

Aug. 20 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2001

Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a Report on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization  
August 14, 2001

Dear \_\_\_\_\_ :

I transmit herewith the semiannual report required under the heading “International Organizations and Programs” in title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104–107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

GEORGE W. BUSH

NOTE: Identical letters were sent to Robert C. Byrd, chairman, and Ted Stevens, ranking member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and C.W. Bill Young, chairman, and David R. Obey, ranking member, House Committee on Appropriations. This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on August 20.

Letter to Congressional Leaders on Continuation of Export Control Regulations  
August 17, 2001

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b), I hereby report to the Congress that I have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to continue in effect the system of controls contained in 15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774, including restrictions on participation by U.S. persons in certain foreign boycott activities, that heretofore has been maintained under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 *et seq.* In addition, I have made provision for the administration of section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778(e).

The exercise of this authority is necessitated by the expiration of the EAA on August 20, 2001, and the lapse in the system of controls maintained under that Act that would result from such expiration.

In the absence of controls, foreign parties would have unrestricted access to U.S. commercial products, technology, and assistance, posing an unusual and extraor-

dinary threat to national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives critical to the United States. In addition, U.S. persons would not be prohibited from complying with certain foreign boycott requests. This would seriously harm our foreign policy interests, particularly in the Middle East.

Controls established in 15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774, and continued by this action, include the following:

- National security export controls restricting the export of goods and technologies that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of certain other countries and that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
- Foreign policy controls that further the foreign policy objectives of the United States or fulfill its declared international obligations in such widely recognized areas as human rights, antiterrorism, regional stability, missile