

17-1558

*Liberian Community Association v. Lamont*

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**

August Term 2017

(Argued: February 8, 2018

Decided: August 14, 2020)

No. 17-1558

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LIBERIAN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, LOUISE MENSAH-SIEH, on behalf of herself and her minor children B.D. and S.N., on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, VICTOR SIEH, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, EMMANUEL KAMARA, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, ASSUNTA NIMLEY-PHILLIPS, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, LAURA SKRIP, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, RYAN BOYKO, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, ESTHER YALARTAI, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, BISHOP HARMON YALARTAI, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated,

*Plaintiffs-Appellants,*

-v.-

NED LAMONT, Governor, DEIDRE S. GIFFORD, Acting Commissioner of Public Health, JEWEL MULLEN, Former Commissioner of Public Health,

*Defendants-Appellees.*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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Before: WINTER, LIVINGSTON, and CHIN, *Circuit Judges*.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Ryan Boyko, Laura Skrip, the Mensah-Sieh family, Assunta Nimley-Phillips, Bishop Harmon Yalartai, Esther Yalartai, and the Liberian Community Association of Connecticut (“Appellants”) appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello, J.) denying their motion for class certification and dismissing their suit for lack of standing and based on qualified immunity. Appellants challenged the quarantine decisions of certain Connecticut state officials in response to an Ebola epidemic in West Africa. On appeal, they primarily argue that (1) they suffered actual or imminent injuries that create standing to seek prospective relief to avert allegedly unconstitutional future quarantines; (2) clearly established law required that any quarantine imposed be medically necessary and comport with certain procedural safeguards; and (3) their class is sufficiently numerous to merit certification. We conclude that (1) the district court properly deemed their injuries too speculative to support standing, and (2) the law surrounding quarantines was not clearly established such that a state official may be held liable for the actions taken here. We do not reach the class certification issue because it is mooted by our conclusion as to standing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED** and **REMANDED** with instructions to amend the judgment to clarify that the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

Judge CHIN concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.

FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:

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(Kim E. Rinehart, Wiggin and Dana, LLP, New Haven, CT, *for* Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation, Hartford Hospital, The Hospital of Central Connecticut, Backus Hospitals, MidState Medical Center, Windham Hospital, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, Johnson Memorial Hospital, Saint Mary's Hospital, Bristol Hospital, and Western Connecticut Health Network, Inc., as *amici curiae*)

(Dan Barrett, ACLU Foundation of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, and Esha Bhandari, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, *for* American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut, Doctors Without Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières USA as *amici curiae*)

(Ann O'Leary and Kathleen Hartnett, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Palo Alto, CA, and

David A. Barrett and Yotam Barkai, Boies  
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FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: ROBERT J. DEICHERT, Assistant Attorney  
General, *for* George Jepsen, Attorney  
General, Hartford, CT.

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, *Circuit Judge*:

This case arises out of the Ebola epidemic that ravaged West Africa between 2014 and 2016. In response to the epidemic, then-Governor Dannel Malloy declared a public health emergency in the State of Connecticut. The declaration authorized Dr. Jewel Mullen, then-Commissioner of Public Health, to isolate or quarantine individuals whom she believed had been exposed to or could transmit the Ebola virus. She ordered twenty-one-day quarantines for two Ph.D. candidates—Ryan Boyko and Laura Skrip—and six members of the Mensah-Sieh family who had recently emigrated from Liberia. None of the quarantined individuals were infected with Ebola.

Boyko, Skrip, the Mensah-Siehs, Assunta Nimley-Phillips, Bishop Harmon Yalartai, Esther Yalartai, and the Liberian Community Association of Connecticut (collectively, “Appellants”) filed a putative class-action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello, *J.*) challenging the state

officials' actions.<sup>2</sup> They primarily alleged violations of their substantive and procedural due process rights and the Fourth Amendment. The defendants—the Governor and Commissioners of Public Health—moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). As to these constitutional claims, the district court dismissed the claims for injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(1), for lack of standing, and dismissed the claims for damages under Rule 12(b)(6), on the basis of Dr. Mullen's assertion of qualified immunity.<sup>3</sup> The court also denied the motion for class certification. We agree with the conclusions reached by the district court as to standing and qualified immunity and need not reach the issue of class certification. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment but REMAND with instructions to the district court that the judgment be amended to reflect that the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

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<sup>2</sup> Dr. Mary Jean O was also a plaintiff but moved before this Court on May 21, 2020, for an order dismissing this appeal as to her. We granted the motion on June 23, 2020.

<sup>3</sup> As set forth herein, the plaintiffs also raised certain federal statutory claims that were similarly dismissed and that are not pursued on appeal. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to additional claims raised under Connecticut state law, thus dismissing them without prejudice. *See infra* Background, Section II.

## BACKGROUND

### I. Factual Background<sup>4</sup>

#### A. The 2014 Ebola Outbreak

Ebola “is spread through direct physical contact with the bodily fluids of a symptomatic person, the body of a person who has died from Ebola, or objects contaminated with the virus, such as used needles.” J.A. 26.<sup>5</sup> Once an individual has contracted the virus, “[t]he incubation period (the time from infection to onset of symptoms) is usually four to nine days but can range from two to twenty-one days.” *Id.* “Symptoms include fever, headache, joint and muscle aches, diarrhea, and vomiting.” *Id.*

The first victim of the 2014 Ebola outbreak may well have been a young boy from a village “deep within the Guinean forest region” who died in December 2013.<sup>6</sup> The disease thereafter spread, “kill[ing] the boy’s mother, then his 3-year-old sister, then his grandmother.”<sup>7</sup> In the months that followed, dozens more

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<sup>4</sup> The factual background presented here is primarily derived from allegations in the complaint, which we accept as true in considering a motion to dismiss.

