[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (2000, Book II)]
[July 28, 2000]
[Pages 1497-1502]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Interview With Israeli Television Reporters
July 28, 2000

Israeli-U.S. Relations

    Q. Mr. President, time is of the essence. How do you consider right 
now the relationship between Israel and the United States after the 
summit?
    The President. Well, I think it's very strong. But I think in view 
of the courageous actions that the Prime Minister 
and the Israeli team took at the summit and in view of the withdrawal 
from Lebanon, I think some review and strengthening is in order.
    I plan to have a comprehensive review to improve our strategic 
relationship. We're going to have talks that will start right away, with 
a view toward what we can do to ensure that Israel maintains its 
qualitative edge, modernizes the IDF, and meets the new threats that 
Israel and the other countries will face in the 21st century.
    Secondly, I want to have a memorandum of understanding done as soon 
as possible with regard to our bilateral assistance, with a goal of 
making a long-term commitment to the necessary support to modernize the 
IDF. I think that's important.
    The third thing that I think is significant is that we provide 
assistance, which we will do, to Israel, to upgrade its security in 
light of the withdrawal from Lebanon. And in that context, we also want 
to try to help the Government of Lebanon to strengthen its ability to 
control south Lebanon and to make progress toward a more normal 
existence. There are some other things that we're reviewing.
    You know, I have always wanted to move our Embassy to west 
Jerusalem. We have a designated site there. I have not done so because I 
didn't want to do anything to undermine our ability to help to broker a 
secure and fair and lasting peace for Israelis and for Palestinians. But 
in light of what has happened, I've taken that decision under review, 
and I'll make a decision sometime between now and the end of the year on 
that.
    And there are other things I think we have to be open to. But the 
main thing that I want the people of Israel to know is that the United 
States remains a friend and a partner, completely committed to the 
security and future of Israel, continuing to believe that a just and 
lasting peace is the best alternative and the only alternative for 
absolute security. But in the meanwhile, we have to do what we can to 
strengthen the capacity of Israel to defend itself and to deepen our 
bilateral relationship. So I intend to do that.

U.S. Embassy in Israel

    Q. You mentioned the relocation of the Israeli--of the American 
Embassy and put it in Jerusalem. Would you consider it in any 
circumstances, even if there is no agreement?
    The President. Well, I think I should stand on the words I said. I 
have always wanted to do it. I've always thought it was the right thing 
to do. But I didn't want to do anything to undermine the peace process, 
our ability to be an honest broker, which requires that we be accepted 
by both sides.
    But it's something that I have taken under review now because of the 
recent events. And I think that's all I should say about it now.

Israeli-Palestinian Talks

    Q. So what is the next move right now? As I understand, Prime 
Minister Barak is saying that he's willing to go to another summit. What 
do you think is the next move?
    The President. Well, I think, first of all, we need to have their 
people start talking directly again, and I think they will at a certain 
level. And then the Prime Minister needs to have 
a little time, I think, in Israel to deal with governmental issues. And 
I would hope that Chairman Arafat and the 
other leaders in the Arab world will work to prepare their public for 
the proposition that there can be no agreement without courage and 
conscience but also honorable compromise. That's what agreements are.
    The Palestinians did make some moves at these talks that have never 
been made before. And while I made it clear in my statement I thought 
that the Prime Minister was more creative and 
more courageous, they did make some moves, and the teams, the 
negotiating teams, for the first time in a formal setting where it 
counted, actually discussed these issues.
    Now, you know, there had been side papers and discussions and all 
that over the last 7 years,

[[Page 1498]]

since Oslo, but nothing like this, not ever. And there's a reason when 
the Oslo agreements were signed that these final status issues were put 
off until the end: They're hard; they're difficult; they're contentious. 
But the fact that they were actually there talking and the fact that I 
saw changes emerge on both sides, including within the Palestinian camp, 
I think is hopeful.
    But what I want to do--first of all, I'll do anything I can. I'll be 
glad to convene another meeting. I'll go anywhere, do anything, anything 
I can. But----
    Q. Will you consider a visit to Israel?
    The President. Well, I just want to defer making any statements 
until I make a decision about what is the best thing for the peace 
process. I will act as soon as I can be helpful. We're doing things all 
the time, including now, today, as we speak. But I don't want to do 
something that's not helpful. And if we're going to make a difference, 
then the next time we meet, both sides have to be prepared to make the 
decisions necessary to conclude an agreement. And as soon as I'm 
convinced that's a good possibility, I'll do what I can to make it 
happen.

