first occurs, a claim arising in favor of a creditor by reason of property transferred or services rendered by the creditor to the bankrupt for the benefit of the estate shall be provable to the extent of the value of such property or services.” 14 MacLachlan, Handbook of the Law of Bankruptcy 40. 15 See, e. g., New York County National Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138. 16 Further, the 1959 amendments to § 18, by which adjudication results by operation of law from filing, were adopted upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference and its Committee on Bankruptcy Administration. Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference, 1958, p. 28. The bill received the endorsement of the National Bankruptcy Conference. H. R. Rep. No. 241, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. It therefore seems quite improbable that the 1959 amendments could have inadvertently excluded voluntary proceedings from the scope of § 70d. 110 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Harlan, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. Congress has done.17 The Court has not found § 70 constitutionally impermissible.18 It has simply measured the statute by the standard of its own conscience, and concluded that equity requires a result which the statute forbids. I had thought it well settled that equity may supplement, but may never supersede, the Act. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy fl 2.09, at 171-172. The Act’s language is neither imprecise nor infelicitous; I can therefore see no room for the interposition of equity. More important, the Court today permits the dilution of the Chandler amendments to § 70. The Court’s disposition of this case may be taken to suggest that whenever equity is thought strongly to demand relief from the strictures of the Act, further exceptions may be appropriately created to the statutory scheme. I fear that the Court may have set in motion once more the protracted process which before 1938 resulted in “confusion and uncertainty,” “litigation, expense and delay.” 17 Judge Soper’s reasoning in Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co., 218 F. 2d 394, 399, seems entirely persuasive: “Whether the line which has been drawn is the best possible solution of the problem is not for the courts to say. The line has in fact been drawn by competent authority and it is no longer necessary for the courts to make the attempt, which has not been conspicuously successful in the past, to decide cases on the facts as they arise . . . .” See also Kohn v. Myers, 266 F. 2d 353. 181 cannot in any event accept petitioner’s contention that these provisions have denied it due process. In exercise of its express constitutional authority over bankruptcy, Art. I, § 8, Congress has attached great importance to swift and efficient administration; to this purpose it devised a statutory scheme by which it balanced the competing rights of the interested parties. Congress’ purposes are permissible, and the scheme it has adopted is reasonably calculated to achieve those purposes. In this context I cannot say that the Constitution requires that all whose rights may be reached by bankruptcy proceedings must first have actual notice of them. Cf. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181. BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. Ill 99 Opinion of Fortas, J. If so, the Chandler amendments will have had no more permanent result than to wipe the judicial slate momentarily clean. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Fortas. I would vacate the judgment. I believe that we do not have before us a case or controversy between the parties of record. Respondent, the trustee in bankruptcy, has no substantial stake in the outcome of this litigation and is not an adversary in the usual sense. On February 24, 1964, the referee in bankruptcy ruled that both the petitioner bank and the payee on the bankrupt’s checks were liable to the trustee. On May 19, 1964, the payee paid the trustee in full and has not been a party to this litigation since that time. Having received full payment, the trustee has no interest in the litigation except professional curiosity as to the question of law—and he so apprised the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. See Brief for Respondent, p. 2. See also Petition for Certiorari, p. 4. Nevertheless, the bank, also eager for an answer to this intriguing legal problem and facing a claim from the payee for contribution, continued the litigation against the trustee, and the trustee obligingly went along. The respondent trustee’s only financial interest is admittedly confined to the question of court costs,1 incurred as a volunteer. 1 An unbroken line of cases establishes the rule that controversy as to costs alone does not salvage an otherwise moot case. See, e. g., Walling v. Reuter Co., 321 U. S. 671, 677 (1944); United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 (1929); Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528, 533-536 (1926); Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216 (1923); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359, 362-363 (1921); Robertson & Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 112 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of Fortas, J. 385 U. S. There are two reasons of substance why the Court should not, in this case, decide the important statutory question presented. First, this is not an adversary proceeding, and has not been one since respondent received full payment in 1964. It is basic to our adversary system to insist that the courts have the benefit of the contentions of opposing parties who have a material, and not merely an abstract, interest in the conflict. Adverse parties—adverse in reality and not merely in positions taken—are absolutely necessary. See, e. g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 361-363 (1911); California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U. S. 300, 301-302 (1892). Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-242 (1937) (Hughes, C. J.); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129-130 (1922) (Brandeis, J.). Second, this is a peculiar case in which to depart from the settled rule. The effect of the decision today is to strip the payee of its asserted right to contribution, although the payee is not before this Court, and was not before the Court of Appeals or the District Court. The question of the relative rights and obligations of the payee and the bank ought to be resolved in litigation in which both participate.* 2 Cf. Mullane n. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). The impact of today’s decision upon a party not present confirms the wisdom of the rule “that when there is no actual controversy, involving real and substantial rights, between of the United States § 274 (Wolfson & Kurland ed.); 6 Moore, Federal Practice 54.70 [5], at 1311 (2d ed. 1965). 2 Upon vacation of the judgment below, the bank would be free to relitigate with the payee the question of its own liability, since the bank was in no respect responsible for the manner in which this case became a nonadversary proceeding. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 & n. 1 (1950). BANK OF MARIN v. ENGLAND. 113 99 Opinion of Fortas, J. the parties to the record, the case will be dismissed.” Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 557. See also Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 255. I would vacate the judgment below and remand with direction to dismiss. See M editing Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U. S. 324, 329-330 (1961); United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36, 39-41 (1950). 114 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. November 21, 1966. 385 U. S. BADGLEY et al. v. HARE, SECRETARY OF STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. No. 505. Decided November 21, 1966. 376 Mich. 410, 137 N. W. 2d 495, 138 N. W. 2d 16; 377 Mich. 396, 140 N. W. 2d 436, appeal dismissed. William T. Gossett for appellants. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Curtis G. Beck, Assistant Attorney General, for Hare; Theodore Sachs for Scholle et al., appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. BOYDEN v. CALIFORNIA. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT. No. 271, Mise. Decided November 21, 1966. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Appellant pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. DECISIONS PER CURIAM. 115 385 U. S. November 21, 1966. BATTAGLIA et al., dba PRODUCE TRANSPORT DISPATCH v. UNITED STATES et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON. No. 564. Decided November 21, 1966. Affirmed. Earle V. White for appellants. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert Ginnane and Betty Jo Christian for the United States et al. Randall B. Kester, John F. Weisser, Jr., James W. Nisbet, J. D. Feeney and Ed White for railroad appellees. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for oral argument. 116 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Syllabus. 385 U.S. BOND et al. v. FLOYD et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA. No. 87. Argued November 10, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966. Several months after the election in June 1965 to the Georgia House of Representatives of appellant Bond, a Negro, a civil rights organization of which he was a staff member issued an anti-war statement against the Government’s Vietnam policy and the operation of the Selective Service laws. Bond endorsed the statement in a news interview stating among other things that as “a second class citizen” he was not required to support the war, as a pacifist he was opposed to all war, and he saw nothing inconsistent with his statement and his taking the oath of office. House members in petitions challenged Bond’s right to be seated, charging that his statements aided our enemies, violated the Selective Service laws, discredited the House, and were inconsistent with the legislator’s mandatory oath to support the Constitution. Following the House clerk’s refusal to seat him, Bond, manifesting willingness to take the oath, challenged the petitions as depriving him of his First Amendment rights and being racially motivated. At a House committee hearing Bond amplified his views and denied having urged draft card burning or other law violations. Following the hearing, the committee concluded that Bond should not be seated and the House thereafter refused to seat him. Bond brought this action in District Court for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. The District Court, holding that it had jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue, concluded that Bond had been accorded procedural due process through the hearing. It also held that the House had a rational basis for concluding that Bond’s remarks exceeded criticism of national policy and that he could not in good faith take an oath to support the State and Federal Constitutions and thus could not meet a qualification for membership which the House had the power to impose. While Bond’s appeal to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from that decision was pending he was again elected as a Representative, in a special election. He was rejected by the House Rules Committee BOND v. FLOYD. 117 116 Syllabus. when he declined to recant, and later was elected again, in the regular 1966 primary and general elections. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a disqualification for the office of state legislator under color of a proper constitutional standard violates First Amendment rights. P. 131. 2. In disqualifying Bond because of his statements the State violated the First Amendment made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Pp. 131-137. (a) A majority of state legislators is not authorized to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator meets the requirement for holding office of swearing to support the Federal and State Constitutions. P. 132. (b) The State may not apply to a legislator a First Amendment standard stricter than that applicable to a private citizen. Pp. 132-133. (c) Bond’s statements do not show an incitement to violate the Selective Service statute’s prohibition of counselling against registration for military service. Pp. 133-134. (d) Though a State may impose an oath requirement on legislators it cannot limit their capacity to express views on local or national policy. “[D'Jebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270. Pp. 135-136. 251 F. Supp. 333, reversed. Howard Moore, Jr., and Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs was Victor Rabinowitz. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were William L. Harper and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul L. Hanes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Robert L. Carter for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Melvin L. Wulf and 118 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. Charles Morgan, Jr., for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether the Georgia House of Representatives may constitutionally exclude appellant Bond, a duly elected Representative, from membership because of his statements, and statements to which he subscribed, criticizing the policy of the Federal Government in Vietnam and the operation of the Selective Service laws. An understanding of the circumstances of the litigation requires a complete presentation of the events and statements which led to this appeal. Bond, a Negro, was elected on June 15, 1965, as the Representative to the Georgia House of Representatives from the 136th House District. Of the District’s 6,500 voters, approximately 6,000 are Negroes. Bond defeated his opponent, Malcolm Dean, Dean of Men at Atlanta University, also a Negro, by a vote of 2,320 to 487. On January 6, 1966, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a civil rights organization of which Bond was then the Communications Director, issued the following statement on American policy in Vietnam and its relation to the work of civil rights organizations in this country: “The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has a right and a responsibility to dissent with United States foreign policy on an issue when it sees fit. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee now states its opposition to United States’ involvement in Viet Nam on these grounds: BOND v. FLOYD. 