    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2004, Book I)]
    [February 11, 2004]
    [Pages 200-205]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Remarks at the National Defense University
    February 11, 2004

        Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National
    Defense University. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here
    have helped to prepare America for the changing threats to our national
    security. Today, the men and women of our National Defense University
    are helping to frame the strategies through which we are fighting and
    winning the war on terror. Your Center for Counterproliferation Research
    and your other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into
    the dangers of a new era. I want to thank each one of you for devoting
    your talents and your energy to the service of our great Nation.
        I want to thank General Michael Dunn for
    inviting me here. I used to jog by this facility on a regular basis.
    Then my age kicked in. [Laughter] I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang
    Ischinger from Germany. Mr. Ambassador,
    thank you for being here today. I see my friend George Shultz, a distinguished public servant and true patriot,
    with us. George, thank you for coming, and Charlotte, it's good to see you. I'm so honored that Dick
    Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I
    appreciate you taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby
    Chambliss with you as well. I appreciate the
    veterans who are here and those on active duty. Thanks for letting me
    come by.
        On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new
    kind of war. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could
    inflict upon our country, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19
    airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the prospect of even worse
    dangers, of other weapons in the hands of other men. The greatest threat
    before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack
    with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.
        In the past, enemies of America required massed armies and great
    navies, powerful air forces to put our Nation, our people, our friends
    at risk. In the cold war, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of
    mass destruction but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last
    resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that in the hands of
    terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort, the
    preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder.
    These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and
    transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single
    nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics or failing states could gain
    the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.
        America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for
    decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes and
    unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this Nation:
    America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us
    with the world's most deadly weapons.
        Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy.
    Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and
    defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from this new threat.
    America faces the possibility of catastrophic attack from ballistic
    missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction, so that is why we are
    developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The best
    intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop
    proliferation, so that is why I have established a commission that will
    examine our intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and
    adapt them to detect new and emerging threats.
        We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will
    stop these

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    weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from being
    transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being used.
        One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that
    build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and
    force their influence upon the world. These nations pose different
    challenges; they require different strategies.
        The former dictator of Iraq possessed and
    used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. For 12 years,
    he defied the will of the international community. He refused to disarm
    or account for his illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve
    to enforce our word, and now he sits in a prison cell while his country
    moves toward a democratic future.
        To Iraq's east, the Government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a
    uranium enrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear
    weapons. The United States is working with our allies and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran meets its
    commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons.
        In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-
    range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons,
    and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia,
    America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and
    irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.
        America has consistently brought these threats to the attention of
    international organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to
    answer them. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these
    threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront these
    dangers and to end them.
        In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear as
    well. America and other nations are learning more about black-market
    operatives who deal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of
    mass destruction. These dealers are motivated by greed or fanaticism or
    both. They find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions
    for the parts and plans they need to speed up their weapons programs.
    And with deadly technology and expertise on the market, there's the
    terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate
    weapons they desire most.
        The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the
    case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan.
    This is the story as we know it so far.
        A.Q. Khan is known throughout the
    world as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What was not
    publicly known until recently is that he also led an extensive
    international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and
    know-how. For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani Government
    payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed
    lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment
    to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.
        A.Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly
    out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading
    scientific mind as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade,
    he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his
    expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to
    enrich uranium as well as nuclear designs stolen from the Pakistani
    Government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the
    centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear
    bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea
    with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges as well as designs for
    more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these
    countries with components and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges.
        To increase their profits, Khan and
    his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for
    centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased

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    through network operatives based in Europe, in the Middle East, and
    Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies
    as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to
    deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials.
        Khan's deputy, a man named B.S.A.
    Tahir, ran SMB Computers, a business
    in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the
    proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both
    the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also
    its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of
    centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia
    facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs and then
    ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also
    arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to
    transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.
        This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several
    years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence
    services gradually uncovered this network's reach and identified its key
    experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions,
    mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A.Q.
    Khan and senior associates. They shadowed
    members of the network around the world. They recorded their
    conversations. They penetrated their operations. We've uncovered their
    secrets. This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful
    for the hard work and the dedication of our fine intelligence
    professionals.
        Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the
    Khan network and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A.Q.
    Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top
    associates are out of business. The Government of Pakistan is
    interrogating the network's members, learning critical details that will
    help them prevent it from ever operating again. President
    Musharraf has promised to share all the
    information he learns about the Khan network and has assured us that his
    country will never again be a source of proliferation.
        Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where
    authorities are investigating his activities. Malaysian authorities have
    assured us that the factory the network used is no longer producing
    centrifuge parts. Other members of the network remain at large. One by
    one, they will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will be
    ended.
        As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the
    British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts
    manufactured at the Malaysian facility. We followed the shipment of
    these parts to Dubai and watched as they were transferred to the BBC
    China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez
    Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian
    authorities. They found several containers, each 40 feet in length,
    listed on the ship's manifest as full of used machine parts. In fact,
    these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.
        The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and
    American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its
    WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted Libyan officials
    with this evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program. About 2
    months ago, Libya's leader
    voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons programs, not
    to pursue biological weapons, and to permit thorough inspections by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now working in partnership with
    these organizations and with the United Kingdom to help the Government
    of Libya dismantle those programs and eliminate all dangerous materials.

