

United States District Court  
Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IZMO, INC.,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
ROADSTER, INC.,  
Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06092-NC

**ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL  
MOTION TO DISMISS**

Re: Dkt. No. 38

Before the Court is defendant Roadster, Inc.’s motion to dismiss part of plaintiff Izmo, Inc.’s second amended complaint. *See* Dkt. No. 38. The sole question in Roadster’s motion is whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in *Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC*, 586 U.S. \_\_\_\_, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019), Izmo may amend its complaint to assert copyright infringement of photographs that were not registered at the time it initiated this lawsuit.

A brief recap of the procedural and factual background is useful. Izmo initiated this lawsuit in October 2018, alleging that Roadster infringed its copyright in 79 photographs of cars.<sup>1</sup> *See* Dkt. No. 1. Roadster moved to dismiss the first amended complaint on February 14, 2019. *See* Dkt. No. 29. While that motion was pending, the Supreme Court

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<sup>1</sup> Izmo’s original complaint lists 80 photographs, but one of those images was a duplicate. *See* Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A. Izmo amended its complaint to fix this error. *See* Dkt. No. 28.

1 decided *Fourth Estate*, holding that a copyright plaintiff must obtain registration of its  
2 copyrights with the Copyright Office before filing suit. *See Fourth Estate*, 139 S. Ct. at  
3 892.<sup>2</sup> With the Supreme Court’s ruling in hand, the Court denied Roadster’s motion to  
4 dismiss, but *sua sponte* ordered Izmo to amend its complaint to comply with *Fourth*  
5 *Estate*. *See* Dkt. No. 34 at 3, 7.

6 Izmo filed its second amended complaint on April 8, 2019. *See* Dkt. No. 35. It its  
7 amended complaint, Izmo lists 80 copyrighted photographs and the date registration was  
8 made for each photograph. *See id.*, Ex. A. Out of those photographs, only 11 were  
9 registered prior to the filing of the original complaint. The remaining 69 photographs were  
10 registered on April 3, 2019, exactly six months after Izmo initiated this lawsuit. *See id.*

11 Roadster now contends that Izmo’s copyright infringement claims must be  
12 dismissed to the extent it alleges infringement of those 69 pictures. *See* Dkt. No. 38 at 1.  
13 Izmo argues that dismissal is not warranted because, when it initiated this lawsuit,  
14 registration had been made for 11 of the asserted copyrights. *See* Dkt. No. 40 at 7. The  
15 newly-registered copyrights, Izmo argues, merely supplements the list of preexisting  
16 registrations. *Id.* Because Izmo did not commence this lawsuit prior to obtaining *any*  
17 copyright registration, Izmo argues that Roadster’s motion must be denied. *Id.*

18 As the Court previously explained, the Supreme Court recently held that a  
19 registration “has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the  
20 Copyright Office “has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”  
21 *Fourth Estate*, 139 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court clarified that “although an owner’s  
22 rights exist apart from registration . . . registration is akin to an administrative exhaustion  
23 requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership rights.” *Id.* at  
24 887. In reaching this result, the Supreme Court reasoned that permitting copyright  
25 claimants to sue before obtaining registration of the underlying material would render  
26 much of the statutory scheme superfluous. *See id.* at 889–90.

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28 <sup>2</sup> The registration requirement is subject to several exceptions involving movies, musical compositions, or live broadcasts not relevant to this case. *See id.* at 888.

1           The Supreme Court’s opinion, however, did not squarely address the issue here:  
2 whether a copyright claimant may amend its complaint to include subsequently registered  
3 material. But in *Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe*, No. 18-cv-10956-JMF, 2019 WL 1454317  
4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019), the Southern District of New York held that *Fourth Estate* bars  
5 the addition of infringement claims relating to copyrighted material registered after the  
6 commencement of the lawsuit. Relying on Second Circuit precedent and *McNeil v. United*  
7 *States*, 508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993), the *Malibu Media* district court noted that “legal  
8 proceedings are *instituted* by the . . . filing of the original complaint.” *Id.* at \*8 (emphasis  
9 in original and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned that the statutory  
10 language of § 411(a) serves to prohibit “an amended complaint [from] add[ing] copyright  
11 claims that, although timely as of the date of their addition to the action, would have been  
12 premature when the action was ‘instituted.’” *Id.* at \*8 n.2; *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)  
13 (“no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be  
14 instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made”).

15           This Court agrees with the reasoning of *Malibu Media*. The Supreme Court has  
16 made clear that the registration requirement of § 411(a) was “akin to an administrative  
17 exhaustion requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership  
18 rights.” *Fourth Estate*, 139 S. Ct. at 887. In related contexts, the Ninth Circuit has  
19 rejected amendment of pleadings as a means to cure a claimant’s failure to comply with  
20 administrative exhaustion requirements. *See, e.g., McKinney v. Carey*, 311 F.3d 1198,  
21 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring dismissal without prejudice in prison condition cases  
22 where claimant did not exhaust administrative remedies). Here, permitting amendment to  
23 cure a claimant’s failure to register its copyright before suing would undermine the  
24 objectives animating the Supreme Court’s decision in *Fourth Estate*. The fact that Izmo  
25 properly “commenced” this lawsuit as to *some* of its copyrights does not excuse its failure  
26 to comply with § 411(a) as to its other copyrights.

27           Izmo’s reliance on *Zito v. Steeplechase Films, Inc.*, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025  
28 (N.D. Cal. 2003) and other efficiency concerns is unavailing. *Zito* was decided long before

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*Fourth Estate*. It is unclear whether *Zito* remains good law in light of the Supreme Court’s repudiation of this Circuit’s previous approach to the registration prerequisite to suit. The Supreme Court also largely rejected efficiency concerns animating *Zito* and other related authorities. See *Fourth Estate*, 139 S. Ct. at 891–92 (rejecting arguments relating to the timely adjudication of copyright holders’ rights).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Roadster’s motion to dismiss. Izmo’s copyright infringement claims are dismissed without prejudice to the extent they allege infringement of photographs registered before October 3, 2018.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Dated: June 4, 2019

  
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NATHANAEL M. COUSINS  
United States Magistrate Judge