    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (2000, Book I)]
    [March 21, 2000]
    [Pages 508-513]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Interview With Peter Jennings of ABC's
    ``World News Tonight'' in
    New Delhi
    March 21, 2000

    India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir

        Mr. Jennings. Prime Minister Vajpayee said that you will conclude,
    now that you're here, that the situation--Kashmir, between India and
    Pakistan--is not as bad as they say it is. Is that what you conclude?
        The President. Well, I think that I've concluded that he is going to do everything he can to avoid having
    it escalate into a war with Pakistan. And that is encouraging. But I
    still think it's a difficult situation, to say the least. I think it's
    important that they both show restraint. I think it's important that
    they respect the Line of Control, both sides do. And then, over the long
    run, I think what really matters, in terms of an ultimate resolution, is
    that the people of Kashmir feel that their legitimate interests are
    being addressed in some formal fashion.

    [[Page 509]]

        But I do feel better about his
    determination to avoid a war, at least what you might call a full-scale
    war. But I don't--I'm still very troubled by the fact there's so much
    violence there. A lot of it obviously is propagated beyond the borders
    of Kashmir, and I don't think the Line of Control is adequately
    respected.
        And I think--you know, what happened at Kargil was very troubling to
    me, because I supported strongly the dialog between India and Pakistan
    in the Lahore process. I still think it's a difficult situation, and I
    don't think they should take it lightly, either side.
        Mr. Jennings. Moreover, Prime Minister Vajpayee is much more
    militant with the Indian press than he was with you today.
        The President. That's good, though. That means that--maybe that
    means my trip here has a beneficial impact. And I hope I can have some
    impact on the Pakistanis when I go there.
        Mr. Jennings. What do you mean by ``impact,'' Mr. President?
        The President. You know, I spent last July 4th trying to persuade
    former Prime Minister Sharif to withdraw back
    behind the Line of Control. He did. I think it weakened him when he did,
    frankly, but it was the right thing to do.
        I think that they--these countries need to be thinking about
    reducing violence and increasing cooperation and dialog and freeing up
    their immensely talented people for different pursuits. If you look at
    how well the Indians and the Pakistani-Americans have done, how well
    they're doing in the information economy in the United States, how well
    they're beginning to do here, it's truly a tragedy that they're
    basically trapped in this position which, even if it doesn't lead to
    war, leads to big expenses on defense, which could be spent on education
    and health care or the development of a modern economy.
        So I hope that my trip here and the long-term rekindling of the
    relationship with India that I'm committed to for our country can
    basically, slowly, over time, take this in a different direction.
        Mr. Jennings. Forgive me for being more pointed. You know as well as
    I do that you're talking, to a very large extent, in generalities. What
    do you think the United States can really do here, especially given the
    fact that the Indians say the United States has no role?
        The President. Well, I think that what they say is that we have no
    role in Kashmir. And they have every right to say that. Every place in
    the world I've been involved in the peace process--you know, it's
    because we have been able to inspire the confidence and have a
    relationship with both parties.
        But I think the United States does have an interest in trying to
    avert a larger conflict and trying to reduce the tensions between the
    two countries. I think we do have a clear interest there.
        Mr. Jennings. So?
        The President. We've worked with the Pakistanis for years. We want
    it--and obviously we've got a big interest in India's future. So
    therefore, I think anything I can do to get them to focus on what it
    would take to reduce the tensions is important. And I think right now
    the important thing is respecting the Line of Control, reducing
    violence, and find a way to resume the dialog. Now, beyond that, it's up
    to them.
        Mr. Jennings. You'll tell the Pakistanis they should respect the
    Line of Control, the de facto cease-fire line?
        The President. Absolutely.
        Mr. Jennings. And what will you tell those Kashmiris, or Pakistanis,
    who believe they're fighting to free the Muslim Kashmiris from Indian
    control?
        The President. First of all, I think that--the same thing I said to
    the Indians. I don't think there can be a military solution to Kashmir.
    And the tangled history of it does not admit of a simple solution. I
    think that the best chance that the Pakistanis have, if they want to
    have a positive impact on what they believe the legitimate concerns of
    people who live in that part of Kashmir that's in India, is through a
    dialog, not through acts of violence and supporting acts of violence.
        And I think for many years they thought that might get us involved,
    and it won't. I'm not going to be dragged into something that--first of
    all, that India doesn't want us to be part of and, secondly, that I got
    dragged into from deliberate acts of violence. I just don't think that's
    right.
        Mr. Jennings. So what is America's Kashmir policy?
        The President. Our policy is: First, respect the Line of Control;
    second, do not promote violence by third parties in Kashmir; third,
    negotiate; and fourth, with respect to India, that

