[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (2000, Book I)]
[March 21, 2000]
[Pages 508-513]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Interview With Peter Jennings of ABC's 
``World News Tonight'' in
New Delhi
March 21, 2000

India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir

    Mr. Jennings. Prime Minister Vajpayee said that you will conclude, 
now that you're here, that the situation--Kashmir, between India and 
Pakistan--is not as bad as they say it is. Is that what you conclude?
    The President. Well, I think that I've concluded that he is going to do everything he can to avoid having 
it escalate into a war with Pakistan. And that is encouraging. But I 
still think it's a difficult situation, to say the least. I think it's 
important that they both show restraint. I think it's important that 
they respect the Line of Control, both sides do. And then, over the long 
run, I think what really matters, in terms of an ultimate resolution, is 
that the people of Kashmir feel that their legitimate interests are 
being addressed in some formal fashion.

[[Page 509]]

    But I do feel better about his 
determination to avoid a war, at least what you might call a full-scale 
war. But I don't--I'm still very troubled by the fact there's so much 
violence there. A lot of it obviously is propagated beyond the borders 
of Kashmir, and I don't think the Line of Control is adequately 
respected.
    And I think--you know, what happened at Kargil was very troubling to 
me, because I supported strongly the dialog between India and Pakistan 
in the Lahore process. I still think it's a difficult situation, and I 
don't think they should take it lightly, either side.
    Mr. Jennings. Moreover, Prime Minister Vajpayee is much more 
militant with the Indian press than he was with you today.
    The President. That's good, though. That means that--maybe that 
means my trip here has a beneficial impact. And I hope I can have some 
impact on the Pakistanis when I go there.
    Mr. Jennings. What do you mean by ``impact,'' Mr. President?
    The President. You know, I spent last July 4th trying to persuade 
former Prime Minister Sharif to withdraw back 
behind the Line of Control. He did. I think it weakened him when he did, 
frankly, but it was the right thing to do.
    I think that they--these countries need to be thinking about 
reducing violence and increasing cooperation and dialog and freeing up 
their immensely talented people for different pursuits. If you look at 
how well the Indians and the Pakistani-Americans have done, how well 
they're doing in the information economy in the United States, how well 
they're beginning to do here, it's truly a tragedy that they're 
basically trapped in this position which, even if it doesn't lead to 
war, leads to big expenses on defense, which could be spent on education 
and health care or the development of a modern economy.
    So I hope that my trip here and the long-term rekindling of the 
relationship with India that I'm committed to for our country can 
basically, slowly, over time, take this in a different direction.
    Mr. Jennings. Forgive me for being more pointed. You know as well as 
I do that you're talking, to a very large extent, in generalities. What 
do you think the United States can really do here, especially given the 
fact that the Indians say the United States has no role?
    The President. Well, I think that what they say is that we have no 
role in Kashmir. And they have every right to say that. Every place in 
the world I've been involved in the peace process--you know, it's 
because we have been able to inspire the confidence and have a 
relationship with both parties.
    But I think the United States does have an interest in trying to 
avert a larger conflict and trying to reduce the tensions between the 
two countries. I think we do have a clear interest there.
    Mr. Jennings. So?
    The President. We've worked with the Pakistanis for years. We want 
it--and obviously we've got a big interest in India's future. So 
therefore, I think anything I can do to get them to focus on what it 
would take to reduce the tensions is important. And I think right now 
the important thing is respecting the Line of Control, reducing 
violence, and find a way to resume the dialog. Now, beyond that, it's up 
to them.
    Mr. Jennings. You'll tell the Pakistanis they should respect the 
Line of Control, the de facto cease-fire line?
    The President. Absolutely.
    Mr. Jennings. And what will you tell those Kashmiris, or Pakistanis, 
who believe they're fighting to free the Muslim Kashmiris from Indian 
control?
    The President. First of all, I think that--the same thing I said to 
the Indians. I don't think there can be a military solution to Kashmir. 
And the tangled history of it does not admit of a simple solution. I 
think that the best chance that the Pakistanis have, if they want to 
have a positive impact on what they believe the legitimate concerns of 
people who live in that part of Kashmir that's in India, is through a 
dialog, not through acts of violence and supporting acts of violence.
    And I think for many years they thought that might get us involved, 
and it won't. I'm not going to be dragged into something that--first of 
all, that India doesn't want us to be part of and, secondly, that I got 
dragged into from deliberate acts of violence. I just don't think that's 
right.
    Mr. Jennings. So what is America's Kashmir policy?
    The President. Our policy is: First, respect the Line of Control; 
second, do not promote violence by third parties in Kashmir; third, 
negotiate; and fourth, with respect to India, that

