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TRUSTEE. See *Bankruptcy Act*, 1; *Bankruptcy Trustee*; *Constitutional Law*, II, 1-2.

UNFAIR COMPETITION. See *Federal Trade Commission*.

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS. See *Jurisdiction*, 3.

UNIONS. See *Intervention*; *Jurisdiction*, 2-3; *National Labor Relations Act*, 1-2.

UNPATENTABILITY. See **Patent Applications.**

UNRECORDED LIENS. See **Bankruptcy Trustee.**

VAGUENESS. See **Constitutional Law, I, 1.**

VIRGINIA. See **Constitutional Law, II, 3.**

WARRANTS. See **Constitutional Law, IV; Evidence.**

WILLS. See **Constitutional Law, II, 1-2.**

WISCONSIN. See **National Labor Relations Act, 1-2.**

WITNESSES. See **Contempt, 1-2.**

WORDS.

1. "*Based in whole or in part on any matter complained of.*"—Clayton Act, § 5 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 16 (b). *Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.*, p. 54.

2. "*Connecting lines.*"—Interstate Commerce Act § 3 (4), 49 U. S. C. § 3 (4). *Western Pac. R. Co. v. United States*, p. 237.

3. "*Consistent with the public interest.*"—Interstate Commerce Act § 5 (2)(b), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(b). *Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. U. S.*, p. 154.

4. "*Judgment creditor.*"—Internal Revenue Code § 6323, 26 U. S. C. § 6323. *United States v. Speers*, p. 266.

5. "*Prior art.*"—35 U. S. C. § 103. *Hazeltine Research v. Brenner*, p. 252.

6. "*Property.*"—§ 70a (5), Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a)(5). *Segal v. Rochelle*, p. 375.

7. "*Transferred.*"—§ 70a (5), Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (a)(5). *Segal v. Rochelle*, p. 375.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. See **Judgments; Rules.**















