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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**  
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9 IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability  
10 Litigation,

No. MDL15-2641-PHX-DGC

11 \_\_\_\_\_  
12 Debra and James Tinlin, a married couple,  
13 Plaintiffs,

No. CV16-0263-PHX-DGC

14 v.

**ORDER**

15 C. R. Bard, Inc., a New Jersey corporation;  
16 and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., an  
17 Arizona corporation,  
18 Defendants.

19 This multidistrict litigation proceeding (“MDL”) involves thousands of personal  
20 injury cases brought against Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular,  
21 Inc. (collectively, “Bard”). Bard manufactures and markets medical devices, including  
22 inferior vena cava (“IVC”) filters. The MDL Plaintiffs received implants of Bard IVC  
23 filters and claim they are defective and have caused serious injury or death.

24 One of the MDL cases is brought by Plaintiff Debra Tinlin. She received a Bard  
25 filter fourteen years ago. Her case has been chosen as one of several bellwether cases  
26 and is set for trial in May 2019. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment.  
27 Doc. 15071. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 15696, 16011. The parties request oral  
28 argument, but it will not aid the Court’s decision. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv

1 7.2(f). For reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it  
2 in part.

3 **I. Background.**

4 The IVC is a large vein that returns blood to the heart from the lower body. An  
5 IVC filter is a device implanted in the IVC to catch blood clots before they reach the  
6 heart and lungs. This MDL involves multiple versions of Bard IVC filters – the  
7 Recovery, G2, G2X, Eclipse, Meridian, and Denali. They are spider-shaped devices that  
8 have multiple limbs fanning out from a cone-shaped head. The limbs consist of legs with  
9 elastic hooks that attach to the IVC wall, and bent arms to catch or break up blood clots.

10 The MDL Plaintiffs allege that Bard filters are more dangerous than other IVC  
11 filters because they have higher risks of tilting, perforating the IVC, or fracturing  
12 and migrating to vital organs. Plaintiffs further allege that Bard failed to warn patients  
13 and physicians about these higher risks. Defendants dispute these allegations, contending  
14 that Bard filters are safe and effective, that their complication rates are low and  
15 comparable to those of other IVC filters, and that the medical community is aware of the  
16 risks associated with IVC filters.

17 **II. The Tinlin Plaintiffs.**

18 Plaintiff Debra Tinlin has a history of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary  
19 emboli. She received a Bard Recovery filter on May 7, 2005. Dr. Joshua Riebe  
20 implanted the filter.

21 On June 10, 2013, Ms. Tinlin experienced cardiac tamponade after the filter  
22 fractured and two struts embolized in the right ventricle of her heart. She had emergency  
23 surgery to drain a pericardial effusion. No fractured strut was found during the  
24 procedure. She was discharged ten days later.

25 On July 31, 2013, a fractured strut was removed through open heart surgery. A  
26 chest scan showed several other struts perforating the IVC wall. Subsequent scans  
27 revealed multiple fractured struts in the pulmonary arteries. These struts and the filter  
28 have not been removed.

1 Ms. Tinlin and her husband assert various claims against Bard under Wisconsin  
2 law, some of which have been withdrawn.<sup>1</sup> The following claims remain: failure to warn  
3 (Counts II and VII), design defect (Counts III and IV), misrepresentation (Counts VIII  
4 and XII), concealment (Count XIII), deceptive trade practices (Count XIV), and loss of  
5 consortium (Count XV). See Doc. 364 (master complaint); Doc. 1, Case No. CV-16-  
6 00263 (short-form complaint).<sup>2</sup>

7 Defendants seek summary judgment on the remaining claims and future damages,  
8 but not on Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Doc. 15071 at 2-4. The Court will  
9 grant summary judgment on the misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices claims,  
10 deny summary judgment on the claims for failure to warn, design defect, concealment,  
11 and loss of consortium, and grant summary judgment in part with respect to future  
12 damages.

### 13 **III. Summary Judgment Standard.**

14 A party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing  
15 the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it  
16 believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." *Celotex Corp. v.*  
17 *Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is warranted where the moving  
18 party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is  
19 entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is  
20 also appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the  
21 existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear  
22 the burden of proof at trial." *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322.

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24 <sup>1</sup> The parties agree that Wisconsin law governs the Tinlins' claims. Doc. 15071  
at 3 n.1.

25 <sup>2</sup> The master complaint is the operative pleading in this MDL. It gives notice,  
26 pursuant to Rule 8, of the allegations that Plaintiffs assert generally. Plaintiff-specific  
27 allegations are contained in individual short-form complaints and fact sheets. See  
28 Doc. 249 at 6. The master complaint asserts seventeen claims and seeks both  
compensatory and punitive damages. Doc. 364 ¶¶ 166-349. The Tinlins do not assert  
wrongful death or survival claims (Counts XVI and XVII), and have withdrawn claims  
for manufacturing defect (Counts I and V), failure to recall (Count VI), negligence per se  
(Count IX), and breach of warranty (Counts X and XI). See Doc. 15071 at 2.

