THIRD HAGUE CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

February 1, 1927.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. Porter, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. Con. Res. 43]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, to whom was referred House Concurrent Resolution 43, requesting the President to propose the calling of a third Hague conference for the codification of international law, having had the same under consideration, reports it back without amendment with the recommendation that the resolution be passed.

The following, among others, urged the passage of this resolution: Hon. David Jayne Hill, Washington, D. C., delegate plenipotentiary of the United States to the second Hague conference; former Assistant Secretary of State; and former American minister to Switzerland and the Netherlands, and former American ambassador to Germany.

Dr. James Brown Scott, president of the Institute of International Law and president of the American Institute of International Law; technical delegate of the United States to the second Hague conference; and former solicitor of the Department of State.

Charles Henry Butler, Esq., lawyer, Washington, D. C., technical delegate of the United States to the second Hague conference; former reporter of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Hon. Chandler P. Anderson, American commissioner Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany; former counsellor of the Department of State; American arbitrator, British-American Claims Arbitration Commission; and American arbitrator, Norwegian arbitration.

Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, United States Navy, retired, Washington, D. C., former naval adviser to the American delegation to the International Commission on Rules of Warfare meeting at The Hague in 1922, and member of the advisory committee to the Amer-


Hon. Lebbeus R. Wilfley, member New York City bar; former attorney general of the Philippines, and judge of the United States Court for China.


The first principle of American philosophy in relation to international relations is that the United States should not enter into any permanent foreign alliance, military or political in character, directly or indirectly.

The second principle of American philosophy in relation to international relations is that international controversies should be settled by judicial decision and not by war.

Judicial decision must be based upon law, and international judicial decision must be based upon international law.

International law has been defined “as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent”; 1 also, as “a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It consists of general principles of right and justice, equally suitable to the government of individuals in a state of natural equality and to the relations and conduct of nations; of a collection of usages, customs, and opinion, the growth of civilization and commerce, and of a code of conventional or positive law.” 2

In relation to the nature of international law and its codification, the following two quotations are informative:

(1) In the official report presented to the conference of maritime nations, including the United States, which met at London in 1908, by M. Louis Renault, delegate plenipotentiary of France, it was stated:

The questions of the program are all settled except two, concerning which explanations will be given later. The solutions have been deduced from the various views or different practices and correspond to what may be called the media sententia. They do not always harmonize absolutely with the views peculiar to each country, but they do not shock the essential ideas of any. They should not be examined separately, but as a whole, otherwise one runs the risk of the most serious misunderstandings. In fact, if one considers one or more isolated rules either from the belligerent or the neutral point of view, he may find the interests with which he is especially concerned have been disregarded by the adoption of these rules, but the rules have their other side. The work is one of compromise and a mutual concession. Is it, as a whole, a good work?

We confidently hope that those who study it seriously will answer affirmatively. The declaration substitutes uniformity and certainty for the diversity and the obscurity from which international relations have too long suffered. The conference has tried to reconcile in an equitable and practical way the rights of belligerents and those of neutral commerce; it is made up of powers placed in very un-

1 Wheaton, International Law, pt. 1, chap. 1, secs. 4, 14.
2 Kent’s Commentaries, pt. 1, lecture 1, pp. 2-4.
like conditions, from the political, economic, and geographical points of view. There is on this account reason to suppose that the rules on which these powers are in accord take sufficient account of the different interests involved, and hence may be accepted without disadvantage by all the others.

