

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

PATRICIA BROWNE,
CLIVE ANTHONY CONNELL, JR.,

Defendants.

CRIMINAL ACTION FILE NO.:

1:24-CR-327-VMC-JKL

ORDER AND FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On September 17, 2024, Defendants Patricia Browne and Clive Anthony Connell, Jr. were arrested at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport after United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers discovered around 9.5 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their checked luggage during a secondary customs screening following their arrival on a flight from St. Lucia. Defendants are charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and (a)(1), and importing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(b)(2). [Doc. 21.]

The case is before the Court on Defendants’ motions to suppress the evidence that CBP seized during the search of their luggage, which argue, in essence, that the search was “non-routine” and that the officers lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct the search. [Docs. 63, 65.] On September 15, 2025, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing, at which two CBP officers involved in the search, Officers Keon Mainor and James Clark, appeared and testified. [Doc. 82; *see also* Doc. 92 (“Hr’g Tr.”).] After the hearing, Defendants filed briefs in support of their motions. [Docs. 100, 102.] The government filed a response [Doc. 113], and the deadline for Defendants to file a reply has passed [*see* Doc. 112 (ordering that any reply be filed no later than December 3, 2025).]

Also pending before the Court are Browne’s (1) “Second Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence” [Doc. 68], which challenges the search of a cell phone that officers seized from Browne during the customs search; (2) “Third Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence” [Doc. 69], which challenges a follow-on search of the contents of Browne’s luggage pursuant to a search warrant; (3) “Motion for Return of Seized Property” [Doc. 70], which requests the return of property seized during the customs search; and (4) “Motion to Suppress Cell-Site Locational Data” [Doc. 72], which seeks to suppress historical cell site information that the government obtained pursuant to a search warrant.

For the following reasons, it is **RECOMMENDED** that Defendants' motions be **DENIED**.¹

I. BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2024, Defendants arrived at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport on a flight from St. Lucia. (Hr'g Tr. at 70; Def. Exs. 9, 11, 12, 13 [Doc. 90-1 at 2-5 (checked luggage tags)].) Defendants proceeded to primary inspection, as all passengers do when arriving from an international flight. (Hr'g Tr. at 20-22, 77.) Unbeknownst to Defendants, a "one-day lookout" had been issued to inspect their luggage for contraband.² (*Id.* at 26.) Because of the one-day lookout, the two were referred to secondary screening. (*Id.* at 25-26.)

¹ Two other pending motions have been deferred to the presiding district judge: Browne's motion to sever defendants [Doc. 67], and Connell's motion *in limine* to exclude cell phone evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404 [Doc. 64]. [See Doc. 71.]

² A one-day lookout is an electronic referral from a CBP officer that instructs CBP officers working in the primary inspection area to send a specific passenger to the secondary inspection area for additional screening. (Hr'g Tr. at 26.) It may be based upon travel history, including how often an individual travels, that person's travel patterns, where that person traveled to, and how long he or she was there. (*Id.* at 26-27.) It is unknown who created the one-day lookout for Defendants, what it said, who was responsible for putting it into the computer system, or whether the submitting officer verified any information about Defendants. (*Id.* at 26, 27, 55, 126.)

A CBP officer escorted Defendants to baggage claim to retrieve their luggage. (*See* Def. Ex. 1-D (video of Defendants being escorted from primary to secondary inspection areas).) They each claimed two suitcases: Browne claimed a large blue suitcase and a smaller red suitcase, while Connell claimed two green suitcases, one larger and one smaller. (Hr'g Tr. at 57; Gov't Ex. 2 [Doc. 88-1 (Sept. 17, 2024 CBP report on seizure, prepared by Officer Mainor)]). The officer then escorted Defendants to the secondary inspection area, where they placed the suitcases side-by-side on a table with a conveyor belt. (Hr'g Tr. at 125; Gov't Ex. 1 at 2:48-3:08³; Gov't Ex. 2 at 1.) Officer Mainor, who was working in the secondary screening area, asked Defendants a series of routine questions, including whether the bags belonged to them and whether they took responsibility for what was inside the bags. (Hr'g Tr. at 25-26, 32-33, 57; Gov't Ex. 2 at 1-2.) Both responded that the respective bags belonged to them. (Hr'g Tr. at 57, Gov't Ex. 2 at 1-2.) Officer Mainor then directed Defendants to take a step back and stand behind a black line on the floor. (Hr'g Tr. at 33, 58-59; Gov't Ex. 2 at 2.) They complied, standing with their hands behind their backs as Officers Mainor and Clark inspected their bags. (Hr'g Tr. at 33, 58-59.) Both were

³ Government's Exhibit 1 is a 24-minute-long video showing the search of the luggage at the secondary screening area.

compliant with instructions, and neither Defendant engaged in any suspicious conduct while standing in the secondary inspection area. (*Id.* at 59.)

