    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2007, Book II)]
    [September 14, 2007]
    [Pages 1202-1205]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug
    Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008
    September 14, 2007

     Presidential Determination No. 2007-33
    Memorandum for the Secretary of State
    Subject: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major
    Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008
        Pursuant to section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization
    Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228)(FRAA), I hereby identify the
    following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug
    producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
    Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica,
    Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
        A country's presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an
    adverse reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level
    of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory
    definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth
    in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
    amended (FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit
    drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of
    geographical, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to
    transit or be produced despite the concerned government's most assiduous
    enforcement measures.

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        Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma
    and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the
    previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international
    counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section
    489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this report are justifications for the
    determinations on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B).
    I have also determined, in accordance with the provisions of section
    706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela's
    democratic institutions is vital to the national interests of the United
    States.
        Although President Karzai has strongly
    attacked narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, one
    third of the Afghan economy remains opium-based, which contributes to
    widespread public corruption, damage to licit economic growth, and the
    strengthening of the insurgency. The government at all levels must be
    held accountable to deter and eradicate poppy cultivation, remove and
    prosecute corrupt officials, and investigate and prosecute or extradite
    narcotraffickers and those financing their activities. We are concerned
    that failure to act decisively now could undermine security, compromise
    democratic legitimacy, and imperil international support for vital
    assistance.
        In Afghanistan, one model for success can be drawn by comparing the
    marked differences in cultivation between the northern and southern
    provinces. Several northern provinces contributed to a decline in poppy
    cultivation resulting from a mixture of political will and incentives
    and disincentives, such as public information, alternative development,
    and eradication. Furthermore, several northern provinces with very low
    amounts of poppy are well on their way to becoming poppy free.
        Despite the significant progress made in Afghanistan since 2001, the
    country continues to face tremendous challenges. Our struggle to win
    hearts and minds, while confronting the insurgency, continues to
    directly hinge on our ability to help the Afghan government produce
    visible results. We need to encourage a firm belief among the Afghan
    people that their national government is capable of delivering an
    alternative to the preceding decades of conflict. Our reconstruction
    assistance is an essential instrument to achieve that goal.
        Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation has been uneven. The Bolivian
    government has cooperated closely on interdiction, and operations and
    seizures have reached record levels. The government is on track to reach
    5,600 hectares of eradication this year, surpassing its goal of 5,000
    hectares.
        However, these measures have been outstripped by replanting and
    expansion of cultivation in Bolivia, the world's third-largest producer
    of coca. The Government of Bolivia's policy of ``zero cocaine, but not
    zero coca'' has focused primarily on interdiction, to the exclusion of
    its other essential complements, especially coca crop eradication. We
    strongly encourage the Government of Bolivia to make its number one
    priority the reduction and eventual elimination of excess coca crops, a
    major source of illegal cocaine for the hemisphere, Europe, the United
    States, and increasingly, for Bolivian citizens. In the area of drug
    control policy development, we urge the Government of Bolivia to revamp
    its national drug control strategy to eliminate permissiveness in licit
    cultivation, to abolish the so-called ``cato'' exemption, and to tighten
    controls on the sale of licit coca. As a party to the three major United
    Nations drug conventions, we urge Bolivia to move quickly to adopt and
    implement a modern anti-money/counterterrorism financing law, and take
    concrete steps to strengthen and better enforce precursor chemical
    controls and its asset forfeiture regime.
        The United States enjoys close cooperation with Canada across a
    broad range of law enforcement issues. We remain concerned that the
    production of high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana for export to the

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    United States continues to thrive in Canada in part because growers do
    not consistently face strict legal punishment. The marijuana industry in
    Canada is becoming increasingly sophisticated, with organized crime
    groups relying on marijuana sales as the primary source of income and
    using profits to finance other illegal activities. The production of
    synthetic drugs such as MDMA/Ecstasy and methamphetamine, some of which
    are exported to the United States, appears to be on the rise in Canada.
    The Government of Canada has made a serious effort to curb the diversion
    of precursor chemicals that are required for methamphetamine production
    to feed domestic and U.S. illegal markets and has worked productively
    with the United States in joint law enforcement operations that
    disrupted drug and currency smuggling operations along both sides of the
    border.
        The Government of Ecuador has made considerable progress in
    combating narcotics trafficking destined for the United States. However,
    a dramatic increase in the quantity of cocaine transported toward the
    United States using Ecuadorian-flagged ships remains an area of serious
    concern. Effective cooperation and streamlined maritime operational
    procedures between the U.S. Coast Guard and Ecuadorian Navy are
    resulting in an increase in the amount of cocaine interdicted. Building
    on that cooperation, we will work with Ecuador to change the
    circumstances that make Ecuadorian-flagged vessels and Ecuadorian
    citizenship so attractive to drug traffickers.
        Guinea-Bissau is becoming a warehouse refuge and transit hub for
    cocaine traffickers from Latin America transporting cocaine to Western
    Europe. Narcotics traffic is becoming yet another hurdle for Guinea-
    Bissau as it emerges from civil conflict. International donors and
    organizations are working to encourage and assist Guinea-Bissau in its
    efforts to confront organized cocaine trafficking networks that would
    use the country for warehousing and transshipment. These efforts are
    certainly appropriate and should be supported and advanced to deter
    illegal drug activities in Guinea-Bissau.
        India has an exemplary record on controlling its licit opium
    production and distribution process, despite formidable challenges to
    its efforts. The Government of India can be correctly proud of its
    diligent law enforcement agencies and the introduction of high-tech
    methods, including ``Smart Cards'' for each licensed opium farmer.
    Recently, Indian enforcement officials identified and destroyed
    substantial illicit opium poppy cultivation in areas thought to be free
    of illicit cultivation in the past. Indian officials will want to
    investigate the circumstances of this surprisingly large illicit
    cultivation to identify those behind this disquieting phenomenon and
    arrest, prosecute, and convict them.
        Nigeria has made progress on many narcotics control and anti-money
    laundering benchmarks. There is reason to be hopeful. The Economic and
    Financial Crimes Commission has seized millions in the proceeds of
    crime, anti-money laundering efforts have been successful, and Nigeria
    is cooperating with the international community to improve its efforts
    against money laundering even more. Still necessary are procedural
    reforms to streamline extradition procedures. For many narcotics
    criminals no sanction is more effective than the fear they could face a
    court and jail time in the countries to which they have trafficked
    narcotics. Nigeria should also re-double its efforts to use its frequent
    apprehension of street criminals and couriers to identify and prosecute
    major drug traffickers.
        You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this report under
    section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in
    the Federal Register.

                                                              George W. Bush

    Note: This memorandum was released by the Office of the Press Secretary
    on September 17.

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