

the consolidation of plutonium materials within Italy, and the training and certification of personnel for specialized packaging operations.

The material was safely packaged in transport containers certified by regulators in both the United States and Italy. The United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked seamlessly together and in accordance with all relevant regulations and internationally-recognized recommendations throughout the operation to ensure the safe and secure transport of

this material. Despite the significant technical challenges, the team was able to successfully complete the operation on schedule.

Italy and the United States plan to continue to work together to eliminate additional stocks of special nuclear material to make sure they do not fall into the hands of terrorists. They also pledge to work with others in the international community to assist them with the elimination of such materials.

NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this joint statement.

## Joint Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security

March 24, 2014

This gift basket records the intent of Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States, who choose to join to secure IAEA Category 1 radioactive sources within their territory by 2016, consistent with the actions outlined below:

- We the parties to this additional statement declare our commitment to secure IAEA Category 1 sources consistent with the IAEA's *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* and with consideration of *Nuclear Security Series 14: Nuclear security recommendations on radioactive material and associated facilities* and *Nuclear Security Series 15: Nuclear security recommendations on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control*, giving particular attention to the following activities:
  - Support a regulatory body whose regulatory functions are effectively independent of other functions, with the authority to oversee and enforce security at sites (legislation, regulations, inspections, human resource qualifications, etc.);
  - Establish a comprehensive lifecycle management plan (import/export controls, secure storage, orphan source recovery, disused source management, national registry, etc.);
  - Develop a comprehensive plan for sources out of regulatory control (Search & Secure), notification of neighboring countries and IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;
  - Assess the domestic threat and develop a national response plan (exercised periodically);
  - Implement site level security measures (physical protection measures, procedures, training, performance testing, maintenance, awareness, trustworthiness of individuals involved in the management of radioactive sources, etc.); and
  - Provide rapid response to any attempted or actual unauthorized access to radioactive material (exercised periodically)
- Cooperation with other States and multilateral organizations is encouraged to complete the above-listed radiological security measures.
- We also may consider instituting additional best practices for IAEA Category 1

radioactive source security. These measures could include:

- Robust physical protection access controls preferably with multifactor authentication to restrict access to radiological sources;
- Monitoring systems designed with defense in depth; for example, redundant and timely alarms and video assessment from multiple sites sent to a centralized monitoring facility staffed by trustworthy personnel;
- Enhanced delay measures to allow response forces to arrive in time to address the security threat;

- The active involvement of off-site response forces in both maintaining awareness of radiological sources and threats within the city/state/country, as well as engaging sites with radiological sources in planning and training activities (e.g., facility walk-downs, target folder development, tabletop and other exercises); and
- A robust and holistic regulatory framework that governs secure source transportation, possession, and disposition.

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## Joint Statement—The Hague Declaration *March 24, 2014*

The Hague, The Netherlands

1. We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission met in The Hague to reaffirm our support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

2. International law prohibits the acquisition of part or all of another state's territory through coercion or force. To do so violates the principles upon which the international system is built. We condemn the illegal referendum held in Crimea in violation of Ukraine's constitution. We also strongly condemn Russia's illegal attempt to annex Crimea in contravention of international law and specific international obligations. We do not recognize either.

3. Today, we reaffirm that Russia's actions will have significant consequences. This clear violation of international law is a serious challenge to the rule of law around the world and should be a concern for all nations. In response to Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to demonstrate our determination to respond to these illegal actions, individually and collectively we have

imposed a variety of sanctions against Russia and those individuals and entities responsible. We remain ready to intensify actions including coordinated sectoral sanctions that will have an increasingly significant impact on the Russian economy, if Russia continues to escalate this situation.

4. We remind Russia of its international obligations, and its responsibilities including those for the world economy. Russia has a clear choice to make. Diplomatic avenues to de-escalate the situation remain open, and we encourage the Russian Government to take them. Russia must respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, begin discussions with the Government of Ukraine, and avail itself of offers of international mediation and monitoring to address any legitimate concerns.

5. The Russian Federation's support for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is a step in the right direction. We look forward to the mission's early deployment, in order to facilitate the dialogue on the ground, reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation, and we call on all parties to ensure that Special Monitoring Mission