Officer Clark removed contents of Browne's red suitcase.⁴ (Gov't Ex. 1 at 5:55-7:35; Hr'g Tr. at 109-10.) As he was feeling around inside the suitcase, he noticed that the bottom lining area felt "unusually bulky" and "hard," which suggested to him that there was something in the bottom of the bag⁵ between the interior lining and the exterior of the bag. (Hr'g Tr. at 110-12.) Officer Clark then opened up the interior lining, but was still not able to see anything. (*Id.* at 112-13.) He then took the suitcase to an X-ray machine. (*Id.* at 114.) He noticed an "anomaly" – the color of the image "looked a little bit different," and there was a "little bit of a shape" in the bottom of the bag that, normally, would be empty. (*Id.* at 114-15.)

Meanwhile, Officer Mainor removed the contents from Connell's larger green suitcase. (Hr'g Tr. at 35-36; Gov't Ex. 1 at 6:17-8:53.) He unzipped the interior lining and, feeling underneath it, felt something abnormal, "like a little

⁴ At certain points during the hearing, the red suitcase is also described as "pink." (See e.g., Hr'g Tr. at 69, 110, 114, 117.)

⁵ In terms of orientation, the area appears to be the bottom of the suitcase when it is laid flat on the ground for placing and retrieving clothes and items in the suitcase; it is not the side where wheels are typically found. (See Def. Ex. 7 [Doc. 91-1 at 1 (photograph of suitcases after search)]).

bulge.” (Hr’g Tr. at 35-36). He then took the suitcase to the X-ray machine. (*Id.* at 38.) According to Officer Mainor, the X-ray showed a light greenish square⁶ on the bottom of the bag – where he felt the bulge – which indicated to him that there was something inside the bag. (*Id.* at 38-39.)

Officer Clark, who was still in the X-ray area, X-rayed Browne’s red suitcase again. (Hr’g Tr. at 117, 128.) Officer Clark and Officer Mainor discussed the two anomalies in the bags and agreed that they looked similar. (*Id.* at 116-17; Gov’t Ex. 2 at 2.) They then returned to the secondary inspection area, where Browne and Connell still standing. (*Id.* at 117; Gov’t Ex. 1 at 9:55-10:09.)

Officer Mainor then began to peel back a small plastic layer on the bottom inside of the green suitcase he was inspecting. (Hr’g Tr. at 43; Gov’t Ex. 1 at 10:09-11:01.) He managed to pull enough back to see something wrapped in black plastic and clear tape, and which was something separate from the bag’s various layers.⁷ (Hr’g Tr. at 43-44.) According to Officer Mainor, the object was slightly thinner than an iPhone and was lodged between the bag’s internal plastic layer and its outermost fabric layer. (*Id.* at 44-45.) Officer Mainor was unable to peel

⁶ Officer Mainor testified that most bags would appear clear on the X-ray scan, and that a bag with a support there would appear blue. (Hr’g Tr. at 39.)

⁷ He testified that at that point, he had not cut anything on the bag. (Hr’g Tr. at 44.)

back the lining of the bag because of how the suitcase was constructed. (*Id.* at 45-46.) ⁸Officer Clark then used a Leatherman utility tool to try to unscrew the railing inside the piece of luggage that Officer Mainor was inspecting, but did not succeed. (*Id.* at 47; Gov't Ex. 1 at 11:01–11:56.) Ultimately, the officers cut into the backs of all four suitcases from the outside.⁹ (Hr'g Tr. at 47-48, 123.) Each contained a package wrapped in black plastic and clear tape. (*Id.* at 48; Def. Ex. 7 (photograph of packages recovered from each suitcase).) A preliminary test of the contents of the packages was positive for cocaine. (Gov't Ex. 2 at 2; Gov't Ex. 3 at 2.) The total weight of the substances seized was around 9.5 kilograms. (Gov't Ex. 2 at 2; Gov't Ex. 3 at 2.)

Additional facts are included as necessary below.

