[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (2000-2001, Book III)]
[November 9, 2000]
[Pages 2507-2516]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Letter to Congressional Leaders on the National Emergency Regarding 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
November 9, 2000

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national emergency under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 
Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each 
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the 
Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I 
am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995; 
November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; and November 
10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2000. Accordingly, 
I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 
12938, as amended.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and 
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)). It 
reports actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the 
emergency declaration during the period May 2000 through October 2000. 
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the 
most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as 
the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most recent annual report 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public 
Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of 
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more 
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4 
strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The 
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject 
entities to potential penalties under the Executive Order. The

[[Page 2508]]

original Executive Order provided for penalties for contributions to the 
efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, 
design, produce or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended 
Executive Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for 
nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive 
Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation 
activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of 
potential penalties to include expressly the prohibition of United 
States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of 
imports into the United States and United States Government procurement. 
In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government greater 
flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures 
against foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.

Nuclear Weapons

    In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear 
tests that brought their nuclear weapon programs out in the open, in 
defiance of decades of international efforts to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons. Since that time, they have continued production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons and have flight-tested ballistic 
nuclear-capable missiles. World reaction to these developments included 
nearly universal condemnation across a broad range of international 
fora. The United States and a number of other countries respectively 
imposed sanctions and other unilateral measures. The G-8 agreed to new 
restrictions on lending by international financial institutions.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have 
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, with the South Asia 
Task Force, and through the United Nations to urge India and Pakistan to 
move toward the international nonproliferation mainstream.
    We have supported calls by the P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council 
on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions designed 
to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms and missile race, 
with possible implications beyond the region. The United States has 
focused most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the 
short and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, 
unconditional adherence by India and Pakistan to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations 
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its conclusion, 
a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and 
other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the development of 
nuclear-capable missiles, as well as their nondeployment; and adoption 
of controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive 
materials and technology.
    Against a backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan, 
intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials 
have yielded only modest progress, principally on export controls. In 
September 1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders, noting that their 
countries had already declared testing moratoria, expressed to the U.N. 
General Assembly a willingness to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under 
certain conditions. Subsequent developments including the Indian 
election, the Kargil conflict, the October coup in Pakistan, and the 
U.S. Senate's vote against providing its advice and consent to CTBT 
ratification further complicated the issue during 1999, although neither 
country renounced its commitment. Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee announced during his visit to 
Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain its moratorium 
until CTBT entered into force. Both governments have said they would 
work to build domestic consensus for CTBT signature, without which they 
could not sign. Such consensus has not been achieved and, consequently, 
neither country has signed the CTBT thus far.
    India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on 
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament 
session, and negotiations got underway for a brief time. However, these 
negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock 
over the negotiating mandate.
    Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistani export 
controls into closer conformity with international standards. India 
recently instituted new, more specific regulations on many categories of 
sensitive nonnuclear equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-
related regulations will be forthcoming. Pakistan has publicly announced 
regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that further 
measures are being prepared. However,

[[Page 2509]]

