

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals**For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Submitted May 26, 2026*

Decided May 28, 2026

BeforeAMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, *Circuit Judge*NANCY L. MALDONADO, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-1298

STEVEN CURRY,
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.*v.*

No. 23-1058

MARY CERDA and ADOBERTO
TORREZ,
*Defendants-Appellees.*Colleen R. Lawless,
*Judge.***ORDER**

Steven Curry, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the district court's summary judgment against him for failing to exhaust administrative remedies before he filed this suit. We affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Curry, who is incarcerated at the Pontiac Correctional Center, has faced discipline on multiple occasions for sexual misconduct and other violations of prison rules. After holding disciplinary hearings on these violations, the adjustment committee (including defendants Mary Cerda and Adoberto Torrez) recommended that Curry be punished with yard restrictions and time in segregated housing. Between 2021 and 2023, Curry filed a dozen grievances related to his disciplinary proceedings. In these grievances, Curry complained about the adjustment committee's consideration of certain evidence, the timing of his hearings, Cerda's qualifications, and bias on the part of both Cerda and Torrez. Curry also wrote numerous letters to the Administrative Review Board reiterating his dissatisfaction with Cerda's and Torrez's handling of his disciplinary proceedings.

Curry then turned to federal court, asserting constitutional violations in connection with his disciplinary proceedings. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened Curry's amended complaint, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed him to proceed on a claim that Cerda and Torrez violated his First Amendment rights by punishing him with unusually long periods of segregation in retaliation for his grievances against them. Curry later attempted to file a second amended complaint alleging additional facts and a claim under the Eighth Amendment against different prison officials.

Cerda and Torrez moved for summary judgment based on Curry's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Cerda and Torrez argued that there is no record that Curry submitted any grievances to the Administrative Review Board related to the alleged retaliation.

The district court agreed with Cerda and Torrez and granted their motion. None of Curry's twelve grievances, the court explained, raised the issue of Cerda's and Torrez's alleged retaliation against him. Moreover, Curry's letters to the Administrative Review Board were insufficient because they failed to comply with the prison's administrative rules. The court also struck Curry's second amended complaint because he did not follow the court's instructions for seeking leave to amend—as set out in a prior scheduling order—that directed him to explain how the amended complaint differed from the operative complaint.

On appeal, Curry continues to assert that the twelve grievances he filed—generally attacking Cerda's and Torrez's handling of his disciplinary proceedings—

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were sufficient to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. But to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, a prisoner must comply with every step of the prison's grievance process, *Breyley v. Fuchs*, 156 F.4th 845, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)), and this includes providing specific “factual details regarding each aspect of [his] complaint” in a prison grievance, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810(c). As the district court meticulously showed, Curry faltered in this regard. Although some of his grievances and letters complained about Cerda and Torrez in relation to other aspects of his disciplinary hearings, not one alluded to retaliation or to his term of his disciplinary segregation being unusually long.

Curry also asserts that the court disregarded his pro se status by striking his second amended complaint. But the court's decision to strike this complaint was within its discretion. *See Heng v. Heavner, Beyers & Mihlar, LLC*, 849 F.3d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2017). Even pro se litigants are subject to the rules of civil procedure, *see Bowman v. Korte*, 962 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 2020), and Curry failed to comply with the court's instructions for seeking leave to amend. He did not supply, for example, a separate attachment explaining how the amendment differed from the previous complaint. We note, too, that Curry had already amended his complaint once as a matter of course. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1).

We have considered Curry's other arguments, and none requires discussion.

AFFIRMED