UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 288 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1932 From January 9 (Concluded) to and Including (In Part) March 13,1933 ERNEST KNAEBEL REPORTER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1933 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents Washington, D. C. - Price $1.50 (Buckram) Erratum.—P. 263, line 7, “ 1932 ” should read 132. n JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS ¹ CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, Chief Justice. WILLIS VAN DEVANTER, Associate Justice. JAMES CLARK McREYNOLDS, Associate Justice. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Associate Justice. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, Associate Justice. PIERCE BUTLER, Associate Justice. HARLAN FISKE STONE, Associate Justice. OWEN J. ROBERTS, Associate Justice. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Associate Justice. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, Attorney General.¹ ² HOMER S. CUMMINGS, Attorney General.² THOMAS D. THACHER, Solicitor General. CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY, Clerk. FRANK KEY GREEN, Marshal. ¹For allotment of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices among the several circuits, see next page. ² Mr. Mitchell submitted his resignation to become effective upon the qualification of his successor. On March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt nominated Mr. Homer S. Cummings, of Connecticut. On the same day, the nomination of Mr. Cummings was confirmed by the Senate, he was commissioned, and took the oath of office. iu SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered, That the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, agreeably to the acts of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz: For the First Circuit, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Harlan Fiske Stone, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, Owen J. Roberts, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, James C. McReynolds, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Pierce Butler, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, George Sutherland, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice. March 28, 1932. IV TABLE OF CASES REPOSTED Page Acme Operating Corp., United States v.......... 243 Adams v. Hagerott............................. 599 Aderhold, Miller v............................. 206 Alabama, Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp, v... 218 A. L. Smith Iron Works, George A. Ohl & Co. v.... 170 American Bond & Mortgage Co., Royal Indemnity Co. v.................................... i... 596 American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert......... 596 American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McDonough.... 602 Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama... 218 Appalachian Coals v. United States............. 344 Appalachian Electric Power Co., Virginia v........ 613 Arenz, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v................ 597 Arthur C. Harvey Co. v. Malley................. 415 Ash, Suffern National Bank & T. Co. v.......... 614 A. T. Jergins Trust, Burnet v............... 508,594 Atkins, Ex parte............................... 594 Atlantic City Electric Co. v. Commissioner..... 152 Backus v. United States........................ 610 Baker v. United States........................ 602 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady............... 448 Barceloux (Peter) Co., Buffum v................ 595 Barker v. Fischer.............................. 611 Bartosik v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co...... 609 Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. United States............ 594 Blair v. Commissioner.......................... 602 Blanton v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co........ 609 Board of Comm’rs, Indian Territory Oil Co. v...325 Board of Equalization, Indian Territory Oil Co. v.. 325 Boeing Air Transport, Edelman v................ 595 v VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Borden, Wilson v.............................. 615 Bourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co.................. 607 Brace v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.............. 604 Brady, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.............. 448 Brassert, American Car & Foundry Co. v........... 596 Broad River Power Co. v. Query................ 178 Brooks, Burnet v.............................. 378 Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co.................. 595 Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust............. 508, 594 Burnet v. Brooks.............................. 378 Burnet v. Guggenheim.......................... 280 Burnet v. Huff................................ 156 Burnet, Petroleum Exploration v................467 Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp.................. 406 Burton, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.............. 617 Caldwell, Schug v............................... 609 California, Morrison v........................... 591 Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Canadian Club Corp, v... 599 Canadian Club Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale... 599¹ Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., Brace v............. 604 Capitol Iron & Metal Co. v. Rogers............ 614 Carnduff, Clawans v........................... 601 Carvill v. Massachusetts...................... 587 Castellano v. Globe Indemnity Co.............. 611 Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R. R. Ass’n... 469 Cesar v. Illinois ex rel. McDonough........... 603 Chamberlain, Pennsylvania R. Co. v............... 333 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Burton........... 617 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., Parrish v.......... 604 Chestatee Pyrites & C. Corp., U. S. ex rel., Wilbur v...................................... 97, 590 Chicago North Shore & M. R. Co., United States v.. 1 Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., Bartosik v........ 609 Clawans v. Camduff............................ 601 Commissioner, Atlantic City Electric Co. v......... 152 Commissioner, Blair v........................... 602 Commissioner, Cortland Specialty Co. v........ 599 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. vii Page Commissioner v. Independent Life Insurance Co. 592 Commissioner, Lang v.596 Commissioner, O’Shaughnessy v................. 605 Commissioner, Perthur Holding Corp, v......... 616 Commissioner, Porter v................ ᵣ ᵢ......... 436 Commissioner, Power v......................... 612 Commissioner, St. Louis Bridge Co. v...... 604, 607 Commissioner, Terminal Railroad Assn, v... 604, 607 Commissioner, Tunnel Railroad v........... 604, 607 Conklin v. Ling............................... 600 Consolidated Paper Co. v. United States....... 615 Cook v: United States......................... 102 Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner........ 599 Crocker v. Kay.............................. 615 Crown Willamette Paper Co., Nevada v...........592 Cruise, Dr. Bloom Dentist Inc. v............. 588 Dakota-Montana Oil Co., United States v. 459 Daube v. United States........................ 597 Demco, Doughnut Machine Corp, v............... 605 Diamond Alkali Co., Heiner v.................. 502 Diamond Alkali Co., Lewellyn v................ 502 Dickey (W. S.) Clay Mfg. Co., Harrisonville v..594 Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co................... 188 Dobra v. Lindsey.............................. 606 Dr. Bloom Dentist Inc. v. Cruise.............. 588 Dorland v. Witmer............................. 616 Dorrance v. Pennsylvania...................... 617 Doughnut Machine Corp. v. Demco............... 605 Doughnut Machine Corp. v. Joe-Lowe Corp........ 605 Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport............... 595 Edgar P. Lewis & Sons v. Mars................. 611 Edgerton, Southern Ry. Co. v.................. 605 Ellis v. United States........................ 607 Ex parte Atkins............................... 594 Ex parte Hess................................. 590 Ex parte Moder................................ 587 Factors & Finance Co., United States v............ 89 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co.. 597 Federal Radio Comm’n v. North Shore Church v.... 597 Federal Radio Comm’n, Radio Investment Co. v.... 612 Federal Radio Comm’n, Trinity Methodist Church South v....................................... 599 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Royal Milling Co........ 212 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Arenz................. 597 Fierman, Seward National Bank v................. 613 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Zechiel.............. 602 Fischer, Barker v............................... 611 Fletchinger, Fourchy v.......................... 589 Fort Smith Suburban Ry. Co. v. K. C. Sou. Ry. Co.. 587 Fourchy v. Fletchinger.......................... 589 Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. United States...... 612 Gaul v. United States........................... 616 Geophysical Exploration Co. v. Klodginski....... 608 George A. Ohl & Co. v. Smith Iron Works......... 170 Globe Indemnity Co., Castellano v............... 611 Gold v. United States........................... 603 Goodcell, Title Insurance & Trust Co. v............ 613 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Blanton v..... 609 Greathouse, U. S. ex rel., v. Hurley............ 598 Gross v. Irving Trust Co........................ 598 Guaranty Trust Co., Rogers v.................... 123 Guaranty Trust Co., Union Solvents Corp, v...... 614 Guggenheim, Burnet v............................ 280 Hagerott, Adams v.............................. 599 Hamill, Hawks v.................................. 52 Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co...... 594 Harvey (Arthur C.) Co. v. Malley............... 415 Hawks v. Hamill.................................. 52 Hazelett Storage Battery Co. v. Western Battery Co. 608 Healy v. Ratta.................................. 593 Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co.................... 502 Henry Prentiss & Co., United States v............. 73 Hess, Ex parte.................................. 590 Hoage, New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v............. 608 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. ix Page Huff, Burnet v................................... 156 Hurley, U. S. ex rel. Greathouse v............... 598 Hurn v. Oursler.................................. 595 Illinois, Michigan v...................... 587, 594 Illinois, New York v........................ 587, 594 Illinois, Wisconsin v....................... 587, 594 Illinois Central R. Co., Industrial Commission v.... 606 Illinois ex rel. McDonough, Cesar v............. X. 603 Indemnity Insurance Co., Voehl v........... i.... 162 Independent Life Ins. Co., Commissioner v....... 592 Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board..325 Industrial Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co. 606 International Silver Co. v. United Chromium..... 600 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Wash. Co.. 14 Irving Trust Co., Gross v. 598 Irving Trust Co., New York v.................... 329 Irving Trust Co. v. United States................ 613 Irving Trust Co., Weisman v...................... 598 James v. United States........................... 613 Jergins (A. T.) Trust, Burnet v............. 508, 594 Joe-Lowe Corp., Doughnut Machine Corp, v........ 605 Johnson, Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v............ 609 Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co., Fort Smith Co. v....... 587 Kaplan, Rosekay Amusement Corp, v............. 606 Kaplan, Stillwell Theatre v...................... 606 Kaplan, Windsor Circuit Corp, v.................. 606 Kay, Crocker v................................. 615 Kelley, Long v................................... 591 Keystone Warehousing Co. v. Commission.......... 600 Klodginski, Geophysical Exploration Co. v....... 608 Kramer, Maryland Casualty Co. v................. 611 Lang v. Commissioner............................. 596 Lawes, New York ex rel. Rothenberg v. 598 Lawson v. Whitlock Cordage Co.................... 601 Lee, Louis K. Liggett Co. v...................... 517 Lehigh Valley R. Co., Rocco v.................... 275 Lewellyn v. Diamond Alkali Co.................... 502 X TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Lewis (Edgar P.) & Sons v. Mars................ 611 Lexington Water Power Co. v. Query............. 178 Liggett (Louis K.) Co. v. Lee.................. 517 Lindsey, Dobra v............................... 606 Ling, Conklin v................................ 600 Long v. Kelley................................. 591 Louisiana, Terrell v........................... 589 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee.................... 517 Lynch, New York ex rel. N. Y. & Albany L. Co. v.... 590 Maclay, New York v............................. 290 Malley, Arthur C. Harvey Co. v................. 415 Manton, Relmar Holding Co. v................... 614 Mars, Edgar P. Lewis & Sons v.................... 611 Martin v. United States........................ 617 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kramer................ 611 Massachusetts, Carvill v....................... 587 Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States....................................... 269 McCarl, Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v............. 615 McDonnell v. United States..................... 420 McDonough, American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v.. 602 McDonough, Illinois ex rel., Cesar v........... 603 Meines v. United States........................ 616 McLaughlin, Pacific Coast Steel Co. v.......... 426 McLaughlin, Vincent v.......................... 618 Memphis Cotton Oil Co., United States v.......... 62 Michigan v. Illinois....................... 587, 594 Michigan, Wisconsin v...................... 588, 594 Michigan Artificial Ice Co., Westerlin & C. Co. v... 608 Miller v. Adethold............................. 206 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson........ 609 Moder, Ex parte................................ 587 Moder v. United States......................... 599 Morrison v. California......................... 591 Morton v. United States........................ 607 Munroe v. Raphael.............................. 485 Munson S. S. Line v. North of England S. S. Co.... 601 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XI Page Murmann, New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v......... 601 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace..... 249 Neely v. Stacy................................ 606 Nelson Bros. Bond & M. Co., Radio Comm’n v.....597 Nevada v Crown Willamette Paper Co............ 592 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage........... 608 New Jersey, Pennsylvania v................... 618 New York v. Illinois....................... 587,594 New York v. Irving Trust Co................... 329 New York v. Maclay............................ 290 New York & Albany Lighterage Co., N. Y. ex rei., v. Lynch....................................... 590 New York Central R. Co. v. The Talisman........ 239 New York ex rei. N. Y. & Albany L. Co. v. Lynch.. 590 New York ex rei. Rothenberg v. Lawes.......... 598 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Murmann......... 601 Nicholson v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co.......... 605 Northern Pacific Ry. Co., United States v......... 490 North of England S. S. Co., Munson S. S. Line v.... 601 North Shore Church, Radio Comm’n v............ 597 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States.. 294 Ohl (George A.) & Co. v. Smith Iron Works...... 170 Oregon, Washington v.......................... 592 Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., I. C. C. v......... 14 O’Shaughnessy v. Commissioner................. 605 Oursler, Hurn v.............................. 595 Pacific Coast Steel Co. v. McLaughlin......... 426 Palermo v. United States...................... 600 Parrish v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co........... 604 Pennsylvania, Dorrance v...................... 617 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey.................... 618 Pennsylvania R. Co., Bourke v................. 607 Pennsylvania R. Co v. Chamberlain............. 333 Perthur Holding Corp. v. Commissioner......... 616 Peter Barceloux Co., Buffum v..................595 Petroleum Exploration v. Burnet............... 467 Phelps, Union Bank & Trust Co. v.............. 181 XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page Pope v. United States......................... 610 Porter v. Commissioner........................ 436 Portia Law School, White v.................... 611 Power v. Commissioner................... ...... 612 Prentiss (Henry) & Co., United States v........... 73 Public Service Comm’n, Keystone Co. v......... 600 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co................... 476 Query, Broad River Power Co. v................ 178 Query, Lexington Water Power Co. v............ 178 Radio Investment Co. v. Federal Radio Comm’n.... 612 Raphael, Munroe v............................. 485 Ratta, Healy v................................ 593 Reinecke v. Smith............................. 596 Relmar Holding Co. v. Manton.................. 614 Rice, Vancouver Steamship Co. v............... 445 Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. McCarl............ 615 Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed..................... 603 Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.................. 275 Rogers, Capitol Iron & Metal Co. v............ 614 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co................... 123 Rosekay Amusement Corp. v. Kaplan............. 606 Rossi v. United States........................ 595 Rothenberg, N. Y. ex rel., v. Lawes........... 598 Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & M. Co... 596 Royal Milling Co., Federal Trade Comm’n v...... 212 Ruby v United States.......................... 617 Russell & Co., Puerto Rico v.................. 476 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Commissioner....... 604, 607 Savannah Sugar Rfg. Corp. v. United States..... 615 Schug v. Caldwell............................. 609 Seward National Bank v. Fierman.............. 613 Siegal v. United States....................... 602 S. & L. Bldg. Corp., Burnet v................. 406 Smith, Reinecke v.............................. 596 Smith, Spicer v............. i................... 430 Smith v. United States........................ 608 Smith (A. L.) Iron Works, George A. Ohl & Co. v.... 170 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. XIII Page Southeastern Investment Co. v. Tobler........... 609 Southern Ry. Co. v. Edgerton................... 605 Spicer v. Smith................................. 430 Stacy, Neely v.................................. 606 Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan.................... 606 Suffern National Bank & T. Co. v. Ash........... 614 Talisman, The, New York Central R. Co. v........ 239 Terminal Railroad' Assn., Central Transfer Co. v.... 469 Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Commissioner..... 604, 607 Terrell v. Louisiana............................ 589 Texas Co. v. United States...................... 604 Texas Pipe Line Co. v. United States............ 604 Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Goodcell......... 613 Tobler, Southeastern Investment Co. v............. 609 Trinity Methodist Church South v. Radio Comm’n.. 599 Truda v. United States.......................... 420 Tunnel Railroad v. Commissioner............. 604, 607 Uhlmann Grain Co., Dickson v188 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps................ 181 Union Solvents Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co....... 614 United Chromium, International Silver Co. v..... 600 United States v. Acme Operating Corp............ 243 United States, Appalachian Coals v.............. 344 United States, Backus v......................... 610 United States, Baker v........................... 602 United States, Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v............... 594 United States v. Chicago North Shore & M. R. Co... 1 United States, Consolidated Paper Co. v........... 615 United States, Cook v........................... 102 United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co.......... 459 United States, Daube v......................... 597 United States, Ellis v.................... i...... 607 United States v. Factors & Finance Co............ 89 United States, Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v...... 612 United States, Gaul v........... S. 616 United States, Gold v........................... 603 United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co............. 73 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. Page United States, Irving Trust Co. v............;t... 613 United States, James v......................... 613 United States, Martin v......................... 617 United States, Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v..... 269 United States, McDonnell v...................... 420 United States, Mclnes v......................... 616 United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co........... 62 United States, Moder v.......................... 599 United States, Morton v......................... 607 United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co........ 490 United States, Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.. 294 United States, Palermo v........................ 600 United States, Pope v........................... 610 United States, Rossi v.......................... 595 United States, Ruby v........................... 617 United States, Savannah Sugar Rfg. Corp, v...... 615 United States, Siegal v.......................... 602 United States, Smith v.......................... 608 United States, Texas Co. v...................... 604 United States, Texas Pipe Line Co. v.............. 604 United States, Truda v.......................... 420 United States, Viles v........................... 603 United States, Western Shade Cloth Co. v........ 610 United States, Westling v....................... 590 U. S. ex rel. Chestatee Pyrites & C. Corp., Wilbur v........................................... 97, 590 U. S. ex rel. Greathouse v. Hurley.............. 598 Vancouver Steamship Co. v. Rice................ 445 Viles v. United States.......................... 603 Vincent v. McLaughlin........................... 618 Virginia v. Appalachian Electric Power Co....... 613 Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Co................. 162 Wallace, Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v....... 249 Washington v. Oregon............................ 592 Webster v. Western Battery Supply Co............ 608 Weed, Rio Bravo Oil Co. v....................... 603 Weisman v. Irving Trust Co...................... 598 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. xv Page Westerlin & Campbell Co. v. Michigan Artificial Ice Co............................................... 608 Western Battery Supply Co., Hazelett Co. v........ 608 Western Battery Supply Co., Webster v............ 608 Western Loan & Bldg. Co., Nicholson v.............. 605 Western Shade Cloth Co. v. United States........... 610 Westling v. United States.......................... 590 White v. Portia Law School......................... 611 Whitlock Cordage Co., Lawson v................. 601 Wilbur v. U. S. ex rei. Chestatee Pyrites & C. Corp........................................ 97, 590 Williams v. Williams............................... 612 Williams, Williams v............................... 612 Wilson v. Borden................................... 615 Windsor Circuit Corp. v. Kaplan.................... 606 Wisconsin v. Illinois........................ 587, 594 Wisconsin v. Michigan......................... 588, 594 Witmer, Dorland v.................................. 616 W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., Harrisonville v........ 594 Zechiel, Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v................ 602 181684°—33-II TABLE OF CASES Cited, in Opinions Page Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 267 Addyston Pipe & S. Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 375 Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 418 278 Aiken v. Burnet, 282 U. S. 277 424 Akerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 158 Minn. 369 341 Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Jackson & E. Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244 34,38,241 Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 570 Almy v. California, 24 How. 169 227 Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 229,237 Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 516 Amaranth, The, 35 F. (2d) 872 109 American Column & L. Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 374 American Creosote Works v. Powell, 298 Fed. 417 145 American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500 539 American Sugar Rfg. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 570,585 Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449 . 484 Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373 571 Amsinck (G.) & Co. v. Springfield Grocer Co., 7 F. (2d) 855 211 Page Anderson v. Olivia State Bank, 186 Minn. 396 432 Andrews v. Guayaquil & Q. Ry. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 211 132 Andrus v. Cblumbia & O. Steamboat Co., 47 Wash. 333 241 Anglo-Patagonian, The, 235 Fed. 92 447,448 Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 262 Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185 484 Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158 263 Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1 539 Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226 570 Art Metal Construction Co. v. United States, 47 F. (2d) 558 72 Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 200 Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436 232 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Denver & N. O. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667 241 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 173 Cal. 577 41,51 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 319,492 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 206 U. S. 1 32 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502 591 XVII XVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U. S. 257 266 Atwater v. Edwards Brokerage Co., 147 Mo. App. 436 200 Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310 317 Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 226 Austin v. The Aidermen, 7 Wah. 694 544 Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14 130,145 Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 266,539 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 401 Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68 235 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baker, 287 U. S. 610 454 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481 475 Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Carroll, 280 U. S. 491 67 Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 328,515 Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316 68 Banton v. Belt Line Ry., ’268 U. S. 413 41 Barnett v. Kunkel, 264 U. S. ¹⁶ ⁴⁸⁴ Barrett v. Virginian Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 473 343 Bartlesville Zinc Co. v. Mellon, 56 F. (2d) 154 458 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602 284 Baxter v. Continental Casualty Co., 284 U. S. 578 591 Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Marsh, 282 U. S. 799 546 Beidler v. S. C. Tax Comm’n, 282 U. S. 1 401 Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 538,570 Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 577 242 Page Bentler v. Cincinnati, C. & E. 235 211 Ry. Co., 180 Ky. 497 43 Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148 143 Biddle v. Thiele, 11 F. (2d) 235 211 Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 571 Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441 308 Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U. S. 518 148 Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U. S. 571 483 Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 389,402 Blades v. Lawrence, L. R. 9 Q. B. 374 176 Blid v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 89 Neb. 689 339,341 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain Co., 198 U. S. 236 194 Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.1 199 Bonner, In re, 151 U. S. 242 211 Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 258 72 Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234 543 Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154 169 Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16 343 Bowsher v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 174 Mich. 339 341 Boyd, In re, 4 Sawyer 262 294 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U. S. 221 591 Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477 574 Brady v. Ham, 45 F. (2d) 454 440 Brady v. United States, 283 U. S. 804 458 Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 269 U. S. 483 435 Brent v. Bank of Washing- ton, 10 Pet. 596 294 Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327 13, 120, 315, 393, 466 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XIX Page Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 328 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 268 Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 396 50 Brown v. Butchers & Drovers Bank, 6 Hill 443 176 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 226,238 Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563 570 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U, S. 1 400,572 Bryant v. United States, 214 Fed. 51 211 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 547 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 287 Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 58,148 Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., 287 U. S. 544 154 Burnet v. Chicago Ry. Equipment Co., 282 U. S. 295 423,424 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 286 U. S. 393 328,516 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 443,444 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 284 Burnet v. Howes Bros. Hide Co., 284 U. S. 583 156 Burnet v. Petroleum Explor- ation, 61 F. (2d) 273 460 Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 130,144 Burns v. Burrows, 196 Iowa 1048 176 Butler v. Cantley, 47 S. W. (2d) 258 433 Butterfield v. Trittipo, 67 Ind. 338 341 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 304,305 Caldwell w. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 547 Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Co., 285 U. S. 413 130 Page Capital Nat. Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 286 U. S. 550 610 Carey v. Keith, 250 N. Y. 216 292 Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118 40 Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66 268,545 Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S. 95 266 Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674 546,591 Catagrone v. United States, 287 U. S. 574 592 Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453 60 Cement Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 374 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 570, 574 Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677 480 Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 283, 285,287,442,445 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massa- chusetts, 246 U. S. 147 547 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U. S. 209 343 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U. S. 218 278 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 242 U. S. 603 32 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35 37 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 120 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 360,361,370,377 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472 342 344 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.’ v. Public Util. Comm’n, 274 U. S'. 