both countries' steps still fall well short of international standards. 
We have begun with India a program of technical cooperation designed to 
improve the effectiveness of its already extensive export controls, and 
encourage further steps to bring India's controls in line with 
international standards. Similar assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by 
coup-related sanctions.
    The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 military 
takeover in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the Indo-Pakistani 
bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions remain high, particularly 
over insurgent attacks in Kashmir, and there are no encouraging signs 
that talks will resume soon.
    We have agreed to continue regular discussions with India at the 
senior and expert levels, and will also remain engaged with Pakistan, as 
appropriate. Our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the P-5, G-8, and 
in international fora, will also continue.
    I discussed these issues with the Governments of India and Pakistan 
during my trip there in March 2000 and with Prime Minister 
Vajpayee when he came to Washington 
this September. With India, we have stressed that our relationship will 
not be able to reach its full potential without progress on our 
nonproliferation and regional security concerns. With Pakistan, we also 
emphasized the importance of progress on regional security and 
nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.
    In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an Agreed Framework 
which, if fully implemented, will ultimately result in the complete 
cessation of the DPRK's nuclear weapon-related program and its full 
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a first 
step, North Korea froze construction and operations at its Yongbyon and 
Taechon nuclear facilities. The freeze remains in place, and to monitor 
the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained 
a continuous presence at the Yongbyon site since 1994. The U.S. spent 
fuel team completed canning of the accessible spent fuel rods and rod 
fragments from the North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor in April 2000. The 
IAEA has confirmed that the remaining few rod fragments that are 
currently inaccessible do not represent a proliferation concern, and the 
Agency continues to monitor the canned fuel. The U.S. spent-fuel team 
returned to the DPRK in October 2000 to continue clean-up and canning at 
Yongbyon, and to begin looking at long-term maintenance.
    Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at Kumchang-ni 
led the United States to raise its concerns directly with Pyongyang and 
to negotiate access to the site as long as U.S. concerns remain. In May 
1999, a Department of State-led team of experts visited the site and 
judged it, as then configured, not suited to house plutonium production 
reactors or reprocessing operations. Based on the data gathered by the 
U.S. team and the subsequent technical review, the United States 
concluded that the activities were not a violation of the Agreed 
Framework. A second Department of State-led team conducted a visit in 
May 2000 and found no evidence to contradict the 1999 assessment. In 
light of a final review of these results, the joint communique issued 
following the visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington stated that ``U.S. concerns'' about the 
underground site at Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.''
    While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our nonproliferation 
concerns, future negotiations with the North will seek to discuss ways 
to allay all of them--in the context of assuring full implementation of 
the Agreed Framework and improving overall relations. In May and July 
2000, the United States and DPRK held rounds of talks concerning Agreed 
Framework implementation and the DPRK's missile program, respectively. 
Another round of talks, which included discussion on terrorism issues, 
was held in New York from September 27 to October 2 of this year. During 
the talks, the DPRK informed us that DPRK Special Envoy Marshal Jo Myong 
Rok would visit Washington from October 9 to 
12, 2000. The joint communique released at the end of that historic 
visit noted that both countries ``are prepared to undertake a new 
direction in their relations.'' Toward that end, the two stated that 
``neither government would have hostile intent toward the other.'' Both 
sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and their efforts to 
fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed 
Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight test 
moratorium, and agreed that ``there are a variety of available means, 
including the Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean 
Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 
Armistice

[[Page 2510]]

Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.''
    The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. In May 2000, NPT Parties met in New York for the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference (REVCON). Despite predictions to the contrary, the 158 
participating nations adopted by consensus a Final Document that reviews 
NPT implementation over the past 5 years and establishes a program of 
action for the future. This is the first NPT Review Conference to 
achieve such a Final Document since 1985. The Conference met or exceeded 
all U.S. objectives. It provided an important boost to the NPT and to 
nuclear nonproliferation goals in general.
    The IAEA verifies states' compliance with their NPT obligations by 
means of its safeguards system. The discovery at the time of the Gulf 
War of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities led to an 
international consensus in favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards 
system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
The United States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in 
the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including 
the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the classes 
of nuclear activities states are required to declare, and expansion of 
IAEA access rights. Measures requiring additional legal authority are 
embodied in a Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol 
has now been signed by 54 states and has entered into force for 14. 
Provided the IAEA is given the resources and political support it needs 
to implement its new safeguards measures effectively, proliferators will 
now find it much harder to evade the system.
    The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
on September 24, 1996. As of early October 2000, 160 countries have 
signed and 65 have ratified the CTBT, including 30 of the 44 countries 
required by the Treaty for its entry into force. During 2000, CTBT 
signatories conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission 
(PrepCom) and its subsidiary bodies in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid 
completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by 
the Treaty.
    On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, 
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret 
the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse to provide its 
advice and consent to ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several 
United States national security interests by prohibiting all nuclear 
explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons; make the development of advanced new 
types of weapons much more difficult; contribute to the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and 
strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks a historic 
milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer 
world. For these reasons, we hope that at an appropriate time, the 
Senate will reconsider this treaty.
    The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty's requirement to apply International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty 
requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports 
to nonnuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. 
The Committee maintains and updates a list (the ``Trigger List'') of 
equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the 
recipient facility. The relative informality of the Zangger Committee 
has enabled it to take the lead on certain nonproliferation issues that 
would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
    At its March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the Chairman's 
report of Committee activities to the 2000 NPT REVCON. The Committee 
also agreed to continue consideration of possible future adoption of the 
full-scope safeguards (FSS) policy. The Committee also agreed to an 
informal meeting with IAEA staff to discuss procedures for keeping the 
Agency informed on Trigger List changes and the rationale for such 
changes, since the Agency uses the Zangger Trigger List as a reference 
document. A separate working group, chaired by Sweden, is considering 
the addition of plutonium enrichment equipment to the Trigger List.
    During the past year, two new members have joined the Zangger 
Committee--Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March 2000.
    All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are members of 
the Zangger Committee.