1           Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude  
2 summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could  
3 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S.  
4 242, 248 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the  
5 nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are drawn in that party’s favor because  
6 “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences  
7 from the facts are jury functions[.]” *Id.* at 255; *see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith*  
8 *Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

9 **III. Failure to Warn Claims (Counts II and VII).**

10           Plaintiffs assert strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims. *See* Doc. 364  
11 ¶¶ 171-81, 210-17; Doc. 1 at 3, Case No. CV-16-00263. To establish each claim,  
12 Plaintiffs must show, among other things, that the lack of an adequate warning was a  
13 cause of their injuries. *See* Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(e) (a plaintiff asserting a strict  
14 liability claim must prove that “the defective condition was a cause” of her injuries);  
15 *Kessel v. Stansfield Vending, Inc.*, 714 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (a plaintiff  
16 claiming negligent failure to warn must prove a “causal connection between the  
17 defendant’s breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff’s injury”). “Under Wisconsin  
18 law, negligence or defect ‘caused’ an injury if it was a substantial factor in producing the  
19 injury.” *Burton v. Am. Cyanamid*, No. 07-CV-0303, 2019 WL 325318, at \*2 (E.D. Wis.  
20 Jan. 25, 2019); *see Sunnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.*, 360 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Wis.  
21 1984) (“The long-standing test for cause in Wisconsin is whether the defect was a  
22 substantial factor in producing the injury.”); *Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins.*, 275 N.W.2d 660,  
23 666 (Wis. 1979) (“The test of cause-in-fact is whether the negligence was a ‘substantial  
24 factor’ in producing the injury.”); *Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.*, 680 N.W.2d 345, 353  
25 (Wis. 2004) (“When Wisconsin courts currently speak of ‘cause,’ they do so in the  
26 context of the substantial factor test for cause-in-fact.”); *see also* Wis JI-Civil 1500  
27 (general causation standard).

28

1 Defendants contend that the failure to warn claims fail because Plaintiffs cannot  
2 show that an adequate warning would have changed Dr. Riebe's decision to use a  
3 Recovery filter for Ms. Tinlin. Doc. 15071 at 3, 7-9. The Court does not agree.<sup>3</sup>

4 Defendants note that Dr. Riebe does not recall seeing the Recovery's instructions  
5 for use ("IFU") and does not routinely read IFUs or "dear doctor" letters. Doc. 15071  
6 at 8-9. But "it does not follow that he would have ignored any warnings provided by  
7 [D]efendants." *Stevens v. Stryker Corp.*, No. 12-CV-63-BBC, 2013 WL 12109101, at \*6  
8 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2013). Defendants do not contend that IFUs and "dear doctor" letters  
9 are the only avenues by which Bard can provide warnings to physicians. *See* Doc. 15071  
10 at 9. Dr. Riebe testified that sales representatives for IVC filter manufacturers, including  
11 Bard, visited the hospital where he performed surgery and called on him as a customer  
12 throughout his practice. Doc. 15702 ¶ 10; *see* Doc. 15702-1 at 3, 10. Because Bard sales  
13 representatives could have personally provided warnings about the Recovery to  
14 Dr. Riebe, the fact that he did not read IFUs or "dear doctor" letters does not establish a  
15 lack of causation.

16 Dr. Riebe testified that he needed complete and accurate information from medical  
17 device manufacturers to help him conduct a proper risk-benefit analysis. Doc. 15702-1  
18 at 5. He stated that he would have wanted to know about the Recovery's alleged higher  
19 risks of failure, and that Bard did not understand the root causes, did not have a good  
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21 <sup>3</sup> Defendants assert that they had a duty to warn Dr. Riebe, and not Ms. Tinlin  
22 directly, under the learned intermediary doctrine. *Id.* at 7-8. The Wisconsin Supreme  
23 Court has not decided whether to adopt the doctrine, and federal courts applying  
24 Wisconsin law are split on the issue. *See* Doc. 12007 at 14 n.6 (discussing the conflicting  
25 case law). The Court need not decide the issue on the present motion because summary  
26 judgment is not warranted on the failure to warn claims even under the learned  
27 intermediary doctrine. *See Forst v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 602 F. Supp. 2d 960, 968  
28 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (because a triable issue existed as to whether the defendant adequately  
warned the prescribing physician about the drug's risks, "the 'learned intermediary'  
doctrine would not preclude any 'failure to warn' claim, even if the court determined that  
the doctrine applied"). Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiffs cannot prove  
causation if the duty to warn is owed to Ms. Tinlin (Doc. 16011 at 3-4), but the Court will  
not grant summary judgment based on an argument raised for the first time in a reply  
brief. *See Zamani v. Carnes*, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007).

1 understanding of the long-term performance of its retrievable filters or the dynamics of  
2 the IVC, had placed the Recovery on hold due to migration problems, and internally  
3 found the Recovery to have unacceptable risks. *Id.* at 6-8, 14. This information would  
4 have been important for understanding the Recovery’s safety and conducting a proper  
5 risk-benefit analysis. *Id.* at 8-9, 19; *see* Doc. 15701 ¶¶ 17-22. Bard’s knowledge that  
6 overweight patients tend to have large expansions of their IVCs, if shared with Dr. Riebe,  
7 would have helped him select a filter that would have remained in place in Ms. Tinlin.  
8 Doc. 15702-1 at 22; *see* Doc. 15702 ¶ 5.