<sup>5</sup> “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix.

<sup>6</sup> Michelle Roberts, *First Ebola boy likely infected by playing in bat tree*, BBC (Dec. 30, 2014), <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-30632453>.

<sup>7</sup> Denise Grady and Sheri Fink, *Tracing Ebola’s Breakout to an African 2-Year-Old*, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 2014), <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/world/africa/tracing->

died as the disease moved between relatives, friends, and health care workers. Soon, the virus had “spread rapidly throughout Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.” J.A. 26. On March 23, 2014, “the World Health Organization (‘WHO’) announced an outbreak of Ebola in West Africa.” *Id.* Over the next twenty-two months, more than 28,000 individuals were diagnosed with Ebola. Over 11,000 died. This was the largest Ebola outbreak in history, yet those afflicted resided almost exclusively in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Outside those three countries, fewer than forty cases of Ebola emerged.

During the outbreak, to prevent the spread of the disease in the United States, both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) released policy guidance on how to manage the flow of people from West Africa. The CDC initially “recommended only self-monitoring or active monitoring for twenty-one days, and recommended no movement restrictions or quarantine” “[f]or asymptomatic individuals returning from West Africa with ‘no risk’ or ‘low risk’ of exposure.”<sup>8</sup> J.A. 27.

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[ebolas-breakout-to-an-african-2-year-old.html](#).

<sup>8</sup> “According to the CDC, ‘isolation’ is the separation of individuals who are sick with a contagious disease from those who are not sick. ‘Quarantine’ is the separation of asymptomatic individuals exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick.” J.A. 28. “‘Self-monitoring’ refers to a practice whereby people check their own

On October 8, 2014, the CDC and the DHS jointly “announced a safety plan” pursuant to which individuals “entering the United States from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone” were directed “to one of five ports of entry.” J.A. 28. On arrival, trained staff screened travelers for signs of illness and inquired about their health and possible prior exposures. If a passenger “required further evaluation or monitoring, federal officers referred those travelers to the appropriate state or local public health authority. Travelers with no symptoms, fever, or a known history of exposure received health information for self-monitoring and were approved to exit the airport.” J.A. 28. After the safety plan was announced, the CDC also revised its prior guidance. The new guidance, issued on October 27, “recommended ‘no restrictions on travel, work, public conveyances, or congregate gatherings’ for asymptomatic individuals . . . who had been in an affected country but had no known exposure.” J.A. 30.

Over a year and a half after the virus was first identified, the WHO declared Sierra Leone Ebola-free on November 7, 2015. Guinea and Liberia followed on December 29, 2015, and January 14, 2016, respectively. Despite these

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temperature and monitor themselves for symptoms. ‘Active monitoring’ refers to the ‘monitoring of travelers by health departments.’” Appellants Br. 7 n.2.



declarations, experts cautioned that these three nations “remain[ed] at high risk of future Ebola outbreaks.” *Id.* Nevertheless, on March 29, 2016, the WHO deemed the “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” over. J.A. 111. Since the end of the Ebola crisis in West Africa, there have been at least ten flare-ups or small outbreaks of Ebola in West Africa, and multiple outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

### **B. Connecticut’s Response**

Under Connecticut state law, the state government acquires the authority to quarantine if the Governor declares a public health emergency. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-131a. Once the Governor makes such a declaration, he may authorize the State Public Health Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) to quarantine or isolate people “whom the commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe” are or could be infected with a communicable disease. *Id.* § 19a-131b(a). The Commissioner is to issue quarantine and isolation orders only when they are “necessary and the least restrictive alternative to protect or preserve the public health.” *Id.* Numerous statutory factors guide the issuance of a quarantine or isolation order. *Id.* § 19a-131b(b). The Commissioner must also comply with various procedural requirements, including informing the quarantined or isolated individuals in

writing, *id.* § 19a-131b(c), limiting the order to a renewable twenty-day period, *id.*, and informing individuals that they have a right to a hearing to challenge their quarantine order and a right to an attorney at this hearing at the State's expense, *id.* § 19a-131b(d).

Turning to the actions of the Governor of Connecticut ("Governor")<sup>9</sup> and then-Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health Dr. Jewel Mullen (collectively with Acting Commissioner Deidre S. Gifford, "Appellees"), on October 7, 2014, the Governor issued an order declaring a public health emergency for the State of Connecticut. The order authorized Dr. Mullen "to direct the isolation or quarantine of individuals whom she 'reasonably believe[d] to have been exposed to, infected with, or otherwise at risk of passing the Ebola virus.'" J.A. 28.

The following week, on October 16, 2014, "Malloy and Mullen established statewide Ebola response policies . . . that the Governor's office described as 'more stringent than the guidelines thus far issued by the Federal Center[s] for Disease

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<sup>9</sup> The Governor at the time of the events underlying this suit and when the complaint was filed was Dannel Malloy. He has since been succeeded by Ned Lamont. Accordingly, Governor Lamont has been automatically substituted as a defendant-appellee. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

Control and Prevention . . . .’ All asymptomatic individuals who had traveled to affected areas or been in contact with an infected individual were to be quarantined at home for twenty-one days.” J.A. 28–29. Appellants allege that the Governor and Dr. Mullen knew that their policy went further than was necessary, citing a statement from a Connecticut Department of Public Health spokesman describing people quarantined as “not sick and not a risk to public health.” J.A. 29, 71. The policy was ultimately modified and made less restrictive on October 27, the same day the CDC issued the revised guidance discussed above. The new plan “imposed ‘mandatory active monitoring’ for asymptomatic travelers arriving in Connecticut from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but still contemplated ‘quarantine for individuals based on risk factors’” following an “individualized risk assessment.” J.A. 29–30.

