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2. *Supreme Court—Appeal from state conviction—Death of appellant.*—In case in which appellant had been convicted in an Ohio court of a state crime, had been sentenced to imprisonment and to pay costs of prosecution, and had died while his appeal was pending in this Court, a motion to substitute the administratrix of his estate was granted and the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. *Wetzel v. Ohio*, p. 62.

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**WORDS.**

1. "*Affecting commerce.*"—National Labor Relations Act. *Labor Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp.*, p. 224.

2. "*Competitor.*"—Clayton Act, § 2 (b). *Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co.*, p. 505.

3. "*Custody.*"—28 U. S. C. § 2241. *Jones v. Cunningham*, p. 236.

4. "*Exclusive jurisdiction.*"—Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. *Paul v. United States*, p. 245.

5. "*Final judgment.*"—28 U. S. C. § 1257. *N. A. A. C. P. v. Button*, p. 415; *Construction Laborers v. Curry*, p. 542; *Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau*, p. 555.

6. "*For the purpose of executing*" a fraudulent scheme.—18 U. S. C. § 1341. *United States v. Sampson*, p. 75.

7. "*Gross income from mining.*"—Internal Revenue Code of 1939. *Riddell v. Monolith Portland Cement Co.*, p. 537.

8. "*Mining.*"—Internal Revenue Code of 1939. *Riddell v. Monolith Portland Cement Co.*, p. 537.

9. "*Prices . . . set by law or regulation.*"—10 U. S. C. § 2306 (f). *Paul v. United States*, p. 245.

10. "*Probable cause.*"—Fourth Amendment. *Wong Sun v. United States*, p. 471.

11. "*Rates or prices . . . not fixed by law or regulation.*"—10 U. S. C. § 2304 (g). *Paul v. United States*, p. 245.

**WORDS**—Continued.


12. "*Reasonable grounds.*"—Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Wong Sun v. United States, p. 471.

13. "*Required*" to be heard by three-judge court.—28 U. S. C. § 1253. Paul v. United States, p. 245; United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n, p. 285.

14. "*Unfair methods of competition.*"—Federal Aviation Act, § 411. Pan American World Airways v. United States, p. 296.


15. "*Unfair practices.*"—Federal Aviation Act, § 411. Pan American World Airways v. United States, p. 296.























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