[[Page 510]]

there's not a military solution to Kashmir's problems by India, either, 
that the Kashmiris deserve to have their own concerns addressed on the 
merits. But I don't think we ought to get in the position of saying that 
we think that an ethnically diverse country like India can't exist 
anymore. I don't agree with that.
    Mr. Jennings. Do you support the Kashmiris' right to a referendum on 
their own independence? Do you support the right as it was laid out by 
the United Nations in 1948, for them to have a plebiscite on their 
future?
    The President. Well, there's been a lot of changes since 1948, 
including what happened in 1971 and a number of things since. What I 
support is--I support some process by which the Kashmiris' legitimate 
grievances are addressed, and I support respecting the Line of Control. 
And I think the Pakistanis and the Indians have to have some way of 
talking about it. And the Indians have to have some way of talking to 
their own Kashmiris about it that recognizes there's not a military 
solution.
    But the most I can do right now is to oppose violence, particularly 
oppose violence propagated by third parties within Kashmir, and to 
support reaffirming the Line of Control. And Prime Minister Vajpayee 
just said today that if the Pakistanis would reaffirm the principles of 
the Lahore Declaration and not promote or support violence on the other 
side of the Line of Control and respect the Line of Control, that 
he thought a dialog could be resumed. I 
think that is the best hope, ultimately, for resolving this.
    Mr. Jennings. Who are these third parties you're referring to, 
involved in Kashmir?
    The President. Well, we know that there have been instances of 
violence within Kashmir that were propagated by people who were not from 
there, but they weren't necessarily elements of the Pakistani 
Government. I don't want to accuse Pakistan of something it didn't do.
    Mr. Jennings. Do you believe the Pakistan Intelligence Service 
facilitates the infiltration of fighters to Kashmir?
    The President. I believe that there are elements within the 
Pakistani Government that have supported those who engaged in violence 
in Kashmir.
    Mr. Jennings. And what will you tell General Musharraf about that?
    The President. Just exactly what I said to you. And I want to talk 
with him, as I did with Prime Minister Vajpayee, about the future. I think that in order to get out of 
a fix--when you get into a fix like this and you feel paralyzed by your 
past practices, the only way to change it is to have a vision of the 
future which convinces you that if you want to achieve a certain goal, 
you've got to do it in a different way. And I'll do my best to persuade 
him of that.
    I just don't think that this is the way to deal with Kashmir, and I 
don't think it's a good enough reason to drive, in effect, the whole 
existence, the whole policy of the Pakistani Government. The Pakistanis 
are great people, too. They've been good allies of ours. They've helped 
us even in my time, since the end of the cold war, to get terrorists, 
the terrorists involved--one involved in the World Trade Center, one 
involved in the CIA killing. They've helped us in other contexts. I want 
to continue to be a good ally for them. But I think they have to have a 
plan for restoring democracy, and they have to have a nonviolent plan 
for resolving their differences with India.
    Mr. Jennings. Just so I understand, then, Mr. President, you want 
the United States on the sidelines in this, giving advice but not 
involved in any three-way attempt to settle the Kashmir issue?
    The President. I don't think the United States can be involved in a 
three-way attempt to settle the Kashmir issue, unless and until they 
both want us. I think that that is the evidence--you know, if you look 
at, we're in the Middle East because they both want us, not to say that 
either side agrees with everything I say and do, but we have a certain 
credibility there born of years and years and years of labor and a 
welcoming into the process. The same thing is true in the Irish peace 
process.
    So I think that right now what I need to do is to try to convince 
both sides to avoid the worst--and there's something to be said for 
avoiding the worst here--and then to adopt some common principles which 
will allow the resumption of the dialog. If we can get them to renounce 
violence as a way of resolving this and to restore their dialog, respect 
the Line of Control so the dialog can be restored, then who knows what 
will happen and what they decide to do and how they decide to do it. But 
if they stay sort of hunkered down in unapproachable positions, then I 
think we'll have to work very hard to avoid a more difficult situation.