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        Colonel Qadhafi made the
    right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is
    fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the
    pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United
    States and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not
    bring security or international prestige but only political isolation,
    economic hardship, and other unwelcomed consequences.
        We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network.
    Other countries expressed great interest in their services. These
    regimes and other proliferators like Khan
    should know: We and our friends are determined to protect our people and
    the world from proliferation.
        Breaking this network is one major success in a broadbased effort to
    stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to
    the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France
    and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
    and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security
    Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are
    sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo,
    conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and
    ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise
    proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo
    on the BBC China before it reached Libya. Three more governments, Canada
    and Singapore and Norway, will be participating in this initiative.
    We'll continue to expand the core group of PSI countries. And as PSI
    grows, proliferators will find it harder than ever to trade in illicit
    weapons.
        There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be
    tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into
    action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of
    weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies and the
    people who traffic in them cross many borders. To stop this trade, the
    nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work
    together. We must act effectively.
        Today I announce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts
    to stop the spread of deadly weapons. First, I propose that the work of
    the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than
    shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight
    terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We
    need greater cooperation, not just among intelligence and military
    services but in law enforcement as well. PSI participants and other
    willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to
    justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to
    seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every
    lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers, and the buyers. Our
    message to proliferators must be consistent, and it must be clear: We
    will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped.
        Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and
    international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall,
    I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to
    criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all
    sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should
    pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to
    help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help
    us deal with proliferation.
        Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the cold
    war and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991,
    Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this
    program, we're helping former Soviet states find productive employment

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    for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling, destroying, and
    securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. We
    have more work to do there. And as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002,
    we agreed to provide $20 billion over 10 years, half of it from the
    United States, to support such programs.
        We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will
    retain WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya.
    We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research
    reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The
    nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear
    and chemical and biological and radiological materials.
        As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent
    governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to
    prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already
    possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help
    nonnuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the
    pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been
    exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are
    allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs
    under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
        So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole.
    The world must create a safe, orderly system to fuel civilian nuclear
    plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The
    world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have
    reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so
    long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment
    and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness
    nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
        The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell
    enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that
    does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and
    reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing
    the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators
    must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the
    material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.
        For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It
    is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover
    banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to
    the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the
    tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other
    nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires
    states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities and
    allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities.
        As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have
    signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their
    civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting
    proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've
    submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to
    consent immediately to its ratification.
        We must also ensure that the IAEA is organized to take action when
    action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a
    special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on
    safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in
    good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA
    to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.
        And finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear
    nonproliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on

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    the IAEA Board of Governors. For instance, Iran, a country suspected of
    maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program, recently completed a
    2-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the
    Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state
    under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to
    serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.
    And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation
    should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the
    IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules
    should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules.
        As we move forward to address these challenges, we will consult with
    our friends and allies on all these new measures. We will listen to
    their ideas. Together, we will defend the safety of all nations and
    preserve the peace of the world.
        Over the last 2 years, a great coalition has come together to defeat
    terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
    inseparable commitments of the war on terror. We've shown that
    proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for
    regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences. The way
    ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We will proceed as if the lives of
    our citizens depend on our vigilance, because they do. Terrorists and
    terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must
    lose. Terrorists are resourceful. We're more resourceful. They're
    determined. We must be more determined. We will never lose focus or
    resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations and rise to
    the hard demands of dangerous times.
        May God bless you all.

    Note: The President spoke at 2:30 p.m. at Fort Lesley J. McNair. In his
    remarks, he referred to Lt. Gen. Michael M. Dunn, USAF, president,
    National Defense University; former Secretary of State George Shultz and
    his wife, Charlotte; President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan; and Col.
    Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi, leader of Libya. The Office of the Press
    Secretary also released a Spanish language transcript of these remarks.