Jerusalem

    Q. You know, the discussion about Jerusalem during the summit opened 
Pandora's box in Israel. Can you assure the Israeli people that Barak 
isn't going to divide Jerusalem?
    The President. Let me say this. First of all, all the discussions 
that were held were private, and I have to honor that. What the Israelis 
and Palestinians decide to say about it is their affair. But I can't be 
in the position of violating the trust of either side.
    What I believe is that Prime Minister Barak 
in no way ever compromised the vital interests of the security of the 
State of Israel. One thing I think that I can say without violating 
either side is that the most progress in the talks was made in the area 
of security, where there was a surprising amount of consensus and an 
understanding that neither side would be secure after a peace agreement 
unless both were secure and unless both worked together. And there was 
no interest, fundamentally, in the Palestinians in having a weak Israel, 
a vulnerable Israel, an Israel unable to defend itself; and that the 
Palestinians would be stronger if they were working together.
    I think if there is one thing that should be encouraging to the 
people of Israel, of all political parties and persuasions, it would be 
that. There was a clear willingness to try to come to grips with what 
were very different positions on this issue when they met and come 
together. And I was quite encouraged by that.
    You know, Jerusalem is a difficult issue. But I believe that the 
Prime Minister did everything he could to reach 
an agreement while preserving the vital interests of Israel.
    Q. Israel is afraid that if Barak already made some concessions 
right now, and that the Palestinians didn't make any concession--in 
Jerusalem--so many people are afraid that if the negotiations will 
resume, Israel will be asked to do, to make some more concessions. Can 
you tell the Israeli people that you wouldn't ask Barak to give much 
more than what he already was ready to give?
    The President. Well, first of all, I don't think that he will ever do anything that he believes undermines the 
vital interest of the people of Israel and Jerusalem. And it is true 
that while the Palestinians, themselves, didn't make some moves on 
Jerusalem, that Israel did more, but nothing that I think undermined the 
vital interests of the people of Israel.
    And I think that is an issue where--and frankly, most of the 
discussion involved ideas embraced not formally by either side. And they 
are not bound by it. So I believe that everybody pretty well knows right 
now that there won't necessarily be a lot more movement of the same 
kind. And we may have to have a resolution in some ways that no one has 
quite thought of yet.
    But I kept telling the Palestinians, and I will say again to the 
world, that you cannot make an agreement over something as important as 
a city that is the holiest place in the world to the Jews, to the 
Christians, and to the--one of the holiest places in the world to the 
Muslims--if it is required of one side to say, ``I completely defeated 
the interest of the other side.'' If either side gets to say that at the 
end, there won't be an agreement, there can't be.
    There has to be a way to identify the legitimate interests--and 
there are legitimate interests in both sides, in Jerusalem--in such a 
way that they are met and honored and that the sanctity of the Holy City 
is uplifted. There has to be a way to do that. But you know, it's not 
for me to design a plan. They have to come to it. And I think they will 
come to it if the people of Israel, and if the Palestinians will give

[[Page 1499]]

their leaders a clear message that they trust them not to compromise 
their vital interest or their security; but beyond that, to be as 
flexible as possible to try to honorably accommodate each other's true 
interests.