[[Page 511]]

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

    Mr. Jennings. I have a nuclear question. The United States tells 
people in the rest of the world to be like us. And the Indians say, 
``Right. We're just like you. We're a democracy. We're a free-market 
economy, and we have nuclear weapons in order to protect our national 
security.'' What's wrong with that?
    The President. Well, what's wrong with it is that we're trying to 
lead the world away from nuclear power and away from the threat of 
nuclear war. And when the Indians took this position, they basically 
said, ``We don't think we can be secure without nuclear weapons, and 
it's our right as a great nation to have them.''
    And we, first of all, don't believe it does; we don't believe it 
enhances their security. We think countries like Brazil, Argentina, 
South Africa, South Korea, that walked away from the prospect of nuclear 
programs, are more secure and have more funds to support their own 
national security and the development of their people and their economy. 
And we believe that it sends a bad signal when a great democracy like 
India, in effect, is telling the world that we ought to get into another 
arms race.
    I've tried to reduce the arms of the United States. I hope this year 
we'll make another effort to reduce the arms of the United States and 
the arms of Russia. I've tried to support the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the restriction of the 
distribution of fissile material.
    So I think India--it sounds great to say, ``Well, the United States 
has nuclear weapons, and they're a democracy. We ought to.'' But if you 
look at the whole history of this thing, what they're saying is, ``We 
want to reverse the move toward reducing the nuclear threat because we 
say we ought to have nuclear weapons.''
    Mr. Jennings. Well, they also say, sir, that these are weapons of 
self-esteem and this is a U.S.----
    The President. Self-esteem, that's right. If they're weapons of 
self-esteem for India, then every nation in the entire world has the 
same right to self-esteem. So therefore, however many countries there 
are in the world, everyone that can afford one ought to have a nuclear 
weapon. I do not believe that that would make the world safer. I believe 
that that would make the world more dangerous.
    So I respect what the Indians say. They say, ``Look, it's not just 
Pakistan. China has nuclear weapons. You know, it wasn't so many decades 
ago we had a border war with China. We have our problems there.'' But I 
think that most people believe--and have studied this believe that all 
nations would be more secure if we reduce the overall nuclear threat and 
reduce the number of people that had access to nuclear weapons.
    And also keep in mind, the more nuclear weapons you have, the more 
nuclear material you have, the more risk you have that that nuclear 
material will be subject to pilfering. So you have to worry about--not 
only about other states becoming nuclear states but even terrorists 
getting ahold of small-scale nuclear weapons. I just think that it takes 
the world in the wrong direction. It's an honest disagreement we have 
with the Indians.
    Mr. Jennings. Yes, because the Indians say to you, ``You Americans 
say well, you just don't trust us''----
    The President. That's not true.
    Mr. Jennings. ----``It's okay for you, but you don't trust us.''
    The President. No, that's not true. Actually, I do trust them. I 
believe Prime Minister Vajpayee when he 
says, ``I will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.'' So it's not 
a question of trust.
    What I don't agree with is that a country needs nuclear weapons to 
manifest its esteem or its national greatness. Nor do I agree that India 
is actually more secure with these nuclear weapons. I think that in some 
ways it reduces one's security.
    Mr. Jennings. Trust the Pakistanis with control of nuclear weapons, 
too?
    The President. I feel the same way about them. I think--they 
probably think they have a better argument since they know they couldn't 
win a conventional war with India, because India is so much bigger and 
because Lahore, for example, one of the most important places, is so 
close to the Indian border.
    But it just seems to me--again, if you look at--if you ask yourself, 
where is there greater security? In Brazil, in Argentina, or even in 
South Africa, or even in South Korea, where they renounced nuclear 
weapons? Are those people less secure than the people of Pakistan and 
India? I think you would have to say they are not less secure.

