[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2008, Book I)]
[March 8, 2008]
[Pages 337-339]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''
March 8, 2008

To the House of Representatives:
    I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2082, the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.'' The bill would 
impede the United States Government's efforts to protect the American 
people effectively from terrorist attacks and other threats because it 
imposes several unnecessary and unacceptable burdens on our Intelligence 
Community.
    Section 444 of the bill would impose additional Senate confirmation 
requirements on two national security positions--the Director of the 
National Security Agency and the Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (9/11 Commission) observed that the effectiveness of the 
Intelligence Community suffers due to delays in the confirmation 
process; section 444 would only aggravate those serious problems. Senior 
intelligence officials need to assume their duties and responsibilities 
as quickly as possible to address the pressing requirements of national 
security. Instead of addressing the 9/11 Commission's concern, the bill 
would subject two additional vital positions to a more protracted 
process of Senate confirmation. Apart from causing such potentially 
harmful delays, this unwarranted requirement for Senate confirmation 
would also risk injecting political pressure into these positions of 
technical expertise and public trust.
    Section 413 would create a new Inspector General for the 
Intelligence Community. This new office is duplicative and unnecessary. 
Each intelligence community component already has an Inspector General, 
and the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence has been vested with all the legal powers

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of any inspector general to carry out investigations on matters under 
the jurisdiction of the Director of National Intelligence. There is no 
reason to commit taxpayer resources to an additional inspector general 
with competing jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements. 
Creating duplicative inspectors general, who may have inconsistent views 
on the handling of particular matters, has the potential to create 
conflicts and impede the Intelligence Community from efficiently 
resolving issues and carrying out its core mission. In addition, the 
creation of a new inspector general would add yet another position in 
the Intelligence Community subject to Senate confirmation, contrary to 
the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
    Section 327 of the bill would harm our national security by 
requiring any element of the Intelligence Community to use only the 
interrogation methods authorized in the Army Field Manual on 
Interrogations. It is vitally important that the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) be allowed to maintain a separate and classified 
interrogation program. The Army Field Manual is directed at guiding the 
actions of nearly three million active duty and reserve military 
personnel in connection with the detention of lawful combatants during 
the course of traditional armed conflicts, but terrorists often are 
trained specifically to resist techniques prescribed in publicly 
available military regulations such as the Manual. The CIA's ability to 
conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists 
who possess the most critical information in the War on Terror has 
helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to 
fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into 
Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London. While details of the 
current CIA program are classified, the Attorney General has reviewed it 
and determined that it is lawful under existing domestic and 
international law, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
I remain committed to an intelligence-gathering program that complies 
with our legal obligations and our basic values as a people. The United 
States opposes torture, and I remain committed to following 
international and domestic law regarding the humane treatment of people 
in its custody, including the ``Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.''
    My disagreement over section 327 is not over any particular 
interrogation technique; for instance, it is not over waterboarding, 
which is not part of the current CIA program. Rather, my concern is the 
need to maintain a separate CIA program that will shield from disclosure 
to al Qaeda and other terrorists the interrogation techniques they may 
face upon capture. In accordance with a clear purpose of the ``Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,'' my veto is intended to allow the continuation 
of a separate and classified CIA interrogation program that the 
Department of Justice has determined is lawful and that operates 
according to rules distinct from the more general rules applicable to 
the Department of Defense. While I will continue to work with the 
Congress on the implementation of laws passed in this area in recent 
years, I cannot sign into law a bill that would prevent me, and future 
Presidents, from authorizing the CIA to conduct a separate, lawful 
intelligence program, and from taking all lawful actions necessary to 
protect Americans from attack.
    Other provisions of the bill purport to require the executive branch 
to submit information to the Congress that may be constitutionally 
protected from disclosure, including information the disclosure of which 
could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties. Section 326, for example, would require that the 
executive branch report, on a very short deadline and in accordance with 
a rigid set of specific statutory requirements, the details of highly 
classified interrogation techniques and the confidential legal advice 
concerning

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them. The executive branch voluntarily has provided much of this 
information to appropriate members of Congress, demonstrating that 
questions concerning access to such information are best addressed 
through the customary practices and arrangements between the executive 
and legislative branches on such matters, rather than through the 
enactment of legislation.
    In addition, section 406 would require a consolidated inventory of 
Special Access Programs (SAPs) to be submitted to the Congress. Special 
Access Programs concern the most sensitive information maintained by the 
Government, and SAP materials are maintained separately precisely to 
avoid the existence of one document that can serve as a roadmap to our 
Nation's most vital information. The executive branch must be permitted 
to present this information in a manner that does not jeopardize 
national security. The executive branch will continue to keep the 
Congress appropriately informed of the matters to which the provisions 
relate in accordance with the accommodation principles the Constitution 
contemplates and the executive and legislative branches have long and 
successfully used to address information sharing on matters of national 
security.

                                                          George W. Bush

 The White House,

 March 8, 2008.