

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 27, 2026

Decided October 8, 2026

Before

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, *Circuit Judge*

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-1521

TAJINDER PREET SINGH,
Petitioner,

Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.

v.

No. A206-446-185

TODD W. BLANCHE, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.

ORDER

Tajinder Preet Singh entered the United States without authorization in 2014. After the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, Singh filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) denied Singh's application for relief after finding that Singh was not credible and that he had not sufficiently supported his claims with corroborating evidence.

Singh twice appeared before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Both appearances resulted in his appeal being denied. Singh now petitions this court for

review of the decisions below. Because substantial evidence supports those decisions, we deny Singh's petition.

I.

Singh told the IJ the following: He is a Sikh man from India. In 2011, he joined the Shiromani Akali Dal, a political party in India that advocates on behalf of Sikh causes. Singh's membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal—and his efforts to advance the party's agenda—led to his being attacked twice. The attacks were carried out by members of the Indian National Congress (Congress Party), a political party more dominant in the area where Singh lived. During the first attack, Singh sustained cuts on the base of his neck and behind his ear. During the second attack, Congress Party members beat Singh by hitting him with field hockey sticks on his back and legs. Then, when Singh reported his attack to local law enforcement, he was taken into custody and beaten once more—this time by Congress Party members and the police.

Fearing he would be attacked again because of his political affiliation, Singh left India for the United States in March 2014. Soon after he arrived in the country, DHS initiated removal proceedings against him. Singh conceded removability but filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. In his application, Singh asserted that if he returned to India, he would be persecuted for being a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal.

Singh then appeared four times before an immigration judge to argue his case. At Singh's first appearance in September 2015, the IJ scheduled Singh's "final" hearing date for April 25, 2017. The IJ called for "all documents" supporting Singh's application to be filed 15 days before that hearing.

Singh next appeared for the April 2017 hearing. There, the IJ told him that he "ha[dn't] submitted nearly enough information to qualify for asylum" and that, if forced to make a decision then, he "would deny [Singh's] application." To allow Singh time to gather the missing corroborating evidence, the IJ continued Singh's case for six months. The IJ cautioned Singh that his application could not be granted as it then stood because it did not "sound plausible or credible," and the IJ recommended Singh "try and obtain some evidence" to substantiate his claims.

At the third hearing in October 2017, the IJ continued Singh's case for about a year. The IJ again called for Singh to submit any materials supporting his application 15 days before the hearing.

Singh appeared for his final merits hearing in November 2018. At the start of this hearing, he attempted to admit new evidence. The IJ refused to admit Singh's evidence because, among other reasons, it was "literally years late" and Singh failed to comply with the court's instructions to submit it 15 days before the hearing. The IJ also observed that Singh offered no explanation as to good cause for the delay and failed to provide copies of the evidence to DHS before the hearing.

As to the merits of Singh's application, the IJ determined Singh was not credible because he failed to give sufficiently specific and plausible testimony. Specifically, Singh's hearing testimony was inconsistent with his written statements. He contradicted himself, for example, as to where he sought medical care, how long it took him to recover, and who treated him after he was first beaten by members of the Congress Party. The IJ also found that despite being given ample opportunities, Singh failed to "provide any timely corroborating evidence," such as statements or testimony from people with knowledge of the attacks or his political activities. Ultimately, because Singh failed to support his claims with sufficient evidence, and because he was not credible, the IJ denied his application for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.

Singh appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In its decision dismissing Singh's appeal, the Board explained it did not need to discuss the IJ's adverse credibility finding. Singh's "failure to submit sufficient corroborating evidence regarding key aspects of his claims," the Board said, was reason enough to affirm the IJ. Given the absence of any corroborating evidence, the Board affirmed the IJ's ruling that Singh did not meet his burden of proof for relief.

Singh then sought review of the IJ's and Board's decisions in this court. But before we could hear argument on his petition, the parties filed a joint motion to remand. In their motion, the parties explained that remanding Singh's case would "permit the Board to further consider" its conclusion that Singh failed to submit sufficient corroborating evidence. The parties suggested that the Board might consider "whether the requested corroboration would have been required for burden of proof purposes, if Mr. Singh were presumed credible, and whether any unavailable corroboration would have been unreasonable to obtain." We granted the motion to remand.

Curiously, despite asking for remand so the Board could re-review the IJ's decision, Singh did not file a brief in support of his appeal once he was back before the Board. Nor did he file a response to the government's brief requesting that the IJ's decision be affirmed. With no argument from Singh as to why its prior dismissal was in

error, the Board once again affirmed the IJ's decision. This time, the Board explicitly considered the IJ's adverse credibility finding. The Board found that the IJ's credibility finding was "supported by specific and cogent reasons ... present in the record." The Board also agreed, again, with the IJ that Singh's "corroborating evidence d[id] not independently establish his claim." Consequently, the Board affirmed the IJ's decision in full, and in so doing it dismissed Singh's appeal. Singh now returns to us with a new petition for review.

