UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 296 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1935 From October 7, 1935, to and Including (In Part) January 6,1936 ERNEST KNAEBEL REPORTER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1936 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. - Price $2.00 (Buckram) JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT . DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS 1 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, Chief Justice. WILLIS VAN DEVANTER, Associate Justice. JAMES CLARK McREYNOLDS, Associate Justice. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Associate Justice. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, Associate Justice. PIERCE BUTLER, Associate Justice. HARLAN FISKE STONE, Associate Justice. OWEN J. ROBERTS, Associate Justice. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Associate Justice. HOMER S. CUMMINGS, Attorney General. STANLEY REED, Solicitor General. CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY, Clerk. FRANK KEY GREEN, Marshal. 1 For allotment of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices among the several circuits, see next page. in \ ; * - SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered, That the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, agreeably to the acts of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz : For the First Circuit, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Harlan Fiske Stone, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, Owen J. Roberts, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, James C. McReynolds, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Pierce Butler, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, George Sutherland, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice. March 28, 1932. IV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page. A-l Garage v. Lange Investment Co.............. 642 Abbot v. Ickes................................ 612 Aderhold, Dambrosio v......................... 573 Aerovox Corporation, Ruben Condenser Co. v...... 623 Aetna Life Ins. Co., Hesselberg v623 Alabama ex ret. Comm’n, Clyde Lines v......... 261 Aladdin Manufacturing Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co.... 639 Alexander v. Hillman.......................... 222 Alfred H. Smith Co. v. Commissioner........... 648 Alleghany Corporation, Campbell v............. 581 Allen v. Bethea............................... 622 Allen v. Cloisters Bldg. Corp................ 657 Allen C. Weissman Co. v. Denison.............. 646 Allen C. Weissman Co. v. Lehigh Bernstein Mfg. Corp....................................... 646 Allison v. Texas.............................. 661 Allison (George) & Co. v. United States.... 546,664 Allred v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co........... 627, 663 Amchanitzky v. United States............... 598, 662 American Casualty Co. v. Claverie............. 590 American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. v. Weisthoff... 619 American Lace Paper Co., Lily-Tulip Cup Corp, v.. 585 American Security & Trust Co., Hardee v....... 595 American Ship & Commerce Nav. Corp., Lamborn v. 581 American Steam Conveyor Corp. v. United States... 599 American Steamship Co., Milwaukee v........... 591 American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co.. 133 Amtorg Trading Corp., Int. Agricultural Corp. v.... 576 Anderson v. St. Louis Coke & Iron Corp........ 656 A-l Garage v. Lange Investment Co............. 642 Archer, Harlan v.............................. 656 v VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Arizona v. California......................... 552 Arkansas, Hudspeth v...........................642 Arkansas v. Tennessee......................... 545 Arkansas Baptist College, Union College v...... 615 Arkansas ex rel. Attorney General, Irby v..... 616 Arkansas Natural Gas Co., Sartor v............ 656 Armand Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n............ 650 Armour & Co., Green Star Steamship Co. v....... 668 Armsby, Cities Service Co. v.................. 583 Arnold Constable Corp. v. Commercial Operating Corp........................................ 616 Asbury Park, U. S. ex rel. Christmas v........ 624 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority........ 562 Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner...... 645, 664 Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wilson.......... 580 Athletic Shoe Co., John T. Riddell, Inc. v.......... 580 Atkinson, United States v....................... 559 Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co. v. United States....... 33 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McDonald........ 621 Attorney General, Arkansas ex rel., Irby v..... 616 Atwood, C. F. Smith Co. v....................... 659 Atwood, Commonwealth Trust Co. v.............. 566 Aull v. Lidepa Corporation.................... 581 Aultman, Mississippi Central R. Co. v......... 537 Austin v. Thomas.............................. 626 Automatic Paper Machine Co., Julius Levine & Co. v¿. 638 Aycock, Bradbury v.......................... 589 Ayer & Lord Barge Co., Wright v............... 602 Backus, Moore v............................... 640 Baker v. W. J. Kennedy Dairy Co............... 634 Balkwill v. Helvering......................... 609 Ballard, Mutzenbecher v...................... 606 Ballard, Spruill v...................... 575,662 Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. United States..... 595 Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Comm’n.... 538 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Wolf............ 592, 662 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. vii Page. Bancker v. Commissioner........................ 603 Bank of New York & T. Co., United States v.. 463, 558 Barnsdall Refineries, Oklahoma ex rel. v... 521,556 Bartlett, Missouri Pacific R. Co. v........... 620 Bates & Klinke, Inc., Peters Patent Corp, v.... 661 Baton Rouge Rice Mill v. Fontenot.......... 549,569 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Wahlgren.......... 603 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry.......... 547, 660 Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co......... 48,564 Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings................... 74 Bedell v. United States....................... 628 Beers v. Commissioner......................... 620 Bell-Dowlen Mills v. Draper................... 633 Bellows Claude Neon Co., Telling v............ 594 Bell Telephone Co. v, Van Dyke................ 533 Belsey, Devereaux v............................ 589 Berman, Witt v................................ 612 Bernheimer v. First National Bank............. 639 Berwind Land Co., Williams Coal Co. v......... 610 Bethea, Allen v............................... 622 Bingham v. United States.................. 211,564 Bingham Land Co. v. Central Maine Power Co... 543 Binzel v. Commissioner........................ 579 B. Kuppenheimer & Co. v. Mornin.............. 615 Blackmer, Sentinel Life Ins. Co v............. 602 Blackshear, Jacksonville Terminal Co. v.... 627,663 Blue Rose Oil Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Kerner... 605 Blumen v. Haff................................ 644 Blumenthal, Helvering v.................... 552,563 Board of Commissioners, Board of Liquidation v....................................... 540, 663 Board of Commissioners v. North American Corp.. 633 Board of Liquidation v. Board of Commission- ers..................................... 540, 663 Bolin v. Marshall............................. 573 Bonner, New England Newspaper Pub. Co. v....... 610 Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles.... 10,664 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Borgia v. United States........................ 615 Boster v. First National Bank.................. 614 Bowen, Ohio ex rel., Capital Endowment Co. v.... 546 Bowers, Del Vecchio v.......................... 280 Bowers v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co............. 649 Bowers, Freeport Texas Co. v.................... 613 Bowers, Reinhard v............................. 640 Bowers v. Untermyer............................ 641 Bradbury v. Aycock............................. 589 Brame v. Keystone Credit Corp.................. 591 Brand v. United States......................... 655 Brandtjen & Kluge, Chandler & Price Co. v......... 53 Braun, Lake’s Laundry v................... t.,. 622 Brea Canon Oil Co. v. Commissioner............. 604 Bright, Kelley v. ............................ 617 Bronx Brass Foundry v. Irving Trust Co......... 565 Brown v. Garey................................. 615 Brown v. Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose, etc... 618, 663 Brown, Macho v................................. 590 Brown v. Mississippi........................... 559 Brown, Palmer Clay Products Co. v...............556 Budlong v. Budlong............................. 550 Budlong, Budlong vi ........ 550 Buffalo Gravel Corp., Gravel Products Corp, v.. 599 Buie v. United States...................... 585, 662 Bullard Machine Tool Co., Ryerson & Son v...... 648 Bunker Hill Country Club v. United States...... 583 Burlington, Kansas Utilities Co. v............. 658 Burt v. General Electric Co.................... 553 Burton v. United States........................ 608 Bus & Transport Securities Corp. v. Helvering.. 391, 567 Butler, United States v........................ 561 Cahill v. Mayflower Bus Lines.................. 629 Cahn v. United States......................... 558 California, Arizona v............................ 552 California, Hall v............................... 656 California, McNabb v........................... 660 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. ix Page. California, United States v.................... 554 California Trust Co., Gustason v............... 607 California Water Service Co. v. Railroad Comm’n... 667 Callaghan, Egbert v............................ 646 Callaghan v. Reconstruction Finance Corp........ 570 Callahan, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v..... 543 Callison v. Pickens............................ 605 Camden Fire Insurance Assn., Di Giovanni v...... 64 Campbell v- Alleghany Corporation.............. 581 Canaday (Ward M.), Inc. y. Commissioner......... 612 Canister Co. v. Wood & Selick, Inc............. 590 Canister Co., Wood & Selick, Inc. v.............590 Capital Endowment Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Bowen..... 546 Carrey, Secesh Dredging, M. & M. Co. v-........... 544 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.................... 571, 636 Carter, Helvering v............................. 571 Carter Coal Co., Carter v................. 571, 636 Cary, Corporation Commission v................. 452 Casey (John F.) Co., Wheeling v................ 593 Central Leather Co., Ingraham v................ 668 Central Maine Power Co., Bingham Land Co. v.. •.. 543 Central Vermont Ry. v. Fierce.................. 629 Central Vermont Ry. v- Pearson................. 629 Certain Lands in Louisville, United States v....... 567 C. F. Smith Co. v. Atwood..................... 659 Chadick v. United States....................... 609 Chandler v. Peketz............................. 571 Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge....... 53 Chapman v. Hoage............................ 526,554 Chapman v. United States....................... 628 Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Prudence-Bonds Corp........................................ 652 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States...... 187 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., United States v...... 187 Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., West v...... 661 Chicago & Alton R. Co., U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co. v....................................... 668 x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Chicago Gravel Co. v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co....................................... 617, 663 Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Goldhammer...655 Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co., Richardson v.......... 646 Chickasaw Nation v. United States............. 644 Chickasha, Foster v............................. 643 Chief Consolidated Mining Co., Mammoth Mining Co. v....................................... 667 Chippewa Indians v. United States............. 576 Chiropractic League, U. S. Naturopathic Assn, v.... 539 Chisholm, Helvering v......................... 641 Choctaw Nation v- United States............ 643, 644 Christmas, U. S. ex rel., v. Asbury Park...... 624 Chung Yim v. United States.................... 627 Cities Service Co. v. Armsby.................. 583 Cities Service Gas Co., Missouri ex rel., Comm’n v.. 657 Citizens State Bank, Mitchell v.................. 611 City Bank Farmers Trust Co., Helvering v... 85, 664 City Cab Co., Simon v......................... 640 Cizura v. Day................................. 668 Clark, R. C. Tway Coal Co. v.................. 572 Clark, Wheeler v............................ 631, 663 Clarke v. Hot Springs Electric Co............. 624 Claverie, American Casualty Co. v............... 590 Clayton, Southern Pacific Co. v............... 631 Cleary, Hopkins Federal Assn, v................. 315 Cleary, Northern Bldg. & Loan Assn, v............ 315 Cleary, Reliance Bldg. & Loan Assn, v......... 315 Clifton Manufacturing Co. v. United States...... 622 Cloisters Building Corp., Allen v................. 657 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel- Comm’n.... 261 Coggin v. Hartford Accident & I. Co........ 620, 663 Cohen v. Commissioner......................... 610 Coleman-Gilbert Associates, Helvering v....... 369, 555 Colgate v. Harvey............................. 404 Collier v. King............................... 577 Collier Service Corp. v. Commissioner......... 559 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xi Page. Collins, Sorensen v........................... 611 Colonial Trust Co., Hollidge v.................. 581 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., Continental Bank v.. 617, 662 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., Gravel Co. v.. 617, 663 Colvin v- United States........................ 669 Combs, Helvering v......................... 365, 564 Commerce Trust Co., Woodbury v................. 614 Commercial Operating Corp., Arnold Constable Corp, v...................................... 616 Commissioner, Alfred H. Smith Co. v............ 648 Commissioner, Asiatic Petroleum Co. v....... 645, 664 Commissioner, Bancker v........................ 603 Commissioner, Beers v......................... 620 Commissioner, Binzel v......................... 579 Commissioner, Brea Canon Oil Co. v............. 604 Commissioner, Bus & Transport Securities Corp, v.. 567 Commissioner, Cohen v.......................... 610 Commissioner, Collier Service Corp, v............. 559 Commissioner, Consumers Natural Gas Co. v....... 634 Commissioner, Dibblee v................ 102, 566, 664 Commissioner, Dick v......................v.. .,. 588 Commissioner, Dorsey v......................... 589 Commissioner, Dyer v.......................... 586 Commissioner, Fain v....................... 588,589 Commissioner, George v......................... 634 Commissioner, Georgetown Water, G. & E. Co. v.... 579 Commissioner, Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v...... 601 Commissioner, G. & K. Manufacturing Co. v....... 563 Commissioner, Godfried v....................... 610 Commissioner, Great Western Power Co. v........1 568 Commissioner, Greensboro Gas Co. v............. 639 Commissioner, Guaranty Trust Co. v.............. 591 Commissioner, Haskell v........................ 652 Commissioner, Hulburd v. 300 Commissioner, John A. Nelson Co. v............. 555 Commissioner, Johnstone v..578 XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Commissioner, Keck Investment Co. v............ 633 Commissioner, Lamborn v....................... 637 Commissioner, Lincoln Mortgage Co. v............ 654 Commissioner, Lindgren v....................... 638 Commissioner, Logan v.......................... 637 Commissioner, Lucky Tiger Gold Co. v............ 584 Commissioner, Manhattan Equipment Co. v......... 559 Commissioner, Manus Muller & Co. v............. 657 Commissioner, McFeely v...........;........ 102, 664 Commissioner, McGaha v......................... 588 Commissioner, Menihan v....................... 651 Commissioner, Michael v........................ 579 Commissioner, Morgan v........................ 601 Commissioner, Morrissey v...................... 344 Commissiotier, Morton v........................ 620 Commissioner, Moifnt Vernon Trust Co. v......... 587 Commissioner, Nevius v......................... 591 Commissioner, Newman v......................... 600 Commissioner, New York Central R. Co. v......... 653 Commissioner, Noxon Chemical Products Co. v..... 647 Commissioner, Pennsylvania Indemnity Co. v...... 588 Commissioner, Riggs v............ 637 Commissioner, Rosenbaum v..................... 610 Commissioner, Schoenberg v..................... 586 Commissioner, Shamrock Oil Co. v................ 632 Commissioner, Signal Gasoline Corp, v.......... 657 Commissioner, Slayton v........................ 586 Commissioner, Swanson v.................... 362, 563 Commissioner, Taylor v..................... 594, 662 Commissioner, Trafford Oil & Gas Co. v.,....... 630 Commissioner, Troup v.......................... 586 Commissioner, U. S. Trust Co. v............ 481, 557 Commissioner, V. Vivaudou, Inc., v............. 648 Commissioner, Ward M. Canaday, Inc., v.......... 612 Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Atwood............... 566 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson.... 535 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xm Page. Constantine, United States v................... 287 Consumers Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner...... 634 Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Columbian Ins. Co.............................. 617,662 Cook v. Cutler................................. 656 Corporation Commission v. Cary................. 452 Cosmopolitan Bond & Mortgage Co., Planert v.... 657 Counselman v. Pritzer.......................... 650 Credit Alliance Corp., Thai v.................. 598 Crocker v. Helvering.......................... 596 Cummings, Becker Steel Co. v.................... 74 Curreri v. Vice............................... 638 Curtis v. Humphrey............................. 605 Cutler, Cook v................................. 656 Dakota Corporation v. Slope County............. 593 Dambrosio v. Aderhold.......................... 573 Dance, Provident Life & A. Ins. Co. v.......... 582 Dante v. Tait.................................. 614 D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Graves................. 536 Davis, Ex parte................................ 541 Davis v. Federal Reserve Bank.................. 577 Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co................. 603 Day, Cizura v.................................. 668 Dektor v. Overbrook National Bank.............. 661 Delaware v. Irving Trust Co.................... 652 Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., Industrial Board v... 597 De La Ysla v. United States.................... 575 Del Vecchio v. Bowers.......................... 280 Denison, Allen C. Weissman Co. v............... 646 Dennis v. New York Central R. Co.............. 621 Deppe, In re................................... 552 Detroit v. Wyandotte Transportation Co......... 595 Devereaux v. Belsey............................ 589 Dibblee v. Commissioner................ 102,566, 664 Dick v. Commissioner........................... 588 Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Insurance Assn...... 64 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Dismuke v. United States..................... 554 Doane-Commercial Towing Co. v. Mexican Petroleum Corp..................................... 669 Dodson v. Federal Trade Comm’n................. 623 Donahue v. Rockwell............................ 650 Dore v. Fontenot........................... 549,569 Dorrance v. Martin............................. 393 Dorsey Co. v. Commissioner..................... 589 Douglas v. Willcuts.............................. 1 Downey v. Thomson.............................. 630 Drake v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.......... 632, 664 Draper, Bell-Dowlen Mills v.................... 633 Dunn v. Ickes.................................. 612 Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans.......... 569 Durell v. Pearson.............................. 606 Dyer v. Commissioner........................... 586 Ebert v. Miller................................ 666 Eckstein v. United States...................... 582 Edwards v. Rector.............................. 628 Egbert v. Callaghan............................ 646 E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. Trade Comm’n....... 617 Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co... 648, 665 Elliott, Lindsay v............................. 604 Elting, Navigazione Generale Italiana v..... 603, 608 Elyria Savings & Trust Co., Simms v............ 596 Endehnan v. Reconstruction Finance Corp........ 649 Engebretson v. Marceli......................... 579 Enterprise Railway Equipment Co., Wine Co. v..... 560 Equitable Life Assurance Society, Goldberg-Rud-kowsky v.................................... 583 Ervin v. Industrial Comm’n..................... 669 Ervin, North Western Refrigerator Line Co. v..... 622 Evans, Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v.......... 569 Evans v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co........ 607, 662 Evans Terry Co. v. Mississippi ex rei. Rice. 538, 663 Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Helvering........ 628 Ex parte. See name of party. TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xv Page. Export Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Helvering........... 627 Faber v. United States........................ 596 Fain v. Commissioner........................ 588, 589 Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., Bowers v.............. 649 Farmers Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot........ 549, 569 Federal Motor Truck Co., New York ex rel., v. Lynch..................................... 588, 662 Federal Reserve Bank, Davis v.................. 577 Federal Reserve Bank, Florida Asphalt Pavement Mfg. Co. v................................... 577 Federal Trade Comm’n, Armand Co. v............. 650 Federal Trade Comm’n, Dodson v.7............... 623 Federal Trade Comm’n, E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v.. 617 Feiffer v. Mann................................ 587 Fidelity & Deposit Co., Oklahoma State Bank v.... 611 Fidelity & Deposit Co., Prudence Co. v............ 566 Fidelity & Deposit Co., Public Warehouses v...... 633 First Methodist Episcopal Church, Long v......... 593 First National Bank, Bernheimer v................ 639 First National Bank, Boster v......... i... .lf..... 614 First National Bank v. First National Bank....... 651 First National Bank, First National Bank v....... 651 First National Bank, United States v.... 102, 564, 664 Florida Asphalt Pavement Mfg. Co. v. Reserve Bank......................................... 577 Fontenot, Baton Rouge Rice Mill v........... 549, 569 Fontenot, Dore v........................ J.:. 549, 569 Fontenot, Farmers Rice Milling Co. v........ 549, 569 Fontenot, Levy Rice Milling Co. v........... 549, 569 Fontenot, Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co. v.... 549, 569 Fontenot, Rickert Rice Mills v............... 549, 569 Fontenot, Simon v........................... 549, 569 Fontenot, United Rice Milling Co. v......... 549, 569 Fordham v. Ickes............................... 613 Ford Motor Co., United States v................ 636 Foster v. Chickasha............................ 643 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller....................... 207 33682°—36-n XVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Franc-Strohmenger-Cowan, Inc. v. Payette Neckwear Co....................................... 667 Frazie v. Orleans Dredging Co................. 653 Freeport Texas Co. v. Bowers.................. 613 Furlaud, McCandless v...................... 140, 664 Gallegos, Intermountain Bldg. & Loan Assn, v... 639 Garey, Brown v........................f........ 615 Garlick v. Prudence Co........................ 646 Geiger v. Merle............................... 630 Gelkom Realty Corp. v. Young Women’s Hebrew Assn....................................... 537 General American Life Ins. Co., St. Louis Can Co. v557, 660 General Chemical Co., Standard Phosphate Works v..................................... 606, 663, 664 General Electric Co., Burt v..................... 553 General Motors Acceptance Corp., Kline v....... 655 General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric Corp.... 655 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Callahan.... 543 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hoar....... 543 General Public Utilities Corp., Ex parte...... 598 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering. 200 Gentry, Bayside Fish Flour Co. v............ 547, 660 George v. Commissioner........................ 634 George Allison & Co. v. United States....... 546, 664 Georgetown Water, Gas & E. Co. v. Commissioner.. 579 Georgia, Herndon v............................ 661 Georgia v. Morgenthau.................. 544, 547,548 Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Commissioner.... 601 Germantown Trust Co., Jones v................. 589 Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphic, M. B. H., Brown v................................. 618, 663 Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co..... 667 Gillis v. New York City....................... 653 G. & K. Manufacturing Co. v. Helvering...... 389, 563 Glenn, R. C. Tway Coal Co. v.................... 571 Glidden Co., United States v.................... 652 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xvn Page. Godfried v. Commissioner........................ 610 Goebel, Lipman v................................ 654 Goldberg-Rudkowsky v. Equitable Life Society.... 583 Goldhammer, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v.... 655 Goldstein, Schick v......................... 626 Goll, Johnston v.............................. 634 Gordon v. Heller.............................. 619 Graham v. White-Phillips Co..................... 27 Gravel Products Corp. v. Buffalo Gravel Corp.... 599 Graves, D. A. Schulte, Inc. v..................... 536 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks............... 558 Great Western Power Co. v. Commissioner......... 568 Greensboro Gas Co. v. Commissioner............ 639 Green Star Steamship Co. v. Armour & Co......... 668 Gregory, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v............... 635 Gross, In re.................................. 645 Gross, Keithley v............................. 587 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner............ 591 Guardian Nat. Bank, Union Guardian Co. v....... 619 Guitar, Williams v............................ 666 Gulf Refining Co., Holman v................ 590, 664 Gustason v. California Trust Co............... 607 Gutenkunst v. Wisconsin....................... 608 Guy, Macrae v......................v.....i..... 585 Hackley, Southern Pacific Co. v.................. 630 Haff, Blumen v................................ 644 Haff, Koutei Sugaya v.... ¿.. i.................. 644 Hall v- California............................ 656 Hall v. Universal Oil Products Co.......... 621, 663 Halsey, Stuart & Co., United States v............. 451 Hamburg Bank, Ouachita National Bank v........ 655 Hamilton v. Offutt........................... 592 Hamilton Gas Co. v. Harper.................... 647 Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters................... 647 Hanna Manufacturing Co., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. 645 Hardee v. American Security & Trust Co........ 595 XVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Harlan v. Archer................................ 656 Harold Lloyd Corp., Witwer v.................... 669 Harper, Hamilton Gas Co. v...................... 647 Harper v. Moran................................. 592 Harris, Hays v................................. 613 Harris, Tuttle v............................. s... 567 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., Coggin v.. 620, 663 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., Hoage v..... 609 Hartford-Empire Co., Shawkee Mfg. Co. v........ 635 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Leithauser v.......... 645 Harvey, Colgate v............................. 404 Haskell v. Commissioner....................... 652 Hastings, United States v..................... 188 Hauptmann v. New Jersey....................... 649 Havemeyer, Public Service Comm’n v.......... 506, 556 Hays v. Harris................................ 613 Heard v. Houston Gulf Gas Co.................. 643 Heller, Gordon v. 619 Helmholz, Helvering v......................... 93 Helvering, Balkwill v........................... 609 Helvering v. Blumenthal..................... 552,563 Helvering, Bus & Securities Transport Corp, v.391 Helvering v. Carter............................. 571 Helvering v. Chisholm........................... 641 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co..... 85, 664 Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates..... 369, 555 Helvering v. Combs.......................... 365,564 Helvering, Crocker v............................ 596 Helvering, Evening Star Newspaper Co- v........ 628 Helvering, Export Leaf Tobacco Co. v. 627 Helvering, General Utilities & Operating Co. v. 200 Helvering, G. & K. Manufacturing Co. v.......... 389 Helvering v. Helmholz............................ 93 Helvering v. Honnald............................ 632 Helvering, John A. Nelson Co. v............. 374,555 Helvering v. Lee....................... 102, 565, 664 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xix Page. Helvering v. Mcllvaine...................... 488,567 Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co............... 378, 562 Helvering, Montana, W. & S. R. Co. v............. 604 Helvering v. New York Central R. Co............. 653 Helvering, Ogle v............. 102,565 Helvering, Peck v............................... 625 Helvering v. Pennsylvania Co.................... 651 Helvering v. Peterson....................... 378,562 Helvering, Rand v....................... 102,566,664 Helvering v. Randolph........................... 600 Helvering, Randolph v........................... 599 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co............ 39 Helvering v. Salvage............................ 557 Helvering, Salvage v............................ 557 Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co........ 561 Helvering \v. Schweitzer................ 551,555,665 Helvering v. Sicard............................ 387, 563 Helvering v. Sloane............................ 387, 563 Helvering, Smith Paper Co. v............... 627 Helvering v. Speyer.......................... 631 Helvering, Stallforth v...................... 606 Helvering (u. Stokes........................ 551,665 Helvering v. Stoner.......................... 650 Helvering, T. C. Williams Co. v.............. 627 Helvering v. Ullmann......................... 631 Helvering, Waggaman v........................ 618 Helveri'ng v. Watts......................... 387,563 Helvering, Wishnick-Tumpeer, Inc. v............. 628 Henderson, U. S. Radiator Corp, v................ 635 Hennef ord, Rainier National Park Co. v........... 647 Henry v. Wadhams Oil Co......................... 625 Herndon v. Georgia............................. 661 Hesselberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co................ 623 Hessey, Lowendahb v........................... 595 Higgins v. Oklahoma City........................ 560 Hill v. Ickes................................... 613 Hill v. Martin.................................. 393 XX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Hanna Mfg. Co........ 645 Hillman, Alexander v........................... 222 Hirsig v. Travelers Insurance Co............... 604 Hoage, Chapman v......................... 526, 554 Hoage v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co....... 609 Hoage, Speaks v................................ 574 Hoar, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.......... 543 Hoffman v. United States....................... 666 Holbrook, Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. v.......... 618 Holland, Washington v. 534 Hollidge v. Colonial Trust Co.................. 581 Holman v. Gulf Refining Co................. 590, 664 Honnald, Helvering v........................... 632 Hopkins Federal Savings & L. Assn. v. Cleary.... 315 Hot Springs Electric Co., Clarke v............. 624 House v. United States......................... 608 Houston Gulf Gas Co., Heard v.................. 643 Houze (L. J.) Convex Glass Co. v. United States.... 611 Hudspeth v. Arkansas........................... 642 Hughes (E. Griffiths), Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n....................................... 617 Hulburd v. Commissioner........................ 300 Hull {v. Ickes............................... 613 Humbird, Joyce v............................... 641 Humbird, William T. Joyce Co. v................. 641 Humphrey, Curtis v............................ 605 Hutton v. Torgerson............................ 602 Ickes, Abbot v................................. 612 Ickes, Dunn v.. 612 Ickes, Fordham v............................... 613 Ickes, Hill v.................................. 613 Ickes, Hull v................................... 613 Ickes, Lässig v................................ 612 Ickes, Putnam v. 612 Ickes, Thompson v.............................. 613 Illinois,. Schuedter v........................ 667 Illinois Brick Co., Pennsylvania R. Co. v.......... 560 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxi Page. Illinois ex rel. Kerner, Blue Rose Oil Co. v..... 605 Use, Ex parte................................... 575 Indian Motocycle Co., United States v........... 600 Industrial Board v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co...... 597 Industrial Comm’n of Illinois, Ervin v.......... 669 Industrial Trust Co. v. United States....... 220, 564 Ingraham v. Central Leather Co.................. 668 In re Deppe..................................... 552 Interborough Rapid Transit Co., Gilchrist v...... 667 Intermountain Building & Loan Assn. v. Gallegos... 639 International Agricultural Corp. v. Amtorg Corp... 576 International Visible Systems Corp. v. Remington Rand, Inc..................................... 618 Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Jones County.... 608 Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., Oliver v........ 582 Irby v. Arkansas ex rel. Attorney General....... 616 Irving Trust Co., Bronx Brass Foundry v.......... 565 Irving Trust Co., Delaware v.................... 652 Irving Trust Co., Levy v........................ 539 Irving Trust Co. v. Los Angeles................ 640 Irving Trust Co., Miller v..................... 256 Irving Trust Co., National City Bank v........ 651 Irving Trust Co., Urban Properties Co. v........ 658 Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County............. 667 Jackson Securities & Investment Co. v. Snead..... 599 Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blackshear..... 627, 663 Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., Jones v... 646, 665 Jenello v. United States.................... 623, 662 Jenny Wren Co. v. Sykes......................... 624 J. J. & M. Taxman Rfg. Co. v. Wichita Falls...... 587 John A. Nelson Co. v. Commissioner.............. 555 John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering................. 374 John F. Casey Co., Wheeling v................... 593 Johnson, Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v....... 535 Johnson, Smith v................................ 545 Johnson, Sommer & Maca Glass Machinery Corp. v. 605 Johnson v. Washington........................... 535 XXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Johnston v. Goll.............................. 634 Johnstone v. Commissioner..................... 578 John T. Riddell, Inc. v. Athletic Shoe Co..... 580 Jones v. Germantown Trust Co.................. 589 Jones v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co... 646, 665 Jones County, Interstate Trust Co. v.............i 608 Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Bullard Co......... 648 Joyce v. Humbird.............................. 641 Joyce (William T.) Co. v. Humbird............. 641 Julius Levine & Co. v. Automatic Paper Co...... 638 Kansas, Linderholm v....................... 572, 662 Kansas Tribe of Indians v. United States...... 577 Kansas Utilities Co. v. Burlington............ 658 Kaufman, New York Life Ins. Co. v............. 626 Kaw Tribe of Indians v. United States......... 577 Keck Investment Co. v. Commissioner........... 633 Keithley v. Gross............................. 587 Kelley v. Bright.............................. 617 Kenan, Lee v................................... 637 Kenmore Granville Hotel Co., Meyer v............ 565 Kennedy (W. J.) Dairy Co., Baker v............ 634 Kerner, Illinois ex ret., Blue Rose Oil Co. v.. 605 Kerr v. Southwestern Lumber Co................ 611 Kesterson, United States v................. 299, 562 Keyes, Stewart v661 Keystone Credit Corp., Brame v.................. 591 Kierce, Central Vermont Ry. v.................... 629 King, Collier v............................... 577 Kinnebrew Motor Co., United States v...........669 Kitrell v. United States...................... 643 Klamath Indians v. United States.............. 244 Kline v. General Motors Acceptance Corp........ 655 Klochkov v. Petrogradski Bank................. 573 Koutei Sugaya v. Haff......................... 644 Kuppenheimer (B.) & Co. v. Mornin............. 615 Lafayette National Bank v. Morrison........... 669 Lake’s Laundry, Inc. v. Braun................. 622 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxin Page. Lamborn v. American Ship & Commerce Corp........ 581 Lamborn v. Commissioner........................ 637 Lange Investment Co., A-l Garage v............. 642 Lässig v. Ickes................................ 612 Leadbetter Motor Co., United States v.......... 669 Leahy v. State Treasurer....................... 572 Leathern Smith-Putnam Navigation Co. v. Osby.... 653 Lee, Ex parte................................. 541 Lee, Helvering v........................ 102, 565, 664 Lee v. Kenan................................... 637 Legg v. St. John............................... 489 Lehigh Bernstein Mfg. Corp., Weissman Co. v..... 646 Leithauser v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co............ 645 Levine (Julius) & Co. v. Automatic Paper Co..... 638 Levy v. Irving Trust Co...................... 539 Levy Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot........... 549, 569 Libuwitz, Ottenheimer Bros, v.................. 582 Lidepa Corporation, Aull v..................... 581 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States.... 580 Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Lace Paper Co.......... 585 Lincoln v. Ricketts.............................566 Lincoln Mortgage & Title G. Co. v. Commissioner... 654 Linderholm v. Kansas........................ 572, 662 Lindgren v. Commissioner....................... 638 Lindsay v. Elliott...........................\. 604 Lindy, Windt v................................. 637 Lipman v. Goebel............................... 654 Livingston, Mortgage Loan Co. v.............. 607 L. J. Houze Convex Glass Co. v. United States... 611 Logan v. Commissioner.......................... 637 Long v. First Methodist Episcopal Church........ 593 Long Island R. Co., Norge Corporation v........ 616 Lorleberg, Richards v.......................... 642 Los Angeles, Borax Consolidated v........... 10,664 Los Angeles, Irving Trust Co. v................ 640 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.....661 Louisville & N. R. Co., Davis v................ 603 XXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Love v. Nordbye................................ 