119 116 Opinion of the Court. “We believe the United States government has been deceptive in its claims of concern for freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia and in the United States itself. “We, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, have been involved in the black people’s struggle for liberation and self-determination in this country for the past five years. Our work, particularly in the South, has taught us that the United States government has never guaranteed the freedom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly determined to end the rule of terror and oppression within its own borders. “We ourselves have often been victims of violence and confinement executed by United States government officials. We recall the numerous persons who have been murdered in the South because of their efforts to secure their civil and human rights, and whose murderers have been allowed to escape penalty for their crimes. “The murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee, Ala., is no different than the murder of peasants in Viet Nam, for both Young and the Vietnamese sought, and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed them by law. In each case the United States government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths. “Samuel Young was murdered because United States law is not being enforced. Vietnamese are murdered because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in violation of international law. The United States is no respecter of persons or law 120 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385U.S. when such persons or laws run counter to its needs and desires. “We recall the indifference, suspicion and outright hostility with which our reports of violence have been met in the past by government officials. “We know that for the most part, elections in this country, in the North as well as the South, are not free. We have seen that the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act have not yet been implemented with full federal power and sincerity. “We question, then, the ability and even the desire of the United States government to guarantee free elections abroad. We maintain that our country’s cry of ‘preserve freedom in the world’ is a hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the expediencies of United States cold war policies. “We are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States aggression in Viet Nam in the name of the ‘freedom’ we find so false in this country. “We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of a supposedly ‘free’ society where responsibility to freedom is equated with the responsibility to lend oneself to military aggression. We take note of the fact that 16 per cent of the draftees from this country are Negroes called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam, to preserve a ‘democracy’ which does not exist for them at home. “We ask, where is the draft for the freedom fight in the United States? BOND v. FLOYD. 121 116 Opinion of the Court. “We therefore encourage those Americans who prefer to use their energy in building democratic forms within this country. We believe that work in the civil rights movement and with other human relations organizations is a valid alternative to the draft. We urge all Americans to seek this alternative, knowing full well that it may cost their lives— as painfully as in Viet Nam.” On the same day that this statement was issued, Bond was interviewed by telephone by a reporter from a local radio station, and, although Bond had not participated in drafting the statement, he endorsed the statement in these words: “Why, I endorse it, first, because I like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that war and any other war and eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in it for any reason that they choose; and secondly, I agree with this statement because of the reason set forth in it— because I think it is sorta hypocritical for us to maintain that we are fighting for liberty in other places and we are not guaranteeing liberty to citizens inside the continental United States. “Well, I think that the fact that the United States Government fights a war in Viet Nam, I don’t think that I as a second class citizen of the United States have a requirement to support that war. I think my responsibility is to oppose things that I think are wrong if they are in Viet Nam or New York, or Chicago, or Atlanta, or wherever.” When the interviewer suggested that our involvement in Vietnam was because “if we do not stop Communism 233-653 0 - 67 - 15 122 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. there that it is just a question of where will we stop it next,” Bond replied: “Oh, no, I’m not taking a stand against stopping World Communism, and I’m not taking a stand in favor of the Viet Cong. What I’m saying that is, first, that I don’t believe in that war. That particular war. I’m against all war. I’m against that war in particular, and I don’t think people ought to participate in it. Because I’m against war, I’m against the draft. I think that other countries in the World get along without a draft—England is one—and I don’t see why we couldn’t, too. . . I’m not about to justify that war, because it’s stopping International Communism, or whatever—you know, I just happen to have a basic disagreement with wars for whatever reason they are fought— . . . [F]ought to stop International Communism, to promote International Communism, or for whatever reason. I oppose the Viet Cong fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the United States fighting in Viet Nam. I happen to live in the United States. If I lived in North Viet Nam I might not have the same sort of freedom of expression, but it happens that I live here—not there.” The interviewer also asked Bond if he felt he could take the oath of office required by the Georgia Constitution, and Bond responded that he saw nothing inconsistent between his statements and the oath. Bond was also asked whether he would adhere to his statements if war were declared on North Vietnam and if his statements might become treasonous. He replied that he did not know “if I’m strong enough to place myself in a position where I’d be guilty of treason.” BOND v. FLOYD. 123 116 Opinion of the Court. Before January 10, 1966, when the Georgia House of Representatives was scheduled to convene, petitions challenging Bond’s right to be seated were filed by 75 House members. These petitions charged that Bond’s statements gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and Georgia, violated the Selective Service laws, and tended to bring discredit and disrespect on the House. The petitions further contended that Bond’s endorsement of the SNCC statement “is totally and completely repugnant to and inconsistent with the mandatory oath prescribed by the Constitution of Georgia for a Member of the House of Representatives to take before taking his seat.” For the same reasons, the petitions asserted that Bond could not take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. When Bond appeared at the House on January 10 to be sworn in, the clerk refused to administer the oath to him until the issues raised in the challenge petitions had been decided. Bond filed a response to the challenge petitions in which he stated his willingness to take the oath and argued that he was not unable to do so in good faith. He further argued that the challenge against his seating had been filed to deprive him of his First Amendment rights, and that the challenge was racially motivated. A special committee was appointed to report on the challenge, and a hearing was held to determine exactly what Bond had said and the intentions with which he had said it. At this hearing, the only testimony given against Bond was that which he himself gave the committee. Both the opponents Bond had defeated in becoming the Representative of the 136th District testified to his good character and to his loyalty to the United States. A recording of the interview which Bond had given to the reporter after the SNCC statement was played, and Bond was called to the stand for cross-examination. He there admitted his statements and elaborated his views. He 124 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. stated that he concurred in the SNCC statement “without reservation,” and, when asked if he admired the courage of persons who burn their draft cards, responded: “I admire people who take an action, and I admire people who feel strongly enough about their convictions to take an action like that knowing the consequences that they will face, and that was my original statement when asked that question. “I have never suggested or counseled or advocated that any one other person burn their draft card. In fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce it if you wish. I do not advocate that people should break laws. What I simply try to say was that I admired the courage of someone who could act on his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff consequences.” Tapes of an interview Bond had given the press after the clerk had refused to give him the oath were also heard by the special committee. In this interview, Bond stated: “I stand before you today charged with entering into public discussion on matters of National interest. I hesitate to offer explanations for my actions or deeds where no charge has been levied against me other than the charge that I have chosen to speak my mind and no explanation is called for, for no member of this House, has ever, to my knowledge, been called upon to explain his public statements for public postures as a prerequisite to admission to that Body. I therefore, offer to my constituents a statement of my views. I have not counselled burning draft cards, nor have I burned mine. I have suggested that congressionally outlined alternatives to military service be extended to BOND v. FLOYD. 125 116 Opinion of the Court. building democracy at home. The posture of my life for the past five years has been calculated to give Negroes the ability to participate in formulation of public policies. The fact of my election to public office does not lessen my duty or desire to express my opinions even when they differ from those held by others. As to the current controversy because of convictions that I have arrived at through examination of my conscience I have decided I personally cannot participate in war. “I stand here with intentions to take an oath— that oath they just took in there—that will dispel any doubts about my convictions or loyalty.” The special committee gave general approval in its report to the specific charges in the challenge petitions that Bond’s endorsement of the SNCC statement and his supplementary remarks showed that he “does not and will not” support the Constitutions of the United States and of Georgia, that he “adheres to the enemies of the . . . State of Georgia” contrary to the State Constitution, that he gives aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, that his statements violated the Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462, and that his statements “are reprehensible and are such as tend to bring discredit to and disrespect of the House.” On the same day the House adopted the committee report without findings and without further elaborating Bond’s lack of qualifications, and resolved by a vote of 184 to 12 that “Bond shall not be allowed to take the oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives and that Representative-Elect Julian Bond shall not be seated as a member of the House of Representatives.” Bond then instituted an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for injunctive re- 126 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. lief and a declaratory judgment that the House action was unauthorized by the Georgia Constitution and violated Bond’s rights under the First Amendment. A three-judge District Court was convened under 28 U. S. C. § 2281. All three members of the District Court held that the court had jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the House action because Bond had asserted substantial First Amendment rights.1 On the merits, however, the court was divided. Judges Bell and Morgan, writing for the majority of the court, addressed themselves first to the question of whether the Georgia House had power under state law to disqualify Bond based on its conclusion that he could not sincerely take the oath of office. They reasoned that separation-of-powers principles gave the Legislature power to insist on qualifications in addition to those specified in the State Constitution. The majority pointed out that nothing in the Georgia Constitution limits the qualifications of the legislators to those expressed in the constitution. Having concluded that the action of the Georgia House was authorized by state law, the court considered whether Bond’s disqualification violated his constitutional right of freedom of speech. It reasoned that the decisions of this Court involving particular state political offices supported an attitude of restraint in which the principles of separation of powers and federalism should be balanced against the alleged deprivation of individual constitutional rights. On this basis, the majority below fashioned the test to be applied in this case as being whether the refusal to seat Bond violated procedural or what it termed substantive due process. The court held that the hearing which had been given Bond by the House satisfied procedural due process. As for 1 The opinion of the District Court is reported at 251 F. Supp 333 (1966). BOND v. FLOYD. 127 116 Opinion of the Court. what it termed the question of substantive due process, the majority concluded that there was a rational evidentiary basis for the ruling of the House. It reasoned that Bond’s right to dissent as a private citizen was limited by his decision to seek membership in the Georgia House. Moreover, the majority concluded, the SNCC statement and Bond’s related remarks went beyond criticism of national policy and provided a rational basis for a conclusion that the speaker could not in good faith take an oath to support the State and Federal Constitutions: “A citizen would not violate his oath by objecting to or criticizing this policy or even by calling it deceptive and false as the statement did. “But the statement does not stop with this. It is a call to action based on race; a call alien to the concept of the pluralistic society which makes this nation. It aligns the organization with . colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia . . . .’ It refers to its involvement in the black people’s struggle for liberation and self-determination . . . It states that ‘Vietnamese are murdered because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in violation of international law.’ It alleges that Negroes, referring to American servicemen, are called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam. “The call to action, and this is what we find to be a rational basis for the decision which denied Mr. Bond his seat, is that language which states that SNCC supports those men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft.” 2 Chief Judge Tuttle dissented.3 He reasoned that the question of the power of the Georgia House under the 2 Id., at 344. 3 Id., at 345. 128 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. State Constitution to disqualify a Representative under these circumstances had never been decided by the state courts, and that federal courts should construe state law, if possible, so as to avoid unnecessary federal constitutional issues. Since Bond satisfied all the stated qualifications in the State Constitution, Chief Judge Tuttle concluded that his disqualification was beyond the power of the House as a matter of state constitutional law. Bond appealed directly to this Court from the decision of the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. While this appeal was pending, the Governor of Georgia called a special election to fill the vacancy caused by Bond’s exclusion. Bond entered this election and won overwhelmingly. The House was in recess, but the Rules Committee held a hearing in which Bond declined to recant his earlier statements. Consequently, he was again prevented from taking the oath of office, and the seat has remained vacant. Bond again sought the seat from the 136th District in the regular 1966 election, and he won the Democratic primary in September 1966, and won an overwhelming majority in the election of November 8, 1966.4 5 The Georgia Constitution sets out a number of specific provisions dealing with the qualifications and eligibility of state legislators. These provide that Representatives shall be citizens of the United States, at least 21 years of age, citizens of Georgia for two years, and residents for one year of the counties from which elected.6 The 4 A question was raised in oral argument as to whether this case might not be moot since the session of the House which excluded Bond was no longer in existence. The State has not pressed this argument, and it could not do so, because the State has stipulated that if Bond succeeds on this appeal he will receive back salary for the term from which he was excluded. 5 Georgia Const., Art. 3, § 6 (§2-1801, Ga. Code Ann.). BOND v. FLOYD. 129 116 Opinion of the Court. Georgia Constitution further provides that no one convicted of treason against the State, or of any crime of moral turpitude, or of a number of other enumerated crimes may hold any office in the State.6 Idiots and insane persons are barred from office,7 and no one holding any state or federal office is eligible for a seat in either house.8 The State Constitution also provides: “Election, returns, etc.; disorderly conduct.— Each House shall be the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members and shall have power to punish them for disorderly behavior, or misconduct, by censure, fine, imprisonment, or expulsion; but no member shall be expelled, except by a vote of two-thirds of the House to which he belongs.” 9 These constitute the only stated qualifications for membership in the Georgia Legislature and the State concedes that Bond meets all of them. The Georgia Constitution also requires Representatives to take an oath stated in the Constitution: “Oath of members.—Each senator and Representative, before taking his seat, shall take the following oath, or affirmation, to-wit: T will support the Constitution of this State and of the United States, and on all questions and measures which may come before me, I will so conduct myself, as will, in my judgment, be most conducive to the interests and prosperity of this State.’ ” 10 6 Georgia Const., Art. 2, § 2 (§2-801, Ga. Code Ann.). 7 Ibid. 8 Georgia Const., Art. 3, §4 (§2-1606, Ga. Code Ann.). 9 Georgia Const., Art. 3, § 7 (§2-1901, Ga. Code Ann.). 10 Georgia Const., Art. 3, §4 (§2-1605, Ga. Code Ann.). 130 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. The State points out in its brief that the latter part of this oath, involving the admonition to act in the best interests of the State, was not the standard by which Bond was judged. The State does not claim that Bond refused to take the oath to support the Federal Constitution, a requirement imposed on state legislators by Art. VI, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution: “The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Tests shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Instead, it argues that the oath provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions constitute an additional qualification. Because under state law the legislature has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an elected Representative meets the enumerated qualifications, it is argued that the legislature has power to look beyond the plain meaning of the oath provisions which merely require that the oaths be taken. This additional power is said to extend to determining whether a given Representative may take the oath with sincerity. The State does not claim that it should be completely free of judicial review whenever it disqualifies an elected Representative; it admits that, if a State Legislature excluded a legislator on racial or other clearly unconstitutional grounds, the federal (or state) judiciary would be justified in testing the exclusion by federal constitutional standards.11 But the State argues that there can be no 11 See Gomillion v. Lightjoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), in which the Court stated: “When a State exercises power wholly within the BOND v. FLOYD. 131 116 Opinion of the Court. doubt as to the constitutionality of the qualification involved in this case because it is one imposed on the State Legislatures by Article VI of the United States Constitution. Moreover, the State contends that no decision of this Court suggests that a State may not ensure the loyalty of its public servants by making the taking of an oath a qualification of office. Thus the State argues that there should be no judicial review of the legislature’s power to judge whether a prospective member may conscientiously take the oath required by the State and Federal Constitutions. We are not persuaded by the State’s attempt to distinguish, for purposes of our jurisdiction, between an exclusion alleged to be on racial grounds and one alleged to violate the First Amendment. The basis for the argued distinction is that, in this case, Bond’s disqualification was grounded on a constitutional standard—the requirement of taking an oath to support the Constitution. But Bond’s contention is that this standard was utilized to infringe his First Amendment rights, and we cannot distinguish, for purposes of our assumption of jurisdiction, between a disqualification under an unconstitutional standard and a disqualification which, although under color of a proper standard, is alleged to violate the First Amendment. We conclude as did the entire court below that this Court has jurisdiction to review the question of whether the action of the Georgia House of Representatives deprived Bond of federal constitutional rights, and we now move to the central question posed in the case—whether Bond’s disqualification because of his statements violated domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right” 364 U. S., at 347. 132 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. the free speech provisions of the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State argues that the exclusion does not violate the First Amendment because the State has a right, under Article VI of the United States Constitution, to insist on loyalty to the Constitution as a condition of office. A legislator of course can be required to swear to support the Constitution of the United States as a condition of holding office, but that is not the issue in this case, as the record is uncontradicted that Bond has repeatedly expressed his willingness to swear to the oaths provided for in the State and Federal Constitutions. Nor is this a case where a legislator swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath. Thus, we do not quarrel with the State’s contention that the oath provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do not violate the First Amendment. But this requirement does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. Such a power could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from national or state policy or that of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty to the Constitution. Certainly there can be no question but that the First Amendment protects expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and to the Selective Service system. The State does not contend otherwise. But it argues that Bond went beyond expressions of opposition, and counseled violations of the Selective Service laws, and that advocating violation of federal law demonstrates a lack of support for the Constitution. The State declines to argue that Bond’s statements would violate any law if made by a private citizen, but it does argue that even though such BOND v. FLOYD. 133 116 Opinion of the Court. a citizen might be protected by his First Amendment rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter standard to its legislators. We do not agree. Bond could not have been constitutionally convicted under 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), which punishes any person who “counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration.” 12 Bond’s statements were at worst unclear on the question of the means to be adopted to avoid the draft. While the SNCC statement said “We are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft,” this statement alone cannot be interpreted as a call to unlawful refusal to be drafted. Moreover, Bond’s supplementary statements tend to resolve the opaqueness in favor of legal alternatives to the draft, and there is no evidence to the contrary. On the day the statement was issued, Bond explained that he endorsed it “because I like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that war and any other war and eager and anxious to 12 The pertinent provisions of §462 (a) are as follows: “[A]ny person who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the making, of any false statement or certificate regarding or bearing upon a classification or in support of any request for a particular classification, for service under the provisions of this title . . . , or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant thereto, or who otherwise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . , or who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . , or of said rules, regulations, or directions, ... or any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere or attempt to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise, with the administration of this title ... or the rules or regulations made pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any one or more of such offenses, shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment . . . .” 134 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. encourage people not to participate in it for any reason that they choose.” In the same interview, Bond stated categorically that he did not oppose the Vietnam policy because he favored the Communists; that he was a loyal American citizen and supported the Constitution of the United States. He further stated “I oppose the Viet Cong fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the United States fighting in Viet Nam.” At the hearing before the Special Committee of the Georgia House, when asked his position on persons who burned their draft cards, Bond replied that he admired the courage of persons who “feel strongly enough about their convictions to take an action like that knowing the consequences that they will face.” When pressed as to whether his admiration was based on the violation of federal law, Bond stated: “I have never suggested or counseled or advocated that any one other person burn their draft card. In fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce it if you wish. I do not advocate that people should break laws. What I simply try to say was that I admired the courage of someone who could act on his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff consequences.” Certainly this clarification does not demonstrate any incitement to violation of law. No useful purpose would be served by discussing the many decisions of this Court which establish that Bond could not have been convicted for these statements consistently with the First Amendment. See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949). Nor does the fact that the District Court found the SNCC statement to have racial overtones constitute a reason for holding it out- BOND v. FLOYD. 135 116 Opinion of the Court. side the protection of the First Amendment. In fact the State concedes that there is no issue of race in the case. The State attempts to circumvent the protection the First Amendment would afford to these statements if made by a private citizen by arguing that a State is constitutionally justified in exacting a higher standard of loyalty from its legislators than from its citizens. Of course, a State may constitutionally require an oath to support the Constitution from its legislators which it does not require of its private citizens. But this difference in treatment does not support the exclusion of Bond, for while the State has an interest in requiring its legislators to swear to a belief in constitutional processes of government, surely the oath gives it no interest in limiting its legislators’ capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy.13 The manifest function of 13 Madison and Hamilton anticipated the oppressive effect on freedom of expression which would result if the legislature could utilize its power of judging qualifications to pass judgment on a legislator’s political views. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison opposed a proposal to give to Congress power to establish qualifications in general. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 420-422 (1937). The Journal of the Federal Convention of 1787 states: “Mr. Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. . . . Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction. “Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliamt. possessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy 136 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. The central commitment of the First Amendment, as summarized in the opinion of the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), is that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” We think the rationale of the New York Times case disposes of the claim that Bond’s statements fell outside the range of constitutional protection. Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected. The State argues that the New York Times principle should not be extended to statements by a legislator because the policy of encouraging free debate about governmental operations only applies to the citizen-critic of his government. We find no support for this distinction in the New York Times case or in any other decision of this Court. The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizencritics than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in governmental debates of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.” 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (Aug. 10, 1787). Hamilton agreed with Madison that: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen . . . are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature.” The Federalist, No. 60, p. 409 (Cooke ed. 1961). BOND v. FLOYD. 137 116 Opinion of the Court. by the person they have elected to represent them. We therefore hold that the disqualification of Bond from membership in the Georgia House because of his statements violated Bond’s right of free expression under the First Amendment. Because of our disposition of the case on First Amendment grounds, we need not decide the other issues advanced by Bond and the amici.14 The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. 14 Bond argues that the action of the Georgia House was not authorized by state law, that if the State Constitution allows this exclusion it does so pursuant to an oath which is unconstitutionally vague, that the exclusion was based on statements protected by the First Amendment, and that the exclusion is a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. In addition, amicus briefs filed in support of appellant Bond add the arguments that the decision not to seat him was inextricably involved with race prejudice and that it violated the guarantee of a republican form of government clause. Similarly, we need not pass on the standing of two of Bond’s constituents who joined in the suit below. The majority below dismissed the complaint as to these two constituents because they lacked a sufficiently direct interest in the controversy as would give them standing. The majority noted that it was appropriate to dismiss the case as to Bond’s constituents because Bond’s complaint would resolve every issue necessary to a decision in the case. We express no opinion on the question of whether Bond’s constituents can claim that concrete adverseness which would be necessary to give them standing. 233-653 0 - 67 - 16 138 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS. No. 86. Argued November 9, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966. Respondent sued the Government in the Court of Claims for damages for breach of contract to manufacture rifles. The United States asserted as a defense that it canceled the contract because three of respondent’s key employees had accepted compensation for awarding subcontracts in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act. The Court of Claims found that the kickbacks had been paid and that this was the basis for the cancellation but construed the Act as not authorizing such action. Held: The Act, which clearly expresses a policy hostile to kickbacks, authorized the United States to cancel this contract. Pp. 142-148. 171 Ct. Cl. 324, 347 F. 2d 509, reversed. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Richard A. Posner, David L. Rose and Robert V. Zener. Jack Rephan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Raymond R. Dickey and Bernard Gordon. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent, Acme Process Equipment Company, brought this action against the United States in the Court of Claims to recover damages for breach of a contract under which Acme undertook through itself and subcontractors to manufacture 2,751 75-mm. recoilless rifles for about $337 per rifle. Among other defenses, the United States alleged that it had rightfully canceled its contract with Acme because three of Acme’s principal employees had accepted compensation for awarding subcontracts in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act set out UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS CO. 139 138 Opinion of the Court. in part below.* 1 The Court of Claims found, as facts, that the kickbacks had been paid as alleged and that this was the ground on which the United States had canceled the prime contract with Acme, but construed the Act as not authorizing the cancellation. 171 Ct. Cl. 324, 347 F. 2d 509. We hold that it does. I. In October 1952, Acme hired Harry Tucker, Jr., and his associate, James Norris, for the purpose of establishing and managing a new division of the company to handle government contracts. Norris was made general manager of production with authority to submit bids, sign government contracts, and award subcontracts. Tucker was placed in charge of sales, government con 1 Section 1 of the Anti-Kickback Act, 60 Stat. 37, as amended, 74 Stat. 740, 41 U. S. C. §51, provides in pertinent part: “That the payment of any fee, commission, or compensation of any kind or the granting of any gift or gratuity of any kind, either directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of a subcontractor, . . . (1) to any officer, partner, employee, or agent of a prime contractor holding a negotiated contract entered into by any department, agency, or establishment of the United States for the furnishing of supplies, materials, equipment or services of any kind whatsoever ... as an inducement for the award of a subcontract or order from the prime contractor ... is hereby prohibited. The amount of any such fee, commission, or compensation or the cost or expense of any such gratuity or gift, whether heretofore or hereafter paid or incurred by the subcontractor, shall not be charged, either directly or indirectly, as a part of the contract price charged by the subcontractor to the prime contractor .... The amount of any such fee, cost, or expense shall be recoverable on behalf of the United States from the subcontractor or the recipient thereof by setoff . . . or by an action in an appropriate court of the United States. . . .” Section 4 of the Act, 41 U. S. C. §54, provides: “Any person who shall knowingly, directly or indirectly, make or receive any such prohibited payment shall be fined not more than $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” 140 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. tracts, and expediting subcontract operations. Prior to this time Tucker had entered into a contract with All Metals Industries, Inc., under which he was to receive a commission for all sales to customers, including Acme, procured by him. Tucker’s employment contract with Acme specifically stated that he represented and would continue to represent firms in other lines of business, but Acme did not consult with any of his other clients at the time Tucker was hired. Late in October, Tucker advised his superiors at Acme of the proposed Army contract for rifles, and at Tucker’s suggestion, Acme submitted a bid of $337 per rifle. Since Acme’s bid was the lowest, the Army began negotiations with Acme culminating in the award of the contract in January 1953. The negotiations were handled by Tucker and Norris for Acme. Since it was contemplated that the project would be largely subcontracted, leaving to Acme only the final finishing and assembly of components, the Army expressed a keen interest in Acme’s proposed subcontractors. Not only did it review Acme’s subcontracting plans and require Acme to notify it of changes in those plans during the final stages of negotiation, but the contract eventually awarded required government approval of all subcontracts in excess of $25,000. All Metals, because its proposed subcontract amounted to one-third of the amount of the prime contract, actually participated in the negotiations between Acme and the Army. During this period of negotiation two other developments took place. Tucker obtained agreements from two other potential subcontractors to pay him commissions on any orders he could procure from Acme. Army contracting officers warned Acme’s president, Joshua Epstein, that Tucker was suspected of having engaged in contingent-fee arrangements with other government contractors. UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS CO. 141 138 Opinion of the Court. Finally, Acme was awarded the prime contract. Although the price was fixed at $337 per rifle, the contract contained a price redetermination clause under which, after 30% of the rifles were delivered, the parties could negotiate the price on past and future shipments upward or downward, with an upper limit of $385 per rifle. Within a few weeks after the prime contract was awarded, All Metals and the other two companies with which Tucker had prior kickback arrangements obtained subcontracts from Acme.2 Tucker was paid his kick-backs, but, apparently unsatisfied with the amount of his payoff, he got Jack Epstein, the superintendent of the chief Acme plant and the son of Acme’s president and principal stockholder, to join the kickback conspiracy. Together Epstein and Tucker threatened to cancel All Metals’ subcontract unless it paid $25,000 to a dummy corporation owned by Tucker, Norris, and Epstein for fictitious consulting services. All Metals reluctantly acceded to the shakedown. The amount paid to Tucker, Norris, and Epstein was charged to Acme through an increase in the subcontract price. Although they knew that Tucker was representing other companies and had been notified of the Army’s suspicions of Tucker’s involvement in contingent-fee arrangements, other officials of Acme were not aware of the kickback activities of Tucker, Norris, and Epstein until late in 1953. At that time, Acme’s president caused the resignation of the three suspected officials. In 1956 Tucker, Norris, and Epstein were indicted for violation of the then Anti-Kickback Act, 60 Stat. 37.3 2 Shortly after the prime contract was awarded, two other companies paid Tucker’s father and Norris’ assistant kickbacks for obtaining subcontracts from Acme. This made a total of five subcontracts obtained through kickbacks. 3 This was the original Anti-Kickback Act passed by Congress in 1946. It expressly prohibited kickbacks only to employees of “a 142 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. After presentation of the Government’s case, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for acquittal on the ground that the Act—which at that time embraced only “cost-plus-a-fixed-fee or other cost reimbursable” government contracts—did not apply to Acme’s contract, a fixed-price contract with a provision for limited price redetermination. The court found the defendants’ actions “despicable and morally reprehensible, but unfortunately within the narrow letter of the law.” The court recommended that Congress amend the AntiKickback Act “to include as a crime the vicious and immoral type of conduct that has been exhibited in this case.” United States v. Norris, Crim. No. 18535 (D. C. E. D. Pa.), April 14, 1956. The District Court’s opinion did indeed spur the Comptroller General to recommend amendatory legislation and in 1960 the Anti-Kickback Act was amended to apply to all “negotiated contracts.”4 The civil provision of the amended Act was made retroactive to allow government recovery of kickbacks “whether heretofore or hereafter paid or incurred by the subcontractor.” II. The Anti-Kickback Act, as originally passed in 1946 and as amended in 1960, provides two express sanctions for its violation: (1) fine or imprisonment for one who makes or receives a kickback, and (2) recovery of the kickback by the United States. The Court of Claims held, and it is argued here, that had Congress wanted “to provide the additional remedy of contract annulment, it could have done so” by express language, 171 Ct. Cl., at 343, 347 F. 2d, at 521, and of course it could prime contractor holding a contract ... on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee or other cost reimbursable basis . . . .” 4 See generally H. R. Rep. No. 1880, S. Rep. No. 1585, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. The Act, as amended, is set out in part in note 1, supra. UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS CO. 143 138 Opinion of the Court. have. But the fact that it did not see fit to provide for such a remedy by express language does not end the matter. The Anti-Kickback Act not only “prohibited” such payments, but clearly expressed a policy decidedly hostile to them. They were recognized as devices hurtful to the Government’s procurement practices. Extra expenditures to get subcontracts necessarily add to government costs in cost-plus-a-fixed-fee and other cost reimbursable contracts. And this is also true where the prime contract is a negotiated fixed-price contract with a price redetermination clause, such as this prime contract is here. The kickbacks here are passed on to the Government in two stages. The prime contractor rarely submits his bid until after he has tentatively lined up his subcontractors. Indeed, as here, the subcontractors frequently participate in negotiation of the prime contract. The subcontractor’s tentative bid will, of course, reflect the amount he contemplates paying as a kickback, and then his inflated bid will be reflected in the prime contractor’s bid to the Government. At the renegotiation stage, where the prime contractor’s actual cost experience is the basis for price redetermination, any kickbacks, paid by subcontractors and passed on to the prime contractor after the prime contract is awarded, will be passed on to the Government in the form of price redetermination upward.5 5 This is precisely what happened here before the Government canceled Acme’s contract. Acme in 1953 submitted cost data for price redetermination purposes that included the charges of the five subcontractors which had paid kickbacks to Acme’s employees. These subcontracting charges in turn included the amounts paid as kickbacks. Had the kickbacks not been discovered and the contract not been canceled, Acme would have been able to use these costs to renegotiate the price per rifle from $337 to $385. Such price redetermination could have cost the Government about $132,000 more on the entire contract. 