II. DISCUSSION

In the discussion that follows, the Court begins with Defendants' motions to suppress the fruits of the search of their suitcases at secondary screening. [Docs. 63, 65.] The Court then takes up Browne's motion for return of her

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⁹ The officers examined and X-rayed the other two suitcases and found anomalies consistent with the prior two before cutting into them. (Hr'g Tr. at 48-49; Gov't Ex. 2 at 2; Gov't Ex. 3 [Doc. 88-2 (Sept. 25, 2024 CBP report on seizure, prepared by Officer Clark)] at 1.)

property. [Doc. 70.] Finally, the Court addresses the remaining motions to suppress. [Docs. 68, 69, 72.]

A. Motions To Suppress Fruits of the Border Search

The Fourth Amendment generally requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant to conduct a search. *United States v. Pulido*, 133 F.4th 1256, 1273 (11th Cir. 2025), *cert. denied*, No. 25-5795, 2025 WL 3132007 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2025). But “the Supreme Court has long recognized a border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and search warrant requirement.” *United States v. Quarles*, No. 23-10377, 2025 WL 1430866, at *3 (11th Cir. May 19, 2025) (citing *United States v. Ramsey*, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977)); *see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez*, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”). “Under that exception, border searches without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable by virtue of the single fact that the person or item in question has entered into our country from the outside.” *Pulido*, 133 F.4th at 1273 (cleaned up).

Importantly for present purposes, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has never required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border, *however non-routine and intrusive*, and neither have we.” *United States v. Tousey*, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). Rather, reasonable suspicion is required at the border only “for highly intrusive searches of a person’s body such as a strip search or an x-ray examination.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Alfaro-Moncada*, 607 F.3d 720, 729 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Here, Defendants contend that because the CBP officers destroyed their luggage by cutting into them, the officers needed to have a least reasonable suspicion to justify the search. [Doc. 100 at 1-2, Doc. 102 at 9-11.] They stress that none of the officers had any information to suggest that Defendants were engaging in criminal conduct or that their luggage contained contraband. Defendants also complain about the escalating steps that the CBP officers took, including their referral to secondary screening; the opening of the luggage and removal of their contents in a public space; X-raying the luggage; and finally, cutting the luggage open. These arguments lack merit.

It is undisputed that Defendants were attempting to enter the United States from a foreign country and that the Atlanta airport is functionally equivalent to an international border. *See United States v. Hill*, 939 F.2d 934, 936 (11th Cir. 1991).

Under the authority discussed above, the warrantless search of the luggage was therefore reasonable simply because Defendants and their luggage entered from outside the United States. *See Pulido*, 133 F.4th at 1273 (characterizing denial of motion to suppress border search of electronic devices as an “easy affirmance” because reasonable suspicion is not required to search property at the border). Thus, no reasonable suspicion was necessary. *Id.*¹⁰

¹⁰ After the evidentiary hearing, Connell filed a “Motion To Reopen Evidence and Compel Production of Subpoenaed Records (X-Ray Images and SOPs).” [Doc. 85.] In it, he seeks an order compelling the government to produce “(1) the X-Ray images relied upon or referenced by the testifying officer(s); and (2) the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the standard procedures of CBPO agents and luggage searches.” [*Id.* at 2-4.] He also seeks to reopen the evidentiary hearing so he can present that requested evidence to the Court. [*Id.* at 4.] The motion is **DENIED**.

First, Connell did not issue a lawful subpoena for those materials, thus there is no subpoena to enforce. But even if they had been subpoenaed, the X-ray images (assuming they even exist, which is doubtful) and standard operating procedures are clearly immaterial to resolving the present motions. It does not matter what the X-ray images showed because, as discussed, reasonable suspicion was not required to conduct the search of the luggage. Moreover, it appears that none of the X-ray images were preserved, so there are no X-ray materials that the Court could order the government to produce. (*See Hr’g Tr.* at 59.)

Along similar lines, the standard operating procedures applicable to border searches are not relevant to whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation, since it is the objective reasonableness of law enforcement’s conduct that matters, not whether their conduct complied with internal procedures. *See United States v. Carrell*, No. CR 05-1484 MCA, 2006 WL 8427720, at *11 (D.N.M. June 30, 2006) (“The fact that an officer did not comply with his or her employer’s standard operating procedures, or did not use a less intrusive alternative means

That the officers cut open the luggage does not change this result. “The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the distinction between border searches of a person’s body and of a person’s property. The search of a person’s property during a border search, ‘however non-routine and intrusive,’ requires no level of suspicion.” *United States v. Falzone*, No. 8:23-CR-351-VMC-SPF, 2024 WL 4164723, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2024) (quoting *Touset*, 890 F.3d at 1233), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2024 WL 3964089 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2024). The entire interaction here involved only personal property. No officer engaged in any physical contact with either Browne or Connell, much less subjected them to anything akin to strip search.¹¹ Thus none of the officers’ actions here required reasonable suspicion.