9 A jury reasonably could infer from this evidence that Bard’s failure to warn  
10 Dr. Riebe about the Recovery’s higher risks of failure, Bard’s lack of knowledge about  
11 the root causes, and the Recovery’s known migration problems in overweight patients  
12 was a substantial factor in Dr. Riebe’s decision to choose a Recovery for Ms. Tinlin. *See*  
13 *Burton v. Am. Cyanamid*, 334 F. Supp. 3d 949, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2018) (denying summary  
14 judgment where the jury could draw “the permissible inference . . . that the persons  
15 responsible for selecting [the product] would have heeded warnings regarding the risk . . .  
16 if such warnings had been issued”); *Stevens*, 2013 WL 12109101, at \*6 (finding a triable  
17 issue with respect to causation even though the physician generally did not rely on  
18 information he received from the defendants when he decided to use their medical  
19 device); *Forst*, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (a jury could rely on the prescribing physician’s  
20 testimony that the lack of warning about the drug’s increased risk for suicide prevented  
21 him from doing a proper risk-benefit analysis in concluding that his decision to prescribe  
22 would have changed); *Michaels v. Mr. Heater, Inc.*, 411 F. Supp. 992, 1007 (W.D. Wis.  
23 2006) (denying summary judgment where the jury reasonably could find that the failure  
24 to provide adequate warnings was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries).<sup>4</sup>

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26 <sup>4</sup> Defendants object to Dr. Riebe’s testimony that he would have wanted to know  
27 certain information about the Recovery, claiming that the testimony lacks foundation and  
28 the questions are incomplete hypotheticals. Doc. 16011 at 5 n.5. But Defendants do not  
provide a basis for the objections. Dr. Riebe clearly is qualified to testify about  
information he would want to know from IVC filter manufacturers in order to conduct a  
proper risk-benefit analysis. Defendants have not shown that this testimony should be  
disregarded at the summary judgment stage. *See Quanta Indemnity Co. v. Amberwood*

1 Defendants contend that because Dr. Riebe had no involvement in selecting the  
2 IVC filters used at his hospital, and never suggested that any filter other than a Recovery  
3 could have been used for Ms. Tinlin, no reasonable inference can be drawn that he would  
4 have selected a different filter regardless of what warning Bard provided. Doc. 15071  
5 at 9. But Dr. Riebe testified that he often would switch to a Cook Bird's Nest filter for  
6 patients with large IVCs. Doc. 15702-1 at 25; *see* Doc. 15702 ¶ 5.

7 Defendants have not shown, as a matter of undisputed fact, that their alleged  
8 failure to warn was not a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. The Court will deny summary  
9 judgment on the failure to warn claims.<sup>5</sup>

#### 10 **IV. Misrepresentation Claims (Counts VIII and XII).**

11 Wisconsin common law recognizes three distinct claims of misrepresentation:  
12 negligent, strict liability, and intentional or fraudulent. *See Van Den Heuvel v. AI Credit*  
13 *Corp.*, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (citing *Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co.*,  
14 *Inc.*, 288 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Wis. 1980)); *see also Kaloti Enters, Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co.*,  
15 699 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Wis. 2005) (noting that "intentional misrepresentation [is]  
16 sometimes referred to as fraudulent misrepresentation"). Each claim requires the plaintiff  
17 to show that she relied to her detriment on a false representation of fact. *See Van Den*  
18 *Heuvel*, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 1073; *Blenker Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Array Fin. Servs.*, 340 F.  
19 Supp. 3d 792, 797-98 (W.D. Wis. 2018); *Novell v. Migliaccio*, 749 N.W.2d 544, 553

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*Dev. Inc.*, No. CV 11-1807-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 1246144, at \*2 (D. Ariz. March 26,  
2014) (material that could be presented in a form admissible at trial may be used to avoid  
23 summary judgment).

24 <sup>5</sup> Defendants assert that any failure to warn was not the "proximate cause" of  
25 Plaintiffs' injuries. Docs. 15071 at 7, 16011 at 5. But the use of "proximate cause" to  
26 describe the extent of liability based on lack of causal connection "has long since been  
27 abandoned in Wisconsin in favor of the 'substantial factor' test used to establish cause-in-  
28 fact, which is a jury issue." *Fandrey*, 680 N.W.2d at 353 (citations omitted); *see*  
*Michaels*, 411 F. Supp. at 1006 (noting that "proximate cause" is "a legal theory that  
Wisconsin no longer uses to discuss the causal connection between wrongdoing and  
injury"). Under current Wisconsin law, "proximate cause" is "simply short hand for the  
public policies a court may consider to deny recovery even if the plaintiff proves  
cause-in-fact." *Stevens*, 2013 WL 12109101, at \*6. Defendants identify no such public  
policies.

