

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA**

TALESHA RIKELLE WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 25-CV-403

DAWN H. PARKER , ET AL

SECTION: "H"(1)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se Plaintiff Talesha Rikelle Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned matter in this Court naming Dawn H. Parker, Dionne L. Hughes, Tania T. Roubion, Dlanor T. Smith, Patrick M. Jones, Andrew S. Principe, Charbonnet-Labat-Glapion (6 Sidewalk Steppers) – (6WS), Western & Southern Mutual Holding, NOLA Department of Justice, NOLA City Hall, NOLA DCFS, and Universal Music Group (UMG) YoungMoney/ CashMoney South as defendants. Plaintiff invokes this Court’s federal question jurisdiction and summarily alleges that Defendants are liable for desecration of a gravesite, IRS tax fraud, insurance fraud, life insurance fraud, property estate fraud, copyright infringement, defamation, identity theft, false arrest, discrimination, bribery, stalking, retaliation, and attempted murder. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, is devoid of any factual allegations to state a claim against any Defendant that is plausible on its face. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any defendant, it is RECOMMENDED that this lawsuit be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 26, 2025. On March 28, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* in the instant proceeding under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but ordered that summons be withheld and that Plaintiff show cause in writing by May 7, 2025, as to why this lawsuit should not be summarily dismissed for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In the Court’s order, the Court indicated the following:

Plaintiff’s Complaint reads as a disjointed diary or stream of consciousness spanning multiple decades, wherein Plaintiff discusses, in part, multiple past court proceedings, her past employment, her familial history, and her general life history. Despite spanning over one hundred and fifty pages and attaching nearly eighty exhibits, it is impossible to determine the nature of Plaintiff’s claims against each specific defendant. The Complaint contains conclusory and vague allegations, is replete with facts that are not related to any identifiable claim, is short on factual allegations to support any claims, and does not set forth a basis for relief. The Complaint also generally asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions. Such a pleading is insufficient. *See Garig v. Travis*, No. 20-654, 2021 WL 2708910, at *17–19 (M.D. La. June 30, 2021) ((citing *Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office*, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)) (dismissing complaint that was “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action,” because it contained “poorly written, rambling, first person narrative of events dating back to 2016,” and noting that Plaintiff had also improperly failed to provide corresponding factual support for each separate cause of action and failed to specify what Defendant took what action)).

Rec. Doc. 3.

In response to the Court’s order to show cause, Plaintiff filed two responses on May 7, 2025. *See* Rec. Doc. 5 (“First Response”); Rec. Doc. 6 (“Second Response”). On May 19, 2025, Plaintiff subsequently filed a “Motion to Show Cause to Each Defendant Role to Not Summarily Dismiss” (“Motion to Show Cause”), which was referred to the undersigned. Rec. Doc. 7.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

There exists no absolute right to proceed *in forma pauperis* in federal civil matters; instead, it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees *when it is apparent that the claims do not lack merit on their face*. *See Startii v. United States*, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1969); *see also Adepegba v. Hammons*, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the revocation of the privilege of proceeding *in forma pauperis* is not new), *abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson*, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1762-63 (2015)).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court **shall dismiss** the case at any time if the court determines that –

* * *

(B) the action or appeal –

- (i) is frivolous or malicious;
- (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
- (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added). In plain language, § 1915 requires dismissal if the Court is satisfied that the case fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous. A claim is “frivolous” when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” *Id.* at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” *Id.* at 327-28. To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Here, despite being given the opportunity to provide additional clarity on her claims, Plaintiff has failed to provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face with enough specificity to raise a right to relief above the speculative level against any defendant. From what the Court can surmise, Plaintiff appears to assert claims related to: the “cold case” of Kendall Henry, the tax sale of property located on Dumaine Street, the administration of her grandmother’s estate, the alleged theft of her life insurance money, several state court proceedings brought against her, the revocation of child support and other government benefits, an alleged identity theft and stalking, and purported defamation against her. *See generally* Rec. Docs. 5-7. Plaintiff generally asserts that Defendants have committed “hate crimes” and “blue and white collar crimes.” Rec.