(2) In speaking of the codification of international law in a report submitted to the twenty-third conference of the Interparliamentary Union, Washington, D. C., October 3, 1925, Hon. Elihu Root, former Secretary of State and former United States Senator from the State of New York, stated:

The process is not properly codification in the sense in which that term is used to apply to municipal law. What is called for now and what we mean when we speak of codification of international law is the making of law, and the necessary process is described in the report of Louis Renault which I have quoted. The ordinary codifier has to deal with existing law created by the dictum of superior power. He has to systematize, classify, arrange, and state clearly what he finds to be already the law, and if there be doubt it is to be resolved by appeal to the same superior power. The task now before the civilized world is to make law where law has not yet existed, because of a lack of agreement upon what it ought to be. The process is necessarily a process of agreement quite different in its character from the process of codification and declaration by superior authority. Codification, properly so called, is, however, a necessary incident in this lawmaking process, because to extend the law without duplication or confusion we must know definitely what the law already is; and so far as the lawmaking process reaches conclusions, the statement of those conclusions may be called codification, although the process by which the conclusions are reached must necessarily be entirely different from the process of codification.

We have gradually come into a method of making international law quite different from the slow general acceptance of the rules adopted in particular concrete cases, by which the law was originally created. The changes in the conditions of civilized life during the past century have been so extensive and so much more rapid than the growth of international law in the old way, that the law has been falling behind and becoming continually less adequate to cover the field of international contracts. The declaration of Paris upon the close of the Crimean War in 1856 was a new departure in the making of international law by a conventional statement of rules and an appeal to the nations generally for an official acceptance of the rules thus stated. The three neutrality rules of the treaty of Washington of 1871 were an attempt to determine by convention what should be the law to guide the tribunal in the Geneva arbitration upon the Alabama case. The Geneva conventions, the Hague conventions, contain numerous provisions established between the parties by conventional agreement in reliance upon general acceptance to give them the quality of law as distinct from mere agreement. To that conventional method we must now look for the extension of international law.

Several things should be said about this undertaking. It is necessarily a slow and difficult process. It will require patience and good temper, and learning, and distinguished ability, and leadership. The differences of opinion and of interests among the nations which have long prevented the establishment of further rules of international law can not be disposed of in a day. There is, however, ground for hope that the changes of conditions may have changed the attitude of many nations upon many questions, so that progress may be made now where progress never could be made before.

The work must ultimately be accomplished by official representatives of the nations acting under the instructions of their several governments. It is only results attained in that way which can secure consideration and ratification. The work, however, can not be done ab initio by official representatives. Their work must be preceded by and based upon the painstaking preparations wrought out by individuals and unofficial organizations; the work of such men as Field and Bluntschli and Fiore; such work as the codification of the laws of peace prepared by the American Institute of International Law and submitted to the governing board of the Pan American Union on the 2d of March, 1925; such work as that of the Institut de Droit International which made the achievements of the first Hague conference possible. Such work must be done in preparation. Without official conferences will be helpless; partly because they have not the force, partly because a large number of their membership will naturally be composed of men of affairs who have not the learning and the aptitude for scientific research.
necessary to laying the foundation for agreement; and partly because the freedom and frankness of discussion and mutual concession necessary for the reconciliation of views is difficult to secure among official delegates acting under instructions and obliged to get governmental authority for every position they state.

Because the process must be a slow one, because official action must be preceded by long and laborious preparation on the part of private individuals and organizations, no time ought to be lost in getting to work systematically.

RESOLUTION

The resolution which this report accompanies is as follows:

[H. J. Res. 221, Sixty-ninth Congress, first session]

JOINT RESOLUTION Requesting the President to propose the calling of a third Hague conference for the codification of international law

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby, respectfully requested to propose, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to the nations of the world, the calling of a third Hague conference, or to accept an invitation to participate on behalf of the United States in such a conference upon the proposal of some other government which had itself taken part in the second Hague conference, and to recommend to such conference the codification of international law for the following purposes: (1) To restate the established rules of international law; (2) to formulate and agree upon the amendments and additions, if any, to the rules of international law shown to be necessary or useful; (3) to endeavor to reconcile divergent views and to secure general agreement upon the rules which have been in dispute heretofore; and (4) to consider the subjects not now adequately regulated by international law, but to which the interest of international justice requires that rules of law shall be declared and accepted.

This resolution follows seriatim the recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, assembled at The Hague in 1920, representing 10 different countries, designated by the Laegue of Nations, to draft a plan for the Permanent Court of International Justice, of which committee the Hon. Elihu Root was a member. This committee recommended:

I. That a new conference of the nations, in continuation of the first two conferences at The Hague, be held as soon as practicable for the following purposes:

1. To restate the established rules of international law, especially, and in the first instance, in the field affected by the events of the recent war.
2. To formulate and agree upon the amendments and additions, if any, to the rules of international law shown to be necessary or useful by the events of the war and the changes in the conditions of international life and intercourse which have followed the war.
3. To endeavor to reconcile divergent views and secure general agreement upon the rules which have been in dispute heretofore.
4. To consider the subjects not now adequately regulated by international law, but to which the interest of international justice require that rules of law shall be declared and accepted.

II. That the Institute of International Law, the American Institute of International Law, the Union Juridique Internationale, the International Law Association, and the Iberian Institute of Comparative Law be invited to prepare, with such conference or collaboration inter sese as they may deem useful, projects for the work of the conference to be submitted beforehand to the several governments and laid before the conference for its consideration and such action as it may find suitable.

III. That the conference be named “Conference for the Advancement of International Law.”

IV. That this conference be followed by further successive conferences at stated intervals to continue the work left unfinished.

This resolution was rejected in toto by the League of Nations, and the assembly substituted for it, on December 18, 1920, the following recommendation:
The assembly of the League of Nations invites the council to address to the most authoritative of the institutions which are devoted to the study of international law a request to consider what would be the best methods of cooperative work to adopt for a more definite and more complete definition of the rules of international law which are to be applied to the mutual relations between States.

Upon that recommendation the following colloquy took place:

Lord Robert Cecil (South Africa) said he hoped that the resolution would not be adopted. He did not think that a stage had yet been reached in international relations at which it was desirable to attempt the codification of international law.

The President said that it was not proposed to codify international law under this recommendation, but only to discover the best means of doing so.

Lord Robert Cecil said that either the recommendation was submitted with serious intention of proceeding to the codification of international law or it was a pious hope of no real value or importance. He was opposed to the recommendation because if it meant something it was bad and if it meant nothing it was worse.

The resolution was not adopted.

No further action was taken by the League of Nations until December, 1924, when a committee of experts was appointed by the council in conformity with the following resolution of the assembly adopted on September 22, 1924:

The assembly—
Considering that the experience of five years has demonstrated the valuable services which the League of Nations can render toward rapidly meeting the legislative needs of international relations, and recalling particularly the important conventions already drawn up with respect to international conciliation, communications, and transit, the simplification of customs formalities, the recognition of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts, international labor legislation, the suppression of the traffic in women and children, the protection of minorities, as well as the recent resolutions concerning legal assistance for the poor.

Desirous of increasing the contribution of the League of Nations to the progressive codification of international law—

Requests the council—

To convene a committee of experts not merely possessing individually the required qualifications but also as a body representing the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. This committee, after eventually consulting the most authoritative organizations which have devoted themselves to the study of international law; and without trespassing in any way upon the official initiative which may have been taken by particular States, shall have the duty:

(1) To prepare a provisional list of the subjects of international law, the regulation of which by international agreement would seem to be most desirable and realizable at the present moment;

(2) After communication of the list by the secretariat to the governments of States, whether members of the league or not, for their opinions, to examine the replies received; and

(3) To report to the council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe and on the procedure which might be followed with a view to preparing eventually for conferences for their solution.

Under date of February 9, 1926, this committee communicated with various nations concerning questions involving—

1. Nationality.
2. Territorial waters.
3. Diplomatic privileges and immunities.
4. Responsibility of States in respect of injury caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners.
5. Procedure of international conferences and procedure for the conclusion and drafting of treaties.
7. Exploitation of the products of the sea.
Such have been the official interest and activities in the Eastern Hemisphere in relation to the codification of international law since 1920. The official interest and activities in the Western Hemisphere in relation to the codification of international law are disclosed by the following official actions:

The Second International Conference of American States, held in Mexico from October, 1901, to January, 1902, agreed to a convention by the terms of which the Secretary of State of the United States and the ministers of the American Republics accredited to Washington should appoint a committee of five American and two European jurists to draft in the interval between the second and third conferences of the American Republics a code of public and private international law to govern the relations of the American States.

The third International Conference of American States, meeting at Rio de Janeiro August 23, 1906, adopted a convention establishing an International Commission of Jurists “for the purpose of preparing a draft of a code of private international law and one of public international law, regulating the relations between the nations of America.” The Government of the United States was a party to this convention, which was ratified by the Senate.

The fifth International Conference of American States, meeting at Santiago, Chile, April 26, 1923, requested each government of the American Republics to appoint two delegates to constitute the Commission of Jurists of Rio de Janeiro “in the interest of the progressive and gradual codification of international law.”

Projects of conventions have been prepared at the request, January 2, 1924, of the governing board of the Pan American Union for the consideration of the International Commission of Jurists, called to meet in Rio de Janeiro in 1927, and submitted by the American Institute of International Law—projects covering both private and public international law for the Western Hemisphere—to the governing board of the Pan American Union. The projects of public international law are 30 in number, and the project dealing with private international law is in the form of a code. The projects of public international law consist of—

1. Preamble.
2. General declarations.
3. Declaration of Pan American unity and cooperation.
4. Fundamental bases of international law.
6. Recognition of new nations and new governments.
7. Declaration of rights and duties of nations.
11. Rights and duties of nations in territories in dispute on the question of boundaries.
12. Jurisdiction.
13. International rights and duties of natural and juridical persons.
15. Responsibility of governments.
17. Extradition.
20. Aerial navigation.
22. Diplomatic agents.
23. Consuls.
25. Interchange of professors and students.
27. Pacific settlement.
29. Measures of repression.
30. Conquests.

The official interests and activities in relation to the codification of international law in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres are not exclusive or competitive. They should lead to a general international conference representing all the nations upon a basis of equality, where no power or powers shall be predominant, a conference free from military and political control and purposes, a conference wholly for the advancement of international justice and the settlement of international controversies by judicial decision.

The advisability of this third Hague conference in succession to the first two of the series is well founded upon the fruits of the previous two conferences.

THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The first Hague conference was the first official peace conference ever called in time of peace and not at the end of war. The eighth article of its program provided for “acceptance, in principle, of the use of good offices, mediation, and voluntary arbitration in cases where they are available, with the purpose of preventing armed conflicts between nations; understanding in relation to their mode of application and the establishment of a uniform practice in employing them.”

The result of this conference was the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the greatest single treaty or convention in the history of international relations.

This conference recognized the civilized peoples as forming a society of nations; stated their desire of extending the empire of law and of strengthening the appreciation of international justice; commended a permanent court of arbitration “accessible to all, in the midst of independent powers;” and solemnly confessed their faith in “the principles of equity and right, on which are based the security of States and the welfare of peoples.”

No greater step has ever been taken toward permanent peace than this accession of all nations to the principles of justice expressed in rules of law which should govern their foreign intercourse. It provided methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes wherever there existed a will to accomplish this result.

The Government of the United States participated in this conference.

THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The second Hague conference revised the three conventions of its predecessor, as shown to be necessary in the light of experience, and drew conventions dealing with the following subjects:

The limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts; the necessity of a declaration of war on the opening of hostilities; the laws and customs of war on land; the rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land; the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities; the conversion of merchant ships into war ships; the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; the bombardment by naval forces in time of war; the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva convention; restrictions with regard to the exercise of the right of capture in naval war; the creation of an international prize court; the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war.

In addition to these formal agreements, a draft convention was drawn for the creation of a court of arbitral justice which, lacked only a method of appointing the judges to be a permanent court of international justice. And, finally, the conference provided in express terms for a third Hague conference in the following language:

Finally, the conference recommends to the powers the assembly of a third peace conference, which might be held within a period corresponding to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference, at a date to be fixed by common agreement between the powers, and it calls their attention to the necessity of preparing the program of this third conference a sufficient time in advance to insure its deliberations being conducted with the necessary authority and expedition.

The Government of the United States participated in this conference.

The Interparliamentary Union, at its twenty-third conference in Washington, October 1 to 7, 1925, adopted a resolution looking toward "an international conference of nations called for the purpose of effecting the codification of international law."

Without a restatement, formulation, and general agreement upon rules of international law, modern and adequate in character, international justice can not now be administered either by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague or the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations, or any other agency.

The statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations provided for in article 14 of the covenant of the League of Nations, stated in article 36 that "The jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force." The court is thereby excluded from the decision of the great number and variety of questions not now covered by international law. Hon. Elihu Root stated in relation to this article:

The limitation was necessary because upon so many subjects the nations had long been unable to agree upon what the law ought to be. These disagreements had arisen from the differing characteristics and conditions of the different nations. Sometimes they came from different modes of thought and feeling; sometimes they came from conflicting interests; and upon such subjects every rule proposed has always found some nation which conceived that it would be injured and its rivals would be benefited by the adoption of such a rule. We can all agree upon the principles of international law, but it has been exceedingly difficult to secure agreement upon the rules which will adequately and properly apply those principles. To authorize a court not merely to apply the rules of international law, but to make those rules and then apply them, would be to authorize the court to overrule the nations themselves in their contention as to what the law ought to be, to establish rules to which the nations have not consented, and thus to deprive international law of one of its essential characteristics as a body of accepted rules.
In enlarging the law which a court or judicial agency is authorized to apply, the scope of the jurisdiction of the court or agency is increased in equal measure.

Twenty-six nations participated in the first Hague conference; forty-four nations were represented at the second Hague conference. The third of the series of Hague conferences would naturally be composed of all the nations recognizing international law.

Experience has shown that conferences of The Hague type have been able to agree on conventions of the utmost importance, and without being assemblies for the codification of international law, they nevertheless have been able to agree upon a large number of conventions which when ratified by the participating States have become the law of nations. This process begun in 1899, continued in 1907, was interrupted by the World War. It should be resumed. The first two conferences were, as has been shown, fruitful in positive results. They were not preceded, however, by preparation extending over a period of years. The subjects to be discussed in a third conference would already in large measure have been studied and prepared, and the third conference would meet not merely with a program agreed upon by the nations in advance, but with draft conventions prepared by official and learned societies for such consideration as the conference should be disposed to give to them.

The letter of the Secretary of State dated May 11, 1926, to your chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs makes it clear that the conference would at least have the benefit of the official conventions prepared in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.

The positive results of a third conference would in all probabilities be more important than those of either of its predecessors. It is in independent conference that the nations can best agree upon the law which is to be applied to the disputes which may arise between or among them, because they have agreed to the law in advance of the disputes to which it is applied.

It is in independent conference that the nations can best extend the domain of law to questions which hitherto have been considered as political, and by agreement give to them the force of law.

It is in periodical conference of the nations that the law can keep abreast of judicial conditions so that between nations as between individuals there may hereafter be no international wrong without an adequate international remedy.

The hope of the future is through law devised by the nations in conference and administered by appropriate agencies.

H. J. Res. 221, reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, provides this method of procedure through international conference and international law, in accordance with the traditions of the United States, and a third Hague peace conference, as proposed by H. J. Res. 221, is in accordance with the present policy of the Government of the United States as evidenced by the official letter of the Secretary of State under date of May 11, 1926, to your chairman, informing him and through him the committee, that the Government of the United States is in favor of a conference and requesting an appropriation in order to enable
the Government to participate in such a conference when it may be assembled.

