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STOCKHOLDERS. See **Securities Exchange Act**.

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1. *District Court authority—Levying taxes to operate desegregated schools.*—The District Court may require the County Supervisors to levy taxes as is done in other counties in the State for non-racial operation of the county public schools. *Griffin v. School Board*, p. 218.

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TRADEMARKS. See **McGuire Act**.

TRANSPORTATION. See also **Constitutional Law, I, 1; Federal Employers' Liability Act.**

1. *Interstate commerce—Liability for damage—Perishable commodities.*—Under § 20 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act a carrier, while not an absolute insurer, is liable for damages to perishable and nonperishable commodities, other than livestock, while in its possession, unless caused by an act of God, a public enemy, the shipper, public authority, or the inherent vice or nature of the goods. *Missouri P. R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl*, p. 134.

2. *Motor carriers—Backhauling—Exempt private carriage.*—Section 203 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act does not prohibit all backhauling, and where the backhaul furthers the carrier's primary general merchandise business it is exempt private carriage. *Red Ball Motor Freight v. Shannon*, p. 311.

TRANSPORTATION ACT. See **Interstate Commerce Commission.**

TRUCKERS. See **Transportation, 2.**

TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, I, 3; IX; Procedure, 8.**

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Where company "is located or has its principal place of business"—State of incorporation—Dismissal for lack of venue.—The term "is located" in § 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act refers, in the case of a corporation, to the State of its incorporation, and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition for lack of venue where natural gas corporation brought an action seeking review of Federal Power Commission order in a circuit other than where it was incorporated. *Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco*, p. 33.

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WITNESSES.

Antitrust Immunity Act—Immunity from prosecution—Testimony before congressional subcommittee.—Act of February 25, 1903, as amended, did not immunize from prosecution a witness who testified before a congressional subcommittee, since the Act confines immunity to those who testify in judicial proceedings under oath and in response to a subpoena. *United States v. Welden*, p. 95.

WORDS.


1. "*Individual employed by any person.*"—§ 8 (b) (4) (1), National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 158 (b) (4) (i). *Labor Board v. Servette*, p. 46.


2. "*Is located.*"—§ 19 (b), Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). *Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco*, p. 33.


3. "*Other than picketing.*"—§ 8 (b) (4) (ii), National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 158 (b) (4) (ii). *Labor Board v. Fruit Packers*, p. 58.


4. "*Threaten, coerce, or restrain.*"—§ 8 (b) (4) (ii), National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 158 (b) (4) (ii). *Labor Board v. Servette*, p. 46.


5. "*Within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise.*"—§ 203 (c), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (c). *Red Ball Motor Freight v. Shannon*, p. 311.























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