[[Page 2511]]

However, unlike all of the other nuclear weapon states members of the 
Zangger Committee, China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), which requires its members to adhere to a FSS policy of requiring 
nonnuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear 
facilities as a condition of supply to those states. China has been 
reluctant to agree to this policy.
    With 38 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and effective 
export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of 
nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG 
through adherence to the Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and 
through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear 
proliferation concern.
    Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus became the newest members of the NSG in 
May 19, 2000. Slovenia was invited to participate as an observer at the 
2000 Paris Plenary and has applied for NSG membership this year. NSG 
members often agree to allow non-member nations deemed eligible for NSG 
membership to participate in Plenary meetings as observers. While not an 
NSG member, China has taken a major step toward harmonization of its 
export control system with the NSG Part 2 Guidelines by the 
implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use equipment, 
material, and related technology.
    In May 2000, the NSG Troika (composed of the past, present, and 
future NSG Chairs--in this case Britain, Italy and France) met with 
representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss Iranian criticism 
of the NSG. The meeting of the Troika followed up earlier meetings by 
the Italian Chair in Tehran and on the margins of the 1999 NSG 
Transparency Seminar in New York. The Troika urged Iran to sign the 
additional protocol with the IAEA that strengthens safeguards. Iranian 
officials offered to provide additional confidence-building measures to 
facilitate nuclear exports from NSG members. The United States, as the 
future plenary chair, intends to be an active participant in all NSG 
Troika activities in the coming years, though any involvement in Troika 
contacts with Iran will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
prior to the meetings. The United States does not believe that the 
ongoing discussions with Iran can or should soften supplier attitudes.
    During the Plenary meetings in Paris in June 2000, the Czech 
Republic presented information on its new legislation intended to halt 
all tangible and intangible supply to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in 
Iran. The Czech delegation stated that the new legislation covers direct 
transfers to Bushehr, as well as indirect support through a third party. 
The Italian NSG Chair presented a report of NSG activities at the 2000 
NPT Review Conference.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Expanded 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and 
continue to be administered by the Department of Commerce, in 
consultation with other agencies, in order to control the export of 
items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned 
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States 
Signatories as original States Parties, including the United States, 
which ratified on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 
1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. As of October 30, 
2000, 140 countries will have become States Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established on April 29, 
1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague is comprised of States Parties and 
international civil servants that are responsible for implementing the 
CWC. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive 
Council, and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the 
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff of 
approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained and equipped 
to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout the world. As 
of October 30, 2000, the OPCW has conducted over 790 routine inspections 
in some 37 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken place. The

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OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW 
destruction facilities in Utah, on Johnston Island, and elsewhere. 
Accordingly, approximately 70 percent of the inspection days currently 
have been at U.S. declared facilities.
    The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for 
states or other entities attempting to engage in chemical weapons-
related activities. Receiving accurate and complete declarations from 
all States Parties will improve our knowledge of possible chemical 
weapons-related activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access 
by international inspectors to declared and potentially undeclared 
facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons 
production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more 
expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was 
enacted into U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). I issued Executive Order 13128 on June 
25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and the Convention, 
and published regulations on December 30, 1999, regarding declarations 
and inspections of industrial facilities. The United States commenced 
its submission of industry declarations at the end of April 2000, and 
hosted its first industry inspection on May 8, 2000. Industry 
inspections are proceeding well. Our submission of the industry 
declarations to the OPCW and commencement of inspections, has 
strengthened U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our ability 
to encourage other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely 
declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC have been isolated politically 
and denied access by the CWC to certain key chemicals from States 
Parties. The relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed to 
penalize countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in 
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play an active role in the 
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). 
We participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The AHG is 
striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 
Convention to promote compliance and enhance transparency. This Ad Hoc 
Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The 
Fourth BWC Review Conference (November/December 1996) urged the AHG to 
complete the protocol as soon as possible before the next BWC Review 
Conference in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft text through 
discussion of national views and clarification of existing text. 
Differences in national views persist concerning such substantive areas 
as on-site activities, export controls, declarations, and technical 
assistance provisions. The United States remains strongly committed to 
the objective agreed to in the 1996 Review Conference, but will only 
accept a protocol that enhances U.S. security and strengthens national 
and international efforts to address the BW threat.
    I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the United 
States would take a leading role in the effort to erect stronger 
international barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by 
strengthening the BWC with a new international means to detect and deter 
cheating. We are working closely with industry representatives to obtain 
technical input relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating 
positions and then to reach international agreement on protocol 
provisions.
    The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 32-
member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons 
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent 
annual AG Plenary Session from October 2-5, 2000, during which the Group 
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the AG's 
viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members 
continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all 
governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on 
chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national activities 
support these goals. At the 2000 Plenary, the Group welcomed its newest 
members, Cyprus and Turkey. At this year's plenary, the regime continued 
to focus on strengthening and refining AG export controls and sharing 
information to

