

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals**For the Seventh Circuit****Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Submitted May 19, 2026*

Decided May 20, 2026

*Before*DAVID F. HAMILTON, *Circuit Judge*JOHN Z. LEE, *Circuit Judge*JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

Nos. 24-3334 & 25-1628

JASPER FRAZIER,
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.*v.*

No. 1:21-cv-02445-SEB-TAB

JAMA JONES,
*Defendant-Appellee.*Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.

* The appellee did not enter an appearance and is not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

ORDER

Jasper Frazier, a former prisoner at New Castle Correctional Facility, appeals the district court's order awarding nominal damages to him in this suit asserting violations of his constitutional rights. We affirm.

Frazier brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several prison employees, including case manager Jama Jones, for retaliating against him in violation of the First Amendment and subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because Jones defaulted, we accept Frazier's allegations as true, *see Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc.*, 961 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2020), and according to Frazier's complaint, Jones instructed officers—during Frazier's stint in segregation—to deny him access to his personal belongings, such as a blanket and soap. He also asserted that Jones encouraged other prisoners to harass him in retaliation for filing a complaint against her. The district court found Frazier's evidence insufficient and entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants except for Jones, who never responded to the suit. Because Jones did not defend the claim, the court entered a default judgment against her. The court then gave Frazier an opportunity to provide evidence of his damages.

Frazier responded with several arguments, many which did not relate to his claim for damages. He argued, as relevant to this appeal, that Jones was indemnified by her employer. The district court pointed out, however, as it had done previously, that any liability against Jones did not automatically make her employer liable, and only she—not Frazier—could seek indemnification for her actions. The court proceeded to determine that Frazier was entitled neither to compensatory damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (because he did not allege that he suffered any physical injury from his conditions of confinement, *see* 42 U.S.C. § 1997e), nor punitive damages (because no evidence suggested that Jones would repeat her conduct or that Frazier suffered actual harm). The court awarded Frazier nominal damages of \$1.00.

Frazier filed two notices of appeal—one after the order granting summary judgment in favor of the other defendants and one after the award of nominal damages. But because the two notices relate to the same final judgment, *see* FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2), we construed the second as an amended notice and consolidated the appeals for purposes of briefing and disposition. *See Grunt Style LLC v. TWD, LLC*, 140 F.4th 839, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2025).

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Frazier now challenges the district court's refusal to require the prison contractors to indemnify Jones. He asserts that they indemnified her in a different action. But while Jones may be entitled under Indiana law to indemnification by her former employers for costs related to this case, *see* IND. CODE § 34-13-4-1, any right to indemnity is Jones's, not Frazier's. *See Robinett v. City of Indianapolis*, 894 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2018).

To the extent Frazier means to contest the damages award or the summary judgment entered for the other defendants, he has not suggested any basis to disturb the court's order. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8); *Behning v. Johnson*, 56 F.4th 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 2023).

AFFIRMED