82D CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

DOCUMENT
No. 41

TENSIONS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF
SENATOR ALEXANDER WILEY
BY THE
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
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PRESENTED BY MR. WILEY

MAY 24 (legislative day, MAY 17), 1951.—Ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1951

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FOREWORD

Summary and Conclusions

In the struggle of the free world against the aggression of communism an increasing importance is being given to the so-called battle of the mind. Most calculations of the actual and potential strength of the Soviet Union omit, however, consideration of the mood and temper of the Russian people. Yet upon a correct appraisal of what the Russian people feel and think—for the measure of which there is no yardstick—depends a true understanding of the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of our relations with that country.

With this in mind, I asked the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for a study of the tensions within the Soviet Union. In response to this request Dr. Sergius Yakobson, senior specialist in international relations, assisted by John L. Houk, prepared a report based mainly upon Soviet source material and reports of interviews with Soviet displaced persons and refugees. This report, which has been prepared for publication by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, discloses an impressive list of areas of tensions which now exist within the Soviet Union.

The Soviet propaganda machine would have the outside world believe that the entire Soviet people is a nation of loyal and fearless citizens ready to support the regime through thick and thin. However, this report demonstrates that assertion to be unfounded in fact.

The cleavage between the men in the Kremlin and vast numbers of Soviet citizens, who are direct victims of the theory and practice of bolshevism, is clear and definite. The dictatorial regime has lost the confidence of a large part of the indoctrinated youth. Wide circles of the intelligentsia refuse to follow the whims of party directives. Religious groups fight back the revival of the antireligious policies of an atheistic government. Minority groups—the Ukrainians, the Tartars, the Baltic peoples, and others—suffer from the policies of a centralistic totalitarian system, and the Jewish people are frustrated in their desire to migrate to Israel. The Red Army lives under strict control and is permeated by secret agents. Soviet women have their own grievances being forced to perform heavy labor duties as a part of their much-vaunted "freedom"; and they are without a proper share in political influence and in the number of professions supposedly open to them. The Soviet worker is economically and politically enslaved, and the trade-unions, which should protect the worker, instead take their orders from the regime. The collective farms are inefficiently manned by an unwilling peasantry who have never become reconciled to the deprivation of independent economic action. Forced-labor camps, in which millions of people starve to death, have become a permanent feature of the regime, but at the same time the spawning grounds of discontent and hatred for the oppressive rule. Other

groups too, such as the Communist Party, the managerial group and the centralistic bureaucracy add their dissatisfactions to an impressive total of discontent.

The areas of tension within the Soviet Union are manifold, piling one upon the other. The grievances and dissatisfactions of several wide strata of the Soviet population are very real indeed. Today the Russian people are more the slaves of their rulers than they were under the Czars. The true "revolutionists" are no longer Stalin and his associates, but the oppressed masses of the U. S. S. R. fighting back against the policies and practices of their tyrannical rulers. A totalitarian and oppressive government is their enemy. The Russian people are our potential allies. The problem is how to make them aware of this fact. Its solution requires the establishing of communication between the Russian people and ourselves. The only way of doing so effectively is by appeals to them in terms of their group interests. We should speak to each group in the language of its grievances, demonstrate how the group frustrations can be resolved in the world of free men, and suggest how the group aspirations can be achieved. It is possible that on occasion we may have to abandon the Marquis of Queensbury rules, if we are to be effective in this venture.

Whether the structure of the Soviet system and society, fragile as it is, will be able to resist indefinitely the manifold and ever newly generated strains and tensions, only the future can tell. But, as far as we peace-loving anti-Communist Americans are concerned, it is imperative for us to get better acquainted with the everyday life and mental climate of the Soviet Union, to learn more about the social composition of the Soviet society, and the peculiar disaffection of each individual group, and to diagnose properly the degree of tension existing within the Communist state between the Government and the enslaved people.

Oppression creates inertia, aloofness, fatigue, disillusionment, cynicism. Soviet Russia is a country ruled by terror, police espionage and supervision, and narrow party dictatorship, which have prevented the Russian people from translating into action their longing for a free and prosperous life. But once the Russians know that they have unselfish friends abroad—people who know and understand their problems, who have sympathy for their suffering and miseries, and are ready and eager to help in a decisive hour—it might have a profound effect on the behavior of these downtrodden and now inert masses.

One word of caution is required. Because these tensions exist does not mean that the Russian people are ready to revolt. The only conclusion which is warranted from this study is that the Russian people, but not their leaders, are our potential allies and that this fact should be exploited.

ALEXANDER WILEY.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

I. The Background

SOVIET UNION IS NOT MONOLITHIC IN CHARACTER [1]

The feud, which has developed between Belgrade and Moscow since the spring of 1948, has had far-reaching repercussions within the Soviet orbit, and has also had great influence upon public opinion in the West. It has destroyed the myth of the monolithic character of the Soviet empire, which maintained that Soviet Society was as unified and solid as a huge block of granite.

At the same time, paradoxically, it has created a most dangerous illusion, namely an unwarranted expectation of "Titoism" among all the satellites—a hope which has come to influence the thinking and action of both governments and the man on the street. Thus undoubtedly the expectation of Mao T'se-tung's dissension from Moscow had an influence on the British Government's extending recognition to the Communist Government of China. Recently Sir Oliver Franks is reported to have said:

> We are not convinced that the combination of communism and nationalism in China will always obey the orders of the Kremlin. We have observed in the case of the Communist Government in Moscow strong nationalist and imperialist elements. That is largely what makes them a threat to the free world today. It seems to us that it is not to be assumed in the long term that the Governments of China and Russia will always want the same things or pursue the same policies or the one be subservient to the other. That has not been so in the past.[2]

REVOLUTION IS NOT IMMINENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

A further illusion against which one should be on guard in considering the tensions within the Soviet Union, is the conclusion that because dissatisfaction exists in Russia, therefore an armed and organized revolt is imminent there. It is debatable that those, who are dissatisfied, would necessarily disaffect from the Soviet Union and its Communist regime in case of a military show-down with the west, particularly if no well-thought-out guidance and encouragement are given to the dissenting elements from the outside.

VULNERABILITY OF TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENTS TO TENSIONS

However, in the light of this last caution, if we ask the question, should the present society of Soviet Russia be regarded as mono-

[1] Saul K. Padover in his recent New York Times Book Review of Edgar Ansel Mowrer's Challenge and Decision, takes, for instance, Mowrer to task for indicating that the Soviet Union and its satellites were monolithic in nature. Padover states: "There is good reason to believe that, in reality, Monolithia is not monolithic and that its handful of rulers are in a constant state of insecurity, particularly vis-à-vis their subject peoples."—Saul K. Padover, Duel Between Titans, New York Times Book Review, December 17, 1950, p. 3.

[2] Sir Oliver Franks. Official text: Speech by the British Ambassador delivered before the Executives Club, Chicago, Friday, December 15, 1950. British Information Services mimeographed publication T. 127, Washington, D. C., December 15, 1950, p. 5.

lithic, the answer as already indicated is, certainly not. Under a totalitarian regime—and the Soviet regime is totalitarian—tensions, stresses, and strains are bound to arise just as they do in any other human society. But in the totalitarian setting they are potentially more dangerous than tensions that exist in democratic lands. Furthermore, when totalitarian tensions come into the open they are apt to be more violent since the discontent of the various social strata brew under the surface with no, or at best very few, escapes.

INTERGROUP STRUGGLES IN THE U. S. S. R.

Careful and objective students of Soviet affairs agree that—

a struggle among various interest groups for power, prestige, and economic rewards takes place in the Soviet Union, although its manifestations are not those made familiar by the corresponding struggle in western society.[3]

A pluralization of the Soviet community has been taking place since the inception of the regime in 1917. The demands for and expectations of better treatment are growing. Harold Lasswell writes:

The main lines of present and potential pluralization are ethnic, functional, and territorial. Hundreds of folk cultures are alive in the Soviet Union, and functional groups comprise hundreds of skills and subskills which range from learned professions to the simplest occupations. Territorial lines follow the neighborhoods and regions of each ethnic group * * *

Pluralizing processes do not leave the party intact. There is a continual drag, particularly at the humblest levels, to adapt the party to society rather than to adapt the society to the party * * *. Local party leaders build up informal constituencies when they are credited with having brought better working conditions to the plant or the cooperative. Leaders with similar constituencies build up informal blocs inside the party. In these ways small pressures accumulate by the million for "more now." [4]

These developments have become even more pronounced and marked since the end of World War II. The war gave millions of Russians, both leaders and people, previously encapsuled in the Soviet milieu, a welcome opportunity to establish contact with the outside world. This contact has given them a larger insight into life under "capitalism" and has provoked demands for change and reforms. Lasswell points out that:

If changes occur at all, obviously they must begin with the ruling groups or the masses. So far as the ruling groups are concerned, a tiny corps of carefully chosen and closely supervised officials is involved in direct foreign contacts. These officials carry on the trickle of diplomatic, economic, armed force, police, cultural, and propaganda activities which are permitted beyond the Soviet pale. * * *. In contact with the highly differentiated living standards of parts of the non-Communist world, tastes develop among the commissars (and their wives) who are not wholly insensitive to the figure they cut. Gradually these officials lose a sense of overwhelming personal urgency about the defense of the Soviet Union against a supposed aggressor, an attitude which is not wholly lost after returning home.

Among the masses we can anticipate certain changes which are in some respects parallel to the transformations we have been describing for a fraction of the elite. Not all observers of the Soviet Union who are in contact with the peasant population believe that it is possible to segregate the broad masses of the peasant and working population from all contact with, or awareness of, the world outside, especially where the standards of living are involved. Even after allowance has been made for any surviving tendency to romanticize the wise men of the soil, there is a residue of creditable testimony that the gossip chains through the Soviet Union are not all run or necessarily tapped by the NKVD.[5]

[3] Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 317.

[4] Harold D. Lasswell, "Inevitable" War: A Problem in the Control of Long-Range Expectations. World Politics (New Haven), October 1949, pp. 16–17.

[5] Ibid., pp. 15–16.

PUBLIC ENEMY NO. 1 OF THE SOVIET UNION IS MAN'S NATURE

Public enemy No. 1 of the Politburo is, however—and has been since the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia—the nature of man himself, with all his inborn instincts and desires for well-being, personal property, moral freedom, and spiritual independence. The Bolsheviks themselves are the first to admit in their own party publications—incidentally insufficiently studied abroad—the severe difficulties they encounter in their efforts to impose communism on the Soviet masses. They point out that "survivals (remnants) of capitalism in the minds of people can amount to dangerous proportions in Soviet Russia," unless they are checked by strong countermeasures and effective Government action. The following naked revelation of the true state of affairs within the Soviet Union is offered by S. Kovalev, 33 years after the Communist revolution occurred in Russia. It appears in the October 1950 issue of the leading party magazine Bolshevik and deserves the full attention of the west. It can be taken as a keynote in the search for correct evaluation of the present mood and temper of the Soviet population.

* * * the supremacy of the socialist ideology does not mean that we have already completely done away with the survivals of the old bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology, with the old views, manners, and habits. Survivals of bourgeois ideology still exist in the Soviet society.

It cannot be forgotten that the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people are supported by the hostile capitalist world.

Whenever the survivals of capitalism are ignored and the struggle against them is slackened, these survivals mount to *dangerous proportions* * * *.

The Bolshevist Party has managed to bring about a radical alteration in the views of Soviet people concerning labor * * *. At the same time, a segment of Soviet citizens still retains a backward *uncommunistic* attitude toward work. Among the workers and collective farmers there are still those who are remiss in the attitude toward labor. A negligent attitude toward their duties is also encountered among members of the intelligentsia. The unsocialist attitude toward labor finds expression in nonfulfillment of output quotas, in poor quality work, in output of inferior quality. Among certain workers of industry and agriculture there are to be encountered *conservatism, antimechanization tendencies, and unwillingness to introduce new technology.* There are still officials in industry and agriculture who do not wish to translate into reality the Socialist principle of remuneration of labor and practice petty bourgeois leveling of wages.

The U. S. S. R. Constitution obliges citizens of the U. S. S. R. to observe labor discipline. The June 26, 1940, decree of the Presidium of the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet is enforced against shirkers. There are still to be found on the collective farms idlers and loafers who care nothing for the interests of the state or for the interests of the collective farm. Against them is directed the decree of the U. S. S. R. Council of People's Commissars and Party Central Committee "on increasing the obligatory minimum of work-day units for collective farmers." This decree establishes for each able-bodied collective farmer an obligatory minimum of work-day units in each period of agricultural work; the decree states that able-bodied collective farmers who do not turn out the obligatory minimum of work-day units without sufficient reason are liable to prosecution. Loafers, antisocial elements who maliciously evade work on the collective farms and carry on a parasitic mode of life encounter emphatic condemnation * * *.

* * * the survivals of the past in the attitude toward public property have not been completely overcome. The negligent attitude toward Socialist property finds expression, for example, in antistate tendencies, in the fact that in certain collective farms the grain is not delivered to the state on time or in strict conformity with the law on grain deliveries. There are still administrators in economic organizations and Soviet institutions who are inclined to manifest generosity at the expense of the state, conferring illegal bonuses, or swelling the staff.

There are people who do not stop short of outright assault on public property. Pilfering of public property takes place where the heads of institutions and organi-

zations *show no concern for introducing Bolshevist order,* do not react to warning signals from the working people and do not cut short misdeeds which are taking place.

The September 19, 1946, decree of the Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee "on measures for the liquidation of violations of the agricultural artel statutes on the collective farms," is of great importance for instilling in the collective the socialist attitude toward public property. The party and the Soviet state instill in the collective farmers an awareness of the fact that state interests must take first place * * *.

There are still to be encountered instances of petty bourgeois dissoluteness, * * *. Not yet eliminated are rudeness, drunkenness, ruffian conduct, assaults on the personal dignity of citizens and on their property and similar instances of behavior inherited from the old regime.

Soviet society cannot put up with such antisocial phenomena. *Education by persuasion does not exclude measures of compulsion* against malicious violators of the rules of socialist community life * * *.

Among the widespread survivals of the old which the educational work of the party is aimed at overcoming is the survival of religion * * * these prejudices still cling. Moreover, in some instances in which appropriate educational work is not being carried on, *these prejudices are becoming stronger.* * * * The task of our propaganda and cultural enlightenment institutions is to step up scientific propaganda, inculcate the materialist world outlook, wage unremitting struggle against idealism, mysticism, and any kind of obscurantism and expose the instigators of a new war, who likewise employ religion in their propaganda.

* * * unfortunately people of low awareness do not yet realize the height to which history has elevated them under the Soviet system. The minds of backward people in our country still continue to be weighed down by the old fabrications of representatives of the exploiter classes of Czarist Russia about the "superiority" of foreign bourgeois culture and the scornful attitude toward our native culture, science, and art. These "theories" were cultivated by the ideologists of the landlord-bourgeois system, the lackeys of the Russian and international bourgeoisie, Mensheviks, Trotskyites, Bukharinists, and other enemies of our people. The Weismannist-Morganists in biology and the cosmopolitan drama and literary critics have been exposed and condemned by the Soviet public as bearers of these pernicious views. They cultivated the antipatriotic ideology of cosmopolitanism. *Rootless cosmopolitanism and kowtowing before things foreign are all the more harmful and dangerous in that cosmopolitanism serves as the ideological banner of the present American claimants to world hegemony* * * *

It happens at times that the successes achieved in various sectors of our work give rise to self-satisfaction on the part of executives; they cease to take note of defects, cease to drive the job forward * * * Incapable of educating the working people in the spirit of communism, such persons become the prisoners of survivals of capitalism and then become an obstacle to our development. The bureaucrat is concerned not for the interests of the state but for his own personal prestige; this is why he "breeds" around himself flatterers, careerists, and suppressors of self-criticism * * * The party carries on the most resolute and ruthless struggle against the bureaucratic attitude * * * for this attitude muffles the initiative of the masses and at the same time *undermines the authority of the administrators among the working people.*[6] [Italics furnished.]

As can be seen from the preceeding lengthy extract, taken, it is repeated, from an official and recent Soviet source, there is an impressive list of stresses and weaknesses in the Soviet state as of October 1950. It seems to support the conclusions reached by an American observer that—

Behind the great show of monolithic strength, parade-ground power, and outward devotion to the Communist cause lay shambles and despair.[7]

[6] S. Kovalev, Overcoming the Survivals of Capitalism in the Minds of People. Bolshevik, No. 19, October 1950, pp. 19–31. Extract taken from a translation in summary appearing in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, No. 44, December 16, 1950, pp. 10–11.

[7] Boris Shub, The Choice. New York, Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1950, p. 99.

HOW THE SOVIET REGIME PREVENTS REVOLT

What enables, then, the Soviet regime to overcome these difficulties and to avoid the outbreak of the storm? Soviet officialdom speaks of a "moral political unity," "friendship of the peoples," and "Soviet patriotism," as motive forces of the Soviet society, and interprets the existing political discord and social tension within the Soviet Union in terms of a struggle "between the new and old, between the dying and born." Stalin is quoted as saying:

> Something is always dying in life. But what is dying is unwilling to die simply, * * * but whines, yells, insisting on its right to existence. The struggle between the old and the new, between what is dying and being born—is the basis of our development. This struggle is expressed in Soviet society in a totally new form, not through class struggles and cataclysms, but in the form of criticism, the long-range directing force of criticism and self-criticism, * * * a powerful instrument in the hands of the party.[8]

In fact, the Politburo has succeeded, so far, in diverting and dissipating, within the Soviet planned society, the manifold strains and tensions through a policy of terror, through an elaborate system of "regimented" criticism and self-criticism, through manipulating of propaganda slogans, through tightly knit controls, laws, decrees, orders, punishments, exhortations, reorganization, and the shifting of policies and of men, and through imposed loyalties, appeals to vested interests, rewards and citations, decorations, and incentives.

FRAGILE NATURE OF THE SOVIET POWER STRUCTURE

In spite of all window dressing, however, the Soviet power structure continues to be most fragile, and it is characterized by a number of soft spots, which are most uncomfortable to the Soviet leaders. This raises several questions. Would this structure be able to stand up under abnormal and adverse conditions? It is possible that, if not brought to a tottering fall, it would at least be severely wounded by an alliance between the free and powerful United States and the millions of Soviet dissidents and nonconformists, so far inarticulate but hostile to the regime. Is there room for an appeal directed by Washington to the Soviet masses over the head of their Government and is not such an appeal called for even at this late hour? Edmund Stevens, former Christian Science Monitor correspondent in the Soviet Union, suggests that the potential strength of the people of Russia be understood and exploited for our own good as well as theirs. He writes:

> There are in Russia today legions of thinking, intelligent people who chafe under the omnipotent police state and long with their whole being for freedom. * * * thousands upon thousands of people in all walks of life have at some time sustained some deep personal hurt from the police regime. Each new purge or "ideological campaign" adds new contingents of malcontents. While all open criticism of the regime is effectively prevented and the ears and eyes of the MVD (secret police) are omnipresent, such is human nature that every individual has at least one person he fully trusts, and thus an endless chain extends, even though it lacks organized form.

Stevens indicates that by the age of 35 years most Soviet citizens have suffered deep and final disillusionment. This disillusionment breeds, according to Stevens, cynicism (which characterizes party and

[8] Quoted in an article, Criticism and Self-Criticism, Principle of Development of Socialist Society. Bolshevik, March 15, 1948.

state staffs), apathy (which pervades the majority of citizens), and intense inner rebellion. Stevens believes that:

* * * many, at the least sign of hope, would gravitate toward the third (rebellion).

He continues:

It is essential that the West learn to distinguish between the police state and the Soviet people, for if the former are implacable foes, the latter, unless stupidly antagonized, are potential friends and allies.[9]

Stevens' opinions are shared by Boris Shub, another ardent supporter of the idea of an alliance between the United States and the Russian people, who writes as follows:

* * * The gigantic Soviet propaganda machine has been devoted almost entirely, since the end of World War II, to convincing the Russians that we are planning to destroy them by atomic warfare. Although much of this propaganda is discounted by thinking Russians, the very nature of our atomic-hydrogen program, our military aid to Atlantic Pact nations, and so on, lends itself to skillful distortion, enabling the Kremlin to convince many Russians that we are actually planning to wage aggressive genocidal war against them. As time goes on and preparations for war continue, the Kremlin may succeed in convincing most Russians that such are our intentions. If, through the continued absence of a positive American peace program toward Russia, the Kremlin does convince the majority that we intend to wage genocidal war, they will have to rally behind Stalin as the lesser evil. For no matter how much they hate the police state, they cannot welcome mass extermination by American hydrogen bombs.

But if we offer the Russians an alliance against the Stalin regime with the solemn pledge not to be diverted by sinister threats, retaliatory actions, or spurious peace offers from the Kremlin, we will find millions upon millions of allies within Russia.

We will find them in the command of the Soviet army, in the highest level of the party and the government, among the ranks of the army, among the workers and the peasants, and, of course, among all the unhappy millions now in forced-labor camps. For there is no true loyalty to Stalin-Beria-Malenkov in any significant segment of the party, the state, the army, the police, or the people. There is only fear, hatred, distrust, cynicism, and despair.

If we make Russia our ally, Stalin, Beria, and Malenkov will become as hopelessly isolated as all the despots of history in those last days when the scaffold was being erected for them by the people.

If we make Russia our ally, the regime will fall apart because a society of enlightened slaves cannot endure.[10]

LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

It is not the task of the present study to recommend ways and means of reaching and enlightening enslaved masses of Russian people. Several ways of doing so have been proposed, among them (1) a general appeal to the Russian people as a whole, which Shub suggests;[11]

[9] Edmund Stevens, This Is Russia Uncensored: Collective Slavery Is Seed for Revolt. Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 1950.

[10] Shub, Op. cit. pp. 191–192.

[11] Ibid., pp. 200–202. Shub writes in part as follows:

"* * * The first step should be a solemn proclamation by the President of the United States, addressed to the Russian people and to all the peoples of the world, announcing that the United States will throw its full support behind all groups and individuals in the command and ranks of the Soviet army; in the Central Committee and other organs of the Communist party; in the Supreme Soviet and all other agencies of the Soviet government, who will act to replace the present Politburo leadership with an interim government pledged to the reestablishment of legitimate and representative government in Russia.

"The proclamation will make it completely clear to all Russians that we have taken this action because we know that they need our help to regain their freedom and because we know that in their return to the community of nations lies their best hope and ours of escaping the indescribable nightmare of another world war.

"We should extend our full support to all men and groups in Russia who pledge themselves to abolish the powers of the MVD and the privileged status of the Communist party and its affiliates; to transfer the forced-labor camps to army control as displaced-persons centers pending the orderly return of the inmates to their homes or to new communities of their own choice; to restore freedom of speech, worship, press, and assembly, the right of labor to organize in free trade-unions, and the right of the peasantry to choose their own forms of land tenure; and to hold general elections, on the basis of universal suffrage, for a constituent assembly. When these conditions have been met and that assembly is chosen and convened, it will signify the restoration of legitimate and representative government in Russia."

(2) appeals to single professional groups—on the theory that professional group interests are closer to the heart than those of the community at large; and (3) resort to clandestine methods. Our main purpose, however, is to identify and map the areas of tension within the Soviet society, and to point out the special grievances of such groups as young people, intellectuals, religious believers, ethnic minorities, professional soldiers, workers, peasants, slave laborers, and their families. These are the potential allies of the United States who can be appealed to and mobilized in the struggle for freedom and for the dignity of man all over the world, and especially in the Soviet Union.

METHOD USED IN THIS STUDY

The method applied in this study of discord and dissatisfaction among various groups of the Soviet people—and there are many—follows to some extent the procedure used by the Kremlin in its identification of the defects and shortcomings of Soviet society.[12] If the implications of individual cases of trouble and disruption seem to be far reaching, certain deductions—sometimes based upon past experience—are legitimately made.

Thus in the investigations that were necessarily a prelude to this study there was, first of all, vigilance for simple instances of dissension in Soviet Russia, either casually reported in the Soviet press or pointed out by observers on the spot. There was then an attempt to corroborate this preliminary information with further evidence gathered from Soviet and foreign sources before endeavoring, finally, to present herewith general observations regarding signs of disunity and discord, dissatisfaction and nonconformity, permeating various segments of Soviet society which are worth considering and watching by policy makers, and possibly worth cultivating—by enlarging the cleavage existing between the regime and the people—in the over-all fight waged by the United States and the free world against the Communist rulers of Russia.

AWARENESS OF THE SOVIET UNION—THE CHALLENGE

It is important, however, to realize, in any consideration of the areas of tension which are presented herein, that the Soviet Government itself is well aware (as can be seen by the use of Soviet sources in this study) of these dangers and is determined not to allow them to become more dangerous. The Kremlin is constantly taking new countermeasures to emasculate and prevent social unrest or open revolt. The regime's allies are apathy and inertia, which they have unwittingly engendered, on the one hand, and the fear of punishment and reprisals, as well as a more natural fear of the unknown (i. e., change in regimes), on the other hand. And real friends are perhaps too far away from those who would organize or become articulate or they have not succeeded in making themselves well heard. This is the challenge with which we are faced today.

[12] Barrington Moore, Jr., an astute scholar of Russian affairs, writes:

"* * * The Politburo to some extent meets situations as they arise through a series of small day-to-day decisions, rather than by following a carefully elaborated policy and plan. * * * Kaganovich again illustrates this * * * in his comments on the reform of the educational system * * * which arose from Stalin's discovery that education was proceeding badly in a single school. From there the matter developed into a study of textbooks and the way they were used in the USSR, and then to much broader matters. Kaganovich commented, probably correctly, that he could quote numerous examples to show how very often, out of what at first sight seemed to be a simple question, 'a simple communication or letter,' a great decision affecting all branches of Soviet activity arose."

Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1950. p. 268.

II. Youth

SOVIET YOUTH DISILLUSIONED

It has been said that the strength of a totalitarian regime depends upon the number of generations which have completed both primary and secondary schools established by the regime. The youth of Soviet Russia are particularly important since life expectancy in the U. S. S. R. is under 45 years, and 63 percent of the Soviet people in 1939 were under the age of 30.[13] Therefore it is significant to note that of all the promising areas of tension in the Soviet Union perhaps the greatest lies within the youth group, normally thought of as a thoroughly indoctrinated sector of the Soviet society filled with enthusiastic members of the various Communist youth organizations. A large segment of this group does not actually possess the enthusiasm ascribed to it in spite of the careful, particular, and constant attention given by the Kremlin to the political education of Soviet youth along Marxist-Leninist lines.

Certainly indoctrination of more than one generation would be a powerful control, if the indoctrination squares with the everyday experience of those subjected to it. This condition does not seem to have been fulfilled in the case of Soviet Russia. Frederick C. Barghoorn, who for years has been attached to the American Embassy in the U. S. S. R. and has traveled widely in the Soviet Union, states:

> Writers and poets had been given a little more freedom of expression during the war than was customary, and some of them not realizing the temporary character of this relaxation of control, cautiously gave expression to moods which the Party was not slow in denouncing as irresponsible, frivolous, and downright harmful.
>
> Soviet youth, particularly students, seem to have been especially hit by these moods. The Soviet press has had a good deal to say about the attitude of youth. The head of the Communist Youth League in an article written in the spring of 1946 denounced a mood of "demobilization" among a part of the young people. *In some cases, their disillusionment took the form of deep discontent or even a nihilistic attitude toward Soviet life. One Soviet acquaintance told me that the regime had lost confidence in the youth, and reposed its faith in the children,* who are now being subjected to intense chauvinistic indoctrination. The book, "I Want to Be Like Stalin," edited by Professor George Counts and recently published here—a translation of parts of the Soviet handbook for teachers—indicates the flavor of this indoctrination. The skepticism of Soviet youth tends to be bitter and sardonic, though tinged with deep fatalism. It is very different from the superficial hardboiled mood of many American young people. In part, it is the psychology of a generation which has infinitely more reason to consider itself "lost" than had its American counterpart in the 1920's. *I often was told by young Soviet acquaintances that the war had taken a part of their youth and that the hard postwar period would consume the rest—if a new war didn't. Among a few of the intelligent youth, there is a feeling that the revolutionary ideas of Communism have been betrayed.* I remember a conversation with a woman student whom I met once or twice in a park in Moscow and who denounced successful Soviet people as careerists and speculators. She said that the N. K. V. D. men and Party bosses were getting all the good things of life.[14] [Italics furnished.]

[13] Sergius Yakobson. Slavica. Library of Congress quarterly ournal of current acquisitions. Washington, Government Printing Office, vol. 4, February 1947, p. 45.

[14] Frederick C. Barghoorn, Notes on Life and Travel in Russia. Yale Review (New Haven), June 1948, pp. 612-613.

INTEREST OF SOVIET YOUTH IN THE WEST

Critical in their attitude toward the Communist state, Soviet youth at the same time display positive interest in the accomplishments of the Western World. General Walter Bedell Smith, while he was Ambassador to Moscow, collected the gratuitous comments of the Soviet people who visited the United States Information Office. He recalls that:

> One of these spontaneously offered the opinion that the principal audience [of the "Voice of America"] was "youth." He then gave a more precise definition: "The young, cultured working class, aged from twenty-five to thirty-five, without higher education but having a lively interest in a variety of subjects." He cited himself and his friends—a printer, a barber, a lathe operator, and a shoe factory worker—as typical examples of members of this youth group. There were a very large number of such young cultured workers, he said. Their interest in America was not the result of war contacts, but was a long-standing one, arising from the fact that "America represents progress—it has authority." This interest is strong, he continued, and it persists in spite of current attempts by the Soviet press to blacken and slander America.[15]

While the interest in and admiration for America may be of "long standing," the war-created contact with the west has also had a strong impact on the Soviet mind, and particularly on the mind of the youth. Stalin seems to have made a serious political mistake not only in allowing Europe to see the Red army but in having the Red army see Europe. Soldiers exposed to the west have caught a glimpse of so-called "capitalist comforts" and "luxuries" which are unavailable and unheard of in the Soviet Union, and they have transmitted to those at home disquieting doubts about the perfection of the Soviet paradise. Vacillation of Soviet youth as a result of outside "bourgeois" influence has become one of the chief concerns of Soviet educators. Party spokesmen have railed at the insufficiency of the youth organizations.[16] The "apolitical" attitude of young members of the Soviet intelligentsia, and particularly their openly expressed admiration for western ideas and artistic achievements, while tolerated in the honeymoon period of the war alliance, have come to be regarded as a dangerous infection since that alliance disintegrated.

INADEQUATE INDOCTRINATION OF NEW PARTY MEMBERS

The dissatisfaction of Soviet youth also has other causes. During the war years the party was forced to open its doors to insufficiently indoctrinated Red army men and women who had faced death on behalf of the Soviet "fatherland" and who were heroes in the eyes of the public. Basically these "heroes" felt and believed as Russian nationalists. The ranks of the party swelled to six million—more than one and one-half times the prewar membership. The bemedaled and ambitious wartime party recruits, however, were deprived of their constitutional right to aspire to the Supreme Soviet by the postwar arbitrary act of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet making the age limit for election to that body 23 years instead of the previous

[15] Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow. New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1950, p. 181.

[16] E. g., V. Koroteyev (Superficial Approach to Education of Youth. Pravda, June 27, 1950, p. 2—as translated in summary in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York) v. 2, No. 26, August 12, 1950, p. 45) states that "* * * on the whole the shortcomings in the work of the Young Communist League are tremendous. The form and content of the work of the Young Communist organizations are far from satisfying young people. Regimentation by YCL committees, a common practice, stifles the initiative and independent activity of young people."

18. Before being admitted to office the youth were first to be re-educated along the old orthodox party lines partially abdicated during the war.[17] This act constituted, in effect, the first purge of the post-war Soviet youth. It was an effort to eliminate the deleterious effects of the wartime nationalism in favor of the orthodox internationalism of Marx and Lenin. The latter, however, has lost by now a great deal of its former revolutionary *elan*. Merle Fainsod, a Harvard expert on Soviet affairs, cites an interview with an emigrant Soviet school teacher in which the teacher noted:

> * * * that there was a great difference between a revolutionary ideology which appealed to youth's idealistic and utopian instincts, and an official ideology which insisted on conformity. Communism in its present state had become such an official ideology. It was dinned into the children day after day. But, she asserted, a number, instead of becoming imbued with it, become bored with it. * * *[18]

The statement that "America represents progress—it has authority," begins to appear as the natural outcome of such an official static ideology and its resultant boredom and regimentation.

Stalin himself stated the principle of a totalitarian system of education. "Education," he said to H. G. Wells nearly 20 years ago, "is a weapon whose effect depends on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is aimed." But Stalin neglected to note the effects of purpose and inspiration in such a program. The fruits of that neglect are now becoming apparent.

Fainsod's teacher informant pointed out that it was—

> * * * important to distinguish between the attitudes of two different generations of Soviet youth: (1) Those who came of age in the period of the first Five Year Plan and collectivization, and (2) those who came of age in the middle and late thirties.[19]

BASES OF DISILLUSIONMENT

The imagination of the first group was captured by the grandiose schemes of the Five Year Plan; but the enthusiasm has abated. The agony of collectivization has lost the support of many of the rural youth. Questions are now being asked about the crowded conditions in home life, food shortages, low living standards, the arrests of friends and relatives, the difficulty of obtaining a higher education, compulsory labor service, and other embarrassing elements of Soviet life. To be sure, many young people have made their careers by membership in youth organizations, and ultimately the party itself, and have thus subscribed to the announced aims of the party and regime, but much of this initial enthusiasm and ideological momentum has been lost in the process. And in certain areas of Soviet life even membership has fallen off sharply. Louis Nemzer, a seasoned observer of Soviet life says:

> In recent years, the Komsomol unit in the armed forces, although presumably a "mass organization" open to all able young people, has actually been losing members. It has allegedly failed to secure contributions from many of those who have remained in its ranks and those Komsomol members who are being utilized in political work are reportedly operating on a low level.[20]

[17] Sergius Yakobson, Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union. Annals (Philadelphia), May 1949, pp. 124–125.
[18] Merle Fainsod, Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System. American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), June 1950, pp. 275–276.
[19] Ibid., p. 275.
[20] Louis Nemzer, The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), March 1950, p. 79.

NATURE OF YOUTH MILITATES AGAINST CONFORMITY

The statements of former Soviet citizens and the studies of independent observers seem to imply that the youth of the Soviet Union have been less zealous for the regime and its program since the disruption of the war and the contact with the west. The very nature of youth is, such as to militate against such a regime as Soviet Russia's. Mikhail Koriakov, a former Soviet journalist who is now a refugee professor of literature at Fordham University, comments on this quality of youth as follows:

> To begin with, it would be a fallacy to think of Soviet youth as a uniform, homogeneous entity stamped in a single mold. On the contrary, there is in Russia today an active process of stratification, a "washing away of the middle." This process is furthered by the militarized conditions within the country, which do not brook neutrality, and by the fact that youth is always polarized, especially Russian youth. * * *
>
> The students, whom I know very well, are in a ferment of the most varied and contradictory searchings and strivings. Recoiling from Marxism-Leninism, they grasp at Leibniz, Nikolai Kuzansky, Schelling. There was great interest in Berdyaev.
>
> Since there are no open vents and no normal outlets, the searchings of the youth are spasmodic, polarized. Now they turn to monarchism, now to Konstantin Leontiev, now to Catholicism, and now again to something else. In January 1944 an interesting thing occurred at the University of Moscow. It was discovered that Professor Skazkin, the dean of the history faculty, had adopted Catholicism, and with him—two girl students. The authorities tried to hush it up. The students disappeared, and Professor Skazkin was expelled from the university. But in vain; the school buzzed with the affair like a disturbed beehive. Professor Skazkin was forced to make a public recantation, confessing his "guilt," analyzing his "errors," and so on. He was finally reinstated at the university—no longer as a dean, but as an ordinary professor; as for the students, they were never heard of again.[21]

MASS SURRENDER TO THE NAZIS EARLY IN THE WAR

From the Soviet point of view that a low state of morale existed among youth groups even prior to the war is attested to by the mass surrenders of Soviet soldiers to the Nazis in the early stages of the war, that is, before the German atrocities and excesses convinced even rebellious young people that their duty lay in fighting for their country even if not for communism. Lowell M. Clucas, Jr., long associated with the Voice of America, points this out quite clearly in his article, Piercing the Iron Curtain. He states:

> The existence of potent oppositionist factors in the Soviet Union was disclosed both by the reactions of large bodies of Soviet troops and civilians during the war and by repressive measures taken by the regime when the war was over. There is ample evidence to show that before the Nazis introduced their policy of Schrecklichkeit in occupied Russia, whole Red Army regiments and remnants of divisions went over to the enemy. Documents made public at the Nuremberg trials reveal that during the first 4 months of the war at least 4,000,000 Soviet troops either surrendered to or were captured by the Germans. Many Soviet soldiers offered to join the Wehrmacht and fight the Bolsheviks. In one Latvian prison camp, for example, 12,000 out of 26,000 prisoners petitioned the German command for permission to fight Stalin and turn the invasion into a civil war. Toward the end of the war, the German Army was using several hundred thousand Russian troops in various rear echelon assignments.
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> * * * * * * *
>
> Opposition to the regime among civilians was also widespread through European Russia. In the Ukraine armed bands fought both the Germans and Red Army partisans and continued to operate against the Soviet authorities certainly through 1947.[22]

[21] Mikhail Koriakov, The Faith of the Soviet. Thought (New York), December 1950, pp. 608–609.
[22] Lowell M. Clucas, Jr., Piercing the Iron Curtain. Yale Review (New Haven), June 1950, pp. 616–617.

WE SHOULD APPEAL TO THE SOVIET YOUTH DIRECTLY

If the youth of Russia is a main target of the propaganda machine within the Soviet Union, it behooves us to ask whether it should not also be one of the targets of our effort to reach important conflict areas of Soviet "public opinion." The United States Department of State has a golden opportunity to appeal directly to this very important age group through the Voice of America or special youth publications in its program of putting across the "American point of view" in various parts of the world. The Reverend Dr. George A. Buttrick has observed that, "We have built a selfishly adult world." He contends that the child can only be the hope of the world when adults remove the shackles they have placed upon the children.[23] Of course, no useful purpose would be served if we attempted to substitute some sort of American intellectual shackles for the Russian variety. Rather, our aim should be to give the Soviet youth an opportunity to choose freedom, and to give them a fair chance to throw off the chains that bind them physically, mentally, emotionally, and economically.

[23] The Reverend Dr. George A. Buttrick, pastor of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church of New York, in his address to the opening session of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth.

III. Soviet Intelligentsia

PERSISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT THINKING A SOURCE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

Perhaps even more important than youth, because it possesses a virtual monopoly of ideological and materialistic weapons, is the scientific and cultural group. It is misleading to presume that all Soviet intellectuals are on the side of the regime. In spite of the strenuous efforts of the Soviet leaders to insure the conversion of this element to the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist political faith by various means, be it by extending to them privileges and rewards [24] or by whipping them into obedience,[25] some Soviet intellectuals have preserved an impressive degree of independent thinking.

All Soviet scholars who are not perverted to the official political doctrine are sources of potential conflict. This is particularly notable because the preservation of the Soviet regime may depend upon the Soviet scientist, since revolutions in our day need not be mass uprisings but may hinge upon the mood and upheaval of a few scientists in charge of extraordinary weapons.

It goes without saying that the Soviet scientist, who depends upon complete freedom and international exchange of information for the proper pursuit of his studies, must be concerned by the constant intervention into his field by a powerful laity led by J. V. Stalin himself. And he must be deeply perturbed by the isolation imposed on him by the party and by the emphasis on the so-called "practical," or applied, science, that, in fact, precludes "pure" science.[26]

[24] Edmund Stevens, who has described some of these privileges in a series of articles written about his impressions of the Soviet Union, says for example (This Is Russia Uncensored: Forbidden Zone—Red Elite Live Here. Christian Science Monitor (Boston), October 20, 1949):

"Many of the Soviet great and near-great, from Prime Minister Joseph Stalin down, have their dachas in the Forbidden Zone [a special scenic and idyllic rural area set aside for the elite and forbidden to all others]. Besides top government and party chiefs, cabinet ministers, and leaders of the armed services, they include factory directors, members of the Academy of Sciences, prominent authors, artists, and stage celebrities. * * * * * * *

"Academy members, who are in a class by themselves, draw a total of 25,000 rubles a month (about $4,800). In addition, their regular incomes are supplemented from time to time by cash bonuses. * * *"

[25] William L. Ryan introduces his analysis of recent Soviet purges with the statement that (Threat of Purges Terrorizes Russian Economic Ministers. Washington Star, September 14, 1950, p. A-16):

"Russia's Communist rulers are cracking the whip with deadly regularity on a selected group of scapegoats. It may even amount to a quiet behind-the-scenes reign of terror. * * *"

He continues, after supplying some details of these purges:

"The pronouncement of Marshal Stalin last May destroying the School of Language Study of N Ya. Marr, before then the accepted and much touted school, was no idle philosophizing on the master's part. It was a stern warning to all fields of science that Stalin made the laws and the lines must be followed to the very letter."

[26] This emphasis is given official sanction in an editorial in Pravda, August 25, 1949, which states in part:

"To be guided by the spirit of the Bolshevik Party approach means first of all to strive to embody scientific achievements in Socialist practice, to arm the people with the achievements of science in its struggle for communism. This is why Soviet scientists sharply criticize those who regard practical assistance to the Socialist economy as something secondary."

Among the American publications The U. S. News and World Report (Why Russia Purges Scientists. U. S. News and World Report (Washington), January 14, 1949, pp. 22-23) had noted this emphasis and interpreted it as follows:

"Moscow pressure for quick results in almost every field of science lies behind much of the purge now going on. Russia needs to grow more food, develop new areas, build up industries, combat diseases that in some cases are epidemic, needs to make an atomic bomb. Apparently scientific theories long accepted by the rest of the world are too slow for Russia's rulers. So up-and-coming Russian scientists who advance new theories, or who promise better application of old theories for quick results are getting approval to go ahead. Their more conservative colleagues are being cast aside. * * *

"Whether * * * other scientists have been demoted, fired, or exiled is not known outside Russia. Whether the current political offensive will go still deeper is anybody's guess.

"But the Soviet Academy of Sciences—once one of the most respected scientific bodies in the world—met in Leningrad this month to hear an opening lecture entitled "The Role and Significance of Stalin's Work" in practically all fields of science. * * *

"What it means is that Russia is gambling that politicians can run Soviet science better than scientists can. As western scientists see it, this gamble marks the beginning of the end of Soviet science. They say Russian students will not be free to follow tested methods in research, cannot criticize one another freely and openly. Instead they have to work with one eye on Stalin and can never be quite sure they are following the party line. * * *"

ATTACK OF THE REGIME AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

The realistic Soviet scientist, for instance, cannot ignore, as was once pointed out in the New York Times, the fact that even Soviet blood will continue to circulate according to Harvey's theory; Soviet apples will gravitate to the earth as predicted by Newton; and Einstein's theory will remain binding for the Soviet physicist.

This realization, however, makes the Soviet physicist particularly suspect in the eyes of the present Communist rulers. It deserves special attention that in a volume published in the summer of 1950 by the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences under the title of "The Great Power of the Ideas of Leninism," the Soviet physicist has been singled out for an attack in two contributions to the publication. In the first such contribution the late president of the Academy, S. Vavilov, wrote:

> It is impossible to ignore the fact that some of our physicists are still in the grip of idealistic survivals which are primarily supported by an uncritical attitude toward the literature on physics of the capitalistic countries. Our immediate task is to fight these survivals through a method of implacable criticism and self-criticism. The harmful influence of these survivals is great both in the field of ideology as well as in the sphere of the solution of practical tasks. A much greater activity and attention than heretofore given to philosophical questions is required on the part of the physicist. The task of Soviet physicists is to exploit unreservedly the dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, as a powerful weapon also in the field of physics.[27]

Denunciation by name of single Soviet physicists is readily contributed by another author in the same volume, A. Maksimov, who accuses them of not having liberated themselves from the survivals of bourgeois ideology, of being hostile to communism politically, and of being directly or indirectly subservient to the ideology of the imperialist bourgeoisie.[28]

CULTURAL AND LITERARY REINDOCTRINATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

But the scientist is not alone in suffering Soviet purges. The lack of satisfactory cooperation and mutual understanding between the Soviet intellectual and the Government can best be illustrated by the endless cleansing of the Soviet educational and scholarly institutions from elements alien to the regime, and the purification action directed against various groups of Soviet intelligentsia which have taken place since the end of the war.

Very soon after the end of military operations the Soviet regime began a campaign for the reindoctrination of Soviet citizens. Beginning in July 1946, Soviet opera, theater, painting, films and architecture were sharply criticized and condemned by the party for their "inability to move with the times." Gleb Struve, professor of Russian at the University of California, gives us something of the nature of this purge as it related to literary circles:

> The Zhdanov purge of September 1946 must still be fresh in everybody's memory. It resulted at the time in the expulsion from literature of Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, a reprimand to several minor writers, the suppression of one Leningrad literary magazine and the complete reorganization of another.[29]

Since 1947 the attacks and purges in the Soviet Union have spread

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[27] Akademiia Nauk S. S. S. R. Institut filosofii. Velikaia sila idei leninizma. Sbornik statei, Moscow 1950, p. 186.
[28] Ibid., p. 220.
[29] Gleb Struve, Antiwesternism in Recent Soviet Literature. Yale Review (New Haven), winter 1950 P. 210.

from one field of learning and art to another—from musicians to biologists, from biologists to physicists, from physicists to philosophers, from philosophers to economists, writers, agriculturists, historians, and cartoonists.[30]

Perhaps the most recent of such actions is the attack on Soviet linguists which was headed by Generalissimo Stalin himself,[31] and on the physiologists, who are accused of ignoring or underestimating the theories of I. P. Pavlov.[32]

PURGES NOT COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE

One would think that all these persistent efforts of the regime to cleanse the intellectuals of all "cosmopolitanism," "objectivity," "kowtowing before the west," etc., should have by now produced the desired results—particularly as they were supported by police measures and the use of the whole propaganda apparatus at the disposal of a totalitarian system. But this has not been the case; on the contrary at least part of the Soviet intelligentsia has shown passive resistance to this indoctrination and reeducation imposed upon them by the party.

The letters which so many of the Soviet scholars have to write "admitting" their guilt and mistakes and promising better conduct in the future, while at the same time glorifying the wisdom of Stalin, can hardly be accepted as a sincere expression of the surrender of the fruits of their life work. Typical of such letters is the following penned by Prof. N. Yakovlev:

* * * J. V. Stalin discovered the basic defect in the work of many linguists * * *.

* * * * * *

J. V. Stalin's exhaustively complete, profound, and clear solution of the basic problem of the radical difference between language and superstructure has become the only methodological weapon with whose aid we can now confidently build a Marxist-Leninist linguistics.

* * * * * *

One must admit that the work written by me * * * contains * * * excessive praise of the obviously erroneous theses of N. Ya. Marr * * *.

* * * * * *

* * * I intend to correct my errors honestly in future work.[33]

[30] This last group—cartoonists—seems to deserve one's special attention and patronage. That nothing is as destructive as ridicule is axiomatic; in this wise the United States Department of State was moving on the right track in reproducing lately over 30 "Herblock" (well-known Washington Post cartoonist, Herbert Block) anti-Soviet cartoons for free distribution abroad. The Kremlin itself for years preserved the monopoly and control of Soviet "humor," entrusting Karl Radek with the invention of jokes designed to be harmlessly critical of the regime. Recently the following instructions were given to the Soviet cartoonists by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, irritated by the failure of the humor magazine Krokodil to become a "Fighting organ of Soviet satire and humor":

"The main task of the journal is to fight against survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of the people. With the weapon of satire the journal must unmask embezzlers of Socialist property, grafters, bureaucrats and any instances of bragging, sycophancy or banality; it must respond promptly to controversial international events, must criticize the bourgeois culture of the West, showing up the insignificance and degeneracy of its ideas." (On the journal "Crocodile." Kultura i Zhizn. November 9, 1948.)

This Soviet attitude on cartoonists provoked famed British cartoonist David Low to say (Krokodil cartoonists. Soviet Studies (Glasgow) October 1950, p. 170):

"Restricted satirists, as pointers-out of the ridiculous, are in danger of becoming themselves ridiculous."

[31] This controversy was between the followers of N. Ya. Marr and certain other linguists. Finally the matter was settled by the intervention of Stalin, who wrote:

"The liquidation of the Arakcheyev-like regime in linguistics, the repudiation of N. Ya. Marr's mistakes and the inculcation of Marxism in linguistics—such is in my opinion the way which would make it possible to instill new health in Soviet linguistics." (On Marxism in Linguistics. Pravda, June 20, pp. 3–4. Translated and reproduced in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. (New York) vol. 2, July 8,1950, p. 9):

[32] In this dispute Pavlov's successor and protege, L. A. Orbeli, was attacked, with others, for failing to inject ideology into his teachings, and for incorrectly interpreting the master. Thus Yu. Zhdanov writes

"The unfounded desire of certain individuals to create their own special 'schools' and 'sub-schools' and thereby to oppose the general trend of Pavlov's teachings has been a serious obstacle * * *. The session's [joint session of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences and the U. S. S. R. Academy of Medical Sciences devoted to 'problems of academician J. P. Pavlov's teachings'] resolution rightly condemns these harmful feudal strivings on the part of individual scientists. * * *" (Certain Conclusions From the Session on Physiology. Pravda, July 28, 1950, pp. 2–3. Translated and reproduced in Current Digest of the Soviet Press. (New York) vol. 2, September 9, 1950, p. 23:).

[33] N. Yakovlev, Let Us Correct Mistakes in Our Work. Pravda, July 4, 1950, p. 4. Translated and reproduced in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, August 26, 1950, p. 7.

Another such letter, written by Prof. N. Chemodanov, is even more worshipful in its overt expression:

> In the light of Comrade Stalin's work "On Marxism in Linguistics" I must admit the utter erroneousness of my article * * *.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> Now, after Comrade Stalin's article, it has become clear to me that this is not at all true [i.e., previous thinking]. Comrade Stalin's brilliant new work is a tremendous event, a turning point in the development of social sciences. Among Marxist-Leninist classics on linguistics it is the most outstanding, the fullest and most systematic exposition of Marxism in this field of knowledge.
>
> Comrade Stalin's work has created a firm theoretical foundation for Soviet linguistics and has destroyed the confusion in points of view which has existed until now. Soviet linguistics can only be grateful to Comrade Stalin for fatherly assistance * * *.[34]

Some letters give a clear indication of insincerity by abject subservience to a political body that almost amounts to sarcasm. Thus the specialist in genetics, A. R. Zhebrak, writes after having attacked the only at present politically permissible theories of the "geneticist" Lysenko:

> So long as our party recognized both tendencies in Soviet genetics and disputes between those tendencies were viewed as creative discussions of theoretical questions in contemporary science, thereby assisting in the discovery of truth, I steadfastly defended my views, which in part differed from the views of Academician Lysenko. Now that it has become clear to me that the basic postulates of the Michurin tendency in Soviet genetics have been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, I, as a member of the party, do not consider it possible for me to retain a position that has been recognized as erroneous by the Central Committee * * *.[35]

THE RESULT OF THE PURGES IS INTELLECTUAL TIMIDITY

Even if such letters were sincere the pressure exerted by the Government and party on the intellectuals certainly does not create the "militant spirit" demanded by the authorities, but, on the contrary, produces timidity of serious proportions in their approach to scientific and other problems. This timidity, or aversion to accepting responsibilities, became so acute that Soviet historians, for example, refused to climb out on a limb by writing textbooks, surveys, or monographs on the history of the Soviet regime after the death of Lenin. And those, who dared to speak in public on that subject, refused to let their lectures be printed. To record Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the twenties and thirties and to analyze the Soviet scene frightened even the bravest and least suspect among them.

