

if we disregarded the pleadings and tested the jurisdiction by the statements in the opinion of the court below as to the arguments urged upon it, the situation as to the absence of a Federal question adequate to confer jurisdiction would be manifested. We say this because the opinion also states that it was established by the proof and not controverted in the argument below that the tracks of the railroad were not on Sixth street as alleged in the bill, but were on a right of way not part of a street, a situation which at once gives rise to the inquiry whether the operation of the road complained of could under this condition be treated as state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

*Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.*

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### TOOP *v.* ULYSSES LAND COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.

No. 284. Submitted May 13, 1914.—Decided June 1, 1915.

This court cannot entertain jurisdiction of a direct writ of error to review a judgment of the District Court under § 238, Judicial Code, on frivolous grounds.

The contention that rights were denied under a treaty that did not go into effect until two years after title had vested in defendants in error or in their grantors under the state law, is too frivolous to sustain jurisdiction of this court under § 238, Judicial Code.

Even though the widow had some use of the intestate's property after his death which continued until after the treaty became operative, if the title was not suspended, the treaty could have had no effect thereon.

The contention that a state statute forbidding the ownership of real estate by non-resident aliens is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it does forbid such ownership is also frivolous.

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Opinion of the Court.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of direct appeals from the judgment of the District Court, are stated in the opinion.

*Mr. Clair E. More, Mr. J. J. Boucher, Mr. Almon W. Bulkley and Mr. Thomas D. Crane* for plaintiffs in error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

*Mr. R. C. Roper and Mr. C. M. Skiles* filed a brief as *amici curiæ*.

Memorandum opinion by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE, by direction of the court.

The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, alleging themselves to be residents of England and subjects of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in 1912 sued the defendants in error to recover a two-thirds interest in a piece of real estate situated in Nebraska. They alleged that John Toop, a resident of Nebraska, who had owned the real estate in question, died in 1898 intestate and without issue, his widow surviving him, and that as children and grand-children of a deceased brother and sister of Toop they as his heirs became the owners of the two-thirds of the property sued for. It was charged that the right to inherit the property notwithstanding the alleged alienage was secured by a treaty between the United States and Great Britain which took effect in 1900. In their answer the defendants deraigned their title from the children and grand-children of a deceased sister of Toop who, it was alleged, were American citizens at the time of Toop's death. Without denying the kinship of the plaintiffs to Toop as they alleged, it was asserted that as aliens they were incapacitated from taking by inheritance or holding real estate in the State of Nebraska in virtue of a law of

that State which was in force at the time of Toop's death. The case was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts and was decided against the plaintiffs on the ground that applying the state law prohibiting non-resident aliens "from acquiring title to or taking or holding any lands or real estate in this State by descent, devise, purchase, or otherwise," etc. (act of March 16, 1889, § 4825, Comp. Stat. of 1907), the plaintiffs had no interest in the property for which they sued. The court concluded that the treaty referred to in the pleadings was not necessary to be considered as it only became operative two years after the death of Toop and had no retroactive effect.

On the face of the pleadings the only ground upon which there is any semblance of jurisdiction to entertain this direct writ of error is the averment of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain. But the absolutely frivolous character of that ground is apparent when it is considered that the treaty only went into effect two years after the death of Toop and the vesting of the property in those entitled legally to take it. It is true that it is now argued—a contention which seems not to have been pressed below—that the treaty is involved because Toop's widow who survived him and died in 1907 after the treaty was adopted had a use of the property during her life and therefore title to it did not pass to the heirs until her death. This, however, does not add substance to the proposition, but only asserts another unsubstantial contention, for it is apparent that the fee of the property was not in suspension until the death of the wife, but passed to the heirs entitled to take, subject, it is true, to the use of the widow, but nevertheless so far as the passage of the title was concerned uncontrolled and uninfluenced by the treaty.

As except for a contention that the state statute forbidding the ownership of real property by aliens was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, which seems also

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Syllabus.

not to have been raised below and which we think also is too frivolous to afford a basis for jurisdiction, what we have said disposes of all the considerations relied upon as the basis for the right to prosecute this direct writ of error, it follows that we are without jurisdiction and the writ is therefore

*Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.*

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BROWN AND SCHERMERHORN, TRUSTEES, v.  
FLETCHER, AS TRUSTEE OF BRAKER.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE  
SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 286. Argued May 13, 14, 1915.—Decided June 1, 1915.

*Brown v. Fletcher*, 235 U. S. 589, followed to the effect that § 24, Judicial Code, does not apply to the assignment of an interest of the *cestui que trust* of a testamentary trust fund.

Even though jurisdiction to do so exists, this court will not dispose of a case on the merits where such action would be out of harmony with the provisions of the Judicial Code giving a direct right of review on questions of jurisdiction, or where it would be incompatible with the provisions of that Code giving finality to judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

The refusal of the Circuit Court of Appeals to decide a case on its merits because it erroneously held that the diversity of citizenship necessary to give jurisdiction to the Federal courts did not exist, should not, under the circumstances of this case, be made the basis of this court for deciding a case which, if jurisdiction does exist, should be finally decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

The District Court having taken jurisdiction of a case on the ground that diversity of citizenship existed, and decided the case on the merits, and the Circuit Court of Appeals having held that jurisdiction did not exist and reversed, with instructions to dismiss the bill, but not on the merits, this court, having found that diversity of citizen-