1 (Wis. 2008); *Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.*, 677 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Wis. 2004);  
2 *Whipp v. Iverson*, 168 N.W.2d 201, 203-204 (Wis. 1969); *see also* Wis JI-Civil 2400.

3 Plaintiffs assert negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. *See* Doc. 364  
4 ¶¶ 218-28, 245-59; Doc. 1 at 3, Case No. CV-16-00263. Defendants argue that the  
5 claims fail because Plaintiffs cannot show that Ms. Tinlin or Dr. Riebe relied on any Bard  
6 representation in selecting a Recovery filter. Doc. 15071 at 9-10. The Court agrees.

7 Plaintiffs assert that a Bard sales representative may have met with Dr. Riebe in  
8 the past. Doc. 15696 at 7 (citing Doc. 15702 ¶ 10). But even if this were true, Plaintiffs  
9 present no evidence that the sales representative made representations on which  
10 Dr. Riebe relied in selecting a Recovery for Ms. Tinlin. Absent such evidence, Plaintiffs  
11 cannot establish their misrepresentation claims. *See Blenker Bldg. Sys.*, 340 F. Supp. 3d  
12 at 798 (noting that “reliance is an element of all common law misrepresentation claims”)  
13 (citing *Novell*, 749 N.W.2d at 553); *Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. Zdanovec*, 586 N.W.2d  
14 41, 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (the element of reliance is “common to all types of  
15 misrepresentation”).

16 Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Riebe relied on risk-benefit information from those who  
17 trained him. Doc. 15696 at 7. Dr. Riebe was trained by Dr. John McDermott, an  
18 interventional radiologist at the University of Wisconsin. *Id.* Plaintiffs claim that  
19 Dr. McDermott was involved in a 2004 email with Bard employees that downplayed  
20 concerns about the number of Recovery migrations in bariatric patients. *Id.*; *see*  
21 Doc. 15702-1 at 23. From this evidence, Plaintiffs contend, “[i]t is more than reasonable  
22 to infer that Bard’s actions caused Dr. Riebe’s use of the Recovery filter and Ms. Tinlin’s  
23 injuries.” Doc. 15696 at 7.

24 But Plaintiffs present no evidence that misleading statements about Recovery  
25 migration problems were shared with Dr. Riebe, or that he relied on any such statements  
26 in selecting a Recovery for Ms. Tinlin. Moreover, it appears that the “John McDermott”  
27  
28

1 involved in the email is the former president of Bard Peripheral Vascular, and not the  
2 physician who trained Dr. Riebe at the University of Wisconsin. *See* Doc. 16011 at 6-7.<sup>6</sup>

3 Reliance is an essential element of Plaintiff’s common law misrepresentation  
4 claims. *See Blenker Bldg. Sys.*, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 798; *Kimberly Area Sch. Dist.*, 586  
5 N.W.2d at 51. Plaintiffs have failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the  
6 existence of this element. The Court will grant summary judgment on the negligent and  
7 fraudulent misrepresentation claims. *See Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322; *Valente v. Sofamor*,  
8 *S.N.C.*, 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 877 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (granting summary judgment where  
9 “the plaintiffs [did] not present evidence to show that they or their doctors relied on the  
10 defendants’ alleged misrepresentations regarding the efficacy and safety of [their] pedicle  
11 screw device”); *Staudt v. Artifex Ltd.*, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (E.D. Wis. 1998)  
12 (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that he  
13 relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations about their spinal devices); *Collins v. Eli*  
14 *Lilly Co.*, 342 N.W.2d 37, 54 (Wis. 1984) (granting summary judgment on a  
15 misrepresentation claim because “[e]ven assuming that the defendants made  
16 misrepresentations concerning [their drug], since there was no reliance on those  
17 misrepresentations, there can be no recovery under this cause of action”).

18 **V. Concealment Claim (Count XIII).**

19 A defendant is liable for fraudulent concealment in Wisconsin “when, having a  
20 duty to disclose, he intentionally fails to do so with the intent to deceive the plaintiff and  
21 thereby induces the plaintiff to act to his or her detriment.” *Schmidt v. Bassett Furniture*  
22 *Indus.*, No. 08-C-1035, 2009 WL 3380354, at \*10 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2009) (citing  
23 *Kaloti Enters.*, 699 N.W.2d at 211-12); *see Ollerman*, 288 N.W.2d at 100 (noting that the  
24 “failure to disclose [a] fact is treated in the law as equivalent to a representation of the  
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26 <sup>6</sup> In the email, McDermott wrote to various high-level Bard employees that  
27 “we have had several discussions with physicians about bariatric patients and I’ve asked  
28 *our Filter team* to summarize what we know to date.” Doc. 15702-2 at 2 (emphasis  
added). He further stated that he would provide a “summary of *our filter complaints*  
[and] *shipments.*” *Id.* A copy of the email provided by Defendants shows McDermott’s  
email address as “John.McDermott@crbard.com.” Doc. 16011-1 at 2.