The revised policy remained in place until April 1, 2016, when, three days after the WHO declared an end to the public health emergency in West Africa, Governor Malloy terminated the emergency in Connecticut.

## **C. Appellants' Experiences**

### **1. The Ph.D. Candidates**

Ryan Boyko and Laura Skrip were Ph.D. candidates at the Yale School of Public Health who traveled to Liberia to help the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare analyze data collected during the Ebola outbreak. After arriving in Liberia on September 18, 2014, they did not have contact with any Ebola-symptomatic people and took a variety of precautions to avoid exposure. They planned to return to the United States on October 3 but delayed their trip when Boyko developed a cough. Skrip displayed no symptoms, and Boyko felt better after two days. As a condition of returning on a replacement flight, Yale's travel medical insurance company required that Boyko be tested for Ebola. On October 6, he tested negative and received a letter confirming this. When they learned that a freelance cameraman who spent time at their hotel had developed Ebola symptoms, Boyko and Skrip consulted with CDC representatives, who told them that this presented "no risk" because the cameraman did not display symptoms until after they had last seen him. J.A. 33.

Boyko and Skrip left Liberia on October 11 and, upon arriving back in the United States, underwent Ebola screening procedures. DHS officials allowed

them to enter the country. Federal officials informed Connecticut officials about Boyko and Skrip's arrival. The pair returned to New Haven, where they took their temperatures twice a day and emailed the results to the Yale Health Center.

On October 15, Boyko developed a fever and was transported to the Yale-New Haven Hospital. Hospital staff took blood samples and sent them to the CDC and the Massachusetts Public Health laboratory for testing. Boyko's fever subsided while he was under the hospital's care and both tests came back negative for Ebola. Contemporaneously, the City of New Haven health department told Skrip that she would be subject to "mandatory active monitoring," meaning that the City would call her twice a day to ask her to take her temperature and report the results. J.A. 34.

On October 17, the same day Boyko received his second negative result, Dr. Mullen ordered him quarantined. The order required him to stay in his home through October 30, twenty-one days after October 10, *i.e.*, the longest possible incubation period for Ebola. The order informed Boyko that failure to comply could lead to penalties but acknowledged that Boyko had a right to a counseled hearing. Dr. Mullen signed an equivalent order for Skrip. Boyko received a copy of his quarantine order in the hospital, but Skrip was informed of hers over

the phone. After she informed a Yale official that she had not received an official quarantine order, Skrip received a written order laying out the terms of the quarantine and her rights.

Police officers were deployed outside of Boyko and Skrip's apartments to ensure they complied with the quarantine orders. Their quarantines ended at 12:01 a.m. on October 30, 2014, a day earlier than initially anticipated because of state law requirements. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-131b(c) (only allowing for quarantine orders of twenty days unless the Commissioner of Public Health renews the order). Despite the revision to Connecticut's quarantine policy on October 27, neither Boyko's nor Skrip's quarantine order was reevaluated before the quarantines ended in due course.

## **2. The Mensah-Sieh Family and Assunta Nimley-Phillips**

Assunta Nimley-Phillips, who is Louise Mensah-Sieh's sister, immigrated to the United States from Liberia in the 1980s. Mensah-Sieh, her husband Nathaniel Sieh,<sup>10</sup> and their four children—Victor Sieh, Emmanuel Kamara, B.D., and S.N.—lived in Liberia. After receiving visas to live in the United States through the Diversity Visa Lottery, the entire family underwent medical tests on

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<sup>10</sup> Nathaniel Sieh did not appeal the district court's order of dismissal.

the basis of which federal officials approved them for entry into the United States. They arrived on October 18, 2014, at which point the family was screened by DHS personnel and cleared to enter the country. The Mensah-Siehs were neither told to self-monitor nor provided any other quarantine-related information. Nimley-Phillips met her family at the airport and drove them to her home in West Haven, Connecticut. CDC and DHS officials notified Connecticut state and local health officials of the family's arrival.

On October 20, 2014, Maureen Lillis, West Haven Director of Public Health, called Nimley-Phillips and told her that the Mensah-Siehs were subject to a quarantine for twenty-one days. Lillis told Nimley-Phillips to check the family's temperature three times a day and monitor them for symptoms. As with Boyko and Skrip, police officers were stationed outside Nimley-Phillips's home and barred anyone from entering or exiting the house apart from Nimley-Phillips and her adult daughter. Neither Nimley-Phillips nor the Mensah-Sieh family received a written quarantine order, official communications about the quarantine, or information regarding their right to challenge the quarantine. No adjustments were made to the Mensah-Siehs' quarantine orders following the October 27 revision to Connecticut's quarantine policy.

### **3. The Yalartais and the Liberian Community Association of Connecticut**

The other Appellants—Bishop Harmon Yalartai, Esther Yalartai, and the Liberian Community Association of Connecticut (“LCAC”)—all allege that they intend to travel to Liberia and fear being subject to quarantine orders upon their return. Indeed, three of the Appellants—the Yalartais and Skrip—were in Liberia when the complaint was filed. The Yalartais, who were born in Liberia but reside in Connecticut, are leaders of a religious organization with churches in both Liberia and Connecticut. They regularly travel to and from Liberia to oversee the work of their church. LCAC is a non-profit organization that works to enhance the lot of the Liberian community in Connecticut and contribute to development efforts in Liberia. Dozens of its 230 members regularly travel to Liberia.