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address the CBW threat, especially from terrorism. The AG also 
reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach program of 
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on 
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and under-
standing of national policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to 
be more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC 
contexts.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine intelligence and 
other information of trade in CBW-related material and technology that 
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new 
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period. The 
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other 
countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States continues carefully to control exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, 
and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation 
concern. We also continue to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In 
April 2000, we imposed sanctions against a North Korean entity and four 
Iranian entities for missile proliferation activities. These sanctions 
followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern 
entities.
    During this reporting period, the 32 Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share information about 
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential 
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized 
the need for implementing effective export control systems. This 
cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related 
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
    In March and September 2000, the United States participated in two 
MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact Meetings (RPOC). At the RPOCs, MTCR 
Partners continued their discussions on new ways to better address the 
global missile proliferation threat. They also undertook to develop a 
new multilateral mechanism on missile nonproliferation. This mechanism 
is intended to complement the important work of the MTCR and eventually 
to include the participation of both MTCR and non-MTCR countries.
    The MTCR Partners held their annual plenary meeting in Helsinki, on 
October 9-13, 2000. The Partners took decisions concerning the substance 
of a new multilateral mechanism on missile nonproliferation and ways to 
take it forward. They also discussed cooperation on halting shipments of 
missile proliferation concern and exchanged information about activities 
of missile proliferation concern worldwide, including in South Asia, 
Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.
    During this reporting period, the United States continued to work 
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat 
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly 
and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we continued 
our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China, India, the Republic 
of Korea, and North Korea, and have raised this issue with Pakistan at 
senior levels. Although regular discussions with Pakistan at the expert 
level have not proceeded since the fall 1999 coup, we remain engaged at 
the diplomatic level, and I addressed our nonproliferation concerns 
during my visit to Pakistan in March of this year. In the course of 
normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such discussions with 
other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
    In July 2000, the United States and the DPRK held a fifth round of 
missile talks in Kuala Lumpur. This was the first round of talks after a 
16-month hiatus. It provided a useful opportunity to assess developments 
since the March 1999 talks in Pyongyang, including the DPRK's June 2000 
reaffirmation of its moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles 
of any kind. The United States discussed its continuing concerns about 
North Korea's missile activities and again pressed for tight constraints 
on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. Both sides agreed to 
hold another round of talks as soon as possible, and a sixth round 
occurred September 28-29 in New York. The United States continued to 
urge the DPRK to take steps to address U.S. and international concerns 
about the DPRK's indigenous missile programs and its missile-related 
activities. The United States also discussed Chairman Kim Jong-Il's idea, suggested to Russian President Putin in mid-July, of trading missile restraints