344 318 Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567 57,58 XX TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416 32 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 68 Chicago Title & T. Co. v. Newman, 187 Fed. 573 130 Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 433 176 Chiswick, The, 231 Fed. 452 448 Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 Ü. S. 292 328 Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531 181,328 Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196 174 Citizens Bank v. Owensboro, 172 U. S. 636 547 Citizens Nat. Bank v. Buck- heit, 14 Ala. App. 511 229 Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 570, 572,579 Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen, 262 S. W. 387 197,201 Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 441 Clark v. Life Association, 14 App. D. C. 154 130 Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258 591 Cohn v. Mishkoff Costello Co., 256 N. Y. 102 131,144 Commissioner v. City Button Works, 49 F. (2d) 705 155 Commissioner v. Ohio Falls Dye Works, 50 F. (2d) 660 87 Commissioner v. Shillito Realty Co., 39 F. (2d) 830 155 Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278 343 Compania General v. Collec- tor, 275 U. S. 87 574 Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386 294 Conery v. Creditors, 115 La. 807 176 Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126 197 Consolidated Underwriters v. Breedlove, 114 Tex. 172 170 Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7 144 Page Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261 226,583 Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 226,238 Cook v. Rome Brick Co., 98 Ala. 409 229 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S.;47 405 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434 59 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 283,284,285 Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549 590 Corry v. Barre Granite & Q. Co., 91 Vt. 413 145 Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 394 Corsair, The, 145 U. S. 335 447 Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341 273 Cover v. Burnet, 60 App. D. C. 303 440 Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227 479 Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498 195 Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi 257 U. S. 129 546 Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 225, 227,237,267 Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. 8. 189 200 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 166 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 227 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460 235 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 267 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Par-ramore, 263 U. S. 418 169 Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S. 23 539 Cummings v. Shipp, 156 Tenn. 595 260 Cunard S. S. Co. v. Kelley, 126 Fed. 610 341 Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100 116 Cymbor v. Binder Coal Co., 285 Pa. 440 170 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXI Page Dakota-Montana OH Co. v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 853 469 Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390 544 Davis v. Fanners Co-opera- tive Co., 262 U. S. 312 547 Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147 279 Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680 88 Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 41,48,51 Deauville, The, 49 F. (2d) 372 109 DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 390,393 De Harn v. Mexican Nat. Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68 447 De La Vergne Co. v. Savings Institution, 175 U. S. 40 556 Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co., 213 U. S. 435 144 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 588 Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 186 Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Tax Appeal Board, 287 U. S. 295 224,232,233 Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313 484 De Voe v. N. Y. State Railways, 218 N. Y. 318 169 Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102 57 Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494 489 Dilley v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 464 212 Director General v. Viscose Co., 254 U. S. 498 475 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 393, 398 District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U. S. 62 263 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 554 Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530 121 Page Dofnos Corp. v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 1401 540 Dolan’s Estate, In re, 279 Pa. St. 582 289 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 541 Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 588 Duckett (A. W.) & Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 149 247 Duncan’s Heirs v. United States, 7 Pet. 435 325 Dunham v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 70 Me. 164 241 Dunn, Ex parte, 50 S. D. 48 211 Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1 149 Eastern Air Transport v. Tax Commission, 285 U. S. 147 268 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 283 U. S. 465 229, 267,539 Eberhard v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 210 Fed. 520 130 Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 140 161 Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 232, 234,235 Edward Hines Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 58 Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson, 160 Mo. 516 197,200 Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578 390 Ellis v. Handley Mfg. Co., 214 Ala. 539 233 Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker, 202 Mo. App. 81 197 Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336 197 Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 539 Enfield v. Hills, 2 Lev. 236 172 Engel v. O’Malley, 219 U. S. 128 574 Engelhardt v. Al vino Realty Co., 248 N. Y. 374 292 Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 547 XXII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Ernst v. Rutherford & B. S. Gas Co., 38 App. Div. 388 145 Euclid v.’ Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 261,574 Evans v. Backer, 101 N. Y. 289 325 Ewart Lumber Co. v. American Cement Co., 9 Ala. App. 152 229 Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 339, 343 Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283 227 Fairbanks v. Beard, 247 Mass. 8 176 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 261 Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N. Y. 199 151 Farish & Co. v. Commis-sioner, 31 F. (2d) 79 157 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 389,401,402 Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 13,315 Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 262 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615 217 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cassoff, 38 F. (2d) 790 217 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 217 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 216 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 216 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Winsted Co., 258 U. S. 483 216, 217 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426 228 Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123 259,263,264 Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Hanson, 287 U. S. 599 610 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 262,305,308 Page First Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341 186 First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 401,402 First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 546 Fleischmann Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 349 418 Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29 ' 59 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 232, 233,400,571,590 Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 292 Fluegelman & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 37 F. (2d) 59 217 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 396 Ford v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 339 109 Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593 118,119 Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. hr- kansas, 251 U. S. 532 571,590 Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412 265 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 180,328 Frances Louise, The, 1 F. (2d) 1004 109 Frazier v. Georgia Railroad & B. Co., 108 Ga. 807 341 Fresh v. Gilson. 16 Pet. 327 341 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 402,405 Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 207 69 Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U. S. 515 576, 579 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583 229 Gallardo v. Havemeyer, 21 F. (2d) 1012 482 Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson, 282 U. S. 638 463 Ganzer v. Rosenfeld, 153 Wis. 442 145 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXIII Page Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Rfg. Co., 283 U. S. 494 259 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 148 Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 121 General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U. S. 367 267 General Investment Co. v. American Hide & L. Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 230 141 General Investment Co. v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 23 F. (2d) 822 476 General Investment Co. v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228 475 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211 266 Generes v. Campbell, 11 Wall. 193 173 George v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 213 Mo. App. 668 341 Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U. S. 516 263 Germania Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S. 473 484 Gibbs v. R. H. Macy & Co., 214 App. Div. 335; 242 N. Y. 551 170 Gilchrist v. Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 60 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 328,516 Gilmour v. Dorman, Long & Co., 105 L. T. (N. S.) 54 169 Glancy v. McKees Rocks Borough, 243 Pa. 216 340 Glenn v. Doyal, 285 U. S. 526 592 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N. Y. 483 141 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 238 Godchaux Co. v. Estopinal, 251 U. S. 179 589 Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451 260 Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199 483 Page Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 258 U. S. 22 287 Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 262 Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45 243 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 286 Grathwohl v. Nassau Club Properties, 216 App. Div. 107 169 Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425 588 Great Northern Ry'. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340 41 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Rfg. Co., 287 U. S. 358 59 Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449 480 Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 579 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 266,539 Guaranty Title Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152 331 Gusta vino Co. v. Comerma, 184 Fed. 549 218 Guilford v. Western Union, 59 Minn. 332 130 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 576 Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Wells, 275 U. S. 455 ' 344 Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90 343 Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224 443,445 Hall’s Estate, In re, 99 N. J. L. 1 289 Hammers v. United States, 279 Fed. 265 211 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322 546 Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331 574 Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 305, 571 Hancock v. Rogers, 140 Ga. 688 212 XXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U. S. 136 154 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 543 Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151 543 Harrell v. American Home Mortgage Co., 161 Tenn. 646 260 Harriss v. Tams, 258 N. Y. 229 67 Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499 266 Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169 610 Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1 194 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 285 Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52 287 Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 226 Heine v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 F. (2d) 382 131 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 400,444 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 180 Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245 267,268 Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 544 Hennings v. United States, 13 F. (2d) *74 109 Herbert v. Butler, 97 U. S. 319 173,343 Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall’s Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554 217 Hiff v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 199 Hodges v. Hamblen County, 152 Tenn. 395 260 Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 444 Hoggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269 210,212 Hogue v. American Steel Foundries, 247 Pa. 12 130 Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234 243 Page Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Comm’n, 192 Cal. 307 41,51 Holmes v. Camp Co., 219 N. Y. 359 132 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 575 Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 232,233 Homestead, The, 7 F. (2d) 413 122 Hood Co. v. McCune, 235 S. W. 158 200 Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486 484 Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305 544, 546 Howard v. United States, 184 U. S. 676 489 Hump Hairpin Co. v. Em- merson, 258 U. S. 290 235 Ice Service Co. v. Commis- sioner, 30 F. (2d) 230 155 Idaho & Oregon Land Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 509 174 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190 573 Illinois Central R. Co. v. I. C. C., 206 U. S. 441 50 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Mulberry Coal Co., 238 U. S. 275 457 Illinois Surety Co. v. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214 489 Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442 343 Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, 288 U. S. 325 514 Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522 328 Interborough Transit Co. v. Sohmer, 237 U. S. 276 590 International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 234 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 333 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 57, 287 International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 227 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXV Page Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 267 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. B. & O. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263 23 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. B. & 0. R. Co., 225 U. S. 326 23 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 108 41 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. C., R. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88 23 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42 474 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 23 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Los Angeles, 280 U. 8. 52 35 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. 8. 88 319 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178 13,315 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222 U. 8. 541 318 lowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 188 536,539,575 Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. 8. 499 197 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. 8. 22 57 Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592 130 Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. 8. 609 327 Jellenik v. Huron Copper Co., 177 U. 8. 1 132 Jett v. Turner, 215 Ala. 352 170 Johnson v. Fleet Corp., 280 U. 8. 320 27 Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225 284,289 Jones v. Portland, 245 U. 8. 217 579 Page Judson v. Western Railroad Corp., 6 Allen 487 243 Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93 490 Kansas City, F. 8. & M. Ry. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U. 8. 227 232,267,546 Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 182 Ala. 138 233 Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. 8. Ill 232, 233, 235, 267 Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525 572 Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 539 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. 8. 428 262, 318 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Exchange, 262 U. 8. 544 536,576 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 121 Kimball v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 7 130,131 Kimmel’s Estate, 278 Pa. 435 176 King v. West Virginia, 216 U. S. 92 541 Kinney v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 222 U. 8. 283 175 Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568 226 Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 480 Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 445 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. 8. 226 490 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 400,572 Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 396 Knox’s Estate, 131 Pa. St. 220 176 Krauss Bros. Co. v. Mellon, 276 U. 8. 386 173 Kroger Grocery Co. v. Yount, 287 U. 8. 574 592 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. 8. 349 58 La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423 263 XXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 479 Lake Shore Tel. & Tel. Co. v. De Groat, 109 Minn. 168 145 Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452 434 Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581 588 Lancaster v. Kathleen Oil Co., 241 U. S. 551 484 Lancaster Cotton Mills v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 270 72 Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531 131 Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, 235 U. S. 461 59 Lawrence v. Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 543, 577,590 Lehigh & W. B. Coal Co. v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 637 72 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115 480 Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 70,86 Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 331 Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U. S. 654 458 L’Hote v. Crowell, 286 U. S. 528 166 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 262 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers Assn., 276 U. S. 71 262,544,579 Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 536 Littlefield’s Case, 126 Me. 159 170 Liverpool Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566 482 Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613 13,315 Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178 234,547 Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 263 Page Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. 8. 409 547 Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Leston, 2 How. 497 479,482 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 572,584 Louisville & J. F. Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 402 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Alabama, 248 U. S. 533 233, 235 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. East Tenn., V. & G. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 993 339 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co., 242 U. S. 288 458 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Parker, 287 U. S. 569 610 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 201 Ala. 317 233 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 740 273 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Williams, 113 Ala. 402 447 Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445 160,161 Lusk v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 236 • 232 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 262 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 396 Maclay v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 152 U. S. 499 434 Magoun v. Illinois T. & S.⁻ Bank, 170 U. S. 283 572 Maguire v. Mortgage Co., 203 Fed. 858 144 Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193 149 Malony v. Adsit, 175 U. S. 281 173,174 Manning v. Spry, 121 Iowa 191 433 Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457 318 Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 360,374,375 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXVII Page Marion Phillis, The, 36 F. (2d) 688 109 Marjorie E. Bachman, The, 4 F. (2d) 405 109 Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90 170 Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314 479 Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 293,330 Martin v. Card & Co., 193 App. Div. 6 170 Martin v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F. (2d) 840 434 Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670 419 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 261 Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525 60,61 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 61 Maul v. United States, 274 U. S. 501 113 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 572 May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 226 McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Dis- trict Court, 141 Minn. 61 170 McCaughn v. Hershey Choc- olate Co., 283 U. S. 488 120, 273 McClelland v. Dodge Bros., 233 App. Div. 504 170 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 400,571 McCuing v. Bovay, 60 F. (2d) 375 174 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 328 McDonnell v. United States, 288 U. S. 420 426,429 McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 204 Fed. 998 483 McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 340 McKesson & Robbins v. Ed- wards, 57 F. (2d) 147 72 McLaughlin Bros. v. Hallo- well, 228 U. S. 278 479 McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass. 497 170 Means v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 748 289 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412 458 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 141 Merchants Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443 176 Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501 474 Merino, The, 9 Wheat. 391 122 Messer v. Manufacturers Light & H. Co., 263 Pa. 5 170 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 514 Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322 174 Michel v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 38 72 Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334 224,233 Michigan v. Wisconsin, 272 U. S. 398 263 Michigan Central R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 236 U. S. 615 32 Midurban Realty Co. v. F. Dee & L. Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 307 293 Miller v. Dental Examiners, 90 Colo. 193 588 Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463 260 Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53 32 Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373 27 Minnesota v. Northern Secu- rities Co., 194 U. S. 48 484 Mintie v. Biddle, 15 F. (2d) 931 210 Miss C. B., The, 59 F. (2d) 744 109 Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40 588 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Commissioners, 183 U.S. 53 484 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 200 XXVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570 68 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262 32 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 33 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196 41 Mistinguette, The, 27 F. (2d) 738 109 Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U. S. 247 458 Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35 591 Moffit v. Kelley, 218 U. S. 400 591 Moore-Mansfield Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U. S. 619 58 Morgan Run Ry. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 98 Oh. St. 218 41 Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135 574 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U. S. 304 457 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 574 Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 466 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 259,261,262 Mussina v. Cavazos, 6 Wall. 355 173 My rick v. Michigan Central R. Co., 107 U. S. 102 241 Nagle v. Loi Hoa, 275 U. S. 475 120 Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165 172 Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 360 Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, 162 Tenn. 356 260 National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 273 National Newark & E. Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74 284 Neace v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 739 . 212 Page Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 294 447 Nesbitt v. Twin City Co., 145 Minn. 286 169 New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 41 New Jersey v. Anaerson, 203 U. S. 483 331 New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 262 N. J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344 243 N. J. Telephone Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338 229 Newton Bay, The, 30 F. (2d) 444 100 New York v. North River Sugar Co., 121 N. Y. 582 561 New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 227 New York & Albany Lighter- age Co. v. Lynch, 288 U.S. 590 577 New York Central R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U. S. 486 340, 344 New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340 69 New York ex rel. Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, U. S. 244 39 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 200 U. S. 361 13 New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345 39, 45,46 New York Terminal Co. v. Gaus, 204 N. Y. 512 293 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 400,444 Nickel v. Cole, 256 U. S. 222 592 Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 112 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub- lic Serv. Comm’n, 265 U. S. 70 32 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39 318 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXIX Page Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dustin, 142 U. S. 492 43 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585 33,41,50 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526 484 North State C. & G. Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151 130 Norton Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 664 87 O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 536,543,583,586 Ohio Leather Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 45 F. (2d) 39 217 Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S.146 180,186 Ohmen v. Adams Bros., 109 Conn. 378 170 Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 IT. S. 606 112 Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U. S. 21 263 Oklahoma Nat. Gas. Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 88 Okla. 51 39 Oklahoma Power Co., In re, 141 Okla. 100 56 Okmulgee v.' Okmulgee Gas Co., 140 Okla. 88 56,59 Okmulgee Gas Co., In re, 141 Okla. 98 56 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 262,263,264 Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 .33 Origet v. Hedden, 155 U. S. 228 317 Origet v. United States, 125 U. S. 240 174 Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 485 Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 586 Over the Top, The, 5 F. (2d) 838 109 Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664 186 Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 251 574 Page Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 224, 229,236 Pacific American Fisheries Co. v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269 572 Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 232,234 Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1 485 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. y. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 262 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 473 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 284,461 Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio 471 176 Panama, The, 6 F. (2d) 326 109 Paramount Famous Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 360 Patch v. Wabash R. Co., 207 U. S. 277 479 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 591 Patterson & Co. v. Lawrence, 8.3 Ga. 703 441 Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 658 343 Pearce v. Sutherland, 164 Fed. 609 144 Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 237 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 544 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co., 238 U. S. 456 458 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121 457 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Son-man Coal Co., 242 U. S. 120 457 Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 361 242,474 People v. Bork, 78 N. Y. 346 211 People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304 588 People v. Rivera Zayas, 29 P. R. 423 481 People ex ret. C. P. R. Co. v. Willcox, 194 N.Y. 383 318 Perry v. Elizabethton, 160 Tenn. 102 260 XXX TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Pescawha, The, 45 F. (2d) 221 109 Petroleum Exploration v. Burnet, 288 U. S. 467 516 Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 225, 237 Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513 176 Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277 32 Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 286 U. S. 299 10 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 261 Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356 176 Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 144 561 Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116 343 Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 236 Pocono Pines Hotels Co., Ex parte, 285 U. S. 526 263 Podgorski v. Kerwin, 144 Minn. 313 169 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 273 Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 287 U. S. 346 57 Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225 591 Porto Rico Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Mor, 253 U. S. 345 478 Postal Telegraph Co. v. Ala- bama, 155 U. S. 482 484 Postum Cereal Co. v. Cali- fornia Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693 262 Powell v. United Association, 240 N. Y. 616 130 Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 536 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210 318 Price v. Barnes, 300 Mo. 216 197 Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 226 Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492 291 Page Public Service Comm’n v. Batesville Telephone Co., 284 U. S. 6 591 Public Service Comm’n v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 Md. 478 41 Puffenbarger v. Charter, 165 S. E. 541 432,436 Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574 50 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 571,576 Quick Service Tire Co. v. Smith, 156 Tenn. 96 265 Quintana Bros. & Co. v. S. Ramirez & Co., 22 P. R. 707 481 Quisenberry v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 142 Mo. App. 275 340 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 570,571 Rachmil v. United States, 288 Fed. 782 211 Ragsdale v. Southern Ry. Co. 121 Fed. 924 341 Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U. S. 79 43 Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U. S. 145 . ₑ 148 Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331 38,46 Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 380 38 Railroad Co. v. Manufactur- ing Co., 16 Wall. 318 241,243 Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135 484 Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 181,328,516 Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 543, 544,561 Rashall v. Railroad, 249 Mo. 509 341 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 570 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXI Page Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 200 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 288, 442,445 Resolution, The, 30 F. (2d) 534 109 Richmond, The, 9 Cranch 102 122 Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218 490 Riordon v. McCabe, 341 Ill. 506 194 Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 378 148, 261 Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 547 Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50 544 Rock County v. Industrial Comm’n, 185 Wis. 134 170 Rock Island A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141 .92 Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Mise. 306 147 Rogers v. Hill, 60 F. (2d) 109 133 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114 589 Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 191 447 Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 80 479 Russell v. United States, 278 U. S. 181 425,428 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 40,400,575 Sadler v. Mitchell, 162 Tenn. 363 260 Sagatind, The, 11 F. (2d) 673 109 St. Louis Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269 574 St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 50 St Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545 479 181684°—33——hi Page St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Middlekamp, 256 U. S. 226 267 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 232, 235 267 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 264 U. S. 64 319 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U. S. 157 268,573 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446 176 Salomon v. Tax Comm’n, 278 U. S. 484 572 Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 283,285,287 Samnanger, The, 298 Fed. 620 448 Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen 474 176 Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 363 130 Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 200 Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 294 Savory, Re, 15 Jur. 1042 176 Schlafly v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 195 155 Schneider Granite Co. v. Gas Realty Co., 245 U. S. 288 541 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290 67 Seiliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200 227 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 237 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 200 Shippee v. Commercial Trust Co., 115 Conn. 326 436 Shipping Board v. Greenwald, 16 F. (2d) 948 448 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505 483 Shriver v. Woodbine Bank, 285 U. S. 467 59 Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561 . 484 Siler v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 148 Sim v. Edenborn, 242 U. S. 131 58,59 XXXII TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 570, 571 Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238 57, 58 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 200 Small Co. v. Lambom & Co., 267 U. S. 248 343 Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56 482 Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 99 Mass. 605 340 Smith v. Geiger, 202 N. Y. 306 176 Smith v. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349 176 Smith v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 132 Kan. 233 434, 436 Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 448 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 . 318 Solomon v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 150 72 Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 . 227,539 Sorenson v. Security Bank, 121 Neb. 521 433 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 285 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Cal- houn, 287 Fed. 381 39,51 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. California, 118 U. S. 109 484 Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 536,543 Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U. S. 190 340,341 Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519 237,267 Southern Ry. Co. v. Young- blood, 286 U. S. 313 279 South Spring Hill G. M. Co. v. Amador Medean G. M. Co., 145 U. S. 300 261 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114 538, 570,585 Spillman v. First State Bank, 121 Neb. 515 432 Page Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 291 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 585 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 229,267 Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 275 U. S. 504 579 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 360 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 235 360,377 Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540 544 Stange v. United States, 282 U. S. 270 424 State v. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Corp., 142 So. 87 233 State v. Bongiorno, 96 N. J. L. 318 211 State v. Christopher, 318 Mo. 225 197,201 State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512 201 State v. Lawrence Bridge Co., 22 Kan. 438 59 State v. Long, 261 Mo. 314 196 State v. National Cash Credit Assn., 224 Ala. 629 223,233 State v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 287 Mo. 522 39,43 State v. Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457 211 State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 89 Cal. App. 197 170 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 585 Stevens v. The White City, 285 U. S. 195 340,344 Stines v. Dillman, 4 S. W. (2d) 477 341 Stock v. Mann, 255 N. Y. 100 293 Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 284 Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 484 Stover v. Wood, 28 N. J. Eq. 253 149 Stratford v. City Council, 110 Ala, 619 229 TABLE OF CASES CITED XXXIII Page Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 530 61 Stude, In re Estate of, 179 Iowa 785 434 Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312 88 Successors of M. Lamadrid & Co. v. Torrens, Martorell & Co., 28 P. R. 824 481 Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Tow- ing Co., 287 U. S. 291 242 Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305 544 Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18 57 Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 266 Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 283 U. S. 291 181,328 Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 484 Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn. 87 170 Symington v. State, 133 Md. 452 211 Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369 570 Tax Commissioners v. Jack- son, 283 U. S. 527 180, 532,542,583,584,585 Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42 434 Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197 121 Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582 260 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 261 Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 547 Texas v. I. C. C., 258 U. S. 158 261,262 Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466 539 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Mil- ler, 221 U. S. 408 547 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sa- bine Tram Co., 227 U. S. Ill 266 Page Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 475 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 37,39,44 Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19 227 Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 293 Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 561 Thomas v. Trustees, 195 U. S. 207 480 Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579 ' 328 Throndyke, The, 53 F. (2d) 239 109 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 59 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 57,287 Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U. S. 360 37 Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259 131,145 Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 294 Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U. S. 228 71 Tucker Stevedoring Co. v. Gahagan 6 F. (2d) 407 339 Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 283,287,443,445 Tyson v. Jennings Produce Co., 16 Ala. App. 374 229 Unadilla Valley Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 139 279 Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 F. (2d) 893 421 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 237 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285 68 Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 402, 403,573 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 105 W. Va. 603 39 XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 278 U. S. 300 45,46,50 United States, Ex parte, 242 U. S. 27 209 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 374 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 360 United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 231 U. S. 274 474 United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299 403 United States v. Birmingham T. & S. Bank, 258 Fed. 562 331 United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94 122 United States v. Canal Bank, 3 Story 79 294 United States v. Cargo ex British Schooner Patara, 40 F. (2d) 74 109 United States v. Cleveland, P. & E. R. Co., 42 F. (2d) 413 155,156 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 375 United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 469,516 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 400 United States v. Duncan, 4 McLean 607 294 United States v. Elliott, 57 F. (2d) 843 331 United States v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 283 U. S. 269 71 United States v. Ferris, 19 F. (2d) 925 109 United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 288,441,442 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358 292 United States v. G. Falk & Bro, 204 U. S. 143 120 United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343 435 United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co, 288 U. S. 73 93,506 United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1 227 Page United States v. International Harvester Co, 274 U. S. 693 376 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 49 United States v. Joint Traffic Assn, 171 U. S. 505 475 United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477 263 United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568 40,49 United States v. Lecato, 29 F. (2d) 694 210 United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 174,592 United States v. Memphis Oh Co, 288 U. S. 62 83,93,96 United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179 286 United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760 315 United States v. Mulligan, 48 F. (2d) 93 210 United States v. New River Co, 265 U. S. 533 457 United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253 292 United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446 120 United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 122 United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 120 United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F. (2d) 387 109 United States v. 63 Kegs of Malt, 27 F. (2d) 741 . 109 United States v. Terminal Assn, 224 U. S. 383 377 United States v. Texas, 162 U. S. 1 112 United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486 331 United States v. Trans-Mis-souri Freight Assn, 166 U. S. 290 475 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co, 273 U. S. 392 375 United States v. Union Pacific R. Co, 226 U. S. 61, 470 28 United States v. U. S. Steel Corp, 251 U. S. 417 376,574 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXV Page United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 247 United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102 444 United States v. Worley, 281 U. S. 339 592 U. S. Express (Do. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 267 U. S. ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. Tariff Comm’n, 274 U. S. 106 • 302 U. S. Fidelity & G. Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S. 205 332 U. S. Fidelity & G. Co. v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, 145 Fed. 273 339 U. S. Fidelity & G. Co. v. Kenyon, 204 U. S. 349 489 U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 227,237 U. S. Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 807 141 Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 181 Van Cbtt v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45 284 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 Fed. 260 447 Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225 333 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 571 Villere v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 409 331 Vinces, The, 20 F. (2d) 164 109 Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 50 Vogel’s Case, 257 Mass. 3 170 Wabash R. Co. v. De Tar, 141 Fed. 932 341 Wagner Tugboat Co. v. Meagher, 287 U. S. 657 610 Walker v. Moser, 117 Fed. 230 211 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 125 589 Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 235 Wallace v. Motor Products Corp., 25 F. (2d) 655 130, 144 Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 651 141 Page Ware v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 92 Ala. 145 229 Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526 218 Warshawsky & Co. v. A. Warshawsky & Co., 257 Ill. App. 571 218 Wason v. Buzzell, 181 Mass. 338 144 Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333 161 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 574 Wells v. Commissioner, 286 U. S. 529 592 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 547 Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439 141 Weschler v. United States, 27 F. (2d) 850 331 Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511 235 Western Union v. Gottlieb, 190 U. S. 412 181,267 Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 232,234,236,547 Western Union v. Massachu- setts, 125 U. S. 530 181 Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256 435 Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424 176 Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 33 F. (2d) 390 476 White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367 592 White v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 N. Y. 131 340 White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692 590 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190 119 Wilbur v. Vindicator Consolidated G. M. Co., 284 U. S. 231 100 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 181,226,328,514 William Filene’s Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 .332 Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79 574 xxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Page Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 271 570 Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 181 Williamson v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 56 F. (2d) 503 129,132 Williamsport Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551 84, 93,95, 505,506 Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U. S. 274 262 Wilson v. Merchants Loan & Trust Co., 183 U. S. 121 419 Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo, 236 U. S. 635 484 Winans v. Attorney-General, [1910] A. C. 27 396 Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U. S. 403 360,377 Page Wineburgh v. U. S. Steam & St. Ry. Advertising Co., 173 Mass. 60 145 Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287 32, 241 Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 269 U.S. 244 45,46 Wood & Henderson, In re, 210 U. S. 246 332 Woodruff v.- Painter & Eldridge, 150 Pa. 91 242 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. 10 399 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 . 591 York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107 243 Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354 173 TABLE OF STATUTES • Cited in Opinions (A) Statutes of the United States Page 1790, Aug. 4, c. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145.............. 113 1799, Mar. 2, c. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627 ............. 113 1815, Mar. 3, 3 Stat. 224.... 308 1817, Mar. 3, c. 39, 3 Stat. 361.................... 308 1824, Jan. 7, c. 4, 4 Stat. 3.. 308 1830, May 31, c. 219, 4 Stat. 425.................... 308 1872, June 1, c. 255, § 4, 17 Stat. 197.............. 173 1882, May 15, c. 145, 22 Stat. 64................. 309 1882, July 12, c. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162.............. 485 1884, June 26, c. 121, 23 Stat. 57..................... 3os 1887, Feb. ’4* c.' ¡04,’ § Y, ’ 24 Stat. 379 (as amend- ed) ................... 499 1887, Feb. ’ 4,' c.' 104,’ § 2, ’24 Stat. 379............... 24 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379.... 241,456,499 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 5, 24 Stat. 379............... 24 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 8, 24 Stat. 379.............. 456 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 9, 24 Stat. 379.......... 456,458 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 15a, 24 Stat. 379.............. 493 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 15a (2), 24 Stat. 379............ 51 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 16 (1), 24 Stat. 379........... 456 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 16 (2), 24 Stat. 379.. 456,458,459 Page 1887, Feb. 4, c. 104, § 16 (3) (f), 24 Stat. 379...... 458 1890, July 2, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209........... 356 1890, Oct. 1, c. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 ................... 309 1898, June 13, c. 448, § 29, 30 Stat. 464........... 390 1898, July 1, c. 541, §§ 2, 64, 57 (n), 30 Stat. 544 331 1900, June 5, c. 717, 31 Stat. 270 .................. 173 1908, Apr. 22, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 ................ 277,333 1909, Aug. 5, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11 ................ 309,310 1909, Aug. 5, c. 6, § 37, 36 Stat. 112...............403 1910, June 18, c. 309, §§ 1-6, 36 Stat. 539............ 23 1913, Oct. 22, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208 .................... 23 1914, Sept. 26, c. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717............ 213 1914, Oct. 15, c. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 737. 470,473,474 1915, Jan. 28, c. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803.............. 485 1916, Sept. 8, c. 463, § 12 (b) Second, 39 Stat. 756 ................... 463 1916, Sept. 8, c. 463, § 203 (b), 39 Stat. 756...... 389 1916, Sept. 8, c. 463, §§ 706, 708, 39 Stat. 756...... 307 1917, Mar. 2, c. 145, §§ 2, 41, 42, 39 Stat. 951....... 478 1917, May 29, c. 23, 40 Stat. 101..................... 34 XXXVII XXXVIII TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page 1917, June 15, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182 ................... 244 1917, Oct. 3, c. 63, § 207, 40 Stat. 300............... 95 1917, Oct. 3, c. 63, § 210, 40 Stat. 300............... 91 1917, Oct. 6, c. 105, 40 Stat. 405 ................... 431 1918, Sept. 8, c. 463, §§ 700, 702, 703, 706, 707, 39 Stat. 756.............. 310 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 214 (a) (4) (5) (6), 40 Stat. 1057 .................. 159 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 234 (a)(7), 40 Stat. 1057. 464 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 234 (a) (9), 40 Stat. 1057. 460, 461,465 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 240, 40 Stat. 1057........ 153 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 301, 40 Stat. 1057.......... 504 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 327, 40 Stat. 1057 . 81,503,504 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 327 (a), 40 Stat. 1057 .......... 95 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 327 (d), 40 Stat. 1057.. 84, 94, 505,506 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 328, 40 Stat. 1057.. 81,503,504 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 402 (c), 40 Stat. 1057... 288 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 403 (b) , 40 Stat. 1057... 390 1919, Feb. 24, c. 18, § 403 (b)(3), 40 Stat. 1057. 394 1920, Feb. 28, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456 ................. 43,47 1920, Feb. 28, c. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 456....... 34 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 214 (a)(7), 42 Stat. 227.. 162 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 234 (a)(7), 42 Stat. 227.. 464 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 234 (a)(9), 42 Stat. 227 . 460, 461,466 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, §§ 242- 247, 42 Stat. 227...... 271 Page 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 250 (d) , 42 Stat. 227 . 421, 422,424,427,428 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 252, 42 Stat. 227 ......... 84 1921, Nov. 23, 136, § 402 (c), 42 Stat. 227.... 288 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 403 (b), 42 Stat. 227.... 390 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 403 (b) (3), 42 Stat. 227. 395 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 1318, 42 Stat. 227......... 66 1921, Nov. 23, c. 136, § 1331, 42 Stat. 227......... 152 1922, Sept. 21, c. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858 .... 297,302 1922, Sept. 21, c. 356, § 501, 42 Stat. 858......... 316 1922, Sept. 21, c. 356, § 581, 42 Stat. 858........ 107, 109,110,118,119 1922, Sept. 21, c. 369, 42 Stat. 998............. 191 1923, Mar. 4, c. 267, 42 Stat. 1499 ................. 184 1923, Mar. 4, c. 276, 42 Stat. 1504 .................. 66 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 204 (c) , 43 Stat. 253 . 461,466 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 234 (a)(7), 43 Stat. 253 . 464 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 234 (a)(8), 43 Stat. 253 . 460 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 240 (c)(1), 43 Stat. 253. 155 1924, June 2, c. 234, §§ 242- 247, 43 Stat. 253.... 271 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 277 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 253.. 422 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 278 (c) , 43 Stat. 253 .. 424 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 278 (e) , 43 Stat. 253.... 421, 499 49? 49fi 1924, June 2, c. 234, §§ 301,’ 302, 303, 304, 43 Stat. 253....... , 3§7 1924, June 2,’ c. *234,’ § *302 (d) ,(h), 43 Stat. 253 . 287 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 303 (b) , 43 Stat. 253... 390 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. XXXIX Page 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 315, 43 Stat. 253 ........ 285 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 319, 43 Stat. 253..... 282,444 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 320, 43 Stat. 253 ........ 282 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 322, 43 Stat. 253......... 286 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 324, 43 Stat. 253......... 285 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 1011, 43 Stat. 253 ......... 84 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 1100 (b) , 43 Stat. 253.... 428 1924, June 2, c. 234, § 1100 (d), 43 Stat. 253 ..... 428 1924, June 7, c. 320, 43 Stat. 607 ................... 431 1924, June 7, c. 320, § 21 (1), (2) (3), 43 Stat. 607 ................... 433 1924, June 7, c. 320, § 22, 43 Stat. 607 .......... 433 1924, June 7, c. 320, § 26, 43 Stat. 607.......... 433,434 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936 ........... 589,591,593 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, § 8 (a), 43 Stat. 936........... 607 1925, Feb. 13, c. 229, § 12, 43 Stat. 936......... 485 1925, Mar. 4, c. 553, § 20, 43 Stat. 1312..............434 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 200 (d), 44 Stat. 9.........271 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 204 (c) , 44 Stat. 9......460 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 212, 44 Stat. 9.................409 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 214 (a)(2), 44 Stat. 9... 271 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 230, 44 Stat. 9...........409 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 232, 44 Stat. 9............409 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 234 (a)(2), 44 Stat. 9.... 271 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 234 (a)(7), 44 Stat. 9... 464 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 234 (a)(8), 44 Stat. 9... 460, 461,468 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 240 (c), (d), 44 Stat. 9.. 155 Page 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, §§ 242- 247, 44 Stat. 9.........271 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 245, 44 Stat. 9............269 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 245 (a) (8), 44 Stat. 9.... 275 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 284, 44 Stat. 9............ 84 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 284 (b) , 44 Stat. 9....... 66 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 301 (a) , 44 Stat. 9.......441 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 302, 44 Stat. 9............441 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 302 (d), 44 Stat. 9.........439 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 303, 44 Stat. 9............441 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 303 (b) , 44 Stat. 9.......393 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 303 (d), (e), 44 Stat. 9... 394 1926, Feb. 26, c. 27, § 1113, 44 Stat. 9.............. 84 1926, Feb 26, c. 27, § 1208, 44 Stat. 9..............410 1926, Mar. 25, c. 88, 44 Stat. 923 1S4- 1926, May 27, ’ c.’ 406,’ § 13, 44 Stat. 666 .......... 331 1926, July 2, c. 723, § 2, 44 Stat. 791.............. 433 1926, July 2, c. 723, § 3, 44 Stat. 791.............. 434 1927, Feb. 25, c. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224............. 546 1927, Mar. 4, c. 503, 44 Stat. 1421 .................. 482 1928, Apr. 23, c. 411, 45 Stat. 447 ................... 482 1928, May 17, c. 623, 45 Stat. 600 ................... 165 1928, May 29, c. 852, § 141 (d), 45 Stat. 791.......155 1928, May 29, c. 852, §§ 201- 205, 45 Stat. 791...... 271 1928, May 29, c. 875, § 2, 45 Stat. 964.............. 433 1929, Feb. 13, c. 182, 45 Stat. 1166.................... 98 1930, June 7, c. 497, §§ 330- 336, 46 Stat. 590...... 314 1930, June 7, c. 497, § 581, 46 Stat. 590.. 107,110,119 XL TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Page 1930, June 7, c. 497, § 584, 46 Stat. 590......... 108 1930, June 7, c. 497, § 594, 46 Stat. 590......... 108 1930, July 3, c. 849, § 21, 46 Stat. 991............ 434 1930, July 3, c. 849, § 21 (3), 46 Stat. 991....... 434 1932, June 6, c. 209, § 141 (d), 47 Stat. 169.... 155 1932, June 6, c. 209, §§ 201- 205, 47 Stat. 169.... 271 1932, June 6, c. 209, § 501 (c), 47 Stat. 169.... 283 1932, June 6, c. 209, § 510, 47 Stat. 249 ...... 285 1933, Feb. 25, 47 Stat. 907.. 546 Constitution. See Index at end of volume. Judicial Code. (See also, U. S. Code, Title 28.) §24.................... 478 §28.................... 478 §237 (a)........... 258,589 §237 (c)............... 589 §240 (b)............... 591 §265................... 488 §266................... 593 Revised Statutes. §649................... 418 §700 .................. 418 §953................... 173 §954................... 174 §3067.................. 113 §3466 ..... 291,432,433,435 §5219.................. 184 U. S. Code. Title 15, §26.......470,473 §45........... 213 Title 16, c. 12........ 180 Title 19, §§ 91, 96, 97, 100, 101.. 310 §381.......... 316 U. S. Code—Continued. Page Title26, §1094 (d).... 439 §§ 1131, 1132.. 282 §1134................. 286 §1136 (]).... 285 Title 28, §41..........478 §41 (16).....485 §41 (27),(28). 23 §42 ........ 485 §§43-48....... 23 §71..........478 §350........ 607 §379........ 488 §380. 179,356,593 §391.... 174,177 §773........ 418 §776....... 173 §777........ 174 §875........ 418 Title 31, §191... 291,432 Title 33, §§901-950.. 165 §919 (a).... 166 §933........ 446 Title 38, §450 .. 433,434 §451........ 434 §454........ 433 §§471-502 ... 431 §501 (a).....434 §§511-518.....431 §556........ 434 Title 45, §51.........280 Title 49, c. 1........473 §1 (6)......474 §1 (18).... 47,48 §3 (3)......474 §6 (1)......475 §6 (3)......475 §12..........473 §12 (1)...... 6 §15 (7).....475 §20 (a)....6,48 Supp. V, Title 28, §§ 41 (27), 44,45, 45 (a), 46, 47, 47 (a), 48........ 23 (B) Statutes of the States and Territories Alabama. Page Constitution, §§ 211, 217. 185 §232...... 223 Constitution, 1887, Art. 13................... 550 1867, Rev. Code, pt. 2, c. 3, § 1759........ 550 Alabama—Continued. Page 1870, Mar. 3, Act No. 282, § 3, Laws 1869-70, p. 320.............. 550 1876, Act of Feb. 28, § 9, Laws 1875-76, p. 244. 550 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. XLI Alabama—Continued. Page 1876, Code, § 1811, p. 509 .................. 550 1896, Code, c. 28, § 1259, р. 429 .............. 550 1915 Gen. Acts, p. 397, Act No. 464, § 16.... 221 1919 Gen. Acts, p. 291, Act No. 328, § 16.... 221 1923 Gen. Acts, p. 152, Revenue Act, 1923, § 6. 184 1923 Gen. Acts, p. 164, Act. No. 172, § 11... 221 1923 Gen. Acts, p. 267, Act No. 263........... 221 1927 Gen. Acts, Act No. 163, § 42............. 231 1927 Gen. Acts, p. 176, Act No. 163, § 54 . 221,230 1927 Gen. Acts, p. 177, Act No. 163, § 56.... 238 1928 Code, § 7217..... 229 Arizona. 1864-71 Comp. Laws, p. 486, c. 51, § 19.......550 Arkansas. Constitution, 1874, Art. 12.................... 550 1929 Acts, Act No. 208. 197 1931 Supp. Dig. Stat. § 2661a-2661k............ 197 California. Constitution, 1849, Art. 4, § 31............... 550 1885, Civil Code, § 285.. 555 Colorado. Constitution, 1876, Art. 15, § 2................550 Connecticut. 1888 Gen. Stats., § 1944. 555 Delaware. Constitution, 1831, Art. 2, §i 17............. 549 Constitution, 1897, Art. 9, § 1............... 550 1871, Mar. 21, Act of, с. 152, 14 Del. L. 229............... 551,555 District of Columbia. Code, Title 19, §§ 11, 12................ 165,166 Florida. Page Constitution, 1838, Art. 13, § 2............... 549 1931 Laws, c. 15624 ..... 541 1931 Laws, c. 15624, § 1. • 535 §2.. 537 §5.. 528, 536,537 §8.. 538 §11. 536 1931 Laws, cc. 15659, 15788 .................. 538 Rev. Gen. Stats., §§ 926. 537 Georgia. Constitution, 1868, Art. 3, § 6................550 1890-1891 Laws, p. 55.. 550 1929 Acts, p. 245...... 197 1930 Supp., Code, § 4264 (l)-4264 (8).......... 197 Idaho. Constitution, 1889, Art. 11, § 2............... 550 Illinois. Constitution, 1848, Art. 10, §1............... 550 §5..................549 1849 Laws, p. 87, Act of Feb. 10................555 1849 Laws, p. 92, Act of Feb. 10, § 22......... 556 1852 Laws, p. 135, Act of June 22............... 550 1857 Laws, p. 110, Act of Feb. 17............... 550 1857 Laws, p. 161, Act of Feb. 18............... 550 1872 Laws, p. 296, Act of July 1 .............. 555 1872 Laws, p. 300, Act of July 1, § 16./.........556 1891 Rev. Stats., c. 114, §11..................... 555 Indiana. Constitution, 1851, Art. 11, § 13............. 550 1889 Laws, c. 81, § 1.. 555 1914, Burns Ind. Stats., vol. 2, § 5137........ 554 1921 Laws, p. 93, Act of Feb. 28, c. 35........ 554 1926, Bums Ind. Stats., vol. 2, § 5547........ 554 XLII TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. Iowa. Page Constitution, 1846, Art. 8, § 2................. 550 Kansas. Constitution, 1855, Art. 13, § 1............. 550 Stats., § 2030 ......... 434 Louisiana. Constitution, 1864, Art. 121................... 550 Maine. Constitution, 1875, Art. 4, § 14..............550 1862 Laws, Act of March 19, c. 152, § 3. 550 c. 154................ 555 1867 Laws, Act of Feb. 28, c. 125, § 7........550 1867 Laws, p. 75, § 24.. 556 1870 Laws, Act of Feb. 26, c. 93, § 1.........550 1876 Laws, p. 51, Act of Feb. 3, c. 65......... 555 1876 Laws, Act of Feb. 3, c. 65, § 2......... 550 1883 Laws, Act of Feb. 14, c. 116, § 1......550 1883 Rev. Stats., pp. 412, 467................... 555 1891 Laws, Act of Mar. 25, c. 99, § 1.........550 1901 Laws, Act of Mar. 21, c. 229............ 550 Maryland. Constitution, 1851, Art. 3, § 47............... 550 1888 Gen. Laws, p. 299 . 555 1894 Laws, c. 599 ...... 555 1911, Bagby’s Code, Art. 23, § 245, p. 648..... 553 1918 Laws, p. 884, Act of Apr. 10, c. 417.... 553 Massachusetts. 1855, Act of Mar. 19, c. 68, § 1................551 1860 Gen. Stats., (2d ed.), p. 341, Act of May 15, 1851, c. 133. 551, 555 1870, Acts & Res., p. 154, Act of May 9, c. 224. 552 1871, Act of Mar. 22, c. 110, § 1............. 552 Massachusetts—Continued. Page 1872, Act of Apr. 24, c. 244.................. 552 1873, Act of Apr. 14, c. 27g .................552 1874, Act of Apr. 14, c. 165 ................. 552 1874, Act of Apr. 14, c. 165, § 1............. 555 1875, Act of May 3, c. 177, § 3..............552 1879, Act of Apr. 9, c. 202 ............. 552 1879, Act of Apr. 11, c. 210.............. 552 1885, Act of May 15, c. 240 ............. 552 1885, Act of June 11, c. 314.............. 552 1888, Act of Mar. 9, c. 116.............. 552 1891, Act of Apr. 11, c. 189 ............. 552 1893 Act of May 27, c. 397 ............. 552 1894, Act of June 5, c. 450 ............. 552 1894, Act of June 5, c. 452 ............. 552 1894, Act of June 9, c. 469 Wï 1899, Act of Mar. 28, c. 199...............552 1903, Act of June 17, c. 437 ............. 552 Michigan. Constitution, 1835, Art. 12, § 2......................549 Constitution, 1850, Art. 15, § 1............. 550 1846 Laws, p. 265, Act No. 148 of May 18... 555 1846 Laws, pp. 265-267, Act No. 148 of May 18, § 6...............554 1853 Laws, p. 53, Act No. 41 of Feb. 5......554 1877 Laws, p. 87, Act No. 113 of May 11, § 4.................. 554 1885 Laws, p. 343, Act No. 232 of Sept. 19, § 2.................. 554 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. XLIII Michigan—Continued. Page 1914, 3 Howell’s Mich. Stats., § 9533, p. 3815, Act No. 232 of June 18, 1903............... 554 1914, Howell’s Mich. Stats., § 7783, p. 3158, § 7804, p. 3165, Act No. 233, Sept. 17,1903 . 554 1917 Laws, pp. 529, 530, Act No. 254 of May 10, § 2....................554 1921 Laws, p. 125, Act No. 84 of Apr. 26.. 553 Minnesota. Constitution, 1857, Art. 10, § 2...............550 Mississippi. Constitution, 1890, Art. 7, § 178............ 550 1928 Acts, c. 304..... 197 1930 Code, §§ 1827- 1837 ................. 197 Missouri. Constitution, 1865, Art. 8, § 4.............. 550 1887 Laws, p. 171....... 196 1889 Rev. Stats., §§ 3931-3936 ............. 196 1899 Rev. Stats., c. 12, Art. 9, § 1320, p. 429.. 554 1907 Laws, p. 166, Act of Mar. 30............ 554 1919 Rev. Stats., c. 90, Art. 7, § 10152....... 554 1927 Laws, p. 395, Act of Apr. 8............. 554 1927 Supp. to Rev. Stats. § 10152 .............. 554 1929 Rev. Stats., §§ 4316-4323 ........ 196,200 1929 Rev. Stats., § 4318. 201, 206 1929 Rev. Stats., § 4324. 196, 200,204 1929 Rev. Stats., §§ 4324-4326, 4329... 196 Montana. Constitution, 1889, Art. 15, § 2.............. 550 Nebraska. Constitution, 1866, Title Corporations, § 1..550 Nevada. Page Constitution, 1864, Art. 8, § 1................ 550 New Hampshire. 1901 Pub. Stats., c. 147, § 6, p. 470 ............ 553 1907 Laws, p. 131, Act of Apr. 5, c. 129....... 553 1919 Laws, p. 113, Act of Mar. 28, c. 92.......... 553 New Jersey. Constitution, 1875, Art. 4, § 7.................. 550 1846 Laws, p. 69, § 28. 555, 556 1865 Laws, p. 707, Act of Mar. 30, c. 379......... 551 1869 Laws, p. 1001, Act of Mar. 31, c. 374.... 551 1874 Laws, p. 129, § 16.. 556 1875 Laws, c. 611, § 22.. 556 1888 Laws, pp. 385, 445, cc. 269, 295............ 556 1892 Laws, p. 90......... 563 1893 Laws, c. 171, p. 301 .................... 556 1894 Laws, c. 228, § 3... 563 1903, N. J. Practice Act, §84..................... 132 1913 Laws, c. 18.......... 559 1917 Laws, c. 195........ 127, 129,132,559 1920 Laws, c. 175, § 1.. 125, 136 General Corporation Law, § 224, as added by § 16 of c. 318, Laws of 1926 ............... 127,132 New York. Constitution, Art. 7, § 9. 549 Constitution, 1846, Art. 8, § 1.................. 550 1811 Acts, Act of Mar. 22, c. 67............... 551 1817 Acts, Act of Apr. 14, c. 223 ............. 551 1821 Laws, c. 231, § 19.. 551 1822-1824 Laws, p. x... 549 1825 Laws, p. 448, § 3.. 556 1848 Laws, c. 40, § 8.... 556 1852, 1 Rev. Stats., c. 18, Title 4, § 3, p. 1175.. 556 1852 Acts, c. 228........ 551 1853 Acts, c. 117.........551 XLIV TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. New York—Continued. Pase 1853 Acts, c. 124..... 551 1854 Acts, c. 232..... 551 1865 Acts, c. 691..... 551 1866 Acts, c. 322..... 551 1866 Acte, c. 838, p. 1896 ................. 555 1867 Acts, c. 419......551 1870 Acts, c. 773..... 551 1874 Acte, c. 143..... 551 1875 Acts, c. 445..... 551 1875 Acte, c. 611, § 11 ............. 551,555 1876 Laws, c. 358..... 556 1881 Acts, c. 295....... 551 1890 Laws, c. 564, § 40.. 556 1890 Laws, c. 567, § 12 ............. 556,561 1892 Laws, c. 323....... 562 1892 Laws, c. 688, § 40.. 562 1901 Laws, cc. 355, 520. 563 Consolidated Laws, c. 60, § 197 ................ 292 North Carolina. Constitution, 1868, Art. 8, § 1................ 550 North Dakota. Constitution, 1889, Art. 7, § 131.............. 550 Ohio. Constitution, 1851, Art. 13, § 1............... 550 1886, Rev. Stats., § 3236. 555 Oklahoma. Constitution, Art. II, § 32.......... 55 Art. XVIII, § 5a...... 56 1917 Laws, c. 97.......... 197 1931 Stats., c. 15, Art. 24.................... 197 Consolidated Stats., § 5367 ................. 60 § 5627 ................. 60 Oregon. Constitution, 1857, Art. II, § 2.............. 550 1930 Code, § 5-703.... 447 Boat Lien Law, § 51- 601 .................. 447 Pennsylvania. Constitution, Art. Ill, § 7..................... 556 Constitution, 1874, Art. III, § 7............. 550 Pennsylvania—Continued. Page 1849 Laws, p. 563, Act No. 368 of Apr. 7 . 553,555 1864 Laws, p. 1102, Act No. 949 of July 18... 553 1873 Laws, p. 28, Act No. 4 of Mar. 25......... 553 1873 Laws, p. 76, Act No. 54 of Apr. 18.........553 1874 Laws, p. 8........556 1874 Laws, p. 73, Act of Apr. 29 ............. 553 1874 Laws, p. 80, § 13.. 556 1905 Acts, Act No. 190 of Apr. 22, amending Act No. 1 of Feb. 9, 1901 .................. 553 1905, Purdon’s Digest, Title Corporations, § 63 .................. 555 Puerto Rico. 1930 Civil Code, §§ 27-30, 1558, 1560, 1583, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1596, 1598 . 481 1930 Code of Commerce, §§ 95, 97, 98, 102, 106, 123, 124,125,141, 156 ............ 481 Rhode Island. Constitution, 1842, Art. 4, § 17.............. 549 South Carolina. 1928 Acts, Act No. 711.. 197 1931, Act of May 9, 37 Stat, at Large 357.... 179 1932 Code, §§ 6313-6321 .................. 197 South Dakota. Constitution, 1889, Art. 17, § 1.............. 559 Tennessee. Constitution, 1870, Art. 11, § 8.............. 550 1887 Acts, c. 139 ...... 555 1923 Pub. Acts, c. 29.... 258 1923 Pub. Acts, c. 58 .............. 258,265 1925 Pub. Acts, c. 67 .............. 258,265 Texas. Constitution, 1876, Art. 12, § 1.............. 550 1925 Acts, c. 15........ 197 English—Continued. Page British Hovering Act of 1736, 9 Geo. II, c. 35, § 23............. 113 Customs Consolidation Act, 39 & 40 Viet., c. 36, § 159........ 113 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. XLV Texas—Continued. Page 1925 Laws, p. 188, Act of Mar. 9, c. 51........ 554 1925 Rev. Penal Code, Arts. 656-664 ........ 197 1925 Rev. Stats., vol. 1, Title 32, Art. 1302, pars. 15, 16, 27...... 554 Utah. Constitution, 1895, Art. 12, § 1.............. 550 Vermont. 1884 Laws, Act No. 105. 555 1906 Pub. Stats., Title 25, c. 187, § 4311, p. 830 ................. 553 1910 Laws, pp. 140, 141- 142, Act No. 143 of Jan. 28, 1911........ 553 1915 Laws, p. 222, Act No. 141 of Apr. 1.... 553 Virginia. Page Constitution, 1902, Art. 12, § 154............. 550 Washington. Constitution, 1889, Art. 12, § 1.................550 West Virginia. Constitution, 1872, Art. 11, § 1................ 550 Wisconsin. Constitution, 1848, Art. 2, §§ 4, 5.........549 Art. 11, § 1........... 550 1878 Rev. Stats., c. 86, § 1772, p. 516..........550 1879 Laws, p. 10, Act of Feb. 7, c. 7........... 550 1908 Stats., c. 85, § 1750. 555 (C) Foreign Statutes English. Page Westminster 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 31.............. 172 British Hovering Acts of 1709 and 1718, 8 Anne, c. 7, § 17; 5 Geo. I, c. 11.......... 113 (D) Treaties Page 1924, May 22, 43 Stat. 1761 (Great Britain).. 107,109 1924, July 2, 43 Stat. 1775 (Norway)............ 109 1924, July 25, 43 Stat. 1809 (Denmark)........... 109 1924, Aug. 11, 43 Stat. 1815 (Germany)........... 109 1924, Aug. 18, 43 Stat. 1830 (Sweden)............ 109 1924, Oct. 22, 43 Stat. 1844 (Italy)............. 109 1925, Jan. 19, 43 Stat. 1875 (P'anama)........... 109 1925, Apr. 8, 44 Stat. 2013 (Netherlands) ..... 109 Page 1926, June 19, 44 Stat. 2395 (Cuba)............... 109 1926, Nov. 17, 44 Stat. 2465 (Spain).............. 109 1927, Mar. 12, 45 Stat. 2403 (France)............. 110 1928, Jan. 11, 45 Stat. 2456 (Belgium)............ 110 1929, Feb. 18, 45 Stat. 2736 (Greece)............. 110 1930, Jan. 16, 46 Stat. 2446 (Japan).............. 110 1930, Aug. 8, 46 Stat. 2773 (Poland)............. 110 1930, Nov. 26, 46 Stat. 2852 (Chile)............... 110 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1932 UNITED STATES v. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE & MILWAUKEE RAILROAD CO. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 264. Argued December 16, 1932.—Decided January 9, 1933. 1. An independent electric railroad, built and equipped primarily for interurban and suburban passenger service, and whose traffic is mainly of that character, but which interchanges passengers and freight with steam railroads, and competes with them, the freight business being, however, subsidiary in amount and function and not fairly comparable to the ordinary freight business of a standard steam railroad,—held an “interurban electric railway,” within the meaning of § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, and therefore excepted, by par. 1 of that section, from the necessity of obtaining authority from the Commission before issuing bonds. P. 10. 2. In so holding, the Court assumes the question to be doubtful but decides that the status of the carrier as an “interurban electric railway ” is settled by the uniform construction of § 20a applied to it by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Commission having for many years resolved doubt in favor of the carrier, and the carrier having issued large amounts of bonds in reliance upon this administrative construction and without any objection from the Commission. P. 13. Affirmed. Appeal from a decree dismissing a bill filed by the United States praying that the railroad company be enjoined from issuing securities or assuming obligations without authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission. 181684°—33--1 1 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Argument for the United States. 288 U.S. Assistant to the Attorney General O’Brian, with whom Solicitor General Thacher and Messrs. Charles H. Weston and Elmer B. Collins were on the brief, for the United States. The words “interurban electric railway” have the same meaning in § 20a as in § 1 (22). The principle to be deduced from the Piedmont & Northern case is that when the volume of a carrier’s interstate business is such as to constitute it an important competitor, on substantially equal terms, with interstate steam railroads, it falls within the class of carriers “ long recognized as objects of national concern and regulation ” and is not a “ street, suburban, or interurban electric railway” exempted from the regulatory provisions governing extensions and abandonments of lines and security issues. A carrier does not have to be predominantly a freight-carrying road in order to be a substantial factor in the business of interstate transportation. In passenger traffic, appellee furnishes the same character of service as that of its steam-railroad competitors, including sales of through tickets for railroads, steamship lines, air and motor-bus lines, for points throughout the country and in Canada. It may be estimated that in 1930 it had a revenue of over $2,300,000 from passenger traffic between Chicago and Waukegan, Illinois and cities in Wisconsin. For 1926 this revenue would be more—approximately the same as the entire freight revenue for that year of the Piedmont and Northern. The interrelation between appellee’s intrastate and interstate traffic is shown by the fact that it has twice applied to the Commission alleging that intrastate rates imposed by state authority caused unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, or undue prejudice to persons or localities in interstate commerce, in violation of paragraph (4) of § 13 of the Act. In both cases the U. S V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 3 1 Argument for Appellee. Commission found that the intrastate rates caused unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, as well as undue prejudice, and raised the intrastate rates to the level of the interstate rates. 62 I. C. C. 188, 193; 136 I. C. C. 165, 168. The findings of the District Court do not support its statement that the Commission by its failure to act, and by affirmative recommendations in its annual reports to Congress, has given to this road by contemporaneous construction the status of an interurban electric railway. The exception as to electric railroads in § 15a differs from the exception in § 20a. Administrative and statutory classifications have not been uniform, and in any event would not control this litigation. Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 286 U. S. 299. Mr. Robert E. Quirk, with whom Messrs. Ralph R. Bradley and Claude D. Cass were on the brief, for appellee. It is clear from the legal history of the phrase “ interurban electric railway ” that Congress used it as descriptive of a class of independently operated electric railways, as that phrase had the sanction of time and common usage. It is also apparent from § 20a and other sections of the law that the fact that such a railroad interchanges freight and passenger traffic with steam railroads and competes for such traffic does not make it any the less an interurban electric railroad. Appellee does not forfeit its character merely by complying with the duties imposed upon it by other and older provisions of the law in establishing through routes and interchange arrangements with steam railroads. United States v. Munson S. S. Line, 283 U. S. 43. There were and are only four classes of electric railways in this country, namely, urban, suburban, interurban, and electrified parts of steam railroads. 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Argument for Appellee. 288 U.S. In Spokane Inland Empire R. Co. v. United States, 241 U. S. 344, the Court described the electric railroad there involved which handled freight and passenger traffic and maintained freight and passenger rates on a national scale as an interurban electric railroad. There is striking similarity between the traffic characteristics of the Spokane line at the time of that decision and the traffic characteristics of appellee as it is today. Congress is presumed to have known of that decision and to have known that at the time of the amendments of 1920 the Interstate Commerce Commission had in numerous cases required the establishment of through routes and joint rates between interurban electric railroads and steam railroads, and that interurban electric railroads had developed at that time to the point where many or most of them engaged in a general way in the transportation of freight and passengers under through routes with steam railroads. The court below correctly described the common characteristics of interurban electric railways as railways which use electric power in the transportation of passengers and freight, occupy city streets and highways in addition to private rights of way, stop cars or trains at street intersections and country highways for the reception and discharge of passengers, maintain loading platforms and shelter sheds without agents, have short radius curves, and operate part of their systems under municipal and village franchises, charters and restrictions. By common consent and by contemporaneous construction of both federal and state authorities, the appellee has been described and treated as an interurban electric railway. In 162 I. C. C. 188, and 136 I. C. C. 165, the Interstate Commission described the appellee as an interurban electric railroad. In its annual reports to Congress and by other informal acts the Commission has given the statute the construction relied upon by appellee. Securities aggregating more than $39,000,000 have been issued U. S. V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 5 1 Argument for Appellee. in good faith by appellee, from time to time, with the knowledge and without objection of the Interstate Commission and under the specific authority of the regulating commissions of Wisconsin and Illinois. Such acts of these State commissions should be given full faith and credit under the Constitution and in comity are entitled to highest respect. Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265. The reason for federal control over the securities of steam railroads did not exist as to independently operated electric railroads. Hence the exclusion of this class from § 20a and from certain other of the new provisions of the law enacted in 1920. Appellee is clearly distinguishable from the Piedmont & Northern which was before the Court in 286 U. S. 299. The same phrase may have a different meaning in different connections in the same Act, and in the Piedmont de Northern case the Court answered some of the contentions of the Piedmont & Northern as to the significance of the similarity of phraseology in other sections of the Act by this observation: “But it is so used with other purposes in view.” American Security Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, 494; Alabama Midland Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 168 U. S. 144. Cf. Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512. Paragraph 11 of § 20a provides that any security issued or obligation assumed by a carrier subject to that section without the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be void, and that any such void security acquired by any person for value in good faith and without notice that it is void, entitles such person to hold the carrier and its directors, officers and attorneys jointly and severally liable for the full amount of damages sustained, in a suit in any court of competent jurisdiction. Since 1920 the appellee has issued securities aggregating about $39,000,000, under state authority and without the 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. authority, but with the knowledge and tacit sanction, of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Other electric lines similarly situated have issued securities aggregating more than $239,000,000 since 1920 without the approval of the federal Commission and under authority of the state regulating bodies. If appellant’s theory of the law be sustained, the effect under the statute if valid will be to make void the securities of the appellee and of other electric lines, the result of which may be a plethora of law suits for damages which staggers the imagination. Moreover, should the Court adopt appellant’s theory of the law and hold that the appellee is not an interurban electric railway, such a finding will raise for the appellee and for the whole electric railway industry a fog of uncertainty as to classification and jurisdiction which will make it impossible for any electric railway to know in advance of a decision by this Court what its status is under § 20a; and such a finding will work untold injury to appellee and to the entire railway industry. Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit brought pursuant to § 12 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended,¹ to enjoin the appellee from issuing any securities or assuming any obligation or liability in respect of the securities of others without first having obtained an order from the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing such action, as required by § 20a of the Act.¹ ² The petition avers appellee’s intention to issue or become guarantor of securities in violation of the last mentioned section. The District Court, after making detailed and elaborate fact findings, concluded as matter of law that the rail- ¹U. S. Code, Tit. 49, § 12 (1). ²U. S. Code, Tit. 49, § 20a. U. S. V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 7 1 ’ Opinion of the Court. road was an independently operated electric interurban railway expressly excepted from the requirements of the section. The question is whether the facts found warrant the decision. Section 20a forbids a carrier to issue shares, bonds or obligations, evidence of interest or indebtedness, or to assume any obligation or liability of any other person or corporation, unless the Commission, upon application, after investigation, shall by order authorize such issue or assumption, as within the applicant’s corporate purpose and compatible with the public interest.. After prescribing the procedure before the Commission, and declaring its jurisdiction plenary and exclusive, the section enacts that securities or obligations not issued pursuant to its terms shall be void, and imposes civil and criminal liability upon officers and directors participating in their creation. Paragraph 1 provides: “As used in this section the term * carrier ’ means a common carrier by railroad (except a street, suburban, or interurban electric railway which is not operated as a part of a general steam railroad system of transportation). . . .” The properties of the appellee have developed, through various transfers and reorganizations, out of a street railway company organized more than twenty-five years ago. The company has for some years owned and operated in interstate commerce an electrified railroad, the main line of which extends from Chicago, Illinois, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. There are 138 route miles of line, 132 miles of second track and 42 miles of yard and other track. About 40 miles of main and second track are in city streets, on some of which the appellee operates in common with street cars and vehicular traffic. In addition to the main line between Chicago and Milwaukee there is an alternate line for part of the distance; a branch some 36 miles in length; and two other branches, one of which is 3 and 8 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. the other 8 miles long. Operation in Chicago is over the elevated tracks of the Chicago Rapid Transit Company from the south side northerly through the loop district to a point on the north side (approximately 16 miles). Thence the line runs northerly through Chicago and Evanston to Wilmette, approximately 8 miles, over elevated dirt fill tracks owned by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, leased by the appellee jointly with the Chicago Rapid Transit Company. The remainder of the appellee’s lines are upon its own right of way, or in streets the use of which is granted by local franchise. The total laid under local franchises, outside of Milwaukee, is approximately 3 miles; in the latter city the operation for 2.67 miles is over the tracks of a street surface railway owned by the appellee. Twenty fast through passenger trains are operated daily in each direction between downtown Chicago and downtown Milwaukee with a running time equalling that of the fastest trains of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway, which operates fifteen through trains daily between the same cities. Dining cars and parlor cars are included in some of the appellee’s fast trains. Modern, well equipped passenger stations are maintained at a number of points; 51 have agents selling passenger tickets; at some 96 places shelters and platforms are maintained, at 35 platforms only; and at 42 locations at which certain trains stop at streets or highways no facilities are provided. Through railroad and Pullman tickets are sold to any part of the United States, Canada or Mexico. Local passenger fares are computed on the mileage basis used by steam railroads. Appellee’s tracks are of standard gauge and are physically connected with those of four steam railroads at some thirteen points, and with those of three electric lines. Eight connections are used for handling interchange carload freight. The railroad has substantial facilities for U. S. V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 9 1 Opinion of the Court. serving various industries located on its lines, such as side, industrial, team and switch tracks, and freight classification tracks. It owns seven electric locomotives which are of a small type and unable to haul freight trains of the size usually employed by steam railroads, and 114 freight cars which have no electrical equipment and are interchangeable with steam railroads. Sixteen local freight tariffs are published; in 206 tariffs the railroad participates as initial carrier, and in more than 800 as a delivering or intermediate carrier, in conjunction with steam railroads. The total transportation revenue in 1930 was over $6,000,000, about 76% from passenger traffic and about 22% from freight. This ratio has been substantially maintained for some years. In 1930, 87% of carload freight traffic was interchange and 78% of all freight traffic was interline, but only 42% of freight revenue was derived from interline business. Locomotives are not employed in the passenger service, the cars having installed electrical equipment, and being somewhat shorter and narrower than standard passenger railroad coaches. Freight is hauled by electric locomotives. A merchandise package delivery freight service is supplied by cars similar to baggage cars used on steam railroads, having self-contained electric equipment, operated from the loop in Chicago to Milwaukee in trains of from one to five cars. At certain points gantlet tracks are required for handling freight cars, as the clearances on the main line are insufficient to permit their passage. Grades are much heavier than those customary on steam railroads, and some of the curves are of so short a radius as not to permit the passage of a steam locomotive. The company maintains no facilities for receipt or delivery of carload freight at its termini in Chicago and Milwaukee, and cannot accomplish interchange of such freight at either, connections for this purpose being outside those cities. 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. The railroad was constructed to afford a fast electric passenger service between Chicago and Milwaukee and suburban passenger service into and out of Chicago. The freight business is subsidiary to this primary function, and is not fairly comparable to that ordinarily transacted by a standard steam railroad. Passenger traffic, whether measured by car service or by gross earnings, heavily preponderates over interline freight business. The main terminals serve only the passenger and merchandise freight traffic. We thus have a typical example of an interurban electric line for passenger service, which has developed, in addition, such freight traffic as could advantageously be undertaken without interfering with performance of the main purpose of the carrier. The facts differentiate the present case from Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 286 U. S. 299. There the railway was predominantly a carrier of interchange carload freight and the proposed extension of line, which was the subject of that litigation, had as its object the creation of a link in a trunk-line route composed of the electric line and a number of steam railroads, which would divert from other steam railroad trunk-line routes some $4,000,-000 of revenue annually. The purely local traffic in freight, passengers, baggage and express was there relatively inconsequential; but here greatly preponderates. It was there said: - In cases where an appreciation of the facts is requisite to proper classification it is not always easy to draw the line. Instances may be supposed where great difficulty might be experienced in determining whether an electric railway line falls within or without the exception of paragraph (22) [which is couched in the same words as the exception in § 20a (1)]. But this is not such a case. The facts clearly require a holding that petitioner’s railway is not within the true intent and purpose of the exclusion intended by the paragraph.” If the U. S. V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 11 1 Opinion of the Court. status of the appellee were a matter of first impression, we should, though the decision is not free from difficulty, be inclined to hold § 20a inapplicable. But for the reasons about to be stated, we consider the question settled. The definitions embodied in § 1, paragraphs (2) (a) and (3), embrace the appellee and render it subject to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by the remaining sections, unless excepted by their terms. Interurban electric railways are expressly saved from the requirements of §§ 1 (18) to (21) inclusive, 15a and 20a. The language of the excepting clauses in the first and third instances is identical except for the use in one case of the singular and in the other of the plural number. That applicable to 15a, which is the section providing for fixing rates to yield a fair return, and for recapture, differs in substance from the two others and is: “excluding . . . (c) interurban electric railways unless operated as a part of a general steam railroad system of transportation or engaged in the general transportation of freight. . . .” As indicated in the Piedmont case, supra, the phrase “interurban electric railway” may not in all circumstances be susceptible of exact definition. The Commission has realized the difficulty. In its 35th annual report, for 1921, this was said (p. 21): “ Under the law as it now stands, we have no jurisdiction over the issuance of securities of a ¹ street, suburban, or interurban electric railway which is not operated as a part of a general steam railroad system of transportation.’ Certain electric railways independently operated are engaged in the general transportation of freight in interstate commerce in addition to the transportation of passengers. The use of electricity as motive power for railways is rapidly increasing. Some electric fines correspond substantially to steam roads in all important particulars except that of motive power. Under Section 15a 12 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. of the act we are given authority to include in groups of carriers for rate-making purposes such interurban electric lines as are engaged in the general transportation of freight. It seems desirable that Section 20a of the interstate commerce act be so amended as to indicate definitely the classes of electric railway companies subject to that section.” The recommendation was repeated in the annual reports for 1923, 1924 and 1925.³ In the report for 1928 (p. 83) the following appears: “ That the present exemption provisions of paragraph (22) of section 1, paragraph (1) of section 15a, and paragraph (1) of section 20a, applicable to electric railways, be amended by substituting provisions exempting all electric railways except such as interchange standard freight equipment with steam railways and participate in through interstate freight rates with such carriers; provision to be made for exemption of particular electric railways falling within the excepted class, if upon application they are able to show to the satisfaction of the commission, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that they are not affected with an important national interest so far as the provisions in question are concerned.” See also the 1929 report, p. 89. The position heretofore taken by the Commission with respect to the appellee is of great significance. In 1923 a brief was filed with the Commission supporting the view that § 15 (a) had no application to the company because it was an interurban electric railway not operated as part of a general steam railroad system of transportation and not engaged in the general transportation of freight. The Director of the Bureau of Finance replied that unless later advised to the contrary the carrier would ⁸ Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission for 1923, p. 70; Report for 1924, p. 78; Report for 1925, p. 72. U. S. V. CHICAGO NORTH SHORE R. CO. 13 1 Opinion of the Court. not be required to file returns under the section. No such advice has ever been communicated to the appellee. The District Court finds that since July, 1916; when the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad, the immediate predecessor of appellee, acquired the properties, the appellee and its predecessors have issued securities aggregating $71,327,200 par value. Of this total $61,-662,600 have been issued since March 1, 1920, the date of the incorporation of § 20a into the Interstate Commerce Act. All of these securities were issued upon the authority and with the approval of the regulating commissions of Wisconsin and Illinois, and of those issued since March 1, 1920, $38,935,608 were outstanding in the hands of the public on April 30, 1931. The required annual reports filed by the appellee with the Commission have shown all securities issued since March 1, 1920, and in compliance with the rules have stated that these issues were each approved by the state commissions. With this knowledge of the situation the Commission never, until it requested the Attorney General to institute the present suit, by word or act intimated that the procedure followed by the railroad was illegal or the state regulatory bodies without jurisdiction. It would be difficult indeed to conceive a clearer case of uniform administrative construction of § 20a as applied to this company. Conceding that the proper classification of the railway is not free from difficulty, all doubt is removed by the application of the rule that settled administrative construction is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned except for cogent reasons. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 200 U. S. 361, 401; Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613, 627; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 336; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 378; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178. 14 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Syllabus. 288 U.S. The primary responsibility rested upon the Commission to determine whether under the circumstances the railroad was required to procure leave under § 20a for the issuance of securities. Evidently entertaining serious doubts on this question it has for more than a decade resolved them in favor of the carrier, and the company and its officers have acted in reliance on the administrative tribunal’s construction of the statute. At this late day the courts ought not to uphold an application of the law contradictory of this settled administrative interpretation. Affirmed. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION CO. et AL. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON. No. 23. Argued November 8, 9, 1932.—Decided January 9, 1933. 1. In a suit to set aside an order of the Interstate Comm erne Commission requiring a railroad extension, that Commission and commissions representing interested States, having intervened to defend the order, are entitled as “ aggrieved parties ” to appeal to this Court from a decree annulling it, even though the United States, as represented by the Attorney General, will not join in the appeal. Urgent Deficiencies Act, Oct. 22, 1913; Commerce Court Act, §§ 2, 5. P. 22. 2. Upon such an appeal a decree may be obtained enforcing the rights of the United States. P. 25. 3. An official may be designated to stand in judgment on behalf of the United States so that a decree against him binds the Government; Congress had power, in naming the United States as the defendant in such suits, to give the Commission, and others having an interest, authority to litigate the validity of such orders, and, regardless of joinder by the Attorney General, to obtain by appeal a review effective as to the United States. P. 27. 4. That part of par. 21 of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act which authorizes the Commission to require a carrier “ to extend its line I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 15 14 Argument for the Commission. or lines,” provided the Commission find that such extension is reasonably required in the interest of public convenience and necessity and that the expense involved therein will not impair the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the public, refers to extensions within the carrier’s undertaking and does not empower the Commission to compel the building of what is essentially a new line to reach new territory which the carrier never agreed to serve. Pp. 35 et seq. 5. This provision of par. 21 is in contrast with that part of par. 18 of the same section which provides that no company shall undertake “ the extension of its line, or the construction of a new line of railroad,” without having first obtained a certificate of present or future public convenience and necessity from the Commission. P. 36. 6. The Act distinguishes between three sorts of facilities,—new lines, or extensions, voluntarily undertaken (§ 18); compulsory extensions within the area which the carrier has bound itself to serve (§ 21); and spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks located wholly within one State, which are left within state control (§ 22). Pp. 38-40. 7. A statute should be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid grave doubt of its constitutionality. P. 40. 8. Having charter authority to build a line of railroad does not commit the company to an obligation to build. P. 43. 47 F. (2d) 250, affirmed. Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges which set aside, and enjoined the execution of, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., (a subsidiary of the Oregon Short Line, which in turn is a subsidiary of the Union Pacific Co.,) to build an “extension” from a point on its railroad in Oregon, 185 miles across an arid, sparsely settled and unproductive country, to a point on one of the lines of the Southern Pacific System, west of the Cascade Range. The report of the Commission is 1591. C. C. 630. See also 111 id. 3. Mr. J. Stanley Payne, with whom Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton was on the brief, for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant. 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Argument for the Commission. 288 U.S. Under the applicable statutes, this Court has jurisdiction over, and appellants have the right to prosecute, this appeal. The provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act and so much of the Commerce Court Act as remains in force now appear in the U. S. Code, as amended by Supplement V, in Title 28, §§ 41 (27) and (28), 43, 44, 45, 45a, 46, 47, 47a and 48. The provision giving the Commission and parties in interest the right to “ continue said suit or proceeding unaffected by the action or non-action of the Attorney General,” together with the provision for direct appeal, seems clearly to give the Commission the right to pursue the case to its final determination in this Court. Eor the history of the legislation see: H. R. 17536, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rep. No. 923, p. 158; 45 Cong. Rec., Pt. V, p. 5524; Sen. Rep. 355, Pt. 2, pp. 5, 6, 7, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.; 45 Cong. Rec., Pt. 5, pp. 4604, 4607; id. Pt. 6, pp. 6406, 6445, 6451. Paragraph 21 confers jurisdiction upon the Commission in reference to two distinct matters—car service facilities and extensions of lines. The provision relating to extensions is subject to both limitations prescribed in the proviso. The provision relating to car service facilities is subject only to the second limitation. The Commission interpreted § 1 (21) in Cooke v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 66 I. C. C. 452; Gunderson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 91 I. C. C. 702; Clarkston Chamber of Commerce v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 160 I. C. C. 752; and Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 185 I. C. C. 741. Although the Commission has been requested repeatedly to exercise the power conferred by § 1 (21), the case at bar is the only case in which it has found that the facts justified the exercise of the authority. This Court, like the Commission, has given the language its natural import. Railroad Comm’n of California v. Southern Pac. I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 17 14 Argument for the Commission. Co., 264 U. S. 331; Alabama Ry. v. Jackson Ry., 271 U. S. 244; Atchison Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 283 U. S. 380; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. U. S. ex rel. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52. The plain import of its terms is confirmed when it is read with paragraphs 18, 19, 20, and 22. The first three confer upon the Commission a negative or restraining power. Paragraph 22 restricts the power conferred. It makes it clear that the authority of the Commission over voluntary constructions and over compulsory extensions, applies to extensions which are more than merely spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks. See Railroad Comm’n v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331. Cf. also § 6 (13). The provisions of paragraphs 18-22 of § 1 and paragraph 13 of § 6 are not to be confused with the power conferred by paragraph 9 of § 1 authorizing the Commission to require by order the construction, installation, and operation of switch connections. Cf. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 404; United States v. New York Central R. Co., 272 U. S. 457. The extensions mentioned in paragraph 21 are such as the Commission has authorized in many cases under pars. 18-20. The length of the extension alone is not important. A relatively long extension in the open country might not cost as much to construct as a very short one in a congested metropolitan area where property values are high. It would obviously have been impracticable for Congress to attempt to prescribe legislatively the definite maximum mileage of an extension which the Commission might require. No such limitation was needed, for the conditions that were prescribed operate as definite limitations. An interpretation of the compulsory extension provision broad enough to embrace such an extension as here 181684°—33——2 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Argument for the Commission. 288 U.S. ordered is in strict conformity with the Commission’s recommendation for enactment. The facts developed in the exhaustive record before the Commission demonstrate the public convenience and necessity for the extension, and fully justify the order requiring its construction. The extension will aid in more adequately serving and developing a large area in eastern and central Oregon that is now either wholly unserved or inadequately served by existing railroad lines. This area is probably the largest within the United States that is without rail facilities. The construction of the extension would provide shorter routes which would make it possible to ship perishable commodities to available markets. Joining the lines of the Southern Pacific on the west with those of the Union Pacific on the east, the extension would afford a new, shorter, more expeditious and more economical transcontinental route between western Oregon and the East. With the resulting shorter routes to Pacific Coast markets, the extension across central Oregon would be of great advantage to southwestern Idaho. This section looks principally to California for markets. The ultimate aim of the extension is to afford more adequate transportation to the State of Oregon as a whole. The Union Pacific system, of which the O.-W. R. & N. is a dependent part, is one of the principal carriers to which the State must look for its transportation service. The Union Pacific has many miles of main and branch lines in Oregon. By these it holds itself out to serve those portions of Oregon that are tributary thereto. Much of its present traffic could be better served with the aid of the extension. The proposition that a carrier is under no duty with respect to traffic originating at points not directly served by its lines is erroneous. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 19 14 Argument for the Commission. If Congress is without power to require a carrier to construct this extension, then it would seem that it is without power to require the construction of a track connection between the main lines of interstate carriers, Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Jackson E. Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. n. Jacobson, supra, or the construction of a switch connection with a lateral branch line of railway, C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 404, or the construction of a connecting track to the dock of a water carrier, United States v. New York Central R. Co., 272 U. S. 457, or even the establishment of through routes and joint rates, United States v. Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136, 142, Cf. Minneapolis cfc St. L. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, and Missouri & I. C. Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 22 I. C. C. 39, 44r-46. For in all such instances the carrier would be required to engage in a new service which it had not theretofore professed to render. Moreover, for many years the O.-W. R. & N. held a franchise to build the extension which is here ordered. Although this permissive franchise did not compel the company to build the line, nevertheless the fact that it held this franchise was no doubt sufficient to discourage any other carrier from attempting to enter the territory. In this broad sense, at least, the Union Pacific has “ occupied the territory.” The principle applicable in cases involving extensions of service by such public utilities as have been given franchises for definite territories, New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 173 Cal. 577, is not applicable to extensions of railroad lines. Railroads are not given franchises conferring upon them the right to serve exclusively any particular territory, district, or community. Hence, 20 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Argument for the Commission. 288 U.S. no extension of a railroad line could under any circumstances be required if it were necessary to find, as a condition precedent, that the railroad held an exclusive franchise to serve the territory. Nevertheless the company owes a duty to the territory through which it has been given a franchise to construct its line. The Transportation Act places a duty upon railroads, in the interest of public convenience and necessity, to adequately serve and develop the territory through which their lines run. The provision for extensions is one of many provisions of Transportation Act, 1920, in pari materia, having for their ultimate purpose the development and maintenance of an adequate national transportation system. The provision is therefore a valid exercise of the plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The extension ordered is such an enlargement of transportation facilities as is contemplated by the Act, provision for which is made by rate adjustment to yield revenue sufficient to provide a return fixed at a level which takes into consideration the necessity of providing adequate national transportation service. The requirement, considered with regard to the interests both of the carrier and of the public, is reasonable and appropriate, meets the test of constitutional validity laid down by this Court in cases which reviewed state commission orders, and does not take the carrier’s property. Atchison Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 283 U. S. 380; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287; Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 530; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Railroad Comm’n, 231 U. S. 457, 469-470; Alabama & V. Ry. v. Jackson & E. Ry., 271 U. S. 244; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416; Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 193 U. S. 53; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 265 U. S. 70. I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 21 14 Opinion of the Court. It was affirmatively shown that a large traffic is available for movement over the extension ordered, and that the construction of it will create additional traffic; and the Commission found that the extension would be a valuable asset to the Union Pacific system. The validity of the order is not dependent upon the profitableness of the extension, considered separately from the remainder of the transportation system of which it will form a part. Messrs. William C. McCulloch and James M. Thompson, with whom Mr. I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon, was on the brief, for the Public Utilities Commissions of Oregon and Idaho, appellants. Mr. Arthur C. Spencer, with whom Messrs. Henry W. Clark and James M. Souby were on the brief, for the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., appellee. Mr. Ben C. Dey, with whom Messrs. Guy V. Shoup and Alfred A. Hampson were on the brief, for the Southern Pacific Co., intervener-appellee. Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. The Public Service Commission of Oregon filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission, against eleven railroads, including the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, asserting they had failed and refused to provide reasonable and adequate transportation facilities to an area of some 33,000 square miles within the State. The prayer was that one or more of them be required to extend or build a line of railroad from a point near Crane, to Crescent Lake, or some adjacent point. Several municipalities and commercial organizations, and the Public Utilities Commission of Idaho, were given leave to be heard in support of the petition. The respondents answered that public necessity and con- 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. venience would not be served by the proposed construction and that there was no authority in law for granting the requested relief. After hearing, the Commission entered an order requiring Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company to “ extend its line of railroad, now terminating near Burns, Oreg., from, or near, a station thereon designated as Crane, Oreg., to a connection with the Cascade line of the Southern Pacific Company at, or near, Crescent Lake, Oreg.”¹ The Oregon-Washington Company thereupon filed a petition against the United States, in the District Court, to set aside, annul and suspend the order and to enjoin the Government, its officers and agents, from enforcing the Commission’s mandate. The Southern Pacific Company intervened in support of the petition, and the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Public Utilities Commissioner (the successor of the Public Service Commission) of Oregon, and the Public Utilities Commission of Idaho, were permitted to intervene, and participated in the defense of the suit. From a decree setting aside the order and granting an injunction the three intervening defendants appealed. The United States refused to join in the appeal, and a summons and severance was duly served upon it. The appellees insist that if we should reverse the decree as to the appellants the United States would remain bound by its terms; that we may not pass upon the merits in the absence of the Government, a necessary party, and should therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We shall first dispose of the question thus presented. Before the Commerce Court was established suits to enjoin orders of the Commission were brought against that body, and appeals from the judgments rendered were ¹159 I. C. C. 630. The order contained ancillary provisions which it is unnecessary here to recite. I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 23 14 Opinion of the Court. prosecuted by it in its own name.² The Act of June 18, 1910,³ created the Commerce Court, defined the jurisdiction and regulated the procedure of that tribunal, and authorized a direct appeal to this court. The Urgent Deficiencies Act,⁴ under which this suit was instituted, abolished the Commerce Court, transferred the jurisdiction theretofore vested in it to the several district courts, and made the procedure therein the same as that previously followed in the Commerce Court. Existing statutes were repealed only insofar as inconsistent with the new jurisdiction conferred on district courts.⁵ Section 4 of the Commerce Court Act directed “ That all cases and proceedings in the commerce court [now District Court] which but for this Act would be brought by or against the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought by or against the United States, and the United States may intervene in any case or proceeding in the commerce court [District Court] whenever, though it has not been made a party, public interests are involved.” Other sections permit the Commission, or complainants before the Commission, or any party in interest in a proceeding before that body, or any other interested party, to become parties to a suit involving the validity of an order of the Commission; forbid the Attorney General ² Interstate Commerce Commn. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. C., R. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 225 U. S. 326. ⁸ Chap. 309, 36 Stat. 539, §§ 1-6. ⁴ Act of October 22,1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, 220. See U. S. C., Tit. 28, §§ 47 and 48. “Those portions of the Commerce Court Act which remained in force, and the new provisions substituted for those superseded, may be found in the U. S. Code, Tit. 28, §§ 41 (27) and (28), and 43-48, inclusive, as amended by Supplement V, Tit. 28, §§ 41 (27), 44, 45, 45a, 46, 47, 47a and 48. 24 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 US. to control, dispose of, or discontinue the suit against the objection of anyone so becoming a party; allow the intervenor to prosecute, defend or continue the proceeding unaffected by the action or non-action of the Attorney General; and accord to any aggrieved party the right of appeal to this court.⁶ The Commission, by entering its appearance in the District Court, became a party defendant, as did the two state utilities commissions. The court below decided adversely to all these bodies. They are aggrieved parties granted a review by § 2; the Interstate Commerce Commission for the reason that the decree set aside its order, * Section 5 enacted “ That the Attorney-General shall have charge and control of the interests of the Government in all cases and proceedings in the commerce court, and in the Supreme Court of the United States upon appeal from the commerce court; . . . Provided, That the Interstate Commerce Commission and any party or parties in interest to the proceeding before the commission, in which an order or requirement is made, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by their counsel, in any suit wherein is involved the validity of such order or requirement or any part thereof, and the interest of such party;” [for “Commerce Court” read “District Court”]. And further: “That communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals who are interested in the controversy or question before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in any suit which may be brought by anyone under the terms of this Act, or the Acts of which it is amendatory or which are amendatory of it, relating to action of the Interstate Commerce Commission, may intervene in said suit or proceedings at any time after the institution thereof, and the Attorney-General shall not dispose of or discontinue said suit or proceeding over the objection of such party or intervenor aforesaid, but said intervenor or intervenors may prosecute, defend, or continue said suit or proceeding unaffected by the action or nonaction of the Attorney-General of the United States therein.” By section 2 it was ordained: “ That a final judgment or decree of the commerce court [District Court] may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States if appeal to the Supreme Court be taken by an aggrieved party within sixty days after the entry of said final judgment or decree. . . .” I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 25 14 Opinion of the Court. the state commissions because they officially represent the interest of their states in obtaining adequate transportation service. Though the present appellants were parties in the court below, as of right, and not by grace or favor, were aggrieved by the decree, and have a right of appeal, the appellees maintain this court may not hear and decide the case in the absence of the United States. While admitting intervenors’ right to be heard as to the substance of the decree the District Court entered against the Government, the appellees assert the appellants have no standing in this court to ask modification or reversal of the decree as it affects the United States when the latter seeks no review. We may concede that, unless the Act so directs, a reversal at the suit of the appellants will not affect the judgment as respects the United States. The injunction will stand as against the United States and its agents, because unchallenged by that defendant. Summons and severance does not cure the defect, for though the United States has been severed by that process, if this court should reverse the decree as to other parties, but allow it to remain in force against the Government, the appeal would be a vain thing. The appellants, however, contend that the legislation creates an exception to the ordinary rule governing our jurisdiction. They assert that the purpose of Congress is to permit proper parties in the District Court to carry the litigation to a final conclusion in this court. The statute clearly provides that in the trial of the case the intervening parties shall not be foreclosed by the action or nonaction of the Attorney General. Even though he concludes not to defend, they are permitted to do so. If notwithstanding their defense a decree goes against them and the United States, can it have been the purpose of Congress that the failure of the Attorney 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. General to prosecute an appeal concludes such intervenors? We think not. So to hold would render meaningless and superfluous § 2 of the act, which permits a review of the action of the court below “ if appeal to the Supreme Court be taken by an aggrieved party . . The section can be given effect only by holding that an aggrieved party may challenge the decree not only to vindicate his own rights, but those of the United States as well. Congress evidently intended the Attorney General should represent and protect the interests of the United States as such, but should not at any stage control the litigation against the objection of the other parties and to their disadvantage; and that any aggrieved party might obtain a decree which the United States could have secured had it defended the action or prosecuted an appeal. This conclusion is confirmed by comparing the form of § 5 of the Commerce Court Act as first presented and as subsequently altered by amendment. The section as originally introduced precluded the Commission and its attorneys from taking any part in suits brought to review its orders. This provision was stricken out in committee. The clause giving the Attorney General control of such cases was also modified. The stated purpose of the amendments was to prevent his forestalling the Commis-' sion or any other interested party desiring to litigate the questions involved.⁷ The movers of the amendments which were ultimately incorporated in the act insisted that a party affected by the order should have the right to follow the case “ through the Commerce Court and Supreme Court ”; and that “A party litigant should always have the right to follow his case to final judgment.” ’ House Report No. 923, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 158; Cong. Rec., Vol. 45, Part 5, p. 5524. Senate Report 355, Part 2, pp. 5, 6, 7, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess. Cong. Rec., Vol. 45, Part 5, pp. 4604, 4607; Part 6, pp. 6406, 6445, 6451, 6462. I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 27 14 Opinion of the Court. An official may be designated to stand in judgment on behalf of the United States, so that a decree against him binds the Government.⁸ As has been stated, this was the accepted practice in suits by and against the Commission prior to the adoption of the Commerce Court Act. The new legislation might have left the rights of the United States arising out of orders of the Commission to be thus determined in the court of first instance and on appeal. But Congress had undoubted power, in naming the United States as the defendant in such suits, to give the Commission, and others having an interest, authority to litigate the validity of such orders, and, regardless of joinder by the Attorney General, to obtain by appeal a review effective as to the United States. The act plainly exhibits this purpose. Should a reversal be required the mandate may vacate the judgment against the United States though it did not join in the appeal. We think that review may not be denied for want of a necessary party, and we are therefore brought to a consideration of the merits of the cause. The Oregon Short Line owns all of the capital stock of the Oregon-Washington Company, and the Union Pacific owns all the capital stock of the Short Line; these three companies, with the Los Angeles and Salt Lake, make up the Union Pacific System. The main lines of the Union Pacific Railroad extend from Council Bluffs, Iowa and Kansas City, Missouri, to Ogden, Utah. The Short Line runs from a connection with Union Pacific at Granger, Wyoming, to Huntington, Oregon. From Huntington the Oregon-Washington follows a northwesterly direction to the Columbia River, thence along the south bank of that stream to Portland. Branches extend southerly and westerly from the main line between Huntington and Portland, east of the Cascade Mountains, but the company ⁸ See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 387-388; Johnson v. Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320, 326-327. 28 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. operates no lines south of Portland and west of the Cascade Range. Crane, just beyond which the required extension would begin, is in eastern Oregon on a line known as the Ontario-Burns Branch, which connects with the Oregon Short Line at Ontario, forty miles south of Huntington, and runs westward to Crane, 127 miles, and thence northwest 30 miles to Burns. The extension would run west from Crane across central Oregon a distance of 185 miles to Crescent Lake, which is on the Cascade Line of the Southern Pacific. The latter operates lines from Ogden, Utah, and New Orleans, Louisiana, to San Francisco, and from Roseville, California, on the Ogden-San Francisco line, to Sacramento and Portland. To Portland it has two alternate main lines between Black Butte, California and Eugene, Oregon, that on the west, the original main line, passing through Medford, Grants Pass and Roseburg, and a newer line to the east, known as the Cascade or Natron cut-off, passing through Klamath Falls, Kirk, Chemult, Paunina, Crescent Lake, the western terminus of the required extension, and Natron. Prior to 1913 the railways of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific were jointly operated under control of the Harriman interests. A cross-state line was then planned to run from Malheur Junction, just south of Ontario, Oregon, to Eugene. The Natron cut-off between Eugene and Weed was also in contemplation. In 1911 construction of the cross-state road was begun at both ends. 73.6 miles were completed from Ontario to Juntura; and eastward from Eugene 40 miles were built as far as Oakridge. Work on the Natron cut-off was begun and proceeded through Kipmath Falls to Kirk, 127 miles. The line would have joined with the Natron cut-off at Odell Lake, just north of Crescent Lake, the present proposed terminus. In January, 1913, this court, in United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U. S. 61, 470, declared control of South- I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 29 14 Opinion of the Court. ern Pacific by Union Pacific through stock ownership offensive to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the combination was dissolved. All work on the Oregon projects ceased and was not resumed, except that in 1915 the Ontario-Juntura line was extended to Riverside, 92.7 miles, and in 1916 to Crane, an additional 34 miles. After the passage of the Transportation Act the Oregon Public Service Commission applied to the Commission under paragraph 21 of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, asserting that the cross-state line was needed and asking that some one or more of the respondents named in the complaint be ordered to build it; and further requesting that the Commission require completion of the Natron cut-off and order certain other railroad construction in central Oregon. The Southern Pacific voluntarily assumed the completion of the Natron cut-off and to that end was granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 1 (18). The Oregon-Washington also applied for and obtained a certificate for construction of the branch from Crane to Bums. Other applications by various carriers were granted. The Commission then dismissed the complaint, holding that the record was not adequate to support the requested order.⁹ On May 24, 1927, the Oregon Commission filed the present complaint against eleven railroads, including the Oregon-Washington, the Oregon Short Line, the Southern Pacific, and others serving the State, and also the Union Pacific. The failure and refusal to provide railroad facilities to a large area of central Oregon was the gravamen of the complaint. Consequences of the neglect to build this line were enumerated as prevention of the development of a vast area, hindrance of exploitation of the natural resources of the State, unreasonably circuitous routes, with consequent delays, and car shortages, all causing Construction of Railroad Lines in Eastern Oregon, 111 I. C. C. 3. 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 UK losses to the people of Oregon. The relief prayed was an order that one or more of the respondents be required to construct the cross-state line, from Crane to Crescent Lake. This line, 185 miles in length, after leaving Crane would traverse about 20 miles of swampy area and 15 miles of alkali flats, and would then pass over the Great Sandy or High Desert for 115 miles. The region is in part sparsely settled and in part wholly uninhabited, and contains no towns except Crescent and Crescent Lake, at the western extremity, neither of which has a population of 100. There is no town within 20 miles north or south of the proposed line. Certain of the lands have possibilities of cultivation through irrigation, and the evidence for complainants is that if the railroad were built such activity would be stimulated. There seems to be no dispute that traffic to be obtained from the region will fall far short of supporting the line. The appellants are of opinion that sufficient traffic for this purpose may be secured by diverting to the new line freight originating west of the Cascade Range, and now moving east on the Southern Pacific through Ogden. In the total haul between Crescent Lake and Granger, Wyo., the route via the cross-state fine would be some 214 miles, or 11%, shorter. Neither the Oregon-Washington nor any other portion of the Union Pacific System serves the territory south of Portland and west of the Cascade Mountains. The Southern Pacific lines cover this area. Freight may, however, be routed either over the Southern Pacific via Ogden, or over the Union Pacific via Portland and Granger, Wyoming. The latter furnishes a reasonably short route with adequate and quick service. Inasmuch, however, as the freight originates in Southern Pacific territory, very little is sent over the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific routing it so as to obtain the long haul. The contention is that even if the proposed line were constructed the same condition I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 31 14 Opinion of the Court. would obtain and that the Union Pacific System could get little or none of the traffic from western Oregon, unless in addition to the cross-state line the Oregon-Washington should build across the Cascade Range into the agricultural counties now served by the Southern Pacific.