NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 13, 2026*
Decided October 14, 2026

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, *Circuit Judge*

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-3339

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RYAN MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cr-00292

Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.

O R D E R

Ryan Miller, a federal prisoner, appeals an order granting the government's motion to turn over funds to satisfy his restitution debt. We affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

In 2015 Miller pleaded guilty to mail fraud affecting a financial institution and to aggravated identity theft. *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1028A(a)(1). As part of the agreement, Miller acknowledged that under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, he would be required to pay restitution to the victims in an amount determined by the court. The district court accepted Miller's plea, sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release, and ordered him to pay his victims $28,073.65 in restitution. The court ordered that restitution was due immediately and that Miller was required to make payments while in prison through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Miller appealed, and we affirmed in all respects but modified the judgment to reflect that Miller's participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program was voluntary. *United States v. Miller*, 883 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir. 2018).

In October 2025 the government sought an order requiring the Bureau of Prisons to turn over $1,200 from Miller's inmate trust account (which held $2,082.95 at the time), to be applied toward Miller's outstanding restitution obligation of $26,274.17. The government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), which provides that substantial financial resources prisoners receive during incarceration must be applied towards restitution. Miller filed a one-sentence response to the government's motion, stating only that he accepted the ordered restitution amount of $28,073.65. The district court granted the government's motion.

On appeal, Miller again states that he accepts that he owes restitution in the amount of $28,073.65, but he asserts that the district court erred in ordering the turnover of $1,200. He contends that the amount cited by the government as the remaining balance on his obligation, $26,274.17, is unsupported by the record. Miller characterizes this sum as a "random number" and asks that the clerk of court restore $1,200 to his inmate trust account. He does not assert that the amount remaining on his obligation is less than $1,200. To the extent Miller is arguing that the turnover order was improper because the government misstated the amount remaining on his debt, he did not raise this (or any) argument in the district court, and so it is waived. *Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED