

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals**For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Submitted May 9, 2025*

Decided May 12, 2025

BeforeMICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-3088

BOBBY R. BLAIN,
*Plaintiff-Appellant,**v.*MILWAUKEE COUNTY,
*Defendant-Appellee.*Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.

No. 22-cv-1142

Brett H. Ludwig,
*Judge.***ORDER**

Bobby Blain is an African American man who was employed as a highway maintenance worker for Milwaukee County. He was fired after he delayed reporting his involvement in a hit-and-run accident while operating County equipment. Blain filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, *see* 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, *see* 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12212, asserting that he

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

No. 24-3088

Page 2

was unlawfully fired based on his race and disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Milwaukee County because Blain's claims were barred by a settlement agreement with the County and, alternatively, because Blain did not obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

In his brief on appeal, Blain rehashes his arguments that the County treated him unfairly, but he does not engage with the district court's rationale, let alone cite any case law that would cast doubt on the ruling. Although we construe pro se briefs liberally, an appellate brief must contain a discernible argument challenging the district court's reasoning and support for that argument. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 28; *Anderson v. Hardman*, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). Because an appeal is meant to evaluate the district court's decision, *see Wonsey v. City of Chicago*, 940 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2019), it must be dismissed if the appellant's brief lacks any basis to disturb the judgment, *see Anderson*, 241 F.3d at 545.

DISMISSED