144 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. Acme argues, however, that the express provision for recovery of kickbacks is enough to protect the Government from increased costs attributable to them. But this argument rests on two false assumptions. The first is that kickbacks can easily be detected and recovered. This is hardly the case. Kickbacks being made criminal means that they must be made—if at all—in secrecy. Though they necessarily inflate the price to the Government, this inflation is rarely detectable. This is particularly true as regards defense contracts where the products involved are not usually found on the commercial market and where there may not be effective competition. Such contracts are generally negotiated and awarded without formal advertising and competitive bidding, and there is often no opportunity to compare going prices with the price negotiated by the Government.6 Kickbacks will usually not be discovered, if at all, until after the prime contract is let. The second false assumption underlying Acme’s argument is that the increased cost to the Government is necessarily equal to the amount of the kickback which is recoverable. Of course, a subcontractor who must pay a kickback is likely to include the amount of the kickback in his contract price. But this is not all. A subcontractor who anticipates obtaining a subcontract by virtue of a kick-back has little incentive to stint on his cost estimates. Since he plans to obtain the subcontract without regard to the economic merits of his proposal, he will be tempted to inflate that proposal by more than the amount of the kickback. And even if the Government could isolate and recover the inflation attributable to the kickback, it would still be saddled with a subcontractor who, having obtained the job other than on merit, is perhaps entirely unreliable in other ways. This unreliability in See S. Rep. No. 1585, supra, n. 4, at 3. UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS CO. 145 138 Opinion of the Court. turn undermines the security of the prime contractor’s performance—a result which the public cannot tolerate, especially where, as here, important defense contracts are involved. HI. In United States v. Mississippi Valley Co., 364 U. S. 520, 563, the Court recognized that “a statute frequently implies that a contract is not to be enforced when it arises out of circumstances that would lead enforcement to offend the essential purpose of the enactment.” The Court there approved the cancellation of a government contract for violation of the conflict-of-interest statute on the ground that “the sanction of nonenforcement is consistent with and essential to effectuating the public policy embodied in” the statute. Ibid. We think the same thing can be said about cancellation here. The Court of Claims, in holding that the AntiKickback Act does not authorize government cancellation because of its violation, distinguished Mississippi Valley Co. on the ground that the Anti-Kickback Act, unlike the conflict-of-interest statute, provides a civil as well as a criminal remedy. But we do not deem the provision of a civil remedy in the Anti-Kickback Act decisive. Where there is a mere conflict of interest, no concrete monetary rewards may have been received or paid which the Government can recover in a civil action. But where there is commercial bribery in the form of a kickback, there is something specific which the Government can recover, and hence it was quite natural for Congress to provide this express remedy. There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the Anti-Kickback Act that Congress, in providing a civil remedy for a more tangible evil, intended to preclude other civil sanctions necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. 146 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. There is likewise no merit to the Court of Claims’ distinction of the Mississippi Valley Co. case on the ground that there the criminal provision of the conflict-of-interest statute was violated whereas here the kick-back conspirators were acquitted of violating the AntiKickback Act as it existed when the kickbacks occurred, prior to 1960. As we have seen, Acme’s employees were acquitted on the technical ground that Acme’s prime contract was not a “cost reimbursable” contract to which the Act then expressly applied. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether this holding was correct.7 For whether the kickbacks here contravened the narrow letter of the criminal law, strictly construed, they clearly were violative of the public policy against kickbacks first expressed by Congress in 1946. If Congress then limited the reach of the Act to cost reimbursable contracts, it was only because other types of negotiated contracts were rarely in use then. Though the recent extensive use of other forms of negotiated contracts led Congress in 1960 to amend the Act to cover clearly these types of contracts and to close the technical loophole opened by the acquittal of Acme’s employees, the congressional policy against all kickbacks was not changed. Congress merely reiterated its recognition of the evil and sought to correct the letter of the law to effectuate its longstanding policy. In making the civil remedy of the 1960 Act retroactive, Congress clearly indicated that there had been no basic change in the public policy against kickbacks. This public policy requires that the United States be able to rid itself of a prime contract tainted by kickbacks. 7 See United States v. Barnard, 255 F. 2d 583, cert, denied, 358 U. S. 919, holding that a fixed-price contract with provision for unlimited price redetermination is a “cost reimbursable” contract. UNITED STATES v. ACME PROCESS CO. 147 138 Opinion of the Court. Though the kickbacks did not take place until after the prime contract was awarded to Acme, the kickback arrangements existed either at the time the prime contract was awarded or shortly thereafter, and at least one of the kickbacking subcontractors actually participated in the negotiation of the prime contract. These circumstances, as well as the price redetermination feature of the prime contract, produced a great likelihood that the cost of the prime contract to the Government and the reliability of Acme’s performance under it would be directly affected by the fact that the prime contract was to be performed largely through subcontracts obtained by kickbacks. The Court of Claims, in holding that the Act does not authorize government cancellation because of kickbacks, relied heavily on its finding that none of the officers of Acme were aware of the kickbacks. But as previously stated those of Acme’s employees and agents who did know were in the upper echelon of its managers. One of the guilty employees was the general manager of one of the company’s chief plants and the son of Acme’s president, and the two other kickback receivers were in charge of operations, sales, and government contracts. They were the kind of company personnel for whose conduct a corporation is generally held responsible. Cf. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 278 U. S. 349. Since Acme selected those agents to carry on its business in obtaining and performing government contracts, there is no obvious reason why their conduct in that field should not be considered as Acme’s conduct, particularly where it touches the all-important subject of kickbacks. And here, as this Court said about the conflict-of-interest statute in United States v. Mississippi Valley Co., supra, at 565, it is appropriate to say that it is the “inherent difficulty in detecting corruption which requires that 148 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 385 U. S. Opinion of the Court. contracts made in violation of . . . [the Anti-Kickback Act] be held unenforceable, even though the party seeking enforcement ostensibly appears entirely innocent.” The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed with directions to sustain the United States’ right to cancel the prime contract. It is so ordered. UNITED STATES v. DEMKO. 149 Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. DEMKO. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 76. Argued November 8, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966. Respondent, a federal prisoner, was injured while performing an assigned prison task. He filed claim for compensation benefits under 18 U. S. C. § 4126, and received an award which was to be paid monthly upon discharge and to continue while he was disabled. He then filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Government’s defense that the § 4126 remedy was exclusive was rejected by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The compensation system provided in 18 U. S. C. § 4126 reasonably and fairly covers federal prisoners who are injured in prison employment and is the exclusive remedy to protect that group. United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, distinguished. Pp. 151-154. 350 F. 2d 698, reversed. Richard S. Salzman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Robert S. Rifkind and Morton Hollander. Gerald N. Ziskind argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent Demko, a federal prisoner, was seriously injured in 1962 in the performance of an assigned prison task in a federal penitentiary. Shortly afterward he filed a claim for compensation benefits under 18 U. S. C. § 4126. That law, first enacted by Congress in 1934, authorized the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a federal corporation, to use its funds “in paying, under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, compensation ... to inmates or their dependents 150 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. for injuries suffered in any industry.” 1 Under that law and regulations promulgated under it, respondent was awarded $180 per month which was to start on discharge from prison and continue so long as disability continued.* 2 After winning this compensation award, respondent brought this action against the United States in the Federal District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act,3 alleging that his injury was due to the Government’s negligence for which he was entitled to recover additional damages under that Act. The United States defended on the single ground that respondent’s right to recover compensation under 18 U. S. C. § 4126 was his exclusive remedy against the Government barring him from any suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The District Court, holding that compensation under 18 U. S. C. § 4126 was not his exclusive remedy, rejected this defense and accordingly entered a judgment for the respondent against the United States for tort claim damages based on stipulated facts. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 350 F. 2d 698. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Granade v. United States, 356 F. 2d 837, reached precisely the opposite result, holding that a prison inmate, injured in prison employment and eligible for compensation under 18 U. S. C. § 4126, is precluded from suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act. To resolve this conflict we granted certiorari. 383 U. S. 966. xAct of June 23, 1934, c. 736, §4, 48 Stat. 1211. The Federal Prison Industries was established as a District of Columbia corporation and a “governmental body” to expand an industrial training and rehabilitation program for prisoners initiated by the Act of May 27, 1930, c. 340, 46 Stat. 391. 2 On August 1, 1966, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., raised respondent’s award to $245.31 per month under authority of the Act of July 4, 1966, 80 Stat. 252, amending the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 751 et seq 3 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq. UNITED STATES v. DEMKO. 151 149 Opinion of the Court. Historically, workmen’s compensation statutes were the offspring of a desire to give injured workers a quicker and more certain recovery than can be obtained from tort suits based on negligence and subject to commonlaw defenses to such suits. Thus compensation laws are practically always thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to, common-law tort actions. A series of comparatively recent cases in this Court has recognized this historic truth and ruled accordingly. Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, and Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495, for instance, are typical of the recognition by this Court that the right of recovery granted groups of workers covered by such compensation laws is exclusive. Such rulings of this Court have established as a general rule the exclusivity of remedy under such compensation laws.4 In Johansen v. United States, supra, at 441, this Court stated that where “the Government has created a comprehensive system to award payments for injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legislation to that effect.” Later in Patterson v. United States, supra, at 496, this Court em- 4 The lower federal courts have held, uniformly, that persons for whom the Government has supplied an administrative compensation remedy are precluded from seeking recovery against the United States for injuries received in the course of their work under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Jones Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, or the Public Vessels Act. Jarvis v. United States, 342 F. 2d 799, cert, denied, 382 U. S. 831; Rizzuto v. United States, 298 F. 2d 748; Lowe v. United States, 292 F. 2d 501; Somma v. United States, 283 F. 2d 149; Mills v. Panama Canal Co., 272 F. 2d 37, cert, denied, 362 U. S. 961; United States v. Forjari, 268 F. 2d 29, cert, denied, 361 U. S. 902; BaLancio v. United States, 267 F. 2d 135, cert, denied, 361 U. S. 875; Aubrey v. United States, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 65, 254 F. 2d 768; United States v. Firth, 207 F. 2d 665; Lewis v. United States, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 21, 190 F. 2d 22, cert, denied, 342 U. S. 869. See also Gradall v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 714, 329 F. 2d 960, 963; Denenberg v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 401, 305 F. 2d 378, 379-380. 