But even if the officers needed reasonable suspicion before cutting open the suitcases, the officers developed it during their encounter with Defendants and their luggage. The beginning stages of the search—including opening the

of detaining a suspect, does not necessarily mean that the officer’s conduct was ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”). As discussed, the mere fact that Defendants entered into the United States from a foreign country was enough to make the search of their luggage acceptable from a constitutional standpoint.

¹¹ Along these lines, Browne’s assertion that she felt that she was subject to “personal indignity” by having the contents of her suitcase emptied in a public space does not compel a different result. [See Doc. 102 at 11.]

suitcases, feeling around inside, and X-raying the luggage—are textbook examples of permissible, routine border searches that do not violate the Fourth Amendment. *United States v. Kandhai*, No. 1:13-CR-274-3-ODE, 2014 WL 1682070, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2014) (“[N]o articulable suspicion is required for routine border searches, such as questioning, luggage searches and pat-downs or frisks, which only intrude slightly on a person’s privacy.”) (collecting cases), *aff’d*, 629 F. App’x 850 (11th Cir. 2015); *United States v. Restrepo Naranja*, 643 F. Supp. 154, 160 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding warrantless X-ray search of defendant’s outbound baggage was reasonable and proper under the “border search exception”); *see also United States v. Lawson*, 461 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e accept the commonsense (and commonly observed) conclusion that customs officers may x-ray an airline passenger’s luggage at the border without reasonable suspicion—a conclusion that several other courts have embraced and that none (to our knowledge) has rejected.”); *United States v. Okafor*, 285 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although an involuntary x-ray of a person could in some cases be considered non-routine, the same is not true about x-rays of objects.”) (citation omitted). Once the officers found unidentified and unexplained anomalies in between the linings of the suitcases, and X-rays showed that there were in fact objects in those internal areas that were supposed to be empty, the officers had developed

reasonable suspicion that would justify a more intrusive examination to determine what was being secreted within the suitcases.

Defendants also argue, briefly, that they were detained at the primary inspection and that officers needed reasonable suspicion to refer them to secondary screening, which Defendants contend the officers did not possess, at least not at that point. [Doc. 100 at 9; Doc. 102 at 10.] This argument is frivolous. “Routine searches include secondary customs searches that are conducted after an initial inspection.” *United States v. Wallace*, No. 1:12-CR-00230-TWT-LTW, 2013 WL 1707904, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2013), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2013 WL 1702791 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2013); *see United States v. Masesa*, 218 F. App’x 880, 882 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that both initial stop and secondary inquiry at airport screening “were part of the initial border investigation” and that “[t]his second phase of inquiry was merely an extension of the initial border search”); *United States v. Abarca*, No. 1:14-CR-434-ODE, 2015 WL 1412161, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2015) (stating that “border/customs officers may refer a border-crossing traveler to secondary inspection even in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion”) (citing *United States v. Garcia*, 616 F.2d 210, 211 (5th Cir. 1980)). As part-and-parcel of a routine inspection, the CBP officers referral of Defendants for secondary screening simply did not require reasonable suspicion.

In sum, the search of Defendants' suitcases fall within the border search exception to the warrant requirement, and the fruits of the searches should not be suppressed. Defendants' motions should be **DENIED**. [Docs. 63, 65.]

B. Motion for Return of Property

Browne separately moves for the return of property that CBP officers seized at customs, including her cell phone, jewelry, luggage (which contained personal effects), approximately \$800 in currency, and her "credit and banking cards." [Doc. 70 at 2.] The government opposes the motion, arguing that the contents of Browne's luggage were lawfully seized and will have evidentiary value at trial.¹² [Doc. 115.] The government has the better of the arguments.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides that

A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings.

¹² The government contends that \$80 in currency was seized; not \$800. [Doc. 115 at 2 n.1.] The amount of currency seized is immaterial for resolving Browne's motion.

A defendant who seeks the return of property while a criminal prosecution is pending bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to the property. *See United States v. Odom*, No. 1:25-MJ-00841-RGV, 2025 WL 2885505, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2025 WL 2880804 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 9, 2025); *see also United States v. Chambers*, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If a motion for return of property is made while a criminal prosecution is pending, the burden is on the movant to show that he or she is entitled to the property.”); *United States v. Young*, No. 1:07-CR-0114-BBM, 2008 WL 11383978, at *5 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2008) (“Because criminal prosecution is ongoing, it is [defendant’s] burden to show that he is entitled to the \$502.”). Moreover, “[w]hen the government has a continuing interest in the property, the property does not have to be returned.” *Odom*, 2025 WL 2885505 at *2. Thus, as a general matter, a motion for return of property under Rule 41(g) “is properly denied if . . . the property is contraband or subject to forfeiture, or the government’s need for the property as evidence continues.” *United States v. Garcon*, 406 F. App’x 366, 369 (11th Cir. 2010).