572 Lowe, Moore v.................................. 574 Lowell, Triplett v...................... 570, 621, 660 Lowendahl v. Hessey............................ 595 Lowry v. McCarl................................ 637 Lucky Tiger Gold Mining Co. v. Commissioner..... 584 Lunsford, Southern Ry. Co. v................... 561 Lynch, New York ex rel. Truck Co. v........ 588, 662 Macho v. Brown................................. 590 MacLaughlin, Pennsylvania Indemnity Co. v....... 644 Macrae v. Guy...................................585 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker............ 623 Maiatico Construction Co., U. S. ex rel. Phelps v.... 649 Mallery v. Managers Securities Co.............. 593 Malooly, York Heating & Vent. Corp, v....... 533, 662 Mammoth Mining Co. v. Chief Consolidated Mining Co.......................................... 667 Managers Securities Co., Mallery v............. 593 Manhattan Co. v. Prudence-Bonds Corp........... 584 Manhattan Co., United States v................. 558 Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner. 559 Mann, Feiffer v................................ 587 Mannisto, U. S. ex rel., v. Reimer............. 600 Mansfield v. United States..................... 601 Mantle Lamp Co., Aladdin Mfg. Co. v............ 639 Manufacturers Trust Co., Updike v.............. 648 Manus Muller & Co. v. Commissioner............. 657 Marcell, Engebretson v......................... 579 Markowitz, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v................ 625 Marshall, Bolin v.............................. 573 Marshall v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n.......... 585 Martin, Dorrance v............................. 393 Martin, Hill v................................. 393 Martin, Springfield Fire & M. Ins. Co. v....... 598 Maryland Casualty Co., Nellis v............ 615, 662 Massachusetts, McKnight v...................... 660 Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., Mayers v.... 594 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxv Page. Massachusetts Protective Assn. v. Picard.... 598 Matalone v. Peoria Life Ins. Co............. 594 Mattes v. United States..................... 636 Mayers v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co... 594 Mayflower Bus Lines, Cahill v............... 629 McBride v. Washington....................... 535 McCandless v. Furlaud................... 140, 664 McCandless v. United States................. 570 McCarl, Lowry v.........U....................... 637 McCarthy v. United States................... 650 McDonald, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v...... 621 McFeely v. Commissioner................. 102, 664 McGaha v. Commissioner...................... 588 Mcllvaine, Helvering v........................ 488, 567 McKinley, Southern Pacific Co. v............ 631 McKnight v. Massachusetts................... 660 McLaughlin, Wells Fargo Bank Co. v.......... 638 McLean, Peyser v............................ 638 McMullen v. Pennsylvania R. Co............. 607 McNabb v. California........................ 660 McNee, Wall v............................... 547 Menihan v. Commissioner..................... 651 Merle, Geiger v............................. 630 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Drake v..... 632, 664 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rubin’s Store... 578 M. E. White Co., Milwaukee County v......... 268 Mexican Petroleum Corp., Doane-Commercial Tow- ing Co. v................................. 669 Meyer v. Kenmore Granville Hotel Co......... 565 Micca v. Wisconsin National Life Ins. Co.... 580 Michael v. Commissioner..................... 579 Milborne, Shinn v............625 Miller, Ebert v............................. 666 Miller v. Irving Trust Co................... 256 Miller, United States v..................... 666 Miller, West v................................. 633 Milwaukee v. American Steamship Co.......... 591 XXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co............. 268 Minnesota Tea Co., Helvering v............. 378,562 Mississippi, Brown v........................... 559 Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Aultman.......... 537 Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Roberts.......... 536 Mississippi ex rel. Rice, Evans Terry Co. v.... 538, 663 Missouri ex rel. Cities Service Gas Co., Comm’n v.. 657 Missouri ex rel. Woods v. Sevier.......... 626, 663 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Bartlett............ 620 Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Evans v..... 607, 662 Mitchell v. Citizens State Bank................ 611 Moadoc Indians v. United States................ 244 Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Rogers................. 642 Montana, W. & S. R. Co. v. Helvering........... 604 Montgomery, Realty Acceptance Corp, v..... 590,662 Mooney, Ex parte........................... 541,662 Moore v. Backus................................ 640 Moore v. Lowe.................................. 574 Moore v. Tumwater Paper Mills Co............... 597 Moore v. United States......................... 583 Moran, Harper v................................ 592 Morgan, Ex parte ..................... 542 Morgan v. Commissioner......................... 601 Morgenthau, Georgia v.................. 544, 547,548 Momin, B. Kuppenheimer & Co. v............... 615 Morris v. United States........................ 666 Morrison, Lafayette National Bank v............ 669 Morrissey v. Commissioner...................... 344 Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston................ 607 Morton v. Commissioner......................... 620 Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner......... 587 Muller, Fox Film Corp, v........................207 Muller (Manus) & Co. v. Commissioner........... 657 Mulloney v. United States...................... 658 Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry., L. & P. Co............ 577 Must Hatch Incubator Co. v. Patterson.......... 666 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory................ 635 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxvii Page. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Markowitz............ 625 Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe..................... 668 Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., Ossen v.......... 616 Mutzenbecher v. Ballard...................... 606 National Box Co. v. United States............ 636 National City Bank v. Irving Trust Co........ 651 National City Bank, Posadas v............ 497,556 National Lead Co. v. St. Louis............... 640 Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n....... 659 Navigazione Generale Italiana v. Elting.... 603, 608 Nebraska v. Wyoming.................. 542,548,553 Nee, Washburn Crosby Co. v............... 641,664 Nellis v. Maryland Casualty Co............ 615, 662 Nelson (John A.) Co v. Commissioner........ 374, 555 Nevius v. Commissioner....................... 591 New England Newspaper Pub. Co. v. Bonner....... 610 New Jersey, Hauptmann v...................... 649 New Jersey v. New York City........... 259, 542, 549 New Jersey, O’Toole v..................... 613, 662 Newman v. Commissioner....................... 600 New Mexico, Texas v.......................... 547 New York, Small v.1 575 New York Central R. Co. v. Commissioner...... 653 New York Central R. Co., Dennis v............ 621 New York Central R. Co., Helvering v......... 653 New York Central R. Co., Purcell v............... 545 New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v- Singleton.... 578 New York City, Gillis v........................ 653 New York City, New Jersey v........... 259,542, 549 New York ex rei. Federal Truck Co. v. Lynch... 588, 662 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman............ 626 New York Life Ins. Co. v- Viglas............. 571 Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Water Power Comm’n... 609 Nicholson, Rowe v. 573 Noble v. Oklahoma City....................... 560 Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot.... 549, 569 xxvni TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Nordbye, Love v............................... 572 Norge Corporation v. Long Island R. Co........ 616 North American Fruit & S. S. Corp., Comm’rs v.. 633 Northern Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Cleary......... 315 Northern Insurance Co., Ex parte................ 547 North Western Refrigerator Line Co. v. Ervin... 622 Noxon Chemical Products Co. v. Commissioner.... 647 O’Brien v. United States...................... 637 Ocean Transport Co., Van Der Weyde v.......... 567 O’Connell v. United States.................... 667 O’Connor v. Rhodes............................. 568 Offutt, Hamilton v............................. 592 Ogle v. Helvering.......................... 102, 565 Ohio, Whitfield v.............................. 561 Ohio ex rel. Bowen, Capital Endowment Co. v. 546 Oklahoma City, Higgins v. 560 Oklahoma City, Noble v........................ 560 Oklahoma ex rel. Tax Comm’n v. Barnsdall Refin- eries............................... 521,556 Oklahoma State Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.... 611 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, Oklahoma ex rel., v. Barns- dall Refineries......................... 521,556 Oliver v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn...... 582 Omaha Baum Iron Store v. United States......... 576 Oregon, Washington v........................... 542 Oregon Short Line R. Co., Railway Equip. Co. v.... 658 Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Roy............... 579 Orleans Dredging Co., Frazie v................ 653 Osby, Leathern Smith-Putnam Navigation Co. v.... 653 Ossen v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co............ 616 Ostrander v. Preece........................... 543 O’Toole v. New Jersey..................... 613,662 Ottenheimer Bros. v. Libuwitz................. 582 Ouachita National Bank v. Hamburg Bank......... 655 Overbrook National Bank, Dektor v............. 661 Pacific States Box Co. v. White............... 176 Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown............. 556 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxix Page. Parks v. United States....................... 573 Park Savings Bank, Thompson v.................. 592 Patterson, Must Hatch Incubator Co. v........ 666 Payette Neckwear Co., Franc-Strohmenger-Cowan, Inc. v....................................... 667 Payne v. United States....................... 659 P. & D. Manufacturing Co., Electric Auto-Lite Co. v................................... 648, 665 Pearson, Central Vermont Ry. v............... 629 Pearson, Durell v.........;.................. 606 Peck v. Helvering............................ 625 Peerless Stages v. Railroad Commission.... 540, 663 Peketz, Chandler v........................2^... 571 Pennsylvania, Schuylkill Trust Co. v......... 113 Pennsylvania Co., Helvering v................... 651 Pennsylvania Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner.... 588 Pennsylvania Indemnity Co. v. MacLaughlin..... 644 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co..... 560 Pennsylvania R. Co., McMullen v.............. 607 Pennsylvania R. Co., Terminal Warehouse Co. v.... 560 Peoria Life Ins. Co., Matalone v. 594 Perkins, U. S. ex rel. Tetonis v............. 661 Peterson, Helvering v....................... 378, 562 Peters Patent Corp. v. Bates & Klinke........ 661 Petrogradski Mejdunarodni Bank, Klochkov v.... 583 Peyser v. McLean............................. 638 Pflueger v. Sherman.......................... 584 Phelps, U. S. ex rel., v. Maiatico Co........ 649 Philadelphia National Bank v. Raff........... 601 Picard, Massachusetts Protective Assn, v..... 598 Pickens, Callison v.......................... 605 Piergiovanni, Ex parte........................ 552 Pink, United States v.. 463, 558 Planert v. Cosmopolitan Bond & Mortgage Co.... 657 Poe, Mutual Lumber Co. v..................... 668 Pollitt, Ex parte............................ 552 Poor, White vi............ 98 XXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Porto Rico Ry., L. & P. Co., Munoz v........... 577 Posadas v. National City Bank.............. 497,556 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. White............ 534 Pottorff v. Stafford........................... 619 Preece, Ostrander v............................ 543 Preferred Electric & Wire Corp., G. M. Corp. v.... 655 President and Directors of the Manhattan Co. v. Prudence-Bonds Corp.......................... 584 President and Directors of the Manhattan Co., United States v............................... 463 Pritzer, Counselman v. 650 Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dance.... 582 Prudence-Bonds Corp., Chemical Bank & T. Co. v.. 652 Prudence-Bonds Corp., Manhattan Co. v.......... 584 Prudence Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.......... 566 Prudence Co., Garlick v........................ 646 Public Service Comm’n v. Havemeyer......... 506, 556 Public Service Comm’n v. Missouri ex rel. Gas Co.. 657 Public Service Comm’n, Natural Gas Co. v......... 659 Public Warehouses v. Fidelity & Deposit Co..... 633 Puerto Rico v. Velazquez....................... 602 Puerto Rico v. White Star Bus Line............. 606 Pugliese v. Uhl................................ 652 Purcell v. New York Central R. Co.............. 545 Putnam v. Ickes................................ 612 Quigley v. United States....................... 629 Radford, Louisville Land Bank v.................. 661 Radio Corporation v. Raytheon Mfg. Co...... 459, 557 Raff, Philadelphia National Bank v............... 601 Railroad Commission, California Water Service Co. v. 667 Railroad Commission, Peerless Stages v..... 540, 663 Railway Engineering Equipment Co. v. Short Line.. 658 Rainier National Park Co. v. Henneford......... 647 Rand v. Helvering...................... 102, 566, 664 Randolph v. Helvering...................... 599, 600 Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States...... 60 Raytheon Manufacturing Co., Radio Corp. v.. 459, 557 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XXXI Page. R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Clark................... 572 R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn................... 571 Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery........ 590, 662 Reconstruction Finance Corp., Callaghan v...... 570 Reconstruction Finance Corp., Endelman v........ 649 Reconstruction Finance Corp., Stitt v.......... 570 Rector, Edwards v.............................. 628 Reimer, U. S. ex rel. Mannisto v............... 600 Reinhard v. Bowers............................. 640 Reliance Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Cleary.......... 315 Remington Rand, Visible Systems Corp, v....... 618 Rhodes, O’Connor v............................. 568 Rhodes, U. S. Shipping Board v................. 568 Rice, Mississippi ex rel., Evans Terry Co. v. 538, 663 Richards v. Lorleberg.......................... 642 Richardson v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co....... 646 Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot............. 549, 569 Ricketts, Lincoln v............................ 566 Riddell (John T.), Inc. v. Athletic Shoe Co..... 580 Ridgeway v. Woodward........................... 575 Riggs v. Commissioner.......................... 637 Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. United States...................................... 624 Rizzo, United States v......................... 559 Roberts, Mississippi Central R. Co. v.............. 530 Rockwell, Donahue v............................ 650 Rogers, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v................. 642 Rogers v. Safety Car Heating & L. Co........... 555 Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.. 626 Rosenbaum v. Commissioner...................... 610 Rowe v. Nicholson.............................. 573 Roy, Oregon Short Line R. Co. v.. \. 579 Ruben Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corporation...... 623 Rubin, Ex parte................................ 550 Rubin’s Department Store, Metro. Ins. Co. v....... 578 Russell, Smith v............................... 614 XXXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Ryerson (Joseph T.) & Son v. Bullard Co........ 648 Safety Car Heating & L. Co., Rogers v.......... 555 Safety Car Heating & L. Co., United States v...... 555 St. John, Legg v.............................. 489 St. Louis, National Lead Co. v................ 640 St. Louis Can Co. v. General American Life Ins. Co...................................... 557,660 St. Louis Coke & Iron Corp., Anderson v.......... 656 St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co., Zachritz v.... 584 St. Louis Union Trust Co., Becker v........... 48, 564 St. Louis Union Trust Co., Helvering v.......... 39 Salvage v. Helvering........................... 557 Salvage, Helvering v........................... 557 San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., Helvering v...... 561 Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co.............. 656 Savings Depot & Trust Co., Simms v.............. 597 Scalese, Ex parte.............................. 550 Schick v. Goldstein............•............... 626 Schoenberg v. Commissioner..................... 586 School Board, Short v.......................... 663 Schuedter v. Illinois.......................... 667 Schulte (D. A.), Inc. v. Graves................ 536 Schumacher, Skipper v.......................... 578 Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania........... 113 Schweitzer, Helvering v................. 551,555,665 Secesh Dredging, Mining & M. Co. v. Carrey..... 544 Seifer Furniture Co. v. Surprise............... 618 Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer............. 602 Sevier, Missouri ex rel. Woods v.............. 626, 663 Shamrock Oil Co. v. Commissioner............... 632 Shawkee Manufacturing Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. 635 Sherman, Pflueger v............................ 584 Shinn v. Milborne.............................. 625 Short v. School Board...................... 539, 663 Shreve v. United States........................ 654 Sicard, Helvering v........................ 387, 563 Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner.......... 657 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxxiii Page. Simms v. Elyria Savings & Trust Co............. 596 Simms v. Savings Depot & Trust Co.............. 597 Simon v. City Cab Co........................... 640 Simon v. Fontenot.................,........ 549, 569 Singleton, New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.......... 578 Skipper v. Schumacher.......................... 578 Slayton v. Commissioner........................ 586 Sloane, Helvering v........................ 387, 563 Slope County, Dakota Corporation v.............. 593 Small v. New York.............................. 575 Smith v. Johnson............................. 545 Smith v. Russell.............................. 614 Smith (Alfred H.) Co. v. Commissioner.......... 648 Smith (C. F.) Co. v. Atwood.................... 659 Smith Paper Co. v. Helvering................... 627 Snead, Jackson Securities & Inv. Co. v......... 599 Solez v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. 668 Sommer & Maca Glass Machinery Corp. v. Johnson. 605 Sorensen v. Collins............................ 611 South Carolina Tax Comm’n, Marshall v.......... 585 Southern Pacific Co. v. Clayton..-............. 631 Southern Pacific Co. v. Hackley................ 630 Southern Pacific Co. v. McKinley............... 631 Southern Pacific Co. v. Walton............. 647, 665 Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford................... 561 Southwestern Lumber Co., Kerr v................ 611 Speaks v. Hoage................................ 574 Speyer, Helvering v....................... i.. 631 Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Martin....598 Spruill v. Ballard......................... 575,662 Squire, U. S. ex rel. Various Trustees v............. 602 Stafford, Pottorff v.............................. 619 Stallforth v. Helvering........................ 606 Standard Oil Co. v. United States.............. 597 Standard Wholesale' Phosphate & Acid Works v. General Chemical Co................... 606, 663, 664 Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., Allred v.............. 627, 663 xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. State Conservation Commission, Via v............. 549 State Docks Comm’n, Alabama ex rel., Clyde Lines v. 261 State Tax Comm’n, Baltimore National Bank v.... 538 State Treasurer, Leahy v........................ 572 Steinberg v. United States...................... 574 Steve, Ex parte................................. 541 Stewart v. Keyes................................ 661 Stitt v. Reconstruction Finance Corp............ 570 Stokes, Helvering v......................... 551,665 Stone v. White........................... 550, 596 Stoner, Helvering v ............................. 650 Surprise, Seifer Furniture Co. v................ 618 Swan-Finch Oil Corp., Warner-Quinlan Co. v....... 621 Swanson v. Commissioner.................... 362, 563 Sykes, Jenny Wren Co. v......................... 624 Szarowicz v. Szarowicz.......................... 668 Szarowicz, Szarowicz v........................... 668 Tait, Dante v................................... 614 Tarrer v. United States......................... 574 Taxman (J. J. & M.) Refining Co. v. Wichita Falls. . 587 Taylor v. Commissioner...................... 594,662 T. C. Williams Co. v. Helvering................ 627 Telling v. Bellows Claude Neon Co............... 594 Tennessee, Arkansas v........................... 545 Tennessee, Willis v............................. 533 Tennessee Valley Authority, Ash wander v........ 562 Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.... 560 Tetonis, U. S. ex rel., v. Perkins.............. 661 Texas, Allison v................................ 661 Texas v. New Mexico............................. 547 Texas, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v........... 552, 581 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Texas........... 552, 581 Thai v. Credit Alliance Corp.................... 598 Thomas, Austin v................................ 626 Thompson v. Ickes............................... 613 Thompson v. Park Savings Bank................... 592 4» TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxxv Page. Thomson, Downey v............................... 630 Tinkoff, Ex parte............................... 548 Torgerson, Hutton v............................. 602 Trafford Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner.......... 630 Travelers Insurance Co., Hirsig v............... 604 Travelers Insurance Co., Wolfe v............... 635 Triplett v. Lowell...................... 570, 621,660 Troup v. Commissioner........................... 586 Tumwater Paper Mills Co., Moore v............... 597 Tuttle v. Harris................................ 567 Tway (R. C.) Coal Co. v. Clark.................. 572 Tway (R. C.) Coal Co. v. Glenn.................. 571 Twin Falls Canal Co., Land & Water Co. v......... 654 Twin Falls Land & Water Co. v. Canal Co.......... 654 Tyson v. United States.......................... 554 Uhl, Pugliese v................................. 652 Ulhnann, Helvering v........................... 631 Union Agricultural & Industrial College v. Arkansas Baptist College............................... 615 Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co. v. Van Schaick... 594 Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Guardian Nat. Bank.. 619 United Rice Milling Products Co. v. Fontenot... 549, 569 United States, Amchanitzky v................ 598, 662 United States, American Steam Conveyor Corp. v... 599 United States v. Atkinson....................... 559 United States, Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co. v......... 33 United States, Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v....595 United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. 463, 558 United States, Bedell v.............■........... 628 United States, Bingham v................... 211,564 United States, Borgia v......................... 615 United States, Brand v.......................... 655 United States, Buie v....................... 585, 662 United States, Bunker Hill Country Club v........ 583 United States, Burton v......................... 608 United States v. Butler......................... 561 xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. United States, Cahn v............................. 558 United States v. .California..................... 554 United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville.... 567 United States, Chadick v......................... 609 United States, Chapman v. . 628 United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co....... 187 United States, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v....... 187 United States, Chickasaw Nation v................. 644 United States, Chippewa Indians v................. 576 United States, Choctaw Nation v............. 643, 644 United States, Chung Yim v........................ 627 United States, Clifton Manufacturing Co. v...... 622 United States, Colvin v.......................... 669 United States v. Constantine..................... 287 United States, De La Ysla v...................... 575 United States, Dismuke v...........................554 United States, Eckstein v........................ 582 United States, Faber v........................... 596 United States v. First National Bank..... 102, 564, 664 United States v. Ford Motor Co................... 636 United States, George Allison & Co. v.......... 546, 664 United States v. Glidden Co....................... 652 United States v. Halsey, Stuart & Co..............451 United States v. Hastings........................ 188 United States, Hoffman v. 666 United States, House v.......................... 608 United States v. Indian Motocycle Co.............. 600 United States, Industrial Trust Co. v....... 220,564 United States, Jenello v...................... 623, 662 United States, Kansas or Kaw Tribe of Indians v.. 577 United States v. Kesterson................... 299, 562 United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co.............. 669 United States, Kitrell v.......................... 643 United States, Klamath and Moadoc Indians v........244 United States, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v....580 United States v. Leadbetter Motor Co............. 669 United States, L. J. Houze Convex Glass Co. v... 611 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxxvii Page. United States v. Manhattan Co................... 558 United States, Mansfield v...................... 601 United States, Mattes v......................... 636 United States, McCandless v..................... 570 United States, McCarthy v....................... 650 United States v. Miller......................... 666 United States, Moore v.......................... 583 United States, Morris v......................... 666 United States, Mulloney v....................... 658 United States, National Box Co. v................ 636 United States, O’Brien v........................ 637 United States, O’Connell v.. 667 United States, Omaha Baum Iron Store v.......... 576 United States, Parks v............................ 573 United States, Payne v.......................... 659 United States v. Pink....................... 463,558 United States v. President of the Manhattan Co.... 463 United States, Quigley v......................... 629 United States, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v...... 60 United States, Riverside Cotton Mills v........... 624 United States v. Rizzo.......................... 559 United States v. Safety Car Heating & L. Co..... 555 United States, Shreve v.......................... 654 United States, Standard Oil Co. v............... 597 United States, Steinberg v....................... 574 United States, Tarrer v......................... 574 United States, Tyson v.......................... 554 United States, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v...... 573 United States, Walker v......................... 612 United States, Wheeler v........................ 661 United States v. Wood........................... 643 United States, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.... 661 U. S. ex rel. Christmas v. Asbury Park......... 624 U. S. ex rel. Mannisto v. Reimer................ 600 U. S. ex rel. Phelps v. Maiatico Construction Co.... 649 U. S. ex rel. Tetonis v. Perkins................ 661 U. S. ex rel. Various Trustees v. Squire........ 602 XXXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page. U. S. Guarantee Co., Walsh Construction Co. v.. 605 U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. Co.......................................... 668 U. S. Naturopathic Assn. v. Chiropractic League... 539 U. S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson............. 635 U. S. Shipping Board M. F. Corp. v. Rhodes..... 568 U. S. Trust Co. v. Commissioner.......... 481,557 Universal Oil Products Co., Hall v........ 621, 663 Universal Oil Products Co., Root Refining Co. v... 626 Untermyer, Bowers v........................... 641 Updike v. Manufacturers Trust Co.............. 648 Upper Moreland School Board, Short v............ 539 Urban Properties Co. v. Irving Trust Co....... 658 Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co........... 567 Van Dyke, Ex Parte............................ 541 Van Dyke, Bell Telephone Co. v................ 533 Van Schaick,. Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co. v.. 594 Van Schaick, Villa v.......................... 544 Various Trustees, U. S. ex rel., v. Squire.... 602 Velazquez, Puerto Rico v...................... 602 Via v. State Conservation Commission.......... 549 Vice, Curreri v............................... 638 Viglas, New York Life Ins. Co. v................. 571 Villa v. Van Schaick.......................... 544 Vivaudou (V.), Inc. v. Commissioner......... . 648 V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. Commissioner............ 648 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States..... 573 Wadhams Oil Co., Henry v...................... 625 Waggaman v. Helvering......................... 618 Wahlgren, Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v......... 603 Walker, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.............. 623 Walker v. United States....................... 612 Wall v. McNee................................. 547 Walsh Construction Co. v. U. S. Guarantee Co... 605 Walton, Southern Pacific Co. v............ 647,665 Walton County, Jackson Lumber Co. v............ 667 Ward M. Canaday, Inc. v. Commissioner......... 612 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xxxix Page. Warner-Quinlan Co. v. Swan-Finch Oil Corp........ 621 Washbum Crosby Co. v. Nee................. 641, 664 Washington v. Holland............................ 534 Washington, Johnson v............................ 535 Washington, McBride v535 Washington v. Oregon............................. 542 Water Power & Control Comm’n, Power Co. v.... 609 Watters, Hamilton Gas Co. v...................... 647 Watts, Helvering v.......................... 387,563 Weeks, Great Northern Ry. Co. v.................. 558 Weissman (Allen C.) Co. v. Denison............... 646 Weissman (Allen C.) Co. v. Lehigh Mfg. Corp... 646 Weisthoff, American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. v.... 619 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. McLaughlin ............................................ 638 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co..... 661 West v. Miller............................. 633 Westinghouse Electric Co., American Surety Co. v.. 133 Wheeler v. Clark............................. 631,663 Wheeler v. United States................... 661 Wheeling v. John F. Casey Co............... 593 White, Pacific States Box Co. v................... 176 White v. Poor..................................... 98 White, Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.............. 534 White, Stone v............................. 550, 596 White (M. E.) Co., Milwaukee County v............ 268 White-Phillips Co., Graham v...................... 27 White Star Bus Line, Puerto Rico v............... 606 Whitfield v. Ohio................................ 561 Wichita Falls, J. J. & M. Taxman Rfg. Co. v... 587 Wichita Falls & Southern R. Co. v. Holbrook... 618 Willcuts, Douglas v. 1 Williams v. Guitar......................... 666 Williams Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Berwind Land Co. 610 Williams (T. C.) Co. v. Helvering.......... 627 William T. Joyce Co. v. Humbird.................. 641 Willis v. Tennessee........................ 533 xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page. Wilson, Associated Indemnity Corp, v............. 580 Windt v. Lindy................................ 637 Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Co....560 Wisconsin, Gutenkunst v........................ 608 Wisconsin National Life Ins. Co., Micca v..... 580 Wishnick-Tumpeer, Inc. v. Helvering........... 628 Witt v. Berman................................ 612 Witwer v. Harold Lloyd Corp................... 669 W. J. Kennedy Dairy Co., Baker v................ 634 Wolf, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v........... 592,662 Wolfe v. Travelers Insurance Co............... 635 Wood, United States v......................... 643 Woodbury v. Commerce Trust Co................. 614 Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Canister Co............ 590 Wood & Selick, Inc., Canister Co. v........... 590 Woods, Missouri ex rel., v. Sevier........ 626, 663 Woodward, Ridgeway v......................... 575 Wren (Jenny) Co. v. Sykes..................... 624 Wright v. Ayer & Lord Barge Co................ 602 Wyandotte Transportation Co., Detroit v.......... 595 Wyoming, Nebraska v.................. 542, 548, 553 York Heating & Vent. Corp. v. Malooly 533, 662 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States.... 661 Young Women’s Hebrew Assn., Gelkom Realty Corp, v..................................... 537 Zachritz v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co..... 584 Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., Solez v. 668 TABLE OF CASES Cited in Opinions Page. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198 57 Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440 124, 126,127,128 Acme White Lead Works v. Republic Truck Co., 285 Fed. 88 239 Adamos v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 386 462 Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19 126,130,131 Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Comm’n, 295 U. S. 285 438,439,538 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 275 U. S. 440 185,186,541 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. 8, 530 529 Air-Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71 423 Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S. 229 458 Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 438,439 Alaska Packers Assn. v. In- dustrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U. S. 532 273,274 Allen v. La Vaud, 213 N. Y. 322 * 158 Allen v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 173 U. S. 479 211 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 433 Allington v. Shevlin-Hixon Co., 2 F. (2d) 747 59 Al ward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 539 American Assn. v. Hurst, 59 Fed. 1 403 Page. American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 171 Fed. 540 159 American Equitable Assur- ance Co. v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 46 307 American Express Co. v. • Mullins, 212 U. S. 311 278 American Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lowe, 70 F. (2d) 616 528 American Mills Co. v. Ameri- can Surety Co., 260 U. S. 360 241,462 American Shipbuilding Co. v. Whitney, 190 Fed. 109 403 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 437,438 American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 75 F. (2d) 380 140 Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449 479 Anderson v. Clark, 70 Ga. 362 275 Anderson v. Daley, 38 App. Div. 505 165 Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604 419 Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162 271 Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 533 Angier v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 48 F. (2d) 612 57 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373 276 Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1 446 XLI XLii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Arnold v. Searing, 78 N. J. Eq. 146 163 Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co. v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 885 37 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U. S. 532 534 Atlantic & Pacific R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U. S. 413 517 Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chap- man, 208 U. S. 360 159 Atlantic Trust & Deposit Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690 531 Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347 58 Attorney General v. ----------, 2 Ans. Rep. 558 272 Attorney General v. Cham- bers, 4 DeG. M. & G. 206 24 Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 262 271 Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 225 271 Attorney General v. Schulze & Co., 9 Sc. L. T. Rep. 4 274 Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M. & W. 77 272 Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371 339 Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 223 271 Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642 529 Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575 8 Bacon v. Tax Comm’rs, 126 Mich. 22 421 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture _Co., 259 U. S. 20 296 Bailey v. Pittsburgh & Con- nellsville Co., 69 Pa. 334 175 Baldwin v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 227 Fed. 455 57 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 293 U. S. 522 458 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 446 Balsier, In re, 215 Fed. 134 496 Page. Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U. S. 568 519 Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591 78,83 Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481 17 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 22 Barnsdall Refineries v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 171 Okla. 145 522 Barrows v. People’s Gasfight & Coke Co., 75 Fed. 794 505 Barstow, Matter of, 256 N. Y. 647 44 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129 443, 445 Baudouine, In re, 96 Fed. 536 496 Bayless v. People, 56 Ill. App. 55 312 Beadall v. Moore, 199 App. Div. 531 274 Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1 505 Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 219 Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings 296 U. S. 74 272 Becket v. Uniontown Bldg. & Loan Assn., 88 Pa. 211 328 Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477 437 Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457 • 80 Belford v. Woodward, 158 Ill. 122 271 Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 443,449 Bibb County Loan Assn. v. Richards, 21 Ga. 592 328 Big Spring Electric Co. v. Kitzmiller, 268 Pa. 34 161 Binckes, In re Goods of, 1 Curteis 286 309 Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 70 Bingaman v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 15 F. (2d) 119 162 Bingham v. Mears, 4 N. D. 437 530 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xliii Page. Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211 22i Blackfeather v. United States, 190 U. S. 368 25( Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U. S. 220 18f Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 421 Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 Ill. 647 31i Bliss, Matter of, 121 Misc. 773 27- Blum v. Whitney, 185 N. Y. 232 17< Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & A. 268 25 Board of Commissioners v. Lafayette Southside Bank, 27 F. (2d) 286 5t Board of Education v. Illi- nois, 203 U. S. 553 437,44( Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 298,441,53f Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 75 Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 272,27c Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 18f Boston India Rubber Co. v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92 271 Boston & Maine Railroad v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234 441 Bostwick v. Young, 118 App. Div. 490 174 Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157 161 Bowers v. Hoage, 64 App. D. C. 226 284 Brabham v. Cooper, 9 F. Supp. 904 29C Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 273,274 Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 289 U. S. 92 18f Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 428,432,44f Brady v. United States, 283 U. S. 804 54f Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77 25 Page. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327 108,355 Brewster v. Hatch, 122 N. Y. 349 157,172 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 240 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 273,274,276,278 Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 U. S. 257 135 Brooks - Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106 80 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 267 Brown v. Executors of Riggins, 3 Ga. 405 531 Browne v. Union Pacific R. Co., 267 U. S. 255 546 Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334 478 Bugbee v. Van Cleve, 99 N. J. Eq. 825 398 Bunsul v. American Surety Co., 308 Ill. 312 531 Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262 487 Burke v. Oregon, 279 U. S. 811 533 Burk-Waggoner Oil Assn. v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110 356 Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 493 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 426 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 523 Burnet v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 52 F. (2d) 123 307 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 9,91 Bums Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 30 Burtis, In re, 188 Fed. 527 496 Buzard v. Helvering, 64 App. D. C. 268 307 Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591 517 California Bank v. Richard- son, 248 U. S. 476 121,133 California-Calaveras Mining Co. v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285 160 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 444 xLiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Camp v. Boyd, 229 U. S. 530 242 Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87 544 Canajoharie National Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191 165 Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 266 Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238 533 Capital Endowment Co. v. Ohio, 296 U. S. 546 194 Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205 267 Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66 539 Carter v. Anderson, 4 Ga. 516 311 Carter v. Crews, 2 Port. 81 271 Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 121 Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N. H. 482 107 Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467 159 Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673 334,341 Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 217 Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 290 U. S. 264 73 Central R. Co. v. State Tax Dept., 112 N. J. L. 5 399 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman’s Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 162,337 Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 79 Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U. S. 53 241 Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540 211 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 47 Cheesman v. Cheesman, 236 N. Y. 47 529 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294 253 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 191 533 Page. Chester v. Life Assn., 4 Fed. 487 57 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574 515 Chipman v. Manufacturers’ National Bank, 156 Mass. 147 309 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 253,254 Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1 254 Choctaw Nation v. United States, 19 Ct. Cis. 243 251 Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U. S. 200 211 Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290 276,277 Citizens’ Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319 67 Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 538 Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 437,442 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 398,403 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 398 Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 268 Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 441 Clark Plastering Co. v. Sea- board Surety Co., 259 N. Y. 424 272 Clary, In re, 112 Cal. 292 311 Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 290 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lan- der, 184 U. S. Ill 116,124 Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461 239 Cockrill v. Cooper, 86 Fed. 7 240 Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50 493 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 276 Cole v. Driskell, 1 Blackf. 16 271 Colegrove, Matter of, 221 N. Y. 455 487 Coleman v. Tepel, 230 Fed. 63 162 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlv Page. Coleman-Gilbert Associates v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 191 347 Collins, Ex parte, 277 U. S. 565 548 Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71 274 Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283 U. S. 96 540 Commercial Trust Co. v. Müler, 262 U. S. 51 79 Commissioner v. Mell vaine, 78 F. (2d) 787 482 Commissioner v. New York Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 463 307 Commissioner v. Nichols & Cox Lumber Co., 65 F. (2d) 1009 307 Commissioner v. Stevens, 79 F. (2d) 490 88 Commissioner v. Strauss, 77 F. (2d) 401 87 Commonwealth v. Barnes Bros. Co., 5 Dauph. Co. Rep. 75 128 Commonwealth v. Eastern Securities Co., 309 Pa. 44 115 Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 156 Pa. 488 115,125 Commonwealth v. Hazelwood Savings & Trust Co., 271 Pa. 375 117 Commonwealth v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 162 Pa. 603 125 Commonwealth v. Merchants & Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 168 Pa. 309 124 Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 227 Pa. 163 124 Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 Pa. 308 115 Commonwealth v. Provident Trust Co., 40 Dauph. Co. Rep. 146 121 Commonwealth v. Reading Traction Co., 204 Pa. 151 161 Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray 451 25 Commonwealth v. Standard OU Co., 101 Pa. 119 115 Commonwealth v. Union TVwiOn oqvpo us 10/1 Page. Commonwealth v. Whipple, 181 Mass. 343 217 Compagnie Generale v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 1053 82,84 Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386 519 Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535 421,437,441 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 296 U. S. 535 546 Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 538 Continental Products Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 434 307 Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co., 82 Fed. 642 239 Continuous Extracting Corp. v. Eastern Cotton Oil Co., 264 Fed. 340 57 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 274,278 Cooke, In re Goods of, [1895] P. D. 68 309 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 265-267 Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582 45 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 429 Cosmopolitan Club v. Vir- ginia, 208 U. S. 378 515 Covell, Itb re Goods of, [1889] 15 P. D. 8 309 Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446 446 Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691 17 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 426,429,443 Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 446 Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223 350,352 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 111 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 18,286,287 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 445 xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23 131 Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 446 Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410 267 Curan v. Colbert, 3 Ga. 239 531 Curran v. St. Charles Car Co., 32 Fed. 835 57,58 Dallmann v. Dallmann, 159 Wis. 480 505 Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 236 U. S. 699 - 72 D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 275 Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390 420 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 336 Davis v. Las Ovas Co., 227 U. S. 80 158 Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 132 Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306 496 Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 338 Debs, In re, 158 U. S. 564 340 DeGuyer v. Banning, 167 U. S. 723 16 Delaware Tribe v. United States, 72 Ct. Cis. 483 251 Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 62 App. D. C. 327 284 Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11 273 Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 175 Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 116,124 De Sousa v. Crocker First Nat. Bank, 23 F. (2d) 118 58 Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 536, 537 Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 419 Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181 157,172,173 Diehl v. Miller, 56 Iowa 313 311 Page. Diversey v. Johnson, 93 Ill. 547 312 Doleman v. Levine, 295 U.S. 221 529 Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227 271 Domenech v. National City Bank, 294 U. S. 199 500 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243 16 Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618 18 Dorrance, In re, 115 N. J. Eq. 268 396 Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 13 N. J. Misc. Rep. 168 396 Dorrance’s Estate, 309 Pa. 151 397 Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 276 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 64,551, 552 Downey v. Kearney, 81 W. Va. 422 311 Druon v. Sullivan, 66 Vt. 609 72 Dubelbeiss v. West Hoboken, 82 N. J. L. 683 400 Duke v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 591 45 Duke v. National Surety Co., 130 Wash. 276 531 Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340 258 Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377 429,444,445 Dupuy v. Johns, 261 Pa. 40 125,128 Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446 515 East Boston Co. v. Common- wealth, 203 Mass. 68 25 Eastern Extension Tel. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 326 504 Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700 132 Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 124, 127, 294 Edwards v. Goode, 228 Fed. 664 530 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlvii Page. Eichelberger v. Mills Land & Water Co., 9 Cal. App. 628 26 Elberta Peach & Land Co. v. Chicago Bonding & S. Co., 279 Mo. 535 ' 531 Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178 349,351 Elkins v. First Nat. Bank, 43 F. (2d) 777 239 Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595 505,506 Empire Engineering Corp. v. Mack, 217 N. Y. 85 71 Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 68,462 Engel v. O’Malley, 219 U. S. 128 419 Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157 193,210,543,546 Equitable Surety Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 448 135 Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584 441 Erickson v. Erickson, 181 Minn. 421 7 Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App. Cas. 1218 157,172,173 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 267 Escher v. Woods, 281 U. S. 379 81 Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 403 Eureka Mining Co. v. Lively, 59 Wash. 550 163 Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361 193,210 Evans, In re, 253 Fed. 276 496 Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 494 Everglades Drainage Dist., Ex parte, 293 U. S. 521 548 Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Florida Ranch & D. Corp., 74 F. (2d) 914 548 Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 42 255 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1 273 33682°—36----iv Page. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elevated R. Co., 177 U. S. 51 477 Farnsworth v. Minnesota & Pacific R. Co., 92 U. S. 49 517,520 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 271,277,278 Federal. Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 518 Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266 518 Finletter v. Acetylene Light Co., 215 Pa. 86 162 Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 82,84 First National Bank v. Daw- son County, 66 Mont. 321 328 First National Bank v. Hahn, 197 Mo. App. 593 275 First National Bank v. Hartford, 273 U. S. 548 131 First National Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 289 U. S. 60 131 First National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416 339 First National Bank v. United States 76 F. (2d) 200 107 First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Helmholz, 198 Wis. 573 96 Fix v. Philadelphia Barge Co., 290 U. S. 530 76 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 299 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 349 Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 341 Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 Fed. 951 57 Ford v. United States, 116 U. S. 213 84 Forgeus v. Santa Cruz County, 24 Cal. App. 193 26 Forrest v. Jack, 294 U. S. 158 315 Fort Smith Light & T. Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U. S. 387 441 xlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 298,436,438,439,441 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 539 Frank v. Von Bayer, 236 N.Y. 473 166 Fraser v. Fraser, 149 Ill. App. 186 312 Frederickson v. Louisiana, 23 How. 445 544 Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U. S. 515 423 Fullerton v. Texas, 196 U. S. 192 535,546 Gaines v. Nicholson, 9 How. 356 550 Galion Iron Works v. Ohio Corrugated Culvert Co., 244 Fed. 427 73 Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U. S. 98 436 Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U. S. 16 276 Gasquet v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co., 57 Fed. 80 239,242 Gearhart v. Standard Steel Car Co., 223 Pa. 385 162 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 158,240 General Electric Co. v. Marvel Co., 287 U. S. 430 57 General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U. S. 261 240 General Electric Co. v. Marvel Co., 287 U. S. 430 241 General Investment Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228 272 Georgetown National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341 131 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 340,341 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 267 Gibbs v. Tax Board, 101 N. J. L. 371 400 Gill v. Waterhouse, 245 Fed. 75 529 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 522 Page. Gillet v. Moody, 3 N. Y. 479 159 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 267 Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657 444,445 Gittings v. Crawford, Taney’s Dec. 1 479 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 ' 444 Gluckstein v. Barnes, [1900] A. C. 240 157,172,173 Godchaux Co. v. Estopinal, 251 U. S. 179 535,536,537,538 Goldschmidt, In re Goods of, 78 L. T. (N. S.) 763 309 Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343 32 Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471 15,16 Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S. 186 _ 480 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 8 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 446 Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373 550 Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544 517 Grange National Bank v. Collman, 306 Pa. 200 161,175 Granger v. Harriman, 89 Minn. 303 108 Grayson v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 523 311 Greathouse, U. S. ex rel., v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352 73 Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp. 844 290 Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 242 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 517 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 385 Gregory v. Pike, 67 Fed. 837 59 Groce v. Field, 13 Ga. 24 311 Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 523 Guarantee T. & T. Co. v. Dilworth Coal Co., 235 Pa. 594 161 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlix Page. Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416 531 Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. v. Wenatchee Land Co., 122 Minn. 266 274 Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16 548 Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612 487 Haag v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 516 307 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 273 Haggerty v. Amory, 7 Allen 458 275 Hale v. Akers, 132 U. 8. 554 193 Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56 70 Hall v. Odber, 11 East. 118 271 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 446 Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414 89 Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 446 Hamilton Gas Light Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258 517 Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73 193 Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engi- neering Co., 84 Fed. 392 159 Hampton v. Phipps, 108 U. 8. 260 139 Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. 8.1 276 Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 18,22 Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. 8. 78 533 Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. 8.151 441 Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 478 Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U. S. 334 72 Hartford Accident Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207 242 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 490 534 Page. Haskell v. Haskell, 116 Minn. 10 7 Hawley v. Walker, 232 U. 8. 718 442 Hays v. The Georgian, Inc., 280 Mass. 10 172 Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill. App. 395 529 Hazlett v. Blakely’s Estate, 70 Neb. 613 310 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 70,73 Healy v. Root, 11 Pick. 389 272 Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573 17 Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. 8. 297 442 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. 8. 312 293 Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. 8. 144 351, 352, 355,356,358,361,368 Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 340 Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 185 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. 8. 312 42,92,441 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 437,438,448 Helson and Randolph v. Ken- tucky, 279 U. 8. 245 430,444 Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. 8. 144 108,111,356 Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552 551 Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. 8. 365 4,10 Helvering v. City Bank Farm- ers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 47, 94,96 Helvering v. Helmholz, 75 F. (2d) 245 88,99,101 Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U. S. 378 376, 377, 388, 389 Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 107,110 Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. 8. 214 127 Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. 8. 123 206,306 l TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 50,53,219 Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551 551,552 Helvering v. Stockholms En-skilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84 9 Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312 111 Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605 295 Henderson’s Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652 504 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 268 Henkel v. Cincinnati, 177 U. S. 170 535,546 Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U. S. 298 78,79,83 Hennessy v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438 72 Henningsen v. U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 208 U. S. 404 138,139 Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121 69 Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N. H. 321 274 Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480 128,130,131 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 534,538 Herrick v. Borst, 4 Hill 650 530 Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11 272 Heslop, In re Goods of, 1 Robertson’s Eccl. Rep. 457 309 Hibernia Savings Society v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310 131 Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169 538 Hicky v. Stall worth, 143 Ala. 535 311 Hihn (F. A.) Co. v. Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436 26 Hill v. Merchants’ Ins. Co., 134 U. S.515 • 540 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 296 Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 92 Page. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 444 Hollander v. Heaslip, 222 Fed. 808 242 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371 160 Holmes v. Conway, 241 U. S. 624 534 Holmes v. United States, 78 Fed. 513 84 Holmes v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75 157 Holshouser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248 272, 274 Home for Incurables v. New York City, 187 U. S. 155 535, 546 Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503 124 Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611 . 273 Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415 540 Horsy v. Daniell, 2 Lev. 161 271 Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 338 Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503 522 Hoyne, People ex rel., v. Grant, 283 Ill. 391 31 Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black 518 533 Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412 336 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349- 341 Huffman v. Hulbert, 13 Wend. 377 530 Humphrey v. Hitt, 6 Grat. 509 531 Humphrey v. Industrial Comm’n, 285 Ill. 372 286 Hunt v. Purdy, 82 N. Y. 486 530 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 273,279,280 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 444 Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543 266,267 Hyattsville Bldg. Assn. v. Bouic, 44 App. D. C. 408 403 Hyde v, Rogers, 59 Wis. 154 531 TABLE OF CASES CITED. li Page. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28 272 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 245 U. S. 493 335 Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376 135 Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 287 U. S. 573 538 Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522 522 Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238 265,266 Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 550 Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 268 Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U. S, 389 445 lowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 131,132 Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F. (2d) 121 165 Irving Trust Co. v. Perry Co., 293 U. S. 307 258 Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 9 Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616 240 Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586 165 Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 442 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 80 James & Co. v. Second Rus- sian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248 .274 Jenkins v. Loewenthal, 110 U. S. 222 193 Jenkins v. National Surety Co., 277 U. S. 258 137,138 Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1 538 Johnson v. Success Brick Co., 104 Miss. 217 ' 529 Johnson v. U. S. Shipping Board, 280 U. S. 320 84 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1 254 Jones & Laughlins v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913 239 Page. Julien v. Model B., L. & I. Assn., 116 Wis. 79 505 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 268 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46; 185 U. S. 125 340,.341 Kearney v. Tax Board, 103 N. J. L. 26 400 Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 139 Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U. S. 428 404, 518 Kemmler, In re, 136 U. S. 436 429,444,445 Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13 73 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. Si 411 276,277,278 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 162 Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626 536,537 Kerfoot v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 218 U. S. 281 339 Kern, In re, 8 F. Supp. 246 494 Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 147 520 Ke-Sun Oil Co. v. Hamilton, 61 F. (2d) 215 403 Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730 420,421 King v. Doane, 139 U. S. 166 32,165 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 445 Klein v. Board of Super-. visors, 282 U. S. 19 421 Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 45,46,47 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 478 Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257 210 Knight v. U. S. Land Assn., 142 U. S. 161 15,17,19, 21, 27 Knights Templars’ Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197 335 Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 2 Black 715 240 lu TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Krebs v. Oberrender, 274 Pa. 154 162 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365 267 Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531 509 Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549 522 Lathrop v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6 107 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276 420,437,441 Leathe v. Thomas, 97 Fed. 136 403 Leaver v. K. & L. Box & L. Co., 6 F. (2d) 666 58,59 Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 260 U. S. 653 241 Leman v. Krentier-Arnold Co., 284 U. S. 448 56 Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238 217, 218,221 Liberis v. Nee, 10 F. Supp. 336 290 Liberman’s Committee v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 527 308 Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U. S. 235 462 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 293 Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566 298 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 336,441,536 Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 296,338 Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 478 Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 295 Lit v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 551 88 Lloyd Investment Co. v. Schmidt, 66 F. (2d) 371 257 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S 234 496 Lockwood, In re, 154 U. S. 116 445 London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, App. Cas. 1892, 201 33 Page. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553 253,254,255 Long Beach Co. v. Richard- son, 70 Cal. 206 26 Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Ind. •60 505 Loos v. Wilkinson, 113 N. Y. 485 166 Lord v. Wilkinson, 56 Barb. 593 32 Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483 71 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 328,337,423,425,441 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230 534 Loveday, In re Goods of, [1900] P. D. 154 309 Lowry v. Silver City G. & S. Mining Co., 179 U. S. 196 534 Lunsford v. Nashville S. & L. Corp., 162 Tenn. 179 496 Lyman v. Brown, 2 Curtis 559 271 Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S. 52 534,545 Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 80 Macallen Co.v.Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 294 Mack v. Latta, 178 N. Y. 525 165 MacLaughlin v. Westmore- land Coal Co., 73 F. (2d) 1004 61 Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 544 Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 299,438,439,536 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283 544 Maguire v. Macomb, 293 Ill. 441 312 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 186 Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700 445 Mahoney v. Bernhard, 45 App. Div. 499 310 Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 258 Manigault v. Springs, 199 , U. S. 473 267 TABLE OF CASES CITED. liii Page. Mann v. Edinburgh Northern Tramways Co. [H. L.], 68 L. T. (N. S.) 96 162 Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U. S. 273 17 Manziano v. Public Service Gas Co., 92 N. J. L. 322 286 Mara v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 397 84 Marble v. Marble’s Estate, 304 Ill. 229 487 Martin, Matter of, 255 N. Y. 359 274 Martin, Matter of, 136 Misc. 51 274 Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 15 Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers Co., 203 Wis. 79 336 Martinson v. Martinson, 116 Minn. 128 7 Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9 274 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fonts, 11 F. (2d) 71 137 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 341 Matschke, In re, 193 Fed. 284 496 Matteson, State ex rel., v. Probate Court, 84 Minn. 389 311 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 69,72,73 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 436,446,544 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 444,446 Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 511 533 Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 Wall. 77 276 May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 45 Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 259 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 273 Mayor of Vidalia v. Mc- Neely, 274 U. S. 676 444 McCabe v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 550 72 McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140 339 Page. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 355 McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78 161 McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 . 45 McCoy v. Shaw, 277 U. S. 302 210,546 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 443 McDaniel v. Traylor, 212 U. S. 428 67 McElhenny’s Appeal, 61 Pa. 188 175 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 276 McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S.155 445 McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70 22 McGowan v. Parrish, 237 U. S. 285 242 McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co., 221 N. Y. 92 137 McHenry v. Hazard, 45 N. Y. 580 71 McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684 533 McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 230 276 McLean & Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38 268 McNair v. Howie, 123 S. C. 252 311 McNitt v Turner, 16 Wall. 352 276 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 444,445 Mechanics’ Savings Bank v. Waite, 150 Mass. 234 309 Medhurst v. The South American, 264 U. S. 587 629 Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138 126,130 Merchants’ Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 422 Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365 183,268 Liv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Merchants Heat & L. Co. v. Clow & Sons, 204 U. S. 286 242 Merchants National Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., 258 Mich. 526 31 Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486 271 Merrill & Baker, In re, 186 Fed. 312 259 Merry weather v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 407 479 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 127 Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 31 442 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 292 U. S. 620 441 Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152 441 Miles v. Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 147 U. S. 177 217 Miller v. Prudential Banking & Trust Co., 63 W. Va. 107 328 Miller v. Roberstson, 266 U. S. 243 80 Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478 517 Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535 445 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 442 Miller & Lux v. Secara, 193 Cal. 755 26 Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 91 Minnesota v. First National Bank, 273 U. S. 561 131 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 267,338 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 445 Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 183,338 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 339 Missouri Insurance Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 119,131 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 446 Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187 534 Page. Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479 16 Modawell v. Holmes, 40 Ala. 391 311 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 541 Moore v. Mausert, 49 N. Y. 332 505 Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18 275 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 274,275 Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 241,419 Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530 18 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose 289 U. S. 373 334,335 Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 266,267 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 363-374 Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119 139 M t. Sterling Improvement Co. v. Cockrell, 70 S. W. 842 531 Mulvane v. Sedgley, 63 Kan. 105 529 Municipal Council v. Bull [1909], 1 K. B. 7 274 Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 193,505 Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 355 Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 32 Musick v. Beebe, 17 Kan. 47 311,312 Mutual Bldg. & Savings Assn. v. Wilkinson, 8 F. (2d) 183 328 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Fed. 1 496 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147 403 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 419 National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 124 TABLE OF CASES CITED. lv Page. National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 33S National Bank v. Uptown State Bank, 273 Ill. App. 401 31 National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U. S. 331 231,458 National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 131 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 293 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 . 184 Nelson v. First National Bank, 69 Fed. 798 529 New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 650 84 Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761 . 17 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Morris Canal Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398 25 New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336 515 Newton, In re Goods of, 3 Curteis 428 309 New York v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 112 N. J. L. 536 278,279 New York v. Kleinert, 268 U. S. 646 536,537 New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 340,341 New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 128,439 New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 338 New York Electric Lines v. Empire City Subway, 235 U. S. 179 515,517 New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1 517 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U. S. 109 494 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 91,98 Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 298 Noell v. Nelson, 2 Saund. 226 310 Page. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 340 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 273 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 338 Northern Trust Co. v. McCoach, 215 Fed. 991 124 Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 242 Ill. App. 22 30,32 Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 26 Oakland v. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16 26 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 299 Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224 70 Ogle v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 338 113 O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 185,441 Oklahoma Cotton Ginners’ Assn. v. State, 174 Okla. 243 458 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290 458 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 9,64 Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206 156-173 Oldfield v. Cobbett, 4 L. J. (N. S.) (Chan.) 271 309 Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386 273 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 446 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 444 Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557 446 Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 446 Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437 540 Otey v. Carmel Sanitary District, 219 Cal. 310 26 Ouachita River Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444 266, 267 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 446 Lvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 127 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196 518 Pacific Whaling Co. v. Packers’ Assn., 138 Cal. 632 26 Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 436 Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661 22 Packer Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105 184 Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559 266 Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 265,266,267 Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423 266 Paff v. Kinney, 1 Bradf. 1 310 Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 530 Paine v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 342 Ill. 342 31 Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118 478 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 186 Parmenter v. Fitzpatrick, 135 N. Y. 190 158 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 444 Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345 268 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 429 Pearse v. National Lead Co., 162 App. Div. 766 310 Peck v. Elliott, 79 Fed. 10 238,242 Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612 478 Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 448 Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 266 Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 477,480 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 275 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 340,341 Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 69,480 People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269 339 Page. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 26 People v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 316 Ill. 452 505 People v. Rardin, 171 Ill. App. 226 312 People v. Vandewater, 250 N. Y. 83 298 People ex rel. Hoyne v. Grant, 283 Ill. 391 31 People, Matter of (First Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 415 475 People, Matter of (Moscow Fire Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 433 472 People, Matter of (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148 476 People, Matter of (Northern Ins. Co.), 262 N. Y. 453: 255 N. Y. 433 474 People, Matter of (Russian Reinsurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 415 472,476 Peoples v. Peoples Bros., 254 Fed. 489 137 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 303 Phillips v. Dime Trust & S. D. Co., 284 U. S. 160 46 Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 80 Petrie v. Nampa Irrigation Dist., 248 U. S. 154 193,210 Petters & Co., State ex rel., v. District Court, 76 Mont. .143 311 Pinellas Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462 377,384,389,393 Pingrey v. National Life Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374 217 Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. Mc- Millin, 119 N.Y. 46 159 Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. Heiner, 56 F. (2d) 1072 307 Pittsburg Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307 160 Plaquemines Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 479 TABLE OF CASES CITED. LVII Page. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 445 Polk v. Wendall, 9 Cranch 87 18 Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 15,16,18 Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 173 U. S. 573 238 Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 89 Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 518 Porter v. Wilson, 239 U. S. 170 446 Portland Wood Pipe Co. v. Slick Bros. Construction Co., 222 Fed. 528 243 Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R. Co., 255 U. S. 56 22 Porto Rico v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 227 U. S. 382 530 Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 267 Powell v. Leicester Mills, 92 Fed. 115 58 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 442 Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227 138,139 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 404 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 444,445 Price v. United States, 2*69 U.S. 492 271 Price v. United States, 174 U. S. 373 250 Prince v. Nicholson, 5 Taunt. 665 271 Proctor v. Dicklow, 57 Kan. 119 311 Provost v. United States, 269 U. S. 443 62 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530 446 Public National Bank, Ex parte, 278 U. S. 101 548 Public Service Comm’n v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 130 185,541 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476 519 Page. Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619 541 Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158 268 Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 443 Quarles and Butler, In re, 158 U. S. 532 429 Queen of Holland v. Drukker [1928], Ch. 877 274 Quick v. Campbell, 44 S. C. 386 311 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 437, 438, 443 Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359 517 Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456 444 Randall v. Randall, 181 Minn. 18 7 Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533 166 Raphael v. Bank of England (1855), 33 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 276 32 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 439 Red “C” Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380 268 Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. 8. 596 504,505 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 278 U. S. 339 42-50,87,98 Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 91 Reizer v. Mertz, 223 Ill. 555 312 Revere Copper Co. v. Dimock, 90 N. Y. 33 276 Richards v. Perkins, 8 L. J. (N. S.) (Ex. Eq.) 57 309 Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218 403,478 Riggin v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549 258 Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 378 69 Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 479 Roberts v. Messinger, 134 Pa. 298 107 Robeson v. Roberts, 20 Ind. 155 531 LVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Robinson v. Robinson, 214 Ill. App. 262 312 Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 277 Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191 537,553 Roebling’s Estate, 91 N. J. Eq. 72 399 Rogers v. Frank, 1 Y. & J. 409 309 Rollestone v. National Bank of Commerce, 299 Mo. 57 487 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114 535,536,537,538 Rooney, In re Estate of, 163 Mo. App. 389 311 Rorick v. Everglades Drain- age Dist., 27 F. (2d) 377 548 Rosen v. Ward, 96 App. Div. 262 310 Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260 446 Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 293 U. S. 102 131 Royal Indemnity Co. v. Northern Ohio Granite & S. Co., 100 Ohio St. 373 531 Royal Manufacturing Co. v. Rahway, 75 N. J. L. 416 400 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 422; 423,441 Ruggles v. Simonton, 20 Fed. Cas. 12, 120 403 Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 158 U. S. 253 17 Russell v. Smyth, 9 M. & W-. 810 271 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 80 St. Louis, K. & S. E. R. Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 346 185 St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Shepherd, 240 U. S. 240 535-538 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Becker, 76 F. (2d) 851 45 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufac- turers’ Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 233 Salomon v. Tax Comm’n, 278 U. S. 484 443 Page. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 47 Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288 267 San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656 15, 20 Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 183,268,335,368 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 186 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163 250 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 92,423 School District v. Hunnicut, 283 U. S. 810 548 Schuler v. Schuler, 209 Ill. 522 272 Schweitzer v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 702 4 Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 82 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477 535,546 Seabury v. Green, 294 U. S. 165 311,315 Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 311,315 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 427 Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112 446 Senate Club v. Viley, 12 F. Supp. 982 290 Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 119 Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75 7 Seymour v. McKinstry, 106 N. Y. 230 165 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 448 Shaw, In re Estate of [1905], P. D. 92 309 Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557 32 Shehan v. Hampton, 8 Ala. 942 530 Sheldon H. B. Co. v. Eicke-meyer H. B. M. Co., 90 N. Y. 607 162 TABLE OF CASES CITED. LIX Page. Shenandoah National Bank v. Ayres, 87 Iowa 526 530 Shipley’s (Mary) Case, 4 Coke, Pt. 8, p. 408 310 Shively v.Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 15,16,21,22 Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529 308 Sielcken-Schwarz v. Ameri- can Factors, 60 F. (2d) 43 80 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 441 Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439 276 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Process Co., 289 U. S. 689 158 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 438 Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 299,517 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 276 Slaker v. O’Connor, 278 U. S. 188 537 Slaughter House Case, 1 Woods 21 428 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 184,429,430,443,445 Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 532 Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 18 Smith, Matter of, 95 N. Y. 516 158 Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274 395 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 69 Smyth v. Asphalt Belt Ry. Co., 267 U. S. 326 78 Snow v. Yarboroughs’ Ad- ministrator, 26 Ala. 417 530 Snyder v. Snyder, 280 Ill. 467 487 Society for Propagation v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480 • 519 Society of Knowledge v. Abbott, 2 Beav. 559 162 South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433 540 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 186 Page. South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Munoz, 28 F. (2d) 820 512,514 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114 437 Spangler Brewing Co. v. McHenry, 242 Pa. 522 162,175 Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Arma Engineering Co., 271 U. S. 232 78 Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 548 Sprigg v. Bank of Mt. Pleas- ant, 14 Pet. 201 530 Springer v. Toothaker, 43 Me. 381 531 Springfield National Bank v. American Surety Co., 7 F. (2d) 44 137 Stallings v. Conn, 74 F. (2d) 189 56 Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Scottish Metropolitan Assur. Co., 283 U. S. 284 532 Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582 441 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 546 Stansell, In re, 8 F. (2d) 363 496 Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103 355 Starr v. Willoughby, 218 Ill. 485 312 State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59 423 State v. Justices, 1 N. J. L. 244 400 State Bank v. Edwards, 20 Ala. 512 531 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 422 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204 266 Steamship Co. v. Portward- ens, 6 Wall. 31 265, 266 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 441 Steckler, Ex parte, 292 U. S. 610 194 Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 239 Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531 271 lx TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 79 Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240 17 Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 57 436 Stotts, State ex rel., v. Ken-rick, 159 Mo. 631 311 Strand Improvement Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765 26 Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10 540 Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 530 69 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 540 Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182 553 Sullivan v. Dwyer, 42 S. W. 355 530 Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 368 368,373 Sweet v. Lang, 14 F. (2d) 758 159 Swiss Oil Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407 441 Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470 91 Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438 500 Tappan v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490 422 Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173 271 Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583 478 Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 272 Ter rett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 515 Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11 26 Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 395 188 Thomas, Estate of, [1912] P. D. 177 309 Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71 337 Thompson v. United States, 246 U. S. 547 89 Thompson v. Watson, 10 Yerg. 362 530 Page. Thorn Wire Co. v. Washburn & Moen Co., 159 U. S. 423 254 Tüt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43 275 Timken Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 274 U. S. 181 79 Tirrell v. Johnston, 293 U. S. 533 539 Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 67 Fed. 168 56,57 Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454 517 Tompkins v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Md. 560 174 Tracey Elliott v. Earl of Morley, Ch. Div. 51 Sol. Jour. (1907), 51 25 Transportation Co. v. Park- ersburg, 107 U. S. 691 266,267 Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 184 Fed. 426 529 Travellers’ Ins. Co. v. Con- necticut, 185 U. S. 364 420,434 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 425,434 Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp. v. Tax Board, 92 N. J. L. 398 400 Tretolite Co. v. Darby Petro- leum Corp., 5 F. Supp. 445 58 Trinityfarm Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 127 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 132 Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38 181,182,185 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 429,444,446 Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 46 Union Land & Stock Co. v. United States, 257 Fed. 635 520 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Har- ris, 215 U. S. 386 17 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Lara- mie Stock Yards, 231 U. S. 190 308 Union Savings & Inv. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 44 Utah 397 328 TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxi Page. Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412 273 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 278 U. S. 322 458 United States v. Arthover (D. C., N. D. Tex., unreported) 290 United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 282 U. S. 522 34,36 United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315 340 United States v. Boston & Maine R. R., 279 U. S. 732 . 9,64 United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S. 355; 148 U. S. 31 247 United States v. Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U. S. 55 328,329 United States v. Carter, 231 U. S. 492 192,452 United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250 271 United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 294 United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1 253 United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546 504 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 192,452 United States v. Collins, 25 Fed. Cas. 14,834 403 United States v. Columbia Fruit Products Co., 10 F. Supp. 873 290 United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 300 United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472 17,21 United, States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 249,253 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 429,430 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 335 United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41 338 Page. United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297 194 United States, Ex parte, 287 U. S. 241 547 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 544 United States v. Hall, Fed. Cas. No. 15,282 427 United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188 452 United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49 22 United States v. Jones, 131 U. S.1 84 United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 254 United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 192 United States v. LaFranca, 282 U. S. 568 294 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 293 United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 80 United States v. Mahoning Coal R. Co., 51 F. (2d) 208 9 United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498 253 United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 599 192 United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391 15 United States v. Moist, 231 U. S. 701 192,452 United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 452 United States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73 137 United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321 293,294 United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587 23 United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 282 U. S. 30 208,210 United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446 254 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 544 United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 486 LXII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. United States v. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 192 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477 293 United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190 194 United States v. Storrs, 272 U. S. 652 452 United States v. The Nancy, 3 Wash. C. C. 281 502 United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88 503 United States v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 1 242 United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 22 United States v. Ward well, 172 U. S. 48 84 United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102 51,91 United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281 429 United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 192,293 U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234 Fed. 868 58 U. S. ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352 73 U. S. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Pensacola, 263 Fed. 344 530 U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Martin, 143 Ky. 241 311 U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Poetker, 180 Ind. 255 531 U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 448 U. S. Trust Co. v. Chicago Terminal T. R. Co., 188 Fed. 292 57 U. S. Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 481 489 Urban Properties Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 654 257 Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U. S. 106 534 Utterson v. Mair, 2 Ves. Jr. 95 309 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 116,124 Page. Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 N. Y. 167 487 Vandever’s Appeal, 42 Pa. 74 311 Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 151 Ore. 455 186 Veiga, In re Goods of, 3 S. & T. 13 309 Venables v. Baring Bros. & Co. (1892), 3 Ch. Div. 527 33 Vennilye & Co. v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. 138 32 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U. S. 252 242 Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 38,188 Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 288 U. S. 162 287 Von Bruning v. Sutherland, 58 App. D. C. 258 83 Von Ette’s Case, 223 Mass. 56 286 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 540 Vowinckel v. Sutherland, 24 F. (2d) 196 77 Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 478 Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 448 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 444,445 Wallace v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 1002 45 Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370 67 Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 17 121 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 429,431 Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365 26 Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 651 240 Warner Collieries Co. v. United States, 63 F. (2d) 34 307 Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458 7 Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo S. A., 293 U. S. 610 629 Washington Investment Assn. v. Stanley, 38 Ore. 319 328 TABLE OF CASES CITED lxiii Page. Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Chapman, 62 App. D. C. 140 528 Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Co., 215 U. S. 33 478 Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122 420 Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U. S. 589 446 Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57 15 Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507 218 Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437 276 Wehrman v. Conkling, 155 U. S. 314 550 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 403 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 426 West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 445 Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 446 Western Union v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406 446 Western Union v. United States & M. T. Co., 221 Fed. 545 57 Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256 334 Westman’s Case, 118 Me. 133 286 Weyer v. Watt, 48 Ohio St. 545 311 Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55 254 White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36 238 White v. Poor, 75 F. (2d) 35 88 White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545 308 Wichita Railroad & L. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 260 U. S. 48 186 Wiegand v. Lewis Lumber & Mfg. Co., 158 Fed. 608 161 Wilbur v. Vindicator Gold Mining Co., 284 U. S. 231 89 Willamette Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1 267 Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557 72 Page. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 127,539 Willets v. Haines, 96 App. Div. 5 310 Williams, Ex parte, 277 U. S. 267 404 Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304 540 Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 419,429,445-449 Williams v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 176 73 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551 306 Willis v. Farley, 24 Cal. 490 311 Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 267 Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60 446 Winfree v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 227 U. S. 296 308 Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265 271,273,278 Wiseman (John), Estate of, 12 Phila. 11 311 Wood v. Corry Water-Works Co., 44 Fed. 146 175 Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80 530 Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342 504 Woodmen of the World v. O’Neill, 266 U. S. 292 67,68,72 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 434 Worcester National Bank, Ex parte, 279 U. S. 347 334 Wright, In re, 157 Fed. 544 496 Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488 18 Wright v. Seymour, 69 Cal. 122 26 Wurster v. Albrecht, 237 Ill. App. 284 530 Wyeth v. Crooks, 33 F. (2d) 1018 221 Wyoming Valley Ice Co., In re, 153 Fed. 787 161,162 Lxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page. Yeiser v. U. S. Board & Paper Co., 107 Fed. 340 157,172 Yetter v. Delaware Valley R. Co., 206 Pa. 485 175 Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 272 Page. Young v. Stevenson, 180 111. 608 174 Youtsey v. Hoffman, 108 Fed. 693 239 Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174 553 TABLE OF STATUTES Cited in Opinions (A) Statutes of the United States. Page. 1790, May 26, c. 11, 1 Stat. 122...... 273 1851, Mar. 3, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631................... 19 1864, Mar. 25, c. 41, 13 Stat. 37 ................... 246 1864, June 3, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99....................333 1864, July Ì,* c.’ 194* 13 Stat. 332................... 19 1864, July 2, c. 213, 13 Stat. 355.................. 247 1874, June’18,’c.’305,’ 18 Stat. 80 .................. 247 1881, Mar. 3, c. 139, 21 Stat. 504.................. 251 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 19a, 24 Stat. 379 ......... 37 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 20, 24 Stat. 379.......... 35 1889, Mar. 2, c. 377, 25 Stat. 850 ................. 247 1894, Aug. 13, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278 . 135 1898, July 1, c.*541,* § Ì (lì), , 30 Stat. 544......... 256 1898, July 1, c. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544............ 492 1898, July 1, c. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544 ........... 256 1898, July 1, c. 541, § 63, 30 Stat. 544 ........... 257 1898, July 1, c. 541, § 63 (a), 30 Stat. 544.......... 258 1898, July 1, c. 541, § 70 (a), 30 Stat. 544.......... 492, 493,494,496 1900, Apr. 12, c. 191, §§ 18, 32, 31 Stat. 77...... 509 Page. 1900, May 1, § 3, 31 Stat. 716,.................... 509 1905, Feb. 24, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811..................... 135 1906, June 21, c. 3504, 34 Stat. 325............... 247 1908, Apr. 30, c. 153, 35 Stat. 70 ................ 248, 252 1909, Aug. 5, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11..................... 349 1911, Mar. 3, c. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167.............. 135 1913, Oct. 3, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 ............... 349 1913, Oct. 22, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208 ..................... 34 1913, Dec. 23, c. 6, § 8, 38 Stat. 251............... 334 1913, Dec. 23, c. 6, § 25, 38 Stat. 251......... 498-506 1916, Aug. 11, c. 313, Part C, 39 Stat. 486....... 196, 198 1916, Aug. 11, c. 313, Part C, § 29, 39 Stat. 486.... 197 1916, Aug. 29, c. 416, § 5, 39 Stat. 545.......... 501, 506 1916, Aug. 29, c. 416, §§ 6, 31, 39 Stat. 545............ 501 1916, Aug. 31, c. 426, § 2, 39 Stat. 673............... 183 1916, Sept. 7, c. 461, § 25, 39 Stat. 752.... 498, 501, 502 1916, Sept. 8, c. 463, § 407, 39 Stat. 756............... 351 1917, Mar. 2, c. 145, §§ 34, 37, 38, 39, 39 Stat.951. 510 1917, Oct. 3, c. 63, § 200, 40 Stat. 300............... 349 LXV LXVI TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page. 1917, Oct. 6, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398 ................. 494 1918, Nov. 4, c. 201, § 7 (c), 40 Stat. 1020 ...... 75-84 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057............ 349 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 202 (b), 40 Stat. 1057......... 380 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. 1057..... 216, 219 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 1000 (a), 40 Stat. 1057.... 351 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, §§ 1001 (12), 1005, 40 Stat. 1057 ................. 291 19'20, Feb. 11, c. 68, 41 Stat. 404 .................. 251 1920, May 26, c. 203, 41 Stat. 623 ................. 245 1920, June 3, c. 222, 41 Stat. 738 .................. 251 1921, Mar. 3, c. 120, § 5, 41 Stat. 1250............ 523 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 2 (2), 42 Stat. 227......... 349 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 202 (c), (c) (2), 42 Stat. 227................... 380 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 206 (a) (6), 42 Stat. 227.. 107 1921, Nov. 23, c, 136 § 402 (c), 42 Stat. 227...... 88 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, §§ 1001, 1004, 42 Stat. 227.... 291 1923, Feb. 23, c. 106, 42 Stat. 1282............ 196,198 1923, Mar. 4, c. 252, 42 Stat. 1454.................. 334 1923, Mar. 4, c. 285, § 9 (a), 42 Stat. 1511...... 75-84 1924, Mar. 19, c. 70, 43 Stat. 27 ................... 251 1924, May 20^ c. 162,’ 43 Stat. 133........'.......... 251 1924, May 24, c. 181, 43 Stat. 139................... 251 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 2 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 253..... 349 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 112 (i) (1) (A), (B), 43 Stat. 253 ........ 383-384 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (a), 43 Stat. 253..... 381 Page. 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (b) (2), 43 Stat. 253 381,388 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (b) (3), (4), 43 Stat. 253 .................. 381 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (e) (1), (2), 43 Stat. 253................... 382 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (h) (1) (A), 43 Stat. 253................... 389 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 203 (h) (1), (2), 43 Stat. 253................... 382 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 204 (a) (5), 43 Stat. 253.. 109 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 219, 43 Stat. 253......... 348 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 301 (a), 43 Stat. 253...... 41 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 302 (c) , 43 Stat. 253... 41,46 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 302 (d) , 43 Stat. 253.... 46 1924, June 2, c. 234, §§ 701, 704, 43 Stat. 253..... 291 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 801 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 253. 349 1924, June 4, c. 249, 43 Stat. 366 .................. 251 1924, June 7, c. 300, 43 Stat. 537................... 251 1924, June 7, c. 335, 43 Stat. 644 .................. 251 1925, Feb. 7, c. 148, 43 Stat. 812.................... 251 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936 . 332,538-540,543-545 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, § 8 (a), 43 Stat. 936......... 629 1925, Mar. 3, c. 459, 43 Stat. 1133 ........... 251 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 2, 44 Stat. 9................. 9 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 2 (a) (2), 44 Stat. 9... 349,363 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 203 (h) (1) (A), 44 Stat. 9... 384 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 203, 44 Stat. 9 .......... 375,383 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. lxvii Page. 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 203 (h) (1) (A), (B), 44 Stat. 9.....................377 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 204 (a) (5), 44 Stat. 9...... 109 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 213, 44 Stat. 9................ 9 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 219, 44 Stat. 9 ..... 4,9,348,363 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 219 (g) , 44 Stat. 9..... 88 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 219 (h) , 44 Stat. 9..... 10 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 274, . 44 Stat. 9 ....... 303,306 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 280, 44 Stat. 9 ...... 303,305 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 280 (a) (1) , 44 Stat. 9.....305 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 280 (b) (2) , 44 Stat. 9... 304,306 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 281 (b), 44 Stat. 9.... 305,308,309 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 286, 44 Stat. 9...............308 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 302 (c), 44 Stat. 9..... 50,51,101 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 302 (d), 44 Stat. 9. 86,94,101 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 302 (g), 44 Stat. 9.......221 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 701, 44 Stat. 9 ......... 288,300 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 800 (A) (2), (3), 44 Stat. 9.. 61 1926, May 14, c. 300, 44 Stat. 555.................. 251 1926, July 2, c. 724, 44 Stat. 801 251 1926, July 3, c.* 734, 44 Stat. 807 ................. 251 1927, Mar. 2, c. 250, 44 Stat. 1263................. 251 1927, Mar. 3, c. 302, 44 Stat. 1349 ................ 251 1927, Mar. 3, c. 314, 44 Stat. 1358................. 251 1927, Mar. 4, c. 503, § 6, 44 Stat. 1418........... 510 1927, Mar. 4, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424................. 527 Page. 1927, Mar. 4, e. 509, §§ 3 (b), 20 (d), 44 Stat. 1424.. 281 1928, Apr. 17, c. 612, 45 Stat. 600................... 527 1928, May 17, c. 612, 45 Stat. 600,................... 282 1928, May 21, c. 664, 45 Stat. 685.................... 182 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 22, 45 Stat. 791................ 9 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 101, 45 Stat. 791........... 105 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 101 (a) (8), 45 Stat. 791. 106 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 101 (c) (8), 45 Stat. 791 110-112 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 112, 45 Stat. 791........... 383 1928, May 29, c. 852, §§ 112 (b) (4), 112 (i) (1), 45 Stat. 791........... 392 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 112 (i) (1) (A), 45 Stat. 791 379,384,390 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 112 (i) (2) , 45 Stat. 791.... 392 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 113 (a) (5), 45 Stat. 791 106, 109 1928, May 29, c. 852, §§ 161, 162, 45 Stat. 791.......4,9 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 167, 45 Stat. 791..........4,10 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 701 (a) (2), 45 Stat. 791.. 349 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 704, 45 Stat. 791........... 356 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 704 (a), 45 Stat. 791...... 361 1930, June 17, c. 497, § 337 (c) , 46 Stat. 590 ... 576 1931, Mar. 2, c. 366, 46 Stat. 1463 .................. 196 1931, Mar. 2, c. 366, 46 Stat. 1463, 1466............. 197 1932, June 6, c. 209, § 112, 47 Stat. 169 .......... 383 1932, June 6, c. 209, § 1111 (a) (2), 47 Stat. 169.. 349 1932, July 22, c. 522, 47 Stat. 725 ................... 331 LXVIII TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page. 1933, June 13, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128.............. 329, 331 1933, June 13, c. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 128.............. 330 1933, June 13, c. 64, § 5 (i), 48 Stat. 128....... 330,335 1934, Apr. 27, c. 168, 48 Stat. 643 ............. 330, 331 1934, May 14, c. 283, 48 Stat. 775.................... 457 1934, June 7, c. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 .................. 331 1935, May 28, c. 150, 49 Stat. 293, 297 ........ 330, 331 1935, Aug. 30, c. 829, 49 Stat. 1014....................291 Constitution. See Index at end of volume. Criminal Code. § 215......................451 Judicial Code. § 24 ................ 69, 270 § 24 (1).................. 479 §48........................ 56 § 51............ 236, 238, 240 § 128 (a)................. 511 §237...................... 479 § 237 (a)......... 262, 332 538, 539, 543, 544 § 237 (c)..... 538, 543, 544 §238 ............... 540, 545 §239...................... 269 § 265........... 395, 397, 403 § 266 .......... 404, 540, 548 §267....................... 69 Revised Statutes. §§ 453, 2257, 2259, 2395- 2398, 2478.............. 17 § 3244 ... 289, 292, 293, 295 §3477.............. 140 §5154................ 334 § 5219 .......... 121-123, 130, 133, 499, 500 U. S. Code. Title 7, Page. §§241-273 .... 196 § 259 197, 199 §§ 260, 269.... .... 197 § 270 190, 197, 199 Title 11, §§ 1 (11), 35... .... 256 § 103 .... 257 Title 12, §§35,342 .... 334r §548 .... 499 § 1281 .... 334 § 1464 .... 330 § 1464 (c) .... 329 Title 15, §§ 1, 2, 14, 15.. 460 Title 18, §338 .... 451 §682 191 , 192, 452 Title 19, § 1337 (c). .... 576 Title 26, §§ 600, 601, 619... 306 §931 .... 308 § 1394 .... 289 Title 28, §31 .... 270 §41 .. 69, 479 §41 (20) .... 84r § U2 .236, 240 §225 (a) (4).. .... 511 §344 .... 479 § 344 (a) .... 262 §346 .... 269 § 350 .... 629 § 380 .... 457 §384 .... 69 § 687 .... 273 Title 33, §§903 (b),920 (d). 281, 284 §921 (b) .... 283 Title 40, § 270 . 135, 137 Title 43, §§ 2, 751-753 1201................ 17 U. S. Code Appendix. Title 26, § 1069 ... 303, 305 (B) Statutes of the States and Territories Alabama. 1923 Acts, No. 303...... 263 1927 Acts, No. 303 ... 263 1928 Code, § 5962..... 311 California. 1911 Stats., c. 656, p. 1256.................. 12, 25 1917 Stats., p. 159.......12, 25 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. LXIX Page. California—Continued. 1933 Probate Code, § 1066................... 311 District of Columbia. Workmen’s Compensation Act, §§ 3 (b), 20 (d)... 284 § 21 (b)............283 §32................ 531 §§ 32 (a), 33 (a), (f), 35, 36....... 528 Georgia. 1933 Code, § 113-2302.. 311 Illinois. 1870 Constitution, Art. VI, § 11.............. 31 1872 Laws, pp. 77, 88, §40.....................314 1872 Laws, pp. 77, 92, §59.................... 313 1872 Laws, pp. 77, 105, 106, §112.............313 1919 Laws, pp. 1, 2, 3... 313 1931 Laws, p. 6........313 1933 Laws, pp. 3, 6....313 1933, Cahill’s Rev. Stats. c. 37, par. 49........ 31 1935 Rev. Stats., c. 3, §41.....................314 1935 Rev. Stats., c. 3, §§ 60, 114............313 Negotiable Instrument Act, §§ 52, 56........ 29 Iowa. 1931, Code, § 12052.... 311 Kansas. 1923 Rev. Stats., § 22- 931...................311 Michigan. 1929 Comp. Laws, § 11957 ............... 334 Minnesota. 1903 Acts, c. 195.......311 1927, Mason’s Stats., §§ 1927, Mason’s Stats., § 8603 ................ 7 1927, Mason’s Stats., vol. 1, § 8886........ 311 Montana. 1921 Rev. Code, §§ 10311, 10331 ............. 311 New York. Page. 1932 Laws, c. 333.... 272 Consolidated Laws, c. 28, § 63 ................ 476 McKinney’s C o n s o 1 i- dated Laws, § 137.... 334 New Jersey. 1900 Laws, § 7, p. 247... 402 1900 Laws, c. 148, p. 347 . 399 1902 Laws, c. 158, § 44, pp. 524, 525......... 399 1903 Certiorari Act...400 1909 Acts, Act of Apr. 20, c. 228............... 395 1909 Laws, §§ 20, 21.... 399 1910 Comp. Stats., vol. 2, p. 2208, § 2......... 396 1910 Comp. Stats., vol. 2, p. 2243 ............. 400 1924 Cum. Supp., vol. 2, p. 2818, § 163-301.... 396 1931 Laws, c. 303, § 18, pp. 763, 764......... 398 1931 Laws, §§ 21, 22, pp. 764, 765 ............ 399 1931 Laws, c. 336, p. 823 . 398 Oklahoma. Constitution, Art. IX, §§ 20,23,36 ............ 457 1913 Laws, c. 93, § 5.... 458 1916 Laws, c. 40....... 522 1933 Laws, c. 132.... 522 Oregon. 1930 Code, §§ 18-2902, 18-2903 ............. 178 1931 Laws, c. 136.... 178 1933 Laws, c. 225.... 178 Pennsylvania. Constitution, Art. XVI, §7..................... 161 1876 Acts, Act of Apr. 17, P. L. 30, 32, § 4.... 161 1897 Laws, Act of July 15, P. L. 292........ 121 1907 Laws, Act No. 512, p. 640............... 115 1923 Laws, Act of July 11, P. L. 1071, 1072 116, 125 1927 Laws, Act of May 7, P. L. 853, 855.. 116, 125 LXX TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Pennsylvania—Continued. Page. 1929 Laws, Act of Apr. 9, P. L. 343, §§ 807, 1705.............. 116 1929 Laws, Act of Apr. 25, P. L. 673... 116, 125 1929 Laws, Act of Apr. 25, P. L. 675....... 125 1929 Laws, Act of Apr. 25, P. L. 677...:.... 121 Purdon’s Stats., Title 7, c. 14................334 Purdon’s Stats., Title 15, § 131............... 161 Purdon’s Stats., Title 72, §1871................. 126 Purdon’s Stats., Title 72, § 1892.............. 125 Purdon’s Stats., vol. 20, §911.................. 311 Puerto Rico. Page. 1917 Acts, Act No. 70.. 517 1917 Acts, Act No. 70, §§ 54, 60, 68, 78, 79-82, 83, 85, 86, 90 94.. 511 1917 Acts, Act No. 70, § 60.................. 516 Civil Code, §§ 341, 343, 344 .................. 515 South Carolina. 1932 Code, § 9024..... 311 Tennessee. 1932 Code, §§ 8456, 8458 493, 496 Vermont. 1933 Pub. Laws, c. 39, §§ 872, 873 ............ 416 1933 Pub. Laws, c. 40, §§ 887, 888 ........ 417, 419 Wisconsin. 1933 Stats., c. 215, §§ 215.01, et seq.... 328, 329 1933 Stats., § 221.21.... 334 (C) Treaties. 1827, July 4, 8 Stat. 346 (Sweden and Norway)... 568 1848, Feb. 2, 9 Stat. 922 (Guadalupe Hidalgo-Mexico) ............ 15 1855, June 22, 11 Stat. 611 (Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians).............. 251 1864, Oct. 14, 16 Stat. 708 (Klamath and Moadoc Indians)............. 247 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1935. DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. No. 1. Argued October 14, 1935.—Decided November 11, 1935. 1. Payments to a divorced wife under a decree for alimony are not regarded as income of the wife but as paid in discharge of the general obligation to support, which is made specific by the decree. P. 8. 2. In a decree of divorce and for alimony, a Minnesota court adopted a provision agreed to by the parties on the eve of the- action, whereby securities were conveyed by the husband to a trustee from the income of which the wife, during her lifetime, was to receive annual payments “ in lieu of, and in full settlement of alimony, and of any and all dower rights or statutory interests in the estate ” of her husband, and “ in lieu of any and all claims for separate maintenance and allowance for her support.” The decree adjudged that the husband provide and create the trust fund as set out in the agreement, and that the wife have the provision made in the agreement “ in lieu of all other alimony or interest in the property or estate ” of her husband. Held: (1) That, by the law of Minnesota, the State court was not bound by the trust agreement but had full authority to make the allowance to the wife out of the husband’s property and to set up a trust to give effect to the allowance;-and, by adopting the terms of the trust agreement, it made them its own. P. 6. 33682°—36-1 1 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Counsel for Parties. 296 U. S. (2) That the provision for annual payments adopted in the decree became an award of alimony, imposing upon the husband, in fulfilment of his statutory duty, the obligation of devoting the income, through the medium of the trust, to the use of the divorced wife. P. 8. (3) That the income from the trust was not income of the wife but income taxable to the husband under Revenue Acts 1926, § 213, and 1928, § 22, defining gross income. P. 9. 3. Section 213, Revenue Act 1926, and § 22, Revenue Act 1928, defining gross income, are to be construed in the light of the evident intent of Congress to make full use of its power to tax income. P. 9. 