¹⁰ * The Union Pacific System, composed as above stated, has a total trackage of 15,045.17 miles. The required extension would add 1.2 per cent, to the existing mileage, and can be constructed at a cost of between $9,900,000 and $11,700,000. The finding of the Commission is that operation of the line will not seriously affect the ability of the Union Pacific System adequately to serve the public. Recognizing that the Oregon-Washington has not the necessary funds, and perhaps cannot borrow them, the order permits the financing of construction by advances from the Union Pacific Railroad, which is found to be in position to make them. Union Pacific and the Oregon-Washington consider the venture unprofitable and wasteful, and have refused to make the investment. In the Commission’s judgment, the railroad, if constructed, while not profitable at first, will ultimately obtain valuable traffic for the Union Pacific System, will aid the Ontario-Burns branch, which now operates at a serious deficit, and consequently prove a remunerative investment. The court below held,¹¹ as we must, that these findings, based upon evidence, may not be disturbed. ¹⁰ The court below found: “5. The proposed line in large part would extend through a sparsely settled desert waste which the petitioner has not undertaken or professed to serve. One of the dominant purposes of the order complained of was to provide for the construction of a new east and west line of railroad, whereby lumber traffic originating hundreds of miles from petitioner’s present line may find a shorter route to eastern markets, and traffic from southwestern Idaho may find a shorter route to northern California points.” “The court below said: "If we were at liberty to review this testimony independently of the findings made by the commission, we might find no little difficulty in reaching the same conclusion,” 47 F. (2d) 252, 32 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. The appellees’ challenge of the order as beyond the power of the Commission was sustained by the District Court, and this decision is assigned as error. The Commission thought its authority to order extension of existing lines was without limitations, save the two which are expressed in paragraph 21,—that public necessity and convenience require the construction, and that the building and operation of the road will not impair the ability of the carrier to render adequate public service. Having determined that the requested extension complied with both conditions the Commission ordered the road built. Prior to the adoption of the Transportation Act, 1920, the Commission had no authority to authorize or to compel extensions of existing lines of railroad. Such power as existed in that behalf rested in the States. In a number of cases this court passed upon and defined the authority of a State to require extensions of existing service and facilities.¹² Orders made were attacked as compelling the companies, against their will and judgment, to devote property to the public service without compensation, con- ¹² Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific R. R.v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Michigan R. R. Commn., 236 U. S. 615 (requirement of track connections and facilities for interchange of traffic); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. n. Minnesota, 193 U. 8. 53 (erection and maintenance of depots); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. 8. 262; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commn., 206 U.S. 1; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Public Service Commn., 242 U. 8. 603 (orders relating to passenger service to be rendered and train schedules to be maintained); Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277 (requirement that a street railway company doubletrack a portion of its lines) ; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416 (extension of a sidetrack as a public track and as part of the railroad’s property and system for the service of a private plant) ; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 265 U. S. 70 (requirement that railroad provide certain facilities for removal of freight from its premises). I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 33 14 Opinion of the Court. trary to the guaranty of due process. They were sustained, however, upon the express ground that the railroads had undertaken the service and must supply facilities adequate and reasonably necessary to its performance. The requirements were found not to involve the rendition of a new or different service from that to which the owners had agreed when they dedicated their property to a public use. Where, however, the State’s mandate involved the rendition of a service beyond the agreement of the carrier, the order was annulled.¹⁸ The regulations adopted by the States were not uniform; statutory authority to order additions and extensions existed in some States and not in others. Congress was informed of this condition, and urged to exercise the federal power to promulgate a uniform system of regulation of interstate commerce.¹⁴ Legislation to effectuate this purpose was enacted. ¹³ * * * * ¹³ Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 417; Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510; compare Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 595. “ See 33d Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1919, p. 3, where the following quotation is given from a statement furnished by the Commission to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce: “ In some of the States the State officers are authorized to require such extensions, but in such cases they are necessarily primarily concerned with, if not confined to, a consideration of State traffic. Some of the States have not vested such authority in any State official. Ordinarily such extensions would be desired for the purpose of facilitating or making possible the transportation of interstate traffic. The desirability of uniformity is obvious. The exercise of Federal authority should not depend upon whether or not the State has acted and should not be different as to the State that has legislated on the subject and the State that has not so legislated. It therefore seems desirable that the Congress should exercise its jurisdiction in this regard in a plenary way and that where such extensions are desired in connection with the movement of presently existing or prospective 181684°—33-----3 34 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. By act of May 29, 1917,¹⁵ new paragraphs were added to § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act; and by the Transportation Act, 1920,¹⁶ these were amended and others inserted. As a result paragraphs 10 to 17 inclusive, all dealing with car service, were given their present form. Paragraphs 18 to 20 inclusive first appear in the Transportation Act. They regulate voluntary extensions of lines or building of new lines, require a certificate of convenience and necessity therefor, and prescribe the procedure for obtaining it. The paragraph with which we are here concerned, numbered 21, was also added by the Transportation Act. It is: “ The Commission may, after hearing, in a proceeding upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, authorize or require by order any carrier by railroad subject to this Act, party to such proceeding, to provide itself with safe and adequate facilities for performing as a common carrier its car service as that term is used in this Act, and to extend its line or lines: Provided, That no such authorization or order shall be made unless the Commission finds, as to such extension, that it is reasonably required in the interest of public convenience and necessity, or as to such extension or facilities that the expense involved therein will not impair the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the public. Any carrier subject to this Act which refuses or neglects to comply with any order of the Commission made in pursuance of this paragraph shall be liable to a penalty of $100 for each day during which such refusal or neglect continues, interstate traffic and the carrier is unwilling to construct them, it may, upon proper showing and after full hearing, be required to do so by the Federal tribunal.” Compare Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. n. Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244, 248, 250. “Chap. 23, 40 Stat. 101. “ Chap. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 476. I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 35 14 Opinion of the Court. which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United States.” The appellants maintain that if the Commission finds the conditions stated in the proviso exist, the power given to compel a carrier “ to extend its line or lines ” is unlimited and the way is open for an order to extend for any distance, at any cost, for the purpose of developing virgin territory hitherto unreached by railroads, or for supplying competition in a remote region served by other carriers. The phrase “ and to extend its line or lines ” is part of a single sentence committing to the Commission the power to require carriers to provide safe and adequate facilities for car service as defined in the act. The reasonable conclusion is, therefore, that the extensions mentioned have to do with car service, and are not intended to create a wholly independent subject of jurisdiction. In the proviso the furnishing of facilities and extension of lines are blended as belonging in a single class. We should expect, if Congress were intending to grant to the Commission a new and drastic power to compel the investment of enormous sums for the development or service of a region which the carrier had never theretofore entered or intended to serve, the intention would be expressed in more than a clause in a sentence dealing with car service. As said in Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52, 70: “ If Congress had intended to give an executive tribunal unfettered capacity for requisitioning investment of capital of the carriers and the purchase of large quantities of land and material in an adverse proceeding, we may well be confident that Congress would have made its meaning far clearer and more direct than in the present meager provisions of the Transportation Act.” Moreover, if the purpose were that claimed by the Commission support should be found in legislative history. But none has been called to our attention. In the 36 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. report to Congress for 1919 the Commission reiterated an outline of the policies previously suggested for legislative action in view of the approaching termination of federal control.¹⁷ No intimation is given that carriers should be required to build into territory they had not undertaken to serve. The scope of the recommendation was not enlarged in the testimony before the committee of the Senate having the Transportation Act in charge.¹⁸ The terms of paragraph 18, by contrast, throw light on the meaning of paragraph 21. The former presupposes voluntary action by a carrier, and provides that no company shall undertake “ the extension of its line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, . . . unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require ” the construction and operation thereof. The difference of phraseology in the two paragraphs emphasizes the distinction between extensions and new lines. The diversity is significant. The purpose of Congress in enacting paragraph 18, as repeatedly explained by this court, was that though a carrier should desire to extend existing facilities or to construct new ones in territory not previously served, the free ¹⁷ In that report the Commission says, at p. 2: "3. Limitation of railway construction to the necessities and convenience of the Government and of the public and assuring construction to the point of these limitations. . . . The thought underlying the second part of this suggestion is that a railroad having been permitted, by public franchise and the powers that go with it, to build into a given territory, it should be required to properly serve and develop that territory. And in developed territory it is important to provide for the extension of short branch or spur lines or spur tracks to communities and industries that should be served and that can furnish sufficient traffic to justify such extension.” ¹⁸ Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in H. R. 4378, Vol, 1, p, 53, 66th Cong., 1st Session. I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 37 14 Opinion of the Court. exercise of discretion should not be permitted, but the Commission must be convinced that the proposed venture would not drain the railroad’s resources and disable it from performing those duties of public service under which it then rested, with consequent detriment to the public in the matter of service and rates.¹⁸ ¹⁹ If a railroad company can prove that the proposal either presently or in the reasonably near future will be self-sustaining, or so nearly so as not unduly to burden interstate commerce, the Commission may issue a certificate authorizing the proposed line. Paragraph 21, on the other hand, contains no provision whatever for new lines. If the power be as broad as contended by the Commission there seems to be no good reason for the omission. The same principles and the same needs might equally require the building of a new line as the extension of an existing one, unless, indeed, Congress recognized a radical difference between compelling embarkation in a new venture and ordering a mere extension of facilities required as the natural concomitant and complement of those presently used for the rendition of the service to which the carrier has committed itself. That paragraph 21 refers to the service the carrier has bound itself to render is further emphasized by the omission to make the future public convenience a factor to be considered. A presently existing public need is expressly stated as prerequisite to the compulsory extension of a line. On the other hand, paragraph 18, which covers voluntary construction, conditions approval on present or future convenience or necessity. Congress therefore drew a distinction between what might be permitted and what compelled. These differences in the two sections were ¹⁸ See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U S. 35, 42. Compare Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U. S. 360. 38 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 U.S. disregarded by the Commission, and are overlooked by the appellants. We are told that if paragraph 22 be given due weight the word “ extend ” in 21 must have a broader connotation than we attribute. This paragraph enacts that the powers conferred upon the Commission by paragraphs 18 to 21, both inclusive, are not to “ extend to the construction or abandonment of spur, industrial, team, switching, or sidetracks, located or to be located wholly within one state. .The argument is that if the phrase “ to extend its line ” be so limited as to apply only to existing commitments of the carrier it becomes synonymous with the matters excluded from the Commission’s jurisdiction by paragraph 22, with the result that the one becomes contradictory of the other in the matter of line extension. The practice in the application of paragraphs 18 and 21 negatives this view. In Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. N-Jackson <& E. Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244, an order of the Commission made under paragraph 21 was sustained which directed the building of a connection between two railroads for interchange of traffic near the outskirts of Jack-son, Mississippi. In Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331, 283 U. S. 380, it was held that under paragraphs 18-21 a certificate was required for the necessary rearrangement of main tracks to comply with an order of the Railroad Commission of California that the interstate carriers entering Los Angeles should combine in the construction and use of a union depot. The court called attention (264 U. S. 345) to the palpable distinction between the main line tracks of an interstate carrier and its spur, industrial, switching or sidetracks, and declared the act exhibited the legislative intent to retain within the control of the Commission any substantial change in the former. Although under the station plan the proposed extensions of lines and main tracks were not great in distance, they involved a new intramural desti- I. 0. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 39 14 Opinion of the Court. nation for each railway attended by great expense. As was said, the necessary outlay might well be such as to cripple the railroads and hamper their service. Such an extension was held to require the finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the changes would not impair the ability of the carriers to perform their public duties. (Compare Texas & Pae. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 270 U. S. 266.) From what has been said it is plain that an extension, though something other than a team, switching, industrial or side track, need not, in order to be distinguished therefrom, be a building into a new and previously unserved locality. The cases above cited, dealing with the powers of state authorities in the matter of extensions of lines and service, furnish a background which must have been in the minds both of the Commission and of the Congress at the time of the passage of the Transportation Act. Those decisions show that due process is denied by requiring service which goes beyond the undertaking of the carrier. Orders for extensions of line were sustained whenever reasonably required in the interest of car service and for interchange of traffic. No extension ordered for the service of new territory had been approved.²⁰ Wherever the state attempted to enforce a regulation or demand extension of ³⁰ See the cases passing on state commission orders, cited supra, notes 12 and 13; also those cited in note 24, infra. The same rule has been applied in the case of other public service corporations. Gas or electric light or telephone companies may be compelled to extend their facilities within the territory covered by the franchises granted them: New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345; New York ex rel. v. Public Service Commn., 269 U. S. 244. But they may not be compelled to extend their lines beyond these limits or to serve other communities. Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 287 Fed. 381; State v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 287 Mo. 522; 229 S. W. 782; Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Corp. Commn., 88 Okla. 51; 211 Pac. 401; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 105 W. Va. 603; 144 S. E, 723. 40 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 US. facilities outside the company’s undertaking to serve the public, the power was negatived for the very reason that the attempted exercise called on the railroad company for something beyond its agreement.²¹ The Act, reasonably construed, distinguishes between three sorts of facilities,—new lines, or extensions, voluntarily undertaken (fl 18); compulsory extensions within the area which the carrier has bound itself to serve (fl 21) ; and spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks located wholly within one State, which are left within state control (fl 22). The second class is distinct from the others and embraces, as the decisions show, a substantial field. But this field is not, as the Commission holds, coterminous with that created by paragraph 18. If it were, power would exist to compel a carrier having lines reaching Chicago and St. Louis, but none connecting those cities, to build a railroad between them. Though in truth a new line, the appellants would call this an extension of the existing lines. If the grant of authority is broad enough to support the order in the present case it would also justify such a hypothetical requirement as we have supposed. We cannot so read the statute, but think the power granted by paragraph 21 is confined to extensions within the undertaking of the carrier to serve, and cannot be extended to embrace the building of what is essentially a new line to reach new territory. There is another consideration which supports the construction adopted. Our duty is to construe the statute, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.²² The views advanced by the appellants, to say the least, raise serious questions in this respect. The rail- ²¹ See note 13, supra; note 24, infra. ²² Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118, 122; Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 492; United States v. LaFranca, 282 U. S. 568, 574. I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 41 14 Opinion of the Court. roads, though dedicated to a public use, remain the private property of their owners, and their assets may not be taken without just compensation.²³ The Transportation Act has not abolished this proprietorship. State courts have uniformly held that to require extension of existing lines beyond the scope of the carrier’s commitment to the public service is a taking of property in violation of the federal constitution.²⁴ * * * The decisions of this court will be searched in vain for the announcement of any principle of Constitutional interpretation which would support the order of the Commission. The statements in New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, and Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, in respect of the purposes of the Transportation Act, on which appellants rely, must be read having in mind the situations there presented and the nature of the orders approved. Care was taken in those cases to demonstrate that the sections upheld did not, in application, go beyond the regulation of rates and the disposition of the excess over a fair return collected by a carrier, and it was shown that no taking or confiscation of property resulted. Those decisions are far from sustaining the validity of an order which seeks to require the investment of millions of dollars in a new venture in undeveloped areas. Such a compulsion imposes upon the carrier and its property “ burdens that are not incident to its engagement.” Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. at p. 595. The ™ Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 108, 118; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196, 206; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 595; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340, 346; Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U. S. 413, 421. M Atchison, T. & 8. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commn., 173 Cal. 577; 160 Pac. 828; Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Commn., 192 Cal. 307; 219 Pac. 983; Public Service Commn. v. United Railways & Electric Co., 126 Md. 478; 95 Atl. 170; Morgan Run Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commn., 98 Oh. St. 218; 120 N. E. 295. 42 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Opinion of the Court. 288 US. construction we adopt makes it unnecessary to pass upon the grave questions of constitutional validity raised by appellants’ argument. It is urged that as the order involved trackage amounting to only 1.2% of that now maintained by the Union Pacific System, the requirement may properly be considered an extension rather than a new line, though a different view might prevail if the Oregon-Washington alone be considered. But whether the order be treated as a command to the Oregon-Washington Company as a separate corporate entity, or as an injunction to the Union Pacific System, it is an attempted exertion of a power not conferred. Assuming, without deciding, that the Commission was entitled to treat the Oregon-Washington company as an instrument of the Union Pacific System, and the required extension, therefore, as one adding only a small percentage to the present mileage of the system, still the purpose is to compel a new investment for the development of a new area at the request and in the interest of the State of Oregon, whose desire is that its natural resources shall be exploited.²⁸ Finally it is claimed that however narrowly the power to compel extensions be construed, the order was justified by the facts developed before the Commission. They are said to disclose an undertaking by the Oregon-Washington Company to serve the region in question. Much ²⁸The Commission said: "It is urged that Oregon’s development, as compared with other States, has been held back and seriously hampered, due to the lack of direct routes to the markets for her products and that the construction of the proposed extension is an important part of anticipated development of adequate rail transportation facilities within the State. The evidence of complainant and defendants brings out clearly and forcibly that no section can develop without transportation. The major portion of the State of Oregon is without adequate transportation facilities and this is particularly true with respect to the portion which would be served by the proposed construction.” 159 I. C. C. 635. I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 43 14 Cardozo, J., dissenting. is made of the circumstance that when the complaint was filed the company had a charter under which it was authorized to build a line on the location of that which the order describes. The possession of the franchise is said to give rise to an implied agreement to serve the district. The company’s having in contemplation the building of the road would in this view render the Commission’s action unassailable. But authority to build the line, if the company were so minded, involved no commitment to construct it.²⁶ Though by appropriate legislation the State might forfeit the charter for non-user, the continued existence of the franchise imposed no obligation to exercise the charter powers. The Oregon-Washington Company chose not to serve the territory which the cross-state line would reach; has not desired and does not now desire to enter upon the project. The possession of a charter which would have made the building of a railroad legal is insignificant as to the company’s actual undertaking. Whether the railroad held itself out to serve the region in question must be decided in the light of all the facts. The record demonstrates that the territory to be traversed was one the company had neither actually nor impliedly agreed to serve with transportation facilities. The decree is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting. Unable to concur in the decision of the Court, I place upon record without extended argument the grounds of my dissent. The Transportation Act of 1920 was framed with the design of securing to the United States an adequate and ¹⁶ Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dustin, 142 U. S. 492, 499, and cases cited; Rentier v. Cincinnati, C. & E. Ry. Co., 180 Ky. 497; 203 S. W. 199; State v. Public Service Commn., 287 Mo. 522; 229 S. W. 782. Compare Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U. S. 79, 85. 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Cardozo, J., dissenting. 288 U.S. efficient system of railroad transportation. Everything contained in it with reference to extensions, voluntary and involuntary, is tributary to that end, and unless related thereto, is misconceived and misapplied. On the one hand, the carriers are to be permitted to make voluntary extensions of their lines, but only with the consent of the Commission, lest waste may otherwise ensue. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 270 U. S. 266, 277, 278. On the other hand, they are made subject to a correlative duty, if so ordered by the Commission, to build extensions, even though unwillingly, when transportation will otherwise be inefficient or inadequate. The limits of this duty are not appropriately defined by dividing the field into extensions big and little, with a power of regulation excluded from the one section and admitted in the other. On the contrary, the word extension is to be taken in no forced or artificial sense, but with the meaning attributed to it in the common speech of men. It does not fairly connote a prolongation so vast and sudden as to work an utter transformation of the character of the road, making what was extended the incident and the extension the principal. The action of the Commission must have a basis in reason, and its order must be viewed with reference to the length and other conditions of the line or lines to be enlarged. No doubt there is a point at which the enlargement of a road becomes “ the construction of a new line” (par. 18) rather than the extension of an old one. On the other hand, the power of the Commission is not limited to extensions that are merely trivial. The purpose of the Congress to make the power more than this, to make it an effective instrument for the development of railroad transportation, is revealed at every step. It is revealed in the legislative history of the measure, and particularly in the report of the Commission explaining the mischiefs to be remedied and recommending the fitting I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 45 14 Cardozo, J., dissenting. cure.* It is revealed very distinctly on the face of the statute, which provides that the extension may not be ordered without a certificate of convenience and necessity, nor ordered even then if the expense to be incurred “ will impair the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the public,” a precautionary proviso that was omitted in the requirement of adequate facilities for car service contained in the same section, and that would surely have been thought to be superfluous if the subject matter of the extension was to be a short or unimportant spur. In the case at hand, the proposed addition increases only by 1.2 per cent the mileage of the Union Pacific System, and is to be laid across a region which the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, the subsidiary most directly affected, had marked out in its certificate of incorporation as territory that it planned to serve. An increment thus related to the thing to be increased is not so extraordinary in size, so lacking in proportion, as to remake or transform under the guise of improving or extending. New York de Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345; Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commn., 269 U. S. 244; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U. S. 300, 308, 309. Another basis of division, in addition to that of size, is put forward in argument as separating the extensions that * Of the four major recommendations made by the Commission in its annual report of December, 1918, the third was as follows: “(3) limitation of railway construction to the necessities and convenience of the Government and of the public, and assuring construction to the point of these limitations.” Accompanying these recommendations was a statement of their fundamental aim or purpose. “ Whatever line of policy is determined upon, the fundamental aim or purpose should be to secure transportation systems that will be adequate to the Nation’s needs, even in time of national stress or peril, and that will furnish to the public safe, adequate and efficient transportation at the lowest cost consistent with that service,” 46 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Cardozo, J., dissenting. 288 U.S. Congress had in view from others so substantial that they are to be taken as excluded. We are to find the test, so it is said, in the expectation or intention, presumable or actual, of the corporators or stockholders. The test, however, is illusory. If expectation or intention is the measure of the power of the nation, development must always wait upon the pleasure of the carrier affected. By hypothesis, the territory already served is the only territory that the carrier has evinced a willingness to serve. If its road is to be built for a greater distance or between other points, there is a frustration of its purpose that the terminus for construction shall be wherever stockholders and directors have willed that it shall be. In the thought of the lawmakers the power of the Government was not to be conditioned upon consent. It was to operate by compulsion upon whatever came within its sphere. The railroads of the nation had been brought together by the Transportation Act into a system of transportation national in its dimensions and under national control. Not the wishes of the component units, but the needs of the public which they are organized to serve, were to give the rule and measure for command and for obedience. Let expectation be the test, and cases such as New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, supra, Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commn., supra, and United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, must have been decided otherwise than they were. In these instances and others, carriers serving a particular territory were compelled to serve another in response to a public need that the field of service be enlarged. Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331, is cited as pointing another way, but its implications are misread. Its precise holding is that an order of a state commission cannot coerce an interstate carrier to make extensive changes and relocations of its main tracks at great expense in connection with the construction of a I. C. C. V. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 47 14 Cardozo, J., dissenting. new union station, but that the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission is necessary in such circumstances even though the new tracks are short. The case is far from holding, however, that the relevant sections of the Transportation Act apply to short additions to the exclusion of all others. On the contrary, the fact that the additions were “ not great in distance,” (p. 346) even though expensive, is recognized as giving color to the argument that no consent is necessary. “ It is argued,” wrote Chief Justice Taft (p. 344), “ that paragraphs 18 to 21 of § 402 refer only to extensions of a line of railroad having the purpose to include new territory to be served by the interstate carrier and do not refer to an extension of new main track for the mere purpose of rearranging terminals within the same city. We do not think the language of paragraphs 18 to 21 can be properly so limited.” In such words there is surely no suggestion that the power of the federal Commission is inadequate to compel an extension into territory not served, nor any acceptance of the test of presumable intention. If the test proposed were not illusory, it would none the less be inappropriate. The time has gone by when the subjection of a public service corporation to control and regulation by the agencies of government is to have its origin and justification in the terms of a supposed contract between the corporation and the state. The origin of the subjection and its justification are to be found, not in contract, but in duty, a duty imposed by law as an incident to the enjoyment of a privilege. The discretion of managers and stockholders, at one time nearly absolute, is now subject in countless ways to compulsion or restraint in the interest of the public welfare. No longer may the carrier abandon any portion of its road without the consent of the Commission, though the portion to be abandoned has been operated at a loss. 41 Stat. 477 (18); 49 U. S. Code, § 1 (18). No longer, without the consent of 48 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Cardozo, J., dissenting. 