PURGES ALSO CREATE INERTIA

This growing timidity or shunting off of responsibility is part of a cycle that must always appear vicious from the Soviet point of view, and may so appear from a non-Soviet or anti-Soviet point of view. That is, the "grass roots" militancy that sometimes carries a revolution to success dies as the revolutionary phase ends and is supplanted by dictatorship. But the dictatorship finds itself dependent upon such militancy for the dynamic policies which are its only justification. Thus it tries to rekindle the "militant spirit" of the revolution, but only succeeds in creating more inertia by its coercive means and

[34] N. Chemodanov, Letter to the Editors. Pravda, July 4, 1950, p. 4. Ibid., p. 8.
[35] Pravda, August 15, 1948.

persecution of the truly independent and militant individual. This brings about a situation of increasingly less participation on the part of the populace, until in the ultimate the regime is left with no popular support and no means by which to appeal to the masses for action. The disturbing part of this picture from an anti-Soviet point of view is that it is equally difficult for enemies of the regime to appeal to the mass victims of inertia for positive action against the oppressors.

Soviet officialdom naturally has become concerned with the increasing timidity and conscious or unconscious nonparticipation of the Russian intellectuals and the masses of which they claim to be the vanguard. The journal Bolshevik recently lamented the reluctance of Soviet scholars to enter into the "free discussions" of the linguistic and physiological controversies:

> Some professors—serious specialists in their field—did not have the courage to defend their point of view in questions relating to their specialties, only because in some paper or other there appeared critical reviews or articles on these questions * * * Thus for example certain sallies of the Literary Gazette regarding concrete questions of science were accepted in silence by scientific workers as virtually representing directives, although they actually contained controversial and even mistaken theses which the specialists could have and should have corrected.[36]

Again, an editorial criticizing the bibliographical magazine of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences complains that:

> Many articles in Sovetskaya Kniga are devoid of the militant spirit. The magazine avoids vital present-day themes which interest our scholarly and scientific circles, is slow to react to faulty and inferior works and deals with them *only after the appearance of critical articles in other publications.*
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> Consequently Sovetskaya Kniga performs a great and important task—criticism and bibliography of our scientific literature—on too low a level of ideology * * *.[37] [Italics furnished.]

SUBSERVIENCE OF THE PRESS

No less is the reluctance of local newspapers and journals to print critical articles until such criticism has been sanctified by its appearance in the Moscow press. Pravda cites several instances of this practice in the Orel paper—the most amusing of which is described as follows:

> The newspaper Orlovskaya Pravda devoted a brief item to the session of the Orel City Soviet [which was sharply criticized] * * *
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> The readers approved this criticism * * * But one strange fact did not escape their attention: The entire item from beginning to end had been "borrowed" from another newspaper, from Izvestia.
>
> Perhaps the Orel paper, for reasons over which the editors have no control, was somewhat late in putting out its report? No, a correspondent, Comrade Yershov, attended the session and wrote a report which pleased the editor * * * But after a telephone call from the executive committee of the city Soviet he rejected the report, thinking up a plausible excuse * * *
>
> Comrade Yershov was not satisfied by the explanation and sent his report on the session to the editors of Izvestia, from which the Orel Pravda reprinted it word for word * * *
>
> These facts reflect the style of the editor, his—to put it mildly—timidity. He does not allow critical materials to appear in his paper, fearing that "something might come of it." [38]

[36] Bolshevik, No. 11, 1950, p. 12.
[37] I. Kuznetsov et al., Raise the Level of Scholarly Criticism. Pravda, April 2, 1950, p. 3. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, May 20, 1950, p. 59.
[38] When the Editor Suppresses Criticism. Pravda, August 16, 1950, p. 2. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, September 30, 1950, p. 55.

The obvious reason for this hestitancy to bespeak one's views is the increasingly rapid changes in Communist Party line. In the earlier days there were changes, turns, reversals of previous policies, but lately at an ever-increasing rate, each zigzag of Soviet policy has become so much shorter that it is evermore difficult for the ordinary Soviet citizen to readjust himself to the whims of the Soviet rulers.

STAGNATION OF FREE RESEARCH

Another result of Soviet policy which must be painful and resented by the scholars is the stagnation of free research. For example, Pravda applauds the efforts of the party in Armenia to—

> improve the education of the intelligentsia and to intensify the struggle against the backsliders into bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the kowtowers before bourgeois culture, the nationalistic chauvinists and those one-sidedly absorbed in idealizing the Armenian past

but notes in the same breath that "*Within the last 3 years, no really valuable book or film has been created in Armenia.*" [39] [Italics furnished.] Another Soviet writer, A. Makarov, complains that the reviews and articles in the literary magazine Zvezda are "unbelievably pallid." He observes,

> A total of 14 reviews of belles-lettres by Soviet writers has been published in 1950. The overwhelmingly majority of the reviews are lightweight, dull rehashing of the content of the books and do not evoke a desire to read them. The selection of the books to be reviewed is casual. In six months Zvezda has not offered a single review of new, important works * * *.[40]

As has been implied throughout, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the regime to isolate the Soviet scholars apparently not trusted by the regime from cultural contacts with the west, to kill their interest in scholarship per se, and the natural desire of a scholar to be objective. The best indication that this nefarious program to turn them into militant party robots has failed (thus certainly leaving an area of tension in its wake) is the appraisal of the situation presented by the Soviet press in connection with two anniversary dates: the fourth anniversary of the publication of the decree on the Task of Literary Criticism, and that of 2½ years of the Reorientation of Philosophical Research. A Pravda editorial on the first-mentioned anniversary proceeds as follows:

> Few good works have yet been written about the people of our factories and plants, about the heroic working class of the Soviet land in their postwar work * * *.
>
> Literary criticism remains a backward domain. Many critics lack a knowledge of life, theoretical preparation, the ability to find and boldly support what is new and advanced * * * to direct their activity toward fulfillment of the tasks which the party and the people put before them * * *.
>
> The Union of Soviet Writers gives little attention to training literary critics in the union republics. One still finds instances of friendly relationships substituting for healthy, principled criticism. * * *[41]

[39] Z. Grigoryan, Ideological and Political Education of Soviet Intelligentsia. Pravda, July 17, 1950, p. 2. Translated in summary in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, September 2, 1950, p. 41.

[40] A. Makarov, Criticism and Book Reviews in the Magazine Zvezda. Kultura i Zhizn, July 11, 1950, p. 4. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, September 30, 1950, p. 27.

[41] For High Ideological Standards and Craftsmanship (editorial). Pravda, August 14, 1950, p. 1. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, September 30, 1950, p. 23.

About the "reorientation of philosophical research" the following official statements were made:

> The presidium [of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Science] noted that [although] 2½ years have elapsed since the philosophical discussion, the Philosophy Institute is still not fulfilling the tasks set before it. * * *
>
> * * * * * * * *
>
> * * * [it] noted that some of the books published by the institute since the philosophical discussion contain gross ideological errors of a cosmopolitan and objectivist nature. * * *
>
> Nor did Academician G. F. Alexandrov fully divest himself of his dispassionate style of exposition and his objectivism in the article "Cosmopolitanism, the Ideology of the Imperialist Bourgeoisie," as was noted by Pravda, September 7, 1949.
>
> These errors show that Bolshevist criticism and self-criticism have not been genuinely conducted in the institute. Far from all the staff members of the institute have yet drawn the necessary conclusions from the philosophical discussions.[42]

THE TACIT OPPOSITION OF SOVIET SCHOLARS TO THE REGIME VERIFIED

From all the above—and the examples are taken at random from a wealth of evidence—we can deduce that many Soviet intellectuals display tacit opposition to the attempts of the Central Committee of the party to whip the Soviet scholar into the role of a blind and subservient executor of all the directives of Soviet political leadership. These intellectuals and scholars want to avert the danger of being turned into arrogant, haughty, half-educated, parochial diehards, strangers in the free world of independent thinking, and neobarbarians. That these resisters are not insignificant in number is attested to by the fact that the rank and file of Soviet intellectuals—practically without exception—are accused by the party of the following basic sins:

(*a*) Falling under the influence of the bourgeois and therefore decadent ideas of the West, admiring them and imitating them;

(*b*) Failure to stress properly Russia's national virtues and achievements and neglecting to emphasize Russian elements in their own work;

(*c*) Failure to apply Marxian principles in their day-to-day operations;

(*d*) Preserving the residues of bourgeois psychology, such as objectivism;

(*e*) Insufficient demonstration of Soviet patriotism and of Soviet national pride; and finally

(*f*) The all-pervading presence of cosmopolitanism.[43]

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[42] Concerning the scholarly work and the state and training of personnel in the Philosophy Institute. Vestnik akademii nauk S. S. S. R., No. 3, 1950, pp. 96–98. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol 2, June 3, 1950, p. 7.

[43] Perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative indictment in this regard has been that of the Soviet author, S. M. Kovalyov. Part of his remarks were (Ideological Conflicts in Soviet Russia. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1948, 20 pp. (translated by the American Council of Learned Societies from an article published in the March 1947 issue of Bolshevik, the original title being "Communist Education of the Worker and the Elimination of Capitalist Survivals from the Popular Consciousness") passim):

"Still, not all Soviet nationals freed themselves uniformly from the survivals of the old ways of thinking; there exist more backward strata among whose thought patterns capitalist survivals are still strongly reflected * * * the sway of the socialist concept of life within the Soviet society must not by any means blind us to the fact that part of our people still show marked traces of the old, individualist, anticommunal psychology * * *.

"In order to bring about a broad evolution of Communist enlightenment of the people there must be effected an increase in ideological work, an improvement thereof in all its branches—in the field of the press, of social science, of literature, art, party propaganda, and agitation.

"In its resolutions on questions relating to ideological and cultural work, the Central Committee of our party has revealed serious flaws in a number of branches of this endeavor. These flaws express themselves

BUT PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP PERMITS NO TURNING BACK—THE STALINIST CONCEPT OF CRITICISM

One would suppose that Communist officials themselves are aware that the opposition to their will is not easily stamped out and that perhaps reactions to their arbitrary actions may have developed. It almost appeared that Stalin himself might have the feeling that things have been carried too far judging by his statement during the recent linguistics controversy that—

> It is universally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a struggle of opinions, without free criticism.[44]

But here again Soviet leadership got caught in the tenets of Communist dogma. No scientific freedom can be tolerated under the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Stalin had previously pointed out, there is only one kind of admissable criticism in the Soviet Union, this is the kind which aims at—

> *implanting* partisanship, *strengthening* the Soviet power, *improving* our constructive activity, *bettering* our economic cadres, and *arming* the working class.[45] [Stalin's italics.]

And in fact Stalin's 1928 article on criticism has been used lately by official publications to stifle any hope that his attitude in the linguistic controversy had really opened the door to analytical and

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primarily in the existence of an attitude disposed toward accommodation with bourgeois ideology and toward yielding ground to it.

"In certain works on social science, certain literary and artistic productions, there has penetrated an undirected, a political, noncritical spirit of accommodation with respect to various bourgeois teachings, theories, and modes of thinking hostile to socialism.

"In evaluating various figures of the past—writers, cultural leaders, scientists, artists—there has been made manifest a tendency to stress only their positive side and to suppress mention of their defects and mistakes.

"Some workers in the Soviet social sciences, writers, creators in the arts, concentrate all their attention on events from the distant past and do not create works dealing with the heroic struggle of the peoples of the U. S. S. R. in building communism. But it is precisely through presentation of these latter incidents that workers should in the first instance be enlightened in the spirit of Soviet patriotism.

"Nothing could be more foreign to a socialist society than the inculcation of pessimism, of defeatist attitudes, such as various partisans of 'pure art,' like Akhmatova, have tried to put across. Such efforts have been severely judged in the resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevist) Party. * * *

"A dangerous survival of capitalism, and a result of alien ideologies working from without, is the sycophantical adulation of contemporary bourgeois culture and ideology, unworthy of a Soviet citizen—who through his intellectual qualities stands immeasurably higher than people of bourgeois society—which is yet to be encountered among individuals within our borders. A consequence of this servility toward bourgeois culture was the circumstance that, as is pointed out in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevist) Party, the repertoire of many Soviet theaters became choked with plays by contemporary bourgeois playwrights which were completely foreign to Soviet ideology.

"Individual writers and artists, inclined to make concessions to contemporary bourgeois culture, ignore the fact that socialist culture and Soviet ideology are the genuinely progressive ones and that it is precisely they that are called upon to give the example and to show the way for all the advanced, progressive part of humanity * * *

"Comrade Stalin at the XVIIIth Party Congress consigned to obloquy the fawning and the slavish bootlicking of the followers of Trotsky and Bukharin before the outside world and in doing so underlined the fact that '* * * the very humblest Soviet citizen, freed of the chains of capitalism, stands a head higher than any highly placed foreign bureaucrat, dragging along under the yoke of capitalist slavery which weighs upon his shoulders * * *'

"We must cultivate in our Soviet people pride in their socialist fatherland, in their great nation. Simultaneously it is indispensable to unmask capitalist ways, the social and national drag under capitalism; to denude the actuality of bourgeois democracy under circumstances of exploitation, the rottenness and reactionary content of bourgeois culture.

"Direct assistance to bourgeois culture and the bourgeois calumniators of Soviet actuality is furnished by those productions of literature and art—if one may so term them—in which Soviet people are depicted as primitive and as deficient in culture. Such productions cannot enlighten our people in the spirit of informed, vigorous Communist conviction.

"Without victory over all these serious faults which represent survivals from capitalism in the consciousness of individual workers on the ideological front, it will be impossible to bring about an improvement in the whole ideological work of enlightening the working classes along Communist lines. * * *

"A great force in the Communist education of the people is the corps of Soviet intellectuals and in the first rank the personnel of the party and of the councils, the teaching profession, workers in letters and the arts, and scientists. But in order that these groups may carry out successfully their honorable function as instructors of the people, they must themselves be enlightened * * *"

[44] J. Stalin, On Marxism in Linguistics. Pravda, June 20, 1950, pp. 3–4. Translated and reproduced in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, July 8, 1950, p. 8.

[45] J. V. Stalin, Against the Vulgarization of the Slogan Self-Criticism. Pravda, June 26, 1928. Reprinted in Bolshevistskaya Pechat, OGIZ, Moscow, 1945, p. 204.

dispassionate criticism. Thus, for example, we read in the Soviet legal magazine:

> The Stalinist instruction concerning criticism and self-criticism points out the permissibility only of criticism of principle, i. e., such criticism as effectively promotes the growth and strengthening of socialist construction in the fields of economics, arts and science. We do not need all kinds of criticism. Already in 1928 in the article Against the Vulgarization of the Slogan Self-Criticism, Comrade Stalin, calling for the criticism of shortcomings of our structure, pointed out in this connection the inadmissability of transforming the slogan of self-criticism into a weapon of advertising exercises, into a weapon for baiting our economic and all other kinds of workers.[46]

As to Stalin's version of the desired "struggle of opinions" one need only refer to the general pattern imposed in the Soviet Union on the free market of ideas familiar to other countries. The Soviet pattern consists of three phases: (1) Discovery of the existence of various schools of thought regarding a certain problem, (2) the intensification of the conflict between the views rather than reconciliation or compromise of them, and (3) the complete victory of the school of thought which the Soviet leadership decides to label Marxist over the opposing views, which are then called capitalist. When the victorious school of thought becomes orthodoxy then other "incorrect" schools are smashed ruthlessly and the defeated scholars "confess" their "errors" in the most abject fashion if they are to retain even their personal freedom, to say nothing of their positions. It is the party which initiates these discussions and it is the party which determines which school is "correct" and which school is "incorrect" and "bourgeois." Within the party, of course, Stalin is the ultimate authority, for

> Comrade Stalin is the greatest Marxist, the greatest Leninist, brilliant continuer of the great cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin * * * All the most important questions of scientific socialism, political economy, philosophy, law, governmental, economic, and cultural construction, military affairs, literature, and art have received the utmost development in the works of Comrade Stalin.[47]

THE MENTAL AGONY OF THE SOVIET SCHOLAR

Thus the Soviet scholar has to face mental agony. Workers in all branches of science are being subjected to increasing pressure to think and write in their various fields according to officially laid down "Marxist-Leninist" principles. For example, the well known Prof. I. Frenkel, member of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences, was taken to task for his "idealistic" approach to the science of physics and he had to admit his ideological "errors" and to promise to "rewrite some of his textbooks in the materialist spirit."

The Soviet scholar is further subject to oppression and persecution. It is clear that some of the people who formerly constituted the "Arakcheyev regime" in Soviet linguistics—those upbraided by Stalin in 1950—have been expelled from their positions. Demotions and removals have not been confined to Leningrad, the "scene of the crime," but extend over the entire country.

AND STILL WESTERN IDEAS CANNOT BE SHUT OFF

And still in spite of all the close "attention" given by the party to scholars and their works it is finally interesting to observe—and this is of the greatest importance—that publications are still coming off the

[46] Soviet State and Law (Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo), June 1950, p. 5.
[47] Soviet State and Law, No. 4, 1950, p. 79, in an article by Colonel of Justice, V. M. Chkhikvadze.

press in the Soviet Union which purport to see some good in western institutions. These are sharply criticised and may ultimately be purged, but they do demonstrate some independence of thought on the part of their authors. For instance, a Soviet expert on law expounds in a recent publication, the "heretic" idea that—

> * * * the consistent publicity and controversy at all stages of the trial and the equality of rights of both prosecution and defense are very fully and consistently upheld in the British criminal trial.[48]

The English-language textbooks used in the middle grades of Soviet schools dared to be "striking for their apoliticalness, lack of ideology, and haphazard text." [49]

SOME EXAMPLES OF NONCONFORMISTS

Beyond that one can find instances in the Soviet Union of nonconformist or dissident groups. For example, the Soviet press reports that—

> At a recent hearing the work of the Novosibirsk composers was subjected to serious criticism. Elements of formalism and an apolitical attitude in the works of certain composers, such as Valgardt and Denbsky, * * * [were ascribed] to the fact that Bolshevist criticism and self-criticism is weak in the Novosibirsk branch of the Union of Soviet Composers. There are composers who have taken a scornful attitude toward the critical remarks of their comrades and have not wanted to subject their work to discussion. * * *[50]

Again the Union of Soviet Architects is charged with "lagging behind the demands of life."

> The relapses of formalism, the mechanical copying of old architectural forms, the pursuit of false beauty and originality, the passion for decorative excesses, etc., still find a place in Soviet architecture. The Union of Soviet Architects is not waging a struggle against these manifestations * * * [and] is not doing necessary work in exposing bourgeois tendencies which hold sway in architecture in the U. S. A. and countries of western Europe * * *[51]

Historians also are accused of viewing history in the light of "bourgeois objectivity" rather than from the party point of view. They are said to be submissive to foreign influence—the impact of "American bourgeois apologetic historiography" on Soviet research. The official writer in the "learned" journal of Soviet historians, Voprosy Istorii, laments:

> Soviet historians have still not acquired the real militant party spirit advocated by Stalin. They still have not outlived the attitude of a family circle. They are unwilling to quarrel, they fear to offend someone, and they preserve the rotten tradition of blind devotion to learned "authorities" inherited from prerevolutionary days.[52]

OPEN CRITICISM IS SOMETIMES HEARD

But the most startling thing of all is that lately a few Soviet scholars have voiced openly their disapproval or resentment of Soviet tactics and policies as far as cultural and educational matters are concerned.

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[48] M. S. Strogovich, The Criminal Trial. Quoted by V. Nikolayev in his article on Serious Shortcomings in Books and Problems of State and Law, Pravda, August 19, 1950, p. 3. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, Sept. 30, 1950, p. 44. Nikolayev charges that Strogovich "glosses over the reactionary exploiter essence of the bourgeois court" and terms it an "objectivist error."

[49] A charge hurled against them by T. I. Basova, a foreign-language specialist in the Soviet Union as reported in the New York Times, July 31, 1949, p. 19.

[50] A. Dremov, Bolshevik, No. 13, July 1950, pp. 60–65. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, October 7, 1950, p. 34.

[51] A. Kaziatko, Kultura i zhizn, August 20, 1950, p. 3. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, October 7, 1950, p. 51.

[52] Quoted by Sergius Yakobson. Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union. Annals (Philadelphia), May 1949, p. 131.

This is illustrated by the remarks of K. Bazilevich, one of the contributors to the History of the U. S. S. R., sharply criticized by the Politburo. He pointed out:

> The authors of the textbook could hardly be blamed for discussing the influence exerted by progressive French bourgeois thought on Russian culture of the eighteenth century. *Only a few years ago did not Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov themselves stress the fact that historians had not paid sufficient attention to the role and influence of western European bourgeois revolutionary and socialist movements on the formation of the bourgeois revolutionary and proletarian socialist movement in Russia?* It seems that this reference has now been forgotten by some of the participants in the discussion. We do not want to worship the West. We have our own culture. We know its great sources, its shortcomings and its brilliant achievements, but to isolate the history of Russia from that of other peoples means to go back to the old, previously condemned conceptions and it is hardly right to follow such a path.[53] [Italics furnished.]

Bertram D. Wolfe, senior fellow in Slavic research at the Hoover Library, Stanford University, gives a further example of a most daring expression of independence on the part of a Soviet scholar. In describing the tumultuous session of the 1948 summer congress of the Lenin All-Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences in which geneticist Lysenko announced party approval of his psuedoscientific doctrines and thus brought forth "confessions," surrenders, and self-humiliations, Wolfe says:

> Yet, as sometimes a dying bull rises to its forelegs and makes one more desperate thrust at the triumphant matador, so there was one more thrill reserved for these spectators of the gladiatorial death pangs. Old Nemchinov, director of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, rose to his feet:
>
> "Comrades, not being a biologist, I did not intend to speak * * * I observe that there is no unity among our scientists on certain questions and I personally as director of the Timiryazev Academy see nothing bad in this. [Commotion in the hall.]
>
> "Both tendencies are allowed to teach at my academy * * * I have said, and I repeat it now, that the chromosome theory of heredity has become part of the golden treasury of human knowledge, and I continue to hold that view."
>
> A VOICE: "But you are not a biologist, how can you judge?"
>
> NEMCHINOV: "I am not a biologist, but I am in a position to verify this theory from the viewpoint of the science in which I do my research, namely, statistics. [Commotion.] And it also conforms to my ideas, but that is not the point.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> "* * * I bear the moral and political responsibility for the line of the Timiryazev Academy * * * I consider it right, and as long as I am director I will continue to pursue it * * * It is impermissible, in my opinion, to dismiss Professor Zhebrak who is a serious scientist * * * The course on genetics should present the views of Academician Lysenko, and the principles of the chromosome theory of heredity should likewise not be kept from the students * * *."
>
> Thus in the nine pages of the stenogram devoted to the remarks of the venerable Nemchinov, every other paragraph is devoted to taunts, commotion, laughter, "a voice," known or unknown, of bullies sure they are playing the winning side. Pravda grimly commented:
>
> "* * * the position of such participants as V. S. Nemchinov exhibited themselves as especially unseemly (nepriglyadni)."
>
> It is not hard to conjecture what this brave man's fate will be.[54]

SUMMARY

To sum up: deadly nonconformity, attacked but ever-present, seems to be a significant phenomenon in the attitudes and sentiments prevailing among Soviet intelligentsia, artists, and scientists.

[53] Quoted by Sergius Yakobson, op. cit., p. 129.
[54] Bertram D. Wolfe, Science Joins the Party. Antioch Review (Yellow Springs, Ohio), March 1950, pp. 56-57.

IV. Religious Groups

The most outspoken opposition to the system and policies of the present Bolshevik regime in Russia (and these strata of Soviet population seem to be rather wide) has been demonstrated by those who resisted the efforts of the Government to replace religious belief by the materialistic Communist dogma.

THE ORTHODOX CONGREGATION IS THE LARGEST

Even according to Soviet official sources the number of believers in the Soviet Union is very large. The largest and most important religious group is the Russian Orthodox congregation. Before the war the chief church baiter, Emelyan Yaroslavsky, had to admit that one-third of the adult population in the towns and two-thirds in the villages were still believers. A British author, R. A. J. Schlesinger, says, on the basis of a review of a Soviet church magazine:

> The external benefits which the church earned by its patriotic attitude during the war are usually overstated, in contrast to a not less current understatement of its strength during the prewar period. In 1937 E. Yaroslavsky spoke of 40,000 existing parish communities, and of a total annual income of the church of 500 million rubles (which would have equaled 200,000 times the average annual income of an unskilled worker, or average collective farmer * * *). Such figures, if reliable, would suggest that not much less than 10 percent of the adult population can have been active church members. Even if the sum total were exaggerated, the church can hardly have had much less than half of the 57,105 parish-communities of the pre-1914 period * * *.[55]

And this in spite of the tremendous campaign against religion which had been waged by the regime.[56]

TOLERATION ONLY A CONVENIENCE DURING WORLD WAR II

The religious situation in Russia has not changed much in spite of the establishment of a working relationship between the regime and the church during the wartime emergency. The relaxation of the persecution policy was only of a temporary nature and the result of the exigency of the war situation. The leaders of the Soviet state during the war felt that it was wiser to keep religion under orderly, legalized control than in a state of suppressed rebellion. The toleration of the church was introduced for two reasons:

(*a*) To avoid open conflict with the church during the wartime struggle to achieve and maintain national unity, and

[55] R. S., The monthly Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy: An Analytical Survey of Contents, 1943–47—I, Soviet Studies (Glasgow), vol. 1, June 1949, p. 55.

[56] "The Communist Party is guided by the conviction that only the realization of conscious and systematic social and economic activity of the masses will lead to the disappearance of religious prejudices. The aim of the party is finally to destroy the ties between the exploiting classes and the organization of religious propaganda, at the same time helping the toiling masses actually to liberate their minds from religious superstitions and organizing on a wide scale scientific-educational and antireligious propaganda * * *." (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—first adopted at the VIII Congress of the Party, March 18–23, 1919—still in force.)

(5) To keep the church as an effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy.[57]

It is ridiculous to speak—as some did at the time—of the "return of religious freedom" to the Soviet Union. The church was given, on September 5, 1943, the long-denied right to have its own Patriarch. However, in the same year, a State Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church was created under the direction of Georgii G. Karpov. This council has been reported by its chief to have over 100 representatives throughout the country serving as liaison between local religious groups and local organizations.[58] A perfect system for both espionage and control.

PERSECUTION STILL PERSISTS AND GROWS

But what is basic and of the utmost importance is that the outlook of the party in regard to religious matters has not changed at all. When the traditional ceremonies of blessing the waters was made the occasion for a recent mass-bathing of believers in the icy Volga River the Soviet press made it the basis for attacks against the allegedly superstitious character of the church.[59] Moreover, late Soviet official documents are filled with antireligious references. The following will serve as examples of the statements to this effect made since the war:

Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and the theoretical foundation of the Communist Party, is incompatible with religion * * *. The world outlook of the party is based on scientific data, whereas religion contradicts science. As the party bases its activity on scientific foundations, it is bound to oppose religion.[60]

The Komsomol has never regarded religion from a neutral angle. Antireligious propaganda forms an integral part of Communist education. Soviet youth has to acquire a materialistic world outlook, a scientific understanding of the phenomena of nature and of social life. Religious superstitions and prejudices are unscientific. That is why Komsomol members must be not only convinced atheists and opponents of all superstitions, but must actively combat the spread of superstitions and prejudices among youth * * *.[61]

[57] See Joseph Newman. Russia Uncensored: Kremlin Is Using Orthodox Church for Expansion and Combating Religion at Same Time. New York Herald Tribune, November 11, 1949.
Some pertinent excerpts from this article read:
"The press campaign against religion, temporarily suspended during the visit of the churchmen [The Moscow Conference of Eastern Orthodox Churches—supported by the Soviet Government], was resumed soon after they left. It was clear that the Communist Party, the heart and lungs of the Soviet regime, would continue to combat religion, on the one hand, while permitting the church to exercise its influence on behalf of the Soviet state, on the other. * * *

* * * * * * *

"While extending an encouraging hand to these two churches [the Orthodox Church and the Moslems] with ties in foreign regions of interest to the Soviet Union, it was uncompromising with those beyond its control. Though the constitution stipulated freedom of religion, Moscow felt free to cut off the Catholic churches in the Soviet Union from contact with the Vatican, setting the pattern subsequently followed by the Eastern European countries. It recently engineered the transfer of the only Roman Catholic Church in Moscow to Soviet hands * * *. Father Thomas, having been cut off from the Soviet congregation, was permitted to hold one Mass each Sunday for the foreign colony.
"The incident provided another example of Soviet policy to suppress those who limit themselves to religion without furthering the interests of the Kremlin."
See also, Albion Ross. Soviet Revives Tie to Levant Church. New York Times, July 17, 1950, p. 12.
Ross states:
"The Soviet Union is enjoying increasing success in extending its influence by assuming the old role of Czarist Russia as a friend of the Greek Orthodox religious community in the Levant states.
"The propaganda channel opened up in this fashion, it is now learned, is being used to spread anti-American literature. * * *
"Old cultural bonds between the Orthodox religious community and Russia are now being reestablished. But the emphasis on anti-American themes in Russian cultural propaganda is apparently a new departure. It fits into the pattern of recent attacks on Israel in certain Soviet publications as 'an outpost of American imperialism.'
"Soviet criticisms of Israel naturally receive wide and favorable attention in the Levant states."
[58] Alex Inkeles, Family and Church in the Postwar U. S. S. R. Annals (Philadelphia), May 1949, p. 39.
[59] R. S., The monthly Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy: An Analytical Survey of Contents, 1943-49—II. Soviet Studies (Glasgow), vol. 1, October 1949, p. 131.
[60] Molodoi Bolshevik, Nos. 5-6, 1946, p. 58.
[61] Advice to Leaders of Study Circles, in Komsomolskii Rabotnik, No. 11, June 1947

The party cannot be neutral regarding religion and it conducts antireligious propaganda against all religious prejudices because it stands for science and religious prejudices are opposed to science since any religion is contrary to science * * *. *There are cases in which some of the members of the party occasionally hinder the thorough development of antireligious propaganda.* If such members of the party are expelled this is very good since there is no room in the ranks of the party for such "Communists." [62] [Italics furnished.]

The world outlook (of communism) is *irreconcilable* to any kind of superstition, religion, or idealism.[63] [Italics furnished.]

And, indeed, we are witnessing at the present time an increase of religious oppression. The Soviet writer I. Oleshchuk sets the keynote when he says:

* * * the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet power call for struggle, for complete victory over religious prejudices and superstitions, for the education of all Soviet people in the spirit of a scientific materialist world outlook * * *. The progressive Soviet teacher cannot, and must not, be neutral toward religion * * * he must be guided by the principle of party-spirit [*partiinost*] in science; he must be not only a nonbeliever himself, but an active *propagandist of atheism* [*bezbozhiye*] amongst others.[64] [Oleshchuk's italics.]

An editorial in Young Bolshevik, the official publication of the central committee of the Young Communist League, asserted in December 1948 that the advance of the Soviet Union required the—

intensification of the struggle against all survivals of bourgeois ideology and morality, including religious prejudices and superstitions.

And an article in the same periodical of May 1948 on Marxism-Leninism about religion repeats all of the old accusations against religion and warns that it is necessary to combat the gains that religion made during the war when the state was too busy carrying on the anti-Nazi struggle to engage in antireligious propaganda and to stress the importance of "science."

AREAS OF TENSION ARE BEING CREATED

The antireligious measures of the Soviet Government are creating areas of tension among the large number of people who Soviet officials themselves admit possess a religious spirit. Religion being what it is, it is not improbable that this number has been and is now on the increase; and there is some evidence of active opposition. This is implicitly admitted by N. Goncharov when he states:

Churchgoers as well as all kinds of sectarians try to influence our children and our youth. The school cannot disregard this. It is quite obvious that we must fight as hard as possible * * *.[65]

All such "churchgoers" and "sectarians" give active proof of the survival of religious sentiment as well as an active religious life in the Soviet Union. It is significant that in 1948, the officially sponsored Moscow Patriarchate laid particular stress on the preservation of discipline within the church. Thus in an article published in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy it is stated:

* * * no army of any state can exist without discipline; without discipline, it would disintegrate. Thus also the strength of the spiritual army of believers is strong through its discipline. Without such spiritual cement, the believers would split into parties, sectarian conventicles, in various quasi-religious groups.[66]

[62] On the magazine Young Bolshevik, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 18, 1947.
[63] On Soviet Socialist Society. Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1948, p. 400.
[64] F. Oleshchuk, Religion—A reactionary ideology. Uchitelskaya Gazeta, November 26, 1949. Translated in summary in Soviet Studies (Glasgow), vol. 1, April 1950, p. 396.
[65] N. Goncharov, Educate School Children in a Spirit of a Scientific World Outlook. Uchitelskaya Gazeta, June 10, 1948. Translated in part and reproduced in Soviet Studies (Glasgow), vol. 1, April 1950, p. 395.
[66] Quoted by R. S., the monthly Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy: An analytical survey of content 1943-49—II. op. cit. p. 131 (footnote 23).

Such "discipline" would, of course, obviate the "sectarians" from the ranks of those who oppose the present regime.

A CLANDESTINE CHURCH WITHIN THE SOVIET FRONTIERS?

Some sources indicate the existence of a clandestine church within the Soviet frontiers. These reports may be exaggerated, but Serge Bolshakoff in his study of nonconforming religious groups in Russia states:

> Within the Soviet Union itself, however, the New Nonconformists—discontented Orthodox, Protestants, and Uniates who object to their superiors because they cooperate with the Government—go "underground" just as older Nonconformists did in the past. No one knows the size or strength of this religious underground in Russia today, but the fact that it does exist and that it will someday come to the surface and make its influence felt can scarcely be doubted. A Croatian Roman Catholic priest, writing under the pseudonym Father George, describes in a recent popular book entitled "God's Underground" a visit of several months in Soviet Russia during which he came into contact with a large number of secretly organized Christian groups. The story that he tells with the literary assistance of Gretta Palmer is a startling account of religious activity involving not only devout peasants and workers but also high Government and military officials. While this story is not capable of objective proof, the history of Russian Nonconformity, with its amazing continuity through underground activity, lends credibility to the basic claims of the author. Prof. Matthew Spinka in reviewing the book has expressed doubts concerning the authenticity of some things that it reports. Nevertheless he concludes: "Undoubtedly there is a basis of fact in what he tells us of the status of religion within the Soviet Union, and it is this residuum of factual information which is highly important. I wish it were all true."
>
> On the whole, the outlook for Russian Nonconformity is a good one. The Nonconformists will continue to preach Christ as they have done before and to preserve the tradition of independence and zeal for their convictions which will make its mark both on the Russian church and on the Russian state.[67]

THE UNIATE GROUP OF THE UKRAINE

There may actually be those in the U. S. S. R. who are "ripe" for proselytizing by one or the other of the split-off, emigré, church bodies now in existence outside Russia.[68] Furthermore, there are many large groups of traditional Nonconformists within the territories that comprise modern Soviet Russia. Important among these, and perhaps typical in pattern, is the Uniate group of the Ukraine. This group certainly is a potential enemy of the Soviet regime. This sect,[69] which acknowledges the supremacy of Rome, has had a long history of suppression at the hands of the Russian Orthodoxy and the state, and more recently at the hands of the Politburo. When the Bolsheviks defeated the Germans on the territories of Poland inhabited by the Uniates, and since incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Uniate Church bishops and clergy were, for the most part, arrested and deported. On March 8, 1946, the Uniates nominally reunited with the Russian church, but their recalcitrance may be indicated by the assassination in 1948 of the man (Dr. Kostelnik) who had been largely responsible for the reunion.[70]

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[67] Serge Bolshakoff, Russian Nonconformity. Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1950; see p. 179.
See also: Red Church, scored by Orthodox group. New York Times, November 30, 1950, p. 9.
This article reports the opposition of the world-wide council of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia to the Moscow Patriarchy and its revelation of underground church activities in the Soviet Union.

[68] Among the larger and more important of these are: The North American Metropolitan See, The West European Exarchate of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Oecumenical Patriarch (of Constantinople), The Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.

[69] See Bolshakoff, op cit. pp. 133-141. Also, R. S. Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy—II. op. cit. p. 132.

[70] Bolshakoff, op. cit. p. 140.

THE ROMAN CATHOLICS

Along with the Uniates the Roman Catholics would certainly be antagonistic to the regime. The Church of Rome has declared its open opposition to the doctrine of communism and has directed its attention for a long time to the lack of religious toleration within the Soviet Union. The Catholic religion is not "banned" in the Soviet Union but insuperable obstacles are continually being placed in its way. For example, the only American priest in Moscow was refused permission last year by the Soviet officials to celebrate mass on Easter Sunday.[71]

PROTESTANT GROUPS

Protestant groups might actually be in a stronger position in Russia today than they were in the days of the Czar. Evangelism was a growing and dynamic phenomenon just prior to the revolution and the abolishment of the favored position of the Orthodox Church probably fostered the growth of Protestantism within the limits of Government persecution. Bolshakoff says of them:

> The Protestant groups are native and independent, dynamic and adaptable. Long years of persecution have taught them to unite their forces and to avoid the internal struggles which have plagued Protestantism for so long. The Russian Protestants have not only a good chance to survive but they may be expected to develop and to organize themselves into a serious spiritual force.[72]

One of the oldest and strongest of these Protestant communities is that of the Baptists. Because it is so overtly strong it has had to yield to Soviet authority in its organization. This organization is constructed at present along lines similar to that of the Orthodox Church with the All-Union Council for the Baptists at the top. Each district is headed by an approved presbyter who is registered with the Soviet authorities and works only in his district.

> No one can preach in any registered congregation unless he is provided with a license from the chief presbyter of the district. As is the case with the Orthodox, many Baptists dislike the close control exercised by the state over their Union through the chief presbyters. Therefore they are only too willing to hear unlicensed preachers who, it is stated, "sow discord in the congregations." There is no doubt that along with the licensed religious organizations in the Soviet Union there are many "underground" groups.[73]

THE MOSLEMS

Not only Christian groups are victims of Soviet persecution, however. The same conditions pertain to other religious groups such as the Moslems and Jews. Despite repeated Soviet attempts to lure the Moslem world with pronouncements that complete freedom exists for Islam in the U. S. S. R., the real attitude of the Soviet regime toward any religion is one of implacable hostility. This hostility is particularly vicious in the case of the predominantly Moslem population of the Soviet Central Asiatic Republics. The Moscow government and party never gave up hopes to discredit Islam and replace it with the atheistic tenets of bolshevism. Recently this campaign has been intensified. The official Russian-language newspaper of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic stated in 1948:

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[71] United States priest barred in Moscow mass. New York Times, April 9, 1950, p. 7.
[72] Bolshakoff, op. cit. p. 176.
[73] Ibid., p. 129.

The religious leadership is trying with all its forces and abilities to support the old in order to maintain faith among the people in the immovability of Islam, and here there is need for an active struggle with religious prejudices.

It must be admitted that during recent years some party organizations have slackened the struggle against that narcotic, religion. * * *

The article continues with the revelation that religious influence has even permeated the party itself:

Otherwise how can one explain the presence of cases when various party members not only fail to struggle against religious survivals but also themselves observe certain religious rites. Thus the former chairman of the October collective farm of Geo-Tepe Raion, now secretary of the party organization, Jurban Mukhamedov, himself personally led the repair of the mosque and after that organized the performance of the "khudia ely" [ceremony affirming that there is but one God].[74]

The official instruction contained in this article for the rebuking of "remiss" party members and the intensification of the struggle against the Moslem religion was repeated by other newspapers of the Soviet Central Asiatic Republics in a concerted campaign. A new antireligious museum was opened in Tashkent in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in the fall of 1949,[75] and the Shariat, the Mohammedan code of laws and rules of life, has been liquidated [76] in spite of assurances by Stalin himself in 1920 that these laws and customs would be preserved.

Recently the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Party Central Committee, Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, devoted the major part of a speech before a special meeting of the Baku "intelligentsia" to villification of the Moslem religion. He distorted history to depict Islam and Moslem aspirations as a force directly opposing and contradictory to the alleged civilizing mission and progressive nature of Russian culture. In speaking of the origins of Islam, Bagirov said:

As it is known, Islam originated in Arabia in the seventh century. Its founder was Mohammed—a representative of the feudal-mercantile aristocracy who utilized Islam for the unification of the Arab tribes and for the maintenance of his own power. Just as every other religion, Islam, being a tool in the hands of the exploiting classes, demands from the faithful absolute submission to their lot, to their fate, to their oppressors.[77]

REASONS FOR SOVIET PERSECUTION OF THE MOSLEMS

Probably the main reason for this intensified campaign against Islam is that Soviet leaders mistrust now more than ever before their Moslem subjects. During the late war the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem broadcast (from Berlin) appeals to the faithful to rise against the Soviet regime. Then, in 1942, insurrections flared up in some of the Soviet Central Asiatic Republics. Pan-Islamic movements outside the Soviet Union are viewed by the Communist regime with uneasiness and suspicion. The traditions and aspirations of the Moslem population of the U. S. S. R. are regarded as a threat to the regime which wants to stamp them out at any cost in order to make the security of the Government complete. The journalist J. L. Teller indicates this when he writes:

Some time ago, Haidar Huseinov was given the Stalin prize for a "History of Philosophic and Political Thought in Azerbaijan in the Nineteenth Century." No sooner were the honors bestowed, when the influential Soviet magazine Litera-

[74] Turkmenskaya Iskra, May 28, 1948.
[75] Pravda Vostoka, October 5, 1949.
[76] This was revealed by an article in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo for January 1950, which declared: "Stalinist precepts, when carried out, quickly led to the elimination of the old-fashioned beliefs in the usefulness of the Shariat, and before long, when the workers themselves were in practice convinced of the advantages and the true popular character of Soviet law, the Shariat eliminated itself and was liquidated."
[77] Bakinski Rabochi, July 18, 1950. Also partially reproduced in Bolshevik, No. 13, 1950, pp. 21-37.

turnaya Gazeta descended upon the jury and discovered grave heresies in Mr. Huseinov's work. The paper lashed out at the author for describing in glowing terms the leaders of the nineteenth century Moslem insurrections against Czarist rule. The analogy between those insurrections and the restiveness of the Moslems in the same region under Prime Minister Joseph Stalin's rule is so vivid that it is astonishing that it escaped the jury. The jurors have since been removed from their posts and have disappeared from sight.[78]

The Moslems are being given increasing reason, then, to recall and reactivate their opposition to Moscow. And the concern evinced by Moscow seems to indicate that they are so doing. There is undoubtedly discontent with the Soviet regime among various Moslem groups, particularly in those whole communities which were transferred eastward at the end of the war. These mass deportations were justified by Soviet authorities as retribution for alleged general collusion with the Germans. There also seems to be discontent among many Moslems over Soviet irreligiousness, particularly in areas where Moslems are not allowed to be married by mullahs, a serious matter for the many Moslems who believe that issue born of a marriage over which a mullah has not presided is illegitimate.

ANTI-SEMITISM

Another deplorable development in the present day Soviet Union, but one which increases the tensions within the U. S. S. R., is the recent rebirth of anti-Semitism. The growth of anti-Jewish feeling in wartime Russia forced even Ilia Ehrenburg to speak openly against this dangerous development in 1943 (although he has of late penned poisonous articles against Zionism). During 1949, the campaign of the Soviet Government against the Soviet intelligentsia and against their "deviations" and "errors" in the realms of art, literature, theater and other cultural activities assumed to a great extent an anti-Semitic coloring. This officially inspired campaign against "homeless cosmopolitans" particularly assaults the Jewish religion. Thus, for instance, one novel was taken to task for propagandizing in favor of and describing in detail the services in a Jewish synagogue.[79]

Joseph Newman, former Moscow correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, reported on the conditions of the Jews in two articles of his serial "Russia Uncensored." In one of these articles he states:

> One year ago, in the fall of 1948, an unauthorized popular demonstration was held in Moscow, one of the very few since Premier Josef V. Stalin took power.
>
> It occurred on Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year at the Moscow synagogue. Members of the Israeli legation, headed by Mrs. Golda Myerson, had just arrived to open the first mission [to] * * * the Soviet Union.
>
> They were invited to attend the religious services at the synagogue. When Mrs. Myerson and members of her mission arrived they were amazed at the huge throng of Jews who packed the entire street in front of the synagogue to greet them.
>
> They were dumbfounded at what happened next. There was an impassioned and almost hysterical outburst of feeling. Jewish men and women broke out in tears. They wept as they cheered and cried aloud: "We have waited all our lives for this! For Israel! Tomorrow to Jerusalem!" * * *
>
> The Soviet leaders were not slow to punish the demonstrators and those who belonged to their faith. They sounded a clear and strong warning to the Jews in Russia, numbering perhaps more than 3,000,000, three times the population of the new State of Israel.

[78] J. L. Teller, Kremlin Drives to Isolate Moslems Within Soviet Union. Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 1950, p. 9.

[79] See Congressional Record, appendix, February 6, 1950, pp. A897-899. (Report on the condition of Jews in Russia written by Sergius Yakobson.)

It was a notice that Russian Jews would not be permitted to leave the Soviet Union and go to Israel. It took the form of a campaign to terrify Jews into abandoning the hope which they so wildly demonstrated on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur and into resigning to spend the rest of their days in the Soviet Union under a dictatorship.

First, a group of Jews accused of having been the ringleaders of the demonstration was rounded up and imprisoned. A large number of others were cross-examined by police and terrified that they, too, might be jailed.

Next, the Soviet police raided and liquidated the only two Yiddish-language printing plants in Moscow—the newspaper "Einheit" and "Emess," a house which published books, pamphlets, and magazines in Yiddish, especially the works of Sholom Alekhem.

At the same time they liquidated the offices of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which Soviet leaders evidently felt had served its purpose in mobilizing support during the war but should not be permitted to continue as a center through which Jews could keep in touch with one another. * * *

There was no official notice; no charges; no trial. * * *

Scores of Jews in all fields of intellectual life—science, education, literature, theater, cinema, music, art—were publicly humiliated by being denounced as "homeless cosmopolitans" and by having their original Jewish names printed after their adopted Russian names.

Thus when the writer G. Yasny was assailed as a "passportless wanderer", his name appeared as follows: G. Yasny (Finkelstein). * * * [81]

Other reputable writers, such as Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union,[81] and Edmund Stevens, former Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor,[82] have also written of the clearly anti-Jewish line which the regime has now taken. The Jewish people in Russia, inspired by Zionism as they have never before been inspired, certainly constitute an area of acute tension within the Soviet Union.

OTHER GROUPS SUBJECT TO THE SAME TREATMENT

Other religious groups, such as the Buddhists and smaller minority religions and cults, are subject to the same persecution on the part of the Communist regime, and thereby are potential areas of tension. The ties of religion and cultures based upon religion are stronger in some parts of the Soviet Union than any latter-day loyalty to the Communist state.

[80] Joseph Newman, Russia Uncensored: Plight of Jews. New York Herald Tribune, November 8, 1949.
[81] Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow. New York, J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1950.
[82] Edmund Stevens, This Is Russia Uncensored: Jews Denied Jobs or Exit to Israel and This Is Russia Uncensored: Zionism Jolts Soviet: Profile of New Purge. Christian Science Monitor, January 10, and January 12, 1950.

V. Minorities

Of the present total Soviet population of roughly 200,000,000, about 46 percent consists of many minority groups each of which has its own distinct and very real grievances against the regime.

PAST GENOCIDAL ACTS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The roster of nationalities which the Moscow Government has attempted to liquidate in the land of socialism might suffice to demonstrate the emptiness of the claim by the Communist propagandists and their dupes that the Soviet regime has solved successfully the nationality problem in the Union. Lev E. Dobriansky submits the following cases of what he terms genocide on the part of the Soviet Union:

The Ingrian nation, which consisted of 400,000 civilized people of Scandinavian culture and who inhabited Ingermanland, was wiped out in 1921–23, accommodating thereby the Russification of this hinterland of Leningrad;

The Don and Kuban Cossack nations, who considered themselves separate national groups, were annihilated between 1928 and 1930;

The Greek population of the Kerch Peninsula, an ethnic group of some 8,000 people, was deported to a forced labor camp in the Arctic in order to allow the Russification of this strategically important region; * * *

* * * * * * *

The Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. * * *[83]

The following is a list of Soviet "autonomous" republics recently liquidated:

As a "precautionary measure" the Volga German Republic was abolished by the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1941 and its inhabitants deported. In 1943 the Chechen-Ingush and Kalmyk autonomous republics were abolished and their population exiled. In 1945 the Crimean autonomous republic inhabited by Tatars was also wiped out of existence, and its population scattered throughout Siberia. The Soviet Government alleged that these peoples had failed to resist the Germans sufficiently * * *[84]

FAVORED POSITION OF THE GREAT RUSSIANS

As early as 1921, on a visit to Georgia, Stalin was astonished at the lack of the former solidarity among the workers of the various Transcaucasian nationalities.

Among the workers and peasants—

he complained—

nationalism has developed; suspicion against their own comrades of other races has strengthened; there are far too many anti-Armenian, anti-Tartar, anti-Georgian, anti-Russian, and other such nationalistic expressions to be heard.[85]

[83] Statement by Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, Georgetown University, president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, for Ratification of the Genocide Convention (hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 81st Cong., 2d sess. on Executive O, the International Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, pp. 325–326).

[84] Sergius Yakobson, Soviet Concepts of Point Four. Annals (Philadelphia), March 1950, p. 132.

[85] Quoted by Sergius Yakobson in the chapter "The Rise of Russian Nationalism"—Chapter V, of Nationalism. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford 1939, p. 74.

In the 1920's a Soviet Communist writer was inclined to criticize [86] and scoff at this Great Russian chauvinism but since the end of the last war there is a marked tendency, even in the highest quarters of Soviet officialdom and party, to placate the great Russians and to place them in relation to the other peoples of the Soviet Union in an avant-garde or privileged position similar to the superior status enjoyed by the members of the Communist Party in relation to the toiling masses of the Union. At the reception for Soviet war heroes at the Kremlin on May 24, 1945, the great Russians were openly toasted by Stalin as the central core of Soviet society. He said:

> I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union. I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people because it has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL GROUPS IN THE POLITBURO

What this leading position amounts to in practice can perhaps best be seen from the following facts and figures. Of about 175 different nationalities living in the Soviet Union only 7 have had any representation in the Politburo since the inception of the regime. The Politburo does not seem to favor leaders of the national groups in its midst. This has been especially true for the Ukraine, long a trouble spot; and those members of the Politburo, who were especially identified with the Ukraine, have been eliminated, although service for the party done in the Ukraine seems to be regarded quite highly.

LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL GROUPS IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Similar observations can be made regarding the role played by the minority groups in the local administration of the Soviet republics. For example, the Kazakhs, who constitute about 58 percent of the population of Kazakhstan, are allotted the lamb's share in white-collar work in Kazakhstan's ministries; the Kazakhs have held only 2 percent of such jobs in local industry, 2 percent in public health, 4 percent in light industry, 6.7 percent in textiles, 7.9 percent in communal economy, 10 percent in agriculture, and 14 percent in milk and meat.[87] Russians, not natives, play the leading role in the economic life of the Central Asiatic Republics and of the Baltic region.

DISCRIMINATION IN INDUSTRY

In industrial endeavor the natives have been given mostly unskilled jobs and little attention is given to raising their qualifications. The few who do succeed in rising to skilled jobs are soon discouraged, because the party and official organizations fail to provide for their cultural and welfare needs.[88]

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[86] In a pamphlet by Alexandrov, entitled "The Masked Class-Enemy," which appeared in Moscow in 1929, we read:

"Great Russian chauvinism has remained alive even to the present day. Among Soviet officials, and even party members, in spite of all the directions of the party and the Government, we meet obstinate resistance to learning the language of the national minorities. We find still among our officials a haughty and contemptuous attitude toward the cultures of the more backward peoples and the requirements of the national republics * * *. It must be emphasized that certain sections of the Russian working population are infected with Great Russian chauvinism even today."

[87] Kazakhstan Pravda, August 13, 1948.

[88] Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 15, 1947.

DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION

The number of Central Asiatics who receive higher training is unimpressive. The rector of the Kazakh State University in Alma-Ata publicly admitted in March 1949 that during its entire existence, since 1934, only 17 percent of the university's graduates had been Kazakhs. In the 1948–49 academic year the Tadzhik Agricultural Institute graduated 14 specialists in truck gardening and not one of them was a Tadzhik. After more than 30 years of Soviet power, it seems that there are few instances of real progress in training native personnel to replace the present Russian leaders in this area.

AUTONOMY A MYTH

Thus it is seen that the so-called autonomy of the Soviet minorities is a myth. The Bolsheviks always have been Centralists by conviction. When the Georgians tried to remain independent of Soviet rule they were overcome by the Red Army, despite the fact that the Soviet leaders had actually signed a treaty in which they recognized the independence of Georgia. Today native officials have only the most limited scope for independent action in the Soviet framework. Taxes and budgets of the Soviet republics are determined in Moscow. The major industrial enterprises in the "autonomous" areas and most of its natural resources are wholly and directly under the Central Government in Moscow. The oil wells of Baku are controlled by a Moscow organ, and not by the Azerbaidzhan government. Georgia is rich in manganese ore but the Georgian local government is an outsider as far as its exploitation is concerned. The collection of Uzbek cotton is managed by an agency having no local responsibilities. The rich coal and water resources of the Ukraine are administered by central agencies completely removed from local control. Even the cultural autonomy so much vaunted in Soviet propaganda has been seriously curtailed. No diversity of spiritual values, among the deeper manifestations of inner life, is tolerated in Communist Russia. There are many tongues in the Soviet Union, but all are required to sing exclusively the praises of Lenin and Stalin. Finally, great Russians are moved bodily into the strategically decisive parts of the Union. Ivar Spector indicates this when he writes:

> Attention was directed in the first place to the Central Asiatic Republics, the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union which is exposed to invasion from the Middle East and which leads directly to the vital Soviet oil resources and to the indispensable industrial area of the Urals. In some of these republics, judging by the Soviet press, the Slavic population already outnumbers the natives. Large numbers of Russians have been brought in, ostensibly to assist in the development of new industries, irrigation projects, and mining enterprises.
>
> Next in importance to the Central Asiatic border were the strategically exposed Baltic area in Europe and the Mongolian frontier in Asia. When, for a time after the Second World War, it seemed likely that the China of Chiang Kai-shek might replace Japan as a none-too-friendly neighbor of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government turned its attention to the autonomous republic of Buryat Mongolia and the nominally "independent" state of Outer Mongolia. The same influx of Russians occurred, until according to the Soviet press in 1949, Ulan-Bator resembled a Russian city.[89]

[89] Ivar Spector, A Translator Looks at Russia: Ruthless Shifting of Her Minorities Tantamount to Genocide. Seattle Daily Times, June 1, 1950.

GENOCIDE IN THE BALTIC ONLY INCREASES THE TENSION

To this record of oppressive colonial acts of the Moscow government there may be added the persecution of political and religious groups of the population of the Baltic countries, and of peoples in parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia annexed by the U. S. S. R. after the last war. On October 15, 1949, the British delegate to the United Nations General Assembly openly accused the Soviet Union of "genocidal terror" in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

All of this, of course, means that an area of tension has been built up both between the Great Russians and the various national minorities and between the Center (Moscow) and the peripheral areas which are supposedly autonomous. Dissatisfaction is particularly acute in the newly annexed territories and it is there that separatist movements are more likely to blossom into full flower.

The Baltic States—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—were victims of Soviet perfidy in the first place. Forced into a treaty with the U. S. S. R., they were nevertheless assured that their independence would be guaranteed. In less than a year they were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Joseph Newman says of this:

> * * * the case of the Baltic States shows, contrary to article 13 of the Soviet Constitution, that admission into the U. S. S. R. need not necessarily be voluntary. The Baltic countries were occupied by Soviet troops in June 1940 (less than a year after Viacheslav M. Molotov, then Foreign Minister, announced that the military pact just concluded with them "in no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania"), and their admission into the U. S. S. R. was effected during this occupation.[90]

But, in spite of great effort to stamp out resistance, the people of these territories have given Moscow much to worry about. Joseph Newman reports that official newspapers in Lithuania reveal large scale violence and insurrection in that country. He writes:

> The Communist newspaper Soviet Lithuania, throughout the months of 1948, reported that "bourgeois nationalist bands" were roaming over the countryside killing peasants who had collaborated in Soviet collectivization, burning homes and warehouses filled with farm products, destroying cattle, and wrecking farm equipment.
>
> In April 1948, the newspaper reported that "kulaks" (a term which originally referred to an exploiting landowner but which now covers anyone who opposes the Soviet collectivization system) had put up "fierce resistance." It said they were infiltrating into collective farms "to wreck machinery and horses, organize thefts of state property, turn agricultural cooperatives into business organizations, and resist collective sowing." [91]

The clergy were especially singled out as centers of resistance and this was used as an excuse to break the back of the Roman Church organization in the Baltic nations. Both Joseph Newman and Edmund Stevens [92] report the wholesale arrest of clergy, the propaganda against them, the cutting off of communication with Rome, and the attempts to build a "national Catholic Church" in the place of the Roman Church.

Most of the population, of course, is forced to give outward tokens of acceptance of the Soviet regime, but they long for freedom once again. This is demonstrated by the fact that almost every morning flowers are found scattered along the base of the monument to Latvian

[90] Joseph Newman, Russia Uncensored: What Happened to Three Baltic States When They Were Joined by Force to Russia and Collectivized. New York Herald Tribune, November 10, 1949.

[91] Loc. cit.

[92] Edmund Stevens, This Is Russia Uncensored: Noose for Religion Tested in Baltics. Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 1950.

independence which still stands in the center of Riga, the capital city of that Baltic state.

These acts and symbols of resistance have cost the Balts dearly, however. Joseph Newman suggests that—

> It is not unlikely that deaths, arrests, and forced resettlement of suspected persons seriously affected the population of the three Baltic States, which already had been reduced from 6,000,000 in 1939 to an estimated 4,500,000 at the end of the war as a result of migration, evacuation, war casualties, deportations to Russia and Germany, and liquidation of elements hostile to their respective military occupations. [93]

In spite of such punishment and reprisals the Baltic people continue to resist and acts of sabotage are prevalent. While the men in the Kremlin may have forgotten their promises to respect the independence of the Baltic states and to leave their social systems unchanged—a promise incidentally given also to Rumania and other present Soviet satellites on the eve of their "liberation" by the Red Army—the Baltic people evidently have not, and resist the new order as best they can.

RESISTANCE IN THE UKRAINE

Another example of actual resistance to the imperialism of Moscow is to be found in the case of the Ukraine. This nation formed an independent Republic in 1920 but was soon swallowed up by the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that all Ukrainian anti-Communist parties were thoroughly liquidated in the period of 1920–23, resistance continues. Lev E. Dobriansky states that—

> * * * there have been, as now in the form of the efficient Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which the Kremlin classifies as a bandit force, outbursts of spirited resurgence against the planned attacks on the Ukrainian national entity as such * * * the patent fact is that the Ukrainian nation itself is intrinsically anti-Communist because it has never surrendered spiritually to the prime objective of the Kremlin to create the Soviet Nation (Sovietsky Narod) and its soviet man, speaking only the Russian language, thinking only in terms of nonbourgeois Soviet concepts, and taught to forget his non-Russian cultural tradition, his language, his history, his church, his art and customs—all the sensitive fibers that sustain the life of a national group. [94]

MANY ARE READY FOR ACTIVE RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME

A clue to the areas of active resistance within the U. S. S. R. in addition to the newly annexed regions discussed above is to be seen in the fact that party work in one or more of three specific regions appears to be the required stepping stone to important party jobs such as membership on the Politburo. These three regions are the Ukraine, which we have just discussed; the Caucasus, from which region was one of the abolished Republics; and Gorki (formerly Nizhni-Novgorod) on the Volga.

There can be little question that dissident minorities would be ready for either active resistance to a hated regime or disloyal in case of armed conflict (as was clearly demonstrated by the tens of thousands of minority-group Soviet citizens who defected to the advancing Germans in the last war).[95] And there can be little question that there are such dissident minorities within the Soviet Union.

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[93] Joseph Newman, op. cit.
[94] Dobriansky, Congressional Record, July 25, 1950, appendix.
[95] Ivar Spector, of the University of Washington, states (Spector, op. cit.):
"In the early stages of the war there were mass desertions of both troops and civilians to the Germans. Not only did some of the non-Slavic peoples along the Baltic and in the Caucasus prove untrustworthy, but even many of the Ukrainians."

VI. The Red Army

Another very important area of potential dissension within the Soviet Union is the Red army itself. Obviously not too much can be known about the position of the Red army as a unit in the political life of the Soviet regime and conclusions must necessarily be tentative, but there are indications that the Soviet regime does not consider the Red army 100 percent trustworthy, and fears and tries to eliminate the competition afforded by the armed forces for the allegiance of the masses.

REGIME UNCERTAIN OF THE RED ARMY

One of the best indications that the regime does fear the competition of the Red army is to be found in a study of the May Day slogans which epitomize the ideological line of the party.

During the heat of the war the Red army had been glorified and lionized. It was hailed as the protector of the honor, freedom, and independence of the Socialist state.[96] But by 1944 the May Day slogans began to play down the Red army. The slogan appealing to the commanders of the Red army was dropped from the list, and the special slogan devoted to the "gallant" and "heroically fighting" Red army as a unit disappeared entirely and was integrated into another slogan—"the great Soviet people and its heroic Red army." Then in 1945—a few days before Nazi Germany's final collapse—in the same slogan the Red army was no longer described as "heroic."

Another example of the effort of the regime to lower the prestige of the Red army comes from no less a person than J. V. Stalin. At a reception which Stalin tendered Red army marshals in June 1945, he reminded them that—

> a good foreign policy was worth two or three army corps, and to point out to them that no one must become conceited.[97]

The Communist anxiety about the Red army aspirations is further illustrated by the fact that in July of 1945 all rights and privileges of the Red army were granted to NKVD and NKGB personnel. Beriya (head of the secret police) was elevated to the rank of marshall and Stalin was given the rank of generalissimo. Frederick C. Barghoorn in reporting these incidents calls them—

> reminders to all in high or low places that the Kremlin did not intend to permit any relaxation of its authority or of state discipline.[98]

[96] A study of May Day slogans has been made by Sergius Yakobson and Harold D. Lasswell in The Language of Politics. See Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates: The Language of Politics. New York, George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949, ch. 10, pp. 233–297, passim.

[97] Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Union Between War and Cold War. Annals (Philadelphia) May 1949, p. 8.

[98] Loc. cit.

RED ARMY CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AND THEIR EFFECT

The regime early realized that sending the Red army to Europe and allowing it to contact the West was a dangerous, albeit necessary, evil. Barghoorn states:

> Considerable evidence came to the attention of foreigners in Moscow that demobilized war veterans were among the most disillusioned and, in some cases, embittered elements of the population. A good many had observed a freer life while abroad and had acquired a degree of self-respect which made it difficult for them to return to the rigid discipline of Soviet postwar civilian life * * *[99]

It was the war veteran and the Red army soldier who had had the chance to see the west. Theirs was the chance to suffer the disillusionment to which the people of a closed intellectual system are subject when encounter with outside reality reveals to them that they have been deceived by the authorities at home. It was their opportunity to meet and know on a personal level their counterparts in the west. It was their opportunity to see the part the Western Allies played to save the Soviet Union from the Nazi hordes. Barghoorn has—

> no doubt that the spontaneous good will manifested toward the Allies on [VE-day] * * * as also the similar feeling expressed by the Red army men who met the Americans in the closing days of the European war, worried the Kremlin. The memoirs of General Eisenhower and General Dean's Strange Alliance make it clear that at least some of this friendliness, in the case of the Red army, extended as high up as Marshal Zhukov. It is certainly significant that the trip to the United States which Zhukov apparently planned never materialized.[100]

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE ARMY

The Soviet regime had already tried to guard against the effects of the wavering of loyalties by increasing the political control of the Army. In 1937 the political officers of the Red army command had been placed in dominant position over that of the military commander in order to ensure the loyalty of the army. Louis Nemzer describes the system of control in the Soviet armed forces as follows:

> Although the Central Committee maintains several checks on the work of the trade-unions, the Union of Communist Youth, and other mass organizations, it uses a more direct method in the case of the Soviet armed forces. Here, the Kremlin has placed the military department of its own apparatus inside the U. S. S. R. Ministry of Armed Forces, and has given it direct responsibility for the loyalty and morale of the nation's military personnel. In this dual capacity, the military department, functioning as the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the armed forces, reports to and works under organs of the party Central Committee. In fact, during the late war, a Politburo member became the chief of the MPA.
>
> The leaders of the MPA have proclaimed that their organization has two major objectives: To assist in the psychological process of stimulating each man to achieve maximum efficiency in his military duties, and to make him an enthusiastic supporter of the policies of the party. In pursuance of these objectives, the MPA leaders are given varying degrees of authority over a large and complete structure, utilizing three major types of personnel. The first, the administrators of this vast system, are the "political workers" of the "political organs," the full-time professional members of the MPA's staff who work in the upper and middle levels of the Soviet armed forces, from the military district headquarters down to the battalion. These are openly referred to as "militant Bolsheviks, placed by the Bolshevik Party in a most important area of work * * * and responsible to the party."

[99] Frederick C. Barghoorn, Notes on Life and Travel in Russia. Yale Review (New Haven), June 1948, p. 613.
[100] Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 6.

The second type of personnel, the military commander in the units below the level of battalion, is only partly responsible to the MPA. As a result of the governmental decree of 1942, the office of military commissar was abolished and the military commander was told that political work had become "part of his service obligations." In this sphere, the commander is responsible to the political organs, and through them to the MPA. A third type of personnel at the disposal of the main political administration is the Communist Party and Komsomol membership in the armed forces, which includes a significant percentage of the total manpower in the Soviet armed forces * * *[101]

Further information how this rather elaborate system of control reaches down into the Red army is provided by Merle Fainsod:

Control in the armed forces conforms to the same basic pattern [as in the factory and collective farm] although there are differences of detail. Corresponding to the administrative-technical line of control is the regular military command, with the usual hierarchy of officers found in all armies. The higher one ascends in the officer bureaucracy, the greater the percentage of party membership. The party has a particularly strong representation in the officer cadres in the newer services such as aviation and tanks.

In the armed forces, it is necessary to distinguish between the work of the party organizers who concentrate on party personnel and the organization of political work in the broader sense of including both party and nonparty personnel. Each small unit of the army has its party and Komsomol organizations, each one led by a partorg or Komsorg (party or Komsomol organizer or secretary). Up to the regiment, the partorg or party secretary is not a full-time official. He performs his party duties in addition to his regular military duties. In the regiment and higher, the party secretary has a full-time job. He is part of the party apparatus and assigned to his duties by higher party authorities. He directs the work of the party organization in his unit, has responsibility for party education, for party meetings, for executing the party lines in the army, and for enforcing party discipline in his political unit.

The political education of the armed forces as a whole (nonparty as well as party) is the responsibility of the political administration—so-called—which has its special representatives in every unit down to and through the battalion. This representative is called the Zampolit, or assistant commander for political affairs. He was formerly called the political commissar. He has responsibility for the political education and political health of the army as a whole. The kinos, the army clubs, the educational circles, the army libraries, the army newspapers, and all varieties of propaganda directed to the army rank and file come under his jurisdiction. He also has responsibility for reporting on the political mood and morals of each unit in the army, officers as well as men. The problem of demarcating his responsibilities from the command responsibilities of the officers in military charge of units presents a particularly troublesome issue in Soviet army organization. The difficulty is that the Zampolit and the commander have separate chains of command—the one leading up in the military hierarchy and the other in the party hierarchy.

In addition, there is still another chain of command independent of the other two—that exercised by the MGB, or secret police in the army. Divisions, corps, and armies—each has its special section representing the MGB; below the level of the division down to the regiment and even occasionally the battalion, there is a specially empowered emissary of the special section. As is usual, this emissary has his dossier on everyone in the unit, and the regular network of informers to keep him posted on what is happening in the unit.[102]

SYSTEM NOT ENTIRELY SUCCESSFUL

This system of control, however, has not been entirely successful nor free from criticism. Nemzer points this out in following words:

Unlike other departments of the Central Committee's Apparatus, the Main Political Administration must operate as a public agency, and is subject to public

[101] Louis Nemzer, The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), vol. 44, March 1950, pp. 78-79.

[102] Merle Fainsod, Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System. American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), June 1950, pp. 280-281.

criticism. It is consequently possible to gain some impression of its weaknesses and problems. The MPA has been accused of top-heavy bureaucracy, of providing insufficient guidance to the vast organization under its control, and of ignoring the needs of many parts of that organization. One unit which has been under heavy fire is the Komsomol structure, through which a special office in the MPA utilizes the million or more military members of the Communist Union of Youth for special service. In recent years, the Komsomol unit in the armed forces, although presumably a mass organization open to all able young people has actually been losing members. It has allegedly failed to secure contributions from many of those who have remained in its ranks and those Komsomol members who are being utilized in political work are reportedly operating on a low level. Political workers are charged with providing little guidance to the Komsomols. Similar forms of criticism are offered concerning other parts of the MPA organization * * *.

It is not surprising to note that the directorship of the Main Political Administration of the armed forces has not been a stepping stone to higher party posts. By the spring of 1949, there had been seven incumbents in this position. Of these, one had died in office, three had been executed, one had disappeared into obscurity, and only one (the present U. S. S. R. Minister of State Control) remains a relatively important personage. The seventh, Colonel-General Shikin, was removed from his post in 1949, and made director of one of the several military academies which his subordinates had been supervising.[103]

DISAFFECTION STILL PERSISTS IN SPITE OF PRECAUTIONS

Still in spite of, or just on account of, the ever-increasing political control [104] over the Armed Forces, disaffection on the part of Red army personnel persists. Even early in the war the Government was conscious of this. Already in the ukase issued June 8, 1943, against traitors to the socialist motherland, even members of the family of a Red army officer or soldier were faced with imprisonment if they knew of the disaffection, or with exile to remote areas though they had no knowledge of the plans.[105] A system of hostages has always been the natural by-product of a totalitarian rule. After the war additional measures were taken by the Government to counteract wholesale disaffection. Merle Fainsod describes these efforts as follows:

> Recent escapees report that there has been a tremendous tightening in the Soviet control machinery since 1947. The personnel of the MGB has been greatly expanded in occupied areas, and there is much more careful surveillance than earlier. The Soviet occupation army leads what amounts to a concentration camp existence. When soldiers are not on duty, they are confined to barracks and clubs. Absence without leave is subject to the most severe penalties. Arms are

[103] Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 79–80.

[104] That these controls themselves cause disaffection is an interesting, but not surprising, phenomenon which we shall study below in the citation of several displaced persons interviews. Meanwhile, it may be of interest to note the opinion of Raymond L. Garthoff, in an article on the strategy and capabilities of the Soviet military establishment, as to how these controls affect the military machine. He states in part (On Soviet Military Strategy and Capabilities (review article). World Politics (New Haven), vol. 3, October 1950. pp. 123–124):

"1. *Political supremacy* over the Soviet military machine is, of course, apparent and effective at all levels of operation. The supreme political command is also the supreme military command, and in addition to this, the Zampoliti or political deputies (formerly political commissars) exercise more than a mere propagandistic and indoctrinating role. Their power is very great, and they are often disliked, for different reasons, by both officers and men. They are sometimes cowardly, but more often fanatic fighters.

"* * * *Bravery and reliance are usual; but even very high officers are usually loath to act without specific directive.* Both the political system and the Zampolit's discretionary power intensify this dilemma. *For this reason effective surprise is an especially disorganizing weapon against them.* [Italics furnished.]

"* * * Originality and conservatism are mixed, on the top level. Below, there is only conformity."

[105] According to liability under article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code which reads as follows:

"In the event of flight abroad by land or air of a member of the armed forces, the adult members of his family, if they in any way assisted the preparation or the commission of this act of treason, or even if they knew of it but failed to report it to the authorities, are to be punished: by deprivation of liberty for a period from 5 to 10 years and by confiscation of all property.

"The remaining adult members of the traitor s family, and those living with him or dependent on him at the time of the commission of the crime. are liable to deprivation of their electoral rights and to exile to the remote areas of Siberia for a period of 5 years." (Quoted by International Survey (London), No. 60, August 25, 1950, p. 33.)

issued only when essential for assigned duty. At the first sign of disaffection, the soldier is arrested and sent home. New recruits are a carefully screened and thoroughly propagandized group. They are not ordinarily sent on occupation duty if there is a record of repression in the family or any indication of anti-Soviet attitudes. Screening obviously does not work perfectly (witness the continuing escapes), but it is much more careful than earlier.[106]

FLIGHT TO THE WEST

All these precautions were, however, in vain. The disaffections were many—particularly after the war. And they would, probably, have been much greater had not the Western Powers been convinced immediately after the end of hostilities that their duty lay in sending back to the Soviet authorities those Red army soldiers who tried to make their way over to the Allies. Since that time of overzealous international amity many Red army deserters have made their way to either the British or American zones of occupied former enemy countries. Fliers have stolen planes in order to escape the Soviet totalitarianism. Foot soldiers have laboriously and riskily made their way through heavily patrolled borders.

These Red army men gave up their national and family ties and position within the Soviet Union for many various reasons. Some were, according to Fainsod, as petty as an impermanent romantic attachment for a German girl. But most were deeply significant. Generally, among the ordinary rank and file, the main grievances were poor food, the enforced isolation from the local population in the case of the occupation army, stringent discipline, the special privileges of the officer group, and the memory of persecuted relatives and friends. Among the officers the professional (and usually nonparty) men resented the encroachment of the Zampoliti on command responsibilities, and the fact that they were constantly under the surveillance of the NKVD (or MGB). They were not trusted and they had to function in an atmosphere of constant insecurity and fear.

Fainsod has summarized a number of interviews with some of the people who have escaped from the Soviet Union since 1945. Five of these interviews are given herewith as representative:

No. 1 was a 25-year-old private of peasant background with no history of repression in the family. He had been an Ostarbeiter (Soviet citizens who had been sent to Germany for forced labor) in Germany between 1942 and 1945 and was inducted into the Red army in 1945. He served as a private until 1948. Why did he flee? First, he reported that he was impressed by the contrast in living conditions between the Soviet Union and the west. He had had a taste of the west and liked it. Second, he said that the MGB (secret police) had kept him in confinement for 2 days *until he agreed to spy on his army comrades.* He found this distasteful and decided to try to escape from the MGB clutches. Third, one of his friends managed to escape, and this gave him the courage to make a similar attempt.

* * * * * * *

No. 5 was a 36-year-old former lieutenant colonel in the army who left in 1945. His father had been a carpenter. There was no history of family repression. No. 5 was brought up as a loyal Soviet citizen. He joined the Komsomol and was a party member. He became an engineer and later a journalist. He served with the Red army from 1941 to 1945 and was promoted from junior officer to lieutenant colonel. He fled in the confusion of the VE-day celebration in 1945. He reported that he had become disillusioned with communism in the course of his work as an engineer, that many of his friends and associates had been ar-

[106] Fainsod op. cit. p. 272.

rested during the 1936–38 purge[107] (the Yezhovschina), and that, although he was passed over, he lived in constant fear that he too would be apprehended. The dominating reason for his flight, he reported, was his desire to be free of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which surrounded him in the Soviet Union.

* * * * * * *

No. 7 was a 34-year-old lieutenant colonel on occupation duty in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. His father had been a Czarist officer. No. 7 was arrested during the Yezhovschina as a Polish spy because his father had Polish connections. He was sentenced to 10 years of forced labor, but escaped during the war, hid out, and finally, with the help of false papers which concealed his identity, obtained a job as an electro-technician. He was sent to Germany in 1945 to work on a reparations assignment and escaped in 1947. He reported that he lived in constant fear that the MGB would discover his true identity. He would have fled earlier but was not sure until 1947 that the Americans would give him a friendly reception.

* * * * * * *

No. 9 was a 43-year-old former middle-level administrator in the Soviet Military Administration, who had been a lieutenant colonel in the supply services during the war. No. 9 had a very successful career as an administrator in the Soviet Union and had never been arrested. Nevertheless, he reported that he had been dreaming about escape for a long time. He hated the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which always surrounded him. The MGB checked everything he did. In the Soviet Military Administration, MGB agents were everywhere. He spoke of the girl stenographers in his office—the foxes, he called them—who were used not only as spies in the office but as provocateurs at evening drinking parties to bring out any latent anti-Soviet sentiment among those present. He was disgusted with the whole business. When he visited home in 1948, he talked the matter over with his wife. She advised him to make a break for freedom if a good opportunity presented itself. He left his wife and two children behind in Moscow and, when interviewed, he was still wondering whether he had a right to flee.

No. 10 was a 41-year-old former cadre officer, a captain who was on temporary duty with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. He fled in 1948, also leaving a wife and two children behind. He was terribly worried about them. He said the decision to escape was a painfully hard one for him because of his family. He had no personal material reason for fleeing. He lived reasonably well. But he always felt that he was living in a prison. Every moment had to be accounted for, every gesture watched, every intonation controlled. Life had become so unendurably disciplined that he decided that he had to break away. He preferred to take his chances as an ordinary laborer in Germany.[108]

These interviews are revealing in the consideration of stresses within the Soviet armed forces. No doubt the constant watching and the threats of purges militates against the formation of an organized and active opposition within the Red army even as it increases the resentment. Nevertheless, that there is tension within that most important area of Soviet life is beyond any doubt.

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[107] The 1936–38 Red army purge was terrible and far-reaching. The Army Information Digest describes it as follows:

"The great Red army purge of 1937 struck the Soviet people like a thunderbolt and greatly shocked the world. The Soviet newspapers headlined 'For espionage and treason to the fatherland—execution by shooting.' Eight high-ranking Soviet generals including Marshal Tukhachevsky had undergone trial and were shot. The purge did not stop here. Seven military district commanders disappeared as did Marshal Bluecher, the renowned, talented, and popular commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. His exact fate is still unknown. Smirnov, the Navy Chief, also vanished along with the Deputy Commissar of Defense, Marshal Egorov, and the head of the military aviation. The bloody purge went deeper into the Red army. It has been estimated that more than 30,000 of the commanding officers of the army and navy were executed or imprisoned. For the most part these officers were never seen again but there is one known exception. General Rokossovsky—a cavalry corps commander in 1937—returned from prison exile in World War II to become a marshal.

"The purge made it evident that a conflict of major importance had arisen between a large section of the Red army leaders and Stalin's clique and that the political machinery designed to insure army loyalty to the party had failed. By its mass executions the Soviet Government indicated its own fear of opposition and its brutal strength of suppression * * *." (The Soviet military organization: II—Rise of the Soviet Army. Army Information Digest (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), vol. 5, November 1950: 53–64, see p. 59.)

[108] Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 269–273.

VII. Women

SEX EQUALITY IS THEORETICAL

Alleged sex equality in the Soviet Union is given a most prominent role in Communist propaganda. However, the Soviet women themselves might have a different story to tell. They have their own peculiar and very definite grievances.

EQUALITY IS EXTENDED WHEREVER HEAVY WORK IS TO BE DONE

To be sure, the women in Soviet Russia have been given equal status with the opposite sex in the performance of heavy labor duties. There is apparently no work considered too strenuous for the Soviet woman. She labors as a stevedore, on road gangs, on construction crews, on railroad repair crews, logs timber, stokes blast furnaces, puddles steel—jobs for which, ironically, the supervisors are usually men. Alex Inkeles, a Russian expert at Harvard, states that:

> In 1941, for example, women constituted 32 percent of the electricians in electrical substations, 29 percent of the machine molders, and 27 percent of the compressor operators. It is important to note that they were represented as well in occupations most unsuited for women, being 17 percent of the stevedores and 6 percent of the steamboiler stokers.[109]

MANAGERIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OPPORTUNITIES ARE LIMITED

Much less successful were the Soviet women, however, in gaining access to managerial and administrative positions. Significantly, the Tenth Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, which took place in Moscow in April 1949, took upon iteslf to urge the trade-union organizations to strive more consistently for equality for women. The Congress tacitly admitting that such opportunity did not exist, resolved that:

> The trade-union organizations must strive more persistently for systematic improvement of the working skill of women and for greater boldness in entrusting leading positions to them in the management of enterprises.[110]

But the trade unions demonstrated that their own record in this regard was none too clean when they further resolved that:

> More boldness must be shown in entrusting administrative positions in trade-unions to a new *aktiv* drawn from * * * especially women * * *[111]

It is further revealing that the Soviet press also saw the need to call for more initiative in promoting women. Thus Izvestia of June 29, 1950, voiced on the front page the demand on the part of the Government that organizations boldly and resolutely promote outstanding women to higher posts. The article stated:

> Although much has been done there are still many places where promotion and training of women lags. We find, for instance, only 35 women out of 690

[109] Alex Inkeles, Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-50. American Sociological Review (Menasha, Wis.), vol. 15, August 1950, p. 469 (information taken from N. Voznesensky, The Economy of the U. S. S. R. During World War II. Washington: Public Affairs Press 1948, p. 66).

[110] Resolutions of the Tenth Congress of Trade Unions of the U. S. S. R. concerning the report on the work of the Central Council of Trade Unions. Pravda, May 11, 1949, pp. 2-3. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 1, May 31, 1949, p. 20.

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

chairmen of rural Soviets in Armenia, or about 5 percent. The situation is not better in Kirgizia, where there is not a single woman among the executive committee chairmen and vice chairmen.

Apparently the leaders of the Soviets in these parts of the union have not yet drawn appropriate conclusions from the directive of the party Central Committee which declares that "promoting women to leading positions is a vital state task."

Bold and determined action is required. The U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet election brought to the fore thousands of women, gifted and full of initiative.

It often happens that women who have been promoted are thereafter neglected and given no further assistance in their work. The party Central Committee demands that daily assistance be given to them in their work as well as in their political-ideological training.[112]

The last words of this Izvestia demand are particularly revealing as they are indicative of the insufficient integration of Soviet women in the Communist society and their suggested lack of required political stability.

WOMEN DO NOT FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN POLITICAL POWER

In this connection it is important to note that Soviet women are not prominently represented in the important organs of power in the Soviet Union. No woman is a member of the all important Politburo or, according to our information, the Central Committee of the Communist Party or of the U. S. S. R. Council of Ministers. The equality of women in the Soviet Union is in evidence, insofar as governing organs are concerned, only in such powerless bodies as the Supreme Soviet, which has a sizeable percentage of women deputies for window-dressing. Women, then, are given a token representation in the ceremonial organs of government, but are conspicuously absent in the organs of real power.

Women are still denied positions of real power in party, government service and national economy. They are currently restricted in such professional careers as the diplomatic service, and it is reported that medical and law schools limit the number of women students that they will accept.

COEDUCATION ABOLISHED

During the war the ways of even boys and girls were parted in the field of education in elementary schools. Coeducation was abolished in metropolitan areas so the boys could be trained to fight and the girls to breed fighters. Apart from the obvious consideration of the military training for boys this separate education for girls has been defended as necessary in the interests of "happy Soviet motherhood" and "the correct upbringing of the children in the home." This does not sound like former Communist propaganda lauding coeducation and the omnipresent claims to sex equality.

Since the war there has been much controversy over the value of this separate education. Those who would uphold the separation make much of the point that there are certain basic differences in personalities and capabilities of the two sexes. For example, in a letter to the Literaturnaya Gazeta, a teacher, S. Nazarov, writes:

> But equal rights do not imply equalization. Undoubtedly, diverse subjects taught in school should be approached in a different way according to whether they are taught to boys or girls. It is known that boys and girls, after having left childhood, show different inclinations in choosing their specializations * * *

[112] "More initiative in promoting Women to Soviet work" (editorial) in Izvestia, June 29, 1950, p. 1 Translated in summary in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, August 12, 1950, p. 52.

Nor should we forget that * * * participation of the family in the education of children is not only not excluded but even becomes more responsible. The girls are the future mothers, and they should be prepared to fulfill the responsible duty of motherhood. They should be appropriately educated for this.[113]

Another letter from the headmaster of a boys' school, B. Tyapkin, indicates the military factor for boys and the homemaking factor for girls. He writes:

Separate education was begun here in the days of the Great Patriotic War. It was introduced from profound patriotic motives which still hold today.

The upbringing and training of Soviet children in boys' schools should have definite distinctive qualities. The young boy should be particularly smart, resourceful, hardy and well disciplined. He should be a good subordinate and an excellent leader. * * *

The education of the future mother is necessary for the family itself, necessary for the correct upbringing of children in the home, and for the contented old age of the parents themselves. Why are we not preparing our girls for this?

From all this there can only be one conclusion: separate education is a natural positive phenomenon in pedagogy and at the present stage in history it is a direct necessity, of importance to the state.[114]

The Literaturnaya Gazeta itself, however, took the side of those who favored coeducation in this State-sponsored controversy. But it is interesting to note the implication of a qualifying word which it used in its editorial "analysis" of the letters and arguments. In arguing that separate education was a departure from the socialist principle of equal rights the magazine stated:

The October revolution radically altered the situation and opened up all branches of knowledge and *many* branches of work to women.[115] [Italics furnished.]

In spite of the stand of the Literaturnaya Gazeta, and the fact that 98 percent of the letters written to this publication *in re* this controversy favored coeducation, the Government has so far been adamant in its refusal to readopt coeducation.

PRACTICE AND PROPAGANDA ARE IN CONFLICT

Thus we see that the practice in the Soviet Union is quite different from the propaganda statements in regard to the position of women in Communist society. But even in their propaganda there is conflict. Official statements range from praise for the Karelo-Finnish Komsomol girls who work a 10-hour day on lumbering operations at temperatures 40° below zero [116] to the Soviet representative Alexei Pavlov's assertion before the United Nations that Soviet women were not used to the rigors of housework allegedly demanded of women in capitalist bourgeois nations and therefore could not be allowed to join their foreign husbands.[117]

SUCH EQUALITY AS DOES EXIST IS IMPOSED

To the extent that Soviet women do have "equality," it is an "equality" imposed upon them from above and results in social upheaval neither desired by the woman nor salubrious to the society.[118]

[113] Letters to the Editor published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 52, June 28, 1950. Translated and reproduced in Soviet studies (Glasgow), vol. 2, October 1950, pp. 190–191.

[114] Letters to the Editor published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 36, May 4, 1950. Translated and reproduced in Soviet Studies, op. cit., p. 189.

[115] "The vital question must be settled." in: Literaturnaya Gazeta, August 24, 1950, p. 2. Translated and reproduced in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York) ,vol. 2, October 7, 1950, p. 10.

[116] Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 9, 1947.

[117] New York Times, December 7, 1948, p. 12.

[118] E. g., the forced stripping of the veil in Moslem communities, or the marriage and divorce laws when they flout established and adhered to religious practice.

VIII. The Worker

The U. S. S. R. claims to operate as a workers' state. The "land of socialism" is supposed to be a country in which the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been established. In fact, the party, or even a small group within the party, has usurped the monopoly of power and is exercising it in the name of the working class.

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PARTY, NOT OF THE PROLETARIAT

The workers of Russia have not had the chance to heed the warning voiced by Lenin to them in 1921:

> Ours is a workers' government with a bureaucratic twist. Our present government is such that the proletariat, organized to the last man, must protect itself against it. And we must use the worker's organizations for the protection of the workers against their government.[119]

The warning could not be heeded. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been replaced by the "dictatorship of the party." Indeed, it is ironic, but interesting, to note the sharp decline in the proletarian membership of the party since 1930. Barrington Moore, Jr., gives us the following tabulation taken from the protocols of party congresses:[120]

Workers from production (percent of party membership)

1926	35. 7
1927	40. 8
1930	48. 6
1934	9. 3

And there has been a further drop since 1934.

CONTROLS OVER THE WORKER

Even a quick glance at the social map of the Soviet society reveals the plight of the Soviet worker under the "workers' state." Restrictions introduced during World War II as an expediency have become permanent features of Soviet life. Their existence puts the Soviet worker in bondage. Under these laws Soviet workers can be imprisoned for quitting their jobs without permission, and the penalty for this can be several months' imprisonment according to laws put into effect on June 6, 1940. Also in 1940 the Moscow government put into effect a stiff rule on absenteeism involving a fine of 25 percent of the worker's wages for 6 months.[121] Later in 1940 another law

[119] Quoted by Joseph Newman. Russia uncensored: trade-unions. New York Herald Tribune, November 6, 1949.

[120] Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 257–258.

[121] Barrington Moore, Jr., discusses the definition of "absenteeism" as follows:

"A decision of the Supreme Court of the U. S. S. R. on August 15, 1940, defined voluntary absence as absence from work without adequate cause for more than 20 minutes, or for more than three times in 1 month, or four times in two successive months. Appearance on the job when drunk is also included under absenteeism. Among other fine points in the discussion at this time was whether falling asleep on the job constituted absenteeism. The Phrase 'without adequate cause' obviously permits a good deal of latitude in applying the law * * *" (ibid., p. 326).

was passed which gave the heads of enterprise authority to transfer workers anywhere within the Soviet Union regardless of individual desire. Any worker who refuses to make the transfer receives a sentence as a criminal.

These laws and others passed in 1940, and since, severely limit the freedom of all workers. The combination of laws is formidable. George C. Guins, lecturer in the Institute of Slavic Studies at the University of California, has summed up some of the effects on the worker of such laws:

> * * * For nonappearance at work without an acceptable reason they are liable to sentence * * * for a term not to exceed 6 months with a reduction of wages not to exceed 25 percent.
>
> Violations of labor discipline without a valid excuse, such as tardiness, leaving work before the scheduled time, undue prolonging of the lunch recess, and loitering on the job, are considered criminally punishable as shirking.
>
> If the period of tardiness is less than 20 minutes or if the quitting of work occurred less than 20 minutes before the end of the work shift, then the accused is subject to disciplinary action. However, if a similar violation occurs three times in a single month, or four times in 2 months, it is considered shirking, for which corrective labor is prescribed for a period of up to 6 months. * * *
>
> Arrival at work more than 20 minutes late without a legitimate reason means a fine of 25 percent of a half year's wages. The court sends a demand for payment to the institution or plant where the sentenced person is employed, and for the six-month period the enterprise is obliged to withhold a portion of the wages of the sentenced person and turn it over to the state treasury. A repeated instance of coming late to work involves prison sentence of not less than one year. Absence from work without a justifiable excuse involves imprisonment for a period of from 1 to 2 years. Arbitrary quitting or changing one's place of employment can also incur a sentence at correctional labor for a period of up to 3 years. * * *
>
> Any person from watchman to chief engineer of any enterprise can be indicted for any breach of labor discipline. The excusing of any such violation is absolutely prohibited. * * * [122]

DOCUMENTS IMPOSED ON THE WORKER

The ability of the Soviet authorities to control the movements and activities of the workers is made complete by the system of documents imposed on the worker. He must have three official documents; an internal passport, labor book, and a pay book. The labor book, which is an imitation of Nazi practice, contains the complete employment record of the worker and must be surrendered to the employer. Thus the simple withholding of this document by the management is sufficient to freeze a worker to his job for however long the employer may desire.

HOW THE WORKER IS EXPLOITED

One of the chief motivations for this rigid discipline is obviously the increase of output on the part of the Soviet worker for the purposes of the state, the elimination of stoppages and breakdowns in production to which the well-being and the interests of the Soviet worker are sacrificed.[123] Under this premise the factory enterprise enjoys the

[122] George C. Guins, Cruel Penalties, Garish Awards in the Soviet State. Des Moines Sunday Register, September 10, 1950.

[123] That this sacrifice alone has the effect of creating tension is suggested by Frederick C. Barghoorn who states (Notes on life and travel in Russia. Yale Review (New Haven), June 1948, pp. 596–617; see p. 598):

"The other factor which must be kept in mind as a source of estrangement between the authorities and the public is the extremely high priority given to the interests of the state as against those of the individual. Russians have been conditioned historically to the sacrificing of individual to group interests, but the hard requirements of the 'Bolshevik tempo' undoubtedly engender nervous and physical exhaustion and resentment."

support of the regime, including the secret police, in its efforts to enforce labor discipline.[124] And in actual practice the worker has no real right of appeal from decisions taken under this premise. Moore cites the legal right of appeal but points out the practical difficulties and concludes—

> it would appear that the worker's opportunity for obtaining satisfaction for even a legitimate grievance is strictly limited under these conditions.[125]

And, of course, this regimentation can, and does, lead to exploitation of the Soviet worker. Joseph Newman warns that:

> It [the piecework system] is a system which is particularly dangerous in the hands of a state which exercises absolute power, against which there is no recourse, and in which the labor organization is made to serve the state first and the worker second.
>
> The Soviet employer-state periodically increases the labor norm on which piecework payments are based so that the worker is expected to increase the amount of goods he produces for the same amount of wages.

He goes on to say:

> Kusnetsov [V. V. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions] in an official statement, published January 9, 1948, reported that increased labor output, which exceeded the prewar level by 14.2 percent, had been facilitated by the upward revision of working norms. New collective contracts, he revealed, would further increase these norms.
>
> This frank admission that the state was securing greater output by making the worker produce more for the same wages was not allowed to be transmitted abroad by foreign correspondents in Moscow for obvious reasons. * * *[126]

Moreover, the worker does not even have the satisfaction of having attained a higher standard of living which might partially compensate for the many restrictions upon his freedom and his exploitation by the regime. The Soviet Union has the lowest per capita national income of any industrialized nation of the world except Poland according to estimates released lately by the Statistical Office of the United Nations. The per capita income for the U. S. S. R. was $308 as compared with $1,453 per capita income as of 1949 for the United States.[127] Furthermore, the lot of the worker is made more difficult by the extreme scarcity of consumer goods available in the Soviet Union and the difficulty of purchasing those goods that are available. For example, in 1948, it was estimated that less than one pair of shoes was produced per capita in the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States the per capita shoe consumption was 2.9 for the same year and the per capita consumption of that commodity in France was 1.7. Annual average consumption of soap in the Soviet Union was 5.5 pounds during that year while in the United States and France the per capita consumption was 19.8 and 11.6 pounds respectively.[128] Moreover, some of the goods produced are so imperfect that no purchasers can be found. Pravda on December 10, 1948, complained that commodities

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[124] Moore, op. cit., p. 323, also Merle Fainsod notes (Controls and tensions in the Soviet system. American political science review (Menasha, Wis.), June 1950, p. 280):

"Each factory of any size also has its so-called Special Section, a branch of the MGB, again with its own independent channel of command. The MGB Special Section controls both party and nonparty personnel in the factory; it maintains a dossier on every employee, and has its network of informers scattered through the factory. Its major task is to discover and root out disaffection wherever it finds it."

[125] Moore, op. cit. p. 324.

[126] Newman, op. cit.

[127] Will Lissner, Income Per Person in Soviet Held $308. New York Times, December 4, 1950, p. 1. This article points out that the estimate of Soviet income is based upon Soviet sources and upon the last official census, factors which would tend to make the estimate considerably higher than it should actually be.

[128] Per capita consumption data obtained from: U. S. S. R.—estimates based on scattered official Soviet data; U. S.—Department of Commerce; France—Deux Ans du Plan de modernisation et d'equipment, 1947–48, Paris, 1949, p. 215.

worth many millions of rubles are confined to Soviet warehouses as dead weight because no one wants to buy them because of their poor quality.

THE WORKER CANNOT RISE ABOVE HIS LOT

From all the foregoing it might be deduced that tension may exist in the social area of the Soviet worker, but the picture is made even more grim for the worker by the realization that he cannot aspire, as he may once have done, to a higher position in life. There is no longer a "Horatio Alger" type of incentive within the Soviet Union if, indeed, there ever was such incentive. Alex Inkeles, in his study of social stratification and mobility in the Soviet Union, points out that:

* * * In the last decade the personnel newly entering into the ranks of management in Soviet industry have tended to come almost exclusively from among the graduates of Soviet higher schools [i. e., the intelligentsia as opposed to the working class] * * * the fact does remain that movement from the status of worker to high managerial positions within the *same* generation, the Soviet equivalent of the American dream of rags to riches, is now becoming less usual. * * * In this sense and to that degree social mobility has decreased in the Soviet Union in the last decade.[129]

NO PROTECTION FROM THE SOVIET TRADE-UNIONS

As to the Soviet trade-unions they give no protection to the Russian workers in spite of the fact that, in 1947, 27 million Soviet workers out of a labor force of over 30 million were members of the trade-unions. The Soviet trade-unions are no militant defenders of the rights of the Soviet industrial worker,[130] but rather are the obedient tools of the party. They are not interested in any initiative coming from the Soviet working masses and are, for all practical purposes, executors of party directives.[131] They have no independence and are part of a bureaucratic machine whose main concern is increased production.[132] Their main role is that of a slave driver. They are not interested in higher wages for the Soviet workers as the wages

[129] Alex Inkeles, Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940–50. American Sociological Review (Menasha, Wis.), vol. 15, August 1950, pp. 465–479; see p. 477.

[130] Moore, op. cit. p. 331.

[131] J. Stalin cynically explained party-union relationships in a statement to an American labor delegation in 1927, when he stated:

"Formally, the party cannot give instructions to the trade-unions, but the party gives instructions to the Communists who work in the trade unions. It is known that in the trade-unions there are Communist factions as there are also in the soviets, cooperative societies, etc. It is the duty of these Communist factions to secure by argument the adoption of decisions in the trade-unions, in the soviets, cooperative societies, etc., which correspond to the party's instruction. This they are able to achieve in the overwhelming majority of cases because the party exercises enormous influence among the masses and enjoys their greatest confidence. By these means unity of action among the most varied proletarian organizations is secured. If this were not done there would be confusion and clashing in the work of these working-class organizations." (Leninism. Moscow, 1933, vol. I, p. 366.)

This point is also made clear in the bylaws of the trade-unions of the U. S. S. R. as follows:

"Soviet trade-unions conduct all their work under the direction of the Communist Party—the organizing and directing force of socialist society. The trade-unions of the U. S. S. R. rally the working masses around the party of Lenin and Stalin." (Trud, May 11, 1949.)

It was further underlined by V. V. Kuznetsov in his speech to the Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions when he said:

"Under the direction of party organizations, the trade-unions raise the level of political and cultural awareness of workers and employees, and assist them in mastering the great teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin." (Trud, April 21, 1949.)

[132] By 1932 the subjugation of trade unions to the government was nearly complete and the role of the unions was then changed from protection of the worker to that of an instrument to secure cooperation in the improvement of production. The report of the Ninth Congress of Soviet Trade-Unions said:

"The old leadership gave precedence to the 'defensive' work of the trade-unions contrasted with their task of cooperating in socialist construction." (Pravda, May 7, 1932.)

In 1934, the People's Commissariat of Labor, the organ of Government dealing with labor, was abolished. The functions of this office were given to the trade-unions. This had the effect of bringing the unions further into the Government apparatus and consequently identified them completely with Government aims and policies.

are determined in advance by the party apparatus.[133] Besides the aim to increase production the labor unions are also devoted to the propagandizing of the Soviet masses along the lines prescribed by the Politburo.[134] Thus it is seen that the Soviet trade-union is inadequate to protect the worker from the regime or to further his advancement in any way.

In fact, according to Communist reasoning, no such protection or advancement is even necessary. The existence of a class struggle within the U. S. S. R. is officially denied by the Soviet regime since, allegedly, exploitation of man by man has come to an end in this proletarian part of the world. The Communist propagandist eliminates differences between the worker and his state employer by declaring them nonexistent. Conflicts are interpreted as the result of bureaucratic distortion.

EVIDENCE OF DISSATISFACTION

Decisive, however, is that in spite of all the efforts of the Soviet Government to propagate the Soviet Union as a workers' paradise and to give the world the picture of the Soviet worker as one of the chief beneficiaries of the regime, proofs of dissatisfaction among the Soviet worker can be detected in the official Soviet press. The unions have been frequently taken to task of late for their failure to present their own positions with sufficient vigor,[135] thus implying that they have not performed well for the worker within even the narrow limits of their protective duties and power. All that transpired in the recently held Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions in Moscow shows the failure of the Soviet regime to make out of the Soviet worker an enthusiastic Communist and free him from the so-called remnants of capitalist psychology. For example, here are a number of excerpts taken from the proceedings of the congress. V. V. Kuznetsov, chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade-Unions, declared:

Trade-unions have achieved a certain improvement of mass cultural work and a strengthening of its material base. Nevertheless, the scale and ideological level

[133] In spite of the fact that the trade-union bylaws call for the participation in the determination of wages for Soviet workers this is contrary to Soviet law. A book on Soviet labor legislation describes the determination of wages as follows:

"The amount of wages and salaries is at the present time fixed by the decisions of the Government (or on the basis of its directives) by means of governmental planned regulation of wages and salaries for separate groups and categories of workers * * *

"The agreement of parties [referring to negotiation of the collective agreement by the trade-unions] plays a subordinate role in the determination of the amount of wages or salaries. It should not be contrary to law and is allowed only within strict limits provided for by statute, for example, where the precise amount is fixed in instances in which the approved table of organization defines the rate as 'from'—'to'; or fixing the remuneration for part-time employment of a person holding another position, and the like." (I. T. Gelyakov, editor, Zakonodatel'stvo o trude, Moscow, 1947, p. 65.)

Another book on Soviet labor law reveals the meaningless of negotiating a collective agreement in the U. S. S. R.:

"The Sixth Plenary Session of the Council of Trade-Unions in 1937 contemplated renewing the practice of making collective agreements. The last collective-bargaining campaign was conducted in 1933 * * * However, experience has shown that restoration of the practice of collective bargaining is not expedient. *The collective agreement as a special form of legal regulation of labor relations of manual and clerical employees has outlived itself.* Detailed regulation of all sides of the relations by mandatory acts of governmental power does not leave any room for any contractual agreement concerning one labor condition or another." (N. G. Aleksandrov and D. M. Genkin, Sovetskoye Trudovoye Pravo. Moscow, 1946, p. 106. [Italics in the original.])

[134] The idea that trade-unions were primarily devoted to being "schools for communism" was played up in the Soviet press comment during the Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions. Typical of such comment is the following:

"In the life of the Soviet socialist state, in the struggle for the realization of the great ideas of Lenin and Stalin, they fulfill an honorable and responsible role, the role of schools of communism; they are the principal transmission belt through which the party communicates with the working class. Trade-unions, as schools of communism, need to look after all aspects of the daily life of the working masses, * * * gradually raise them from a nonparty status to a party status." (Professional'nye Soyuzy, No. 4, April 1949, p. 3.)

[135] Moore, op. cit. pp. 322–323.

of this work are still far below the demands made upon it and do not satisfy all the growing cultural demands of workers and employees * * *.

* * * * * * *

Trade-union bodies carry on all their work among the masses, relying upon the broad *aktiv* [*active* trade-union members]. This *aktiv* is growing with every year. At present it comprises more than 10,000,000 members [compare this figure with the 27,000,000 *nominal* members of trade-unions and total labor force of 30,000,000 mentioned above].

* * * * * * *

* * * Work with the *aktiv* is particularly unsatisfactory in the trade-unions of workers in heavy industry enterprise construction, lumber and rafting, state farms, and several others. Our task is to broaden the ranks of the *aktiv* in every way, to *patiently* [italics furnished—the word "patiently" clearly implies a recognition that early results among the workers mentioned are not to be expected] instruct it and to educate it in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, in devotion to the party of Lenin and Stalin.[136]

The resolution of the Congress reechoed and reemphasized the foregoing statements.

The trade-unions are teaching the wide masses of workers and employees a Communist attitude toward labor and a responsible attitude toward Socialist property [in all trade-union discussion there is an almost pathological preoccupation with the implied lack of respect for "Socialist property," and in the laws of the Soviet Union theft of or damage to this state property carries heavier penalties, even when petty, than does murder or manslaughter]. They are struggling to overcome remnants of capitalist psychology among the people and instilling the sacred feeling of Soviet patriotism in the masses * * *.[137]

If reliance on the Soviet press is not enough to indicate the tensions and dissatisfactions which exist among the workers of the Soviet Union, Merle Fainsod brings out rather strong evidence about their grievances in his interviews with Soviet escapees. He sums up and analyzes this evidence as follows:

The workers interviewed complained generally of inadequate pay, food shortages, and bad housing conditions. There was grumbling about the number of compulsory deductions from pay—the obligatory state loans, trade-union dues, the special subscriptions to this organization or that. There was resentment expressed against the inflation of administrative staffs in the factories, the supernumeraries who held down soft office jobs. Complaints were reiterated about the Stakhanovite movement. It was described as a form of speed-up, a device for raising norms and extracting extra work for the same pay. Workers, it was said, had no real freedom to express their grievances. MGB informers were everywhere. The trade-unions, which should have expressed the interests of the workers, were the creatures of the party and the factory managements. They did not help the worker to improve his position. There were complaints about discipline and the excessively severe penalties for tardiness and absence from work. Those interviewed asserted that they were practically chained to their job. It was almost impossible to shift or transfer.[138]

[136] Opening of the Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions. Report by V. V. Kuznetsov. Pravda, April 20, p. 2. Translated and reproduced in summary in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 1, May 17, 1949, p. 16.

[137] Resolution of the Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions of the U. S. S. R. concerning the report on the work of the Central Council of Trade-Unions, April 27, 1949. Pravda, May 11, 1949, pp. 2-3. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 1, May 31, 1949, p. 18.

[138] Fainsod, op. cit. p. 273.

IX. The Collective Farmer

THE PEASANT IS AN INDIVIDUALIST

The policies and practices of the Soviet regime were confronted from the very beginning with a most active and persistent opposition on the part of the tradition-bound Soviet peasantry. The struggle became particularly acute with the acceleration of forced collectivization in 1928. The peasant all over the world is an individualist and a strong believer in private property rights, and a Russian Moujik is no exception. In spite of attempts to create a "new type of man" and a new, unique, and superior "Communist morality," Frederick C. Barghoorn observes that—

> The old Adam is very much alive [in Russia], and Soviet human nature is amazingly similar to its capitalistic counterpart.[139]

It is interesting in this regard to note that even the Soviet trade-unions stressed recently, with particular pride, the fact that in the worker strata of Soviet life—

> The government is giving every help to workers and employees in building *their own* houses [140] [Italics furnished.]

and not industrial collective settlements.

MAGNITUDE OF COLLECTIVIZATION—COST IN HUMAN LIFE

The transformation of the Russian peasant into a collective farmer involved a tremendous reorganization. This is adequately suggested by M. K. Bennett, of the Food Research Institute of Stanford University, in the following statement:

> In that year [1928] the organization of agriculture in the Soviet Union involved as its great core about 20 million households of small operators, some a bit larger than others, though what was soon to be called a "kulak" fit to be liquidated would be a peasant who had as many as three horses and who hired 50 days of labor a year * * * [141]

The Moscow government won the major battle of collectivization although at a tremendous cost in human life. The forced elimination of individual farming in the Soviet Union laid the ground for a terrible famine in Russia. The natural growth of the Russian people was delayed for years. Experts estimate the excess mortality in the first years of collectivization to have been at least 5 million persons. Still, whatever the cost, by 1938 there existed about 250,000 large and superlarge state and collective farms. These farms operated all but 5 or 6 percent of the land under crops. This in contrast to the period 10 years earlier in 1928 when collectivization was just getting started and less than 5 percent of all the peasant households were absorbed in the state and collective farms.[142]

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[139] Frederick C. Barghoorn, Notes on Life and Travel in Russia. Yale Review (New Haven), June 1948, p. 607.

[140] Resolution of Tenth Congress of Trade-Unions of the U. S. S. R. concerning the report on the work of the Central Council of Trade-Unions. April 27, 1949. Pravda, May 11, pp. 2-3. Translated and reproduced in condensed text in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 1, May 31, 1949, p. 21.

[141] M. K. Bennett, Food and Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 1917–48. Journal of Political Economy (Chicago, Ill.), June 1949, pp. 194–195.

[142] Loc. cit.

THE PEASANT STILL WISHES TO GET OUT FROM UNDER COLLECTIVIZATION

Nevertheless, in spite of this outcome of the battle, the peasant in Soviet Russia did not give in in his fight for greater economic freedom and the preservation of private initiative. He forced the Communist government in 1935 to commit itself definitely to the peasant's right to own a small house and to operate an individual plot of land (not exceeding 2.47 acres) and to possess a limited amount of livestock (usually 1 cow, 2 calves, 1 hog, and 10 sheep). He had already forced the Soviet government in 1932 to permit the organization of open markets in which the collective farmer can sell the produce of his plot directly to the consumer at whatever prices were formed by the interplay of supply and demand. But the peasants' main aim was, and remains, to get out, as far as possible, from the collectivized sector of Soviet agriculture and to be able to devote the maximum of his time and attention to the individual plots of land, and the minimum to the collectively owned and operated land. The Soviet writer, S. Kovalyov, complained in 1947, in the party magazine Bolshevik, about the resistance to collectivization as follows:

> On collective farms, where survivals from private property psychology are stronger than in governmental institutions, an unsocialist attitude toward work is manifested in the drift of a certain portion of the collective farm laborers away from collective farm work, in the inclination to cultivate only their own victory garden plots, in the poor quality of cultivation in evidence on collective lands, in the inferior care of collectively owned cattle, etc. All this hampers the growth of collective farms, the augmentation of collective farm wealth, and by the same token impedes a rise in the welfare level of collective farm workers.
>
> Such an attitude toward work is definitely a survival of capitalism in the popular mind; it has no basis either in the economics of Soviet society * * *.
>
> Cases of transgression against socialist property are to be observed on collective farms, where they find their expression in gross violations of the charters of agricultural collective groups, in sequestration of the common lands of the farms, in the dispersal of collective farm livestock, etc.
>
> The decree of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party, "Concerning measures for the elimination of offenses against charters of agricultural cooperatives on collective farms," is addressed to the fortification of Socialist property, to its defense against trespass on the part of that group among the collective farm workers who have little sense of responsibility, and on the part of individual party and Soviet workers who acquiesce in violations of charters of agricultural cooperatives and indeed on occasion do not themselves refrain from violating these charters through their illegal activities.
>
> The Soviet state also carries on a resolute struggle against the aspirations, prejudicial to the state, fostered by certain managers of agricultural collectives who stray into the paths of defrauding the state by secreting grain stocks and pulling the state's grain supply plans below their norms * * *.
>
> The question of a protective attitude toward community property has become exceedingly acute at this moment, when under postwar conditions the Soviet state is devoting every kopek, every kilogram of metal and coal, every liter of gasoline, to the cause of reestablishing as speedily as possible and further developing the national economy. The establishment of a very severe system of thrift, the augmentation of community wealth, is one of our most important tasks. Hence the great significance of the struggle against the survivals of capitalism, which gives birth to a heedless, negligent, or indeed rapacious attitude toward community property.[143]

[143] S. Kovalyov, Ideological Conflicts in Soviet Russia. Washington, Public Affairs press, 1948, pp. 8–11. Translation of an article published in the March 1947 issue of Bolshevik, its original title was "Communist Education of the Worker and the Elimination of Capitalist Survivals From the Popular Consciousness."

THE REGIME'S PRESENT WARFARE AGAINST THE PEASANT

Thus even today, 33 years after the establishment of the regime, the Moscow government is still waging a psychological as well as a physical war against the peasantry of the country. In spite of the fact that nearly two decades have elapsed since the establishment of collective farms on a large scale in the Soviet state, the Russian peasant yearns for, and fights for, economic freedom. This makes him the black sheep of the Soviet society, and he is openly accused by the party of preserving "private property psychology."

And in fact, according to the observations of an independent American scholar, Barrington Moore, Jr.:

> Within the present institutional framework of the collective farms, certain divisive tendencies which the Government has been forced to combat may be observed. The series of decress from 1932 onward that endeavor to protect collective cultivation against encroachments from various sources, and particularly against the expansion of the privately owned plots, contradicts the official claim that through the collective farms the U. S. S. R. has succeeded in harmonizing the interests of the individual farmer with those of the state.[144]

The state hits hard in its endeavor to roll back the encroachments of the Soviet peasant on the collectivized land. However, a survey of the private plots which was carried out in 1939, revealed, according to Moore:

> * * * that the total land under such allotment amounted to 2,500,000 hectares in excess of the regulations. Since the sown area in private plots amounted to only 5,300,000 hectares the year before, it is safe to conclude that nearly half the existing allotments prior to the war were illegal * * *[145]

at least from the Soviet government's point of view.

SOVIET PRODUCTION OF KEY AGRICULTURAL CROPS IS FALLING

But regardless of the state's striking power and the effort it has made through mechanization of farm work, state planning, and propaganda campaigns, Soviet production in certain key crops has fallen off from Czarist days.

Although the peasantry constitutes a very large part of the Soviet population, they are constantly, and rather cynically, exploited. The regime seems only interested in the output of agricultural products as an economic base for its industrialization programs and as the food supply for its large armed forces. The peasants' own welfare is considered only secondarily and apparently only with the view to stave off more active opposition. A United States Government official writing anonymously of life in Russia concludes:

> * * * for the past 30 years Ivan's [symbolic name for the typical Russian peasant] welfare has been constantly subordinated to that of the city industrial worker. Ivan and his fellow peasants have borne the major burden of paying for the vast, expensive industrial program.
>
> The economic "scissors" which was the cause of much peasant discontent before collectivization have again been in operation: manufactured consumers' goods have been in short supply and therefore expensive, while the prices paid by the Government for agricultural products have been low.
>
> Ivan is not a young man any more, and he has little chance of improving his and Maria's [the wife of Ivan—typical peasant woman] position. He knows that his future lot will be hard work and small returns.[146]

[144] Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma o. Power. Cambridge, Harvard University press, 1950, p. 342.
[145] Ibid., p. 343.
[146] Life on a Soviet Collective. New York Times magazine, February 27, 1949, p. 4.

And Joseph A. Kershaw, an American economist, observes:

* * * I hold that welfare is a concern of the planners only to the extent that they might anticipate political or social unrest if it is kept too low; except for this they are interested in how much of their resources they can divert to investment * * *.[147]

Soviet agricultural policies could, at the best, provoke only inertia among the peasants on the collective farms. Randolph Leigh reports:

With a much larger population and practically the same territory as in Czarist days, the Communists produce less grain in the aggregate and per inhabitant.

	Acres in grain	Tons of grain	Pounds per capita
	Millions	*Millions*	
1909-13	253.8	81.6	1,033
1933-37	255.3	81.9	973
1948	229.8	75	850

(The United States produced 2,118 pounds of grain per capita in 1948.[148])

OPPOSITION PERSISTS

In its last effort to merge small and medium-size collective farms into super collectives, the state ran again into stiff opposition on the part of the peasantry. When this new "agricultural revolution of 1950" was announced in the spring it significantly stressed that the small farms were—

* * * economically unprofitable and cannot properly be worked with modern machinery. By combining them into larger units * * * productivity could be raised and great savings achieved by the elimination of many administrative employees.[149]

Now, less than a year later, incompetent direction is officially made responsible for poor work and damage to crops which has resulted from this mass unification. In reality, however, the main responsibility for the failure of this operation must be placed at the door of the dissident or rebellious collective farmers who—

* * * procrastinate in making ready to move from their old villages to the new "agricultural cities" that are the hallmarks of the new land-tenure pattern.[150]

According to a review of the Soviet press made by Harry Schwartz of Syracuse University:

Peasant resentment against the amalgamation policy has resulted not only from the pressure applied by the Government to effectuate it, but also from the fact that the new organizations require the end of working and living arrangements that have existed for many years, since long before the Soviet regime in many areas.

In addition there are indications that active opposition is being expressed to the corollary Government policy of putting in agricultural technicians as the heads of enlarged farms, even though these technicians may be total strangers.[151]

[147] Joseph A. Kershaw, book review, The Socialized Agriculture of the U. S. S. R.—Plans and Performance, by Naum Jasny. American Economic Review (Princeton, N. J.), March 1950, p. 188.
[148] Randolph Leigh, Russia's Parched Land Drives Her to Aggression. Washington Star, July 30, 1950, p. C-2.
[149] Harry Schwartz, Moscow Replaces Farm Policy head. New York Times, May 10, 1950, p. 6.
[150] Soviet Farm Troubles. New York Times (editorial), December 11, 1950, p. 24.
[151] Harry Schwartz, Russians Opposing Collective Farms. New York Times, December 10, 1950, p. 39.

The New York Times rightly draws the following conclusions regarding the conflict between Soviet government and peasantry as of 1950:

> Behind the curtain of propaganda boasts and guarded complaints, the actual situation seems clear. Once again the Kremlin is locked in bitter struggle with its peasantry as it seeks to push them further toward the status of hired farmhands on "factories in the field" and to wipe out the remains of the old pattern, with its reminders of the days of individual farming.[152]

The creation of a mass inertia is the best that the Communist state can hope to get in response to its policy of collectivization. Prisons and labor camps in Siberia are the least that the Soviet peasant can expect to get for his hostility to the regime. But in spite of all punishments and exhortations he continues to fight the Kremlin by scattered open revolts and mass passive resistance—though as yet with meager results—since, in spite of all the concessions he was able to wrest from the Soviet leadership, the Soviet peasant remains basically a slave of the Communist state.

His life, behavior, and activities are closely controlled not only by the collective farm chairman, usually picked by the party, but also by the village party organization, a management commission, revision commission, and various executive organs of the Government; all of which often mistrust each other and work at cross purposes.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MACHINE TRACTOR STATIONS

But the main tool in the hands of the state—which enables it to dominate the Soviet countryside and to whip the peasant into obedience—is the state-owned and state-operated machine tractor stations. Of this system of domination M. K. Bennett properly says:

> * * * The collective farms do not own tractors, trucks, or combines, though they have horses; it is the machine-tractor stations which own the great bulk of the necessary draft power as well as the harvesting machinery. The machine-tractor stations make contracts with the collective farms for payment of services in kind. Since the Government manufactures the tractors, trucks, and combines, only the machine-tractor stations and the state farms can have them; yet the collective farms must buy their services with payment in produce. Hence the Government gets as collections, and is sure of getting, whatever produce the collective farmers turn over to the machine-tractor stations. Again, there are taxes. These are laid upon both the collective farms and the individual members of them. As everywhere, taxes are not readily to be evaded. Collective farms and their members must deliver produce in payment of taxes. Their principal avenue of "sale" is to the state, which monopolizes most trade whether at the wholesale or retail level. The state sets prices to the farms and farmers, on what they must deliver, very low in relation to what it sells to them, thus getting a big profit for itself * * *. Naturally, the peasants seek to use the free market to the full. But since they must first meet their obligatory deliveries to the state and their payments to the machine-tractor stations, their elbow room is narrow.

All this adds up to a most effective way of assuring the state what it wishes to collect.[153]

What was once said of the medieval Muscovite Russia by the Russian historian Klyuchevsky, is particularly applicable to the present Soviet society: "The state swelled. The people shrank."

[152] Soviet Farm Troubles. Op. cit. p. 24.
[153] Bennett, op. cit. pp. 195–196.

X. Forced Labor

SLAVE LABOR EXISTS ON A FORMIDABLE SCALE

The ugliest feature of the Soviet system is the presence of slave labor on a formidable scale. Wendell Willkie during his visit to Russia in 1943 was surprised not to find in the suburbs of Yakutsk the "usual concentration camps" he had "seen in some other cities, half barbed-wire fences, with sentry boxes at the corners." Quentin Reynolds, in 1942, included in his book Only the Stars Are Neutral, the following moving remarks:

> A few miles outside of Kuibyshev we passed one of the big concentration camps reserved for political prisoners. Beyond that we saw a long line of them working on a new road. There were about 800 of them * * *. On their faces there was no sign of hope. A few soldiers with rifles guarded them carelessly, for there was no place for them to run. Steele and I looked at each other and winced * * *. We winced, I think, because these 800 prisoners were women.[154]

These words are made even more impressive by the knowledge that both Mr. Willkie and Mr. Reynolds were anxiously trying to see the best in our wartime ally, the Soviet Union.

The American Federation of Labor in a study of the slave labor conditions in the Soviet Union estimated that from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 people have been brought into forced labor systems where they dig canals, build roads, set up military projects, mine uranium and gold, and perform other important economic tasks.[155]

A more detailed breakdown of prisoners is given by Michael Rozanoff, himself a former inmate of a forced labor camp, in a publication by the Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps in New York. Rozanoff contrasts the 11,050,000 prisoners which he claims were held by the Soviet Union in 1941 with Vyshinsky's figure of 29,350 prisoners in Czarist Russia in 1914.[156]

CLASSIFICATION

Prof. Ernst Tallgren, himself a former prisoner in the Soviet labor camps, provides the following classification of prisoners. He states:

> There are three distinct groups of prisoners in the labor camps: (1) Professional criminals; (2) bytoviks ["offenders against the mode of life"]; (3) political offenders.
>
> Professional criminals: Thieves, burglars, murderers, etc. A decided minority they form the only organized group within the camps * * * they usually get along better in the labor camps than any other prisoners. They are better fed and better clothed * * *. Most of them continue to practice their criminal trades, stealing anything they can get their hands on, especially food * * * bread would often be seized while a prisoner was eating it. This struggle between hungry people for a 500 gram (1.1 pound) loaf of bread might have been a scene out of Dante. The camp authorities, though claiming a desire to suppress criminality, shut their eyes to most of these practices, and are sometimes in silent accord with the criminals.

[154] Quentin Reynolds, Only the Stars Are Neutral. Random House (New York), 1942, p. 187.
[155] Slave Labor in Russia: The Case Presented by the American Federation of Labor, 1949, passim.
[156] Michael Rozanoff, The Special Labor Force of the Politburo. Challenge (New York). vol. 1, July 1950, p. 2.

Bytoviks: Mostly officials in public institutions found guilty of abuses * * *. Among this group are also sexual offenders, people engaged in illegal business, and similar cases.

The bytoviks are often given posts in the administration of the camp or in the "cultural and educational department." They are proud of their distinct character and position of preference over the "enemies of the people," or political offenders.

The category of political offenders consists of several groups:

1. Peasants suspected of individualistic tendencies and thus undesirable on the collective farms. The most numerous among these are the Ukrainian farmers; the Russian farmers come next; and then follow a host of dissenting farmers from among the national minorities: Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Mordovians, Caucasians, and so on. They are usually without political convictions except for a wholehearted hatred of the Soviet system. As they are used to heavy physical labor, they constitute the bulk of the work brigades.

2. Persons who have been abroad, or have members of their families abroad with whom they communicate. Here the percentage of Jews is disproportionately high, as almost every Jewish family in Russia had relatives living in Poland or Rumania. This group also includes foreign Communists: Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, etc., who fled the persecution of their own governments. Nearly all of them were arrested in 1937, when Yezhov was Commissar of the Interior, under a charge of espionage. Today these prisoners are referred to in the camps as "men of the 1937 class." Like the peasants, the majority of them are sentenced not by a court but simply by some agency of the secret police.

3. Former inhabitants of the borderlands. These are primarily Russian Poles who lived along the western frontier of the Soviet Union, and Chinese and Koreans who lived along the eastern border. Many of them were deported into the interior before 1937, and during the mass arrests that year were sent from their new homes straight to labor camps.

4. People condemned for their religious beliefs: Catholics, Baptists, members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and others. They are distinguished by their high moral standards and the firm strength of their convictions. Against the background of demoralization and mutual enmity prevalent in the camps, these people shine like beacons in the dark.

5. Middle or high state officials sentenced for various political offenses. Many belong to the Communist Party. A large number are civil engineers and technicians convicted chiefly on suspicion of sabotage. This group is slightly better off than the rest of the political prisoners; they usually manage to get administrative posts which insure easier living conditions.

6. People condemned for specific Soviet wartime crimes: Collaboration with the enemy under the occupation; prisoners of war; men and women dragged to Germany and found guilty of voluntary ties with the enemy; and nationals of countries occupied at the end of the war.[157]

WAYS OF COMMITMENT—TRIALS SKETCHY OR ABSENT

To be sent to these horrid forced labor camps, or "corrective labor camps" as they are termed by the Soviet regime, is not a difficult task. Miss Toni Sender, in the American Federation of Labor study, quotes from several affidavits from former inmates of these Soviet concentration camps.[158] These statements point out the lack of

[157] David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947, pp. 4–6.

[158] Slave Labor in Russia, op. cit.: Part III, Affidavits by Former Inmates of Soviet Concentration Camps, passim.

The following are excerpts from some of these affidavits:

(1) "The word 'camp' entails an entire complex of camp sites. Several sites constitute a division, and several divisions make up a camp. My BBK (Baltic-Belomor-Canal) camp included a division No. 14 with its administrative center in the city of Poodosz, and a No. 28. There may be more than 28 divisions, but that was the highest number of which I knew. My own division was No. 2. Each division contained about 10 to 15 camp sites. * * * The total number of such camps is in excess of 100, and if we are to assume that each of 100 camps contains about an average of 100 sites and that in each site there are about 1,000 persons, we reach a minimum of 10,000,000 population of such camps. The true number may be much greater. The huge death rate, on the one hand, and spasmodic additions of persons in given years (for

formal trial procedure in many "convictions" and commitment to the camps. They point out the threat of extension of sentence if workday quotas are not met. Impossible living conditions and low morality are shown to be the tragic norm of existence in the camps. The work of mining gold or uranium, felling forests, or making the steppes of Russia fertile, is done with the cost of a high death rate and the deprivation of the freedon of millions of innocent persons.

A THOROUGHLY RETROGRESSIVE INSTITUTION

In the opinion of the American Federation of Labor leader Matthew Woll, a comparison of the old individual slave system which has been abandoned by all civilized nations and that of the modern totalitarian forced labor program shows the latter to be much worse. Historic slavery was, with all of its evils, an advance over savagery. It made no moral pretenses as to the reasons it exploited its chattels. But twentieth century slavery is a thoroughly retrogressive social phenomenon which hides its callous exploitation behind high sounding phrases.[159]

What sort of a socialism can this be—

asks also George F. Kennan, counselor to the Department of State—

which, after 33 years of power, admittedly continues to turn so many of its citizens into criminals that millions of them must, at any given time, be found enduring the hardships of a purgatory or a hell-on-earth? [160]

Two alternative explanations for the use of forced labor in the U. S. S. R. were offered by the United Kingdom delegate in the

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instance, in 1937 and 1944) [years of great purge activity], on the other hand, lead to the great oscillations in the estimated numbers of prisoners. * * *

* * * * * * * *

"The inmates of the camps work under the control of armed guards. Sanctions which are enforced for not fulfilling the work norm are punitive hunger rations, prison, and—for systematic refusal of the appointed work—trial with the possibility of the death sentence. * * *

* * * * * * *

"In 1945, the ration of workers of the 100 percent norm consisted daily of 500 grams of bread, two watery soups and a small portion of gruel, with an insignificant addition of vegetable fat and irregular and insufficient additions of meat or fish. Sugar, 20 grams daily, was issued only to sick persons and that not always. The standards which exist on paper were not kept in reality. The severe undernourishment of the prisoners is a steady mass phenomenon in the camps." (Julius Margolin, pp. 38–41.)

* * * * * * * *

(2) "The lot of women in the concentration camps is dismal for another reason, too. They made up from 2 to 3 percent of all prisoners, and there was therefore "a hunger for women" in the camps. The administration and guards forced the women to live with them, by all sorts of threats (to transfer them to worse jobs, etc.) and by offering them their protection, material help, etc. Under the hardship conditions in camp, the women almost never succeeded in getting out of the propositions: I observed several instances where good family women, separated from husbands and children, were compelled to turn to debauchery." (Affidavit of Gennadi Khomyakov, p. 54.)

(3) Mrs. Neumann: "The penal block was surrounded by barbed wire, with savage dogs roaming outside all the time. Naturally, living conditions in the penal block were worse than those in the so-called 'free camp.' As I have already said, the work was harder, the food poorer, the filth more repulsive. In the eyes of the Stalin regime, the task we had to fulfill was one of honor in this camp. The Kazan steppe was to be made fertile by these people. Before being sent to this camp, I had read in Pravda that the Kazan steppe was to be cultivated and made fertile in order to produce another victory for socialism. But Pravda said nothing about those who were to make the steppe fertile—that it was cultivated by slaves. * * *" (From (reprint) Populaire Dimanche, national weekly organ of the French Socialist Party (S. F. I. O.), v. 2, March 13, 1949.) (Mrs. Margaret Neumann, here a witness in the lawsuit brought in Paris by Victor Kravchenko against Lettres Françaises, is the wife of Heinz Neumann. Mr. Neumann was a former member of both the Politburo of the German Communist Party and of the executive of the Communist International as well as former member of the German Reichstag. He was arrested in 1937 for "deviating" from the party line and disappeared later in the same year.) (P. 80.)

[159] Ibid. (introduction).

[160] George F. Kennan, Russia and the United States. (Speech delivered at the annual student-faculty banquet, Russian Institute Student Group, Columbia University, New York, May 27, 1950.) Stamford, Conn., The Overbrook Press, 1950, p. 15.

eleventh session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on August 15, 1950. The delegate, Mr. Corley Smith, stated:

> If, as we believe, a high proportion of the population of the Soviet Union is in fact working in forced labor camps and colonies, this can mean either that the Soviet system has produced an infinitely higher proportion of criminals than any other social system, or else that the regime is unpopular and is only maintained by force or the mass imprisonment of its opponents * * * [161]

Inmates of these camps, whether they were conscious of political opposition to the Soviet system before their internment or not, can obviously have only hatred for the regime, but they themselves are already or soon will be, physically and mentally exhausted—human wrecks. A great deal of information on this point can be found in a book by a former Dutch Communist, Elinor Lipper, who spent 11 years in such camps. She tells a gruesome story about the contrast between the value of property and the value of human beings in the Soviet system. One day a prisoner presented a petition to the commander of a camp in which he asked to be given the status of a horse. To the enraged commander he gave a whole catalog of reasons, too numerous to be given here in their entirety, why this should be so; still even a few would indicate the trend of the argument. He said:

> If I were a horse I would have had every 10 days at least 1 day off. At the present I have no free days.
>
> If I were a horse I could rest from time to time also during the working period, as a prisoner I can't do this.
>
> If I were a horse I would be given the amount of work which would correspond to my strength, as a prisoner I am forced to do work which it is impossible for me to carry out * * *
>
> What is a prisoner in Kolyma? Nothing, but a horse is still something; and therefore, citizen commandant, you can see for yourself how much better I would be off if I were a horse.[162]

LITTLE HOPE FOR REVOLT FROM THE SLAVES—BUT MUCH REACTION FROM THE RELATIVES

But if there is little reason to expect from these victims of the Soviet regime a direct revolt against their oppressors, there is definitely some reason to expect some reaction from their close relatives and associates to an appeal promising them liberation from the hated oppressors. There must be tens of millions of them scattered throughout the Soviet Union.[163] They are an important source of an emotional hatred which is above and beyond any rational objection to the policies of the Red government. Just a hint of this sentiment is recorded by the British diplomat, Fitzroy Maclean, in his interesting account of unauthorized travels in the Soviet Union. In speaking of his experiences in Lenkoran in the Caucasus, he says:

> Soon I was to have an even more striking proof of the long arm of the Kremlin. On the second day after my arrival I was awakened by an unaccustomed noise. A succession of lorries were driving headlong through the town on the way to the port, each filled with depressed-looking Turko-Tartar peasants under the escort of N. K. V. D. frontier troops with fixed bayonets. As lorry followed lorry (the procession was to last, intermittently, all day) and it became clear that the operation was taking place on a large scale, the population began to show considerable interest in what was going on. Little groups formed at street corners and, to

[161] Forced Labor in Russia. International Survey (London) No. 60, August 1950. p. 31.

[162] Elinor Lipper, Elf Jahre in Sowjetischen Gefängnissen und Lagern. Zürich, Oprecht, 1950, pp. 198–199.

[163] Merle Fainsod in his article Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System, American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), June 1950, p. 267, reports that out of 64 Soviet escapees interviewed for the study 42 of them had either been in Soviet prisons or labor camps or had close relatives who had been apprehended.

my surprise, *some bold spirits even dared to express their disapproval openly,* and asked the guards what they were doing. It seemed that several hundred peasants had been arrested with their families and were being deported to central Asia. Ships (including the *Centrosoyus*) were waiting to take them across the Caspian.

There was naturally much speculation as to the reason for these mass arrests. The more ideologically correct suggested that the prisoners were kulaks, or rich peasants, a class long since condemned to liquidation, or that their papers were not in order.

A rather more convincing explanation was put forward by an elderly bewhiskered Russian whom I found airing his views in the minute and somewhat ridiculous "Park of Rest and Culture" with which Lenkoran had recently been endowed. In his opinion, he said, the arrests had been decreed from Moscow and merely formed part of the deliberate policy of the Soviet Government who believed in transplanting portions of the population from place to place as and when it suited them. The place of those now being deported would probably be taken by other peasants from central Asia. This, he said, had often happened before. It was, he added, somewhat cryptically, "a measure of precaution." And he tugged portentuously at his white whiskers.

As he watched the lorries rolling down to the shore a youngish nondescript man, with nothing to distinguish him from any other Soviet citizen, came up to me with a copy of Krokodil, the official comic weekly. I saw that he was pointing at an elaborate cartoon, depicting the horrors of British rule in India. A khaki-clad officer, with side whiskers and projecting teeth, smoking a pipe and carrying a whip, was herding some sad-looking Indians behind some barbed wire. "Not so different here," the man said, and was gone. It had been a glimpse, if only a brief one, at that unknown quantity: Soviet public opinion.[164]

A POTENT, ALTHOUGH LATENT, SOURCE OF OPPOSITION

And if one does not hear sufficiently about active opposition on the part of this element of Soviet society, it is because the size of the country, the mistrust of even a close neighbor in a totalitarian regime, the fear of being exterminated or of being exposed to the same treatment meted out by the police to millions of innocent people,[165] prevent them from translating their feelings into action. But they remain a potent, albeit latent, anti-Soviet force within the iron curtain.

[164] Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches. London, Jonathan Cape, 1950, pp. 40–41.

[165] According to Harold J. Berman in his recent book on the interpretation of Soviet law, the following description of Soviet "justice" may be made (Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, passim.):

"Legal guilt [in the Soviet Union] is purely personal, but political guilt may be avenged against relatives and friends" (p. 49).

"The line between political and nonpolitical is a wavy one, and it is the Ministry of the Interior [responsible for the dread secret police], and not the courts, which draws it" (p. 84).

"There can be no comparison of the prerevolutionary police repression with the Soviet system of terror in terms of its extent or its barbarism; the secret agents of the Czarist Ministry of the Interior were amateurs compared to their Soviet successors" (p. 165).

"The murderer [in the Soviet state] is punished by 10 years' deprivation of liberty—the counterrevolutionary by death" (p. 182).

XI. Other Groups

THE MANAGERIAL GROUP

Besides the above-mentioned reservoirs of nonconformity and dissatisfaction in the Soviet Union, there are other social groups whose manifold grievances warrant special watching and attention. There is, for instance, a large managerial group within the Soviet society—plan directors, managers, engineers, and technicians, who have to perform their functions with their hands tied by the Soviet system and its modus operandi.

It is true that the manager was granted more authority within his plant lately. Bienstock, one of the coauthors of a special study on Soviet management, writes:

> * * * The manager's authority within the plant has increased. He rules the whole production process, bears responsibility for the technological process, for quantitative fulfilment of the plan, and for the quality of the goods produced * * *.[166]

The manager gets considerable bonuses.

> * * * in coal mining, for each percent of reduction of real cost of production below planned cost, the manager, assistant manager, chief and assistant engineers get a bonus of 15 percent of monthly salary. In iron and steel industry, the figure is 10 percent. Furthermore, for each percent of overfulfilment of planned output, the bonus for a coal mine manager and his immediate assistants is 4 percent of salary. In iron and steel, bonuses for extra output are calculated progressively * * *. No less important is the effect of plant profits on managerial influence, prestige and power.[167]

In many instances he is a party member and has connections inside the government apparatus. And still basically the Soviet manager is a slave of the directives given to him and received from the center. His hands are tied by the observance of the plan, which deprives him of freedom of action and saps his initiative. Dr. Marshak, a professor of economics in Chicago and a former Russian emigré, describes the position of the manager as follows:

> The Soviet manager is unable to manipulate freely the size of his plant or his inventories. Nor can he take advantage of market situations, current or prospective, by bargaining with sources of supplies or with customers for better prices, or by winning customers through low prices, and sources of supply through high ones. To be sure, with supply chronically lagging behind demand, it would in any case be pointless for a manager to reduce prices in order to win customers. On the other hand, to win preference for a source of supplies by bidding up prices for raw materials would not be pointless, but it is forbidden.[168]

However, the most revealing description of the unenviable position of the Soviet manager, which he suffers in day-to-day operation, can be found in a recent economic publication of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences. Its author writes:

> * * * One of the most important and urgent tasks today is to eliminate the relatively great and strict centralization of the management of enterprises.

[166] Bienstock, Schwarz and Yugow, Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture, edited by Feiler and Marshak, Oxford University Press, New York, 1944, p. 15, quoted by M. S. Shiloh in State Capitalism in Russia. Contemporary Issues (London), vol. 2, autumn 1950, p. 213.
[167] Ibid., pp. 215–216.
[168] Ibid., p. 212.

The enterprise, which is the basic link in the system of administration of all industry, and its direct manager, the director, must be freed from petty and unnecessary supervision. Considerable strengthening of the economic management at enterprises is necessary.

The director, who heads an enterprise as its sole chief, possesses definite rights and has a wide range of duties. Despite the great rights and duties of an enterprise director, and the enormous confidence of the party and government that he enjoys, his opportunities for displaying great initiative, enterprise and maneuverability are restricted. The discovery and use of reserves for the growth of production depend enormously on the display of initiative by direct managers of production sections, and primarily by the director. But the great centralization of administration and petty supervision bind his initiative. Liquidation of petty supervision over managers would increase their responsibility for the work entrusted to them and enterprises could become even more profitable and have still greater savings. * * *

The creation of extensive opportunities for a director to display initiative and enterprise amounts to the problem of sharp restriction of the system of limits issued from the center (central administration or ministry) to the undertaking. Certainly the planned limits for basic and key positions must always be given to the enterprises. There must be limits for such indices as production, prices, profits, the total pay fund, and centralized capital investments. Otherwise it would be impossible to conduct a planned economy, to establish relationships and to coordinate the activity of enterprises on the scale of the entire state. It is a matter not of removing but of sharply restricting limits issued from the center, and of eliminating extremely detailed planning.

Sharp reduction of limits not only will create conditions for enterprise directors to display considerably more initiative, but will also save their valuable time for more thorough operational management. The problems of material stimulation of production and the role of the director in this sphere merit special attention * * *.

* * * the higher are the political consciousness of workers and their socialistic attitude toward work, the higher also is their labor productivity. However, material interest of the workers also plays an important role in this upsurge. Moreover, the task of utilizing the advantages of socialist economy and its inexhaustible reserves depends enormously on the correct organization of material stimulation.

The present procedure for material stimulation does not fully satisfy contemporary requirements of the organization of production. A director does not have extensive rights in regulating pay, reorganizing staffs, and so forth.

In his speech to the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. (director of the Moscow Stalin Auto Factory), Deputy A. Likhachev stressed the need of doing away with petty supervision, and of extending the rights of a director. He said: "It is again appropriate and timely to raise the question of extending the rights of the enterprise director * * *. An enterprise director must be granted the right to dispose of a certain percent of the expenditure at his own discretion within the limits of general cost accounting."

The extension of the rights of a director is not an aim in itself. It results in mobilizing additional sources for the growth of production on the basis of enterprise, initiative, and complete maneuverability. A director must have the right to pay workers more for reducing costs and decreasing overhead expenses, and in turn to pay less to those who lower the qualitative indices of production.[169]

FRICTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY

Along with tensions in the economic sphere there are further strains, squabbles, and factions within the party itself. The old Bolshevik guard has been decimated in the successive purges initiated by Stalin and has, by now, practically disappeared. Figures published by the 1939 party congress show that 70 percent of the members had entered the party after 1928.[170]

[169] A. Arakelian, Industrial Management in the U. S. S. R. Translated by Ellsworth L. Raymond. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1950, pp. 140–142 (originally published by the Moscow Worker Press in Russian in 1947 and issued by the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R.).

[170] Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 256.

However, the existence of rivalries within the party are more than a probability according to indirect evidence. For example, in the now famous article on Soviet conduct, Mr. "X" says:

> Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.
>
> This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's pinnacle of preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself. * * *
>
> But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in 3 years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the party members are persons who have entered since the last party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.
>
> It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook, and interest between the great mass of party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy. * * * * * * Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin * * *.[171]

It is most significant that in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.[172] By this act Stalin made himself the final arbiter of differences within the Politburo. But tensions are manifest also at other levels within the party in spite of, or thanks to, the effect of very tight rules of control which permeate the party apparatus from top to bottom. Louis Nemzer indicates this when he says:

> * * * An intense campaign was also conducted by the cadre department [of the party] to eliminate such politically dangerous practices as the assignment to important posts of persons who have not been approved by the appropriate party offices and the maintenance of inadequate programs for study and training of new personnel. * * *
>
> The cadre departments on the lower levels of the party structure executed assignments from both the cadre department in the national apparatus and the local party officialdom. After the war, they carried through a series of widespread changes which often removed a heavy percentage of all officeholders in their areas. Thus 27 percent of all persons selected for state posts by the Azerbaijan Party Central Committee were removed in 1947 and early 1948, and 24 percent of their own appointees to such posts were discharged by the party officials in Pinsk Province during 1949. * * * Within 18 months after the war in the Byelorussian SSR, 90 percent of all executive secretaries in the party district committees, 96 percent of all leading governmental officials on the county and municipal level, and 82 percent of all collective farm chairmen were replaced.[173]

[171] X. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs (New York) vol. 25, July 1947, pp. 578–580.
[172] Ibid., p. 573.
[173] Louis Nemzer, The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), March 1950, pp. 67–68.

In Merle Fainsod's interviews with Soviet escapees, he found the following reasons for tensions and discord within the party ranks:

The new generation which came of age in the mid and late thirties, according to this informant, never really captured the crusading spirit and idealistic vision of the earlier group. For them, the Komsomol and the party organization were much more of a bread-and-butter affair. They were disciplined to repeat the fashionable party slogans of the moment, but they repeated them as gestures of conformity rather than out of any inner conviction. The more independent-minded of them resented the regimentation, but they had no opportunity to make their resentment effective. The less well-situated rebelled against the growing evidences of inequality in the Soviet Union, but they too were in no position to register any effective protest * * *.

The interviews verified the common assumption that the party organization is one of the strongholds of the regime. But, within the party, distinctions must be made between the party apparat, or apparatus—the full-time party functionaries and leadership group who constitute the inner core of the party—and the party rank and file whose regular major occupations are elsewhere. The party apparat, of course, is peculiarly bound up with and dependent upon the regime; in a sense, it is the regime. It too has its anxieties and worries, not the least of which is the fear that one may be toppled from the heights to the depths with dizzying swiftness. This came out strikingly in an interview with a functionary in a high party school which was attended by regional party secretaries and other party officials of similar rank. This informant remarked that the party secretaries who had been ordered to the school were perpetually worried about what was happening back home in their regions; they were afraid that their authority would be undermined in their absence * * *.

So far as the party rank and file were concerned, there seemed to be general agreement among those interviewed that many joined the party, not out of deep inner conviction, but primarily for careerist reasons—because party membership opened the door to a job which they coveted, because it accelerated the rate of promotion, and because it was the gateway to the perquisites of privilege and high position. But even these careerist Communists had their problems. They found themselves surrounded by the same aura of fear and insecurity which enveloped the nonparty intelligentsia. Enlarged responsibility brought privileges and perquisites—but they also brought burdens and hazards with swift retribution for the first misstep. The interviews with former party members emphasized that the tensions generated by these hazards were a gnawing maggot from which there was no escape.[174]

And the party members were not unlike the bureaucrats, of whom Fainsod wrote:

Insecurity and fear were also the chief grievances of the bureaucrats. They asserted that they dared not exercise any initiative; the penalties of failure were too drastic. Like the Army officers, they felt themselves under constant surveillance, and even more than the Army officers, they reflected a feeling that the privileges of today might evaporate into the deprivations of a forced labor camp tomorrow.[175]

A significant phenomenon in this situation—a byproduct of disillusionment and frustration and the natural desire to accumulate wealth—is the inclination of party members to bypass party councils in pursuit of their professions. According to Edwin D. Gritz, Washington Post reporter, Pravda recently said:

* * * some party workers recently diminished their efforts as regards the party political questions and forgot the party political work. Having engrossed themselves in economic problems, they began to concentrate incorrectly on economic work at the expense of political work.

* * * * * * *

It [Pravda] also noted indignantly that "party political work on * * * city municipal enterprises has been pushed into the background. In the economic

[174] Merle Fainsod, Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System American Political Science Review (Menasha, Wis.), June 1950, pp. 276-277.
[175] Ibid., p. 274.

work (party officials) have begun to see only the beginning and the end of everything."

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[As an example of this apolitical attitude, Gritz reports:] At one collective farm, the Communist leaders met quite formally and agreed—without any ideological qualms—that they merited bonuses. With fine disregard of both the spirit and letter of Communist teachings, they forthwith took their bonuses in the form of livestock, houses, barns, bicycles, and various items of farm equipment.

Thus, according to a subsequent official account of the incident, "by decision of the general meeting of the 'Eighth March' kolkhoz, Sredne-Akhtubinski district, the artel chairman, Badin, was awarded a house; the bookkeeper who had been working at the kolkhoz for about a year, and the chairman of the auditing commission were each awarded a cow." [176]

EVERY GROUP HAS SOME CAUSE FOR GRIEVANCE

Indeed, it would be difficult to find any group in the Soviet Union which would not have its own manifest grievances against the regime. On the other hand, however, the members of these groups are individuals who are kept in constant fear of reprisal and recrimination. They do not know to whom they can turn for support though they need it. Boris Shub, in his book The Choice, quotes a conversation between David Graham of the British Broadcasting Co. and Tamara, a young Russian girl:

"We Russians need something to believe in," she replied quickly. "What good does it do to tell our boys how wonderful life is in other countries and how bad things are in Russia? Our officers and men know all that. They don't have to listen to foreign broadcasts for that. What we need is hope—something to make us believe the world really cares about our fate, that something will happen and we'll be able to live normal lives. * * *" [177]

INTERNAL ESPIONAGE

The Russians cannot trust even their close relatives and next-door neighbors. As a result it is difficult for them to make articulate their dissatisfactions, or effective their opposition. And, sometimes, their complaints are sublimated to the general patriotism which they feel to Mother Russia, and which the regime has exploited to the hilt.

THE DESIRE FOR PEACE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE CONTRASTED WITH THE WARLIKE POLICIES OF THE RULING CLIQUE

But what about their attitude toward the possibility of another war? No doubt there must be in the Soviet Union a formidable number of peace-loving people in all walks of life who do not see eye to eye with the aggressive and bellicose policies of the Communist Government. Many of them must abhor the militant behavior of Soviet leaders who have brought their country to the brink of a war with the free world.

At the end of World War II the Russians were a people in mourning. The war must have left deep scars on the people's memory. In his effort to force Soviet Russia after the end of the fight once more to move along the single track of Communist philosophy and behavior, the Soviet dictator encountered one great difficulty—the mood and temper of the Russian people. The war effort had left the masses of the Russian people weary, eager to live their life as ordinary, everyday

[176] Edwin D. Gritz, Party Backsliding Worries Kremlin. Washington Post, November 12, 1950.
[177] Boris Shub, The Choice. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950, p. 111.

citizens, and particularly apathetic toward the heroic exploits demanded by the party. They asked for a relaxation of the tempo and yearned for an opportunity to enjoy the benefits and comforts of normal life. Party propagandists and agitators encountered considerable mass apathy when they lectured on political subjects.

Therefore, aggressive and provocative in its foreign relations, the party simultaneously tried at home, in the Soviet Union, to create just the opposite impression—of being on the defensive and protecting the country and its citizens from the danger of becoming an "easy prey of capitalistic states" and the so-called foreign warmongers.

Therefore, the party directed to the Soviet population demands calculated to create a new upswing of nationalist sentiment among the various strata of Soviet society. Since the men in the Kremlin failed to make of the Russians militant Communists, they want to turn them into militant nationalists.

Did Stalin succeed in his policy? Was he able to reconcile his new propaganda line with the natural desire of people for the preservation of peace? Much seems to speak against an affirmative answer.

Stalin himself recognized that—

> Today nobody can wage war without the help of the people, and the people do not want to fight.[178]

The Russian people's fear of war forces the Soviet Government, bent on expansion, to conceal its true intentions and ambitions and to parade as—

> the firmest bulwark of peace, truest and strongest champion of their freedom and independence, an insurmountable obstacle to enforcement of imperialist claims to world domination.[179]

And it looks as if the Moscow-inspired Stockholm peace movement is not only meant to undermine the strength and unity of the anti-Communist front in the West but also has definite domestic connotations. It apparently was to placate the large group within the Soviet society who are fearful of a new war which could bring to the ordinary Soviet citizen only "blood, sweat, and tears."

The anxiety of the Soviet populace with regard to the possibility of getting involved in another war and the desire of the Soviet Government to assuage it are further substantiated by Moscow's efforts to discount the possibility of an atomic war or at least to play down in recent Soviet publications the effects of the use of the bomb in World War II. It is most significant that neither Pravda reports, nor those of any other Soviet paper, dealing with President Truman's press conference of November 30, 1950, had any reference to the President's pronouncement regarding possible employment of the bomb in future military situations.

Shub, in his book The Choice reports a revealing conversation he had in Berlin in the fall of 1947 with the Soviet writer Boris Gorbatov, who was one of the editors of the strongly anti-American Literaturnaya Gazeta, a recipient of the Stalin award, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and a Soviet millionaire who owned two cars, a summer home,

[178] Stalin's interview with Elliott Roosevelt on December 21, 1946. Quoted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, November 4, 1950, p. 8.

[179] B. L. Leontyev. The Struggle for Peace—Mighty Movement of Modern Times. Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1950, pp. 21-34. Translated and condensed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, November 4, 1950, p. 4.

and was married to a movie actress. Gorbatov, in the course of the conversation, said:

"They [new rocket weapons] would have a tremendous future if we—the Russians—and you—the Americans—had not decided to work together for a world of peace in which they'll have no future at all. We've had enough of war."

* * * * * * *

* * * "Politics," he sighed, "nothing but politics. All I want to do is to finish building my new country house and get back to work on my novel. * * *"

* * * * * * *

"It [Gorbatov's former novel] did very well," he replied, "a half-million copies were printed. But if the book had appeared this year instead of during the war, we'd have had enough paper to print a million and I could have made enough money to buy up this town."

Spoken like a good Soviet millionaire, I thought, but could not help wondering about Gorbatov's frankness. Hardly the proper tone for a Communist.[180]

And in a postwar Soviet novel by one of the best known Communist writers, Konstantin Simonov, The Smoke of the Fatherland, we read the following striking dialogue between two Soviet officials:

"Is there really going to be another war?"

* * * * * * *

"Three wars for one life. Too much. Too thick. I am not greedy, two would be sufficient for me."

"They will not ask you."

"It is a pity. If I were asked I would have said: 'One system! Two systems! There have been all sorts of systems on earth, but, nevertheless, people used to live somehow, got adjusted, came to some understanding between themselves.'"

He raised his voice: "There should be no more war. You understand? There should be none. It has no right to be by whatever price. I shall tell you, a system might be good, but I shan't need it when I shall be dead.

"Why do you look at me?" he shouted provokedly at Basargin, "Do you think that I dare to say this only to you? Even if Stalin would have been sitting here facing me I would have said to him the same thing, looking straight into his eyes." [181]

The Soviet press and propaganda machinery is constantly attacking what it calls "cosmopolitanism." Could this cosmopolitanism actually be a feeling of brotherhood felt by Russian intellectuals for their counterparts in the West? Could it be, partially, a willingness to get along with the West? Such attitudes would indeed be dangerous to the Communist regime with its announced hostility to the Western democracies—the second "system"—yet just that seems to be indicated. For example, the party magazine Bolshevik said recently:

* * * The minds of backward people in our country still continue to be weighted down by the old fabrications of representatives of the exploiter classes of Czarist Russia about the "superiority" of foreign bourgeois culture. * * * Rootless cosmopolitanism and kowtowing before things foreign are all *the more harmful and dangerous* in that cosmopolitanism serves as the ideological banner of the present American claimants to world hegemony, who are waging a campaign against the national sovereignty of peoples. Cosmopolitanism and kowtowing before things foreign are survivals of the old bourgeois ideology, and have no soil in our country.[182] [Italics furnished.]

Of all the possible areas of tension which have been discussed above, the fear of war among the people in Soviet Russia might be the strongest—permeating all other tensions and transcending them; and

[180] Shub, op. cit., pp. 87–91.

[181] Konstantin Simonov, The Smoke of the Fatherland, in Novyi Mir, No. 11, 1947, p. 25.

[182] S. Kovalev, Overcoming the Survivals of Capitalism in the Minds of People, Bolshevik, No. 19, October 1950. Translated in summary in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York), vol. 2, December 16, 1950, p. 11.

yet it is the most subtle, and the segment which feels it the most amorphous. Evidence available in print is scanty and not too conclusive. But Harold Stassen stated, on his recent return from a tour of the world, that:

> People everywhere, including the iron-curtain countries, want peace and freedom and the Russian Kremlin faces a counterrevolution which will include the Red Army itself, if it begins an aggressive war.[183]

Stassen said that his conclusion about the possibility of counter-revolution within Russia in case of war was based on information brought out of the Soviet territories by refugees or obtained by persons with contacts inside Russia and her satellities.[184]

[183] "Peace Outlook at 3-Year High," says Stassen, back from tour. Washington Post, January 10, 1951, p. 2.
[184] Stassen Returns With Peace Hopes. New York Times, January 10, 1951, p. 20.

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