1 non-existence of the fact.”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to disclose, among  
2 other things, that Bard filters had higher risks of complications than other IVC filters.  
3 *See* Doc. 364 ¶¶ 261-62.

4 Defendants contend that there is no evidence showing that Bard’s alleged  
5 concealment of adverse information about the Recovery caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.  
6 Doc. 15071 at 10. But as explained above, Dr. Riebe testified that he expected Bard to  
7 warn him about the Recovery’s higher risks of complications. *See* Docs. 15701 ¶¶ 17-22,  
8 15702-1 at 5-9, 12-19. He explained that a manufacturer’s concealment of true risks  
9 prevents him from conducting a proper risk-benefit analysis. Doc. 15702-1 at 5. A jury  
10 reasonably could conclude from this evidence that Bard’s failure to disclose the  
11 Recovery’s true risks was a cause of Dr. Riebe’s decision to use the device for  
12 Ms. Tinlin, and her resulting injuries. The Court will deny summary judgment on the  
13 concealment claim.

#### 14 **VI. Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claim (Count XIV).**

15 Plaintiffs assert a violation of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act,  
16 Wis. Stat. § 100.18. *See* Doc. 364 ¶ 321; Doc. 1 at 4, Case No. CV-16-00263. The  
17 statute prohibits sellers from making, with the intent to induce the public to enter into an  
18 obligation relating to the purchase of goods, any representation that is untrue, deceptive,  
19 or misleading. § 100.18(1). The statute provides a private right of action for “[a]ny  
20 person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation[.]” § 100.18(11)(b)(2). “[T]here  
21 are three elements in a § 100.18 cause of action: (1) the defendant made a representation  
22 to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was ‘untrue,  
23 deceptive or misleading,’ and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a  
24 pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” *Novell*, 749 N.W.2d at 553 (citing *K & S Tool & Die*  
25 *Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc.*, 732 N.W.2d 792, 798 (Wis. 2007)); *see Skyrise*  
26 *Constr. Grp. v. Annex Constr., LLC*, No. 18-CV-381, 2019 WL 699964, at \*6 (E.D. Wis.  
27 Feb. 20, 2019); Wis JI-Civil 2418.

28

1 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 100.18 claim fails for lack of causation.  
2 Doc. 15071 at 10. Plaintiffs do not dispute that causation is an essential element of such  
3 a claim. See Doc. 15696 at 8 (citing *Andersen v. Vavreck*, No. 15-CV-667-PP, 2017 WL  
4 680424, at \*3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017) (a plaintiff asserting a violation of § 100.18 must  
5 show that "the representation caused him to suffer a pecuniary loss")). Rather, Plaintiffs  
6 cite *Novell* for the proposition that a § 100.18 claim requires no element of reliance. *Id.*

7 But the question in *Novell* was "whether *reasonable* reliance is a necessary  
8 element in a § 100.18 claim." 749 N.W.2d at 551 (emphasis in original). The *Novell*  
9 court made clear that although reasonable reliance is not an element, "[r]eliance is an  
10 aspect of the third element, whether a representation *caused* the plaintiff's pecuniary  
11 loss." 749 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis added); see *Ramsden v. Farm Credit Servs.*  
12 *of N. Cent. Wis. ACA*, 590 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App.1998) (noting that reliance in a  
13 misrepresentation claim is equivalent to the causation element in a traditional negligence  
14 claim). Wisconsin district courts have read *Novell* "to mean that satisfying the element of  
15 causation for a claim under § 100.18 requires more than a showing by the plaintiff that it  
16 sustained a loss that is somehow connected to a misrepresentation made to 'the public.'" *Grice Eng'g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc.*, 691 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (W.D. Wis. 2010)  
17 (citing *Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel Grp., Inc.*, 621 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (W.D. Wis.  
18 2009)). Rather, "the question is whether 'the representation materially induced the  
19 plaintiff's decision to act and whether the plaintiff would have acted in the absence of the  
20 representation.'" *Id.* (quoting *Novell*, 749 N.W.2d at 554; alterations omitted); see also  
21 *Tim Torres Enters. v. Linscott*, 416 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting  
22 § 100.18 "as requiring some proof beyond the content of the advertisement itself to  
23 establish that the plaintiff was in fact damaged by it"); Wis JI-Civil 2418 (in determining  
24 whether the plaintiff's loss was caused by the defendant's representation, "the test is  
25 whether [the plaintiff] would have acted in its absence").