288 U.S. the Commission, may it extend the length of its road by its voluntary act. 49 U. S. Code, § 1 (18). No longer may securities be issued, in the form either of stock or of evidences of debt, unless the Commission has found the proposed action of the carrier to be compatible with the public good. 49 U. S. Code, § 20a. All these limitations upon ancient rights and privileges have had the approval of this court. The new act, said the Chief Justice in Day-ton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478, “ puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under the fostering guardianship of the Commission, which is to supervise their issue of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction of new lines, their abandonment of old lines, and by a proper division of joint rates, and by fixing adequate rates for interstate commerce, and in case of discrimination, for intrastate commerce, to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged.” The argument is not persuasive that alone among all these inroads upon the freedom of managerial discretion the provision for compulsory extensions is to be struck down as ineffective. As long as governmental orders are kept within the range of reason, their operation is unaffected by expectation or desire. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution is invoked by the carriers but invoked without avail. Consistently with that Amendment Congress may delegate to the Commission the power to force upon unwilling carriers an extension of their lines into fields of old service and of new. Much of what has been written in this opinion as to the meaning of the statute is pertinent also to an inquiry as to power. Again the thought is to be kept before us that the need of the public, not the acquiescence of the carrier, is the measure of the service, provided only that for such service there is adequate requital. Whether such requital has been assured is a question not susceptible of answer I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 49 14 Cardozo, J., dissenting. except in the setting of the circumstances. Objection that it is lacking is to be viewed in the light of the entire scheme and framework of the Act of 1920, and of all the relevant provisions for the carriers’ protection. There must be kept in view the provision whereby rates are to be maintained at such a level as to yield to the carriers of the country, or to the several groups into which they are to be divided, a fair and reasonable return, and whereby the surplus earnings of the strong roads may be recaptured and applied to the use of weaker ones. True indeed it is that courts are wont to lean to the construction of a statute that will avoid serious doubts of its validity, though they might hold it to be valid if pressed to a decision. United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 574; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401. Even so, they will not carry hesitation to the point of devitalizing the essence to preserve the husk alone. When the scheme of the Act is viewed in the totality of its meaning and probable operation, there is a quick end to the objection that in fixing the bounds of duty to render service to the public, the area of the possible must coincide, at least generally and roughly, with that of the actual and voluntary. Congress does not transcend the limits of the Constitution when it establishes a national system of transportation by rail. It does not transcend those limits when in aid of the system thus established, it lays a duty upon the railroads to furnish the extensions requisite for the attainment of the end in view. The conclusion is the same whether the immediate purpose of the order is to develop the resources of the country in territory contiguous to roads already built, or to promote the convenience of communities served imperfectly or not at all. I have said that governmental orders to be valid must be kept within the range of reason. The record gives no support to a contention that those bounds have been exceeded. The cost of the improvement “ will not impair 181684°—33---4 50 OCTOBER TERM, 1932. Cardozo, J., dissenting. 288 U.S. the ability of the carrier or carriers involved to perform their duty to the public.” So the Commission finds, and the fact is not disputed. The improvement when made will be “ a valuable asset to the Union Pacific System,” and will¹ be “ an effective feeder for that system after a reasonable development period.” This finding brings us into the realm of prophecy, and so, not unnaturally, into the field of contention and uncertainty. Much deference is due to the judgment of the Commission, “ a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience ” (Illinois Central R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 206 U. S. 441, 454; Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 665). The conclusion that it has expressed is no arbitrary judgment, but has a basis of fact and reason in the pages of this record. But if doubt were greater than it is, the binding force of the decision would not thereby be defeated. The order of the Commission does not depend for its validity upon the certainty of a prophetic judgment as to all the consequences to follow. Once more we are to keep in mind the changes that have been wrought by the Transportation Act of 1920. In cases unaffected by that Act, two lines of decisions, following separate and yet neighboring channels, are to be found in the reports. The first, represented by Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 595, and Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commn., 251 U. S. 396, is made up of cases where the return for particular services was considered in isolation without reference to earnings generally. The second, represented by St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574; and United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, is marked by the cases where the compulsory enlargement of the range of public service has been held to be permissible if the combined return is adequate for the system as a whole. By force of the Act of 1920, the zone has been narrowed for the application of I. C. C. v. OREGON-WASHINGTON R. CO. 51 14 Cardozo, J., dissenting. the principle which has illustration in the first group, and correspondingly widened for the application of the principle which has illustration in the second. Irrelevant, or nearly so, are the decisions of this court defining the jurisdiction of the Commission as it stood before the Act of 1920 had brought a new system into being. Irrelevant also are the decisions of state courts or of the lower federal courts determining the validity of very different statutes under which there are no compensatory guarantees to mitigate the burden of statutory duties, the carriers affected being viewed as separate units and not as members of a group. See, e. g. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 287 Fed. 381; Atchison, T. that such farming operations occur in the county [or counties] of .................................................................. within said judicial district; that he is insolvent [or unable to meet his debts as they mature]; and that he desires to effect a composition or extension of time to pay his debts under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. That the schedule hereto annexed, marked “A”, and verified by your petitioner’s oath, contains a full and true statement of all his debts, and (so far as it is possible to ascertain) the names and places of residence of his creditors, and such further statements concerning said debts as are required by the provisions of said act. That the schedule hereto annexed, marked “ B ”, and verified by your petitioner’s oath, contains an accurate inventory of all his prop- AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. 647 erty, both real and personal, and such further statements concerning said property as are required by the provisions of said act. Wherefore your petitioner prays that his petition may be approved by the court and proceedings had in accordance with the provisions of said section. ..................., Attorney. United States of America, District of....................., ss: I, ...................., the petitioning debtor mentioned and described in the. foregoing petition, do hereby make solemn oath that the statements contained therein are true according to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. ....................9 Petitioner. Subscribed and sworn to before me this .... day of......., A.D. 19... [Official character'] Form No. 66 ANSWER UNDER SECTION 74 TO INVOLUNTARY PETITION In the District Court of the United States for the................ District of..................... In the Matter of .................... In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor At..........., in said district, on the .... day of............ A.D. 19... And now the said ...................... appears, and in answer to the involuntary petition filed against him asserts that he is insolvent [or unable to meet his debts as they mature] and that he desires to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts under section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act; wherefore he prays that the peti- • tion for his adjudication be not granted, that his answer be approved, and that the proceedings be thenceforth had under said section. Subscribed and sworn to before me, this .... day of.........., A.D. 19... [Official character] 648 AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. Form No. 67 ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR’S PETITION OB ANSWER IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 74, OB HIS PETITION IN PROCEEDINGS UNDEB SECTION 75 In the District Court of the United States for the.............. District of.................... In the Matter of ...................In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor At........,, in said district, on the....day of............... A.D. 19.., before the Honorable .................. judge of said court, the petition [or answer] of..................praying that he be afforded an opportunity to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts under section 74 [or 75] of the Bankruptcy Act, having been heard and duly considered, is approved as properly filed under said section. Witness the Honorable......................, judge of said court, and the seal thereof, at ...................., in said district, on the.........day of........................A.D. 19... [Seal of the court] ...................., Clerk. Form No. 68 OBDEB OF REFERENCE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 74 OR SECTION 75 In the District Court of the United States for the.............. District of ................. In the Matter of ..................lln Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor Whereas the petition [or answer] of......................, filed in this court on the.....day of...................., A.D. 19.., praying that he be afforded an opportunity to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts under section 74 [or 75] of the Bankruptcy Act, having been duly approved by order of this court on the......day of........................... A.D. 19.., it is thereupon ordered, that said matter be referred to............, one of the referees in bankruptcy [or one of the conciliation commissioners] of this court, to take such further proceedings therein as are required by said section; and that the said.............. shall attend before said referee [or conciliation commissioner] on AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. 649 the...... day of....................... at ........................ and thenceforth shall submit to such orders as may be made by said referee [or conciliation commissioner] or by this court relating to the proceedings under said section. Witness the Honorable ....................., judge of the said court, and the seal thereof, at...................in said district, on the.......day of...................., A.D. 19... Clerk. [Seal of the court.] Form No. 69 BOND OF CONCILIATION COMMISSIONER Know all men by these presents: That we......................, of .................., as principal, and...................., of .....................and ......................, of.............. ................................................................., as sureties, are held and firmly bound to the United States of America in the sum of ........................................ dollars, lawful money of the United States, to be paid to the said United States, for the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, by these presents. Signed and sealed this......day of........................, A.D. 19... The condition of this obligation is such that whereas the said ........has been on the............. day of...................... ................................................................., A.D. 19.., appointed by the Honorable ......................... , judge of the District Court of the United States for the District of.,.a conciliation commissioner under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, in and for the county of .............................................................., in said district: Now, therefore, if the said..................... shall well and faithfully discharge and perform all the duties pertaining to the said office of conciliation commissioner, then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. Signed and sealed in the presence of— .................... [L.S.] .................... [LS.] .................... [L.S.] Approved this..........day of......................... District Judge. 650 AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. Form No. 70 NOTICE OF FIRST MEETING OF CREDITORS IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 74 In the District Court of the United States for the.............. District of.................... In the Matter of .....................In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor To the creditors of...................., of..................., in the county of....................., and district aforesaid. Notice is hereby given that on the.....day of................ ........, A.D., 19.., the petition [or answer] of the said. ..........................................................., praying that he be afforded an opportunity to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts under section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, was approved by this court as properly filed under said section; and that the first meeting of his creditors will be held at .......................................... in ., on the ..............day of.............., A.D., 19.., at .... o’clock in the ................................. noon, at which time the said creditors may attend, prove their claims, nominate a trustee, examine the debtor, and transact such other business as may properly come before said meeting. ....................) Referee in Bankruptcy. .................... 19... Form No. 71 NOTICE OF FIRST MEETING OF CREDITORS IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 75 In the District Court of the United States for the.............. District of.................... In the Matter of .....................In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor To the creditors of...................., of..................., in the county of.................., and district aforesaid. Notice is hereby given that on the.....day of................ ......., A.D. 19.., the petition of the said ................., praying that he be afforded an opportunity to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts under section 75 of the AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. 651 Bankruptcy Act, was approved by this court as properly filed under said section; and that the first meeting of his creditors will be held at .................... in ....................., on the ...... day of ...................., A.D. 19.., at .......... o’clock in the...........noon, at which time the said creditors may attend, prove their claims, examine the debtor, and transact such other business as may properly come before said meeting. ..................................................... 9 Conciliation Commissioner. ....................,19... Form No. 72 APPLICATION FOB CONFIRMATION OF A COMPOSITION OR EXTENSION PROPOSAL UNDER SECTION 74 OR SECTION 75 In the District Court of the United States for the............. District of.................... In the Matter of .....................In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor To the Honorable....................., Referee in Bankruptcy [or Judge] of the District Court of the United States for the ....................District of..................: At ’...................., in said district, on the ... day of .........., A.D. 19.., now comes........................., the above-named debtor, and respectfully represents to the court that, after he had filed in court a schedule of his property and a list of his creditors, as required by law, he offered a proposal for a composition or an extension to his creditors, which proposal has been accepted in writing by a majority in number of all creditors whose claims have been allowed, including secured creditors whose claims are to be affected by the proposal, which number represents a majority in amount of such claims; that the consideration to be paid to the creditors, the money necessary to pay all debts which have priority, and the costs of the proceedings, amounting in all to the sum of .........................................................dollars, has been deposited, subject to the order of the court, in the...................................................Bank, of., a desig- nated depository. Wherefore the said ................... respectfully asks that the said proposal be confirmed by the court. Debtor. 652 AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. Form No. 73 ORDER CONFIRMING A COMPOSITION OR EXTENSION PROPOSAL UNDER SECTION 74 In the District Court of the United States for the............ District of................... In the Matter of ...................In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor An application for the confirmation of the proposal offered by the debtor under section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act having been filed in court, and it appearing that the proposal has been accepted by a majority in number of creditors whose claims have been allowed, including secured creditors whose claims are to be affected by the proposal, which number represents a majority in amount of such claims; and the consideration and the money required by law to be deposited, having been deposited as ordered, in such place as was designated by the said court, and subject to its order; and it also appearing that the proposal includes an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for secured creditors whose claims are affected and of financial rehabilitation for the debtor; that it is for the best interests of all creditors; that the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a ground for denying his discharge; and that the offer and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or procured by any means, promises, or acts contrary to the acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy: It is therefore hereby ordered that the said proposal be, and it hereby is, confirmed. Witness my hand, this.......day of.................... A.D. 19... ...................9 Referee in Bankruptcy. Form No. 74 ORDER CONFIRMING A COMPOSITION OR EXTENSION PROPOSAL UNDER SECTION 75 In the District Court of the United States for the............ District of................... In the Matter of ................... In Proceedings for a Composition or Extension Debtor An application for the confirmation of the proposal offered by the debtor under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act having been filed in AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. 653 court, and it appearing that the proposal has been accepted by a majority in number of creditors whose claims have been allowed, including secured creditors whose claims are to be affected by the proposal, which number represents a majority in amount of such claims; and the consideration and the money required by law to be deposited, having been deposited as ordered, in such place as was designated by the said court, and subject to its order; and it also appearing that the proposal includes an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for secured creditors whose claims are affected and of financial rehabilitation for the debtor; that it is for the best interests of all creditors; and that the offer and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or procured by any means, promises, or acts contrary to the acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy: It is therefore hereby ordered that the said proposal be, and it hereby is, confirmed. Witness the Honorable........................., judge of said court, and the seal thereof, this .......... day of ........................, A.D. 19... Clerk. [Seal of the court] Form No. 75 PETITION OF FARMERS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A CONCILIATION COMMISSIONER To the Honorable........................., Judge of the District Court of the United States for the ............................District of...........................: The petition of ................, .............., ..............., ...............> ...............> ................•••> .> ..................................................................................................................f > ..>.... ........................................................................) .} .) > respectfully represents: That each of your petitioners is personally bona fide engaged in farming operations, or derives the principal part of his income from farming operations, as more fully set forth with respect to each petitioner in the schedules hereto annexed and made a part hereof marked exhibits............respectively; That the farming operations of each of your petitioners occur in the county of.........................in said district; that each of your petitioners is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they mature, 654 AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. and that each intends, if a conciliation commissioner for said county is appointed, to file a petition for relief under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. Wherefore your petitioners pray that a conciliation commissioner for said county be appointed as provided in said section. .................... Address......................................................... ............................................................... Address....................................................... ............................................................... Address....................................................... ............................................................... Address....................................................... ............................................................... Address. ........................................................................ Address................................................................ ........................................................................ Address................................................................ ........................................................................ Address................................................................ ........................................................................ Address................................................................ .............................................................................................................................. - Address. ......................................................................................................................................... Address................................................................................................................................. ......................................................................................................................................... Address................................................................................................................................. ......................................................................................................................................... Address................................................................................................................................. ......................................................................................................................................... Address................................................................................................................................. ......................................................................................................................................... Address. [Form of verification to be signed by each petitioner.'] United States of America, District of..................., ss: I [or we], .................................................. .........................................................., who executed the foregoing petition, do hereby make solemn oath that the statements contained therein are true to the best of my [or our] knowledge, information, and belief. [Signatures .] Subscribed and sworn to before me this....day of............. ......., A.D. 19... [Official character] AMENDMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY RULES. 655 ORDER OF MAY 15, 1933. The General Orders in Bankruptcy heretofore promulgated by this Court are amended by including therein a new order, numbered LI, to be immediately effective, and reading as follows: “No ancillary receiver shall be appointed in any District Court of the United States in any bankruptcy proceeding pending in any other District of the United States except (1) upon the application of the primary receiver, or (2) upon the application of any party in interest with the consent of the primary receiver, or by leave of the court of original jurisdiction, or a judge thereof. No application for the appointment of such an ancillary receiver shall be granted unless the petition contains a detailed statement of the facts showing the necessity for such appointment, which petition shall be verified by the party in interest, or the primary receiver, or by an agent of the party in interest or primary receiver specifically authorized in writing for that purpose and having knowledge of the facts. Such authorization shall be attached to the petition.” INDEX ACTIONS. See Admiralty; Brokers, 3. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION. See Statutes, 4r-6. ADMIRALTY. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 5. Action for Death. Jurisdiction. Where an injury received aboard a vessel in navigable waters results in death ashore, admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit under the local death and lien statutes. Vancouver S. S. Co. v. Rice, 445. ALIENS. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1; International Law; Taxation, II, 10-11. AMENDMENT. After statute of limitations has run. See Taxation, III, 6-9. ANTI-TRUST ACTS. 1. Combination of Producers. Selling Agency. Injunction suit to restrain plan of producers of bituminous coal for operation of exclusive selling agency. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 344. 2. Id. Restatement of purposes and limitations of Act; relation of cooperative enterprise to market conditions; competition; testing purpose and probable effect of combination in advance of experience; retention of jurisdiction of case. Id. 3. Injunctive Relief. Private Plaintiff. Matters within jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R. R. Assn., 469. APPEAL. See Bills of Exceptions; Interstate Commerce Acts, 12; Jurisdiction. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. See Jurisdiction, I, 8. ASSUMPTION OF RISK. See Employers’ Liability Act, 1. 181684°—33--42 657 658 INDEX. BANKRUPTCY. General Orders in Bankruptcy, Amendments, p. 619. 1. Relation of States and United States. Power of Federal Government supreme; State must submit to appropriate limitations in respect of claims. New York v. Irving Trust Co., 329. 2. Proof of Claims. Time. Provision (§ 57) that claims shall not be proved after six months from adjudication does not apply to the United States or the States. Id. 3. Id. State. Bar Order. Court had power to expunge State’s notice of claim for taxes filed after expiration of bar order. Id. BANKS. See Constitutional Law, VII, (B), 3-5. Insolvency. Preferences. Priority under R. S. § 3466 does not extend to deposit of payments made to guardian by the United States under the Veterans’ Act. Spicer v. Smith, 430. BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS. Authentication. Amendment. Sufficiency of signature of judge by initials only as “ signing ” under R. S. § 953; necessity of sending bill back for amendment. George A. Ohl & Co. v. A. L. Smith Iron Works, 170. BROKERS. 1. Future Trading. Regulation. Missouri Bucket Shop Law not superseded by Grain Futures Act. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 188. 2. Validity of Contract. Evidence supported conclusion that transactions were executed and performed wholly in Missouri and were illegal under law of that State. Id. 3. Actions by Broker. Defenses. Invalidity of contracts under Missouri Bucket Shop Law—though not contrary to Grain Futures Act—was defense to action by broker for commissions and advances. Id. BUCKET SHOP LAWS. See Brokers, 1-3. CAUSE OF ACTION. Meaning. See United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62. CHAIN STORES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; VII, (B), 7-11. INDEX. 659 CLAIMS. See Bankruptcy, 2-3; Taxation, III, 6-10. 1. Requisitioning of Vessels. Just Compensation. Claim of mortgagee of vessels for amounts expended on repairs after their return and earlier construction liens, held without support. United States v. Acme Operating Corp., 243. 2. War Minerals Relief. Allowances for equipment and machinery, salaries of officers, and legal services, not forbidden as matter of law; claimant entitled to such adjustment as Secretary determines just and reasonable. Wilbur v. U. S. ex rel. Chestatee Pyrites & C. Corp., 97. 3. Id. Secretary may be required by mandamus to reconsider on facts allowances rejected through error of law. Id. COAL INDUSTRY. See Anti-Trust Acts, 1-2. COMMISSIONS. See Brokers, 3. COMPENSATION. See Claims, 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Bankruptcy, 1; Statutes, 1; Taxation, IV; Treaties, 2, 6. I. In General, p. 659. II. Taxing Power, p. 660. III. Judicial Power, p. 660. IV. Commerce Clause, p. 660. V. Exports and Imports, p. 661. VI. Fifth Amendment, p. 661. VII. Fourteenth Amendment. (A) Due Process Clause, p. 661. (B) Equal Protection Clause, p. 661. I. In General. 1. Instrumentalities of Government. Distinction between non-discriminatory tax affecting functions of government only remotely and one imposing direct burden. Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 325. 2. Id. Hydroelectric company licensed by Federal Power Commission is not federal agency exempt from state tax on production and sale of electricity. Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 178. 3. Id. Oil produced from restricted Indian lands under leases approved by Secretary of Interior not immune from state ad valorem tax. Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 325. 660 INDEX. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. I. In General—Continued. 4. Id. Implied exemption from state taxation of federal instrumentalities is not source of congressional power to control state action in other matters. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 181. 5. Id. Income derived by lessee from lease of oil and gas land from municipality, not immune from federal tax. Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 508. 6. Separation of Powers. Authority of deputy commissioner under Longshoremen’s Act to find facts conclusively. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 162. 