Here, for the reasons discussed in the preceding section, CBP officers lawfully searched Browne’s suitcases (including their contents) and her phone

under the border search exception.¹³ Further, the Court cannot say that the property in question has no evidentiary value. As the government explains, Browne's property presents the potential to aid the government in proving the *mens rea* element of the charged offenses at trial. [See Doc. 115 at 5-6.] For example, the contents of her suitcases may aid the government in proving she packed her suitcases and knew the suitcases contained contraband. Likewise, information extracted from her cellphone may provide evidence that she was aware of the controlled substances in her luggage and that her conduct was criminal. Browne's motion, meanwhile, identifies no circumstances that would overcome government's continuing interest in the property. [See generally Doc. 70.] Accordingly, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the motion for return of property be **DENIED**. [Doc. 70.]

C. Remaining Motions to Suppress

Browne has filed three additional motions to suppress. In the motion styled "Second Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence," Browne seeks to

¹³ Though Browne also demands the return of her cell phone, she does not present any colorable argument that the government did not lawfully seize or search the device. Of course, the agents could lawfully search the cell phone at the border without even having reasonable suspicion. See *Touset*, 890 F.3d at 1233-35.

suppress evidence the government has seized through the search of her phone that was seized during the border stop. [Doc. 68.] Browne, however, provides no particularized basis to suppress any evidence seized from her phone. In any event, the Eleventh Circuit held in *Touset* that the Fourth Amendment does not require any suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device conducted at the international border. 890 F.3d at 1233-35. Thus, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the motion be **DENIED**. [Doc. 68.]

Next, in a motion entitled “Third Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence,” Browne moves to suppress the search of cardboard boxes that contained the contents of her luggage. [Doc. 69.] According to the motion, on February 26, 2025, the government obtained a search warrant to search the contents. [Doc. 69.] Browne contends that because the initial border search was unconstitutional, the subsequent search pursuant to a warrant was tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree. [*Id.* at 2-3.] The motion also makes unparticularized assertions that the warrant lacked probable cause and “authorized a seizure of the property when the warrant affidavit and application did not request seizure of the property.” [*Id.* at 3.] But because the initial border search of the suitcases was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the initial search did not

taint the subsequent warrant. Thus, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the motion also be **DENIED**. [Doc. 69.]

Finally, Browne has moved to suppress cell-site location information, in which she generally contends that a warrant for historical cell-site information was not supported by probable cause. [Doc. 72.]¹⁴ At the evidentiary hearing, the Court directed defense counsel to provide a copy of the warrant to chambers (*see* Hr'g. Tr. at 144), however, counsel did not do so. Because Browne provides no particularized basis to conclude that the warrant lacked probable cause and has not taken the necessary steps to do so, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the motion be **DENIED**. [Doc. 72.]

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the following motions be **DENIED**: (1) Connell's and Browne's motions to suppress the fruits of the border search [Doc. 63, 65]; (2) Browne's "Second Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence" [Doc. 68]; (3) Browne's "Third Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence" [Doc.

¹⁴ Connell has filed a motion to join Browne's motion to suppress the cell-site location data, noting that the warrant at issue in the motion also sought historical cell site information from a cellular telephone associated with Connell and that the legal and factual grounds for suppression apply equally to Connell. [Doc. 74.] That motion, which the Court construes as a motion to adopt, is **GRANTED**.

69]; (4) Browne’s “Motion for Return of Seized Property” [Doc. 70]; and (5) Browne’s “Motion to Suppress Cell-Site Locational Data” [Doc. 72].

Connell’s motion to join the motion to suppress the cell-site location data [Doc. 74], which the Court construes as a motion to adopt, is **GRANTED**.

Finally, Connell’s “Motion To Reopen Evidence and Compel Production of Subpoenaed Records (X-Ray Images and SOPs)” is **DENIED**. [Doc. 85.]

I have now addressed all pretrial matters referred to me and have not been advised of any impediments to the scheduling of a trial. Accordingly, this case is **CERTIFIED READY FOR TRIAL**.

IT IS SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of December, 2025.



JOHN K. LARKINS III
United States Magistrate Judge