26  
27 Plaintiffs assert that the record is replete with examples of Bard's misleading  
28 statements to the public. Doc. 15696 at 9. But Plaintiffs present no evidence showing

1 that the statements materially induced Ms. Tinlin or Dr. Riebe to select a Recovery filter,  
2 or that a different filter would have been selected in the absence of the statements.  
3 Without such evidence, Plaintiffs cannot show that the statements caused them to suffer a  
4 pecuniary loss. The Court will grant summary judgment on the § 100.18 claim. *See*  
5 *Valente*, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (granting summary judgment where “the plaintiffs [did]  
6 not show that they or their doctors relied on the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent  
7 representations when they elected to undergo spinal fusion surgery [and therefore could]  
8 not show a causal connection between the defendants’ alleged conduct and any pecuniary  
9 loss suffered as a result of their continued back pain”); *Monson v. Acromed Corp.*, No.  
10 96-C-1336, 1999 WL 1133273, at \*24 (E.D. Wis. May 12, 1999) (finding summary  
11 judgment warranted regardless of whether reliance is an element of a § 100.18 claim  
12 because the record was devoid of evidence showing a causal connection between the  
13 defendants’ statements and the plaintiff’s loss); *Andersen*, 2017 WL 680424, at \*3  
14 (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff “failed to make a sufficient showing that  
15 his damages were caused by the defendants’ conduct”).

## 16 **VII. Design Defect Claims (Counts III and IV).**

17 Plaintiffs assert strict liability and negligent design defect claims. *See* Doc. 364  
18 ¶¶ 182-97; Doc. 1 at 3, Case No. CV-16-00263. Defendants contend that each claim fails  
19 because Plaintiffs offer no reasonable alternative design for the Recovery. Doc. 15071  
20 at 10-13. The Court does not agree.<sup>7</sup>

21 Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ engineering expert, Dr. Robert  
22 McMeeking, offers several alternative designs to the Recovery that he believes would

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23  
24 <sup>7</sup> Wisconsin’s strict liability statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.047, expressly requires  
25 evidence of a reasonable alternative design to show that a product is defective.  
26 § 895.047(1)(a); *see also Janusz v. Symmetry Med. Inc.*, 256 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1000 (E.D.  
27 Wis. 2017); Wis JI-Civil 3260.1. Defendants contend that such evidence is also required  
28 to establish a negligent design claim. Doc. 15071 at 10-11 (citing *Below v. Yokohama*  
*Tire Corp.*, No. 15-CV-529-WMC, 2017 WL 679153, at \*3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017)  
(noting that “the two theories are similar . . . because the reasonableness of a product’s  
design turns essentially on whether the seller could have come up with a less dangerous  
design”). The Court need not decide the issue for purposes of summary judgment  
because Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design.

1 have helped reduce the risk of the failures that occurred in Ms. Tinlin’s filter.  
2 Doc. 15071 at 11. Specifically, Dr. McMeeking opines that “reasonable alternative  
3 designs and alternative features available to Bard before Ms. Tinlin received her filter  
4 include . . . caudal anchors, penetration limiters, two-tier design, and a better (smoother  
5 and rounded) chamfer at the mouth of the ‘cap’ on the filter.” Doc. 15073 ¶ 21; *see*  
6 Doc. 15074-3 at 3. Dr. McMeeking explains that “[m]any of these design features  
7 existed in other IVC filter products already on the market, including the Simon Nitinol  
8 Filter, the Cook Gunther Tulip filter, the Greenfield filter, and the Cook Bird’s Nest  
9 filter.” Doc. 15701 ¶ 30; *see* Doc. 15071-8 at 4. A jury reasonably could find from this  
10 evidence that specific and reasonable alternative design changes were available when  
11 Defendants developed the Recovery. *See Rogers v. K2 Sports, LLC*, 348 F. Supp. 3d 892,  
12 902-03 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff’s expert  
13 opined that the helmet in question did not provide sufficient protection due to a tapered  
14 edge while other helmets without tapering provided the necessary protection); *see also*  
15 Docs. 12007 at 13, 12805 at 5-6 (finding in the Hyde case that Dr. McMeeking’s  
16 opinions constituted sufficient evidence that reasonable alternative designs were available  
17 to Bard when it developed the G2X and Eclipse filters).<sup>8</sup>

18 Defendants contend that permanent IVC filters, such as the Simon Nitinol filter  
19 (“SNF”), are not reasonable alternative designs for the retrievable Recovery. Doc. 15071  
20 at 11-13. But the Recovery was designed and cleared for permanent use (Doc. 7950  
21 ¶¶ 8, 17), and Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Ms. Tinlin’s filter remains  
22 implanted as a permanent device (Doc. 15701 ¶¶ 23-24). Whether the retrievability of  
23 the Recovery makes it sufficiently unlike the SNF and other permanent filters to  
24 disqualify them as reasonable alternative designs is a question for the jury to decide. *See*  
25 Doc. 12805 at 6.<sup>9</sup>

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27 <sup>8</sup> Defendants note that summary judgment would be warranted if their motions to  
28 exclude Dr. McMeeking’s opinions are granted (Doc. 15071 at 11), but the motions were  
denied in relevant respects (Doc. 16992).

<sup>9</sup> Defendants’ reliance on *Oden v. Boston Scientific Corp.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

1 Defendants further contend that the Cook filters and Bard’s later-generation filters  
2 are not reasonable alternative designs because Dr. McMeeking believes they are  
3 defective. Doc. 15071 at 13. Defendants cite *Tunnel v. Ford Motor Co.*, 385 F. Supp. 2d  
4 582 (W.D. Va. 2005), which found that Virginia requires a showing that “the proposed  
5 alternative would truly cure a product of its alleged defects[.]” 385 F. Supp. 2d at 586.  
6 But a manufacturer may be liable under Wisconsin’s product liability statute where the  
7 alternative design would have “reduced” the harm posed by the product. Wis. Stat.  
8 § 895.047(1)(a); see Doc. 12007 at 13. Defendants do not dispute that specific  
9 alternative design features identified by Dr. McMeeking – caudal anchors, penetration  
10 limiters, and a chamfered cap – help reduce the risk of filter failures like those  
11 experienced by Ms. Tinlin.<sup>10</sup>

12 Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design.  
13 The Court will deny summary judgment on the design defect claims. See *Rogers*, 348 F.  
14 Supp. 3d at 902-03.<sup>11</sup>

### 15 **VIII. Future Damages.**

16 Wisconsin law holds that future injuries and healthcare must be established by a  
17 medical probability. See *Pucci v. Rausch*, 187 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Wis. 1971) (citing  
18 cases). “But medical probability does not mean absolute certainty or metaphysical  
19 certainty.” *Reyes v. Greatway Ins.*, 582 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). As long

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20 102639 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018), is misplaced because the case involved the granting of a  
21 motion to dismiss where the plaintiff had received a permanent filter and alleged that  
22 retrievable filters were not designed to be permanent. *Id.* at \*12-13. Although Dr. Riebe  
23 found Ms. Tinlin to be a candidate for a retrievable filter (Doc. 15073 ¶ 5), the Recovery  
also can serve as a permanent device (see Docs. 7950 ¶¶ 8, 15701 ¶ 24).

24 <sup>10</sup> Defendants note in their reply that Dr. McMeeking agrees that his proposed  
25 design changes may not have “avoided” Ms. Tinlin’s injuries. Doc. 16011 at 8. But as  
explained above, it is sufficient that the alternative design would have “reduced” the risk  
of harm. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a).

26 <sup>11</sup> Given this ruling and the denial of summary judgment on the claims for failure  
27 to warn and concealment, Mr. Tinlin’s claim for loss of consortium (Count XV) survives  
28 summary judgment. See Doc. 15071 at 3, 14; *Finnegan v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund*,  
666 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Wis. 2003) (“[A] derivative claim for loss of consortium or loss of  
society and companionship does not have its own elements distinct from the negligence  
claim to which it attaches[.]”) (citing Wis JI-Civil 1815).

1 as an expert's opinion is based on probability, and not mere possibility or conjecture, the  
2 opinion is sufficient to support an award of future damages. *Weber v. White*, 681 N.W.2d  
3 137, 143 (Wis. 2004). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' medical experts could not  
4 opine that Ms. Tinlin "probably" will have future complications and medical expenses  
5 from her Recovery filter. Doc. 15071 at 14-15.

6 **A. Dr. Derek Muehrcke.**

7 Dr. Muehrcke testified that he believes Ms. Tinlin is at future risk for various  
8 complications from her Recovery filter because the filter disintegrated, sending multiple  
9 fragments to the heart and lungs, and the filter remains unstable with several missing  
10 arms. Doc. 15702-4 at 7-8. He opines that Ms. Tinlin's risk of future complications is  
11 40 percent at five and half years. Doc. 15704-5 at 8. He holds these opinions to a  
12 reasonable degree of medical probability. Doc. 15702-4 at 8.

13 Dr. Muehrcke's opinions are expressed "not in terms of 'possibilities' but  
14 'probabilities[.]'" *Bleyer*, 120 N.W.2d at 160. The opinions therefore are sufficient to  
15 support a jury finding that Ms. Tinlin probably will suffer future injuries from the  
16 Recovery which will require further medical treatment. *See id.*; *Weber*, 681 N.W.2d  
17 at 143 (noting that Wisconsin law "does not require mathematical certainty" to establish  
18 future medical care and finding the expert's estimate that the plaintiff's future care would  
19 "probably be around 20 to 25 visits a year . . . on an average" sufficient to support an  
20 award of future chiropractic expenses); *Reyes*, 582 N.W.2d at 485 (finding that the  
21 "doctor's use of the term 'significant chance' indicates an opinion to a reasonable degree  
22 of medical probability"); *Pucci*, 187 N.W.2d at 142 (noting that opinions expressed in  
23 terms of "I feel" or "I believe" have been held to be sufficient) (citing *Hintz v. Mielke*,  
24 112 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Wis. 1961)). The Court will deny summary judgment with respect  
25 to the future injuries and medical care opined to by Dr. Muehrcke.<sup>12</sup>

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27  
28 <sup>12</sup> Defendants note that Dr. Muehrcke did not perform a differential diagnosis for  
Ms. Tinlin's shortness of breath, but make no argument as to why this warrants summary  
judgment. Doc. 15071 at 14.

1           **B.     Dr. Darren Hurst.**

2           Defendants assert that Dr. Hurst could not opine that Ms. Tinlin probably will  
3 experience pneumothorax, abscess, and lung hemorrhage in the future. Doc. 15071 at 15  
4 (citing Doc. 15073 ¶¶ 34-35). Defendants contend that the monitoring and medical  
5 intervention costs that Dr. Hurst recommends for these conditions should not be  
6 compensable, but specifically identify only the costs for lung resection and life-long CT  
7 scans. *Id.*

8                   **1.     Lung Resection.**

9           Dr. Hurst states in his report that three filter arms embolized in Ms. Tinlin’s right  
10 lung, but makes clear that “the future behavior and possible morbidity and mortality of  
11 these embolized arms *is currently unknown.*” Doc. 15074-6 at 3 (emphasis added). He  
12 further states that filter fragments in the lungs of other patients have resulted in  
13 pneumothorax, abscess, and lung hemorrhage, and the filter arms in Ms. Tinlin’s lung  
14 will require lung resection for removal “if they become symptomatic[.]” *Id.* But  
15 Dr. Hurst does not know whether it is probable that the filter arms will cause  
16 pneumothorax, abscess, or lung hemorrhage. He testified that “[f]or all of these potential  
17 complications, there’s no data,” there “are only case reports of similar types of objects in  
18 the lungs that have caused these problems,” and “[n]o one has done a long-term study  
19 because it is so new.” Doc. 15074-7 at 7.

20           This testimony shows that the risk of future complications from the filter arms in  
21 Ms. Tinlin’s lung is a mere possibility, and “an expert opinion expressed in terms of a  
22 ‘mere possibility’ is insufficient to sustain a finding” of future damages. *Bleyer v. Gross*,  
23 120 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Wis. 1963); *see McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co.*, 312 N.W.2d  
24 37, 44-45 (Wis. 1981) (“The court of appeals correctly held that an expert opinion  
25 expressed in terms of possibility or conjecture is insufficient[.]”). The Court will grant  
26 summary judgment on future medical costs for a lung resection.

27       ///

28       ///

1                                   **b.     CT Scans.**

2             The Court reaches a difference conclusion with respect to future CT scans.  
 3     Dr. Hurst opines that the filter arms in Ms. Tinlin’s lung “*will require* life-long follow up  
 4     with CT imaging to document their stability.” Doc. 15074-6 at 3 (emphasis added). He  
 5     testified that he “think[s] she probably will need a CT [scan] either every year or every  
 6     other year to just make sure that she’s not developing an issue related to the fragments.”  
 7     Doc. 15701-7 at 3. This evidence is sufficient to support an award for the costs of future  
 8     CT scans. *See Weber*, 681 N.W.2d at 143; *Pucci*, 187 N.W.2d at 142. The Court will  
 9     deny summary judgment in this regard.

10                                   **3.     Chronic Cough and Asthma.**

11             Defendants contend that Dr. Hurst could not determine whether Ms. Tinlin’s  
 12     chronic cough and exacerbation of her asthma are related to her filter. Doc. 15071 at 15  
 13     (citing Doc. 15073 ¶ 37). But Dr. Hurst found that the chronic cough “is almost certainly  
 14     related to her tracheomalacia.” Doc. 15704-7 at 3.<sup>13</sup> He further found that the  
 15     tracheomalacia “would exacerbate asthma.” *Id.* at 4. This evidence is sufficient to  
 16     support a finding that Ms. Tinlin’s chronic cough and asthma problems are related to her  
 17     Recovery filter. The Court will deny summary judgment on this issue.<sup>14</sup>

18                                   **IT IS ORDERED:**

19             1.     The following claims are **dismissed** based on Plaintiffs’ withdrawal of the  
 20     claims before Defendants moved for summary judgment: manufacturing defect (Counts I  
 21     and V), failure to recall (Count VI), negligence per se (Count IX), and breach of warranty  
 22     (Counts X and XI).

23                                   \_\_\_\_\_

24                                   <sup>13</sup> Ms. Tinlin’s tracheomalacia presumably was caused by the tracheotomy  
 25     procedure during her open heart surgery to remove a fractured strut from the right  
 ventricle.

26                                   <sup>14</sup> Defendants assert in their reply that future medical costs are compensable only  
 27     if they are “reasonably certain” to occur. Doc. 16011 at 10 (citing *Meracle v. Children’s*  
 28     *Serv. Soc’y of Wis.*, 437 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Wis. 1989)). But Defendants have not shown  
 that this standard differs from the “probability” standard applied above. *See Meracle*,  
 437 N.W.2d at 535 (noting that *Bleyer* similarly held that medical testimony about future  
 expenses must be expressed “not in terms of ‘possibilities’ but ‘probabilities’ ”).


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2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15071) is **granted in part and denied in part** as follows:

a. The motion is **granted** on Plaintiffs' misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices claims (Counts VIII, XII, and XIV), and future costs for a lung resection.

b. The motion is **denied** on Plaintiffs' claims for failure to warn (Counts II and VII), design defect (Count III and IV), fraudulent concealment (Count XIII), and loss of consortium (Count XV), and future medical costs for CT scans, chronic cough, and asthma.

Dated this 16th day of April, 2019.



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David G. Campbell  
Senior United States District Judge