## **II. Procedural History**

Appellants filed their putative class action suit on February 8, 2016. All Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief; Boyko and the Mensah-Siehs also sought damages from Dr. Mullen. Appellants allege that Appellees, *inter alia*, (1) violated the substantive due process rights of Boyko, Skrip and the Mensah-Siehs by “quarantining them without medical or epidemiological justification and in a manner that substantially exceeded the least restrictive means



necessary”; (2) violated their procedural due process rights by failing to make individualized assessments or providing adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge their quarantines; and (3) violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing them through the quarantines.<sup>11</sup> J.A. 58–62. They also asserted various state law tort claims, and moved to certify a “class consisting of all persons who will or intend to travel from Ebola-affected countries to Connecticut and are at risk of Defendants subjecting them to an unlawful and scientifically unjustified quarantine.” J.A. 54. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and they opposed the motion for class certification.

The district court denied the motion for class certification, “concluding that the proposed class is too speculative to satisfy the numerosity requirement for class certification.” *Liberian Cmty. Ass’n v. Malloy*, No. 3:16-cv-201, 2016 WL 10314574, at \*7 (D. Conn. Aug. 1, 2016). In a separate decision, the district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss. *Liberian Cmty. Ass’n v. Malloy*, No. 3:16-cv-

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<sup>11</sup> Before the district court, Appellants also asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which they do not press on appeal and we need not address.

201, 2017 WL 4897048, at \*1 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). As to the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the district court found that Appellants lacked standing because they failed to establish “a ‘real and immediate’ threat of injury.” *Id.* at \*7–8 (quoting *Shain v. Ellison*, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004)). The district court further concluded that Dr. Mullen was entitled to qualified immunity on the damages claim. *Id.* at \*9–14. Finally, as to the state law claims, the district court “decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law causes of action,” *id.* at \*15, necessarily dismissing them without prejudice. See *Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC*, 82 F.3d 47, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2016); see also *Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill*, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (“[W]hen the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, the district court entered judgment dismissing the action, although the judgment did not specify that the state claims were dismissed without prejudice.<sup>12</sup> This appeal followed.

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<sup>12</sup> In light of our decision to affirm the dismissal of the federal claims, we do not address the merits of the state law claims. However, we remand as to these claims, with instructions to the district court that it amend the judgment to make clear that these claims are dismissed without prejudice.

## DISCUSSION

Appellants advance two principal arguments on appeal: *first*, that they have standing to seek prospective relief, and, *second*, that Dr. Mullen is not entitled to qualified immunity on Boyko and the Mensah-Siehs' damages claim. We disagree as to both arguments and discern no error in the district court's standing or qualified immunity analysis.

### I

"Standing to sue is a doctrine" that "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). "[T]he 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing consists of three elements." *Id.* (quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). "The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." *Id.*; see also *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). As relevant here, the "injury in fact" must have been "concrete and particularized" as well as "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art[icle] III.” *Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). Rather, there must be “a ‘substantial risk’ that harm will occur.” *Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (quoting *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54 (2010)); see also *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).

“[T]he proper procedural route [for bringing a standing challenge] is a motion under Rule 12(b)(1).” *All. for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co.*, 436 F.3d 82, 88 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006). And on appeal from a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), as here, “we review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions *de novo*.” *Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.À.R.L.*, 790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015). “The plaintiff[s] bear[] the burden of ‘alleg[ing] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [they] ha[ve] standing to sue.’” *Id.* (quoting *Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL*, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011)). All allegations made in the complaint are accepted as true and construed in favor of the plaintiffs. *Id.* (citing *W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP*, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2008)).

Appellants failed to plead a sufficient likelihood that, under the revised policy, any of them faces a substantial risk of suffering a future injury. See *City of*

*Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 106–07 (1983). Indeed, the revised policy—that is, the policy that was in effect when the complaint was filed—defaults to active monitoring for any arriving asymptomatic travelers and permits quarantine only after an individualized assessment. In *Lyons*, the Supreme Court directed the dismissal of Lyons’ complaint challenging the use of chokeholds by Los Angeles police because the complaint “did not indicate why Lyons might be realistically threatened by police officers who acted within the strictures of the City’s policy.” *Id.* at 106. Here, as in *Lyons*, Appellants have failed plausibly to allege any basis for concluding that they will be threatened with quarantine by Connecticut state officials who act within the revised policy.

Appellants argue that Appellees’ failure to reassess the quarantines imposed on Boyko, Skrip, and the Mensah-Siehs in light of the revised policy demonstrates its “irrational execution,” supposedly enhancing their risk of future injury. Appellants Br. 54. But the fact that Appellees declined to reconsider a previously imposed quarantine offers scant if any basis for assessing the substantiality of the *prospective* risk. Particularly in light of the individualized assessment mandated by the revised policy, Appellants “can only speculate as to whether [Appellees] will authorize such [quarantines]” in the future. *Clapper*,

568 U.S. at 413. And under the circumstances alleged in this complaint, “[w]e decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.” *Id.* at 414.

