[United States Statutes at Large, Volume 132, 115th Congress, 2nd Session]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


Public Law 115-409
115th Congress

An Act


 
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes. <>

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, <>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) <>  Short Title.--This Act may be cited
as the ``Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018''.

(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.

TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security
partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of
international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional
economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource
conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.

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TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of
United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indo-Pacific region--
(A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global
population;
(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies in
the world; and
(C) poses security challenges that threaten to
undermine United States national security interests,
regional peace, and global stability.
(2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
international system are being challenged, including by--
(A) China's illegal construction and militarization
of artificial features in the South China Sea and
coercive economic practices;
(B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities; and
(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia
of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as
``ISIS'') and other international terrorist
organizations that threaten the United States.
(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues
to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to United
States economic interests.
(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region have
improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific
governments continue to commit human rights abuses and place
restrictions on basic human rights and political and civil
liberties.
(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law,
may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and
global interests. It is imperative that the United States
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by--
(A) defending peace and security;
(B) advancing economic prosperity; and
(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on United
States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which--
(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes,
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert

[[Page 5389]]

Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King,
Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security
challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of
promoting the rule of law, human rights, and democracy,
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor
of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As
realistic students of history, Chinese leaders recognize
that the role the United States has played since World
War II as the architect and underwriter of regional
stability and security has been essential to the rise of
Asia, including China itself. But they believe that as
the tide that brought the United States to Asia recedes,
America must leave with it. Much as Britain's role in
the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the
twentieth century, so must America's role in Asia as the
region's historic superpower resumes its place.''.
(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred
to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which was
released in December 2017, states--
(A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and
repressive visions of world order is taking place in the
Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from
the west coast of India to the western shores of the
United States, represents the most populous and
economically dynamic part of the world. The United
States interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends
back to the earliest days of our republic.''; and
(B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no
nation. We will redouble our commitment to established
alliances and partnerships, while expanding and
deepening relationships with new partners that share
respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and
the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with
international law. We will work with allies and partners
to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve
the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.''.

TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 101. <>  POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit to a
long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that--
(1) secures the vital national security interests of the
United States and our allies and partners;
(2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests by
advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based Indo-
Pacific economic community;

[[Page 5390]]

(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of
the American people and universal human rights;
(4) supports functional problem-solving regional
architecture; and
(5) accords with and supports the rule of law and
international norms.
SEC. 102. <>  DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.

It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States--
(1) to work with United States allies--
(A) to confront common challenges;
(B) to improve information sharing;
(C) to increase defense investment and trade;
(D) to ensure interoperability; and
(E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
(2) to strengthen relationships with partners who--
(A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
(B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and
(C) understand the importance of civil society, the
rule of law, the free and reliable flow of information,
and transparent governance;
(3) to support functional problem-solving regional
architecture, including through the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East
Asia Summit;
(4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States--
(A) to freedom of navigation under international
law;
(B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and
territorial disputes; and
(C) to expand security and defense cooperation with
allies and partners, as appropriate;
(5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete,
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;
(6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law,
and advocate for transparent governance;
(7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector
partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific
partners;
(8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in
a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of
partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;
(9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries--
(A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
infrastructure projects;
(B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines
or air ways, and communication; and
(C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; and
(10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-
Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with allies
and partners throughout the region.

[[Page 5391]]

TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for
International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of
Defense, $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023,
which shall be used--
(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the
value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance
of United States strategy;
(2) to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of
partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against
security threats, including through foreign military financing
and international military education and training programs;
(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
engagements, particularly with the United States' most highly-
capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges,
including--
(A) certain destabilizing activities of the People's
Republic of China; and
(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and
ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea;
(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in
Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other
terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the
United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad;
(5) to help partner countries strengthen their democratic
systems, with a focus on good governance;
(6) to ensure that the regulatory environments for trade,
infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are
transparent, open, and free of corruption;
(7) to encourage responsible natural resource management in
partner countries, which is closely associated with economic
growth; and
(8) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South
Asia and Southeast Asia--
(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard
training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
(B) by expanding cooperation with democratic
partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and
Sri Lanka;

[[Page 5392]]

(C) through intelligence sharing and other
information-sharing efforts; and
(D) through multilateral engagements, including by
involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.

(c) Countering China's Influence to Undermine the International
System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made
available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic
influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the
strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
(division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation
with the appropriate committees of Congress.
(d) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
(b) may be made available for International Military Education and
Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
(e) <>  Philippines.--
(1) <>  In general.--None of
the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
available for counternarcotics assistance for the Philippine
National Police unless the Secretary of State determines and
reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the
Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a
counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international
human rights standards, including investigating and prosecuting
individuals who are credibly alleged to have ordered, committed,
or covered up extrajudicial killings and other gross violations
of human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
(2) Exception.--The limitation under paragraph (1) shall not
apply to funds made available--
(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, or
transnational interdiction programs; or
(B) <>  to support for the
development of such counternarcotics strategy, after
consultation with the appropriate committees of
Congress.

(f) <>  Cambodia.--None of the
amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be
made available for United States assistance programs that benefit the
Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State certifies and
reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the
requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115-141) have been met.
SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

(a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States Government--
(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, done at
Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent
bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or
before the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the
Indo-Pacific region; and

[[Page 5393]]

(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Japan.

(b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington
October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.

(c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia
and the United States of America, done at San Francisco
September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Australia.

(d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at
Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.
(e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at
Manila September 8, 1954; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements
and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the
enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision Statement for
the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok
November 15, 2012.
SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.

(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that
seek--
(A) to further constrain space for civil society and
religion within China; and

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(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world
affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law
and international norms;
(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive relationship with China--
(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including
over human rights, economic policies, and maritime
security; and
(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional
and global challenges, especially--
(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based
international system; and
(B) the denuclearization of North Korea.

(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue
a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United
States and engagement on global issues;
(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the Indo-
Pacific region and globally; and
(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the
rules-based international system.
SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership
between the United States and India in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and India; and
(3) is committed to--
(A) the New Framework for the United States-India
Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on
June 28, 2005;
(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and
Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;
(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific
and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
(D) the United States-India Joint Statement on
Prosperity Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 2017;
and
(E) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements and arrangements concluded as of the
date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130
Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of
India as a major defense partner.
(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner,
which is unique to India--

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(A) institutionalizes the progress made to
facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between
the United States and India;
(B) elevates defense trade and technology
cooperation between the United States and India to a
level commensurate with the closest allies and partners
of the United States;
(C) facilitates technology sharing between the
United States and India, including license-free access
to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking
into account national security concerns; and
(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on
defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and
port calls in support of defense cooperation between the
United States and India.
SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United States-
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this
section as ``ASEAN'') relationship to a strategic partnership;
(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong,
stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and
socially responsible community of nations that has common rules,
norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with
international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-
Pacific community;
(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration among its members;
(4) recognize the value of--
(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and
security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including
Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and
(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as
activities under the United States-ASEAN Trade and
Investment Framework Arrangement and the United States-
ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN
and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic
relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;
(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in
a constructive manner; and
(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic,
and legitimate regional and international arbitration
mechanisms, consistent with international law, including
through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South
China Sea to further promote peace and stability in the
Indo-Pacific region;
(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in
ASEAN--
(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime
domain awareness;
(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of,
international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that
are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of
commerce;

[[Page 5396]]

(C) to counter piracy;
(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods,
and drugs; and
(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
countries or regional organizations to respond to
emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region; and
(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to
reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's
ruling with respect to the case between the Republic of the
Philippines and the People's Republic of China.

(b) Report on Strategic Framework for Engagement With ASEAN.--
(1) <>
In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following
5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees on a strategic framework to administer
programs, projects, and activities of the United States to
support diplomatic and economic engagement between the United
States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
address the following elements of United States strategy:
(A) Promoting commercial engagement between the
United States and member countries of ASEAN.
(B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use
sustainable, efficient, and innovative technologies in
their respective energy sectors.
(C) Supporting economic conditions in member
countries of ASEAN that promote innovation, the creation
of new businesses, sustainable growth, and the education
of the region's future innovators, entrepreneurs, and
business leaders.
(D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to
improve the policy and regulatory environment for
growth, trade, innovation, and investment.
(E) Supporting the regional integration objectives
of member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic
Community.
(F) Partnership opportunities with the governments
of other countries friendly to the United States that
have committed to a high set of standards for investment
and development with ASEAN, as determined by the
Secretary of State.
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL
SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a
strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the
United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense,
intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.
SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security dialogue between the United States,
Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing
security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
promote--
(A) a rules-based order;

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(B) respect for international law; and
(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to
replace, current mechanisms.
SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

(a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,
done in Washington November 9, 2010;
(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.

(b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive
Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia,
done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.

(c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer
Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at
Washington July 12, 2005;
(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at
Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.

(d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Washington December 16, 2013;
(2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement on
Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
(3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at
Washington May 31, 2017; and
(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this
Act.

(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation,
especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

[[Page 5398]]

SEC. 209. <>  COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.

(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security
relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States
Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint
communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President
Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to
support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the
Taiwan Strait.

(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President should conduct regular
transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the
existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China,
including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable,
and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.
(c) Travel.--The President should encourage the travel of highlevel
United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel
Act (Public Law 115-135).
SEC. 210. <>  NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by
illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs,
in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).
(2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own
people and citizens of other countries, including the United
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close
concert with its partners.

(b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to
activities of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such government, or
other persons in accordance with Executive Order No. 13551 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain
persons with respect to North Korea), Executive Order No. 13687
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional
sanctions), Executive Order No. 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
significant malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive Order
No. 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the
property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party
of Korea, and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to
North Korea), and Executive Order No. 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705;

[[Page 5399]]

relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North
Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act, until the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit
activities described in such Executive orders, including actions
in violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(2) <>  Report.--Not later than 30 days
after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of
the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a
person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other
person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection
(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees justifying the termination of the
sanction and explaining the relationship between such
termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that
violates any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such Government or
person. <>  The reporting requirement
under this paragraph shall terminate on the date that is 5 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).

(c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation on the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile
Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that the objective of
negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
(d) Report on a Strategy to Address the Threats Posed by, and the
Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) <>  In general.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of
State, or a designee of the Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that describes actions
taken by the United States to address the threats posed by, and
the capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) <>  Elements.--Each
report required under paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United
States to identify strategies and policies, including an
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such
strategies and policies--
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
ballistic missile program of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;
(B) an assessment of--
(i) potential road maps toward peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's
Republic

[[Page 5400]]

of Korea and the elimination of the nuclear and
ballistic missile threats posed by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) specific actions that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea would need to take for
each such roadmap to become viable;
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to
increase international coordination and cooperation,
whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally,
including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to
address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, which shall include--
(i) a description of the actions taken by the
Secretary of State, or designees of the Secretary,
to consult with governments around the world, with
the purpose of inducing such governments to fully
implement the United Nations Security Council
resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);
(ii) a description of the actions taken by
such governments to fully implement United Nations
Security Council resolutions related to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(iii) <>  a list of countries
with governments that the Secretary has determined
are noncooperative with respect to implementing
the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
(iv) <>  a plan of action to
engage, and increase cooperation with respect to
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with
the governments of the countries on the list
described in clause (iii);
(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national
export control regimes of countries that are members of
the United Nations, and multilateral export control
regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions imposed
with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security Council
resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
(E) <>  an action plan to encourage and
assist countries in adopting and using authorities
necessary to enforce export controls required by United
Nations Security Council resolutions.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.

(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) representatives of the United States shall use the voice
and vote of the United States in all international
organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such
organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United Nations
Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);
and
(2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries
to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), including

[[Page 5401]]

by considering appropriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture
and foreign assistance of the United States with governments
that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with
respect to implementing the United Nations Security Council
resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).
SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.

The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010,
which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical
cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;
(2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012,
which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a
framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and
defense dialogues; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and New
Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States
should--
(1) support strong United States engagement with the nations
of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
Vanuatu;
(2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South
Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--
(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
(B) environmental challenges and resilience;
(C) global health;
(D) development and trade; and
(E) people-to-people ties; and
(3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands,
as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance, and
economic development.

(b) United States-Compacts of Free Association.--It is the sense of
Congress that the Compacts of Free Association entered between the
United States and the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of
Palau)--
(1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States in
the Western Pacific;
(2) reinforce United States regional commitment;
(3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing
positional advantage; and
(4) further self-governance, economic development, and self-
sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.
SEC. 213. <>  FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.

(a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United States--

[[Page 5402]]

(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation
Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight
operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with
applicable international law; and
(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to
peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in
accordance with applicable international law.

(b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the sense of
Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that
includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint
maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-
Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in
support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.
SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) ISIS.--The term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria.

(b) <>  Report.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, shall
submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that contains
an assessment of the current and future capabilities and activities of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in
Southeast Asia that pose a significant threat to the United States, its
allies, and its citizens interests abroad.

(c) Elements.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
include--
(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast
Asia;
(2) <>  an estimate of the number of ISIS-
linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia from
fighting in the Middle East;
(3) <>  an analysis of the amounts and
sources of ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various
extremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;
(4) the current resources available to combat the threat of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional
resources required to combat such threat;
(5) <>  a detailed assessment of the
capabilities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent
extremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in
the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia;

[[Page 5403]]

(6) a description of the capabilities and resources of
governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist
groups; and
(7) <>  a list of additional United States
resources and capabilities that the Department of Defense and
the Department of State recommend providing to governments in
Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.
SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there
should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and
nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,
including state-sponsored threats;
(2) to share best practices to combat such threats;
(3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks,
misinformation, and propaganda; and
(4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023
to enhance cooperation between the United States and Indo-Pacific
nations for the purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats.
SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION.

(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a
threat to international peace and security;
(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed
to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the
proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and
missile technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction;
(3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
(A) to expand and modernize their respective nuclear
arsenals, including through significant research and
development resources in hypersonic glide vehicles and
other advanced technologies; and
(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
technologies; and
(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in
the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of
peaceful applications.

(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate
efforts to pursue effective arms control and nonproliferation policies
in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery.

[[Page 5404]]

TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by
2030--
(A) 66 percent of the global middle class population
will be living in Asia; and
(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will take
place in Asia.
(2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or
regional trade agreements; and
(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries
are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry
into force.
(3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 3
nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and
the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.
(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a group--
(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the
world; and
(B) have a combined gross domestic product of
$2,400,000,000,000.
(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66
percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral
trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has
increased by 78 percent since 2004.
(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies in
ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was
$77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of
services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
$8,000,000,000.
(7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and
services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states
support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
(8) According to the Business Roundtable--
(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40
percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; and
(B) United States bilateral trade with the other
nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports
15,600,000 jobs in the United States.
(9) According to the United States National Security
Strategy--
(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
``remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's regional
architecture and platforms for promoting an order based
on freedom''; and

[[Page 5405]]

(B) the United States will ``work with partners to
build a network of states dedicated to free markets and
protected from forces that would subvert their
sovereignty.''.

(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that trade
between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is
vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports,
and jobs in the United States.
SEC. 302. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.

Congress supports--
(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements
with partners that--
(A) comply with trade obligations and respect,
promote, and strictly adhere to the rule of law; and
(B) increase United States employment and expand the
economy;
(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete,
verifiable, and measured outcomes;
(3) negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization, including negotiations to enter into appropriate
plurilateral and sectoral agreements;
(4) full implementation of the World Trade Organization's
Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-Pacific countries; and
(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia
Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.

The President should seek to develop to negotiate a comprehensive
economic engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.

(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a robust and
comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation strategy,
including leveling the playing field for American companies competing in
the Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(a).
SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.

(a) In General.--The President should takes steps to strengthen the
enforcement of United States intellectual property laws as a top
priority, including taking all appropriate action to deter and punish
commercial cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.
(b) <>  Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
the following 5 years, the President shall submit a report to Congress
that--
(1) <>  describes the efforts of the United
States Government to combat intellectual property violations and
commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region,
particularly the People's Republic of China; and

[[Page 5406]]

(2) <>  includes a country-by-country
assessment of priority areas for United States engagement and
capacity building assistance.

(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the United States Trade Representative such amounts as
may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities
designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas described in
the annual report required under subsection (b).
SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.

(a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
(1) <>  Strategy.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the President
shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy
to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement
national power strategies and cooperation with United States
energy companies and the Department of Energy national
laboratories to develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to
provide access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in
order to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and job creation,
and to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
through 2023 to carry out paragraph (1).

(b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should explore opportunities to partner with the
private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable
electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar (historically
known as ``Burma'').
SEC. 307. <>  LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,
should increase regional engagement in the areas of environment, health,
education, and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong
countries, including--
(1) assisting in the development of programs that focus on
forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;
(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable
uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving
the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe drinking
water;
(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband
internet connectivity, particularly English training and
connectivity in rural communities; and
(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries,
including--
(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
(B) helping regional partners to track and treat
malaria and tuberculosis.

(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023, the Secretary of
State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, shall submit a report to Congress that
includes--

[[Page 5407]]

(1) <>  a list and evaluation of
Lower Mekong Initiative activities since its inception in 2009;
(2) <>  a strategy for any increased
regional engagement and measures of success for the activities
described in paragraph (1); and
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute Lower Mekong
Initiative activities.
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL
RESOURCE CONSERVATION.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage the
governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and United States
private sector interests with operations and investments in the region
to deploy agriculture practices that--
(1) conserve natural resources; and
(2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and
water bodies.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC RIGHTS.

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should--
(1) support activities that secure private property rights
and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia,
including--
(A) establishing legal frameworks to give women
equal rights to own, register, use, profit from, and
inherit land and property;
(B) improving legal literacy to enable women to
exercise the rights described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and
community leaders to enforce such rights;
(2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and
multilateral organizations to increase the capability of
disadvantaged women and girls in Asia--
(A) to realize their rights;
(B) to determine their life outcomes;
(C) to assume leadership roles; and
(D) to influence decision-making in their
households, communities, and societies; and
(3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products
and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises in Asia.

TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The promotion of human rights and respect for democratic
values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States'
national security interest.
(2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values,
and good governance is critical to a successful United States
diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
(3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the
Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty,

[[Page 5408]]

build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of
extremism, and promote economic growth.
(4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and
civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Thailand,
and Vietnam, which have all been identified by Freedom House as
``Not Free''.
(5) There have been unacceptable human rights developments
in--
(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Partly Free'', and the Department of
State has declared that the violence against the
Rohingya constitutes ethnic cleansing;
(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Partly Free'', and where there are
continued disturbing reports of extra-judicial killings;
and
(C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal
detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and
lack of due process in judicial proceedings remain
troublesome.
(6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United
States--
(A) will ``support, with our words and actions,
those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek
freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
(B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools
to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests
and whose actions run contrary to our values''; and
(C) ``will support efforts to advance women's
equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and
promote women and youth empowerment programs''.
SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.

The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat
trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States Government officials should lead by
example--
(A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the
press in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) by engaging with the press corps at every
appropriate opportunity; and
(2) the United States should advocate and support a
Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to
convene government and civil society, including journalists, to
discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in the
Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-
Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are
dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States democracy,
human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy
interests; and
(2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry
out such activities.

[[Page 5409]]

SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
ENGAGEMENT.

The Secretary of State should, as appropriate--
(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues
with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights
and religious freedom violations;
(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange
programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs
engaging young leaders; and
(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building
programs emphasizing civil society development.
SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
STRATEGY.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should continue to work with ASEAN to improve the capacity of
ASEAN to address human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in
Southeast Asia.
(b) <>  Strategy.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State, after consultation with the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, shall submit a strategy to the
appropriate congressional committees to increase cooperation with ASEAN
to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast
Asia.

(c) <>  Contents.--The strategy submitted under
subsection (b) should include--
(1) an assessment of the types of United States Government
resources available to support increased cooperation; and
(2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that the
United States could potentially support or partner with to
promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in
Southeast Asia.
SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.

The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance freedom
of information access with regard to North Korea.
SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND
SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

(a) Sanctions.--It is the sense of Congress that the President
should impose targeted financial penalties and visa ban sanctions, in
accordance with applicable law and other relevant authorities, on any
individual or entity that--
(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
(2) engages in censorship activities.

(b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--It is the sense of Congress
that the President should, in accordance with applicable law, terminate,
suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any
country that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or
religious freedoms.
SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to
promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule
of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific

[[Page 5410]]

region, including for universities, civil society, and
multilateral institutions that are focusing on education
awareness, training, and capacity building.
(2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States
Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of China.
(3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to
support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting
sustainable development, education, and environmental
conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous
Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and
Nepal.
SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.

(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``human rights
defenders'' means individuals, working alone or in groups, who
nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of universally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such
issues may result in the risk of safety or life.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that human
rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased
difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023
to provide critical assistance to human rights defenders through the
Department of State's Human Rights Defenders Fund.
(d) <>  Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through
2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a
report to Congress that includes--
(1) <>  a list and evaluation of
the Human Rights Defenders Fund activities since its inception;
(2) <>  a strategy for any increased
regional engagement and measures of success for the activities
described in paragraph (1); and
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute the Human Rights
Defender Fund activities.
SEC. 411. <>  YOUNG LEADERS
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.

There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each of the
fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support Indo-Pacific young leaders
initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the
ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange
programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy, human rights,
and good governance activists in the Indo-Pacific region.

[[Page 5411]]

SEC. 412. <>  SAVINGS PROVISION.

Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of
military force.

Approved December 31, 2018.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 2736:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018):
Dec. 4, considered and passed Senate.
Dec. 12, considered and passed House, amended.
Dec. 19, Senate concurred in House amendment.
DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS (2018):
Dec. 31, Presidential statement.