

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 24, 2026*

Decided February 24, 2026

BeforeMICHAEL B. BRENNAN, *Chief Judge*THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, *Circuit Judge*JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-1115

KEYONA CAMPBELL,
*Plaintiff-Appellant,**v.*EDWARD-ELMHURST HEALTH, et al.,
*Defendants-Appellees.*Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 23-cv-02799

John F. Kness,
*Judge.***ORDER**

Keyona Campbell sued Edward-Elmhurst Health, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The district court dismissed Campbell's complaint for lack of subject

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

matter jurisdiction because she lacked standing. Because Campbell has not alleged an injury in fact, we affirm.

Edward-Elmhurst offered Campbell a nursing position in its Medical Oncology Department. Campbell accepted the job offer and began the onboarding process. At the time, Edward-Elmhurst required its staff to be vaccinated against COVID-19, unless approved for a disability or religious exemption. Campbell applied for a religious exemption. Edward-Elmhurst denied her request because it “did not meet the legal requirements for a religious exemption.” Edward-Elmhurst gave Campbell seven days to appeal the decision or be vaccinated. Campbell appealed. Edward-Elmhurst then granted Campbell a temporary exemption—after three months, she would need to reapply. Campbell then withdrew from the onboarding process and sought other employment opportunities.

Campbell sued Edward-Elmhurst, alleging that it violated Title VII by discriminating against her based on religion by requiring that she reapply for the exemption after three months. She alleged Edward-Elmhurst’s vaccine requirement caused her fear of having to be vaccinated against her religious beliefs and suffer ostracization and humiliation. Campbell also sued Illinois officials, arguing that Illinois law permitting mandatory vaccination policies violated the Illinois Constitution, the United States Constitution, and Illinois, federal, and international law. Campbell stated that she was underemployed because of these vaccine policies.

The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Campbell lacked standing. The court reasoned that Campbell’s underemployment was not attributable to the defendants; the existence of vaccine requirements for other jobs was at most a hypothetical future harm; and masking, social distancing, and other public-health measures aimed at slowing transmission of the virus were a generalized grievance rather than a particularized injury. The court concluded that, at bottom, Campbell lacked standing under *Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana Univ.*, 24 F.4th 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), which acknowledged that qualification for an exemption to a vaccine mandate precludes a justiciable controversy.

Campbell appeals the district court’s order only as to her standing to bring the Title VII claims against Edward-Elmhurst. Campbell first maintains that the threat of Edward-Elmhurst refusing to continue the exemption after three months was a concrete injury. But the mere risk of future harm, without more, is not a concrete harm in a suit for damages. *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 437 (2021). Campbell’s allegation

that her exemption could have been denied upon reapplication is just that, a risk that never materialized. Hypothetical harms are insufficient to confer standing, *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013), and Campbell did not continue at Edward-Elmhurst long enough for her to seek renewal of her exemption. Because Campbell qualified for an exemption to Edward-Elmhurst's vaccine policy, she lacked standing to challenge it. *Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana Univ.*, 24 F.4th at 639; *Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana Univ.*, 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021).

Campbell also proposed that she suffered an emotional injury due to the uncertainty of whether her exemption would be extended upon reapplication. The Supreme Court has recognized that exposure to the risk of future harm can, in some instances, itself be a separate concrete harm. *See TransUnion LLC*, 594 U.S. at 437. In the Title VII context specifically, "humiliation, embarrassment, and like injuries ... constitute cognizable and compensable harms." *Gracia v. SigmaTron Int'l, Inc.*, 986 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000)). But here, Campbell does no more than recast her fear about the threat of future injury as an emotional injury. Campbell's complaint states she "became subject to ... ostracization and humiliation," but she did not clearly allege facts in support of this conclusion, as she must. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Moreover, it is hardly plausible that Campbell could have endured an injury while awaiting the outcome of her reapplication when she did not wait at all—she discontinued the onboarding process and sought other employment. *See Silha v. ACT, Inc.*, 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege a factual basis for standing). Whatever emotional injury Campbell may have suffered is not sufficiently concrete to confer standing, as it concerned the outcome of an application she never made.

AFFIRMED