In a final effort to overcome the deficiencies in the complaint, Appellants assert that they also suffer a “present harm” because the quarantine policy “that was firmly in place at the time of filing and had already been applied against several of them” “restricted [their] freedom by greatly increasing the potential monetary, time, and personal costs of traveling to Liberia.” Appellants Br. 56–57 (emphasis omitted). But this argument of present harm is contrary to the complaint’s own allegations. As already noted (and as the complaint alleges), the policy that was applied to quarantine Boyko, Skrip and the Mensah-Siehs was revised shortly after their quarantines were imposed. Appellants do not allege that they—or anyone else—have been subjected to a quarantine *since* the revised policy issued. Such circumstances thus distinguish Appellants from the plaintiffs in *Monsanto*, 561 U.S. at 153–55, and *Friends of the Earth*, 528 U.S. at 184–85, upon which they rely. The plaintiffs in those cases averred that they would have to take immediate and concrete steps to avoid harm. *See Monsanto*, 561 U.S. at 154 (“[R]espondents would have to conduct testing to find out whether and to

what extent their crops have been contaminated.”); *Friends of the Earth*, 528 U.S. at 184 (“[A] company's continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms.”). Conversely here, Appellants merely allege that they must make travel plans “under the reasonable fear of being subject to another unjustified and unlawful quarantine.”<sup>13</sup> J.A. 49. In sum, the notion that Appellants must undertake reasonable efforts in the present to avert injury in the future is also speculative, and Appellants lack standing to pursue any of their prospective claims.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Indeed, Skrip and the Yalartais—the only Appellants who specifically allege that they intend to visit Liberia in the future—allege no changes to their travel plans at all, let alone that they either have incurred or will incur concrete costs because of their fear of the challenged policy.

<sup>14</sup> Because we conclude that none of the named plaintiffs has standing to pursue their claims for prospective relief, the class proposed by Appellants necessarily fails as well. See *Amador v. Andrews*, 655 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A] class action cannot be sustained without a named plaintiff who has standing.”); see also *NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co.*, 693 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have said that, to establish Article III standing in a class action[,] for every named defendant there must be at least one named plaintiff who can assert a claim directly against that defendant, and at that point standing is satisfied and only then will the inquiry shift to a class action analysis.” (brackets, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we do not reach the class certification question.

## II

We now turn to the claim for damages against Dr. Mullen. “To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a ‘complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Drimal v. Tai*, 786 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, Appellees asserted a qualified immunity defense in their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We review a district court's determination as to qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss *de novo*, “‘accepting as true the material facts alleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.’” *Garcia v. Does*, 779 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist.*, 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly ‘stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage [of the] litigation,’” *Wood v. Moss*, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.4 (2014) (quoting *Hunter v. Bryant*, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)), and it is “well established that an affirmative defense of official immunity . . . may be resolved by Rule 12(b)(6) if clearly established by the



allegations within the complaint,” *Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield*, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998); *see also McKenna v. Wright*, 386 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that qualified immunity defense may be “successfully asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).

At the start, qualified immunity doctrine “is intended to provide government officials with the ability to ‘reasonably . . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’” *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (quoting *Davis v. Scherer*, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). When the “general rule of qualified immunity” is applicable, “officials can know that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law.” *Id.* Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting *Reichle v. Howards*, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). And a court need not determine whether a defendant violated a plaintiff’s rights if it decides that the right was not clearly established. *See Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

To be sure, “a case directly on point” is not required “for a right to be clearly established.” *White v. Pauly*, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam). At the same time, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question *beyond debate*.” *Id.* (emphasis added). “‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.” *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (quoting *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). In practice, this means that “‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” dictate the action at issue. *Id.* at 589–90 (quoting *al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. at 741–42). A plaintiff must show with a high “degree of specificity,” *Mullenix v. Luna*, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam), that the rule he seeks to apply prohibited the officer’s conduct. See *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 590; see also *City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality”). In other words, an official is immune from liability unless, under the particular circumstances the official faced, any “reasonable offic[ial]” would have “known for certain that the conduct was

unlawful” under then-existing precedent. *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017).

Boyko and the Mensah-Siehs—the only Appellants seeking damages—advance three legal bases for their claim: substantive due process, procedural due process, and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. We discuss only whether, at the time of Dr. Mullen’s alleged conduct, it was clearly established that her conduct ran afoul of these constitutional protections.<sup>15</sup>

#### **A. Substantive Due Process**

Appellants first argue that “[b]ecause quarantines—a form of civil detention—implicate fundamental liberty interests, existing law clearly establishes that officials may impose them only when necessary to achieve a

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<sup>15</sup> Appellants urge us to “address the merits of the constitutional issue even if the Court were to conclude that Dr. Mullen’s conduct is shielded by qualified immunity.” Appellants Br. 48. Yet the Supreme Court has cautioned us to “think hard, and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones.” *Camreta v. Greene*, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011); *see also al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. at 735 (“Courts should think carefully before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” (quoting *Pearson*, 555 U.S. at 236–37)). While there are circumstances in which discretion is properly exercised to address step one of the qualified immunity analysis even when qualified immunity is appropriate at step two, this is not such a situation. *See, e.g., Jones v. Chandrasuwan*, 820 F.3d 685, 691–92 (4th Cir. 2016); *Morgan v. Swanson*, 659 F.3d 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2011); *cf. Pearson*, 555 U.S. at 237–39 (cataloguing situations where reaching the constitutional question is inappropriate).

compelling state interest and in the absence of less restrictive means.” Appellants Br. 30 (citing *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003); *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). According to Appellants, “[c]ases in multiple civil commitment settings confirm that substantive due process analysis applies whenever, as with quarantine, a state civilly confines an individual ostensibly to protect the public.” Appellants Br. 31 (citing cases). And Appellants cite Second Circuit precedent to the effect that “involuntary confinement of an individual *for any reason*”—which, according to Appellants, includes the quarantining of individuals amidst an infectious disease outbreak—is subject to a least-restrictive-means test. Appellants Br. 33 (quoting *Project Release v. Prevost*, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983)) (emphasis in Appellants Br.).

