

Counsel for Parties.

court should, under the questions certified, consider and determine the entire merits of the case.

We answer the certified questions to this extent :

1. That the Circuit Court of the United States should have regarded the decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in *Bank v. Commissioners*, *Commissioners v. Snuggs*, *Rodman v. Washington*, *Commissioners of Wilkes County v. Cull*, and *Commissioners v. Payne*, above cited, as controlling upon the inquiry whether the legislative enactments of 1868, 1879 and 1881 were passed *in such manner* as to become, under the constitution, *laws* of the State.

2. That the rights of the parties in this case are determinable by the law of the State as it was declared by the state court to be at the time the bonds here involved were made in the name of the county and put upon the market.

*These answers will be certified to the Circuit Court of Appeals.*

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MOUNTAIN VIEW MINING AND MILLING COMPANY v. McFADDEN.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 162. Submitted March 5, 1901. — Decided March 25, 1901.

*Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Company*, 175 U. S. 571, and *Shoshone Mining Company v. Rutter*, 177 U. S. 505, affirmed and applied.

Resort cannot be had to judicial knowledge to raise controversies not presented by the pleadings.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

*Mr. W. B. Heyburn* and *Mr. L. A. Doherty* for appellant.

*Mr. A. B. Browne*, *Mr. Alexander Britton* and *Mr. W. T. Stoll* for appellees.

## Opinion of the Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The Mountain View Mining and Milling Company had made application for a patent on a certain lode mining claim in the land office at Spokane, Washington, against which McFadden and others duly filed their protest and adverse claim, and thereupon brought this action "in aid of their said adverse claim, and to determine the right of possession," in the Superior Court of Stevens County, Washington, which was removed on the mining company's petition into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington, but not on the ground of diverse citizenship. Plaintiffs moved to remand the cause, and the motion was denied.

The petition for removal set up "that the controversy herein is a suit of a civil nature arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, brought in pursuance of the provisions of section 2326 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing for the filing of adverse claims against the application for patent for mining claims, and the bringing of suits in support of said adverse claims."

The petition also set forth that the construction of two acts of Congress was involved, namely, an act approved July 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 62, entitled "An act to provide for the opening of a part of the Colville Reservation, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes," and an act of February 20, 1896, 29 Stat. 9, entitled "An act to extend the mineral land laws of the United States to the lands embraced in the north half of the Colville Indian Reservation." But the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court on removal depended on plaintiffs' statement of their own claim, and that only disclosed an action brought in support of an adverse mining claim.

In *Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Company*, 175 U. S. 571, and *Shoshone Mining Company v. Rutter*, 177 U. S. 505, we held that a suit brought in support of an adverse claim under the Revised Statutes, sections 2325, 2326, was not a suit arising under the laws of the United States in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on the Federal court regardless of the citizenship of the parties.

## Opinion of the Court.

It is conceded by counsel on both sides that those decisions are controlling, unless the Circuit Court was entitled to maintain jurisdiction by taking judicial notice of the fact "that the Mountain View lode claim was located upon what had been or was an Indian reservation," and "of the act of Congress declaring the north half of the reservation, upon which the claim was located, to have been restored to the public domain;" notwithstanding no claim based on these facts was stated in the complaint. But the Circuit Court could not make plaintiffs' case other than they made it by taking judicial notice of facts which they did not choose to rely on in their pleading. The averments brought no controversy in this regard into court, in respect of which resort might be had to judicial knowledge. Thayer, *Treatise on Evidence*, ch. VII; *Oregon &c. Railway v. Skotowe*, 162 U. S. 490.

In *Spokane Falls &c. Railway Company v. Ziegler*, 167 U. S. 65, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was in possession, as a preëmtor, of a tract of land, and entitled to a patent for the same from the United States; that the defendant company, being a corporation of the Territory of Washington, had seized a strip of his land and appropriated it for railroad purposes without his consent and without having compensated him therefor; but that the entry on and seizure of the land was under and pursuant to the laws of the Territory of Washington authorizing railroad companies to appropriate land for right of way for railroad tracks. As we had judicial knowledge that the authority of the territory to legislate in respect of the right of a territorial railroad corporation to enter upon the public lands of the United States was derived from the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, we held that the plaintiff's complaint disclosed the case of a contest between a settler claiming title under the laws of the United States and a railroad company claiming a right under an act of Congress. The case before us affords no such basis for sustaining the jurisdiction.

In *Powell v. Brunswick County*, 150 U. S. 433, 440, we said: "If it appear from the record by clear and necessary intentment that the Federal question must have been directly involved so that the state court could not have given judgment

## Syllabus.

without deciding it, that will be sufficient; but resort cannot be had to the expedient of importing into the record the legislation of the State as judicially known to its courts, and holding the validity of such legislation to have been drawn in question, and a decision necessarily rendered thereon, in arriving at conclusions upon the matters actually presented and considered." And see *Yazoo & Mississippi Railroad v. Adams*, 180 U. S. 41.

The result is that

*The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed; the judgment of the Circuit Court must be also reversed, and the cause be remanded to that court with a direction to remand it to the state court, the costs of this court and of the other courts to be paid by the Mountain View Mining and Milling Company. So ordered.*

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*In re* ALEXANDER MCKENZIE, PETITIONER.

## ORIGINAL.

No. . Original. Submitted February 26, 1901.—Decided March 25, 1901.

The writ of *habeas corpus* cannot be made use of as a writ of error, and when applied for to relieve from restraint in punishment for contempt in the violation of orders of court, will not be issued unless the orders violated are absolutely void.

Orders of the District Court of Alaska, second division, appointing a receiver and granting an injunction, are appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and on refusal of the District Court to do so, the Court of Appeals may allow such appeals with supersedeas, and grant writs of supersedeas, if considered necessary.

If a judge of the Court of Appeals allows such appeals and supersedeas, and directs the issue of writs of supersedeas, ordering among other things the restoration of the property taken possession of by the receiver, orders of the Court of Appeals approving of his action in doing so, and of the writs so issued, are not void.

Where appeals are granted and the original citation and writ of supersedeas together with certified copies of the assignments of error and of the super-