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    there's not a military solution to Kashmir's problems by India, either,
    that the Kashmiris deserve to have their own concerns addressed on the
    merits. But I don't think we ought to get in the position of saying that
    we think that an ethnically diverse country like India can't exist
    anymore. I don't agree with that.
        Mr. Jennings. Do you support the Kashmiris' right to a referendum on
    their own independence? Do you support the right as it was laid out by
    the United Nations in 1948, for them to have a plebiscite on their
    future?
        The President. Well, there's been a lot of changes since 1948,
    including what happened in 1971 and a number of things since. What I
    support is--I support some process by which the Kashmiris' legitimate
    grievances are addressed, and I support respecting the Line of Control.
    And I think the Pakistanis and the Indians have to have some way of
    talking about it. And the Indians have to have some way of talking to
    their own Kashmiris about it that recognizes there's not a military
    solution.
        But the most I can do right now is to oppose violence, particularly
    oppose violence propagated by third parties within Kashmir, and to
    support reaffirming the Line of Control. And Prime Minister Vajpayee
    just said today that if the Pakistanis would reaffirm the principles of
    the Lahore Declaration and not promote or support violence on the other
    side of the Line of Control and respect the Line of Control, that
    he thought a dialog could be resumed. I
    think that is the best hope, ultimately, for resolving this.
        Mr. Jennings. Who are these third parties you're referring to,
    involved in Kashmir?
        The President. Well, we know that there have been instances of
    violence within Kashmir that were propagated by people who were not from
    there, but they weren't necessarily elements of the Pakistani
    Government. I don't want to accuse Pakistan of something it didn't do.
        Mr. Jennings. Do you believe the Pakistan Intelligence Service
    facilitates the infiltration of fighters to Kashmir?
        The President. I believe that there are elements within the
    Pakistani Government that have supported those who engaged in violence
    in Kashmir.
        Mr. Jennings. And what will you tell General Musharraf about that?
        The President. Just exactly what I said to you. And I want to talk
    with him, as I did with Prime Minister Vajpayee, about the future. I think that in order to get out of
    a fix--when you get into a fix like this and you feel paralyzed by your
    past practices, the only way to change it is to have a vision of the
    future which convinces you that if you want to achieve a certain goal,
    you've got to do it in a different way. And I'll do my best to persuade
    him of that.
        I just don't think that this is the way to deal with Kashmir, and I
    don't think it's a good enough reason to drive, in effect, the whole
    existence, the whole policy of the Pakistani Government. The Pakistanis
    are great people, too. They've been good allies of ours. They've helped
    us even in my time, since the end of the cold war, to get terrorists,
    the terrorists involved--one involved in the World Trade Center, one
    involved in the CIA killing. They've helped us in other contexts. I want
    to continue to be a good ally for them. But I think they have to have a
    plan for restoring democracy, and they have to have a nonviolent plan
    for resolving their differences with India.
        Mr. Jennings. Just so I understand, then, Mr. President, you want
    the United States on the sidelines in this, giving advice but not
    involved in any three-way attempt to settle the Kashmir issue?
        The President. I don't think the United States can be involved in a
    three-way attempt to settle the Kashmir issue, unless and until they
    both want us. I think that that is the evidence--you know, if you look
    at, we're in the Middle East because they both want us, not to say that
    either side agrees with everything I say and do, but we have a certain
    credibility there born of years and years and years of labor and a
    welcoming into the process. The same thing is true in the Irish peace
    process.
        So I think that right now what I need to do is to try to convince
    both sides to avoid the worst--and there's something to be said for
    avoiding the worst here--and then to adopt some common principles which
    will allow the resumption of the dialog. If we can get them to renounce
    violence as a way of resolving this and to restore their dialog, respect
    the Line of Control so the dialog can be restored, then who knows what
    will happen and what they decide to do and how they decide to do it. But
    if they stay sort of hunkered down in unapproachable positions, then I
    think we'll have to work very hard to avoid a more difficult situation.