Israeli Domestic Reaction

    Q. During the talks, did you consider the possibility that maybe 
Barak's concession will not pass a referendum?
    The President. I did. Of course, he has to be 
the final judge of that.
    Q. [Inaudible]--help him with that.
    The President. Excuse me?
    Q. You can always advise him and help him with that, too.
    The President. Well, if they reach an agreement that they both 
believe is right and honorable and protects their vital interests and 
their security, obviously I would do whatever I could to persuade the 
people to support it. I don't know that I would have much influence, but 
I would do whatever I could. I would certainly never countenance an 
agreement that I thought undermined Israel's security, but you don't 
have to worry about that. I don't think there was ever anything that was 
clearer to me in these negotiations. The people of Israel may differ 
with their Prime Minister on some of the details, 
but they should never question whether he had the long-term security and 
vital interests of Israel uppermost in his mind. That was clear. And as 
I said, to me something that should be very encouraging is that they 
really did make a lot of progress on the security issue. And Israel was, 
I think, the big winner there, but only because the Palestinians 
recognize that their security will be tied to Israel's security if they 
make an agreement.

President's Role in the Peace Process

    Q. I'm sure that you know that the majority of Israeli, the people 
admire your devotion to the peace process. And they ask themselves today 
if President Clinton can't bring peace, which President of the United 
States will do it?
    The President. Well, I would hope that any President would honor 
America's historic commitment to Israel and our decades of involvement 
in the Middle East and our attempt to be fair to the legitimate 
interests of all the people of the region, including the Palestinians. I 
don't know if anybody else will ever put the time in on this that I have 
or have the kind of personal, almost religious conviction I have about 
it.
    But keep in mind, this is an evolutionary process. If we don't 
finish--and I believe we can, and I still believe we will--but if we 
don't finish this year, the negotiating teams for the two sides and the 
attitudes of the people will be in a different place than they were 
because of all that has happened over the last 7 years, and especially 
because of what happened at Camp David, as long as there is a 
constructive attitude taken about it and a deepened resolve to be frank 
with the public and that this is especially important for the 
Palestinians.
    Q. You are known as the tireless master of negotiating. What 
happened there? How can both leaders resist the Clinton charm?
    The President. I'm afraid my charm and my reasoning abilities, at 
least for just 15 days, cannot compare with the thousands of years of 
history that go to the core of the identity of Israelis and 
Palestinians, as regards Jerusalem. But that's okay. We made a lot of 
progress. We got people to talk about it, to deal with it, to think 
about it. And I hope I prompted a lot of thinking about all the various 
options available to them. There is more than one way to resolve this in 
a way that's honorable for everyone.
    But I must tell you, when we started these negotiations, I didn't 
think we had a one-in-10 chance to succeed. And we actually got more 
done than I thought we would.
    I called this summit because I was afraid that the lack of progress 
was spinning out of control. The parties, after all, promised each other 
they would reach an agreement by the middle of September. And they'd 
never even met to formally, frankly, openly discuss these issues--ever.
    So I think when you look at it in that context, it's--you know, if I 
were just sitting on the outside, and I didn't know any more about it, I 
would be profoundly disappointed. I'd say, ``They've had 7 years. What 
have they been doing all this time?'' Well, you know what they've--we've 
had a lot of progress in the last 7 years, an enormous amount. But these 
final status issues were put off until the end because both sides knew 
they were potentially explosive and agonizingly difficult.
    So it wasn't really a matter of charm. Believe me, if I could have 
prevailed by charming, cajoling, arguing, or just depriving them of 
sleep, we would have a deal. The last 2 nights I went

[[Page 1500]]

to bed at 5 in the morning both nights. I did my best so I would be the 
last person standing on both sides, you know, of all the sides there.
    But we just couldn't get there. And we won't get there until each 
side decides. And this is the decision I think Prime Minister 
Barak made. That he would go as far as he could 
without making any specific commitments, because we had it organized so 
that neither side would be exposed.
    So for people to say that he's bound by all 
these commitments, I don't think that's an accurate reflection of the 
way I conducted the negotiations. I went out of my way, especially as 
regards Jerusalem, to set it up so that if either side were willing to 
float some ideas or entertain some ideas, they wouldn't be exposed, and 
they could always take them back if there was no agreement.
    But both sides--and this applies to the Palestinians; they're going 
to have to think about this--they have to decide that there is a 
solution which meets their vital interests, that does not permit them, 
after it is over, to say, ``I won, and they lost.'' You have to be able 
to be able to say, when this is over, ``We won. Peace won. Our children 
won. The future won.'' We may--yes, if we can get 100 percent of 
everything we wanted, no. Is it an honorable compromise that preserves 
our vital interests and enhances our security--not just maintains it, 
enhances it, yes. That has to be the test. The test has to be that our 
vital interests are preserved; our security is enhanced; our future is 
brighter; and neither side suffered a cataclysmic defeat. That's not 
what a negotiation is.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia

    Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to be that Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia didn't help to persuade Arafat to make the necessary concessions 
to have an agreement. It seems to be that this--both allies of the 
United States in this crucial moment couldn't deliver the goods.
    The President. Well, I think that the truth is that because this had 
never been discussed before between the two parties and because when we 
went into the negotiations, they were usually secret or sacrosanct, that 
I'm not sure, number one, that they thought they knew enough to know 
what to ask for, although I did my best to try to get them to help, in 
general terms, before the process started. But I'm not sure they knew 
enough to know explicitly what to ask for, which won't be the case if we 
meet again, because we're down the road enough now.
    And number two, I do believe that the public opinion among the 
Palestinians, and throughout the Middle East, had not even sufficiently 
discussed all these issues. You can see it was still operating at the 
high level of rhetoric, you know. And at some point, there has to be a 
way of saying, ``We have won by making sure the Israelis didn't lose.'' 
And the Israelis have to be able to say, ``We have won by making sure 
the Palestinians didn't lose.'' And that's--it's harder to sell.
    When you're dealing with something as involved as Jerusalem in these 
peace talks, the only person who's going to get cheered is the person 
that says, no, no, no. And that's an easy sell. You go out and say, no, 
and you can get up the crowd, and they'll cheer you. But if that is the 
attitude which prevails, then we won't get peace.

Palestinian Statehood

    Q. There is right now in the Congress some proposal to eliminate or 
prevent the use, aid to the Palestinians if they decide unilaterally to 
declare about statehood. Hillary Clinton, your wife, is for this 
proposal. What is your approach?
    The President. Well, the bill has just been introduced. We don't 
give a great deal of aid there, as you know. And a lot of it is----
    Q. But it's very symbolic.
    The President. Very symbolic. Well, let me just say this. I think 
there should not be a unilateral declaration. And if there is, our 
entire relationship will be reviewed, not confined to that. So I don't--
I make it a practice normally, when the bills are first introduced and I 
haven't even reviewed them, not to comment. But I think it would be a 
big mistake to take a unilateral action and walk away from the peace 
process. And if it happens, there will inevitably be consequences, not 
just here but throughout the world, and things will happen. I would 
review our entire relationship, including but not limited to that.

Possible U.S. Support to Israel

    Q. If there will be agreement, what kind of support the Israeli 
people can expect from the United States?

[[Page 1501]]

    The President. I will do my best to get the maximum amount of 
support. One of the reasons I wanted very much to get the agreement this 
time is that it would give us more time to pass an aid package through 
Congress. But if there is an agreement, Israel will have further 
security needs. There will be human costs involved. There will have to 
be some sort of international fund set up for the refugees.
    There is, I think, some interest, interestingly enough, on both 
sides, in also having a fund which compensates the Israelis who were 
made refugees by the war, which occurred after the birth of the State of 
Israel. Israel is full of people, Jewish people, who lived in 
predominantly Arab countries who came to Israel because they were made 
refugees in their own land.
    That's another piece of good news I think I can reveal out of the 
summit. The Palestinians said they thought those people should be 
eligible for compensation, as well. So we'll have to set up a fund, and 
we will contribute. I went to the G-8 in Okinawa in part to give them a 
report, and I asked the Europeans and the Japanese to contribute, as 
well. And there will be other costs associated with this. So it will not 
be inexpensive.
    Also, if there is an agreement and if the Palestinians set up a 
state pursuant to an agreement, Israel has a strong interest in seeing 
it be economically stronger and more self-sufficient, a better trading 
partner, not just a supply of labor but also a country capable of buying 
Israeli products in greater detail and growing together in the future. 
So there will be economic issues that have to be dealt with.
    I will try to get as much support as I possibly can for the United 
States but also as much support as I possibly can from Europe, from 
Japan, and from other people in the world.