But Appellants take this Court’s language out of context. The full quotation from *Project Release* makes clear that its “for any reason” language refers specifically to various public policy justifications a state might have to commit the mentally ill, such as its “*parens patriae*” or “police power” authority. See *Project Release*, 722 F.2d at 971. Read in context, it is clear that the Court, in articulating a least-restrictive-means test, was referring *only* to the civil detention of people who are mentally ill. Indeed, every case relied upon by *Project Release* in

discussing due process solely addresses confinement of the mentally ill—not, as Appellants contend, multiple settings. *See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones*, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); *O'Connor v. Donaldson*, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); *Humphrey v. Cady*, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); *see also Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); *Jones v. United States*, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); *Francis S. v. Stone*, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). A “reasonable official” would thus not necessarily interpret *Project Release* or any of these other cases to define the outer limits of the state’s quarantine power in the context of a major Ebola outbreak.<sup>16</sup> *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 590.

The dissent similarly finds support for a least-restrictive-means test in the context of an Ebola-related quarantine in the Supreme Court’s affirmation in *Jones v. United States* that “‘commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.’” Dissenting Op. 3–4 (quoting *Jones*, 463 U.S. at 361) (emphasis in dissent). Again, however, the due

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<sup>16</sup> *Jolly v. Coughlin*, 76 F.3d 468, 479–80 (2d Cir. 1996), upon which Judge Chin’s partial dissent (“dissent”) relies, is similarly unhelpful in establishing the substantive due process standard urged by Appellants. Indeed, *Jolly* does not even address a due process claim. The “medical keeplock” at issue there was challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which by its terms applies a least-restrictive-means test only to claims regarding the exercise of religion. *See id.* at 474.

process standards articulated in *Jones*, as in *Project Release*, concern civil commitment of the mentally ill. Taking a generalized statement like that found in *Project Release* or *Jones* as evidence of a “clearly established rule” in the context of quarantines conflicts with the Supreme Court’s directive that we should not “define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” *Mullenix*, 136 S. Ct. at 308; *see id.* (“This inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” (quoting *Brosseau v. Haugen*, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam))). Quarantines against infectious disease, involving different public safety concerns and implicating different liberty interests, are simply not sufficiently analogous to civil commitment of the mentally ill to clearly establish applicable due process constraints. As the Supreme Court explained in *City of Sacramento v. Lewis*, “[r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory.” 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998); *cf. Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (“‘Substantive due process’ analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for ‘the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’” (quoting *Collins v. Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (brackets omitted)). Accordingly, not “every reasonable official would interpret [civil

commitment cases] to establish the particular rule that the plaintiff[s] seek[] to apply.” *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 590.

Indeed, Appellants point to only one decision that has applied the civil commitment line of cases in the infectious disease context: *Best v. St. Vincents Hosp.*, No. 03 CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003), *adopted by* 2003 WL 21767656, *aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Best v. Bellevue Hosp.*, 115 F. App’x 459 (2d Cir. 2004). But a single magistrate’s report and recommendation, even when adopted by a district court, is insufficient, standing alone, to clearly establish a constitutional rule.<sup>17</sup> *Cf. Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth.*, 757 F.3d 31, 61 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have specifically cautioned against the reliance on non-precedential summary orders [and district court opinions] in ‘clearly established’ analyses” because “[n]on-precedential’ decisions, by their very definition, do not make law.” (citing *Jackler v. Byrne*, 658 F.3d 225, 244 (2d Cir. 2011))).

Nor does it help to situate *Best* among other decisions addressing quarantines and infectious diseases. By the late nineteenth century, “the right of the legislature to enact such measures as will protect all persons from the

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<sup>17</sup> We did not have occasion to pass on the merits of the magistrate judge’s analysis in summarily affirming in part the judgment on appeal.

impending calamity of a pestilence” was well established. *In re Smith*, 146 N.Y. 68, 77 (1895). As the doctrine developed into the early twentieth century, courts gradually recognized limits on this power. Even so, neither Appellants nor the dissent point to any authority in this archipelago of cases that clearly establishes the substantive due process rule they now urge.<sup>18</sup>

Quite to the contrary. In assessing the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law requiring individuals to either receive the smallpox vaccine or pay a fine, the Supreme Court noted in 1905 that “the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative

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<sup>18</sup> For instance, in *Chy Lung v. Freeman*, the Supreme Court considered a California statute which allowed the State to exclude arriving passengers on a number of grounds, including if they were “a public charge, or likely soon to become so” because of “sickness or disease.” 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875). But far from articulating substantive due process limits on the quarantine authority, the Court ultimately struck down the statute because it conflicted with the federal government’s authority to regulate immigration. *Id.* at 281. In *Smith*, the New York Court of Appeals ruled unlawful the quarantine of individuals who had been detained for refusing to receive a smallpox vaccine. 146 N.Y. at 78. But it in no way articulated a least-restrictive-means test of the sort urged by Appellants, instead recognizing “some latitude of a reasonable discretion . . . to the local authorities upon the facts of a case.” *Id.* A pair of cases from California struck down discriminatorily enforced quarantines. See *Jew Ho v. Williamson*, 103 F. 10, 26 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (“The evidence here is clear that this [quarantine] is made to operate against the Chinese population only . . . .”); *Wong Wai v. Williamson*, 103 F. 1, 7 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (granting injunction prohibiting government officials from enforcing a quarantine targeting Chinese individuals). But neither of these cases is analogous to the instant suit as both involved neighborhood-wide discriminatory quarantines. No similar allegations are made here.



enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.” *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); *Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health*, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (“[T]he power of the states to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants . . . is beyond question.”). The Court recognized that such measures could be unlawful if undertaken in “an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or . . . go[ing] so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public . . . .” *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 28; *see also id.* at 31 (noting that courts may strike down public health statutes if they have “no real or substantial relation to those objects, or [are], beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights”). But of particular relevance here is the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that:

An American citizen arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, . . . although apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared.

*Id.* at 29; *see also United States v. Harris*, 838 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if the statement is fairly characterized as dictum, we are obligated ‘to accord great

deference to Supreme Court dicta, absent a change in the legal landscape.” (quoting *Newdow v. Peterson*, 753 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014))).

Since *Jacobson*, the Supreme Court has not addressed the limits imposed by due process on a State’s power to manage infectious diseases. Moreover, in a small number of decisions, other courts have adopted approaches more deferential than the least-restrictive-means test urged by Appellants. See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick*, 219 F. Supp. 789, 790–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (upholding the decision to isolate a woman who arrived in the United States from a region infected with smallpox for the entire incubation period of the disease as “reached in obvious good faith” after “forthright, reasoned and circumstantially reassuring” consideration); *People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz*, 386 Ill. 360, 362, 364–65 (1944) (upholding statute authorizing isolation of criminal defendants who “may be suffering from any communicable venereal disease” on the grounds that “the courts will not interfere with the exercise of this power except where the regulations adopted for the protection of the public health are arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable”).

Appellants and the dissent contend that the trend nevertheless goes in the other direction and that courts have grown less deferential in modern times. See,

*e.g.*, *City of Newark v. J.S.*, 652 A.2d 265 (N.J. Super. Ct., Essex Cty. 1993) (discussing the least-restrictive-means test). But the cases do not bear out this purported trend. In *Hickox v. Christie*, for example, which arose out of the same Ebola crisis that gave rise to this appeal, the court concluded that “[t]he case law regarding the least restrictive means requirement falls far short of a clear consensus capable of defeating qualified immunity.” 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 599 (D.N.J. 2016). That court’s review of the quarantine case law led it to suggest that the usual standard applied is one of “arbitrariness or unreasonableness.” *Id.* at 593; *see also Daniels v. Maricopa Cty. Special Health Care Dist.*, No. CV-07-1080, 2009 WL 10708630, at \*7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 2009) (rejecting due process challenge to isolation of tuberculosis patient under a “reasonably related” standard).

Nor do the smattering of state trial court decisions relied upon by the dissent change the analysis. Passing over the fact that such precedent cannot clearly establish law, *see Matusick*, 757 F.3d at 61, none of these decisions even purported to apply federal due process standards. Both *In re City of New York v. Antoinette R.*, 165 Misc.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens Cty. 1995), and *Mayhew v. Hickox*, No. CV-2014-26 (Me. Dist. Ct., Oct. 31, 2014), assessed quarantine orders against the backdrop of state or municipal laws that incorporated a least-restrictive-means

test. Appellants and the dissent both emphasize that Connecticut's quarantine law employs a least-restrictive-means test. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-131b(a). But the fact that Connecticut and other states have seen fit to adopt this test by statute is not relevant to our qualified immunity analysis. "[W]e have repeatedly held[] that a state statute does not serve as 'clearly established law' for purposes of qualified immunity." *Tooly v. Schwaller*, 919 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2019). Put another way, assuming *arguendo* that Appellees' actions violated Connecticut law, "the court must [still] determine whether the conduct that violated the state statute also violates clearly established federal law, and this is a distinct and separate inquiry." *Id.* at 173.

In sum, there was by no means a "robust consensus" on the proper standard for analyzing quarantine claims at the time of the conduct at issue here. *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. 591. To the extent the substantive due process restrictions articulated by Appellants existed then, they were "at best undeveloped." *Wilson v. Layne*, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). That district courts in this Circuit (*Best* and *Shinnick*, specifically) have employed different analyses only further "demonstrates that the law on the point [was] not well established." *Ziglar*, 137 S. Ct. at 1868.

In such circumstances, where the precedent is simply not “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply,” *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90, the qualified immunity bar applies. As the Supreme Court has recognized, public officials cannot be expected “to predict the future course of constitutional law” based on their reading of a handful of non-precedential opinions. *Wilson*, 526 U.S. at 617–18 (quoting *Procunier v. Navarette*, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978)). It is “unfair” to subject such officials to damages liability when even “judges . . . disagree.” *Id.* at 618. Neither civil commitment law nor other infectious disease cases had clearly articulated the substantive due process standard Appellants urge should have governed Dr. Mullen’s actions. Accordingly, the district court did not err in affording qualified immunity as to this claim.

### **B. Procedural Due Process**

Appellants next argue that Dr. Mullen violated procedural due process by failing: (1) to conduct an individualized assessment of Appellants’ risk to public health; (2) to provide timely notice of the process for judicial review; and (3) to initiate a judicial hearing whereby Appellants could challenge their detention. Again, however, Appellants are unable to point to clearly established law that

supports the conclusion that every reasonable official would have understood that these measures were required at the time the challenged events occurred.