    [[Page 511]]

    Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

        Mr. Jennings. I have a nuclear question. The United States tells
    people in the rest of the world to be like us. And the Indians say,
    ``Right. We're just like you. We're a democracy. We're a free-market
    economy, and we have nuclear weapons in order to protect our national
    security.'' What's wrong with that?
        The President. Well, what's wrong with it is that we're trying to
    lead the world away from nuclear power and away from the threat of
    nuclear war. And when the Indians took this position, they basically
    said, ``We don't think we can be secure without nuclear weapons, and
    it's our right as a great nation to have them.''
        And we, first of all, don't believe it does; we don't believe it
    enhances their security. We think countries like Brazil, Argentina,
    South Africa, South Korea, that walked away from the prospect of nuclear
    programs, are more secure and have more funds to support their own
    national security and the development of their people and their economy.
    And we believe that it sends a bad signal when a great democracy like
    India, in effect, is telling the world that we ought to get into another
    arms race.
        I've tried to reduce the arms of the United States. I hope this year
    we'll make another effort to reduce the arms of the United States and
    the arms of Russia. I've tried to support the Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the restriction of the
    distribution of fissile material.
        So I think India--it sounds great to say, ``Well, the United States
    has nuclear weapons, and they're a democracy. We ought to.'' But if you
    look at the whole history of this thing, what they're saying is, ``We
    want to reverse the move toward reducing the nuclear threat because we
    say we ought to have nuclear weapons.''
        Mr. Jennings. Well, they also say, sir, that these are weapons of
    self-esteem and this is a U.S.----
        The President. Self-esteem, that's right. If they're weapons of
    self-esteem for India, then every nation in the entire world has the
    same right to self-esteem. So therefore, however many countries there
    are in the world, everyone that can afford one ought to have a nuclear
    weapon. I do not believe that that would make the world safer. I believe
    that that would make the world more dangerous.
        So I respect what the Indians say. They say, ``Look, it's not just
    Pakistan. China has nuclear weapons. You know, it wasn't so many decades
    ago we had a border war with China. We have our problems there.'' But I
    think that most people believe--and have studied this believe that all
    nations would be more secure if we reduce the overall nuclear threat and
    reduce the number of people that had access to nuclear weapons.
        And also keep in mind, the more nuclear weapons you have, the more
    nuclear material you have, the more risk you have that that nuclear
    material will be subject to pilfering. So you have to worry about--not
    only about other states becoming nuclear states but even terrorists
    getting ahold of small-scale nuclear weapons. I just think that it takes
    the world in the wrong direction. It's an honest disagreement we have
    with the Indians.
        Mr. Jennings. Yes, because the Indians say to you, ``You Americans
    say well, you just don't trust us''----
        The President. That's not true.
        Mr. Jennings. ----``It's okay for you, but you don't trust us.''
        The President. No, that's not true. Actually, I do trust them. I
    believe Prime Minister Vajpayee when he
    says, ``I will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.'' So it's not
    a question of trust.
        What I don't agree with is that a country needs nuclear weapons to
    manifest its esteem or its national greatness. Nor do I agree that India
    is actually more secure with these nuclear weapons. I think that in some
    ways it reduces one's security.
        Mr. Jennings. Trust the Pakistanis with control of nuclear weapons,
    too?
        The President. I feel the same way about them. I think--they
    probably think they have a better argument since they know they couldn't
    win a conventional war with India, because India is so much bigger and
    because Lahore, for example, one of the most important places, is so
    close to the Indian border.
        But it just seems to me--again, if you look at--if you ask yourself,
    where is there greater security? In Brazil, in Argentina, or even in
    South Africa, or even in South Korea, where they renounced nuclear
    weapons? Are those people less secure than the people of Pakistan and
    India? I think you would have to say they are not less secure.