The committee believes that no greater contribution to world order can be made by the United States than the concept contained in this resolution of an association of all free nations, equal and sovereign, dealing directly with one another in free and independent conference at The Hague for the judicial settlement of international controversies by persuasion and the application of justice without the exercise of force.
MINORITY VIEWS

We respectfully disagree with the majority report for the following reasons: While we would like to see a codification of international laws, yet we do not believe anything can be accomplished by the passage of this resolution, known as House Concurrent Resolution 43, which requests the President to propose on behalf of the Government of the United States to the nations of the world the calling of a third Hague conference, or to accept an invitation to participate on behalf of the United States in such a conference, etc.

The President is vested with full power under the Constitution to do all that is suggested in the resolution; in fact, the conduct of our international affairs rests solely in his hands and he is responsible to the country for the conduct thereof. Ordinarily it is advisable to make suggestions to the President unless special circumstances would seem to require such action.

The President realizes his power and authority, but has not seen fit to do what the resolution requests and has not nor will he express any desire for the passage thereof by Congress.

It would appear that the President does not deem the present a propitious time to call such conference or to suggest the calling thereof, else he would have done so before this. This resolution, however, requests him to do a thing which he has full power and authority to do, but has not deemed wise.

It will also be noted that the Secretary of State in response to a letter from the Hon. Stephen G. Porter, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, replied on May 11, 1926, using the following concluding words:

While I am not at the moment prepared to say that the time is propitious for an international conference on the subject, I think that if Congress is favorably disposed toward participation by the United States in such a conference it might well make an appropriation which would enable this Government to send representatives to a conference whenever an invitation to attend is received.

The Secretary of State is doubtful, to say the least, as to the advisability of such a resolution. Certainly he does not indorse it, but rather suggests another resolution or bill which would appropriate a sufficient sum which would enable this Government to send representatives whenever an invitation to attend is received. From this we would infer that the Department of State does not advise any action by the President but rather desires to be in a position when action is taken abroad.

Dr. Edwin M. Borchard, professor of international law, Yale University, and former assistant solicitor, Department of State, who was produced by the proponents of this resolution, said, on page 83 of the hearings:

I realize the obstacles of the calling of any conference on any legal subject to-day. You gentlemen know the state of international relations to-day as well as anybody in the country does, and I can foresee very little chance of success of any immediate meeting convened to restate international law; the times are
not to-day propitious, for Europe has not since 1918 made progress toward the security gained by respect for law, but, on the contrary, in my judgment, has perhaps retrogressed.

While it is not our desire to drag the League of Nations into this controversy, yet facts must be recorded.

The league has for a long time had eminent jurists engaged in preparing certain drafts for the codification of international law. Would the league, composed of more than 50 nations, be willing for its member nations to enter the third Hague conference and to scrap the work of their jurists after it had progressed so far, or if the nations composing the league did enter the conference are they not bound as one to uphold the work of the league?

If it is results we are after, would it not be better, perhaps, to deal with the league as an international entity, as our Government did in the narcotic drug negotiations, where so much good was accomplished by our delegates, and thereby avail ourselves of the work already performed and which could not be performed in a short Hague conference?

The passage of the resolution would be a mere idle gesture which would have no substantial results.

It will be tantamount to an interference by Congress with the prerogatives of the Executive.

It would have the appearance of our distrust of the League of Nations, which, though our Government has declined to enter, it is thought by many to be a splendid institution and one from which we should not detract even though we do not care to add anything thereto.

Respectfully submitted.

J. CHAS. LINTHICUM.
CHAS. M. STEDMAN.
TOM CONNALLY.
R. WALTON MOORE.
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S. D. McREYNOLDS.
CHARLES G. EDWARDS.