[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (2000-2001, Book III)]
[November 9, 2000]
[Pages 2507-2516]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the National Emergency Regarding
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
November 9, 2000
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national emergency under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the
Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I
am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995;
November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; and November
10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2000. Accordingly,
I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order
12938, as amended.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)). It
reports actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the
emergency declaration during the period May 2000 through October 2000.
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the
most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the
Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as
the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most recent annual report
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public
Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4
strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject
entities to potential penalties under the Executive Order. The
[[Page 2508]]
original Executive Order provided for penalties for contributions to the
efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire,
design, produce or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended
Executive Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for
nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive
Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation
activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of
potential penalties to include expressly the prohibition of United
States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of
imports into the United States and United States Government procurement.
In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government greater
flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures
against foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.
Nuclear Weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear
tests that brought their nuclear weapon programs out in the open, in
defiance of decades of international efforts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons. Since that time, they have continued production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons and have flight-tested ballistic
nuclear-capable missiles. World reaction to these developments included
nearly universal condemnation across a broad range of international
fora. The United States and a number of other countries respectively
imposed sanctions and other unilateral measures. The G-8 agreed to new
restrictions on lending by international financial institutions.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, with the South Asia
Task Force, and through the United Nations to urge India and Pakistan to
move toward the international nonproliferation mainstream.
We have supported calls by the P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council
on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions designed
to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms and missile race,
with possible implications beyond the region. The United States has
focused most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the
short and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt,
unconditional adherence by India and Pakistan to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its conclusion,
a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the development of
nuclear-capable missiles, as well as their nondeployment; and adoption
of controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive
materials and technology.
Against a backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials
have yielded only modest progress, principally on export controls. In
September 1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders, noting that their
countries had already declared testing moratoria, expressed to the U.N.
General Assembly a willingness to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under
certain conditions. Subsequent developments including the Indian
election, the Kargil conflict, the October coup in Pakistan, and the
U.S. Senate's vote against providing its advice and consent to CTBT
ratification further complicated the issue during 1999, although neither
country renounced its commitment. Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee announced during his visit to
Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain its moratorium
until CTBT entered into force. Both governments have said they would
work to build domestic consensus for CTBT signature, without which they
could not sign. Such consensus has not been achieved and, consequently,
neither country has signed the CTBT thus far.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament
session, and negotiations got underway for a brief time. However, these
negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock
over the negotiating mandate.
Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistani export
controls into closer conformity with international standards. India
recently instituted new, more specific regulations on many categories of
sensitive nonnuclear equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-
related regulations will be forthcoming. Pakistan has publicly announced
regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that further
measures are being prepared. However,
[[Page 2509]]
both countries' steps still fall well short of international standards.
We have begun with India a program of technical cooperation designed to
improve the effectiveness of its already extensive export controls, and
encourage further steps to bring India's controls in line with
international standards. Similar assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by
coup-related sanctions.
The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 military
takeover in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the Indo-Pakistani
bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions remain high, particularly
over insurgent attacks in Kashmir, and there are no encouraging signs
that talks will resume soon.
We have agreed to continue regular discussions with India at the
senior and expert levels, and will also remain engaged with Pakistan, as
appropriate. Our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the P-5, G-8, and
in international fora, will also continue.
I discussed these issues with the Governments of India and Pakistan
during my trip there in March 2000 and with Prime Minister
Vajpayee when he came to Washington
this September. With India, we have stressed that our relationship will
not be able to reach its full potential without progress on our
nonproliferation and regional security concerns. With Pakistan, we also
emphasized the importance of progress on regional security and
nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.