[[Page 512]]

    So my argument is, any country can say to us, any country, 
particularly another democracy, ``Oh, you're a hypocrite. You've got 
nuclear weapons. You don't want us to have any.'' Well, I'm trying to 
reduce the store of nuclear weapons the United States has, the store 
Russia has. The Russians have supported this. And we're trying to make 
the world more stable.
    I just think--I don't think they're more secure by having nuclear 
weapons.

Cancellation of Visit to Joypura, Bangladesh

    Mr. Jennings. On the subject of security, I'm really curious. You 
travel all the time in this extraordinarily tight security envelope. And 
yet, it wasn't secure enough yesterday to go to a small village in 
Bangladesh. Did you really feel a personal risk in Bangladesh? Did you 
end up telling Chelsea, or, if you talked to her, Mrs. Clinton, ``I'm 
going off on a trip in which I am at personal risk''?
    The President. Well, I think it's better for me not to discuss it, 
except to say this. Insofar as there was a risk, it had nothing to do 
with the Bangladeshis, nothing to do with the Government or the people 
of Bangladesh, and they were not in any way at fault. I did my best to 
take account of the analysis of our security people and to act 
accordingly, and it worked out just fine. We had a wonderful trip.

President's Security

    Mr. Jennings. Do you ever have your way with the security people?
    The President. Do you mean, do I ever disagree with them?
    Mr. Jennings. No. Do you ever have your way?
    The President. What do you mean?
    Mr. Jennings. In other ways, do you ever have your--you can disagree 
with them; do you ever prevail?
    The President. Sometimes I do. I have from time to time disagreed 
with them and actually done what I wanted to do. But when that happens, 
I try to do it the way they want to do it, because if I disagree with 
them, I realize I've assumed a greater risk, and I should do it in the 
way they want to do it.

Middle East Peace Process

    Mr. Jennings. Last question, sir. You're going to see President Asad 
in Geneva on Sunday. That's a pretty big meeting. Does this mean a deal 
is close?
    The President. I wouldn't say that. But I will say this. Ever since 
they met in Shepherdstown the first of the year, and then the talks sort 
of were stalled, I've been working very hard with both sides. I now 
think I'm in a position to have a sense of what it will take for both 
sides to get an agreement. So it's an appropriate time for me to discuss 
this with President Asad, in the hope that we 
can start the talks again.
    I'm encouraged by the decisions that have been made by the Israelis 
and the Palestinians. I think they are committed to going forward, and 
they have a pretty good timetable. They're going to have to work hard to 
make it. And I think that the only way we'll ever have this thing the 
way it ought to be in the Middle East is to finish with the Syrians and 
then with the Lebanese, as well.
    So I think this is time. Whether it will lead to a breakthrough, I 
don't know. I hope it will lead to a resumption of talks.
    Mr. Jennings. Is it safe to assume that President Asad doesn't leave 
the country easily and would not agree to go to Geneva to see you were 
you not to have something pretty good to offer?
    The President. I think it's safe to assume that I wouldn't waste 
his time, either. I think that we have--it's 
time for us to talk about what we think it would take to resume these 
talks and move to a resolution. And I'm going to give him my honest 
opinion about where we are and where I think we can go. And then we just 
need to make a decision, all of us, about whether to go forward. But 
principally, it's a decision for the Israelis and the Syrians.
    Mr. Jennings. Does this involve a comprehensive settlement, one that 
involves the Syrian Golan Heights, the Israelis, and the Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon?
    The President. Well, I want to talk to President Asad. There isn't an agreement, yet. But if there is an 
agreement, I would hope it would lead to a resolution of both the Syrian 
issues and the Lebanese issues, which is very important in Israel. The 
Israelis care a lot about that, and well they should. And of course, the 
Lebanese do. We'll see. Keep your fingers crossed
    Mr. Jennings. You're enthusiastic.
    The President. I'm hopeful.

[[Page 513]]

Note: The interview began at 4:20 p.m. at the Maurya Sheraton Hotel. In 
his remarks, the President referred to Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee of India; former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan; Gen. 
Pervez Musharraf, army chief of staff, who led a coup d'etat in Pakistan 
on October 12, 1999; and President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria. The 
transcript of this interview was released by the Office of the Press 
Secretary on March 22. A tape was not available for verification of the 
content of this interview.