    [[Page 512]]

        So my argument is, any country can say to us, any country,
    particularly another democracy, ``Oh, you're a hypocrite. You've got
    nuclear weapons. You don't want us to have any.'' Well, I'm trying to
    reduce the store of nuclear weapons the United States has, the store
    Russia has. The Russians have supported this. And we're trying to make
    the world more stable.
        I just think--I don't think they're more secure by having nuclear
    weapons.

    Cancellation of Visit to Joypura, Bangladesh

        Mr. Jennings. On the subject of security, I'm really curious. You
    travel all the time in this extraordinarily tight security envelope. And
    yet, it wasn't secure enough yesterday to go to a small village in
    Bangladesh. Did you really feel a personal risk in Bangladesh? Did you
    end up telling Chelsea, or, if you talked to her, Mrs. Clinton, ``I'm
    going off on a trip in which I am at personal risk''?
        The President. Well, I think it's better for me not to discuss it,
    except to say this. Insofar as there was a risk, it had nothing to do
    with the Bangladeshis, nothing to do with the Government or the people
    of Bangladesh, and they were not in any way at fault. I did my best to
    take account of the analysis of our security people and to act
    accordingly, and it worked out just fine. We had a wonderful trip.

    President's Security

        Mr. Jennings. Do you ever have your way with the security people?
        The President. Do you mean, do I ever disagree with them?
        Mr. Jennings. No. Do you ever have your way?
        The President. What do you mean?
        Mr. Jennings. In other ways, do you ever have your--you can disagree
    with them; do you ever prevail?
        The President. Sometimes I do. I have from time to time disagreed
    with them and actually done what I wanted to do. But when that happens,
    I try to do it the way they want to do it, because if I disagree with
    them, I realize I've assumed a greater risk, and I should do it in the
    way they want to do it.

    Middle East Peace Process

        Mr. Jennings. Last question, sir. You're going to see President Asad
    in Geneva on Sunday. That's a pretty big meeting. Does this mean a deal
    is close?
        The President. I wouldn't say that. But I will say this. Ever since
    they met in Shepherdstown the first of the year, and then the talks sort
    of were stalled, I've been working very hard with both sides. I now
    think I'm in a position to have a sense of what it will take for both
    sides to get an agreement. So it's an appropriate time for me to discuss
    this with President Asad, in the hope that we
    can start the talks again.
        I'm encouraged by the decisions that have been made by the Israelis
    and the Palestinians. I think they are committed to going forward, and
    they have a pretty good timetable. They're going to have to work hard to
    make it. And I think that the only way we'll ever have this thing the
    way it ought to be in the Middle East is to finish with the Syrians and
    then with the Lebanese, as well.
        So I think this is time. Whether it will lead to a breakthrough, I
    don't know. I hope it will lead to a resumption of talks.
        Mr. Jennings. Is it safe to assume that President Asad doesn't leave
    the country easily and would not agree to go to Geneva to see you were
    you not to have something pretty good to offer?
        The President. I think it's safe to assume that I wouldn't waste
    his time, either. I think that we have--it's
    time for us to talk about what we think it would take to resume these
    talks and move to a resolution. And I'm going to give him my honest
    opinion about where we are and where I think we can go. And then we just
    need to make a decision, all of us, about whether to go forward. But
    principally, it's a decision for the Israelis and the Syrians.
        Mr. Jennings. Does this involve a comprehensive settlement, one that
    involves the Syrian Golan Heights, the Israelis, and the Israeli
    withdrawal from Lebanon?
        The President. Well, I want to talk to President Asad. There isn't an agreement, yet. But if there is an
    agreement, I would hope it would lead to a resolution of both the Syrian
    issues and the Lebanese issues, which is very important in Israel. The
    Israelis care a lot about that, and well they should. And of course, the
    Lebanese do. We'll see. Keep your fingers crossed
        Mr. Jennings. You're enthusiastic.
        The President. I'm hopeful.

    [[Page 513]]

    Note: The interview began at 4:20 p.m. at the Maurya Sheraton Hotel. In
    his remarks, the President referred to Prime Minister Atal Behari
    Vajpayee of India; former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan; Gen.
    Pervez Musharraf, army chief of staff, who led a coup d'etat in Pakistan
    on October 12, 1999; and President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria. The
    transcript of this interview was released by the Office of the Press
    Secretary on March 22. A tape was not available for verification of the
    content of this interview.