In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an Agreed Framework
which, if fully implemented, will ultimately result in the complete
cessation of the DPRK's nuclear weapon-related program and its full
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a first
step, North Korea froze construction and operations at its Yongbyon and
Taechon nuclear facilities. The freeze remains in place, and to monitor
the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained
a continuous presence at the Yongbyon site since 1994. The U.S. spent
fuel team completed canning of the accessible spent fuel rods and rod
fragments from the North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor in April 2000. The
IAEA has confirmed that the remaining few rod fragments that are
currently inaccessible do not represent a proliferation concern, and the
Agency continues to monitor the canned fuel. The U.S. spent-fuel team
returned to the DPRK in October 2000 to continue clean-up and canning at
Yongbyon, and to begin looking at long-term maintenance.
Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at Kumchang-ni
led the United States to raise its concerns directly with Pyongyang and
to negotiate access to the site as long as U.S. concerns remain. In May
1999, a Department of State-led team of experts visited the site and
judged it, as then configured, not suited to house plutonium production
reactors or reprocessing operations. Based on the data gathered by the
U.S. team and the subsequent technical review, the United States
concluded that the activities were not a violation of the Agreed
Framework. A second Department of State-led team conducted a visit in
May 2000 and found no evidence to contradict the 1999 assessment. In
light of a final review of these results, the joint communique issued
following the visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington stated that ``U.S. concerns'' about the
underground site at Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.''
While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our nonproliferation
concerns, future negotiations with the North will seek to discuss ways
to allay all of them--in the context of assuring full implementation of
the Agreed Framework and improving overall relations. In May and July
2000, the United States and DPRK held rounds of talks concerning Agreed
Framework implementation and the DPRK's missile program, respectively.
Another round of talks, which included discussion on terrorism issues,
was held in New York from September 27 to October 2 of this year. During
the talks, the DPRK informed us that DPRK Special Envoy Marshal Jo Myong
Rok would visit Washington from October 9 to
12, 2000. The joint communique released at the end of that historic
visit noted that both countries ``are prepared to undertake a new
direction in their relations.'' Toward that end, the two stated that
``neither government would have hostile intent toward the other.'' Both
sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and their efforts to
fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed
Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight test
moratorium, and agreed that ``there are a variety of available means,
including the Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean
Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953
Armistice
[[Page 2510]]
Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.''
The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime. In May 2000, NPT Parties met in New York for the 2000 NPT Review
Conference (REVCON). Despite predictions to the contrary, the 158
participating nations adopted by consensus a Final Document that reviews
NPT implementation over the past 5 years and establishes a program of
action for the future. This is the first NPT Review Conference to
achieve such a Final Document since 1985. The Conference met or exceeded
all U.S. objectives. It provided an important boost to the NPT and to
nuclear nonproliferation goals in general.
The IAEA verifies states' compliance with their NPT obligations by
means of its safeguards system. The discovery at the time of the Gulf
War of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities led to an
international consensus in favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards
system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The United States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in
the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including
the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the classes
of nuclear activities states are required to declare, and expansion of
IAEA access rights. Measures requiring additional legal authority are
embodied in a Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol
has now been signed by 54 states and has entered into force for 14.
Provided the IAEA is given the resources and political support it needs
to implement its new safeguards measures effectively, proliferators will
now find it much harder to evade the system.
The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
on September 24, 1996. As of early October 2000, 160 countries have
signed and 65 have ratified the CTBT, including 30 of the 44 countries
required by the Treaty for its entry into force. During 2000, CTBT
signatories conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) and its subsidiary bodies in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by
the Treaty.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret
the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse to provide its
advice and consent to ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several
United States national security interests by prohibiting all nuclear
explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons; make the development of advanced new
types of weapons much more difficult; contribute to the prevention of
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and
strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks a historic
milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer
world. For these reasons, we hope that at an appropriate time, the
Senate will reconsider this treaty.
The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty's requirement to apply International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty
requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports
to nonnuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
The Committee maintains and updates a list (the ``Trigger List'') of
equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the
recipient facility. The relative informality of the Zangger Committee
has enabled it to take the lead on certain nonproliferation issues that
would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
At its March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the Chairman's
report of Committee activities to the 2000 NPT REVCON. The Committee
also agreed to continue consideration of possible future adoption of the
full-scope safeguards (FSS) policy. The Committee also agreed to an
informal meeting with IAEA staff to discuss procedures for keeping the
Agency informed on Trigger List changes and the rationale for such
changes, since the Agency uses the Zangger Trigger List as a reference
document. A separate working group, chaired by Sweden, is considering
the addition of plutonium enrichment equipment to the Trigger List.
During the past year, two new members have joined the Zangger
Committee--Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March 2000.
All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are members of
the Zangger Committee.
[[Page 2511]]
However, unlike all of the other nuclear weapon states members of the
Zangger Committee, China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), which requires its members to adhere to a FSS policy of requiring
nonnuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear
facilities as a condition of supply to those states. China has been
reluctant to agree to this policy.
With 38 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and effective
export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of
nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG
through adherence to the Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and
through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear
proliferation concern.
Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus became the newest members of the NSG in
May 19, 2000. Slovenia was invited to participate as an observer at the
2000 Paris Plenary and has applied for NSG membership this year. NSG
members often agree to allow non-member nations deemed eligible for NSG
membership to participate in Plenary meetings as observers. While not an
NSG member, China has taken a major step toward harmonization of its
export control system with the NSG Part 2 Guidelines by the
implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use equipment,
material, and related technology.
In May 2000, the NSG Troika (composed of the past, present, and
future NSG Chairs--in this case Britain, Italy and France) met with
representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss Iranian criticism
of the NSG. The meeting of the Troika followed up earlier meetings by
the Italian Chair in Tehran and on the margins of the 1999 NSG
Transparency Seminar in New York. The Troika urged Iran to sign the
additional protocol with the IAEA that strengthens safeguards. Iranian
officials offered to provide additional confidence-building measures to
facilitate nuclear exports from NSG members. The United States, as the
future plenary chair, intends to be an active participant in all NSG
Troika activities in the coming years, though any involvement in Troika
contacts with Iran will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
prior to the meetings. The United States does not believe that the
ongoing discussions with Iran can or should soften supplier attitudes.
During the Plenary meetings in Paris in June 2000, the Czech
Republic presented information on its new legislation intended to halt
all tangible and intangible supply to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in
Iran. The Czech delegation stated that the new legislation covers direct
transfers to Bushehr, as well as indirect support through a third party.
The Italian NSG Chair presented a report of NSG activities at the 2000
NPT Review Conference.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Expanded
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and
continue to be administered by the Department of Commerce, in
consultation with other agencies, in order to control the export of
items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States
Signatories as original States Parties, including the United States,
which ratified on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5,
1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. As of October 30,
2000, 140 countries will have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established on April 29,
1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague is comprised of States Parties and
international civil servants that are responsible for implementing the
CWC. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive
Council, and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff of
approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained and equipped
to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout the world. As
of October 30, 2000, the OPCW has conducted over 790 routine inspections
in some 37 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken place. The
[[Page 2512]]
OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW
destruction facilities in Utah, on Johnston Island, and elsewhere.
Accordingly, approximately 70 percent of the inspection days currently
have been at U.S. declared facilities.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
states or other entities attempting to engage in chemical weapons-
related activities. Receiving accurate and complete declarations from
all States Parties will improve our knowledge of possible chemical
weapons-related activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access
by international inspectors to declared and potentially undeclared
facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons
production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more
expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was
enacted into U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). I issued Executive Order 13128 on June
25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and the Convention,
and published regulations on December 30, 1999, regarding declarations
and inspections of industrial facilities. The United States commenced
its submission of industry declarations at the end of April 2000, and
hosted its first industry inspection on May 8, 2000. Industry
inspections are proceeding well. Our submission of the industry
declarations to the OPCW and commencement of inspections, has
strengthened U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our ability
to encourage other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely
declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC have been isolated politically
and denied access by the CWC to certain key chemicals from States
Parties. The relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed to
penalize countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play an active role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW).
We participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The AHG is
striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972
Convention to promote compliance and enhance transparency. This Ad Hoc
Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The
Fourth BWC Review Conference (November/December 1996) urged the AHG to
complete the protocol as soon as possible before the next BWC Review
Conference in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft text through
discussion of national views and clarification of existing text.
Differences in national views persist concerning such substantive areas
as on-site activities, export controls, declarations, and technical
assistance provisions. The United States remains strongly committed to
the objective agreed to in the 1996 Review Conference, but will only
accept a protocol that enhances U.S. security and strengthens national
and international efforts to address the BW threat.
I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the United
States would take a leading role in the effort to erect stronger
international barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by
strengthening the BWC with a new international means to detect and deter
cheating. We are working closely with industry representatives to obtain
technical input relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating
positions and then to reach international agreement on protocol
provisions.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 32-
member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent
annual AG Plenary Session from October 2-5, 2000, during which the Group
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the AG's
viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members
continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all
governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on
chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national activities
support these goals. At the 2000 Plenary, the Group welcomed its newest
members, Cyprus and Turkey. At this year's plenary, the regime continued
to focus on strengthening and refining AG export controls and sharing
information to
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address the CBW threat, especially from terrorism. The AG also
reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach program of
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and under-
standing of national policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to
be more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC
contexts.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine intelligence and
other information of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period. The
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other
countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues carefully to control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
concern. We also continue to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In
April 2000, we imposed sanctions against a North Korean entity and four
Iranian entities for missile proliferation activities. These sanctions
followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern
entities.
During this reporting period, the 32 Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share information about
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized
the need for implementing effective export control systems. This
cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
In March and September 2000, the United States participated in two
MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact Meetings (RPOC). At the RPOCs, MTCR
Partners continued their discussions on new ways to better address the
global missile proliferation threat. They also undertook to develop a
new multilateral mechanism on missile nonproliferation. This mechanism
is intended to complement the important work of the MTCR and eventually
to include the participation of both MTCR and non-MTCR countries.
The MTCR Partners held their annual plenary meeting in Helsinki, on
October 9-13, 2000. The Partners took decisions concerning the substance
of a new multilateral mechanism on missile nonproliferation and ways to
take it forward. They also discussed cooperation on halting shipments of
missile proliferation concern and exchanged information about activities
of missile proliferation concern worldwide, including in South Asia,
Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.
During this reporting period, the United States continued to work
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly
and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we continued
our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China, India, the Republic
of Korea, and North Korea, and have raised this issue with Pakistan at
senior levels. Although regular discussions with Pakistan at the expert
level have not proceeded since the fall 1999 coup, we remain engaged at
the diplomatic level, and I addressed our nonproliferation concerns
during my visit to Pakistan in March of this year. In the course of
normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such discussions with
other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
In July 2000, the United States and the DPRK held a fifth round of
missile talks in Kuala Lumpur. This was the first round of talks after a
16-month hiatus. It provided a useful opportunity to assess developments
since the March 1999 talks in Pyongyang, including the DPRK's June 2000
reaffirmation of its moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles
of any kind. The United States discussed its continuing concerns about
North Korea's missile activities and again pressed for tight constraints
on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. Both sides agreed to
hold another round of talks as soon as possible, and a sixth round
occurred September 28-29 in New York. The United States continued to
urge the DPRK to take steps to address U.S. and international concerns
about the DPRK's indigenous missile programs and its missile-related
activities. The United States also discussed Chairman Kim Jong-Il's idea, suggested to Russian President Putin in mid-July, of trading missile restraints
[[Page 2514]]
for launches of DPRK satellites on foreign launchers. During the October
visit to Washington of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok, the United States and DPRK agreed that ``resolution of
the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a
fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its
ballistic missile flight test moratorium ``while talks on the missile
issue continue.''
Secretary Albright met with
Chairman Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang October 23-24.
They had serious, constructive, and in-depth discussions on the full
range of U.S. concerns on missiles, including both the DPRK's indigenous
missile programs and exports. They also explored Chairman Kim's idea of
restraining DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches of DPRK
satellites on foreign boosters. U.S. and DPRK missile experts are
scheduled to continue discussions in early November.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and
nuclear development programs, the United States is pursuing a high-level
dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways to work together to cut off
the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic missile development
program and its nuclear weapon program. Russia's government has created
institutional foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation
policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed new
export control legislation to tighten government control over sensitive
technologies and continued working with the United States to strengthen
export control practices at Russian aerospace firms. However, despite
the Russian government's nonproliferation and export control efforts,
some Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic
missile program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond
the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear power reactor project, which could further
Iran's nuclear weapon aspirations.
Consistent with the Russian government's April 2000 announcement of
administrative action against the Rector of the Baltic State Technical
University (BSTU) for his involvement in training Iranian specialists at
BSTU, and following our own assessment, the United States announced on
April 24, 2000, plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on
the Rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program. At the
same time, the United States also announced its intention to remove
restrictions imposed in July 1998 on two Russian entities--INOR and
Polyus--which have ceased the proliferation behavior that led to the
imposition of penalties. However, penalties imposed in July 1998 against
five other Russian entities and in January 1999 against three additional
entities remain in effect.
Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls
The U.S. national export controls--both those implemented pursuant
to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented
unilaterally--play an important part in impeding the proliferation of
WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export controls'' refer to
requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations
on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to certain
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that
also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, export controls
are only one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties and norms,
multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdictions of shipments of
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance, redirection
and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and
diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls as
part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because
every emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from
other countries. Proliferators look to other sources because needed
items are unavailable within their country, because indigenously
produced items are of substandard quality or insufficient quantity, and/
or because imported items can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than
domestically produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators
seek for their WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists
(like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas precursors
on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items (like lower-level
machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of the items
of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, key
precursors and technologies used in the production of fertilizers or
pesticides also can be used to
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make chemical weapons; bio-production technology can be used to produce
biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or denying
proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology for use in
their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national export
controls--and similar controls of our partners in the Australia Group,
Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have
denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best equipment
and technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many instances,
U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have forced
proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements even from
nonmember suppliers, taking time and money away from WMD/missile
programs.
The U.S. national export controls and those of our regime partners
also have played an important role, increasing over time the critical
mass of countries applying nonproliferation export controls. For
example: the 7-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member countries; the
NSG adopted full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended
new controls to nuclear-related dual-use items; several nonmember
countries have committed unilaterally to apply export controls
consistent with one or more of the regimes; and most of the members of
the nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all''
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a specific list of
items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when those items are
destined for WMD/missile programs.) The United States maintains a global
program, funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and
Related Activities account, to assist other countries' efforts to
strengthen their export control systems. A principal focus of this
important effort is Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), where
we also employ funds provided under the Freedom Support Act.
The U.S. export controls, especially ``catch-all'' controls, also
make important political and moral contributions to the nonproliferation
effort. They uphold the broad legal obligations the United States has
undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I),
Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons
Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD
activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints''
on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our
friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely
and unambiguously against WMD/missile proliferation, even against the
prospect of inadvertent proliferation from the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use
exports to proceed under circumstances where, without export control
scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help
build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in
turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation
regimes, for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each
member not to make an export that another has denied for
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it first
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy
make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for exporters.
Threat Reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia
and other Newly Independent States (NIS). My Administration gives high
priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation through
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists
to civilian research and technology development activities. I have
proposed an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support
activities in four areas over FYs 2000-2004: nuclear security;
nonnuclear WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and military
relocation, stabilization and other security cooperation programs. Of
the $1 billion Congressional ETRI request for FY 2000, an estimated $888
million is available: State ($182 million), Energy ($293 million), and
Defense ($467 million). We are seeking $974 million in FY 2001.
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Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during
the period from May 16, 2000, through November 12, 2000.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.
The notice of November 9 on continuation of the national emergency is
listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.