

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 6, 2026*

Decided January 9, 2026

BeforeILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, *Circuit Judge*MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*DORIS L. PRYOR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-1381

ALIYAHOO YISRAEL,
*Plaintiff-Appellant,**v.*CITY OF CHICAGO,
*Defendant-Appellee.*Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.

No. 23 C 15172

LaShonda A. Hunt,
Judge.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

ORDER

Aliyahoo Yisrael appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint as time-barred. We affirm.

We accept the facts alleged in Yisrael's complaint as true and review them in the light most favorable to him. *Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist.*, 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir. 2023). Yisrael owned property in Chicago, lived there six months each year, and kept personal belongings there. On approximately August 19, 2019, Yisrael's neighbor called him to say that the City had demolished the building on his property. Yisrael filed a complaint with the City the same day. He received the City's notice of intent to demolish the building more than four weeks later, on September 21, 2019, after it was already torn down.

On October 20, 2023, Yisrael sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for demolishing his home without due process of law and under 65 ILCS 5/1-4-7 for wrongful demolition. The City moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that Illinois's two-year statute of limitations, which applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, barred the action. The district court agreed, dismissed the federal claim as untimely, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim.

On appeal, Yisrael argues that the court erred by applying Illinois's two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury suits rather than Illinois's five-year statute of limitations for property suits. But Yisrael's argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and circuit precedent: "In § 1983 actions, state law provides the applicable statute of limitations; specifically, we look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the alleged injury occurred." *Milchtein v. Milwaukee County*, 42 F.4th 814, 822 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified); *see also Owens v. Okure*, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989). For § 1983 suits premised on injuries occurring in Illinois, the applicable limitation period is two years, as provided by 735 ILCS 5/13-202. *Woods v. Ill. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.*, 710 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2013). This is true even for § 1983 cases alleging that a city's demolition of the plaintiff's home deprived him of property without due process of law. *Shropshire v. Corp. Couns. of City of Chicago*, 275 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2001).

Yisrael next argues that the court erred in concluding that his claim accrued on August 19, 2019, the day he learned that the building had been demolished. He contends that the claim did not accrue until an unspecified later date when he became aware of a constitutional violation. But even if Yisrael had not yet realized that the

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City's conduct was unlawful, his "ignorance of his legal rights does not affect the accrual of his claim for statute of limitations purposes." *Tobey v. Chibucos*, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).

Yisrael next argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because he reasonably relied on the longer five-year statute of limitations. But we have previously explained that "the lack of legal expertise is not a basis for invoking equitable tolling." *Tucker v. Kingston*, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008).

Lastly, Yisrael argues that the district court should have retained supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claim. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). But once all federal claims are resolved, a district court has broad discretion to decide how to proceed, and there is a presumption that the court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction. *See RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc.*, 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012). Yisrael does not contend that he cannot refile his case in state court because the statute of limitations expired, that proceeding in state court would cause a substantial duplication of effort, or that his claim's resolution is clear. *See id.* at 480. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the state claim without prejudice.

AFFIRMED