4. The provisions of § 219, Revenue Act 1926, and §§ 161, 162, Revenue Act 1928, as to taxation of trusts, fiduciaries and beneficiaries, refer to cases where the income of the trust is no longer to be regarded as that of the settlor, and were not intended to apply to cases where such income would otherwise remain, by virtue of the nature and purpose of the trust, attributable to the creator of the trust and accordingly taxable to him. P. 9. 5. Section 219 (h), Revenue Act 1926, and § 167, Revenue Act 1928, define instances in which the grantor remains taxable, as in case of certain reservations for his benefit or provisions for the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on his life, but are not to be regarded as excluding instances, not specified, where in contemplation of law the income remains in substance that of the grantor. P. 10. 73 F. (2d) 130, affirmed. Certiorari, 295 U. S. 722, to review a judgment reversing one for the present petitioner in the District Court in a suit to recover moneys paid under protest as income tax. Mr. Leland W. Scott, with whom Mr. Clark R. Fletcher was on the brief, for petitioner. Assist ant Attorney General Wideman, with whom Solicitor General Reed and Messrs. Sewall Key, Norman D. Keller, and Arnold Raum were on the brief, for respondent. DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS. 3 1 Opinion of the Court. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court. On September 12, 1923, petitioner, Edward B. Douglas, entered into an agreement with his wife and the Minneapolis Trust Company, by which he transferred securities in trust for his wife’s benefit. Out of the income of the trust estate the trustee was to pay Mrs. Douglas annually the sum of $15,000, up to November 6, 1927, and thereafter $21,000. Deficiencies were to be made up in a prescribed manner. Excess income (in case the principal was not impaired) was to be paid to petitioner. On the death of his wife, he was to receive the property free of the trust. Petitioner reserved the right to designate securities for investment, subject, however, to the approval of the trustee acting in that respect on behalf of Mrs. Douglas. The parties stipulated that the provisions for Mrs. Douglas were “ in lieu of, and in full settlement of alimony, and of any and all dower rights or statutory interests in the estate ” of her husband, and “ in lieu of any and all claims for separate maintenance and allowance for her. support.” Three days later, Mrs. Douglas obtained a decree of absolute divorce in a district court of the State of Minnesota. The decree provided: “ It Is Further Adjudged and Decreed that the defendant provide and create the trust fund as set out in that certain agreement between said parties and the Minneapolis Trust Company as trustee now on file with said trustee, and that the plaintiff have the provision therein made in lieu of all other alimony or interest in the property or estate of the defendant and that neither party have any costs or disbursements herein.” The question in this case relates to the net income of the trust which was distributed to Mrs. Douglas in the 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U. S. years 1927 and 1928. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined'that these amounts were income to the petitioner. Taxes assessed accordingly were paid by petitioner under protest, claim for refund was disallowed, and this suit was brought to recover the amount paid. Judgment for petitioner was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 73 F. (2d) 130. We granted certiorari (April 8, 1935) in view of an asserted conflict with the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in the case of Schweitzer v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 702, 705, 706. Petitioner contends that the agreement created an irrevocable trust; that under the Revenue Acts petitioner and Mrs. Douglas were separate taxpayers, and that, having accepted the benefits of the trust, she was taxable upon the income she received as beneficiary. Revenue Acts, 1926, § 219; 1928, §§ 161, 162, 167; Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365,369,370. The Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the income was taxable to the petitioner, since it went to the discharge of his legal obligation; that is, the income was devoted to payments which petitioner was bound to make under the decree of the Minnesota court. 73 F. (2d) p. 133. The authority of the district court is defined by statute. Mason’s Minnesota Statutes, 1927, §§ 8601-8604. The court is empowered upon divorce for any cause, except that of the wife’s adultery, to decree to the wife “ such part of the personal and real estate of the husband, not exceeding in value one-third thereof, as it deems just and reasonable, having regard to the ability of the husband, the character and situation of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.” The court may also decree “ such alimony out of the estate, earnings and income of the husband as it may deem just and reasonable,” but “ the aggregate award and allowance made to the wife from the estate of the husband ” is not “ to exceed in DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS. 5 1 Opinion of the Court. present value one-third of the personal estate, earnings, and income of the husband, and one-third in value of his real estate.” Id., § 8602. The court “ may appoint trustees, whenever it is deemed expedient, to receive any money ordered to be paid to the wife, upon trust to invest the same, and pay over the income for the support of the wife, or of the wife and minor children of the parties, or any of them, in such manner as the court shall direct, or to pay over to the wife the principal sum in such proportions and at such times as the court shall order.” Id., § 8601. After a decree “ for alimony, or other allowance for the wife and children,” or “ for the appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of the wife or children,” the court may from time to time “ revise and alter ” the decree, with respect to the amount “ of such alimony or allowance ” and also with respect to “ the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust, and may make any order respecting any of the said matters which it might have made in the original action.” Id. § 8603.1 xThe text of these provisions is as follows: “Sec. 8601. Trustee of alimony.—The court may appoint trustees, whenever it is deemed expedient, to receive any money ordered to be paid to the wife, upon trust to invest the same, and pay over the income for the support of the wife, or of the wife and minor children of the parties, or any of them, in such maimer as the court shall direct, or to pay over to the wife the principal sum in such proportions and at such times as the court shall order, regard being had in all such cases to the situation and circumstances of such wife, and the children if there are any, provided for in the order; and such trustees shall give such bond, as the court shall require, for the faithful performance of their trust. “ Sec. 8602. Property of husband—Permanent alimony.—Upon a divorce for any cause except that of adultery committed by the wife, if the estate and property restored or awarded to her is insufficient for the suitable support of herself and such children of the marriage as shall be committed to her care and custody, or if there is no such estate and property, the court may further order and 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. The Supreme Court of the State has decided that the district court in exercising this authority is not precluded by stipulations and agreements of the parties, entered into pending the action (but not void by reason of having been made to facilitate the decree of divorce), from making such provision for the wife as the court may deem appropriate. Such stipulations or agreements do not control the court. The court may adopt or reject them as it deems best in the light of the situation of the parties. When such agreements are approved, and in effect are embodied in the decree, they do not detract from the authority of the court to alter or revise its decree and the provisions made for the wife’s benefit. In Warren v. decree to her such part of the personal and real estate of the husband, not exceeding in value one-third thereof, as it deems just and reasonable, having regard to the ability of the husband, the character and situation of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case. The court may also, in the cases provided for in this section, decree to the wife such alimony out of the estate, earnings, and income of the husband as it may deem just and reasonable, having regard to the ability of the husband, the character and situation of the parties, and other circumstances of the case, and may by its decree make the same a specific lien upon any specified parcels of his real estate, or authorize its enforcement by execution against his property, real and personal; but the aggregate award and allowance made to the wife from the estate of the husband under this section shall not in any case exceed in present value one-third of the personal estate, earnings, and income of the husband, and one-third in value of his real estate. “ Sec. 8603. Order for alimony, etc., revised.—After an order or decree for alimony, or other allowance for the wife and «children, or either of them, or for the appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of the wife or children, the court, from time to time, on petition of either of the parties, may revise and alter such order or decree respecting the amount of such alimony or allowance, and the payment thereof, and also respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust, and may make any order respecting any of the said matters which it might have made in the original action.” DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS. 7 1 Opinion of the Court. Warren, 116 Minn. 458; 133 N. W. 1009, the Court said (pp. 459, 460): “ It appears that the original judgment for alimony was based upon a stipulation of the parties, entered into pending the action, but not to facilitate the granting of the divorce, and plaintiff contends that the judgment so founded and entered became a contract between the parties, and is not subject to change by the court, except upon restoration of plaintiff to her position and rights before its entry. In this we are unable to concur. “ Stipulations and agreements of the kind, where not void by reason of having been entered into to facilitate a decree of divorce, become merged in the judgment when entered, and are not, in the absence of statute upon the subject, so far of a contractual nature as to preclude the court subsequently from changing and modifying the judgment, upon application of one of the parties. The court is not controlled by the stipulation, and may adopt or reject it as seems consistent and proper from the situation of the parties, as disclosed by the evidence on the trial. The fact that such stipulations are usually adopted by the court does not change the situation.” See, also, Haskell v. Haskell, 116 Minn. 10; 132 N. W. 1129; Martinson v. Martinson, 116 Minn. 128; 133 N. W. 460; Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75; 226 N. W. 211; Randall v. Randall, 181 Minn. 18; 231 N. W. 413; Erickson v. Erickson, 181 Minn. 421; 232 N. W. 793. As we have noted, this control over provisions for the benefit of the wife in connection with divorce applies by the express terms of the statute not only to “ alimony ” but also to “ other allowance for the wife and children, or either of them,” and to “ the appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of the wife or children.” See § 8603. In the instant case, the trust agreement was made on the day that the suit for divorce was brought. The agree 8 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. ment was manifestly made in contemplation of that suit. When the district court was shortly called upon to determine what provision should be made for the wife, the court was not bound by the trust agreement. Within the limits prescribed by the statute (and there is no suggestion that the provision here went beyond those limits) the court had full authority to make an allowance to the wife out of her husband’s property and to set up a trust to give effect to that allowance. Being satisfied with the provision made by the trust agreement, the court incorporated that provision in its decree. The court did not approve the trust agreement as one deriving efficacy from the action of the parties. The court made its own requirement. The decree required the petitioner to “ provide and create the trust fund.” While the terms of the trust as set up in the trust agreement were approved, the court made those terms its own. It was from this action of the court that the trust derived its force. Amounts paid to a divorced wife under a decree for alimony are not regarded as income of the wife but as paid in discharge of the general obligation to support, which is made specific by the decree. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 577. Petitioner’s contention that the district court did not award alimony is not supported by the terms of the decree. It described the provision as made “ in lieu of all other alimony or interest in the property or estate of the defendant.” However designated, it was a provision for annual payments to serve the purpose of alimony, that is, to assure to the wife suitable support. The fact that the provision was to be in lieu of any other interest in the husband’s property did not affect the essential quality of these payments. Upon the preexisting duty of the husband the decree placed a particular and adequate sanction, and imposed upon petitioner the obligation to devote the DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS. 9 1 Opinion of the Court. income in question, through the medium of the trust, to the use of his divorced wife. No question is raised as to the constitutional power of the Congress to attribute to petitioner the income thus segregated and paid in discharge of his obligation, and that authority could not be challenged successfully. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677, 682, 684. The question is one of statutory construction. We think that the definitions of gross income (Revenue Acts, 1926, § 213; 1928, § 22) are broad enough to cover income of that description. They are to be considered in the light of the evident intent of the Congress “ to use its power to the full extent.” Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 89. We have held that income was received by a taxpayer, when, pursuant to a contract, a debt or other obligation was discharged by another for his benefit. The transaction was regarded as being the same in substance as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and he had transmitted it to his creditor. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716; United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 279 U. S. 732. See, also, United States v. Mahoning Coal R. Co., 51 F. (2d) 208. The creation of a trust by the taxpayer as the channel for the application of the income to the discharge of his obligation leaves the nature of the transaction unaltered. Burnet v. Wells, supra. In the present case, the net income of the trust fund, which was paid to the wife under the decree, stands substantially on the same footing as though he had received the income personally and had been required by the decree to make the payment directly. We do not regard the provisions of the statutes as to the taxation of trusts, fiduciaries and beneficiaries, (Revenue Acts, 1926, §§ 2, 219; 1928, §§ 161, 162) as intended to apply to cases where the income of the trust would otherwise remain, by virtue of the nature and purpose of the 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Syllabus. 296 U. S. trust, attributable to the creator of the trust and accordingly taxable to him. These provisions have appropriate reference to cases where the income of the trust is no longer to be regarded as that of the settlor, and we find no warrant for a construction which would preclude the laying of the tax against the one who through the discharge of his obligation enjoys the benefit of the income as though he had personally received it. The decision in Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365, is not opposed. There the trust was testamentary and the only question was with respect to the liability for the tax as between the trustee and the beneficiary. The Court observed that “ the evident general purpose of the statute was to tax in some way the whole income of all trust estates.” The decision has no application to a case where the income is still taxable to the grantor. Nor are the provisions of the statutes (Revenue Acts, 1926, § 219 (h) • 1928, § 167) defining instances in which the grantor remains taxable, as in case of certain reservations for his benefit or provisions for the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on his life, to be regarded as excluding instances not specified, where in contemplation of law the income remains in substance that of the grantor. No such exclusion is expressed and we see no ground for implying it. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is • Affirmed. BORAX CONSOLIDATED, LTD. et al. v. LOS ANGELES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 34. Argued October 23, 1935.—Decided November 11, 1935. 1. Tide lands in California, which had not been granted by Mexico or subjected to trusts requiring a different disposition, passed to the State upon her admission to the Union. P, 15. BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 11 10 Syllabus. 2. The Federal Government had no right to convey tideland which had vested in the State by virtue of her admission. P. 16. 3. The words “ public lands ” are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. The term does not include tidelands. P. 17. 4. The authority given the Land Department over surveys of u public lands ” of the United States, and its authority under the preemption law to patent lands “belonging to the United States,” did not empower it to make a survey defining the boundary between an upland lot belonging to the United States, and tideland belonging to a State, which would be conclusive against the State or her grantee in a subsequent suit against one claiming the lot under a preemption patent. Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U. S. 160, distinguished. P. 16. 5. The question of the jurisdiction of the Land Department to act upon the subject matter—a patent of lands—is always open for judicial determination. P. 17. 6. Where the District Court, due to the error of deeming a United States survey and patent conclusive, failed to determine the boundary between tideland granted by a State and upland patented by the United States, in a suit to quiet title involving that question and others, the cause was properly remanded for a new trial. P. 21. 7. In a suit to quiet title brought by a party claiming tideland under grant from a State, against a party claiming under a patent from the United States which purports to convey, according to a plat of survey, land bordering on the ocean, the question whether a part of the tideland is erroneously included by the survey and patent is necessarily a federal question, since it concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States and involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. P. 22. 8. Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law. P. 22. 9. The tideland extends to the high water mark, which means, not a physical mark made upon the ground by the water, but the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides. P. 22. 10. At common law, ordinary high water mark is the boundary of tideland. P. 22. 11. The boundary is the mean high tide line, which is neither the spring tide nor the neap tide, but the mean of all the high tides. Pp. 22, 26. 12 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. 12. In as much as the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey defines mean high water at any place as the average height of all the high waters at that place over a considerable period of time, and finds that, from theoretical considerations of an astronomical character, there should be a periodic variation in the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6 years, the Court approves a ruling that, in order to ascertain mean high tide line with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidelands, an average of 18.6 years should be determined as nearly as possible. P. 26. 74 F. (2d) 901, affirmed. Certiorari, 295 U. S. 729, to review the reversal of a decree of the District Court, which dismissed upon the merits a bill by the City to quiet title to land claimed to be tideland. Mr. A. W. Ashburn, with whom Mr. Gurney E. Newlin was on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Loren A. Butts, with whom Mr. Ray L. Chesebro was on the brief, for respondent. By leave of Court, Messrs. Oscar Lawler and Eugene M. Prince filed a brief as amici curiae, in support of certain contentions of respondent. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court. The City of Los Angeles brought this suit to quiet title to land claimed to be tideland of Mormon Island situated in the inner bay of San Pedro now known as Los Angeles Harbor. The City asserted title under a legislative grant by the State. Stats. Cal. 1911, p. 1256; 1917, p. 159.1 1The Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, c. 656, p. 1256) provided: “There is hereby granted to the city of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation of the State of California, and to its successors, all the right, title and interest of the State of California, held by said state by virtue of its sovereignty, in and to all tide lands and submerged lands, whether filled or unfilled, within the present boundaries of said city, BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 13 10 Opinion of the Court. Petitioners claimed under a preemption patent issued by the United States on December 30, 1881, to one William Banning. The District Court entered a decree, upon findings, dismissing the complaint upon the merits and adjudging that petitioner, Borax Consolidated, Limited, was the owner in fee simple and entitled to the possession of the property. 5 F. Supp. 281. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree. 74 F. (2d) 901. Because of the importance of the questions presented, and of an asserted conflict with decisions of this Court, we granted certiorari, June 3, 1935. In May, 1880, one W. H. Norway, a Deputy Surveyor, acting under a contract with the Surveyor General of the United States for California, made a survey of Mormon Island. The surveyor’s field notes and the corresponding plat of the island were approved by the Surveyor General and were returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The latter, having found the survey to be correct, authorized the filing of the plat. The land which the patent to Banning purported to convey was described by reference to that plat as follows: “ Lot numbered one, of section eight, in township five south, of range thirteen west of San Bernardino Meridian, in California, containing eighteen acres, and eighty-eight hundredths of an acre, according to the Official Plat of the Survey of the said Lands, returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General.” , The District Court found that the boundaries of “lot one,” as thus conveyed, were those shown by the plat and situated below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific ocean, or of any harbor, estuary, bay or inlet within said boundaries, to be forever held by said city, and by its successors, in trust for the uses and purposes, and upon the express conditions following, to wit: ” The conditions which followed are not material here. The granting clause above quoted is the same in the Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p, 159), 14 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. and field notes of the survey; that all the lands described in the complaint were embraced within that lot; and that no portion of the lot was or had been tideland or situated below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean or of Los Angeles Harbor. The District Court held that the complaint was a collateral, and hence unwarranted, attack upon the survey, the plat and the patent; that the action of the General Land Office involved determinations of questions of fact which were within its jurisdiction and were specially committed to it by law for decision; and that its determinations, including that of the correctness of the survey, were final and were binding upon the State of California and the City of Los Angeles, as well as upon the United States. The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this view as to the conclusiveness of the survey and the patent. The court held that the Federal Government had neither the power nor the intention to convey tideland to Banning, and that his rights were limited to the upland. The court also regarded the lines shown on the plat as being meander lines and the boundary line of the land conveyed as the shore line of Mormon Island. The court declined to pass upon petitioners’ claim of estoppel in pais and by judgment, upon the ground that the question was not presented to or considered by the trial court, and was also of the opinion that the various questions raised as to the failure of the City to allege and prove the boundary line of the island were important only from the standpoint of the new trial which the court directed. 74 F. (2d) p. 904. For the guidance of the trial court the Court of Appeals laid down the following rule: The “ mean high tide line ” was to be taken as the boundary between the land conveyed and the tideland belonging to the State of California, and in the interest of certainty the court directed that “ an average for 18.6 BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 15 10 Opinion of the Court. years should be determined as near as possible by observation or calculation.” Id., pp. 906, 907. Petitioners contest these rulings of the Court of Appeals. With respect to the ascertainment of the shore line, they insist that the court erred in taking the “ mean high tide line ” and in rejecting “ neap tides ” as the criterion for ordinary high water mark. 1. The controversy is limited by settled principles governing the title to tidelands. The soils under tidewaters within the original States were reserved to them respectively, and the States since admitted to th,e Union have the same sovereignty and jurisdiction in relation to such lands within their borders as the original States possessed. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229, 230; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471, 478; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65, 66; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 15, 26. This doctrine applies to tidelands in California. Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, pp. 29, 30; United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391, 404, 405. Upon the acquisition of the territory from Mexico, the United States acquired the title to tidelands equally with the title to upland, but held the former only in trust for the future States that might be erected out of that territory. Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U. S. 161, 183. There is the established qualification that this principle is not applicable to lands which had previously been granted by Mexico to other parties or subjected to trusts which required a different disposition,—a limitation resulting from the duty resting upon the United States under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (9 Stat. 922), and also under principles of international law, to protect all rights of property which had emanated from the Mexican Government prior to the treaty. San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656, 671; Knight v. United 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. States Land Assn., supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. That limitation is not applicable here, as it is not contended that Mormon Island was included in any earlier grant. See DeGuyer v. Banning, 167 U. S. 723. It follows that if the land in question was tideland, the title passed to California at the time of her admission to the Union in 1850. That the Federal Government had no power to convey tidelands, which had thus vested in a State, was early determined. Pollard v. Hagan, supra; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra. In those cases, involving tidelands in Alabama, the plaintiffs claimed title under an inchoate Spanish grant of 1809, an Act of Congress confirming that title, passed July 2, 1836, and a patent from the United States, dated March 15, 1837. The Court held that the lands, found to be tidelands, had passed to Alabama at the time of her admission to the Union in 1819, that the Spanish grant had been ineffective, and that the confirming Act of Congress and the patent conveyed no title. The Court said that “ The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy.” Pollard v. Hagan, supra. See also Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at pp. 27, 28; Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479, 490; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 260-261. 2. As to the land in suit, petitioners contend that the General Land Office had authority to determine the location of the boundary between upland and tideland and did determine it through the survey in 1880 and the consequent patent to Banning, and that this determination is conclusive against collateral attack; in short, that the land in controversy has been determined by competent authority not to be tideland and that the question is not open to reexamination. Petitioners thus invoke the rule BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 17 10 Opinion of the Court. that “ the power to make and correct surveys belongs to the political department of the government and that, whilst the lands are subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, the decisions of that bureau in all such cases, like that of other special tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, are unassailable by the courts, except by a direct proceeding.” R. S., §§ 453, 2395-2398, 2478 ; 43 U. S. C. 2, 751-753, 1201. Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691, 698, 699; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573, 585; Knight v. United States Land Assn., supra; Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240, 250, 252; Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 158 U. S. 253, 256; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472, 487, 488. But this rule proceeds upon the assumption that the matter determined is within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. Cragin v. Powell, supra. So far as pertinent here, the jurisdiction of the Land Department extended only to “ the public lands of the United States.” The patent to Banning was issued under the preemption laws, which expressly related to lands “ belonging to the United States.” R. S. 2257, 2259. Obviously these laws had no application to lands which belonged to the States. Specifically, the term “ public lands ” did not include tidelands. Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U. S. 273, 284. “ The words 1 public lands ’ are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.” Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, 763; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 490; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U. S. 386, 388. The question before us is not as to the general authority of the Land Department to make surveys, but as to its authority to make a survey, as a basis for a patent, which would preclude the State or its grantee from showing in an appropriate judicial proceeding that the survey was in-336820—36------2 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. accurate and hence that the patent embraced land which the United States had no power to convey. Petitioners’ argument in substance is that while the United States was powerless as against the State to pass title to tidelands in the absence of a survey (Pollard v. Hagan, supra) > the question whether or not the land was tideland would be foreclosed by a departmental survey, .although erroneous. This contention encounters the principle that the question of jurisdiction, that is, of the competency of the Department to act upon the subject matter, is always one for judicial determination. “ Of course,” said the Court in Smelting Co- n. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 641," when we speak of the conclusive presumptions attending a patent for lands, we assume that it was issued in a case where the department had jurisdiction to act and execute it; that is to say, in a case where the lands belonged to the United States, and provision had been made by law for their sale. If they never were public property, or had previously been disposed of, or if Congress had made no provision for their sale, or had reserved them, the department would have no jurisdiction to transfer them, and its attempted conveyance of them would be inoperative and void, no matter with what seeming regularity the forms of law may have been observed.” The Court added that questions of that sort “ may be considered by a court of law ”; for in such cases “ the objection to the patent reaches beyond the action of the special tribunal, and goes to the existence of a subject upon which it was competent to act.” Id. See, also, Polk v. Wenddll, 9 Cranch 87, 99; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 533; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 519; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 625; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 401; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 58, 59. Here, the question goes to the existence of the subject upon which the Land Department was competent to act. Was it upland, which the United States could patent, or tideland, which BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 19 10 Opinion of the Court. it could not? Such a controversy as to title is appropriately one for judicial decision upon evidence, and we find no ground for the conclusion that it has been committed to the determination of administrative officers. Petitioners urge a distinction in that at the time of the survey no private right in the property had yet attached and the question lay between the Federal Government and the State of California. But the distinction is immaterial. If tideland, the title of the State was complete on admission to the Union. No transfer to private parties was necessary to perfect or assure that title and no power of disposition remained with the United States. To support their contention as to the conclusiveness of the survey and patent, petitioners largely rely upon our decision in Knight v. United States Land Assn., supra. But that decision is not in point, as it related to land which, albeit tideland, had been the subject of a Mexican grant made prior to statehood. What had there been done by the Federal Government was found to be in pursuance of the duty of the United States, imposed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the principles of international law, to protect the rights of property which had previously been created by the Mexican Government. The contest related to land in Mission Creek, an estuary of the bay of San Francisco. The plaintiffs claimed under a tideland grant from the State. The defendant’s claim rested upon the title of the City of San Francisco as successor to the Mexican pueblo of that name. Following the procedure prescribed by statute with respect to the confirmation of such titles (Acts of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631; July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 332), the City had obtained a confirmatory decree from the United States Circuit Court in May, 1865. The statutes required that such a decree should be followed by a survey under the supervision of the General Land Office, and patent was to issue to the successful claimant when such survey had been finally ap 20 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. proved. Id. Accordingly, after the decree in favor of the City, a survey was made, which was approved by the Surveyor General and the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The line of that survey ran along the line of ordinary high water mark of the bay of San Francisco, but in the case of the estuary followed the tideline up the creek and, crossing over, ran down on the other side. The City objected to that method, insisting that the line should have crossed the mouth of the estuary, and, on appeal, that contention was sustained by the Secretary of the Interior. A second survey was made pursuant to that decision and a patent was issued. 142 U. S. pp. 162-172. The plaintiffs contended that the first survey was correct and the second unauthorized. Reviewing that branch of the case, the Court decided that the Secretary of the Interior had power to set aside the first survey and direct another, and that the departmental action in that particular was unassailable. But that conclusion was not sufficient to meet the plaintiffs’ claim under the state grant, unless it could be held that title to the land had not passed to the State. Upon that question the court found that the case of San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U. S. 656, 670, 672, was “ directly in point,” as the Court had there decided that “ if there were any tide lands within the pueblo the power and duty of the United States under the treaty to protect the claims of the City of San Francisco as successor to the pueblo were superior to any subsequently acquired rights of California.” 142 U. S. pp. 183-185. In discharge of that duty, provision had been made by Congress for the investigation and confirmation of the property rights of pueblos equally with those of individuals. The rights of the pueblo “were dependent upon Mexican laws, and when Mexico established those laws she was the owner of tide lands as well as uplands, and could have placed the boundaries of her pueblos wherever she thought proper.” It was for the United States to ascertain those boundaries BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 21 10 Opinion of the Court. when fixing the limits of the claim of the City as successor to the pueblo. Id., pp. 186, 187. The obligation of protection was “ political in its character, to be performed in such manner and on such terms as the United States might direct.” Accordingly, Congress had established a special tribunal to consider claims derived from Mexico, had authorized determinations by the court upon appeal, and “ had designated the officers who should in all cases survey and measure off the land when the validity of the claim presented was finally determined.” Id., pp. 202,203. The survey upon which the patent rested in the Knight case was thus made pursuant to the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to discharge its international duty with respect to land which, although tideland, had not passed to the State. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra, pp. 30, 31; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., supra. The distinguishing features of the instant case are apparent. No prior Mexican grant is here involved. We conclude that the State was not bound by the survey and patent, and that its grantee was entitled to show, if it could, that the land in question was tideland. In this view it is not necessary to consider whether the lines designated in the plat of the Norway survey as “ meander ” lines were intended as boundaries. 3. As the District Court fell into a fundamental error in treating the survey and patent as conclusive, it was not incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to review the evidence and decide whether it showed, or failed to show, that the land in question was tideland. The court remanded the cause for a new trial in which the issues as to the boundary between upland and tideland, and as to the defenses urged by petitioners, are to be determined. In that disposition of the case we find no error. 