[[Page 2514]]

for launches of DPRK satellites on foreign launchers. During the October 
visit to Washington of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok, the United States and DPRK agreed that ``resolution of 
the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a 
fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific region.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its 
ballistic missile flight test moratorium ``while talks on the missile 
issue continue.''
    Secretary Albright met with 
Chairman Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang October 23-24. 
They had serious, constructive, and in-depth discussions on the full 
range of U.S. concerns on missiles, including both the DPRK's indigenous 
missile programs and exports. They also explored Chairman Kim's idea of 
restraining DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches of DPRK 
satellites on foreign boosters. U.S. and DPRK missile experts are 
scheduled to continue discussions in early November.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire 
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and 
nuclear development programs, the United States is pursuing a high-level 
dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways to work together to cut off 
the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic missile development 
program and its nuclear weapon program. Russia's government has created 
institutional foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation 
policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed new 
export control legislation to tighten government control over sensitive 
technologies and continued working with the United States to strengthen 
export control practices at Russian aerospace firms. However, despite 
the Russian government's nonproliferation and export control efforts, 
some Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic 
missile program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond 
the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear power reactor project, which could further 
Iran's nuclear weapon aspirations.
    Consistent with the Russian government's April 2000 announcement of 
administrative action against the Rector of the Baltic State Technical 
University (BSTU) for his involvement in training Iranian specialists at 
BSTU, and following our own assessment, the United States announced on 
April 24, 2000, plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on 
the Rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program. At the 
same time, the United States also announced its intention to remove 
restrictions imposed in July 1998 on two Russian entities--INOR and 
Polyus--which have ceased the proliferation behavior that led to the 
imposition of penalties. However, penalties imposed in July 1998 against 
five other Russian entities and in January 1999 against three additional 
entities remain in effect.

Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

    The U.S. national export controls--both those implemented pursuant 
to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented 
unilaterally--play an important part in impeding the proliferation of 
WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export controls'' refer to 
requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations 
on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to certain 
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that 
also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, export controls 
are only one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its 
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties and norms, 
multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdictions of shipments of 
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance, redirection 
and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and 
diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls as 
part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
    Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because 
every emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from 
other countries. Proliferators look to other sources because needed 
items are unavailable within their country, because indigenously 
produced items are of substandard quality or insufficient quantity, and/
or because imported items can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than 
domestically produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators 
seek for their WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists 
(like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas precursors 
on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items (like lower-level 
machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of the items 
of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, key 
precursors and technologies used in the production of fertilizers or 
pesticides also can be used to

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make chemical weapons; bio-production technology can be used to produce 
biological weapons.
    The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or denying 
proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology for use in 
their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national export 
controls--and similar controls of our partners in the Australia Group, 
Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have 
denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best equipment 
and technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less 
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many instances, 
U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have forced 
proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements even from 
nonmember suppliers, taking time and money away from WMD/missile 
programs.
    The U.S. national export controls and those of our regime partners 
also have played an important role, increasing over time the critical 
mass of countries applying nonproliferation export controls. For 
example: the 7-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member countries; the 
NSG adopted full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended 
new controls to nuclear-related dual-use items; several nonmember 
countries have committed unilaterally to apply export controls 
consistent with one or more of the regimes; and most of the members of 
the nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all'' 
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control 
Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a specific list of 
items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal 
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when those items are 
destined for WMD/missile programs.) The United States maintains a global 
program, funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and 
Related Activities account, to assist other countries' efforts to 
strengthen their export control systems. A principal focus of this 
important effort is Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), where 
we also employ funds provided under the Freedom Support Act.
    The U.S. export controls, especially ``catch-all'' controls, also 
make important political and moral contributions to the nonproliferation 
effort. They uphold the broad legal obligations the United States has 
undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), 
Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons 
Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD 
activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' 
on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our 
friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely 
and unambiguously against WMD/missile proliferation, even against the 
prospect of inadvertent proliferation from the United States itself.
    Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and 
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use 
exports to proceed under circumstances where, without export control 
scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help 
build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in 
turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation 
regimes, for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each 
member not to make an export that another has denied for 
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it first 
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy 
make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime 
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for exporters.

Threat Reduction

    The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise 
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia 
and other Newly Independent States (NIS). My Administration gives high 
priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation through 
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists 
to civilian research and technology development activities. I have 
proposed an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the 
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support 
activities in four areas over FYs 2000-2004: nuclear security; 
nonnuclear WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and military 
relocation, stabilization and other security cooperation programs. Of 
the $1 billion Congressional ETRI request for FY 2000, an estimated $888 
million is available: State ($182 million), Energy ($293 million), and 
Defense ($467 million). We are seeking $974 million in FY 2001.

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Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during 
the period from May 16, 2000, through November 12, 2000.
         Sincerely,

                                                      William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. 
The notice of November 9 on continuation of the national emergency is 
listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.