II.

"We review the immigration judge's order as modified by the Board." *Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi*, 147 F.4th 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2025). Our review of the IJ's and Board's factual findings is for substantial evidence. "[W]e assess whether the Board's decision is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole," *id.* (citation modified), and we will "overturn the Board's decision only if the record compels a different result," *Orellana-Arias v. Sessions*, 865 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 2017).

With this deferential standard in mind, we consider whether substantial evidence supported the two determinations at issue—that Singh was not credible, and that Singh failed to substantiate his claims with corroborating evidence.

A. Adverse Credibility

The IJ's adverse credibility finding, as affirmed by the Board, is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ concluded that Singh was not credible after noting discrepancies between his written statements and hearing testimony. For example, Singh contradicted himself on the details of his treatment for, and recovery from, injuries he sustained after being attacked by Congress Party members. Moreover, in his written statement, Singh said that Congress Party members visited his parent's house and inquired about his whereabouts. But Singh did not testify to that fact at the hearing. The IJ was within his right to ground his adverse credibility finding in these non-trivial inconsistencies. See *Hassan v. Holder*, 571 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, immigration judges may base adverse credibility findings on testimonial inconsistencies "without regard to whether such inconsistencies or falsehoods go to the heart of the applicant's claim" so long as the inconsistencies are "material." *Dai v. Garland*, 24 F.4th 628, 635 (7th Cir. 2022).

Similarly, the vagueness of Singh's testimony substantiates the IJ's adverse credibility finding. "[G]enerally," the IJ concluded, Singh's testimony was "vague and lacked sufficient details." The IJ noted, for example, that Singh provided nebulous answers to questions about his and his father's roles in the Shiromani Akali Dal party, and the party's platform. Testimony that is vague in this way supports an adverse credibility finding. *See, e.g., Porosh v. Garland*, 56 F.4th 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 2023); *Dai*, 24 F.4th at 635; *Santashbekov v. Lynch*, 834 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2016).

Singh does not dispute that there were inconsistencies between his written statement and hearing testimony. Nor does he dispute that his testimony lacked detail. He argues instead that he should have been given notice of the inconsistent and vague testimony on which the IJ relied to make the adverse credibility finding. Singh also argues he should have been provided an opportunity to explain why his testimony was inconsistent or imprecise.

But Singh was not entitled to such an opportunity. As we held in *Sankoh v. Mukasey*, remand is not required when an immigration judge does not provide an applicant the opportunity to explain away testimonial inconsistencies before finding the applicant not credible. *See* 539 F.3d 456, 470 (7th Cir. 2008). Singh provides us with no reason why *Sankoh* should not apply. His argument, therefore, is foreclosed by precedent.

In sum, reviewing the record as a whole, we have no problem concluding that "[t]he balance of evidence relied on by the IJ supports the adverse credibility determination." *Musollari v. Mukasey*, 545 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2008). At least, the record does not compel a contrary result. *See Guzman-Garcia v. Garland*, 996 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) ("Under the substantial-evidence standard, we reverse factual findings by the Board and IJ only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary." (citation modified)). For these reasons, and because "an adverse credibility determination ... doom[s] the applicant's claimed eligibility" for immigration relief, *Dai*, 24 F.4th at 635, we deny Singh's petition insofar as it challenges the IJ's credibility determination.

B. Corroborating Evidence

Even if Singh prevailed on his adverse credibility argument, we would deny his petition because of his failure to provide the IJ with corroborating evidence. "Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, the immigration judge may require the applicant to submit corroborative evidence even if the judge finds the applicant credible." *Cojocari v.*

No. 25-1521

Page 6

Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). “The applicant must provide supporting evidence upon request ‘unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.’” *Id.* (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

Despite being granted several continuances so that he could gather corroborating evidence, Singh did not timely submit relevant corroborating evidence for the IJ to consider at his final hearing. The IJ noted this in his decision. Both of the Board’s orders denying Singh’s appeal noted this as well. In his current petition to this court, Singh makes no argument about the corroborating evidence issue (not even an argument about why evidence corroborating his claim might not have been reasonably obtained). Therefore, the issue is waived. *Smith v. Garland*, 103 F.4th 1244, 1253 n.2 (7th Cir. 2024).

Singh’s lack of corroborating evidence provided the IJ an additional independent basis to deny his application. The Board has now twice affirmed the IJ’s corroborating evidence conclusion. We have no reason to disturb those decisions.

For the reasons explained above, the petition is DENIED.