4. There remains for our consideration, however, the ruling of the Court of Appeals in instructing the District 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. Court to ascertain as the boundary “the mean high tide line ” and in thus rejecting the line of “ neap tides.” Petitioners claim under a federal patent which, according to the plat, purported to convey land bordering on the Pacific Ocean. There is no question that the United States was free to convey the upland, and the patent affords no ground for holding that it did not convey all the title that the United States had in the premises. The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. Packer n. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 669, 670; Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 87; United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55, 56; United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 75. Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 338; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, p. 40; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 382; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 63. The tideland extends to the high water mark. Hardin v. Jordan, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 79. This does not mean, as petitioners contend, a physical mark made upon the ground by the waters; it means the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides. By the civil law, the shore extends as far as the highest waves reach in winter. Inst, lib. 2, tit. 1, §3; Dig. lib. 50, tit. 16, § 112. But by the common law, the shore “ is confined to the flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides.” Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & A. 268, 292. It is the land “ between ordinary high and low-water mark, the land over which the daily tides BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 23 10 Opinion of the Court. ebb and flow. When, therefore, the sea, or a bay, is named as a boundary, the line of ordinary high-water mark is always intended where the common law prevails.” United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590. The range of the tide at any given place varies from day to day, and the question is, how is the line of “ ordinary ” high water to be determined? The range of the tide at times of new moon and full jnoon “ is greater than the average,” as “ high water then rises higher and low water falls lower than usual.” The tides at such times are called “ spring tides.” When the moon is in its first and third quarters, “ the tide does not rise as high nor fall as low as on the average.” At such times the tides are known as “ neap tides.” “ Tidal Datum Plane,” U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Publication No. 135, p. 3.2 The view that “ neap tides ” should be taken as the ordinary tides had its origin in the statement of Lord Hale. De Jure Maris, cap. VI; Hall on the Sea Shore, p. 10, App. xxm, xxiv. In his classification, there are “ three sorts of shores, or littora marina, according to the various tides,” (1) “The high spring tides, which are the fluxes of the sea at those tides that happen at the two equi-noxials”; (2) “The spring tides, which happen twice 2 See “ The Tide,” H. A. Manner, Assistant Chief, Division of Tides and Currents, U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, pp. 9, 10. “ There is generally an interval of one or two days between full moon or new moon and the greatest range of the tide. And a like interval is found between the first and third quarters of the moon and the smallest tides.” Id., p. 11. The origin of the terms spring and neap tides “ is probably due to the fact that as the moon leaves the meridian of the sun in her orbital transit round the earth and approaches the quarters the tides begin to ‘ fall off ’ or are ‘ nipped,’ and neap tides ensue. As she leaves the quarters for the meridian they begin to ‘ lift,’ or ‘ come on,’ or ‘ spring up,’ and when the meridian is reached spring tides ensue.” “A Practical Manual of Tides and Waves,” W. H. Wheeler, p. 49. 24 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. every month at full and change of the moon ”; and (3) “Ordinary tides, or nepe tides, which happen between the full and change of the moon.” The last kind of shore, said Lord Hale, “ is that which is properly littus marls.” He thus excluded the “ spring tides ” of the month, assigning as the reason that “ for the most part the lands covered with these fluxes are dry and maniorable,” that is, not reached by the tides. The subject was thoroughly considered in the case of Attorney General v. Chambers, 4 De G. M. & G. 206. In that case Lord Chancellor Cranworth invited Mr. Baron Alderson and Mr. Justice Maule to assist in the determination of the question as to “ the extent of the right of the Crown to the seashore.” Those judges gave as their opinion that the average of the “medium tides in each quarter of a lunar revolution during the year ” fixed the limit of the shore. Adverting to the statement of Lord Hale, they thought that the reason he gave would be a guide to the proper determination. “ What,” they asked, are “the lands which for the most part of the year are reached and covered by the tides?” They found that the same reason that excluded the highest tides of the month, the spring tides, also excluded the lowest high tides, the neaps, for “ the highest or spring-tides and the lowest high tides (those at the neaps) happen as often as each other.” Accordingly, the judges thought that “ the medium tides of each quarter of the tidal period ” afforded the best criterion. They said: “ It is true of the limit of the shore reached by these tides that it is more frequently reached and covered by the tide than left uncovered by it. For about three days it is exceeded, and for about three days it is left short, and on one day it is reached. This point of the shore therefore is about four days in every week, i. e. for the most part of the year, reached and covered by the tides.” Id., p. 214. BORAX, LTD. v. LOS ANGELES. 25 10 Opinion of the Court. Having received this opinion, the Lord Chancellor stated his own. He thought that the authorities had left the question “ very much at large.” Looking at “ the principle of the rule which gives the shore to the Crown,” and finding that principle to be that “ it is land not capable of ordinary cultivation or occupation, and so is in the nature of unappropriated soil,” the Lord Chancellor thus stated his conclusion: “ Lord Hale gives as his reason for thinking that lands only covered by the high spring-tides do not belong to the Crown, that such lands are for the most part dry and maniorable; and taking this passage as the only authority at all capable of guiding us, the reasonable conclusion is that the Crown’s right is limited to land which is for the most part not dry or maniorable. The learned Judges whose assistance I had in this very obscure question point out that the limit indicating such land is the line of the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps. All land below that line is more often than not covered at high water, and so may justly be said, in the language of Lord Hale, to be covered by the ordinary flux of the sea. This cannot be said of any land above that line.” The Lord Chancellor therefore concurred with the opinion of the judges “ in thinking that the medium line must be treated as bounding the right of the Crown.” Id., p. 217.3 This conclusion appears to have been approved in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v- Roxbury, 9 Gray 451, 483; East Boston Co. v. Commonwealth, 203 Mass. 68, 72; 89 N. E. 236. See, also, New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Morris Canal Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398, 401; 15 Atl. 227; Gould on Waters, p. 62. In California, the Acts of 1911 and 1917, upon which the City of Los Angeles bases its claim, grant the “ tide 3 See, also, Tracey Elliott v. Earl of Morley, Ch. Div. 51 Sol. Journal (1907), 625. 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U. S. lands and submerged lands ” situated “ below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean.”4 Petitioners urge that “ ordinary high water mark ” has been defined by the state court as referring to the line of the neap tides.5 We find it unnecessary to review the cases cited or to attempt to determine whether they record a final judgment as to the construction of the state statute, which, of course, is a question for the state courts. In determining the limit of the federal grant, we perceive no justification for taking neap high tides, or the mean of those tides, as the boundary between upland and tideland, and for thus excluding from the shore the land which is actually covered by the tides most of the time. In order to include the land that is thus covered, it is necessary to take the mean high tide line which, as the Court of Appeals said, is neither the spring tide nor the neap tide, but a mean of all the high tides. In view of the definition of the mean high tide, as given by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey,6 that “ Mean high water at any place is the average height of all the high waters at that place over a considerable 4 See Note 1. 5 See Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 21; Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 373; Eichelberger v. Mills Land & Water Co., 9 Cal. App. 628, 639; 100 Pac. 117; Forgeus v. County of Santa Cruz, 24 Cal. App. 193, 195; 140 Pac. 1092; F. A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 442; 150 Pac. 62; Oakland v." Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 23; 292 Pac. 1076; Otey v. Carmel Sanitary District, 219 Cal. 310, 313; 26 P. (2d) 308. In a number of cases the state court has referred to the limit of the shore as the “ ordinary ” high water mark. See Wright v. Seymour, 69 Cal. 122, 126; 10 Pac. 323; Long Beach Co. v. Richardson, 70 Cal. 206; 11 Pac. 695; Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183; 50 Pac. 277; Pacific Whaling Co. v. Packer^ Association, 138 Cal. 632, 635, 636; 72 Pac. 161; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584; 138 Pac. 79. See, also, Strand Improvement Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 770; 161 Pac. 975; Miller & Lux v. Secara, 193 Cal. 755, 761, 762; 227 Pac. 171. 6 “ Tidal Datum Plane,” Special Publication No. 135, p. 76. GRAHAM v. WHITE-PHILLIPS CO. 27 10 Syllabus. period of time,” and the further observation that “ from theoretical considerations of an astronomical character ” there should be a “ a periodic variation in the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6 years,” 7 the Court of Appeals directed that in order to ascertain the mean high tide line with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidelands, such as those here in question appear to be, “ an average of 18.6 years should be determined as near as possible.” We find no error in that instruction. The decree of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice McReynolds is of opinion that Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U. S. 161, is controlling and that the decree of the District Court should be affirmed. GRAHAM v- WHITE-PHILLIPS CO., INC. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 29. Argued October 23, 24, 1935.—Decided November 11, 1935. 1. A construction of the Illinois Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act, by the Appellate Court of Illinois, not approved by the state Supreme Court otherwise than by a naked denial of an application for review of the case by certiorari, is not binding on the federal courts. P. 30. 2. One who purchases a stolen negotiable bond in good faith before maturity, for a valuable consideration, may be a holder in due course despite the fact that notice of the theft had previously come to him, if, through forgetfulness or negligence, he had it not in mind when purchasing. Illinois Negotiable Instrument Act, § 52 (4); § 56, construed. P. 31. 7 Id. p. 81. 28 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U. S. 3. This is the better doctrine which should be accepted by the federal courts in the absence of an authoritative ruling in the State whose laws apply. P. 32. 74 F. (2d) 417, affirmed. Certiorari, 295 U. S. 728, to review a judgment reversing a decree of the District Court in favor of the petitioner. The proceeding originated in the state court, where the petitioner and respondent here were interpleaded, and was removed to the District Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Mr. James J. Barbour, with whom Mr. W. Edgar Sampson was on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. William L. Patton, with whom Mr. Harold A. Smith was on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court. By an appropriate proceeding, the Treasurer of Illinois sought an adjudication determining the ownership of eight one thousand dollar negotiable coupon bonds issued by the State. They were stolen from their lawful owner, petitioner Graham, August 30,1930, and on Sept. 22,1930, were purchased for a fair price in the ordinary course of its business by respondent’s Chicago office from Connolly, listed dealer at St. Paul, Minnesota. No circumstance suggests conscious wrongdoing by the purchaser. Three days after the theft, petitioner caused the Foreman corporation to send printed notices of it, with adequate descriptions of the bonds, to dealers throughout the country. Accepting the record upon the view most favorable to the petitioner, we may assume, as the Circuit Court of Appeals did, that the notice was received by respondent’s main office in Davenport, also at the Chicago branch, prior to the purchase; there was absence of ordinary care upon GRAHAM v. WHITE-PHILLIPS CO. 29 27 Opinion of the Court. the part of the Chicago branch in not making more elaborate provision for dissemination of the knowledge given by the notice; that respondent paid full value; at the time of the purchase it had no actual knowledge of the theft; it made no investigation to ascertain whether the bonds wrere stolen, other than to inquire concerning the status of the party offering them; the information given by the notice had been forgotten. The District Court declared, as conclusion of law: “The respondent, The White-Phillips Company, Inc., by reason of having actually received, prior to its purchase of the securities here involved, a notice that the same had been stolen as hereinabove set forth, did not, by the purchase of said bonds, become a holder thereof in due course, but that at such time the said respondent had knowledge of such facts that its action in taking such securities amounted to bad faith.” Decree went for petitioner here, which upon appeal, after a painstaking review of the authorities, was reversed. The cause was remanded for further proceedings. The Illinois Negotiable Instrument Act provides: “Holder in Due Course Defined. Sec. 52. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: “ 4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. “ Notice of Infirmity—What Constitutes. Sec. 56. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.” The court below rightly concluded that the narrow question is this: “ Did appellant have actual knowledge 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296U.S. of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that its action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith?” It ruled, that, as a purchaser of negotiable instruments in good faith, before maturity and for a valuable consideration, respondent should be protected against a charge of bad faith which has no fact support other than the receipt of a notice circulated generally among dealers which stated that certain bonds of a large issue had been stolen. Petitioner insists, that under the authoritative construction placed upon the Illinois Negotiable Instrument Law by her Supreme Court, since respondent had received information of the defective title, there was bad faith as matter of law, and no title passed. He strongly relies upon Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 242 Ill. App. 22, and the denial of certiorari therein. Under Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487, a definite construction of the negotiable instrument law by the State Supreme Court, binding upon the local tribunals, must be accepted by the federal courts. But we cannot think that the ruling and action in the Northwestern Bank case amount to such a construction. That cause, decided by the Appellate Court, First Division, October, 1926, involved title to stolen bonds held by one claiming as a bona fide purchaser, after receipt of notice of the theft. The court there said: “The notice having been received by the proper agent of the bank to receive, open and acknowledge its mail in the line of his duties, we think the bank is estopped from claiming that it did not have actual knowledge of the defect in the title to the bonds it subsequently received.” The State Supreme Court denied an application for certiorari without more. The argument is that this amounted to approval of the construction placed upon the statute by the Appellate Court. The point is not well taken. T I * ft A H V GRAHAM v.' WHITE-PHILLIPS CO. 31 27 Opinion of the Court. National Bank v. Uptown State Bank, 273 Ill. App. 401, (1934) construed the statute differently, and made no reference to the earlier case. We cannot know upon what ground certiorari was denied. The Illinois Supreme Court has declared that “Whether one has notice of a certain fact is a question of fact and not of law ”; Paine v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 342 Ill. 342, 348; 174 N. E. 368; also that denial of certiorari does not import approval of the reasons assigned by the lower court. People ex rel. Hoyne v. Grant, 283 Ill. 391, 397; 119 N. E. 344. The Appellate Courts in Illinois are inferior tribunals and a statute provided that their opinions “ shall not be binding authority in any case or proceeding other than that in which they may be filed.” Illinois Constitution, 1870; Article VI, § 11; Cahill’s Illinois Rev. Stats. 1933, c. 37, par. 49. No authoritative construction of the negotiable instrument law of Illinois supports petitioner’s position. And the court below rightly undertook to determine for itself the meaning and effect of the pertinent sections. As with other enactments, the negotiable instrument law must be interpreted in view of the intended end— here, the free circulation of negotiable paper—and the meaning attributed by the courts to the language employed. In a contest over title to stolen negotiable bonds, the Supreme Court of Michigan recently considered the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law of that State. Merchants National Bank v. Detroit Trust Co. (1932), 258 Mich. 526-536, 537; 242 N. W. 739. It held that one may purchase stolen negotiable bonds and acquire valid title as a holder in due course, although before the purchase, notice of the theft had come to him; but he may not willfully close his eyes to the notice, or resort to trick or artifice to avoid knowledge of its contents, or purposely forget 32 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U. S. it. He must act in good faith. Concerning Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, supra, it said: “As far as we have been able to determine this case stands alone. It estops the purchaser from showing good faith at the time the bonds are acquired. It makes notice of theft conclusive evidence of mala fides. It overlooks the well-established rule that though one has received actual notice, if by forgetfulness or negligence he does not have it in mind when he acquires the bonds, he may still be a good-faith purchaser. It has been said that the test is one of simple honesty and good faith.” It approved Lord v. Wilkinson, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 593, which rejected an instruction that “ The defendants, once having had notice, are bound by it, although the notice may have been forgotten,” and declared: “ If the rule is well founded, that notice once given is good forever—that knowledge acquired when notice is given, is conclusive evidence of knowledge possessed when the notes were bought—then this charge is correct. But if the bona fides of the defendants must be judged of from their acts, purposes and knowledge as they existed upon the day of the purchase, then the notice served is only prima facie or presumptive evidence of mala fides, and may be rebutted by proof that the notice was lost, or its existence and contents forgotten.” The doctrine approved in Michigan should be accepted by the federal courts, in the .absence of an authoritative ruling in the state whose laws apply. It accords with what this court said in Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343-365, 366, 367; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Ver-milye -ter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 420-424; 175 N. E. 114, 117. The Moscow Fire Insurance Company, however, had been left with but one director; and although he might be treated as a “conservator” of the property of his company when there were assets within the State “that might otherwise be lost,” the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that a measure of discretion should be exercised by a court of equity “ before surrendering possession.” Exercising that discretion the court directed that the delivery of the assets in the case of that company should be conditioned upon the execution of a bond to the People of the State in a sum equal to the value of the assets delivered, with a condition that the director should faithfully apply the assets to the use of the corporation, its creditors and shareholders. In the event of inability or failure to give the bond, the court directed that delivery should be made to a trust company “as agent or depositary” upon the stipulation of the insurance company and its “conservator” that the fund would “not be withdrawn except upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Matter of U. S. v. BANK OF NEW YORK CO. 473 463 Opinion of the Court. People (Moscow Fire Insurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 433, 435; 175 N. E. 120,121. On the remittitur of the Court of Appeals, judgment was entered in the Supreme Court of the State on August 11, 1931, and provided, in the stated alternative, that the Superintendent should deliver the surplus assets to the Bank of New York and Trust Company. The Moscow Company and Paul Lucke, “its sole surviving director and conservator,” took advantage of this alternative and gave the required stipulation, whereupon the Trust Company received the surplus assets, of about $1,000,000, on April 18, 1933. Immediately—on April 19, 1933—the Moscow Company and Lucke brough suit in the Supreme Court of the State to determine the disposition of these assets, including the determination of the claims of creditors. A second suit was brought in June, 1933, by a shareholder of the Moscow Company. In October, 1933, the first of these suits was referred to a referee to hear and determine, and later the two suits were consolidated. Trial was had before the referee and proofs of claims of various creditors and shareholders of the Moscow Company were submitted. On August 13, 1934, when the referee was about to file his report, the United States Attorney presented to the referee a proof of claim of the United States to the entire fund,—based upon the assignment of November 16, 1933, by the Russian Government. Apparently the claim was not pressed and an understanding was reached that the referee would withhold his report until August 21, 1934, and that the United States would meanwhile determine in what manner it would assert its claim, whether by intervention in a proceeding in the state court or by suit in the federal court. The referee made no mention of the claim in his report, which was filed on August 22, 1934. Judgment was at once entered upon the report directing payment of the claims of creditors as allowed by the referee and, after making reservation for future claims 474 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. and expenses, ordering the distribution of the residue in liquidating dividends to the shareholders of the Moscow Company. There was also provision that any shareholder, or any party to the action, or successor in interest, might apply at the foot of the judgment for further directions. On the same day the United States brought the present suit. (2) The case against the President and Directors of the Manhattan Company (No. 196) relates to the Northern Insurance Company of Moscow. Under an order of the state court, in 1926, the Superintendent of Insurance took possession of the assets of the United States branch of the company. The statutory liquidation was completed. But as the company was left with but two directors, provision was made in April, 1931—under the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York—for the delivery of the surplus assets to a trust company, in case the required bond was not given. Matter of People {Northern Insurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 433, 435; 175 N. E. 120. In the following year an assignment for the benefit of creditors was made on behalf of the Northern Insurance Company to the Bank of Manhattan Trust Company, the predecessor in interest of the defendant in the present suit. Pursuant to a decision of the Court of Appeals on reargument {Matter of People {Northern Insurance Co.), 262 N. Y. 453; 188 N. E. 17) judgment was entered, on June 6, 1933, in the Supreme Court of the State directing the Superintendent of Insurance to deliver the surplus assets to the Bank of Manhattan Trust Company “as agent or depositary” to be held subject to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The delivery was made, the amount being upwards of $245,000. On November 13, 1933, the state court directed the President and Directors of the Manhattan Company, as successor in interest, to transfer the fund to itself “as assignee for the benefit of creditors of the Northern Insur- U. S. v. BANK OF NEW YORK CO. 475 463 Opinion of the Court. ance Company of Moscow.” In July, 1934, the state court appointed a referee to take and state the account of the assignee, and to take proof and report as to the claims of creditors and those entitled to share in the disposition of the fund. That proceeding was in progress when the present suit by the United States was begun on August 25, 1934. (3) The third case (No. 197) relates to the assets of the United States branch of the First Russian Insurance Company, which the state court, in 1925, placed in the hands of the Superintendent of Insurance as liquidator. This case differs from the others in that the Superintendent is still in possession. After the payment of domestic creditors, the surplus assets were retained by the Superintendent under the order of the state court for the purpose of satisfying valid claims founded upon foreign business, where proofs of claim had been filed with him during the statutory liquidation. Matter of People (First Russian Insurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 423; 175 N. E. 114. It appears that some of these foreign claims had been allowed by the liquidator and payments on account had been made under orders of the state court, and that other claims which the liquidator had disallowed were being heard before a referee appointed by the state court, when the United States brought the present suit on November 14,1934. The Government states that the fund then held by the Superintendent amounted to over $1,000,000. First. When the state court directed the Superintendent of Insurance to take possession of the assets of the United States branches, and to conserve those assets until its further order, the court took jurisdiction of the res. While the superintendent was a statutory liquidator, he took possesion under the direction of the court and the fund was at all times subject to the court’s control. The proceeding was essentially one in rem and the Superintendent was protected by a sweeping injunction in the 476 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. unimpeded liquidation of the sequestered property. Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.) supra, p. 420. Under § 63 of the state statute (Insurance Law; Cons. Laws, c. 28), the liquidator had rights and duties such as had previously “been exercised by and imposed upon ancillary receivers of foreign corporations.” Id., p. 424. When the statutory trust was satisfied by the payment of domestic creditors and policyholders, it did not follow that the remaining assets were automatically released and the state court was ipso facto shorn of its jurisdiction. The court still had control of the property and necessarily had the pertinent equitable jurisdiction to decide what should be done with it. In such a case, the court might direct that the surplus assets should be remitted to a domiciliary receiver—if there were one—on appropriate conditions. Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Insurance Co.), 242 N. Y. 148; 151 N. E. 159. Or the court might direct further liquidation, in order to provide for the payment of other claims, if that course appealed to the sense of equity in the particular circumstances. Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.), supra, p. 423. The latter action was taken and the Superintendent of Insurance was continued in possession of the assets subject to the control of the court. He was virtually its receiver for the purposes specified. In No. 197, the Superintendent still holds possession by virtue of that authorization and the res thus remains under the court’s jurisdiction. In the other two cases (Nos. 195 and 196) the Superintendent completed the additional liquidation and turned over the remaining assets to the designated depositaries. To safeguard all rights in the funds, they were not to be withdrawn from the depositaries except upon a court order. We need not pause to inquire as to the effect of that limitation, for, if jurisdiction was relinquished, it was soon resumed. On the very next day, in the case of the U. S. v. BANK OF NEW YORK CO. 477 463 Opinion of the Court. Moscow Fire Insurance Company, suit was brought in its name, and by the sole surviving director and conservator, against the depositary and those alleged to be creditors and shareholders of the insurance company, to determine the disposition of the fund. Claims of creditors and shareholders were in course of adjudication in that proceeding when the present suit was brought. At that time, also, in the case of the Northern Insurance Company, the depositary—which had received an assignment for the benefit of creditors—was accounting in the state court for the fund in its hands and the claims of creditors and of those entitled to share in the fund were being heard. In both these cases the proceedings in the state court were quasi in rem. Control of the funds was essential to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction to protect the rights of claimants. It was not necessary for the court to appoint receivers, as the funds were already in the hands of depositaries appointed by the court and subject to its direction. The principle, applicable to both federal and state courts, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other, is not restricted to cases where property has been actually seized under judicial process before a second suit is instituted. It applies as well where suits are brought to marshal assets, administer trusts, or liquidate estates, and in suits of a similar nature, where, to give effect to its jurisdiction, the court must control the property. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. n. Lake Street Elevated R. Co., 177 U. S. 51, 61. If the two suits are in rem or quasi in rem, so that the court must have possession or control of the res in order to proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to that of the other. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189, 195. This principle is applied in the discharge of the long recognized duty of this court to give effect to such 478 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. “methods of procedure as shall serve to conciliate the distinct and independent tribunals of the States and of the Union, so that they may cooperate as harmonious members of a judicial system coextensive with the United States.” Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 595. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 625; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 341; Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 54; Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118, 129; Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77, 89; Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43. The Government urges that the present suits for an accounting are not suits in rem but in personam; and that to allow the federal court to pass upon the right asserted would not necessarily interfere with the jurisdiction or control by the state court over the res. See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 230. But these suits are not to enforce a personal liability but to obtain possession of the respective funds. The suits are not merely to establish a debt or a right to share in property, and thus to obtain an adjudication which might be had without disturbing the control of the state court. Compare Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Co., 215 U. S. 33, 44-46; Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 223, 224. Complainant demands that the depositaries account and pay over to the complainant, as “the sole and exclusive owner,” the entire funds in their hands. Thus the object of the suits is to take the property from the depositaries and from the control of the state court, and to vest the property in the United States to the exclusion of all those whose claims are being adjudicated in the state proceedings. The Government also insists that the courts of the State had lost jurisdiction of the funds, prior to the time when the present suits were begun, by reason of the fact that the funds were the property of the Russian Government which our Government had recognized. But, what- U. S. v. BANK OF NEW YORK CO. 479 463 Opinion of the Court. ever the effect of recognition, it is manifest that it did not terminate the state proceedings. The state court still had control of the property and questions as to the rights of the parties who were before it, or of those who might come before it, were legal questions which the court had jurisdiction to decide. Second. The fact that the complainant in these suits is the United States does not justify a departure from the rule which would otherwise be applicable. The Government invokes §24 (1) of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 41) which confers jurisdiction upon the District Court to entertain all suits of a civil nature brought by the United States. The Government insists that the United States is entitled to have its claim determined in its own courts. But the grant of jurisdiction to the District Court in suits brought by the United States does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction. It is a general rule that the grant of jurisdiction to one court does not, of itself, imply that the jurisdiction is to be exclusive. See Gittings v. Crawford, Taney’s Dec. 1; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 464; Plaquemines Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511, 517, 518; Merryweather v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 407, 409, 410. Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and enforce every right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceedings before them. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637. In this instance it cannot be doubted that the United States is free to invoke the jurisdiction of the state court for the determination of its claim, and the decision of the state court of any federal question which may be presented upon such an invocation, may be reviewed by this Court and thus all the questions which the Government seeks to raise in these suits may be appropriately and finally, decided. Jud. Code, § 237, 28 U. S. C. 344. 480 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the District Court leaves open the question of the propriety of its exercise in particular circumstances. Even where the District Court has acquired jurisdiction prior to state proceedings, the character and adequacy of the latter proceedings in relation to the administration of assets within the State, and the status of those assets, may require in the proper exercise of the discretion of the federal court that jurisdiction should be relinquished in favor of the state administration. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185; Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S. 186, 188; Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, p. 197. In the instant cases, not only had the state court first acquired jurisdiction, but there are numerous persons whose claims in relation to these funds are in course of adjudication. Whether or not their claims are valid against the claim of ownership by the United States, they are entitled to be heard and they are indispensable parties to any proceeding for the disposition of the property involved. They have not been made parties to the present suits, and this fact in itself would be a sufficient reason for the District Court to refuse to proceed in their absence. Only the stakeholders are defendants. The adverse claimants are parties to the respective proceedings in the state court and from every point of view the principles governing the convenient and orderly administration of justice require that the jurisdiction of the state court should be respected. There is no merit in the suggestion that the United States, in presenting its claim in the state proceedings, would be compelled to take the position of a defendant,— being sued without its consent. In intervening for the presentation of its claim, the United States would be an actor—voluntarily asserting what it deemed to be its rights—and not a defendant. We cannot see that there would be impairment of any rights the United States may U. S. TRUST CO. v. COMMISSIONER. 481 463 Syllabus. possess, or any sacrifice of its proper dignity as a sovereign, if it prosecuted its claim in the appropriate forum where the funds are held. As we are dealing simply with the question of the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court, we intimate no opinion upon the merits. The decrees are Affirmed. UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, TRUSTEE, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 169. Argued December 17, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. A trust created by a father for his three children, providing inter alia that each of them should receive one-third of the net income and upon termination of the trust one-third of the principal of the trust estate, was amended, as permitted by the indenture, to declare that the estate should be divided into three separate and equal shares, to which might be assigned undivided interests in the whole or any part of it; that such shares should be designated by the respective names of the three beneficiaries, and that each of the beneficiaries should have the same rights, intei^st and power . in and over his share and the income thereof as was given to them, respectively, by the original trust instrument over one-third of the trust estate. The object of the amendment was to divide the trust into three separate trusts in order to reduce liability for income taxes. The cash and property of the trust were accordingly transferred on the books of the trustee, in equal shares, to three new accounts, one for each of the beneficiaries; income, disbursements, and new principal were entered in this same way; and the accounts of the single trust were closed. Held: 1. That the single trust had been converted into three in accordance with the intention of the parties. P. 486. 2. It was not necessary that the cash and securities should be physically divided. P. 487. 33682 °—36 ■■ 31 482 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. 3. .Any vested property right, including an undivided interest, may constitute the corpus of a trust; a single fund may be held on several trusts. P. 487. 75 F. (2d) 973, reversed. Certiorari* to review a judgment reversing an order of the Board of Tax Appeals which set aside an additional tax imposed on a trustee by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Mr. Clay Judson for petitioner. Mr. J. Louis Monarch, with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Attorney General Wideman, and Mr. Sewall Key were on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner is trustee under a trust created by John P. Wilson, in 1913, for the benefit of his three children. Under a reserved power, the trust was four times amended. The sole question is whether the amendments created three'separate trusts. The question arises in relation to the taxation of income. If there is but a single trust, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled, an additional tax would be payable. If there are three trusts, as the Board of Tax Appeals determined, there would be no additional tax. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was only one trust. 75 F. (2d) 973. Certiorari was granted because of the conflicting decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Commissioner v. Mcllvaine, 78 F. (2d) 787. By the original deed, one-third of the net income of the securities held in trust was to be paid to each of the three children while living, and upon the death of any one, to those who were to succeed to his or her interest in accord- *See Table of Cases Reported in this volume. U. S. TRUST CO. V. COMMISSIONER. 483 481 Opinion of the Court. ance with the provisions of the deed. During the first fifteen years of the trust the income could be accumulated by the trustee, with the written consent of the primary beneficiaries, and added to the principal. The trust was terminable at any time in whole or in part by the three children (or survivors) subject to the approval of the grantor, if living, and in any event was to terminate on the death of all the children. Upon termination, one-third of the principal was to be distributed to each of the three children if living, and the share of a deceased child was to go according to the provisions of his or her will or, in the absence of such disposition, to the surviving issue of the decedent or, in default of such issue, to the surviving issue of the grantor per stirpes. Provision was made for the alteration of the trust “ in any respect and to any extent at any time ” by the three children, or survivors, subject to the approval of the grantor if living. Thereafter the “rights and powers of all parties concerned” were to be the same as though the trust deed had originally been executed in the altered form. In 1918, the three children, with the approval of the grantor, modified the trust so as to provide: “The trust estate now held under said trust deed shall be divided into three separate and equal parts or shares (to which may be assigned undivided interests in the whole or any part of the said trust estate), which parts or shares shall severally be designated by our respective names, and each of us and our respective legal representatives shall have the same rights, interest and power in and over one of said three equal parts or shares and the income thereof which is given to us respectively by said indenture over one-third of said trust estate and the income thereof, except as may be otherwise specifically provided herein.” It was further provided that the whole of the net income received from each share during the remainder of 1918, 484 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. and one-half of the net income received thereafter and during the life of the grantor, should be accumulated and added to the principal of such share, with privilege of withdrawal by the beneficiary, with the grantor’s consent, of the amount so accumulated. All the provisions of the original trust deed, except as they were “expressly or necessarily” modified by the new instrument, were to continue in force. In 1919, the three children, with the grantor’s approval, executed another modifying instrument which provided that one-half of the net income “of each of the three trust estates” should be paid over, as received, to the beneficiaries entitled thereto, and that the other one-half should be paid to them when the payment was requested by any two of the original beneficiaries; the net income not so paid over was to “be added to the principal of the trust fund from which it is derived.” Provision was also made for the disposition of the net income in case of the death of any of the original beneficiaries and for the distribution of the “several trust estates” upon termination. In 1920, the three children, with the approval of the grantor, modified the amendment of 1919 with respect to the disposition of income by providing that the trustee should pay out “as much of the net income from each of said separate trusts” to the beneficiaries as should be requested by a majority in interest of the beneficiaries, with the added requirement that “equal payments must be made out of the net income from each of said separate trusts, to the end that said several separate trusts may be maintained on a basis of equality in amount so far as practicable.” There was a further provision that so much of the net income, “received in any year from each separate trust estate,” which was not paid out should form part “of the principal of the separate trust estate” from which it was derived, and the trustee was required to U. S. TRUST CO. v. COMMISSIONER. 485 481 Opinion of the Court. devote to charitable purposes so much of the net income “of said trusts” as should be requested by the three children (or survivors), such payments to be made “in equal amounts from each of said separate trusts.” There was a further amendment in 1928 enlarging the powers conferred upon the trustee by the original deed with respect to the borrowing of money, the borrowed sums to be dealt with “ as part of the principal of the three trusts hereunder, in equal shares.” The purpose of- the first amendment and the subsequent course of dealings are thus described in the findings of the Board of Tax Appeals, which are adequately supported by the evidence: “ The purpose of the amendment of September 21, 1918, was to create three separate and distinct trusts, one for each of the beneficiaries of the single trust then in existence, in order to reduce liability for income taxes on the income of the trust. “ Prior to the first amendment the trustee kept one cash account for the trust under the heading ‘ Trust under deed of John P. Wilson, for John P. Wilson, Jr., and others ’ to which was credited all income of the trust. On September 27, 1918, three accounts were opened up by the trustee, one in the name of ‘ Trust under Deed of John P. Wilson for John P. Wilson, Jr.’; one under the name of ‘ Trust under Deed of John P. Wilson, for Anna W. Dickinson ’; and the other under the name of ‘ Trust under Deed of John P. Wilson, for Martha Wilson.’ The single account was then closed by transferring equal amounts of its balance to each of the new accounts. Thereafter cash received and disbursed on account of the trust property was entered in these accounts, one-third in each. “At the same time the property account kept by the trustee for the stock of the single trust was closed out by transferring the items thereof equally to accounts opened up under the names of the three beneficiaries. There was 486 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. no actual division of the property held under the trust indenture. The new accounts as set up showed that one-third of each asset of the old trust represented the corpus of three new trusts, one for each of the three children of the grantor. Acquisitions of additional principal by purchase were divided equally among the three trusts. “ The stock certificates acquired by the trustee before and after September 21, 1918, were carried in the name of the petitioner as trustee under the deed of trust of John P. Wilson or in the name of a nominee of the trustee. The cash belonging to the trusts in question here and all other trusts being administered by the trustee was kept in one general account with another bank. “ During the taxable years the trustee rendered separate reports each month to the beneficiaries on the basis of a separate trust for each. For each of the years 1924 to 1929, inclusive, it filed fiduciary and income tax returns on the basis of a separate and distinct trust for each child. In his audit of the returns the respondent determined that the income held in trust under the indenture of March 12, 1913, as amended, was taxable on the basis of a single trust and a single return for each year.” The Board of Tax Appeals concluded that “ three separate and distinct trusts ” were created. No question is raised as to the validity of the several amendments. The only question is as to. their construction and effect. The parties, if they pleased, had power to convert the single trust into three trusts and the evidence and findings leave no doubt as to their intention to do so. The question is whether they accomplished their purpose. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156,172. If the various securities had been divided physically, if new certificates of stock had been obtained for the several beneficiaries, and such certificates and specific bonds and cash had been set aside for each, there would be no room for argument that three separate trusts were not created. But it was U. S. TRUST CO. v. COMMISSIONER. 487 481 Opinion of the Court. not necessary to have such a physical division in order to carry out the clear intention of the parties. An undivided interest in property may constitute the corpus of a trust. The original trust deed provided that its provisions and limitations should be construed according to the laws of Illinois. But the elementary principle is applied in Illinois, as elsewhere, that “ every kind of vested right which the law recognizes as valuable may be transferred in trust.” Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 268; 102 N. E. 293, 295. “ It [a trust] may be created in any property, real or personal, legal or equitable, which is in existence, and which in the eye of a court of equity, is of value.” Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 356 Ill. 612, 617; 191 N. E. 250, 252. Perry on Trusts, 7th ed., §§ 67, 68. Nor are the amending instruments open to the objection that the subject of the trusts was not adequately defined. Compare Snyder v. Snyder, 280 Ill. 467, 469, 470; 117 N. E. 465; Marble n. Marble’s Estate, 304 Ill. 229, 236; 136 N. E. 589. Where there is an intention to create separate trusts, the fact that “ the trusts ” are “ kept in one fund ” does not necessarily defeat the intention and require the conclusion that there is but a single trust. Matter of Colegrove, 221 N. Y. 455, 459; 117 N. E. 813. “In many cases,” said the Court of Appeals of New York in Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 N. Y. 167,180; 19 N. E. 481, 484, where “ income and principal were given in equal shares, although out of one fund kept in solido for convenience of investment, a severance of the trust into its component parts has been adjudged. . . . The shares and interests are several, although the fund remains undivided.” See, also, Rollestone v. National Bank of Commerce, 299 Mo. 57, 71; 252 S. W. 394. In the instant case, immediately following the first amendment, the trustee opened separate accounts for the three trusts and the single account previously kept was closed. Income received and amounts disbursed were di- 488 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Counsel for Parties. 296 U.S. vided and entered in the separate accounts. The property account of the single trust was closed and the items were transferred equally to separate accounts in the names of the beneficiaries, showing one-third of the assets of the old trust as representing the corpus of each of the three trusts. New principal was divided equally in the same way. If, at the outset, there had been three trust deeds, each creating a trust for the benefit of a distinct beneficiary in an undivided one-third of the property involved, no question would have arisen. We think the same result was achieved by the use of the power of amendment. We find no ground for concluding that the purpose of the parties to create the three trusts was not carried out. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the order of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed. Reversed. HELVERING, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. McILVAINE et al., TRUSTEES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 566. Argued December 17, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. Decided upon the authority of United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, ante, p. 481. 78 F. (2d) 787, affirmed. Certiorari * to review a judgment affirming a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 27 B. T. A. 304, which overruled an additional tax assessment on a trustee. Mr. J. Louis Monarch, with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Attorney General Wideman, and Mr. Sewall Key were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Clay Judson for respondents. * See Table of Cases Reported in this volume. LEGG v. ST. JOHN. 489 488 Syllabus. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is similar to that involved in United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, decided this day, ante, p. 481. By amendments under a reserved power, the terms of an original trust created by John P. Wilson, in 1913, were altered with the intention of creating three separate trusts. The Board of Tax Appeals, upon findings supported by evidence, concluded that this purpose was accomplished and hence that there was no deficiency. 29 B. T. A. 304. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Board. 78 F. (2d) 787. We granted certiorari because of the conflict with the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case of the United States Trust Company, supra, 75 F. (2d) 973, and, for the reasons stated in our opinion in that case, the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is Affirmed. LEGG v. ST. JOHN, TRUSTEE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 54. Argued November 18, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. 1. The right of a bankrupt to receive future disability payments under a contract with an insurance company having no cash surrender value, is not insurance within the meaning of § 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, and, if not exempted by the state law, passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. P. 493. Provision for the payment of disability benefits in connection with life insurance was not introduced in the United States until about twenty years after the passage of the Bankruptcy Act. 2. The fact that the disability benefits were provided for in , a supplementary contract issued on the same day as, and physically 490 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. attached to, a policy of insurance on the obligee’s life, did next make them life insurance. P. 494. 3. The right to receive such disability benefits in the future, having accrued before bankruptcy, is not after-acquired property but is in essence an annuity purchased and paid for, which like other property of the bankrupt, passes to the trustee unless exempted by the law of the bankrupt’s domicile. P. 495. 4. Such disability benefits are not exempted by the statutes of Tennessee. P. 496. 76 F. (2d) 841, affirmed. Certiorari, 295 U. S. 728, to review the affirmance of an order confirming a report of a referee in bankruptcy. Messrs. Wm. Marshall Bullitt and Henry Roberts for petitioner. Mr. Robert Burrow and Mr. Clayton Scyphers, pro hac vice, for respondent. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether the bankrupt or his trustee is the person entitled to future monthly disability benefits payable under a contract entered into before the adjudication. On March 8, 1934, Legg, a resident of Tennessee, was, on his petition, adjudged a bankrupt. He then held a policy in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company by which it agreed, in consideration of an annual premium of $425.83, to pay upon his death either $24,000 in 240 monthly installments or the single sum of $17,452, as commuted value. By a supplementary contract issued the same day and attached to the policy, the company, for an annual premium of $49.39, agreed, among other things, to pay a monthly benefit of $174.52, upon due proof that the insured had become totally and permanently disabled before the age of 60. By this provision, if Legg was “pre- LEGG v. ST. JOHN. 491 489 Opinion of the Court. vented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit,” the company undertook to: “1. Waive the payment of each premium falling due under said Policy and this Supplementary Contract, and, “2. Pay to the insured, or a person designated by him for the purpose, or if such disability is due to, or is accompanied by, mental incapacity, to the beneficiary of record under said Policy, a monthly income of $10 for each $1,000 of insurance, or of commuted value of instalments, if any, under said Policy.” Legg had become totally and permanently disabled several years before the adjudication. The company had treated its obligation as matured; had waived the payment of premiums on both the policy and the supplementary contract; and, until the adjudication, had paid to him monthly the disability benefits. The bankrupt asked to have the life insurance policy and also the future disability benefits payable under the supplementary contract exempted from the operation of the assignment to the trustee. The latter set aside as exempt the life insurance policy and its cash surrender value, but reported that the obligation of the company to make the benefit payments was an asset of the estate. The bankrupt excepted to the report in so far as it denied these to him. The referee ruled that the right to receive them vested in the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication; and that this right given by the supplementary contract is not insurance within the meaning of the laws granting exemptions. He accordingly overruled the exception of the bankrupt. But he directed that of the $174.52 payable monthly, the bankrupt should receive $40 as income exempt under the Tennessee law; and the trustee the balance, namely $134.52. The trustee acquiesced in the decision; the bankrupt sought review. The District Court confirmed the referee’s order; and its judgment was affirmed 492 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 76 F. (2d) 841. This Court granted certiorari, conflict in decisions being alleged. 295 U. S. 728. The bankrupt contends that the “Supplementary Contract” covering disability is not a separate and distinct contract, but an integral part of the life insurance policy; that the obligation to pay disability benefits is insurance within the meaning of § 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act; that it did not pass to the trustee, since that feature has no cash surrender value; and that if it be held that the contract for disability benefits has a cash surrender value, its amount should be ascertained and the bankrupt be given the opportunity, by paying such value to the trustee, to hold the obligation free from the claims of creditors. The bankrupt contends further that any future disability payments are in the nature of future earnings or after-acquired property and, hence, do not pass to the trustee. Finally, he insists that the obligation of the company to pay disability benefits is property exempt under the law of Tennessee. All of these contentions are, in our opinion, unsound. The applicable statutes are these: The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 548, provides, in § 6, that it shall not affect the allowance of exemptions to the bankrupt prescribed by the laws of the State of his domicile; and in § 70 (a) that: “ when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. ...” LEGG v. ST. JOHN. 493 489 Opinion of the Court. The Tennessee Code (1932) provides: “ 8456. Insurance on husband’s life, effected by himself, goes to wife and children.—Any life insurance effected by a husband on his own life shall, in case of his death, inure to the benefit of his widow and children; and the money thence arising shall be divided between them according to the statutes of distribution, without being in any manner subject to the debts of the husband. “ 8458. Life insurance or annuity for or assigned to wife or children, or dependent relatives is exempt from claims of creditors.—The net amount payable under any policy of life insurance or under any annuity contract upon the life of any person made for the benefit of, or assigned to, the wife and/or children, or dependent relatives of such person, shall be exempt from all claims of the creditors of such person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after the effective date of this Code, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary is reserved by or permitted to such person.” First. As Legg had become totally and permanently disabled before the adjudication, the company’s obligation to make benefit payments monthly thereafter was property of the bankrupt which passed to the trustee, unless specially exempted by the law of Tennessee, or by § 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. It was not exempted by § 70 (a), because the obligation to pay disability benefits is not “ insurance ” within the meaning of that section. The term “insurance” as there used referred only to legal reserve life insurance, the kind of insurance to which a cash surrender value was a common incident. For such value specific detailed provision is commonly made in life policies. Compare BUrlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 ; Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50.1 The effect of the pro 1 The Legg policy contained a table of cash surrender values. This related to the separate obligation to pay the face of the policy on death. It had no relation to the company’s obligation under the “ Supplementary Contract ” for disability benefits. 494 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. vision in § 70 (a) is to assign to the trustee the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy. Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474. No provision is made in the “Supplementary Contract” for a cash surrender value of the obligations thereby assumed; and none is provided by law or custom. Provision for the payment of disability benefits in connection with such life insurance was not introduced in the United States until about twenty years after the passage of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Second. The fact that the disability benefits are provided for in a “ Supplementary Contract ” issued on the same day as the policy and physically attached thereto does not make them life insurance. The life policy and the contract were executed as distinct instruments. The “ Supplementary Contract ” was to operate for some purposes as if a part of the life policy.3 But for all other pur- 2 Compare In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246. As early as 1910, some companies had inserted in their policies a provision that if the insured became “ totally and permanently ” disabled, payment of premiums would be waived so long as such disability continued. See New York Life Insurance Co. v. Edwards, 271 U. S. 109, 117, 118. A little later, some companies introduced the provision that in case of total and permanent disability the face of the policy would be paid in annual instalments beginning after the accrual of disability—the amounts so paid to correspondingly reduce the final amount of the policy payable at death, so that the entire liability under the policy could be extinguished even without death. Policies issued under the War Risk Insurance Act, October 6, 1917, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398, provide in addition to payments of (say) $10,000 on death, monthly benefit payments up to $57.50, the aggregate to be deducted from the face of the policy. It was not until about 1920 that provision was made for the payment, in consideration of an, additional premium, of monthly disability benefits in addition to the full face of the policy at death. See Hunter and Phillips, “ Disability Benefits in Life Insurance Policies,” Actuarial Study No. 5 (2nd ed.) Part 1, ch. I (1932); Arthur Hunter, Papers on Disability Benefits, Eighth International Congress of Actuaries (1927), p. 83. 8 It concludes: “ The Supplementary Contract shall be deemed to be a part of the above numbered Policy and the provisions of said LEGG v. ST. JOHN. 495 489 Opinion of the Court. poses it is a separate obligation. The hazards covered by the two instruments are obviously different. The beneficiaries differ also. The payment under the life policy was to be made to the wife;4 the disability benefits are to be paid to Legg himself. A separate and different premium was exacted for the obligations assumed in each instrument. It was provided that forfeiture of the life policy would terminate all rights arising from disability; but the supplementary contract could be terminated by Legg without affecting otherwise his life policy. Third. The obligation of the company to pay disability benefits in the future is not after-acquired property. It is property which was acquired by Legg long before the adjudication, and fully paid for by the premiums paid before the adjudication. Nor are the benefits payable after the adjudication in any sense future earnings. They are not the fruit of anything to be done by Legg after the adjudication. The right to receive disability benefits in the future does not differ from any other right acquired before adjudication to receive money thereafter. It is in essence an annuity purchased and paid for prior to the adjudication. Like other property, it passed to the trustee, unless exempted by the law of the bankrupt’s Policy concerning declarations and representations by the insured, restrictions, payment of premiums, change of beneficiary, and assignment, are hereby referred to and by such reference made a part hereof. No other provision of said Policy shall be held or deemed to be a part hereof, except (a) The provision of the said Policy as to incontestability shall apply hereto, but shall not preclude the Company from requiring as a condition to recovery hereunder, due proof of such total and permanent disability as entitles him to the benefits hereof, (b) The provision of said Policy as to reinstatement shall apply hereto, except that this Supplementary Contract shall not be reinstated unless said Policy is in force and no premium is in default thereon, or unless said Policy is reinstated at the time of reinstatement of this Supplementary Contract.” 4 Later, Legg changed the beneficiary to his children, reserving the right to change the beneficiary thereafter. 496 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U-S. domicile.5 The principle declared in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, is not applicable here. Fourth. No statute of Tennessee exempts disability benefits. Its law is, in some respects, more liberal to the debtor than § 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 8456 provides that “any life insurance effected by a husband on his own life shall, in case of his death, inure to the benefit of his widow and children,” free from claims of the husband’s creditors. This has been held to mean that the cash surrender value, as well as the policy, is exempt.0 But there obviously was no intention to exempt this contract right which is not life insurance, or “the money thence arising,” since § 8456 is, in substance, a re-enactment of the statute passed in 1846. Section 8458, enacted in 1925, and slightly modified since, is not applicable here. It deals only with life insurance and annuity contracts “made for the benefit of, or assigned to, the wife and/or children, or dependent relatives.” Even if a contract for future disability benefits be deemed an annuity within the meaning of that section, it does not apply, because this contract to pay disability benefits was not made for, and has not been assigned to, Legg’s wife, his children, or any dependent. The highest court of Tennessee has not had occasion to decide whether future disability benefits are exempt from claims of creditors; but the intermediate appellate court has held that the statute exempting life insurance does not apply to disability benefits payable 6 See In re Wright, 157 Fed. 544; In re Burtis, 188 Fed. 527; In re Matschke, 193 Fed. 284; In re Evans, 253 Fed. 276. Compare In re Baudouine, 96 Fed. 536; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Fed. 1, 5; In re Balsier, 215 Fed. 134. 8 See Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306; 300 S. W. 567; In re Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363; Grade, Exemption of Life Insurance Policies Under Tennessee Statutes, etc., 11 Tenn. Law Rev. 34. Compare Lunsford v, Nashville S. & L. Corp., 162 Tenn. 179; 35 S. W. (2d) 395. POSADAS v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. 497 489 Syllabus. under a so-called health-insurance policy. Cravens v. Robbins, 8 Tenn. App. 435, 437. Affirmed. POSADAS, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. No. 114. Argued December 11, 12, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. 1. Capital and deposit taxes levied by the Philippine Government, in addition to the taxes permitted by R. S., § 5219, upon branches of a national bank lawfully established in the Philippine Islands under § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, are invalid. P. 499. 2. The Philippine Islands are a “dependency of the United States,” within the meaning of § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act, originally and as amended by the Act of September 7, 1916. Pp. 500, 502. 3. Section 26 of the Organic Act of August 29, 1916, which provides: “That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States,” is to be taken distributively, i. e., as conferring power on the local legislature to deal only with local laws, and not to alter, amend, or repeal any Act of Congress. P. 501. 4. The declaration of §§ 6 and 31 of the Philippine Organic Act of August 29, 1916, continuing in force laws applicable to the Philippines which were not amended or repealed by that Act or in conflict with any of its provisions, applies to § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1916. P. 501. 5. The Act of September 7, 1916, which amended § 25 cf the Federal Reserve Act “to read as follows,” repeating the words of the original section and adding a provision authorizing national banks to invest in the stock of certain other banks, did not repeal and immediately reenact the old provisions but left them continuously in force and speaking from the time of their first enactment. P. 502. 6. Section 5 of the Philippine Organic Act of August 29, 1916, which declares that the statutory laws of the United States “hereafter 33682°—36--32 498 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. enacted” shall not apply to the Islands except when they specifically so provide or it is so provided in that Act, does not apply to those provisions of § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 which , were copied into and retained by the Act of September 7, 1916. Pp. 501, 505. 7. Where there are two Acts on the same subject, effect should be given to both, if possible. P. 503. 8. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be adjudged unless the legislative intention to repeal is clear. P. 503. 9. The mere fact that a later statute covers the whole subject of an earlier one and embraces new provisions does not demonstrate an intention completely to substitute the new for the old. A repeal will be implied only so far as the later enactment is in conflict with the earlier, or so far as it is plainly intended as a substitute for the earlier. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88. P. 503. Affirmed. Certiorari * to review a judgment ordering the Collector to refund to the Bank a sum of money which the Bank had paid to him, under protest, as taxes, and had sued to recover. The judgment of the Court of First Instance, directing recovery of only a part of the taxes, was reversed by the one here under review. Mr. William Cattron Rigby for petitioner. Mr. Carl A. Mead, with whom Mr. Harry W. Forbes was on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. The National City Bank of New York is organized under the National-Banking. Act, as amended from time to time since its enactment. In 1930 the bank, after complying with the requirements of § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, c. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 273, as amended September 7, 1916, c. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 755, * See Table of Cases Reported in this volume. POSADAS v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. 499 497 Opinion of the Court. infra, established branches at Manila and Cebu in the Philippine Islands. A tax was levied by and paid to the Philippine Government on the net income of these branches for the first six months of the year 1931 (R. S. § 5219),1 about which there is no controversy. The Philippine Government, however, in addition, levied capital and deposit taxes not permitted by § 5219, and, these having been paid by the bank under protest, this action was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the amount. That court gave judgment in favor of the bank for only a part of the additional taxes; but the Philippine Supreme Court, upon appeal, reversed the judgment in so far as it was against the bank, and ordered a refund of the entire amount. Section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, supra, reproduced in the margin so far as it is pertinent here,1 2 1Sec. 5219, Revised Statutes (12 U. S. C. [1934 ed.] § 548), provides that the legislature of each state may “(1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income, . . .” provided certain specified conditions are complied with. 2 “ Sec. 25. Any national banking association possessing a capital and surplus of $1,000,000 or more may file application with the Federal Reserve Board, upon such conditions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the said board, for the purpose of securing authority to establish branches in foreign countries or dependencies of the United States for the furtherance of the foreign commerce of the United States, and to act, if required to do so, as fiscal agents of the United States. Such application shall specify, in addition to the name and capital of the banking association filing it, the place or places where the banking operations proposed are to be carried on, and the amount of capital set aside for the conduct of its foreign business. The Federal Reserve Board shall have power to approve or to reject such application if, in its judgment, the amount of capital proposed to be set aside for the conduct of foreign business is inadequate, or if for other reasons the granting of such application is deemed inexpedient.” 500 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. authorizes the establishment of branches of nationalbanking associations “in foreign countries or dependencies of the United States.” It cannot be doubted that, viewing this section without regard to later legislation, the branches here in question were lawfully established; for, as will appear at a later point in this opinion, the Philippine Islands are included by the words “dependencies of the United States.” In that view of the matter, the additional taxes imposed by the Philippine Government are invalid under Domenech v. National City Bank, 294 U. S. 199, 204; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438; and, were it not for the asserted effect of legislation subsequent to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, which we shall examine in a moment, this case would be disposed of, without further detail, upon the authority of those cases. In the Domenech case we held that the national-banking laws extended to Puerto Rico; that a tax on a branch of a national bank is a tax on the bank; and that Puerto Rico, being a dependency of the United States, could not, except as permitted by R. S. § 5219, tax a national bank, since it is an agency of the United States. The Talbott case involved the power of a territory to impose a tax upon a national bank. This court held, in the first place, that the same power of taxation in respect of national banks exists in the territories as in the states; and, in the second place, that this power of taxation in the territories was limited by the provisions of § 5219 although in terms that section refers only to the states. 294 U. S. 204. We find nothing in the original Organic Act or in any of the early statutes relating to the Philippines referred to by petitioner which takes those islands out of the controlling rule of the Domenech case that “ a dependency may not tax its sovereign ”; and we come to the only remaining point which we deem it necessary to discuss. POSADAS v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. 501 497 Opinion of the Court. Petitioner contends that subsequent legislation has the effect of repealing and abrogating § 25 of the 1913 act, permitting the establishment of national bank branches, in so far as the Philippine Islands are concerned. This later legislation consists of certain provisions in the Organic Act for the Philippine Islands of August 29, 1916, c. 416, 39 Stat. 545, and the act of September 7, 1916, supra, amending designated sections of the original Federal Reserve Act. We examine these statutory provisions in their chronological order. By § 25 of the 1913 act, as we have seen, national banks were authorized to establish branches in the Philippine Islands. The Organic Act of 1916 provides: “ Sec. 5. That the statutory laws of the United States hereafter enacted shall not apply to the Philippine Islands, except when they specifically so provide, or it is so provided in this Act. “ Sec. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue, in force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States.” (Section 6 obviously is to be taken distributively—that is to say, as conferring power on the local legislature to deal only with local laws. It, of course, confers no power on the local legislature to alter, amend or repeal an act of Congress.) “ Sec. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force and effect.” By §§ 6 and 31 it is clear that § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, not being in conflict with any provision of the Organic Act of 1916, was continued in full force and effect. 502 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. September 7, 1916, nine days after the passage of the new Organic Act, the act to amend the Federal Reserve Act, supra, was passed. It, first, is to be observed in respect of this amending act that it does not purport to enact a substitute for the Federal Reserve Act, or to repeal and re-enact any portion, but only to amend certain specified sections thereof. The old act contains thirty sections. The act of September 7, 1916, amends §§ 11, 13, subsection (e) of § 14, the second paragraph of § 16, §§ 24 and 25, and § 5202 of the Revised Statutes. The introductory words as to § 25 are—“ That section twenty-five be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows.” The original section is then copied, the only change or addition, so far as the question here is concerned, being the insertion of the words “or insular possessions” after the word “dependencies.” No reason appears from anything called to our attention, and we are not ourselves aware of any reason, for the addition of these words, since the comprehensive term “dependencies” would seem to include all insular possessions which we then had. But in any event, the Philippine Islands constituted a dependency, for they were not possessions merely, but possessions held by right of cession from Spain and over which the United States undoubtedly had supreme power of legislation and government. See United States v. The Nancy, 3 Wash. C. C. 281, 286 et seq. Compare 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 287, 291. The only substantial change made in the old § 25 is the addition of a provision authorizing a national-banking association to invest in the stock of other banks and corporations chartered or incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any state engaged in international or foreign banking, or banking in dependencies or insular possessions of the United States; and it is fairly plain that this addition constituted the sole reason for amending the section. POSADAS v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. 503 497 Opinion of the Court. The amending act just described contains no words of repeal; and if it effected a repeal of § 25 of the 1913 act, it did so by implication only. The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication—(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment. The law on the subject as we have just stated it finds abundant support in the decisions of this court, as well as in those of lower federal and state courts. It will be enough to direct attention to a few of these decisions out of a very large number. In United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, after stating the general rule, said that if two acts “ are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.” It was not meant by this statement to say, as a casual reading of it might suggest, that the mere fact that the latter act covers the whole subject and embraces new 504 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. provisions demonstrates an intention completely to substitute the latter act for the first. This is made apparent by the decision in Henderson’s Tobacco, at the same term, 11 Wall. 652, 657, where, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Strong, it is said, “ But it must be observed that the doctrine [of the Tynen case] asserts no more than that the former statute is impliedly repealed, so far as the provisions of the subsequent statute are repugnant to it, or so far as the latter statute, making new provisions, is plainly intended as a substitute for it. Where the powers or directions under several acts are such as may well subsist together, an implication of repeal cannot be allowed.” (Italics are in the original.) These two cases, with others, are briefly reviewed by this Court in Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 601, by Mr. Justice Woods, and the court’s conclusion stated as follows: “The result of the authorities cited is that when an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law, it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.” The implication of which the cases speak must be a necessary implication. Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 362-363. It is not sufficient, as was said by Mr. Justice Story in that case, “to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even all of the cases provided for by [the prior act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary.” The question whether a statute is repealed by a later one containing no repealing clause, on the ground of repugnancy or substitution, is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by the application of the accepted rules for ascertaining that intention. United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, 551; Eastern Extension Tel. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 326, 332. POSADAS v. NATIONAL CITY BANK. 505 497 Opinion of the Court. And, even in the face of a repealing clause, circumstances may justify the conclusion that a later act repeating provisions of an earlier one is a continuation, rather than an abrogation and reenactment, of the earlier act. Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1, 11-13. Petitioner relies on Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 617; but it is sufficient to say that the rule which we have quoted from Red Rock v. Henry, supra, was formulated with that case in mind, since it is specifically mentioned. In some of the states, the principle has been embodied in statutes to the general effect that provisions of a prior statute, so far as they are reproduced in a later one, are to be construed as a continuation of such provisions and not as a new enactment. See Barrows v. People’s Gaslight & Coke Co., 75 Fed. 794, 795. But such statutes are only declaratory of the rule of the common law. Dallmann v. Dallmann, 159 Wis. 480,485-486; 149 N. W. 137; Julien v. Model B., L. & I. Ascn., 116 Wis. 79, 89-90; 92 N. W. 561. See, also, Ely and others v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595, 598, 599; Moore v. Mausert, 49 N. Y. 332, 335; Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Ind. 60, 63-64; People v. N. Y., C. & St. L. R. Co., 316 Ill. 452, 457-458; 147 N. E. 494. Applying the rule established by the foregoing and other authorities, we see nothing in the terms of the Federal Reserve amending act, in the provisions of the new Organic Act, or in the history of Philippine legislation, which justifies the conclusion that by the amendment of 1916 Congress intended to repeal the old § 25 of the Federal Reserve Act. The amendment is made in a well-approved form—a form which, indeed, many of the states compel by constitutional provision—namely, by repeating the language of the original section with the additions to which we have heretofore called attention. Unless the contrary plainly appear, the employment of such form of amendment is simply to serve the causes of con 506 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Syllabus. 296 U.S. venience and certainty. That is to say, by carrying the full text forward, the task of searching out and bringing together the various fragments which go to make up the completed whole, after specific eliminations or additions by amendment, is rendered unnecessary; and possible doubt as to the precise terms of the law as amended is avoided. Or, as Chief Judge Denio said in Ely and others v. Holton, supra— “ In short, we attribute no effect to the plan of dovetailing the amendment into the original section, except the one above suggested, of preserving a harmonious text, so that when future editions shall be published the scattered members shall easily adjust themselves to each other.” It follows that such parts of the original § 25 as were copied into the amended section were not thereby repealed and immediately reenacted, but continued, uninterruptedly, to be the law after the amendment precisely as they were before. Section 5 of the Organic Act of 1916, supra, which in terms relates only to laws thereafter enacted, must be put aside as not applicable. Judgment affirmed. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF PUERTO RICO v. HAVEMEYER et al. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. No. 115. Argued December 12, 13, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. 1. By grant of the Executive Council of Puerto Rico a limited partnership was entitled (among other privileges) to dam the outlet of a lake and use the impounded water in the irrigation of its own land, subject to the condition, imposed to protect private lands, public roads and the public health from the injurious effects of overflows, that the lake should not be raised above a level prescribed. Held a grant of quasi-public nature, within the mean- COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 507 506 Syllabus. ing of provisions of the Organic Acts for Puerto Rico of 1900 and 1917. P. 514. 2. Every franchise is subject to be revoked by the proper public authority for breach of a condition, express or implied, upon which the grant depended. P. 515. 3. Revocation of a franchise for breach of condition may be by any procedure not repugnant to established principles of justice; and they are satisfied if the withdrawal of the privilege, declared by executive or legislative authority, may be followed by an appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction, in which the rights of the holder may be determined. P. 515. 4. Reservation in the Organic Acts of power in Congress to annul or modify grants of franchises in Puerto Rico does not imply a withholding of such power from the local authorities. P. 515. 5. Under the Organic Acts for Puerto Rico and Act No. 70, 1917, of the local legislature, the Public Service Commission was authorized to cancel the franchise, involved in this case, granted by the earlier Executive Council, both under the power to amend, alter and repeal, which was expressly reserved, and under the implied power to revoke for breach of condition. P. 516. 6. A reserved power to repeal a grant of special privileges may be exercised at the pleasure of the legislature or other authority in which it is vested; but the power to cancel for condition broken cannot be exerted without allowing the holder an opportunity to have the asserted default judicially determined. P. 517. 7. Upon review under Act No. 70, 1917, of Puerto Rico of an order of the Public Service Commission canceling a franchise for breach of condition, the Insular district and the supreme courts are confined to the questions whether the order was (1) reasonable, i. e., not capricious, arbitrary, or confiscatory; (2) in conformity with law; and (3), based upon incompetent evidence; and the court may decide the questions of law and affirm or reverse, or may remand the record to the commission for further action; but it cannot amend or modify the commission’s order. Held: (1) These functions are strictly judicial. P. 516. (2) The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Insular Supreme Court on the reasonableness of the commission’s order. P. 517. 8. Objection, first made in the Circuit Court of Appeals, that appeals from an administrative order canceling a franchise owned by a limited partnership in Puerto Rico were not taken by the parties in interest, because the respondent in the administrative proceeding 508 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court, 296 U.S. was the partnership, described as composed of certain individuals, whereas the appeals were taken in the names of the individuals as members of the partnership,—held (1) too late, and also (2) without merit. P. 518. 9. An answer on the merits admits the actor’s capacity to sue. P. 519. 10. The facts in this record support the conclusion of the Public Service Commission and the Insular courts that the holder of the franchise, by failing to keep clear the outlet of the lake, over which it had control, and thus allowing the waters to rise above the limits specified in the franchise, was responsible for a long-continued overflow resulting in damage to public and private property; and the order canceling the franchise is not shown to be capricious, arbitrary, or otherwise contrary to law. P. 520. 74 F. (2d) 637, reversed. Certiorari * to review the reversal of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico sustaining an order of the Public Service Commission canceling a franchise. Mr. William Cattron Rigby, with whom Mr. Benjamin J. Horton, Attorney General of Puerto Rico, and Mr. Nathan R. Margold were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Ralph S. Rounds for respondents. Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court. March 19, 1901, the executive council of Puerto Rico granted to the Guanica Land Company, a New Jersey corporation, assignable franchises including the privilege to take water from Guanica Lake for the irrigation of the company’s lands. Russell & Company, Sucesores, Socie-dad en Comandita, a limited civil agricultural partnership composed of Havemeyer and the other. respondents as partners, succeeded to that privilege. March 8, 1929, the public service commission of Puerto Rico made an order canceling it. The district court of San Juan and the supreme court successively sustained the order. Respond- * See Table of Cases Reported in this volume. COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 509 506 Opinion of the Court. ents’ final appeal was to the Circuit Court of Appeals; it held the order unreasonable, reversed the judgment of the supreme court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 74 F. (2d) 637. Notwithstanding absence of cross petition, we may consider respondents’ insistence that the commission was without authority to make the order. Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 536-538. The petition presents two questions: Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals, a constitutional court of the United States, has jurisdiction to review the commission’s order; whether the six individual respondents here are parties in interest entitled to appeal. There is another question adequately raised by the petition though not specified formally as are the others or presented in accordance with the best practice. It is whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding the order to be unreasonable and in reversing upon that ground the judgment of the supreme court. The Organic Act of 1900, c. 191, 31 Stat. 77, authorized the creation of an executive council, § 18, and provided: “That all grants of franchises, rights, and privileges or concessions of a public or quasi-public nature shall be made by the executive council, with the approval of the governor, and all franchises granted in Porto Rico shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power to annul or modify the same.” § 32. The Joint Resolution of May 1, 1900, § 3, 31 Stat. 716, required that all such grants “shall provide that the same shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal.” The franchise, in addition to conferring the privilege of using the water of Guanica Lake for irrigation of their lands, authorized the grantees to construct a wharf in, and to build and operate a railroad along, the harbor of Guanica bay into which flow the waters of the lake. The irrigation privilege is the only one here involved; its substance follows: The grant was for 99 years and extended 510 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. to the land company, its successors and assigns. They were authorized to construct and operate a dam across the outlet for the purpose of regulating the flow of the water from the lake. They were given the right to take up to 20,000,000 gallons a day from the outlet or elsewhere, by gravity, through channelsi or by pumps, and to construct and operate works therefor. The franchise declared that nothing therein should be construed to permit grantees to raise or maintain the height of the lake above its customary level during the rainy season in years of average and usual rainfall, and they were declared liable for all damage sustained by abutting owners by reason of unduly raising the waters. They were authorized to acquire by eminent domain private lands needed for their works, and were required to have plans for the same approved by the commissioner of the interior before commencing work. They were required to pay $300 per year for the irrigation privilege, and in case of default the commissioner might stop the flow of the water. It was provided “ that the franchises, privileges and concessions hereby granted, shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal.” The Second Organic Act, approved March 2, 1917, c. 145, 39 Stat. 951, declares the authority of the legislature shall extend , “to all matters of a legislative character not locally inapplicable,” § 37, but expressly reserves to Congress the power to annul acts of the legislature. § 34. The Act also creates a public service commission and declares that all grants of franchises, rights, and privileges of a public or quasi-public nature shall be made by it but not to be effective until approved by the governor and to be subject to the power of Congress “to annul or modify the same.” § 38. It requires such grants to provide that they shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal. § 39. Section 38 was by § 6, Act of March 4, 1927, amended to empower and direct the commission to discharge such additional duties and functions as might be conferred upon it by the legislature. 44 Stat. 1420. COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 511 506 Opinion of the Court. The Laws of Puerto Rico, 1917, Act No. 70, requires that all grants of franchises shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the commission (§ 54), and declares that it shall have power to alter, amend, modify or repeal any franchise that may have been granted by the executive council and shall exercise all the rights and powers reserved to the executive council by any such franchise or privilege or by any law. § 60. Act No. 70 also regulates the commission’s procedure and the appeals from its orders. The testimony before the commission must be taken down. § 68. Any party to the proceedings thereby affected may appeal from its orders to the district court of San Juan. Petitions for appeals include assignments of errors. § 78. The commission is brought in as party defendant; upon the filing of its answer, the case is at issue. The commission is required to certify to the court its proceedings including the testimony, findings, opinions and orders. §§ 79-82. No evidence may be taken on appeal. § 86. The court is required to determine whether the order appealed from is reasonable and in accordance with law. § 83. If found to be so, the court must dismiss the appeal and affirm the order. If found unreasonable or based upon incompetent evidence or otherwise not in conformity with law, the court must reverse the order or remand to the commission. § 85. A party aggrieved by the final judgment of the district court may appeal to the supreme court in the same manner and form as in other cases. § 90. Appeal from the judgment of that court is to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Judicial Code, § 128 (a) (Fourth). 28 U. S. C., § 225 (a) (Fourth). The attorney general is required, upon request of the commission, to proceed by mandamus, injunction or quo warranto to enforce the commission’s orders. § 94. February 24, 1928, the municipality of Lajas complained to the commission and to the commissioner of the 512 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. interior that the works of the holders of the irrigation privilege were causing irreparable damage by raising waters of the lake above the levels specified in the franchise and thereby flooding privately owned lands and public roads. The commissioner investigated and to the governor reported: Apparently the situation was created by violation of the provisions of the franchise. The holders failed to submit plans as required. The customary levels of the lake mentioned in the franchise have not been determined. The company has borne none of the damages. There was sufficient cause to request the commission to consider repealing the franchise. The governor referred the report to the commission. It called on the parties interested to show cause why it should not totally cancel the franchise. The South Porto Rico Sugar Company, interested in other privileges, and Russell & Company, holder of the irrigation privilege, appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the commission. Before answering the rule to show cause, they brought a suit in the United States Court for Puerto Rico to enjoin the commission from asserting any jurisdiction over them in respect of the franchise. The court dismissed the bill on the grounds that the suit was premature and that the commission had jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Munoz, 28 F. (2d) 820. Russell & Company, by its answer to the order to show cause, admits that the water of the lake has been higher than the usual level and has flooded some lands, asserts that it was not raised by the fault of any owners of the franchise, alleges that the holders have spent large sums for works for the taking of water and that cancelation would cause it great loss, maintains that the commission has no jurisdiction over it and says that, although the partnership had no obligation so to do, it has (since the order to show caiise) at its own expense taken steps to COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 513 506 Opinion of the Court. lower the waters of the lake to, and also to guarantee that in the future they will not go beyond, customary levels. Shortly after this answer was interposed, the commission, upon consideration of conditions then existing in and near the flooded area, found partial drainage to be immediately feasible and, by an interlocutory order, called on the holders of the irrigation privilege to prepare a draft of works to lower the level of the lake in order to relieve the overflowed district. The record before us discloses no response or action by the holders. There was a hearing upon the issues raised by the order to show cause and the answers filed by interested parties. Russell & Company appeared and was heard; much evidence was received. The commission canceled the franchise but only in respect of the irrigation privilege. The report made by the president of the commission shows: The holders of the irrigation privilege controlled the lands through which the water had been accustomed to flow from the lake to the bay. They allowed to accumulate in the outlet soil and debris, for a distance of 100 yards or more, which held back the waters and caused overflow on an opposite side of the lake. From about the middle of 1926 until late in 1928 the waters so raised continued to flood thousands of acres including entire farms and seven or eight kilometers of public roads in the Lajas Valley and so caused damage to private owners and to the community in general. The district court deemed itself required to decide only whether the order was reasonable and in accordance with law. There was no claim that it rested on incompetent evidence. Upon the record of proceedings, including the evidence introduced before the commission, it held: Under the franchise the holders of the irrigation privilege assumed control of the flow from the lake through the outlet to the bay and had power to raise or lower the level of the waters. They failed to comply with the duty— 33682°—36------33 514 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. voluntarily contracted by them in accepting the franchise—to submit plans of their works to the commissioner for approval. From July, 1926, appellants caused or permitted an excess of water to be held in the lake raising it to heights above the customary levels in years of average rainfall and thereby flooded thousands of acres and caused injury to land owners and to the community in general. The order is reasonable and agreeable to law. The court gave judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the order. Respondents took the case upon the same record to the supreme court. It construed the franchise not only to prohibit grantees from causing the water to be raised above the indicated levels but also to require them to prevent its exceeding such levels and to that end imposed upon them the duty to keep the outlet open. It held that, “inasmuch as appellant has failed to comply with the conditions of the franchise,” the commission’s order was reasonable and in accordance with law and affirmed the judgment of the district court. On the appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the evidence was omitted from the record. That court, assuming that it was sufficient to support a finding that the holders of the irrigation privilege knowingly permitted obstruction in the outlet to raise the level of the lake, concluded that the order canceling the privilege was “an arbitrary and unreasonable act” and reversed the judgment. 1. First to be considered is respondents’ insistence that the commission was not authorized to cancel the irrigation privilege. That contention has been overruled by both insular courts and the Circuit Court of Appeals on the authority of South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Munoz, supra. While, as to the privilege in question, the original grantee or subsequent holders are not public utilities, the franchise is one of a quasi-public nature. The holders’ right to take COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 515 506 Opinion of the Court. the waters depended upon a grant from the public. Civil Code of Puerto Rico, §§ 341, 343, 344. They were endowed with power of eminent domain to acquire in in-vitum lands of others to enable them conveniently to irrigate their lands and effectively to discharge the duties imposed upon them by the franchise. The terms of the grant were a matter of general concern inasmuch as the use of lands, condition of roads and health of people in the vicinity were liable to be adversely affected if the holders of the privilege should permit the waters to overflow contiguous areas. Implied in every grant of franchise is the condition that it may be lost by misuse. Every such special privilege is subject to termination for breach of condition, whether express or implied, upon which the grant depends. It may be canceled or withdrawn by any procedure that is not repugnant to the established principles of justice. The initial step need not be a suit for mandamus, quo warranto, injunction or the like. Essential requirements are satisfied if the withdrawal of the privilege, declared by legislative or executive authority, may be followed by appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction in which the rights of the holders may be determined. N. Y. Electric Lines v. Empire City Subway, 235 U. S. 179, 194. Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208 U. S. 378, 383. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 346. Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446, 454. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 580. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 51. The assertion by Congress of power to “annul and modify” franchises granted by the commission and to annul laws enacted by the insular legislature gives rise to no implication that the reserved power was intended to be withheld from insular authorities. Inference to the contrary is a more reasonable one and in harmony with the reasons which underlie the reservation. Local authorities 516 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. may ascertain facts and decide questions upon which depends appropriate exertion of the power much more conveniently than may the Congress. Under the Organic Acts and insular laws the power of the commission to make the order in question is clear. And that is so whether the cancelation was accomplished by exertion of the power to amend, alter and repeal expressly reserved or was effected under the implied rule that such franchises are terminable for breach of condition. Congress has not directly empowered the commission or any other insular authority to exert the reserved power. But it has adequately empowered the insular legislature and created a public service commission in which it vested the functions in respect of franchises that theretofore had been discharged by the executive council. The insular legislature by enactment, obviously not locally inapplicable, empowered the commission to alter, amend, modify or repeal any franchise granted by the executive council. § 60, Act No. 70 of 1917. That authorization unquestionably extends to the cancelation of the irrigation privilege. 2. Petitioner maintains that the judicial power of the United States does not extend to the review of reasonableness of the commission’s order and that therefore the Circuit Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction of the appeal. It assumes that the making of the order was merely the exertion of the power to repeal that is expressly reserved in the grant. It says that here involved is a question of the kind of reasonableness of a purely executive decision to exercise a contractual right of the government, and that it is a wholly different kind of question of reasonableness from that involved in the exercise of a power to cancel a franchise where may arise a judicial question whether executive action is confiscatory. And on that basis the commission insists that the repeal in- COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 517 506 Opinion of the Court. volved nothing but the exercise of executive discretion and is therefore not subject to review of the courts. The reserved power to repeal a grant of special privileges implies that it may be exerted at the pleasure of the legislature or other authority in which the power to repeal is vested. Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454, 459. Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, 498. Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 365. Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 720. Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, 17. Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 599. Cf. Grand Trunk Western Ry. n. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544. That power is plainly distinguishable from the power to cancel for violation of the terms of the grant. In the absence of constitutional, legislative or contractual restriction, the exertion of the first mentioned power requires nothing more than an appropriate declaration of the repeal. Hamilton Gas Light Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258, 270-271. But, without consent of the holder, valid cancelation for condition broken cannot be accomplished without giving to the holder an opportunity to have the asserted default judicially determined. N. Y. Electric Lines v. Empire City Subway, supra, p. 195. Farnsworth v. Minnesota & Pacific R. Co., 92 U. S. 49, 66. Atlantic de Pacific R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U. S. 413, 430-434. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1, 24. We need not consider whether the expressly reserved power of repeal is trammeled by Act No. 70 or other law governing the commission or the appeals from its orders, for there is above disclosed enough of the proceedings and determinations of the commission and of the lower courts to show that the order in question was not the exertion of the expressly reserved power to repeal but was the assertion of the implied right to cancel for failure of holders to perform their undertakings. On the appeal the district court was not authorized to substitute for those 518 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. of the commission its own views as to what action would be just or ought to be taken, or to perform any legislative, executive or administrative function. Its only jurisdiction was to decide upon the record certified to it by the commission whether the order was (1) reasonable, (2) in conformity with the law, (3) based upon incompetent evidence. “Reasonable” as here employed means not “capricious,” “arbitrary” or “confiscatory.” Whether the order of cancelation was reasonable in the sense that it did not transgress permissible limits is a question of law. It is not suggested that the other questions presented on the appeal were not within the jurisdiction of the court. The permissible scope of the determinations and judgment of the court is significant. It may only decide the questions of law raised by the appeal and affirm or reverse the order or remand the record to the commission for further action. It is without authority to amend or modify an order of the commission. The jurisdiction and duties of the supreme court and Circuit Court of Appeals are similar in all respects to those of the district court. Neither has any power or function other than what is strictly judicial. It is clear that the Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the appeal taken to it. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 200. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266. Cf. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 444. Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 468. Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 469. 3. The second question specified in the petition for the writ is whether the six individuals named as partners, constituting Russell & Company, are parties in interest entitled to appeal from the order. The question as put requires clarification by reference to the facts on which it is based. Havemeyer and the other persons named constitute a limited partnership, Russell & Company. Its answer to the order to show cause is in this form: COMMISSION v. HAVEMEYER. 519 506 Opinion of the Court. “ Now comes Russell & Company, Suers., S. en C., a civil agricultural partnership organized in accordance with the laws of Puerto Rico, composed of Horace Havemeyer, Frank A. Dillingham, Frank M. Welty, Edwin L. Arnold and H. B. Orde, as partners . . .” The petition for appeal to the district court begins: “ Now come Horace Havemeyer, Frank A. Dillingham, Edward S. Paine, Edwin L. Arnold, Frank M. Welty and Henry B. Orde, members of the civil agricultural partnership of Puerto Rico, Russell & Co., Suers., S. en C., and hereby appeal . . .” With immaterial variations in the use of words, the designation of appellants last given was followed in the petitions for appeals to the supreme court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. And so in substance were the appealing parties referred to in the opinions, judgments and generally throughout the litigation. Petitioner’s point comes to this. The partnership, Russell & Company, composed of the persons named as partners, claiming to be the owner of the irrigation privilege answered the order to show cause; but the appeal from the order of cancelation was taken by these persons as partners constituting the partnership. The commission first raised the point in the Circuit Court of Appeals. If worthy of notice, it should have been made when the appeal was taken to the district court. The appeal is in the nature of a suit to have the order adjudged invalid. The petition for appeal is the complaint. The commission answered on the merits. Thereby it admitted respondents’ capacity to initiate the proceeding. Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U. S. 568, 572. Society for the Propagation v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480, 501. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 450. Havemeyer and the other partners here maintain that, by the proceedings above described, the partnership itself, a juridical entity {Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476, 482) 520 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. • 296 U.S. in legal effect did take all the appeals and was before the Circuit Court of Appeals. It results that the commission’s suggestion that the partnership will not be bound by the judgment is without merit. The Circuit Court of Appeals rightly held that the partnership appealed and was before it and that the commission’s objection came too late. 4. The facts disclosed by the record support the conclusion of the commission and insular courts that the holder of the irrigation privilege is responsible for the overflow and resulting damages to private and public property. Reasonably construed, the franchise must be held to have given to the grantees control of the outlet and to have bound them to keep it sufficiently clear, for the passage of waters from the lake to the bay, to prevent raising them above the designated levels. The findings of fact included in the report of the commission and decisions of the insular courts, based as we must assume on adequate evidence, indicate that Russell & Company allowed the outlet to become and remain filled up and that the obstruction caused the waters to overflow and keep submerged the large contiguous area that is above referred to. Having regard to the quasi-public nature of the privilege, the extended period of the holder’s default, the character of the resulting damages and the commission’s authority to terminate for breach of condition on which the grant was made, the order of cancelation is clearly not shown to be capricious, arbitrary or otherwise contrary to law. Russell & Company have failed to establish any ground upon which it may be set aside. Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 147, 155. Farnsworth v. Minnesota & Pacific R. Co., supra, 68. Union Land Stock Co. v. United States, 257 Fed. 635, 637. Reversed. OKLAHOMA v. BARNSDALL CORP. 521 ♦ Opinion of the Court. OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION et al. v. BARNSDALL REFINERIES, INC. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. No. 116. Argued December 12, 1935.—Decided January 6, 1936. 1. The Act of March 3, 1921, authorizing the State of Oklahoma to levy a tax upon the gross production of oil from lands in Osage County, as applied to oil produced by lessees of lands of the Osage tribe of Indians in that county, is construed, in the light of its history, as authorizing a tax measured by the gross value of oil produced and to be distributed in part to the county, and not as authorizing a tax at a flat rate per barrel, the proceeds of which are paid into the state treasury and used to defray the expenses of administering the state Oil and Gas Proration Law. P. 523. 2. An Act of Congress which waives the immunity from state taxation of instrumentalities of the Federal Government, such as leases of Indian oil lands, is strictly construed. P. 526. 171 Okla. 145; 41 P. (2d) 918, affirmed. Certiorari* to review a decree enjoining the collection of a tax measured on the oil produced by the plaintiffs as lessees of Indian lands. Messrs. C. D. Cund and Earl Foster, with whom Messrs. C. W. King, H. L. McCracken, E. L. Richardson, and Edwin Dabney were on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. L. G. Owen, with whom Messrs. Edward H. Chandler, James B. Diggs, R. W. Garrett, and Wm. H. Zurich were on the brief, for respondents. Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the single question whether an Oklahoma tax of % of a cent per barrel on oil produced in * See Table of Cases Reported in this volume. 522 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. Opinion of the Court. 296 U.S. the state, c. 132, Oklahoma Session Laws, 1933, when applied to oil produced by lessees of lands of the Osage Tribe of Indians in Osage County, Oklahoma, is within the congressional enactment consenting to a state tax upon the production of such oil. The challenged tax is paid into the State Treasury and used to defray the expenses of administering the State Oil and Gas Proration Law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the tax is not within the congressional consent and accordingly enjoined its collection as imposing an unconstitutional burden on the Indian leases, which are deemed to be instrumentalities of the federal government. 171 Okla. 145; 41 P. (2d) 918. We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the state court, the case being of public importance because involving relations of the state to the national government. The Oklahoma legislature, by Act of February 14, 1916, c. 40, Okla. Session Laws, 102, imposed a production tax of 3% of the gross value of all oil produced within the state. The Act provides that the tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon oil in place in the ground, oil leases, or equipment used for oil production, and that one-third of the tax collected in each county shall be returned to it for the construction of permanent roads and bridges and “ for and in aid of ” the common schools. The levy is denominated by the taxing act a “ gross production tax,” a label which this Court and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma have accepted as appropriate. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 504; Barnsdall Refineries, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 171 Okla. 145, 147. In Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503, and Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549, this tax was held invalid so far as applied to the production of oil by lessees of lands of the Osage Tribe of Indians, which were located in Osage County, as a tax burden upon instrumentalities of the United States. See Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522; Gillespie v. Okla- OKLAHOMA v. BARNSDALL CORP. 523 521 Opinion of the Court. homa, supra; compare Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279; Burnet v. Coronado Oil » \D - - ■- & F°n 48?03____________PUBLICATION CHARGE-OUT RECORD GP0 83'24172 n.L.R.B.