Middle East Peace Summit

    Q. With your permission, Mr. President, can you take us inside Camp 
David and describe us one of the crucial moments, one of the crucial 
crises?
    The President. Well, I think the only thing I can talk about without 
revealing the substance of the talks, which I have promised not to do, 
is the first time the talks almost broke up. Right before I went to 
Okinawa, I thought the talks were over. I even went by and said goodbye 
to Chairman Arafat. And I went by and said 
goodbye to Prime Minister Barak. And I was 
walking around talking to the Palestinian and Israeli peace teams. And 
it was obvious to me that they did not want to go and that they feared 
that, if they left in the position the talks were then in, that there 
would be an enormous harshness and recrimination, and it could wind up 
being a net setback, if you will, for the peace process.
    And then, all of a sudden, it became obvious to me that they didn't 
want to go, that they wanted to keep trying, that they thought it was 
still possible. So I went back around; I made two more visits. By then, 
it's very late at night, and I'm leaving at dawn the next day. It was 
like 1:30 a.m. or 1:45 a.m. I made two more visits to both Prime 
Minister Barak and his team and to Chairman 
Arafat and his team.
    And I finally concluded that they really didn't want to quit. And so 
I invited them to stay. And I said that I had to go to the G-8 because 
the United States had some strong interest in Okinawa--it's a main base 
for a lot of our forces in the Pacific--and because I owed it to my 
partners to go there to my last meeting and because I wanted to ask them 
for money to help the peace process, but that if they would stay, I 
would leave Secretary Albright behind 
in charge, and they could keep talking, and they wanted to do it.
    That was, I think, the pivotal moment which turned this from a 
negative result to a positive result, even though we didn't get an 
agreement. Because in the next few days, they relaxed; they began to 
talk. The Palestinians began to open up a little bit, and we began to 
get a sense that at least how we might get an agreement, even if the 
parties couldn't reach it this time. In my mind, looking back on it, I 
think that was a pivotal moment.

President's Legacy

    Q. Finally, I wanted to ask you, many critics of yours are saying 
that you are looking desperately for the missing chapter of your legacy, 
and maybe you tried to overcome the impeachment process. Is the Middle 
East issue the missing chapter of this legacy?
    The President. No. Look, you know, I'm not proud of the personal 
mistake I made, but I'm proud of what happened in the impeachment 
process. As far as I'm concerned, we saved the United States 
Constitution. And I think history will record it favorably to me and 
unfavorably

[[Page 1502]]

to those who did it. And I think I have a pretty good legacy here with 
our economy, with our social progress on crime, on welfare, on 
education, on health care for the elderly, for children. And I am proud 
of what I have done in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Northern 
Ireland, in Africa, in Latin America.
    This has nothing to do with my legacy. All my life, I have wanted to 
see peace in the Middle East, and I promised myself when I got elected 
President, I would work until the last day to achieve it. This is not 
about me. It's about the children who live in the Middle East. It's 
about whether those children will be living together or living apart, 
whether there will be fighting or learning together.
    Q. And you're convinced it can be done?
    The President. Absolutely. And if it doesn't happen while I'm here, 
I just want to know that I have done everything I possibly could to make 
sure it will happen as soon as possible. But I am absolutely convinced 
that we can do it and that we should do it before the end of the year, 
because the parties have committed themselves to this September 
deadline. The parties came to Camp David; nobody had to come. Prime 
Minister Barak thought it was a good time, and I 
knew if we didn't do it, we would never get around to dealing with this.
    We have a saying in America, this is like going to the dentist 
without having your gums deadened, you know? It's like having somebody 
pull your teeth with no painkiller. This is not easy. This was hard for 
these people. But if we hadn't started--you know, you never get to the 
end of the road unless you get out on the road and take the first step. 
And this was a huge, important thing.
    Q. Mr. President, thank you very much.
    The President. You're welcome.

Note: The interview was recorded at 5:42 p.m. on July 27 in the 
Roosevelt Room at the White House for later broadcast and was embargoed 
for release until 3 p.m. on July 28. In his remarks, the President 
referred to Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel and Chairman Yasser 
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority. A tape was not available for 
verification of the content of this interview.