Doc. 5 at p. 11. Plaintiff indicates that she “just need[s] [her] name to be cleared of these false reports & what all was stolen.” *Id.* at p. 20. To be clear: to the extent that Plaintiff seeks criminal charges against any defendant, this Court does not initiate criminal actions. Plaintiff should direct any complaint of criminal activity to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

As to Plaintiff’s civil claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint, First Response, Second Response, and Motion to Show Cause lack clarity and coherence, making it challenging to discern the facts giving rise to any plausible claim. For example, in the beginning of Plaintiff’s First Response, Plaintiff appears to quote several articles on pro se litigation and both civil and criminal litigation in general. *See* Rec. Doc. 5 at pp. 2-3, 7-10. This does not assist the Court in assessing the validity of her claims. And while Plaintiff now alleges that she has “stated throughout this complaint/claim of Employment Discrimination,” Plaintiff offers conflicting narratives on which, if any, of her employers discriminated against her and whether she is truly bringing an employment discrimination claim. *Id.* at p. 3. Indeed, in her Second Response, Plaintiff indicates that “I am not suing any of my past employers[.]” Rec. Doc. 6 at p. 14. And in her First Response, Plaintiff provides, “Louisiana is an at will state, so *I am thankful enough to willfully work for myself* as I was taught to do so in ability to do.” *Id.* (emphasis added). From these statements, the Court can come to no other conclusion than to find that there cannot possibly be any employment discrimination claim asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Show Cause (Rec. Doc. 7) provides the Court with arguably the clearest summary of the claims against each defendant. But even the allegations in Plaintiff’s Motion to Show Cause do not provide enough clarity for this Court to find that Plaintiff states a plausible claim to relief against any defendant.

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts several claims against several defendants related to the tax sale of property on Dumaine Street. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Dawn Parker and Dionne Hughes are “Plaintiff[’s] twin cousins” who “purposely” “let the property 1807/1809 Dumaine St. New Orleans, Louisiana go into a Tax Sale.” Rec. Doc. 7 at pp. 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Parker and Hughes have “hate & jealousy for the plaintiff,” and that although the “Code Enforcement hearing was dismissed and the property was redeemed by Dawn & Dionne,” these defendants “need to be punished, fined, & payback Talesha what they stole from her in the Estate & getting all these outsiders to join in on the cult.” *Id.* at p. 3. Similarly, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Tania T. Roubion “is another defendant who allowed property to go into a tax sale by her own unfortunate hate.” *Id.* at p. 4. None of Plaintiff’s allegations related to the tax sale nor any other disagreement between Plaintiff and these defendants state a plausible claim against Defendants Parker, Hughes, and Roubion.

Relatedly, Plaintiff also asserts claims against Defendant Patrick Jones and alleges that a separate, perhaps related, property on Dumaine Street was set on fire “so [Plaintiff would not] have anything to work on & stop her progression or look as if she can’t do or take care of her job.” *Id.* at p. 6. Although it is not clear, Plaintiff implies that Defendant Jones had some role in this fire and is a “conman and fraud” and that Defendant Jones and another individual, also by the name of Patrick, should “be held accountable for their actions to bully & kill [her] out of her title.” *Id.* at p. 7. But the allegations with respect to Defendant Jones are incoherent and, from what the Court can surmise, do not give rise to any claim against this defendant.

And lastly with respect to the tax sale of the Dumaine Street property, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant New Orleans City Hall allowed the sale of the property without hearing Plaintiff’s arguments related to the property. *Id.* at pp. 10-11. Plaintiff argues that “New Orleans City Hall

tampers with property land records & tax sales.” But she offers no factual proof to support this claim. Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations rise above the speculative level. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant New Orleans City Hall.

As to Defendant Andrew S. Principe, Plaintiff alleges “all the plaintiff know[s] of Andrew S. Principe, is that in his role he claims to have purchase a certain amount of property with the Plaintiff’s Grandmother Estate,” and that he allegedly verbally defamed Plaintiff’s character “in front of neighbors.” *Id.* at p. 7. The Court is unclear what claims Plaintiff brings against Defendant Principe—the mere fact that he purchased property from her grandmother’s estate does not give rise to any civil liability. Nor does Plaintiff indicate what allegedly defamatory statements were made. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant Principe.

Plaintiff also attempts to assert claims related to the “cold case” of Kendall Henry. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant D’lanor T. Smith was “outside the night Kendall Henry was shot and killed.” *Id.* at p. 5. While Plaintiff often references the “cold case” of Kendall Henry in her complaint and subsequent filings, the allegations related to the cold case do not give rise to any civil claim. Nor do Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that Defendant Smith is “a fraud” and has “interfere[d] with Talesha’s business” give rise to any plausible claim against Defendant Smith. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a plausible claim against this defendant.