The inquiry into the existence of a procedural due process right is guided by the three-factor balancing test enunciated in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). At the start, because that analysis entails balancing multiple factors, procedural due process, “unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” *Gilbert v. Homar*, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting *Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy*, 367 U.S. 886, 895, (1961)). Rather, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). “Given this flexible, context-dependent approach, it will be a rare case in which prior precedents have definitively resolved a novel claim of procedural due process. That makes particularly fertile ground for qualified immunity, given that state officials can be liable only for violations of rights that have been established ‘beyond debate’ and with ‘particular[ity]’ by existing constitutional precedents.” *Francis v. Fiocco*, 942 F.3d 126, 149 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting *White*, 137 S. Ct. at 551–52).

Again, Appellants and the dissent rely almost exclusively upon cases imported from the civil commitment context or upon Connecticut state law. But as already explained, the civil commitment cases are insufficiently analogous to clearly establish the procedural rights Appellants urge us to adopt in this case. *See Levin v. Adalberto M.*, 156 Cal. App. 4th 288, 298–02 (2007) (referring, in dicta, to civil commitment context as “analogous” to the civil detention of a tuberculosis patient but noting that infectious diseases like tuberculosis “differ[] from mental illness in ways that justify fewer procedural safeguards, not more”). And “[a] violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.” *Doe v. Conn. Dep’t of Child & Youth Servs.*, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990).

Indeed, we have been unable to find—and Appellants do not identify—any cases articulating *federal* procedural due process protections in the quarantine context. The most analogous case, *Greene v. Edwards*, 164 W. Va. 326, 327–29 (1980) (per curiam), held that due process guarantees certain procedural rights—including adequate notice, a right to counsel, and an elevated burden of proof—when the state seeks to involuntarily confine an individual with tuberculosis. *See also Kirk v. Wyman*, 83 S.C. 372, 390 (1909) (“[B]oards of health may not deprive any

person of his property or his liberty, unless the deprivation is made to appear, by due inquiry, to be reasonably necessary to the public health; and such inquiry must include notice to the person whose property or liberty is involved, and the opportunity to him to be heard, unless the emergency appears to be so great that such notice and hearing could be had only at the peril of the public safety.”). But the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia relied primarily on state law to reach this conclusion. *See Greene*, 164 W. Va. at 327–29. And cases from both the Supreme Court and our Court make clear that the federal procedural due process guarantee does *not* require state officials to inform individuals of all the procedural guarantees they enjoy under state law. *See City of W. Covina v. Perkins*, 525 U.S. 234, 240–41 (1999) (holding that a city that seizes an owner’s property must inform the owner that “his property has been seized” but “need not take other steps to inform him of his [legal] options” because he “can turn to . . . public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him”); *United States v. Lopez*, 445 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, *J.*) (holding that failure to inform an alien in deportation proceedings of his right to seek habeas review did not deny him meaningful judicial review because “where judicial remedies are readily available



in case law and statutes, due process is not offended where no notice of those remedies is provided”).

The rationale of *Perkins* and *Lopez* has at least arguable purchase here, where Boyko, Skrip, and the Mensah-Siehs all did receive notice that they were subject to a mandatory quarantine, and where post-quarantine hearings were available to them under Connecticut law, *see* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-131b. While the full panoply of their rights under state law was not immediately conveyed to them in writing, nor was a hearing convened, Appellants point to no case that clearly establishes that Dr. Mullen violated the Constitution by failing to undertake these measures.

### **C. The Fourth Amendment**

Finally, Appellants assert that “Dr. Mullen’s over-inclusive sweep was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” Appellants Br. 48, because in quarantining Boyko, Skrip, and the Mensah-Siehs, she “depart[ed] from what is scientifically justified for a particular disease,” Appellants Reply Br. 9 (quotation marks omitted). According to Appellants, “all Plaintiffs had no known exposure to Ebola,” Appellants Br. 39, Boyko had undergone several blood tests confirming that he did not have the disease, and Boyko and Skrip had been assured by CDC

representatives that any interactions with a person in their hotel who later developed symptoms posed no risk. This claim is essentially the same as their substantive due process claim but is recast in Fourth Amendment terms.

Qualified immunity affords especial protection to state officials in the Fourth Amendment context. See *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (holding that the “specificity” requirement is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context”) (quoting *Mullenix*, 136 S. Ct. at 308). The Supreme Court has observed, for instance, that “[p]robable cause ‘turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts’ and cannot be ‘reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” *Id.* (quoting *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Therefore, a plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” *Id.* (quoting *Pauly*, 137 S. Ct. at 522).

Appellants have cited no case in which a court has invalidated a quarantine order under the Fourth Amendment. And although they characterize their quarantines as “scientifically unjustified,” Appellants Br. 58, a number of factors could support a determination that the quarantines were at least arguably reasonable as a matter of Fourth Amendment law. Cf. *Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cty. of S.F.*, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (“Where considerations of health and safety

are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of ‘probable cause’ to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken.” (quoting *Frank v. Maryland*, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Put simply, it was not clearly established that it was *unreasonable*, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, for Appellees to quarantine individuals traveling from a nation suffering from an Ebola epidemic for the duration of the disease’s incubation period. And in such circumstances, Dr. Mullen is entitled to qualified immunity.

To be clear, we need not and do not reach the merits of Appellants’ constitutional claims. We conclude simply that the district court did not err in determining that no clearly established law existed at the time of Dr. Mullen’s actions such that every reasonable official would have known that her conduct fell outside the boundaries of due process and Fourth Amendment constraints. No significant precedent had previously articulated the requirements of substantive due process, procedural due process, or the Fourth Amendment in the quarantine or infectious diseases contexts, as urged by Appellants here. In such circumstances, the district court properly concluded that Dr. Mullen is entitled to qualified immunity.

## CONCLUSION

We have considered Appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court but REMAND with instructions to amend the judgment to clarify that the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice.