

Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Missile Defense Issues *July 6, 2009*

In accordance with the understanding reached at the meeting in London on April 1, 2009, Russia and the United States plan to continue the discussion concerning the establishment of cooperation in responding to the challenge of ballistic missile proliferation. Our countries are intensifying their search for optimum ways of strengthening strategic relations on the basis of mutual respect and interests.

We have instructed our experts to work together to analyze the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century and to prepare appropriate recommendations, giving priority to the use of political and diplomatic methods. At the same time they plan to conduct a joint review of the entire spectrum of means at our disposal that allow us to cooperate on monitoring the development of missile programs around the

world. Our experts are intensifying dialogue on establishing the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is to become the basis for a multilateral missile-launch notification regime.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America reaffirm their willingness to engage in equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested countries that share their assessments of the danger of global proliferation of ballistic missiles. We call upon all countries having a missile potential to refrain from steps that could lead to missile proliferation and undermine regional and global stability.

NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this joint statement.

Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation *July 6, 2009*

The United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm their commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. We bear special responsibility for security of nuclear weapons. While we reconfirm that security at nuclear facilities in the United States and Russia meets current requirements, we stress that nuclear security requirements need continuous upgrading. We will continue cooperating on effective export controls that make it possible to prevent nuclear materials, equipment and technologies from falling into the hands of actors unauthorized by the state as well as prevent their use in any manner contrary to obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Building upon previous joint efforts, experience and achievements, and in order to fulfill our agreements reached in London on April 1, 2009, we declare an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further in-

crease the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world, including through minimization of the use of highly-enriched uranium in civilian applications and through consolidation and conversion of nuclear materials. We also reaffirm our commitment to dispose of existing stockpiles of weapon-grade materials that are surplus to defense needs consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

Both sides remain committed to executing the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation to dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States and Russia. The parties recognize that successful implementation of their respective programs will be subject to future appropriation of funds.

Both sides commit themselves to the nuclear security initiatives begun in 2005, to include the repatriation of spent highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. To expand on this work, we will jointly and together with other nations work to return research reactor HEU fuel under the agreed-upon schedule, as a practical implementation of nuclear nonproliferation objectives. We will continue working with other nations to secure and to eliminate excess stocks of proliferation-sensitive nuclear materials worldwide.

We will continue cooperating on development of new types of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for possible conversion of research reactor cores in third countries and on conducting feasibility studies to explore possibilities for conversion of such individual reactors in the United States and Russia. We note the importance of HEU minimization in civilian applications and support such efforts to the maximum extent possible, where feasible.

To continue to improve the level of nuclear security and to combat existing and emerging threats, our experts will continue working to further improve physical protection systems at nuclear facilities and ensure that these improvements will be sustained in the long term. We will continuously improve physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials and radioactive substances and qualifications of professional staff.

Building on our excellent bilateral cooperation in nuclear security, and the expertise of both countries in this area, we will work together to strengthen the ability of other nations to carry out their weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation obligations under UNSCR 1540.

We express our mutual desire to expand capabilities to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive substances at the borders of our countries.

Recognizing the important role of safeguards in promoting confidence in the peaceful use of

nuclear energy and in addressing proliferation threats, we will work together to expand opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to strengthen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the international safeguards system.

We share a common vision of the growth of clean, safe, secure and affordable nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Our nations have a great deal to offer together with other states to the international community in this area, focusing additional efforts on:

- Development of prospective and innovative nuclear energy systems;
- Research into methods and mechanisms for the provision of reliable nuclear fuel cycle services;
- Research into international approaches for the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle services to secure the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime;
- Improvement of the international safeguards system;

As stated in London on April 1, 2009, the United States and Russia will work to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy, which will provide the basis for these and other types of cooperation.

We welcome the expansion and strengthening of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which held the fifth meeting of partner nations in The Hague on June 16–17, 2009, and we are fully determined to continue joint work to expand national and collective efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. To this end, we will jointly initiate practical steps, to include conducting world-wide regional nuclear security best-practices workshops to facilitate greater international cooperation in implementing this initiative.

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The President's News Conference With President Dmitry A. Medvedev of Russia in Moscow

July 6, 2009

President Medvedev. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen of the press, colleagues, we have just completed our negotiations with the U.S. President. The first visit of U.S. President Barack Obama in Russia was a very busy one. The first day showed that we managed to discuss all the items of our agenda, and it was a very big one.

I would like from the outset to say that there was a very useful and very open business-like conversation. This, no doubt, was a meeting that has been expected, both in this country and the United States of America, and on which not only the future of our two country depends but also, to a large extent, the trends of world development.

I would like to emphasize once again, of course, the first day of negotiations, our meeting in one on one and in a limited composition and a larger composition were very open and sincere. And this is extremely important. We have agreed that we will continue to communicate in this mode further on. In reality, for our relations, it is very important, and it is not a simple job, because the backlog of problems is quite impressive.

But we had enough of mutual wish and will and the positions of principles that we have always occupied and still occupy to make the discussion of these problems in a business-like manner. And we have reached mutually beneficial results.

I would like to emphasize that each of our countries understand its role in its own way, but at the same time, we realize our role and responsibility for the situation in this world, especially in a period when the level of globalization has reached such dimensions and such parameters that the decisions we make very often determine the situation in general. And such powerful states as the United States of America and the Russian Federation have special responsibility for everything that is happening on our planet.

We have many points of convergence, many mutual interests and global and economic ones

and a variety of other interests. But our desire to discuss these subjects was mutual, and this is also one of very important results of our meeting, since the work we are doing requires good will, mutual respect, and honest understanding of each other's position.

We also came to the conclusion that Russian-American relations and the level achieved today does not correspond to their potential, to the other possibilities of our countries. And the important thing is that the level that we have today does not correspond to the need of the current age, and without active development of our relations on the foreign affairs agenda, on scientific, trade, educational, relations, we'll not be able to build the road to the 21st century.

We have spent several hours in very busy negotiations, very specific, and at the same we dwelt on the questions of philosophy of our cooperation. I'm grateful to the President of the United States for the understanding he showed on the principles that we put forward and our attention to the proposals made by the American side. So despite of the fact that in several hours we cannot remove the burden of all the problems, we have agreed that we will go forward without stopping, that we will make the decisions that are needed for the development of relations between our two countries.

We have discussed quite specific problems, and I would like to share some of them with you. We, of course, discussed international subjects. We spoke about such difficult problems as the process of Mideast—Middle East settlement. We agreed to continue our work, taking into account the visits we had in the Middle East recently and the plans that we discussed. We discussed the possibility of holding Moscow conference on the Middle East.

We spoke about a very important subject that is extremely—requires the coordination of our activities. This is the problem of Afghanistan. Without our joint work in that area,