152 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. phatically refused to abandon the Johansen ruling, calling attention to the fact that Congress by specific statute could change the Johansen “policy at any time.” Consequently we decide this case on the Johansen principle that, where there is a compensation statute that reasonably and fairly covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive remedy to protect that group. There is no indication of any congressional purpose to make the compensation statute in 18 U. S. C. § 4126 nonexclusive. It was enacted in 1934, and provided for injured federal prisoners the only chance they had to recover damages of any kind. Its enactment was 12 years prior to the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act. There is nothing in the legislative history of this latter Act which pointed to any purpose to add tort claim recovery for federal prisoners after they had already been protected by 18 U. S. C. § 4126. Indeed to hold that the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act was designed to have such a supplemental effect would be to hold that injured prisoners are given greater protection than all other government employees who are protected exclusively by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act,5 a congressional purpose not easy to infer. The court below refused to accept the prison compensation law as an exclusive remedy because it was deemed not comprehensive enough. We disagree. That law, as shown by its regulations, its coverage and the amount of its payments to the injured and their dependents, compares favorably with compensation laws all over the country.6 While there are differences in the way it protects its beneficiaries, these are due in the main to the differing circumstances of prisoners and nonprisoners. That law, as the Solicitor General points out, offers far 5 39 Stat. 742, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 751 et seq. 6 The regulations governing awards of workmen’s compensation to federal prisoners appear at 28 CFR §§301.1-301.10 (1965 rev.). UNITED STATES v. DEMKO. 153 149 Opinion of the Court. more liberal payments than many of the state compensation laws, and its standard of payments for prisoners rests on the schedules of payment of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act which Congress has provided to take care of practically all government employees. This particular federal compensation law, created to meet, in the accepted fashion of such laws, the special need of a class of prisoners, has now for more than 30 years functioned to the satisfaction of Congress, except as Congress broadened its coverage in 1961.7 Until Congress decides differently we accept the prison compensation law as an adequate substitute for a system of recovery by common-law torts. The court below was of the opinion that its holding was required by United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150. We think not. Whether a prisoner covered by the prison compensation law could also recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act was neither an issue in nor decided by Muniz. As our opinion in Muniz noted, neither of the two prisoners there was covered by the prison compensation law. What we decided in Muniz was that the two prisoners there involved, who were not protected by the prison compensation law, were not barred from seeking relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, that is not this case. The decision in Muniz could not possibly control our decision here because respondent is protected by the prison compensation law.8 All 7 In 1961 Congress expanded the coverage of 18 U. S. C. § 4126 to include not only prisoners’ injuries suffered in “any industry” but also in “any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined.” Act of September 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 681, 18 U. S. C. § 4126. 8 In this case, the Government stipulated that respondent’s “right to compensation pursuant to 18 U. S. C. [§]4126 is not affected by this suit. Regardless of the outcome of this suit [respondent] will have the same right to compensation as if suit had not been instituted.” 233-653 0 - 67 - 17 154 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. White, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. other arguments of respondent have been considered but we find none sufficient to justify recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judgments of the courts below are reversed with direction to sustain the Government’s defense that respondent’s recovery under the prison compensation law is exclusive. Reversed. Mr. Justice White, whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting. United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, held that action under the Federal Tort Claims Act was available to federal prisoners injured by the negligence of government employees. Given that case, the respondent, who was injured by government negligence while a federal prisoner, is entitled to relief unless the compensation available to him under 18 U. S. C. § 4126 is his exclusive remedy, a proposition which rests on the intent of Congress to give § 4126 that effect. Certainly the section does not in so many words exclude other remedies; and in my view exclusivity should not be inferred, for § 4126 is neither comprehensive nor certain and does not meet the tests of Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, and of Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495. Section 4126 permits, but does not require, the application of prison industries income to some form of compensation scheme. The scheme adopted by the Attorney General applies to only a limited class of prisoners—those doing prison industry, maintenance, or similar work. A prisoner injured in prison industry work gets no compensation under the plan until he is released and none then if he has completely recovered. Furthermore, his payments stop if he is reincarcerated. If he dies while in prison, he gets nothing at all. On the other hand, if a prisoner is injured by the negligence of a prison guard and is not covered by the § 4126 plan, he may sue and UNITED STATES v. DEMKO. 155 149 White, J., dissenting. recover under the Tort Claims Act. Recovery is his and when he gets it, he keeps it whether or not he dies before his prison term expires and whether or not he is released and then again imprisoned. Essentially, I agree with Judge Freedman, who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The following is a passage from his opinion : “Congress in adopting the amendment of 1961 to § 4126 gave no express indication that the compensation authorized by it was to be exclusive, and its provisions preclude the imputation of any such intention. The compensation scheme for prisoners is very different from the compensation system for servicemen which was described in [Feres v. United States] as being ‘simple, certain, and uniform’ (340 U. S., at 144 . ..) at the time the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed in 1946. It is also vastly different from the right to compensation enjoyed by government employes under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. It is permissive rather than mandatory. The amount of the award rests entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General, but may not under the statute exceed the amount payable under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. Compensation is paid only upon the inmate’s release from prison and will be denied if full recovery occurs while he is in custody and no significant disability remains after his release. There is no provision for the claimant to have a personal physician present at his physical examination, and there is no opportunity for administrative review. Finally, compensation, even when granted, does not become a vested right, but is to be paid only so long as the claimant conducts himself in a lawful manner and may be immediately suspended upon conviction of any crime, or upon incarceration in a penal institution. 156 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. White, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. “What emerges on examination, therefore, is a severely restrictive system of compensation permeated at all levels by the very prison control and dominion which was at the origin of the inmate’s injury. This discretionary and sketchy system of compensation, which would not even have covered the present plaintiff in 1946, may not be deemed the equivalent of compensation under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act of 1916. Nowhere can there be found any indication that Congress intended that it should serve to exclude prisoners from the broad and sweeping policy embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act.” 350 F. 2d 698, 700-701. (Footnotes omitted.) Nor does respondent claim the right to cumulate his remedies; he concedes that recovery under the compensation scheme must be offset against any negligence award he would otherwise receive. Respectfully, I dissent. TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 157 Opinion of the Court. TRANSPORTATION-COMMUNICATION EMPLOYEES UNION v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. No. 28. Argued October 19, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966. Claiming that under its collective bargaining agreement its members were entitled to automated jobs which respondent railroad had assigned to the clerks’ union, petitioner, the telegraphers’ union, complained to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The clerks’ union, given notice of the proceeding, declined to participate though manifesting readiness to file a like proceeding should its members’ jobs be threatened. Without considering the railroad’s liability under its contract with the clerks, the Board held the telegraphers entitled to the jobs and ordered the railroad to pay them. The telegraphers brought this action in District Court to enforce the award. Holding that the clerks’ union was an indispensable party, that court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The Railroad Adjustment Board must exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to settle the entire work-assignment dispute between the competing unions in one proceeding. Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561; Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, followed. Pp. 160-166. 349 F. 2d 408, affirmed and remanded. Milton Kramer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lester P. Schoene and Martin W. Fingerhut. James A. Wilcox argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was H. Lustgarten, Jr. Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and Richard R. Lyman filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Transportation-Communication Employees Union, the petitioner, is the bargaining representative of a group 158 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. of railroad employees commonly known as “Telegraphers.” Prior to 1952 these telegraphers were commonly assigned the duty of sending, by telegraph, railroad way bills, manifests and orders prepared by clerks, members of the brotherhood of Railway Clerks. In 1952, however, the respondent here, Union Pacific Railroad Company, installed IBM machines which resulted in a radical change in the workload of the telegraphers and clerks. When the clerical work previously done by the clerks is manually performed on the IBM machines, the machines automatically perform the communications functions previously performed by the telegraphers. As a result, the railroad’s need for telegraphers was practically eliminated and operation of the IBM machines was assigned to members of the clerks’ union. This case arises out of the dispute over the railroad’s assignment of these jobs to the clerks. The telegraphers’ union, claiming the jobs for its members under its collective bargaining agreement, protested the railroad’s assignment and, in due course, referred its claim to the Railroad Adjustment Board as authorized by § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act.1 Notice of the referral was given to the clerks’ union, which, pursuant to an understanding with the other labor unions, declined to participate in this proceeding on the ground that it had no interest in the matter but stated its readiness to file a 1 This section provides: ‘‘The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, . . . shall be handled in the usual manner . . . but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i). TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 159 157 Opinion of the Court. like proceeding before the Board to protect its members should any of their jobs be threatened.2 The Board then heard and decided the case without considering the railroad’s liability to the clerks under its contract with them, concluded that the telegraphers were entitled to the jobs under their contract, and ordered that the railroad pay the telegraphers who had been idle because of the assignment of the jobs to the clerks. The telegraphers’ union then brought this action in a United States District Court to enforce the Board’s award as authorized by § 3 First (p) of the Act. That court dismissed the case on the ground that the clerks’ union was an indispensable party, and that the telegraphers, though given the opportunity, refused to make it a party. 231 2 Section 3 First (j) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (j), requires the Adjustment Board to “give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.” (Emphasis supplied.) Prior to this case it was the policy of the various railroad unions, including the clerks’ and telegraphers’, in work-assignment disputes submitted to the Board, to refuse to give notice of and to prohibit participation in Board proceedings by anyone but the involved railroad and the petitioning union. This policy, followed by the labor members of the Board, resulted in no notice being given to the nonpetitioning union. See Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 372. In 1959, after some courts had refused to enforce the Board’s awards where it had failed to notify the nonpetitioning union, see, e. g., Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 229 F. 2d 59, cert, denied, 350 U. S. 997, the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, composed of the various railroad unions, changed this policy to the extent that notice would henceforth be given to nonpetitioning unions. Yet the Railway Labor Executives’ Association prescribed a form-letter response—to be sent by the notified nonpetitioning union to the Board—which disavowed any interest in the dispute and declined the opportunity to participate before the Board except in a subsequent and separate proceeding initiated by the nonpetitioning union in the event the Board’s decision adversely affected its members’ jobs. The clerks’ union used this form letter to respond to the §3 First (j) notice in the instant case. 160 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. F. Supp. 33. Affirming the dismissal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the Board had failed to carry out its exclusive jurisdictional responsibility to decide the entire dispute with relation to the conflicting claims of the two unions under their respective contracts to have the jobs assigned to their members.3 We granted certiorari in order to settle doubts about whether the Adjustment Board must exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes like this in a single proceeding with all disputant unions present. Cf. Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 371-372. We hold that it must. I. Petitioner contends that it is entirely appropriate for the Adjustment Board to resolve disputes over work assignments in a proceeding in which only one union participates and in which only that union’s contract with the employer is considered. This contention rests on the premise that collective bargaining agreements are to be governed by the same common-law principles which control private contracts between two private parties. On this basis it is quite naturally assumed that a dispute over work assignments is a dispute between an employer and only one union. Thus, it is argued that each collective bargaining agreement is a thing apart from all others and each dispute over work assignments must be decided on the language of a single such agreement considered in isolation from all others. We reject this line of reasoning. A collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the same old common-law concepts which control such pri- 3 The Court of Appeals’ controlling opinion is reported at 349 F. 2d 408. A prior opinion which was withdrawn is unofficially reported at 59 L. R. R. M. 2993. TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 161 157 Opinion of the Court. vate contracts. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 550; cf. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. “. . . [I]t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law—the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 578-579. In order to interpret such an agreement it is necessary to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining agreements, as well as the practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such agreements. This is particularly true when the agreement is resorted to for the purpose of settling a jurisdictional dispute over work assignments. There are two kinds of these jurisdictional disputes. Both are essentially disputes between two competing unions, not merely disputes between an employer and a single union. The ordinary jurisdictional dispute arises when two or more unions claim the right to perform a job which existed at the time their collective bargaining contracts with the employer were made. In such a situation it would be highly unlikely that each contract could be construed as giving each union the right to be paid for the single job. But the dispute before us now is not the ordinary jurisdictional dispute where each union claims the right to perform a job which existed at the time its collective bargaining agreement was made. Here, though two jobs existed when the collective bargaining agreements were made and though the railroad properly could contract with one union to perform one job and the other union to perform the other, automation has now resulted in there being only one job, a job which is different from either of the former two jobs and which was not expressly contracted to either of the unions. Although only one union can be assigned this 162 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. new job, it may be that the railroad’s agreement with the nonassigned union obligates the railroad to pay it for idleness attributable to such job elimination due to automation. But this does not mean that both unions can, under their separate agreements, have the right to perform the new job or that the Board, once the dispute has been submitted, to it, can postpone determining which union has the right to* the job in the future. By first ordering the railroad to pay one union and then later, in a separate proceeding, ordering it to pay the other union, without ever determining which union has the right to perform the job and thus without ever prejudicing the rights of the other union, the Board abdicates its duty to settle the entire dispute. Yet this is precisely the kind of merry-go-round situation which the petitioner claims is envisaged by the Act, a procedure which certainly does not “provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes . . . ,” the purpose for which the Adjustment Board was established. § 2 (5). (Emphasis supplied.) II. The railroad, the employees, and the public, for all of whose benefits the Railway Labor Act was written, are entitled to have a fair, expeditious hearing to settle disputes of this nature. And we have said in no uncertain language that the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction to do so. Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, was decided 20 years ago. That case concerned a dispute over which employees should be assigned to do certain railroad jobs—members of the conductors’ union under their contract or members of the trainmen’s union under their contract. In that case a district court, in charge of a railroad in bankruptcy, had entered a judgment in favor of the conductors. We reversed, holding that the Railway Labor Act vested exclusive power in the Adjustment Board to decide that controversy over TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 163 157 Opinion of the Court. job assignments. It is true that we did not precisely decide there that the Board must bring before it all unions claiming the same jobs for their members, but we did say this: “We have seen that in order to reach a final decision on that question the court first had to interpret the terms of O. R. C.’s collective bargaining agreements. The record shows, however, that interpretation of these contracts involves more than the mere construction of a ‘document’ in terms of the ordinary meaning of words and their position. . . . For O. R. C.’s agreements with the railroad must be read in the light of others between the railroad and B. R. T. And since all parties seek to support their particular interpretation of these agreements by evidence as to usage, practice and custom, that too must be taken into account and properly understood. The factual question is intricate and technical. An agency especially competent and specifically designated to deal with it has been created by Congress.” Id., at 566-567. (Emphasis supplied.) Four years after Pitney we decided Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239. In that case a state court had interpreted collective bargaining contracts between a railroad and the same two unions here and had decided in favor of the clerks. We reversed, and, relying on Pitney, said: “. . . There we held, in a case remarkably similar to the one before us now, that the Federal District Court in its equitable discretion should have refused ‘to adjudicate a jurisdictional dispute involving the railroad and two employee accredited bargaining agents . . . .’ Our ground for this holding was that the court ‘should not have interpreted the contracts’ but should have left this question for determination 164 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. by the Adjustment Board, a congressionally designated agency peculiarly competent in this field. 326 U. S., at 567-568.” Id., at 243-244. (Emphasis supplied.) We adhere to our holdings in Pitney and Slocum that the Adjustment Board does have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes like this. See also Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Southern R. Co., 339 U. S. 255. Petitioner argues that we are barred from this holding by Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, decided after Pitney and Slocum. There is some language in Whitehouse which, given one interpretation, might justify an inference against the Adjustment Board’s jurisdiction fully to decide this case in a single proceeding. But in the final analysis the holding in Whitehouse was only that the primary jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board could not be frustrated by a premature judicial action. Cf. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 265-266. We decline to expand that case beyond its actual holding. The Adjustment Board has jurisdiction, which petitioner admits, to hear and decide the controversy over the interpretation of the telegraphers’ contract with the railroad as it relates to the work assignments. And § 3 First (j) provides that “the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.” The clerks’ union was given notice here as it should have been under § 3 First (j). Certainly it is “involved” in this dispute. Without its presence, unless it chooses to default and surrender its claims for its members, neither the Board nor the courts below could determine this whole dispute. As respondent contends, to decide, as the Board has here, that the telegraphers are entitled to be paid for these jobs creates another controversy for the railroad with the TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 165 157 Opinion of the Court. clerks who have the jobs now. For should the Board’s order be sustained, the railroad would not only have to make back payments to the telegraphers who have done no work but would be compelled to continue to pay two sets of workers—one set being idle. The Adjustment Board, as we said about the National Labor Relations Board in Labor Board v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers, 364 U. S. 573, 582-583, can, with its experience and common sense, handle this entire dispute in a satisfactory manner in a single proceeding. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in holding that the clerks’ union should be a party before the Board and the courts to this labor dispute over job assignments for its members. The cause should be remanded to the District Court with directions to remand this case to the Board.4 The Board should be directed to give once again the clerks’ union an opportunity to be heard, and, whether or not the clerks’ union accepts this opportunity, to resolve this entire dispute upon consideration not only of the contract between the railroad and 4 The Court of Appeals in affirming the dismissal of the telegraphers’ union’s petition for enforcement was quite correct in holding that the failure of the clerks to appear before the Board and of the Board to consider the contract between the clerks and the railroad could not be cured merely by joinder of the clerks’ union in the District Court’s enforcement proceeding. The Board had the exclusive jurisdiction to consider the clerks’ contract and any claim they might have asserted under it. At the time, the Court of Appeals had no alternative but to affirm the dismissal by the District Court, for district courts could only “enforce or set aside” the Board’s orders under §3 First (p). They could not remand cases to the Board. This was changed on June 20, 1966, by Pub. L. No. 89-456, §2 (e), 80 Stat. 209, which inserted a new provision, §3 First (q), empowering district courts to remand proceedings to the Board. In view of the Board’s failure to consider all of the issues and the clerks’ understandable refusal to participate because of the then existing doubt as to whether they could be bound by the Board’s decision, we conclude it appropriate to use this new availability of remand to the Board. 166 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Stewart, J., concurring. 385 U. S. the telegraphers, but “in the light of . . . [contracts] between the railroad” and any other union “involved” in the overall dispute, and upon consideration of “evidence as to usage, practice and custom” pertinent to all these agreements. Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, supra, at 567. The Board’s order, based upon such thorough consideration after giving the clerks’ union a chance to be heard, will then be enforceable by the courts. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart, whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring. Until now the Adjustment Board has dealt with the claim of the telegraphers as though it were totally unrelated to the claim of the clerks. To take this piecemeal approach to the underlying causes of this controversy not only invites inconsistent awards, but also ignores the industrial context in which the disputed contract was framed and implemented. This case aptly illustrates why the Board cannot judge one-half of a problem while closing its eyes to the other half. The disputed provisions of the collective agreement were drawn before technological progress telescoped two work stations into one. The agreement did not explicitly provide for such a change. But it was designed to cover an extended period of time, and its language is sufficiently general to allow for flexibility in the light of changing circumstances.* * Among the rules of the Telegraphers’ Agreement invoked in this dispute, the following are the most relevant: Article 1—Scope. Rule 1. This agreement will govern the wages and working conditions of agents, agent-telegraphers, agent-telephoners, telegraphers, telephoners, telegrapher-clerks, telephoner-clerks, telegrapher-car distributors, ticket clerk-telegraphers, telegrapher-switch-tenders, C. T. C. telegraphers, train and tower directors, towermen, lever- TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 167 157 Stewart, J., concurring. To do justice to the parties in this situation the Board must take full measure of their circumstances. To justify the deference which the law has given to its deci- men, block operators, staffmen, managers, wire chiefs, repeater chiefs, chief operators, printer mechanicians, telephone operators (except switchboard operators), teletype operators, printer operators, agents non-telegraphers, and agents non-telephoners herein listed. Article 2—Positions and Rates of Pay. Rule 5. General Telegraph Offices, (a) Positions and rates of pay in general telegraph offices under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent Telegraph shall be as follows: 4 Las Vegas “VG° Manager ........................................... 2.127 2d chief operator-printer m[e]chn................ 1.995 3d chief operator-printer mechn................ 1.995 Telegrapher ..................................... 1.851 R’ le 6. New Positions. The wages of new positions shall be in conformity with the wages of positions of similar kind or class in the seniority district where created. Article 3--Time Allowances. Rule 10. Daily Guarantee. Regularly assigned employes will receive eight hours pay for each twenty-four hours, at rate of position occupied .... Article 6—Seniority. Rule 47. Promotion, (a) Promotion shall be based on seniority and qualifications; qualifications being sufficient, seniority will prevail. Article 8—General. Rule 62. Train Orders. No employe other than covered by this schedule and train dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders at telegraph or telephone offices where an operator is employed, and is available, or can be promptly located, except in an emergency, in which case the telegrapher will be paid for the call. Rule 70. Date Effective and Change. This agreement will be effective as of January 1, 1952, and shall continue in effect until it is changed as provided herein, or under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 168 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. sions, the Board must employ a decision-making technique that rests on fair procedure an-4 industrial realities. By using a simple bilateral contract analysis the Board defaults in both of these duties. Cf. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 22-23, 26-27 (1958); Note, 75 Yale L. J. 877, 889-890 (1966). Only by proceeding as the Court today directs can the Board properly decide cases of this kind. The provisions in the Railway Labor Act which state that the Board’s orders are to be directed only against the carrier do not detract from the power of the Board to fulfill its tasks. For if the telegraphers and the clerks both advanced their claims and the Board directed the carrier to honor the claims of only one union, the other union would be bound just as though it had lost in a multilateral in rem proceeding. See 3 Freeman, The Law of Judgments §§ 1524-1526 (5th ed. 1925). Since the Board has failed to use procedures which allow for an informed and fair understanding of the dispute between the petitioner and respondent, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court. Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting. This case involves a dispute between the telegraphers’ union and a railroad as to whether the union’s members, under its collective bargaining agreement with the carrier, were entitled to certain jobs (or compensatory payments in lieu thereof) which the carrier had unilaterally allotted to another union, the clerks. The telegraphers complained to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The Board held that, under the contract between the telegraphers and the railroad, the telegraphers’ members had a right to the jobs, and it ordered the carrier to make compensatory payments to the senior telegrapher idled by its action. TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 169 157 Fortas, J., dissenting. The Court now holds that such an award will not be enforced because the clerks’ union was not a party to the proceeding, and because the Board merely adjudicated the rights of the telegraphers and did not determine whether the clerks were entitled to the jobs instead. The Court’s opinion states that the jobs in question must belong to one union or the other, and that it is the Board’s duty to decide which of the two unions is entitled to the jobs. I dissent. The Board acted as the statute commands. As I shall discuss, its power is limited to adjudications of grievances and contract disputes between a union and a railroad. It cannot compel conversion of a complaint proceeding between a union and a railroad into a three-party proceeding to “settle the entire dispute.” Certainly the courts should not refuse to enforce its award because the Board has failed to do something which the statute does not require or empower if to do. I also emphatically submit that this Court should neither devise nor impose upon the Board or upon management and labor, the proposition, making its debut in this case in the field of railway labor law, that “only one union can be assigned this new job.” There is nothing in the statute or precedents that permits or justifies this peremptory judicial foray into other people’s business. The basis of the Court’s holding cannot be found in any provision of the Railway Labor Act. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188 (as amended by Act of June 20, 1966, 80 Stat. 208). The Court adverts to § 2 of the Act, which sets forth the purposes of the Railway Labor Act (including, of course, provisions relating to the National Mediation Board and provisions creating general duties and rights of carriers and employees—none of which defines the powers of the Adjustment Board). Section 2 sets forth a number of purposes, among which appears the phrase quoted in part by the Court: “(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle- 233-653 0 - 67 - 18 170 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. ment of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” To the extent to which these provisions relate specifically to the purposes of the Adjustment Board, they do not define its powers. The Board’s powers are specifically defined and limited in § 3 First (i) of the Act. The Court begs the question by giving to the phrase “settlement of all disputes” a meaning which disregards both the qualifying language of § 2 itself, and the specific enumeration of powers in § 3 First (i). Ultimately, however, the Court appears to rest its decision not upon the Act, but upon a “principle” which it now creates. That proposition—unknown to railway labor law until this day—is that, whatever the parties’ contract provides, the Board must observe and enforce the rule that “only one union can be assigned this new job.” The Court holds that even if “the railroad’s agreement with the nonassigned union obligates the railroad to pay it for idleness attributable to such job elimination due to automation,” the Board cannot conclude “that both unions can, under their separate agreements, have the right to perform the new job. . . .” It is because of this controlling principle that the Court asserts it was error for the Board to make an award unless the award would bind the clerks’ union as well. Throughout its opinion the Court stresses that there is now but one “job” and that only one union’s member can have “the right to the job.” Obviously only one person can actually do the job; but the Board held only that a telegrapher was entitled to be paid for the job. In fact, the Court is—without articulating its premise—assuming that featherbedding is forbidden by natural law or TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 171 157 Fortas, J., dissenting. some other type of mandate that overrides contract, and that it is the Board’s duty to enforce the prohibition. From this novel premise it derives its conclusion that the award was not enforceable. There is no basis in the Railway Labor Act for either of the Court’s propositions: that both unions must be parties to a proceeding initiated by one of them, or that the Board must “settle the entire dispute” by determining that one or the other (but not both) of the unions has title to the jobs. The Court’s predilection for one job, one man may be sensible, but it may also be contrary to contract; and I know of no provision in the Constitution or statutes or decided cases that compels it. There is no basis for this Court to dictate—and that is what it is here doing—that a collective bargaining contract may not be enforced in accordance with its terms but must be subordinated to a one job, one man theory. This Court cannot and should not impose its own views. The anti-featherbedding principle may or may not be an admirable theory, depending upon one’s preconceptions and point of view. It does not now exist in the railway labor field. And I respectfully suggest that this Court is in no position to assess the desirability of its judicial innovation. If featherbedding in the railroad industry is to be declared unlawful, it should not be this Court which does it. To say the least, the problems are too esoteric and too volatile to be the subject of judicial edict. They should be left to the parties and the legislature. Certainly, this Court should not invade the integrity of collective bargaining contracts to legislate the result it considers desirable or “orderly.” Only last Term this Court considered one of the peculiar institutions of railway labor, and sustained the validity of state “full-crew” statutes. These statutes, in direct contrast to the one job, one man principle 172 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U. S. that the Court today assumes, have the effect sometimes of requiring railroads to hire one man, no job. The Court sustained these statutes against claims, among others, that Congress in the Railway Labor Act had preempted the field. Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U. S. 423 (1966). Such a “sensitive and touchy problem” (id., at 430), the Court wisely decided, was to be left to collective bargaining and the States in the absence of a clear congressional command. It is hard to comprehend the Engineers case if, as the Court now finds, the Railway Labor Act itself (presumably ever since its enactment in 1926) or other overriding law forbids what “full-crew” laws command. Certainly, the present problem, if it is a different one at all, is equally “sensitive and touchy,” and the Court has yet to disclose the congressional authority dictating contrary treatment. Prior decisions of this Court are of no assistance. The Court first refers to Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 (1946). The Court candidly states that “we did not precisely decide there that the Board must bring before it all unions claiming the same jobs for their members . . . .” All that the Court decided in Pitney was that a dispute between two unions claiming a right to certain jobs had first to be determined by the Railroad Adjustment Board, and could not be decided initially by a bankruptcy court in reorganization proceedings. The passage from Pitney quoted by the Court merely states that the decision of the issue—the interpretation of the conductors’ collective bargaining contract—had to be made in light of usage, practice and custom, and of other agreements between the railroad and the trainmen. Indeed, the quotation from Pitney recalls the basic principle that the Court here ignores: that in the “intricate and technical” field of railway labor relations, no court, including this Court, should displace TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 173 157 Fortas, J., dissenting. the agency which Congress has vested with authority— certainly not with the drastic imposition of a mandate to eliminate featherbedding. It is, however, essential to note that there is absolutely no reason to believe that the Board failed to follow Pitney here. Both the majority and concurring opinions assume as fact that the Adjustment Board violated the duty declared in Pitney to construe the telegraphers’ contract in light of the clerks’ contract and railroad usage, practice and custom. Thus the majority characterizes the Board’s proceedings in this case as one “in which only [the telegraphers’] . . . contract with the employer [was] . . . considered.” The concurrence asserts that “Until now the Adjustment Board has dealt with the claim of the telegraphers as though it were totally unrelated to the claim of the clerks,” and has used “a simple bilateral contract analysis” which prevented it from arriving at “an informed and fair understanding of the dispute between the petitioner and respondent.” I am unable to find in the record before this Court any support for these suggestions that the Adjustment Board failed to perform its duty by refusing to consider the clerks’ contract for its evidentiary value.1 The award of the Board makes clear that both practice and usage, and the possibly conflicting contractual claim 1 The Court of Appeals’ opinion asserts that the Board’s rules of evidence excluded other contracts, and that the Board dealt with the case as if the clerks’ contract did not exist. There is nothing in the record which suggests that at any time, in any way, the Board excluded references to the clerks’ contract or treated it as irrelevant. If the Court of Appeals were correct as to the Board’s rules, those rules would plainly be contrary to law and commonsense evidentiary principles. The railroad’s submission to the Board, in demanding that notice be given the clerks’ union (as it was), specifically invoked the clerks’ contract, and stated that the relief sought by the telegraphers “would abrogate the agreement negotiated between the carrier and the Clerks’ Organization . . . .” 174 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Fortas, J., dissenting. 385 U.S. of the clerks to the job in question, and the fact that clerks were currently performing the job, were considered by the Board. As to usage, the Board itself observed, with respect to a different aspect of its award, that “there is unanimity upon the proposition that where, as here, the Scope Rule lists positions instead of delineating work, it is necessary to look to practice and custom to determine the work which is exclusively reserved by the Scope Rule to persons covered by the Agreement.” The Board’s analysis of the substance of the dispute shows its central awareness of the clerks’ claim to the jobs. The machines involved in this case are IBM teletype printers and receivers. They perform automatically the function of transmitting and receiving teletype messages between on-line railroad offices. The Board found that prior to the installation of these machines, telegraphers had exclusively performed this transmitting and receiving function as teletype operators and printer operators. However, apparently for its own convenience, since other machines in its IBM-complex were operated by clerks, the railroad unilaterally assigned the operation of the teletype printers and receivers to members of the clerks’ union. The Board found that the work involved in operating the new machines had “been performed in the past by telegraphers and not by clerks.” Furthermore, even if the majority and concurring opinions were correct in stating that the Board failed to take the proper broad view of its function in construing the contract before it, the remedy, of course, would be to remand to the Board for a second proceeding to construe this contract. Instead, the Court remands for an entirely new proceeding to construe not only the contract brought before the Board in this case, but also the contract of a third party which has never invoked the Board’s jurisdiction, which is not a party and which can be compelled to become a party only by this Court’s TRANSPORTATION UNION v. U. P. R. CO. 175 157 Fortas, J., dissenting. gloss on the statute, and in addition to apply in this new proceeding a novel substantive principle forbidding featherbedding. Actually, the railroad’s complaint is not that the Board refused to consider the clerks’ contract, or relevant usage and practice. It is that the Board did not decide matters outside the issues submitted to it by the parties and the statute. And despite suggestions that Pitney was violated, the Court’s real point—as it is respondent’s— is that the Board should, in this proceeding between the telegraphers’ union and the carrier, also decide the rights of the clerks’ union—and should do so by awarding the jobs to one union or the other. The Court also refers to Slocum v. Delaware, L.