[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2002, Book I)]
[May 9, 2002]
[Pages 767-768]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Additional to the 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United 
States of America
May 9, 2002

To the Senate of the United States:
    I submit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, 
the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards in the United States of America, with annexes, signed at 
Vienna June 12, 1998 (the ``Additional Protocol''). Adhering to the 
Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear 
safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is 
a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy.
    At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned the extent of 
Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to develop nuclear 
weapons. In order to increase the capability of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') to detect such programs, the 
international community negotiated a Model Additional Protocol (the 
``Model Protocol'') to strengthen the Agency's nuclear safeguards 
system. The Model Protocol is to be used to amend the existing bilateral 
safeguards agreements of states with the Agency.
    The Model Protocol is a milestone in U.S. efforts to strengthen the 
safeguards system of the Agency and thereby to reduce the threat posed 
by clandestine efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. By 
accepting the Model Protocol, states assume new obligations that will 
provide far greater transparency for their nuclear activities. 
Specifically, the Model Protocol strengthens safeguards by requiring 
states to provide broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear 
programs and nuclear-related activities and by expanding the access 
rights of the Agency.
    The United States signed the Additional Protocol at Vienna on June 
12, 1998. The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that would 
supplement and amend the Agency verification arrangements under the 
existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
the United States of America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary 
Offer''), which entered into force on December 9, 1980. The Additional 
Protocol will enter into force when the United States notifies the 
Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements for entry 
into force have been met.
    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the ``NPT'') 
requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept Agency safeguards 
on their nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-weapon 
state party to the NPT, is not obligated to accept Agency safeguards on 
its nuclear

[[Page 768]]

activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy of the United 
States since 1967 to permit the application of Agency safeguards to its 
nuclear facilities--excluding only those of direct national security 
significance. The Additional Protocol similarly allows the United States 
to exclude its application in instances where the United States decides 
that its application would result in access by the Agency to activities 
with direct national security significance to the United States or 
access to locations or information associated with such activities. I 
am, therefore, confident that the Additional Protocol, given our right 
to invoke the national security exclusion and to manage access in 
accordance with established principles for implementing these 
provisions, can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent 
with U.S. national security.
    By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil 
nuclear activities that non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT are 
subject to, the United States intends to demonstrate that adherence to 
the Model Protocol does not place other countries at a commercial 
disadvantage. The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was an 
important factor in the decisions of many non-nuclear-weapon states to 
accept the Model Protocol and provided significant impetus toward their 
early acceptance. I am satisfied that the provisions of the Additional 
Protocol, given our right to manage access in accordance with Article 7 
and established implementation principles, will allow the United States 
to prevent the dissemination of proliferation-sensitive information and 
protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information.
    I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of 
the Department of State concerning the Additional Protocol, including an 
article-by-article analysis, a subsidiary arrangement, and a letter the 
United States has sent to the Agency concerning the Additional Protocol. 
Additionally, the recommended legislation necessary to implement the 
Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the Congress.
    I believe that the Additional Protocol is in the best interests of 
the United States. Our acceptance of this agreement will sustain our 
longstanding record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear safeguards and 
greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption of the 
Model Protocol, a central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy. 
Widespread acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to 
our nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied, and 
international security. I, therefore, urge the Senate to give early and 
favorable consideration to the Additional Protocol, and to give advice 
and consent to its ratification.

                                                          George W. Bush

The White House,

May 9, 2002.

Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
May 10. An original was not available for verification of the content of 
this message.