[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2007, Book II)]
[September 14, 2007]
[Pages 1202-1205]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug
Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008
September 14, 2007
Presidential Determination No. 2007-33
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Subject: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major
Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008
Pursuant to section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228)(FRAA), I hereby identify the
following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug
producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica,
Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
A country's presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an
adverse reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level
of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory
definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth
in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit
drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of
geographical, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to
transit or be produced despite the concerned government's most assiduous
enforcement measures.
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Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma
and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the
previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section
489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this report are justifications for the
determinations on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B).
I have also determined, in accordance with the provisions of section
706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela's
democratic institutions is vital to the national interests of the United
States.
Although President Karzai has strongly
attacked narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, one
third of the Afghan economy remains opium-based, which contributes to
widespread public corruption, damage to licit economic growth, and the
strengthening of the insurgency. The government at all levels must be
held accountable to deter and eradicate poppy cultivation, remove and
prosecute corrupt officials, and investigate and prosecute or extradite
narcotraffickers and those financing their activities. We are concerned
that failure to act decisively now could undermine security, compromise
democratic legitimacy, and imperil international support for vital
assistance.
In Afghanistan, one model for success can be drawn by comparing the
marked differences in cultivation between the northern and southern
provinces. Several northern provinces contributed to a decline in poppy
cultivation resulting from a mixture of political will and incentives
and disincentives, such as public information, alternative development,
and eradication. Furthermore, several northern provinces with very low
amounts of poppy are well on their way to becoming poppy free.
Despite the significant progress made in Afghanistan since 2001, the
country continues to face tremendous challenges. Our struggle to win
hearts and minds, while confronting the insurgency, continues to
directly hinge on our ability to help the Afghan government produce
visible results. We need to encourage a firm belief among the Afghan
people that their national government is capable of delivering an
alternative to the preceding decades of conflict. Our reconstruction
assistance is an essential instrument to achieve that goal.
Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation has been uneven. The Bolivian
government has cooperated closely on interdiction, and operations and
seizures have reached record levels. The government is on track to reach
5,600 hectares of eradication this year, surpassing its goal of 5,000
hectares.
However, these measures have been outstripped by replanting and
expansion of cultivation in Bolivia, the world's third-largest producer
of coca. The Government of Bolivia's policy of ``zero cocaine, but not
zero coca'' has focused primarily on interdiction, to the exclusion of
its other essential complements, especially coca crop eradication. We
strongly encourage the Government of Bolivia to make its number one
priority the reduction and eventual elimination of excess coca crops, a
major source of illegal cocaine for the hemisphere, Europe, the United
States, and increasingly, for Bolivian citizens. In the area of drug
control policy development, we urge the Government of Bolivia to revamp
its national drug control strategy to eliminate permissiveness in licit
cultivation, to abolish the so-called ``cato'' exemption, and to tighten
controls on the sale of licit coca. As a party to the three major United
Nations drug conventions, we urge Bolivia to move quickly to adopt and
implement a modern anti-money/counterterrorism financing law, and take
concrete steps to strengthen and better enforce precursor chemical
controls and its asset forfeiture regime.
The United States enjoys close cooperation with Canada across a
broad range of law enforcement issues. We remain concerned that the
production of high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana for export to the
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United States continues to thrive in Canada in part because growers do
not consistently face strict legal punishment. The marijuana industry in
Canada is becoming increasingly sophisticated, with organized crime
groups relying on marijuana sales as the primary source of income and
using profits to finance other illegal activities. The production of
synthetic drugs such as MDMA/Ecstasy and methamphetamine, some of which
are exported to the United States, appears to be on the rise in Canada.
The Government of Canada has made a serious effort to curb the diversion
of precursor chemicals that are required for methamphetamine production
to feed domestic and U.S. illegal markets and has worked productively
with the United States in joint law enforcement operations that
disrupted drug and currency smuggling operations along both sides of the
border.
The Government of Ecuador has made considerable progress in
combating narcotics trafficking destined for the United States. However,
a dramatic increase in the quantity of cocaine transported toward the
United States using Ecuadorian-flagged ships remains an area of serious
concern. Effective cooperation and streamlined maritime operational
procedures between the U.S. Coast Guard and Ecuadorian Navy are
resulting in an increase in the amount of cocaine interdicted. Building
on that cooperation, we will work with Ecuador to change the
circumstances that make Ecuadorian-flagged vessels and Ecuadorian
citizenship so attractive to drug traffickers.
Guinea-Bissau is becoming a warehouse refuge and transit hub for
cocaine traffickers from Latin America transporting cocaine to Western
Europe. Narcotics traffic is becoming yet another hurdle for Guinea-
Bissau as it emerges from civil conflict. International donors and
organizations are working to encourage and assist Guinea-Bissau in its
efforts to confront organized cocaine trafficking networks that would
use the country for warehousing and transshipment. These efforts are
certainly appropriate and should be supported and advanced to deter
illegal drug activities in Guinea-Bissau.
India has an exemplary record on controlling its licit opium
production and distribution process, despite formidable challenges to
its efforts. The Government of India can be correctly proud of its
diligent law enforcement agencies and the introduction of high-tech
methods, including ``Smart Cards'' for each licensed opium farmer.
Recently, Indian enforcement officials identified and destroyed
substantial illicit opium poppy cultivation in areas thought to be free
of illicit cultivation in the past. Indian officials will want to
investigate the circumstances of this surprisingly large illicit
cultivation to identify those behind this disquieting phenomenon and
arrest, prosecute, and convict them.
Nigeria has made progress on many narcotics control and anti-money
laundering benchmarks. There is reason to be hopeful. The Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission has seized millions in the proceeds of
crime, anti-money laundering efforts have been successful, and Nigeria
is cooperating with the international community to improve its efforts
against money laundering even more. Still necessary are procedural
reforms to streamline extradition procedures. For many narcotics
criminals no sanction is more effective than the fear they could face a
court and jail time in the countries to which they have trafficked
narcotics. Nigeria should also re-double its efforts to use its frequent
apprehension of street criminals and couriers to identify and prosecute
major drug traffickers.
You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this report under
section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in
the Federal Register.
George W. Bush
Note: This memorandum was released by the Office of the Press Secretary
on September 17.
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