

careers, and tougher for workers to retire when they want to.

That's a big part of the reason a lot of working families are feeling anxious. It offends our fundamental American belief that everybody who works hard should be able to get ahead.

That's why we've been fighting so hard to give families more opportunity and more security: by working to create more good jobs, invest in our middle class, and help working people get a raise. That's what the Affordable Care Act is all about—filling in the gaps in employer-based care so that when somebody loses a job, or goes back to school, or starts that new business, they still have health care. And it's why I believe we've got to take steps to modernize our unemployment insurance system.

If a hard-working American loses her job, regardless of what State she lives in, we should make sure she can get unemployment insurance and some help to retrain for her next job. If she's been unemployed for a while, we should reach out to her and connect her with career counseling. And if she finds a new job that doesn't pay as much as her old one, we

should offer some wage insurance that helps her pay her bills. Under my plan, experienced workers who now make less than \$50,000 could replace half of their lost wages: up to \$10,000 over 2 years. It's a way to give families some stability and encourage folks to rejoin the workforce, because we shouldn't just be talking about unemployment, we should be talking about reemployment.

That's when America works best: when everyone has opportunity, when everyone has some security, and when everyone can contribute to this country that we love. That's how we make sure that hard-working families can get ahead. And that's what I'll be fighting for with every last day of my Presidency.

Thanks, everybody. Have a great weekend.

NOTE: The address was recorded at approximately 11:50 a.m. on January 15 in the Roosevelt Room at the White House for broadcast on January 16. The transcript was made available by the Office of the Press Secretary on January 15, but was embargoed for release until 6 a.m. on January 16.

Letter to Congressional Leaders on Revocation of Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 With Respect to Iran, Amendment of Executive Order 13628 With Respect to Iran, and Provision of Implementation Authorities for Aspects of Certain Statutory Sanctions Outside the Scope of United States Commitments Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015
January 16, 2016

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) (IEEPA), I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order (the "order") revoking Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 with respect to Iran and amending Executive Order 13628 with respect to Iran in order to give effect to the United States commitments with respect to sanctions described in section 4 of Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14,

2015 (JCPOA) between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran. In addition, the order takes steps to provide implementation authorities for aspects of certain statutory sanctions that are outside the scope of the U.S. commitments to lift nuclear-related sanctions under the JCPOA.

In Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, the President found that the actions and policies of the Government of Iran threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy

of the United States. To deal with that threat, the President declared a national emergency and imposed prohibitions on certain transactions with respect to the development of Iranian petroleum resources. To further respond to that threat and to provide implementing authority for Iran-related sanctions legislation—including the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); certain statutory requirements of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 *et seq.*); section 1245(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81) (22 U.S.C. 8513a); certain statutory requirements of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–158) (22 U.S.C. 8701 *et seq.*); and certain statutory requirements of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of Public Law 112–239) (22 U.S.C. 8801 *et seq.*) (IFCA)—the President issued Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010, Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011, Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011, Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012, Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012, Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012, and Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013.

On July 14, 2015, the P5+1, the EU, and Iran announced the JCPOA, which will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. The JCPOA provides for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran’s completion of specified nuclear-related steps, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

I have determined that Iran’s implementation of the nuclear-related measures specified in sections 15.1–15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, as verified by the IAEA, marks a fundamental shift in circumstances with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. In order to give effect to the United States commitments with respect

to sanctions described in section 4 of Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA, section 1 of the order revokes Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 in their entirety. Section 2 of the order amends Executive Order 13628 by revoking sections 5 through 7 and section 15 of that order, revising cross references in the remaining sections of that order to the revoked sections, and renumbering the remaining sections of that order.

Section 3(a) of the order provides implementation authority for aspects of section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA; this provision only applies to the extent sanctions are imposed with respect to transactions or activities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA, specifically, providing significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods and services in support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of persons described in section 1244(c)(2)(C)(iii) of IFCA (i.e., Iranian persons on the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List)).

Section 3(b) of the order provides implementation authority for aspects of sections 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), and 1246(a)(1) of IFCA; this provision only applies to the extent sanctions are imposed with respect to transactions or activities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA, as reflected in waiver determinations as to sections 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), and 1246(a)(1) of IFCA issued by the Secretary of State to give effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1–17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA (including any transactions or activities involving persons on the SDN List), and any renewals thereof.

Section 3(c) of the order provides implementation authority for section 1249 of IFCA, which is outside the scope of the JCPOA.

I have delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IIEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the order, other than the purposes described in section 6 of the order.

All agencies of the United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of the order.

I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued.

Sincerely,

Remarks on Iran *January 17, 2016*

Good morning. This is a good day, because once again, we're seeing what's possible with strong American diplomacy.

As I said in my State of the Union Address, ensuring the security of the United States and the safety of our people demands a smart, patient, and disciplined approach to the world. That includes our diplomacy with the Islamic Republic of Iran. For decades, our differences with Iran meant that our governments almost never spoke to each other. Ultimately, that did not advance America's interests. Over the years, Iran moved closer and closer to having the ability to build a nuclear weapon. But from Presidents Franklin Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan, the United States has never been afraid to pursue diplomacy with our adversaries. And as President, I decided that a strong, confident America could advance our national security by engaging directly with the Iranian Government.

We've seen the results. Under the nuclear deal that we, our allies, and partners reached with Iran last year, Iran will not get its hands on a nuclear bomb. The region, the United States, and the world will be more secure. As I've said many times, the nuclear deal was never intended to resolve all of our differences with Iran. But still, engaging directly with the Iranian Government on a sustained basis, for the first time in decades, has created a unique opportunity—a window—to try to resolve important issues. And today I can report progress on a number of fronts.

First, yesterday marked a milestone in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Iran has now fulfilled key commitments under

BARACK OBAMA

NOTE: Identical letters were sent to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the Senate. The Executive order is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

the nuclear deal. And I want to take a moment to explain why this is so important.

Over more than a decade, Iran had moved ahead with its nuclear program, and before the deal, it had installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges that can enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb. Today, Iran has removed two-thirds of those machines. Before the deal, Iran was steadily increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium, enough for up to 10 nuclear bombs. Today, more than 98 percent of that stockpile has been shipped out of Iran, meaning Iran now doesn't have enough material for even one bomb. Before, Iran was nearing completion of a new reactor capable of producing plutonium for a bomb. Today, the core of that reactor has been pulled out and filled with concrete so it cannot be used again.

Before the deal, the world had relatively little visibility into Iran's nuclear program. Today, international inspectors are on the ground, and Iran is being subjected to the most comprehensive, intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. Inspectors will monitor Iran's key nuclear facilities 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. For decades to come, inspectors will have access to Iran's entire nuclear supply chain. In other words, if Iran tries to cheat—if they try to build a bomb covertly—we will catch them.

So the bottom line is this. Whereas Iran was steadily expanding its nuclear program, we have now cut off every single path that Iran could have used to build a bomb. Whereas it would have taken Iran 2 to 3 months to break out with enough material to rush to a bomb, we've now extended that breakout time to a year, and with the world's unprecedented in-