7. Relation of Statutes to Treaties. See Cook v. United States, 102. II. Taxing Power. See VI and VII, infra. Jurisdiction to Tax. Limitation of state jurisdiction to tax does not establish the limitation of federal jurisdiction to tax. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. III. Judicial Power. 1. Limitations. Case or Controversy. Appeal from judgment of state court in proceeding under “ declaratory judgments ” law as presenting case or controversy. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 249. 2. Id. Constitution does not require that the case or controversy be presented by traditional forms of procedure and invoke only traditional remedies. Id. IV. Commerce Clause. 1. State Taxation. Chain Stores. Privilege tax on chain stores and tax on value of goods warehoused by them in State, valid. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. 2. Foreign Corporations. Right of State to exclude does not enable it, when granting privilege to do business, to burden by taxation interstate commerce carried on by foreign corporation. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 218. 3. Gasoline Tax. Validity of state excise tax on storage and withdrawal from storage of gasoline within State as applied to gasoline brought into the State by carrier for use in interstate commerce. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 249. 4. Railroads and Motor Carriers. Heavier tax burden on railroads than on motor carriers allowable. Id. INDEX. 661 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. IV. Commerce Clause—Continued. 5. Foreign Commerce. State Taxation. State tax on doing of business by foreign corporation engaged exclusively in landing, storing and selling in original packages nitrate imported by it from abroad, invalid; that corporation qualified to do business in State can not sustain tax. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 218. V. Exports and Imports. Limitations on States in respect of. See supra, IV, 5. VI. Fifth Amendment. See Taxation, II. 1. Federal Taxation. Due Process. Transfer Tax. Power of Congress to tax intangibles belonging to nonresident alien but which are physically in this country at time of death; federal power not affected by limitations on States. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. 2. Id. Validity of including in value of gross estate property transferred prior to statute by deed of trust reserving power to donor though not in favor of himself or his estate. Porter v. Commissioner, 436. VII. Fourteenth Amendment. (A) Due Process Clause. State Taxation. Power to tax not dependent upon enjoyment by taxpayer of special benefit from use of tax funds. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 249. (B) Equal Protection Clause. 1. Classification in General. Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent State from imposing differing taxes on different trades and professions or varying the rates of excise upon various products. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. 2. Classification. Reasonableness. Tax on production and sale of electricity generated by water or steam power, though not applying to production by internal combustion engines or to industrial plants generating for their own and employees’ use, valid. Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 178. 3. Discrimination. Competing Capital. Discrimination in state ad valorem tax between corporations accepting deposits and doing general commercial banking business and their competitors in the business of lending money, valid. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 181. 662 INDEX. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. VII. Fourteenth Amendment—Continued. 4. Banks. Shares of state and national banks not essentially the same for purposes of taxation. Id. 5. Id. Discrimination between state and national banks, favoring latter, valid. Id. 6. Discriminatory Enforcement of Tax Statute. Failure of officials to collect tax from others equally liable is no basis for exemption. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. 7. Chain Stores. Taxation. State privilege tax on chain stores, graduated according to the number of stores maintained, not invalid as discrimination in favor of single and department stores or voluntary chains. Id. 8. Id. Provision of statute laying heavier tax per store where owner’s stores are located in more than one county, invalid as unreasonable and arbitrary. Id. 9. Id. Provision authorizing counties and municipalities to levy license tax graduated by number of stores within their limits, valid. Id. 10. Id. Higher tax on goods stored in warehouses by chain stores than on goods stored by wholesalers, valid. Id. 11. Id. Exemption of gasoline filling stations from chain store tax, taxes being imposed on them by other acts, valid. Id. 12. Corporations. Corporations are as much entitled to the equal protection of the laws as are natural persons. Id. 13. Id. Discrimination can not be justified by assumption that for some purpose wholly different than the declared object of the legislation it might be valid. Id. 14. Railroads and Motor Carriers. Heavier tax burden on railroads than on motor carriers allowable. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace. 249. CONTRACTS. Illegality, see Brokers. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See Employers’ Liability Act, 1. CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2, 5; VII, (B), 12-13; Jurisdiction, I, 5-6; III, 2, 6; Puerto Rico. 1. Domicile. In State of incorporation. Rogers n. Guaranty Trust Co., 123. INDEX. 663 CORPORATIONS—Continued. 2. Rights of Stockholders. Stockholder impliedly agrees that internal affairs of company will be governed by law of State of incorporation. Id. 3. Foreign Corporations. Right of State to exclude does not enable it, when granting privilege to do business, to burden by taxation interstate commerce carried on by corporation. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. n. Alabama, 218. COSTS. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 11. COUNTIES. See Constitutional Law, VII, (B), 8-9. CRIMINAL LAW. 1. Sentence. Jurisdiction. Where sentence ordered suspended, district court has jurisdiction to impose it later, either at same or subsequent term. Miller v. Aderhold, 206. 2. Suspended Sentence. Validity. Order of district court for permanent suspension of sentence is void. Id. 3. Id. Convict may request court to pronounce judgment at any time; otherwise he is deemed to have consented to the indefinite delay. Id. CUSTOMS LAWS. See Forfeiture; Treaties, 3-5, 7. Penalties. Falsity of Manifest. Penalties could not be enforced against British vessel and cargo seized in violation of Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain. Cook v. United States, 102. DAMAGES. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 8-11. DEATH. See Admiralty; Employers’ Liability Act, 1. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. Appeal from judgment under state “ declaratory judgments ” law as presenting case or controversy within jurisdiction of federal court. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 249. DIRECTED VERDICT. See Employers’ Liability Act, 6. DISCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, I, 1; IV, 4; VII, (B), 1-14; Interstate Commerce Acts, 8, 11. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. See Jurisdiction, III, 1, 6. DOMICILE. See Corporations, 1; Taxation, 10-11. DUTIES. See Tariff Acts, 1. 664 INDEX. ELECTION OF REMEDIES. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 8. ELECTRIC RAILWAYS. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 3-4. EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT. 1. Negligence. Assumption of Risk. Duty of railroad to employees on track; track-inspector’s negligence as primary cause of death was question for jury. Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 275. 2. Sufficiency of Evidence. Scintilla rule does not apply in federal courts; verdict can not rest on mere speculation and conjecture. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 333. 3. Id. Inferences. Where proven facts support two inconsistent inferences, party with burden of sustaining one as against the other not entitled to recover. Id. 4. Id. Inference of fact nor permitted where inconsistent with positive and otherwise uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses. Id. 5. Id. Conclusions. Witness may not by a mere conclusion resolve doubt as to which of two equally justifiable inferences shall be adopted. Id. 6. Directed Verdict. Proper where evidence so insufficient that verdict would be improper and must be set aside on motion for new trial. Id. ESTOPPEL. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 7. EVIDENCE. See Employers’ Liability Act. 2-6; Interstate Commerce Acts, 6, 11. Scintilla Rule. Not applicable in federal courts. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 333. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION. See Constitutional Law, I, 2. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. 1. Unfair Competition. Public Interest. Trade-names and representations inducing buyers to believe that “ blenders ” of flour were “ grinders,” held unfair methods of competition; that proceeding was in the public interest sufficiently appeared. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Royal Milling Co., 212. 2. Trade-Names. Order. Order of Commission in respect of trade-names should have permitted their use with proper qualifying words. Id. FLORIDA. See Mandamus. INDEX. 665 FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. See Corporations, 3. FORFEITURE. See Customs Laws. Illegal Seizure. Doctrine that forfeiture for violation of law maybe enforced though possession of property acquired illegally, does not apply where United States itself could not have made rightful seizure. Cook v. United States, 102. FRANCHISES. See Perpetuities; Railroads. FUTURE TRADING. See Brokers, 1-3. GASOLINE STATIONS. See Constitutional Law, VII, (B), 11. GENERAL ORDERS IN BANKRUPTCY. Amendments, p. 619. GRAIN FUTURES ACT. See Brokers, 1, 3. INDIANS. See Constitutional Law, I, 3. INJUNCTIONS. See Anti-Trust Acts, 1, 3; Jurisdiction, HI, 1-2, 5; Receivers, 3. INSOLVENCY. See Banks; United States, 3-4. Priority of Payment. See New York n. Maclay, 290; Spicer v. Smith, 430. INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-5. INTEREST. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 11. INTERNATIONAL LAW. See Treaties. Alien Property. Taxation of securities of nonresident alien which are physically within jurisdiction is not contrary to international law. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACTS. See Anti-Trust Acts, 1-2; Brokers; Federal Trade Commission; Employers’ Liability Act; Jurisdiction, I, 7; II, 2-3. 1. Compulsory Extension of Lines. Commission without power to compel carrier to build new line in territory it had not undertaken to serve. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. 2. Id. Railroad held not to have undertaken to serve particular region, though authorized by charter to do so. Id. 3. Issuance of Securities. Authorization. Carrier held an “interurban electric railway,” excepted from provisions (§ 20a) for- 666 INDEX. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACTS—Continued. bidding issuance of securities, or assumption of obligation or liability, unless authorized by the Commission. United States v. Chicago North Shore & M. R. Co., 1. 4. Id. That carrier was “ interurban electric railway ” within meaning of § 20a held settled by uniform administrative construction. Id. 5. Interchange of Traffic. Liability of carrier for damages to car-float of connecting carrier; notice that carrier will not be responsible is ineffectual; interchange facilities not “ terminal facilities.” New York Central R. Co. v. The Talisman, 239. 6. Rates. Reasonableness. Proceedings. Sufficiency of proof to support finding of reasonableness; comparison of existing rates for similar service to other destinations as test of reasonableness; petition for rehearing-—how framed; refusal to consolidate not unfair when common questions were considered in both cases separately. United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 490. 7. Procedure. Rehearing. Rehearing on rate order because of changed economic conditions; carrier estopped to complain of refusal of rehearing where evidence of change was available long before order was made. Id. 8. Id. Undue Prejudice. Election of Remedy. Shipper damaged by violation or discriminatory enforcement of carrier’s rule in respect to car distribution may make complaint to Commission or may bring suit in District Court. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 448. 9. Reparation Order. Enforcement. Recovery by shipper in suit to enforce reparation order of Commission limited to amount of award. Id. 10. Id. Shipper bound by award. Id. 11. Id. Allegations held sufficient to show unlawful discrimination in distribution of coal cars and to sustain judgment for amount of award together with interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s fee. Id. 12. Suit to Set Aside Order. Appeal. Parties. Interstate Commerce Commission and state commissions, intervening defendants, may appeal as “ aggrieved parties ” from judgment annulling order, though the United States does not join; and a decree effective as to the United States may be obtained. Interstate Commerce Comm’n n. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. INTERURBAN RAILWAYS. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 3-4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Treaties, 4-5. INDEX. 667 JUDGMENTS. See Declaratory Judgments. 1. Validity. Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence, and a void order is neither a final nor a valid judgment. Miller V. Aderhold, 206. 2. Entry. Where judgment not entered at term when verdict was rendered, cause remains pending until final judgment or other appropriate action. Id. JURISDICTION. See Admiralty; Bankruptcy, 3; Criminal Law, 1-2; Interstate Commerce Acts, 8, 12; Receivers, 2-3; Taxation, III, 3-4. I. In General, p. 668. II. Jurisdiction of this Court, p. 668. III. Jurisdiction of District and Territorial Courts, p. 669. References to particular subjects under this title: Admiralty, III, 4. Affirmance, I, 9. Appeal, II, 2. Assignments of Error, I, 8. Case or Controversy, I, 1-2. Certiorari, II, 1. Citizenship, III, 1, 6. Corporations, I, 5. Death, III, 4. Declaratory Judgments, I, 1. Execution, I, 3. Findings, I, 8. Foreign Corporations, III, 2. Injunction, III, 1-2, 5. Interstate Commerce Commission, I, 7; II, 2-3. Law of the United States, III, 7. Local Questions, I, 4-5; II, 4; III, 6. Parties, I, 7; II, 2-3. Procedure, I, 2. Process, I, 3. Puerto Rico, III, 6-7. Receivership, III, 3. Removal, III, 6-7. Rules of Decision, I, 4. Scope of Review, II, 1. State Courts, I, 1, 4-6; II, 4; III, 5. State Officers, III, 1. Stockholders, I, 5. United States, II, 2-3. 668 INDEX. JURISDICTION—Continued. I. In General. 1. Case or Controversy. Appeal from judgment of state court in proceeding under “ declaratory judgments ” law as presenting case or controversy. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 249. 2. Id. Case or controversy need not be presented by traditional forms of procedure. Id. 3. Id. Relief by award of process or execution is not indispensable adjunct to exercise of judicial function. Id. 4. Rules of Decision. Construction of State Constitutions. Federal court will follow state court’s opinion that provision forbidding perpetuities included franchise to operate toll bridge, though uttered as dictum after date of franchise. Hawks v. Hamill, 52. 5. Corporations. Stockholders’ Suit. Courts generally will leave controversies involving management of internal affairs of foreign corporation to courts of State of domicile. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 123. 6. Id. This discretion will be exercised whenever required by considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice. Id. 7. Parties. Suit to Set Aside I. C. C. Order. Interstate Commerce Commission and commissions representing interested States, as “ aggrieved parties ” entitled to appeal; rights of United States. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. 8. Necessity of Findings, etc. Judgment in case tried without jury not reviewable where no findings or rulings were made and assignments of error present no substantial question on pleadings. Arthur C. Harvey Co. v. Malley, 415. 9. Effect of Affirmance. Affirmance of judgment does not indicate approval of appellate court’s decision of other questions which were not properly before it. Id. II. Jurisdiction of this Court. 1. Scope of Review. Certiorari. Review of parts of judgment adverse to respondent. United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 73. 2. Appeal. Parties. Validity of I. C. C. Order. Interstate Commerce Commission and state commissions, intervening defendants, may appeal as “ aggrieved parties ” from judgment annulling order, though the United States does not join. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. 3. Id. On such appeal a decree enforcing the rights of the United States and effective as to it may be obtained. Id. INDEX. 669 JURISDICTION—Continued. II. Jurisdiction of this Court—Continued. 4. Separable State Statute. Where part of state statute held unconstitutional, Court may determine effect of saving clause as to remainder or leave that to courts of State. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. III. Jurisdiction of District and Territorial Courts. 1. Injunction. State Officers. Where rights assorted are strictly local and jurisdiction depends on diversity of citizenship, case for injunction to restrain state officers must be clear. Hawks v. Hamill, 52. 2. Injunction. Foreign Corporations. District Court held not to have abused discretion in dismissing stockholders’ suit relating to management of internal affairs of foreign corporation. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 123. 3. Receivership. Estate. District Court did not lose jurisdiction by granting single creditor leave to sue in state court on bond given to secure all creditors. Munroe v. Raphael, 485. 4. Action for Death. Where an injury received aboard a vessel in navigable waters results in death ashore, admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit under the local death and lien statutes. Vancouver S. S. Co. v. Rice, 445. 5. Enjoining Suit in State Court. Order revoking permission to creditor to sue in state court on bond given by purchaser to secure all creditors, and enjoining further proceedings therein, was within jurisdiction of district court. Munroe v. Raphael, 485. 6. Removal. Citizenship. Sociedad en comandita under laws of Puerto Rico is juridical entity and nonresident members can not remove from Insular Courts controversies arising under local law. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 476. 7. Removal. Law of the United States. Suit by Puerto Rico to recover insular taxes was not suit arising under laws of the United States within meaning of jurisdictional statutes. Id. JURY. See Evidence; Employers’ Liability Act, 1-5. LIENS. See Admiralty; United States, 3-4. LIMITATIONS. See Bankruptcy, 2-3; Taxation, III, 5-9, 11. LONGSHOREMEN’S ACT. See Constitutional Law, I, 6; Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 2. 670 INDEX. MANDAMUS. See Claims, 3. Compelling Collection of Tax. Under law of Florida, remedy of taxpayer for failure of state officials to collect tax from others equally liable is by mandamus. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. MANIFEST. See Customs Laws. MISSOURI. See Brokers, 1-3. MORTGAGES. See Claims, 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, I, 5; VII, (B), 9. NATIONAL BANKS. See Constitutional Law, VII, (B), 4-5. NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Admiralty. NEGLIGENCE. See Employers’ Liability Act, 1; Interstate Commerce Acts, 5. NONRESIDENTS. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1; International Law. NOTICE. Statutory duty not escaped by notice declining future liability. New York Central R. Co. v. The Talisman, 239. PARTIES. See Anti-Trust Acts, 3; Jurisdiction, I, 7; II, 2; III, 6-7. Necessary Parties. United States. United States not necessary party to appeal from judgment annulling order of Interstate Commerce Commission. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. PENALTIES. See Customs Laws. PERPETUITIES. Application of Rule. Perpetual franchise to operate toll bridge violated provision of Oklahoma constitution forbidding perpetuities. Hawks v. Hamill, 52. PERSONAL INJURIES. See Admiralty; Employers’ Liability Act, 1. PLEADING. Amendments. What amendments of pleadings may by relation avoid bar of intervening limitation. See United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62; United States n. Henry Prentiss & Co., 73; United States v. Factors & Finance Co., 89. INDEX. 671 PRIORITY. See Banks; United States, 3-4. PROCEDURE. See Constitutional Law, III, 2; Interstate Commerce Acts, 6-7, 12. PROHIBITION ACT. See Treaties, 4-5. PUERTO RICO. See Jurisdiction, III, 6-7. Sociedad en Comandita. Is juridical person under laws of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 476. RAILROADS. See Constitutional Law. IV, 4; VII, 14; Employers’ Liability Act, 1; Interstate Commerce Acts. Construction. Charter authority did not obligate railroad to build line. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. RATES. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 6-7. RECEIVERS. 1. Property. Bond given by purchaser and sureties, and running to the United States, to secure all creditors, took the place of and represented the estate for distribution by the federal court. Munroe v. Raphael, 485. 2. Id. Federal court did not lose jurisdiction over creditor or subject matter by granting single créditer leave to sue on bond in state court. Id. 3. Enjoining Suit in State Court. Order revoking permission to creditor to sue in state court on bond given by purchaser to secure all creditors, and enjoining further proceedings therein, was within jurisdiction of district court. Id. REENACTMENT. See Statutes, 5-6. REHEARING. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 7. REMOVAL. See Jurisdiction, III, 6-7. REQUISITION. See Claims, 1. RESTRAINT OF TRADE. See Anti-Trust Acts, 1-3. RULES. General Orders «in Bankruptcy, Amendments, p. 619. SCINTILLA RULE. See Evidence. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. See Claims, 2-3. 672 INDEX. SECURITIES. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 3-4; Taxation, II, 10-11. SEIZURE. See Forfeiture. SELLING AGENCY. See Anti-Trust Acts, 1. SENTENCE. See Criminal Law, 1-3. SHERMAN ACT. See Anti-Trust Acts. SIGNATURE. See Bills of Exceptions. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT. See Taxation, III, 1-4. STATES. See Bankruptcy, 1-3; Constitutional Law, I, 1-4; II; IV, 1-5; VII. STATUTES. See Taxation, I, 1—2; Treaties, 6. 1. Construction. Statute should be construed so as to avoid grave doubt of its constitutionality. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. 2. Construction. Uncertainty. Unnecessary hardships should be avoided. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 280. 3. Legislative History. See Burnet v. Brooks, 378; United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 459. 4. Administrative Construction. Uniform administrative construction of statute is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned except for cogent reasons. United States v. Chicago North Shore & M. R. Co., 1. 5. Id. Effect of reenactment. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 269; Burnet v. Brooks, 378; United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 459. 6. Id. Doubt as to construction of statute may be resolved by consistent departmental practice existing before its reenactment. Cook v. United States, 102. 7. Separability. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. STOCKHOLDERS. See Corporations, 2. SUSPENDED SENTENCE. See Criminal Law, 1-3. TARIFF ACTS. 1. Rates of Duty. Function of Tariff Commission. Investigations. Character of “ hearing ” required; investigating costs of production; confidential data; rules of the Commission. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 294. INDEX. 673 TARIFF ACTS—Continued. 2. Search and Seizure. Vessels. Authority of Coast Guard officers beyond territorial limits as affected by Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain. Cook v. United States, 102. TAXATION. See Bankruptcy, 3; Constitutional Law, I, 1-5; II; IV, 1-5; VI, 1-2; VII, (A); VII (B), 1-11, 14; International Law; Mandamus; Treaties. I. In General, p. 673. II. Federal Taxation, p. 673. III. Id.; Assessment, Collection, and Refunds, p. 674. IV. State Taxation, p. 675. I. In General. 1. Construction of Tax Statutes. Application of rule that doubt shall be resolved in favor of taxpayer. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 280. 2. Id. Effect of administrative practice and legislative history. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. II. Federal Taxation. 1. Income Tax. Distribution of. Profits on instalment sales of real estate encumbered by liens; validity of regulations. Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 406. 2. Corporations. Consolidated Returns. Where corporation has legally enforceable control of substantially all stock of another, they are “ affiliated ” and must make consolidated return under 1918 and 1921 Acts. Atlantic City Electric Co. n. Commissioner, 152. 3. Id. Control of substantially all stock includes preferred stock outstanding with voting rights, though redeemable at any time and interest in dividends limited. Id. 4. Id. Ownership of 77 per cent, of entire voting stock, preferred and common, held insufficient for affiliation. Id. 5. Deductions. Losses in Trade or Business. Loss not deductible unless actually sustained during taxable year; mere existence of liability is not enough. Burnet v. Huff, 156. 6. Id. Loss by embezzlement from funds of which taxpayer was trustee held not “ sustained ” in year of theft, but in year following when trustee made up deficit. Id. 7. Id. Bad Debts. Amount due partner by firm not deductible in year before “ ascertained to be worthless.” Id. 8. Id. Depletion. Capitalized cost of drilling and developing oil wells held subject to depletion, not depreciation, allowance. United States n. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 459; Petroleum Exploration v. Burnet, 467; Burnet n. A. T. J ergins Trust, 508. 181684°—33----43 674 INDEX. TAXATION—Continued. II. Federal Taxation—Continued. 9. Id. Life Insurance Company. Cash Accounting Basis. Interest credited to policy holders, but unpaid, not deductible. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 269. 10. Transfer Tax. Nonresidents. Intangibles. Application of 1924 Act to stocks and bonds belonging to nonresident alien and which are actually present in this country at time of death; construction of phrase “situated in the United States.” Burnet v Brooks, 378. 11. Id. Local cash deposit included unless “ deposited with any person carrying on the banking business.” Id. 12. Transfer Tax. Trust Property. Inclusion under § 302 (d) of 1926 Act of trust property where donor reserved power though not in favor of himself or his estate. Porter v. Commissioner, 436. 13. Transfers by Gift. Deeds of trust reserving power of revocation became taxable as gifts upon termination of power. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 280. III. Id.; Assessment, Collection, and Refunds. 1. Special Assessment. Effect of request for. United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 73. 2. Id. Differences between provisions for special assessments under 1917 and 1918 Acts. United States v. Factors & Finance Co.. 89. 3. Id. Conclusiveness of Commissioner’s certificate favoring special assessment. Id. 4. Id. Special assessment under § 328 of 1918 Act involves discretionary action by Commissioner and can not be revised by the courts. Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 502. 5. Refunds. Limitations. Statute limiting time for presentation of claim is to protect against stale demands; administrative regulation as to form of claims is to facilitate research. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62. 6. Claim for Refund. Amendment. Limitations. General claim for refund not specifying grounds, may be amended at any time before final rejection, though new claim barred by limitation United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62; United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 73; United States v. Factors & Finance Co., 89. INDEX. 675 TAXATION—Continued. III. Id.; Assessment, Collection, and Refunds—Continued. 7. Id. General claim for refund may be amended to specify necessity for special assessment as ground, notwithstanding intervening limitation. United States n. Factors & Finance Co., 89. 8. Id. Claim for refund specifying as sole ground necessity for special assessment could not by amendment be turned into one for revision of assessment because of erroneous valuation of invested capital; claim on latter ground was barred by limitations. United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 73. 9. Id. Administrative practice and analogies of pleading as bearing upon determination of whether amendment of claim for refund allowable. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62; United States n. Henry Prentiss Co., 73; United States v. Factors & Finance Co., 89. 10. Id. Final Rejection. Claim for refund held not finally rejected by Deputy Commissioner’s notice to taxpayer that claim would be rejected. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 62. 11. Limitations. Waiver. Validity under § 278 (e) of 1924 Act of waiver in respect of income taxes the assessment and collection of which had become barred before the date of the Act. McDonnell v. United States, 420; Pacific Coast Steel Co. v. McLaughlin, 426. IV. State Taxation. See Constitutional Law, IV; VII. 1. Production and Sale of Electricity. State tax on hydroelectric company licensed by Federal Power Commission valid. Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 178. 2. Ad Valorem Tax. Oil produced from restricted Indian lands. Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 325. 3. National Banks. State tax on shares. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 181. 4. Chain Stores. Validity of Florida chain store tax. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 517. TERRITORIAL SEAS. See Treaties, 3-5. TRADE-NAMES. See Federal Trade Commission, 2. TRANSFER TAX. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1-2; Taxation, II, 10-12. 676 INDEX. TREATIES. See Customs Laws. 1. Subjects of Agreement. Remedy for multiple taxation by several nations is by international conventions. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. 2. Id. Power of the United States to negotiate in this regard is limited only by such restrictions as may be imposed by its own Constitution. Id. 3. Validity and Effect. Conflicting Statutes. Treaty of May 22, 1924, with Great Britain, was self-executing and superseded, so far as inconsistent, provision of § 581 of Tariff Act of 1922 conferring authority on Coast Guard officers to board, search and seize beyond our territorial waters. Cook v. United States, 102. 4. Construction. Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain dealt completely with subject of search and seizure, beyond our territorial limits, of British vessels suspected of smuggling liquors. Id. 5. Id. Treaty of 1924 forbade boarding, search and seizure of British vessel beyond three mile limit and not within one hour’s sailing distance of coast. Id. 6. Modification and Abrogation. Later statute does not modify or abrogate treaty unless purpose is clearly expressed. Id. 7. Id. Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain was not abrogated by reenactment of § 581 of Tariff Act of 1922 in identical terms in Tariff Act of 1930. Id. TRIAL. See Employers’ Liability Act, 1-6. TRUSTS. See Constitutional Law, VI, 2; Taxation, II, 12-13. UNFAIR COMPETITION. See Federal Trade Commission, 1-2. UNITED STATES. See Interstate Commerce Acts, 12. 1. International Relations. United States as sovereign possesses all powers necessary to effectively control its international relations. Burnet v. Brooks, 378. 2. Suits. United States as necessary party on appeal. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 14. 3. Priority as Creditor. Priority under R. S. § 3466 as between debt due United States and lien of state tax not presently enforceable. New York v. Maclay, 290. 4. Id. Deposit of instalments of war-risk insurance and disability compensation paid to guardian appointed pursuant to state law was not preferred claim under R. S. § 3466; guardian was not agent or instrumentality of the United States. Spicer v. Smith, 430. INDEX. 677 VERDICT. See Employers’ Liability Act, 2, 6. VETERANS’ ACT. See Banks. WAREHOUSES. See Constitutional Law, VII, (B), 10. WAR MINERALS RELIEF ACT. See Claims, 2-3. WITNESSES. Credibility. See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 333. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACTS. 1. Hazards of Employment. Injuries sustained by employee while going to or returning from work on service in extra hours or on special errands as within employment. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 162. 2. Findings. Longshoremen’s Act. Deputy Commissioner’s findings of fact, supported by evidence, conclusive. Id. o