Plaintiff further asserts claims against Defendant Charbonnet-Labat-Glapion (6 Sidewalk Steppers) – (6WS) for acting “fake & frivolous,” lying to her, and trying to “intimidate her with threats or talks that [Plaintiff] is not from the 6.” From what the Court can surmise, Plaintiff appears to take issue with this defendant’s alleged failure to acknowledge Plaintiff and her family. Again, these allegations do not give rise to a plausible claim against Defendant Charbonnet-Labat-Glapion (6 Sidewalk Steppers) – (6WS).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Western & Southern Mutual Holdings did not provide her the entire payout of her life savings. *Id.* at p. 9 (“The defendant avoided giving the plaintiff her insurance policy & a copy of her actual holdings with the proof of the actual payout of \$161,000. That amount needs to be sent directly into Talesha’s account as it was going to happen!”). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that this defendant only gave her \$1,061, which was deposited into her Regions Bank account. Plaintiff provides “the defendant needs to abide by law & give Talesha her Insurance Policy & her actual funds that was deposited along with the damages caused because they chose to be apart of making her live in poverty …” *Id.* Outside of her mere belief, however, Plaintiff provides no factual allegations to support her claim that Defendant Western & Southern Mutual Holdings withheld money from her. Because Plaintiff does not provide any details that go beyond the speculative level, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against this defendant.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant NOLA Department of Justice has purportedly defamed her via a “Sterling Background Check.” Rec. Doc. 7. Plaintiff also appears to assert that she has been framed for certain crimes. Again, however, Plaintiff provides no factual support for her claims against Defendant NOLA Department of Justice. Nor does Plaintiff provide enough clarity for the Court to assess what, if any, claim Plaintiff may have against this defendant.

As to Defendant Department of Children & Family Services, Plaintiff appears to contest her loss of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits and child support payments. The revocation of SNAP benefits appears to have occurred in July 2023—nearly two years ago—and the termination of her child support payments appears to have occurred in July 2024 because the “minor child emancipated,” and all services by the Department of Child Support Services were terminated because “Nathaniel Wheeler [the parent ordered to pay support] is deceased and no further action can be taken.” *See* Rec. Doc. 6-45; Rec. Doc. 6-44. Even assuming

arguendo that Plaintiff is entitled to these benefits and that the Department of Children & Family Services could be held accountable, the revocation and termination of each of these benefits was warranted, as Plaintiff appears to have failed to provide verification of income from several employers for purposes of her SNAP benefits and the parent ordered to pay support is no longer living. *Id.* Plaintiff provides no reason to invalidate the Department of Children & Family Services' decisions. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against the Department of Children & Family Services.

Finally, with respect to Defendant Universal Music Group (UMG) Young Money/Cash Money Records, the Plaintiff alleges that “the defendants can manipulate the system & manipulate other artist in the music business as they call it behind the scenes of the industry of such frivolous acts are being caused to stop or destroy the Plaintiffs brand.” *Id.* at p. 13. Outside of this unsupported allegation—which fails to state a plausible claim with enough specificity to raise a right to relief above the speculative level—the rest of Plaintiff’s statements against this defendant are hard to follow and do not state any claims against this defendant which entitle Plaintiff to relief that may be granted by this Court. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant Universal Music Group (UMG) Young Money/Cash Money Records.

In short, this Court fails to see any plausible claim against any defendant. Plaintiff questions whether the Court is “not fully reading nor comprehending [her] complaint,” and asks whether her “complaint is being ignored because of the names of individuals included but not as defendant.” Rec. Doc. 5 at p. 6. Plaintiff also alleges that “[t]his court might not read this entirety (even though it is the duty to) . . .” *Id.* at p. 44. To be clear, the Court did read the 167-page Complaint, the 53 pages filed in response, and the additional 15 pages in Plaintiff’s “Motion to Show Cause on Relief to,” and the Court reviewed more than 500 pages of exhibits

attached thereto. And in each of these filings, the Court maintains that Plaintiff only asserts conclusory and vague allegations, asserts numerous facts that are not related to any identifiable claim, and fails to provide any factual allegations to support any claims or any basis for relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff Talesha Rikelle Williams has failed to state a claim. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this lawsuit be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1(a), 6(b) and 72(b). A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge; and (2) appellate review of the un-objected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*).

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of June, 2025.

Janis van Meerveld
Janis van Meerveld
United States Magistrate Judge