[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1999, Book II)]
[November 10, 1999]
[Pages 2050-2057]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction
November 10, 1999

To the Congress of the United States:
    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each 
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the 
Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I 
am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, 
November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 1998, must 
continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999. Accordingly, I have 
extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as 
amended.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and 
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), 
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency 
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in 
the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and 
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most 
recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of 
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 
of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of 
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more 
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4 
strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The 
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject 
entities to potential penalties under the Executive order. The original 
Executive order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts 
of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, 
produce, or stockpile chemical or biological

[[Page 2051]]

weapons; the amended Executive order also covers contributions to 
foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands 
the original Executive order to include attempts to contribute to 
foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and 
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include the 
prohibition of U.S. Government assistance to foreign persons, and the 
prohibition of imports into the United States and U.S. Government 
procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government 
greater flexibility and discretion in deciding how and to what extent to 
impose measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation 
programs.

Nuclear Weapons

    In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear 
tests. World reaction included nearly universal condemnation across a 
broad range of international fora and multilateral support for a broad 
range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by 
international financial institutions unrelated to basic human needs and 
on aid from the G-8 and other countries.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have 
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the 
United Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps 
toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join 
multilateral arms control efforts and to conform to the standards of 
nonproliferation regimes, to prevent a regional arms race and build 
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve 
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security 
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of 
concrete actions. The United States has focused most intensely on 
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an 
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); engagement in productive 
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending 
their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in 
development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and 
adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of 
sensitive materials and technology.
    Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and 
Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials 
have yielded little progress. In September 1998, Indian and Pakistani 
leaders had expressed a willingness to sign the CTBT. Both governments, 
having already declared testing moratoria, had indicated they were 
prepared to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions. 
These declarations were made prior to the collapse of Prime Minister 
Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, a development that has 
delayed consideration of CTBT signature in India. The Indian election, 
the Kargil conflict, and the October political coup in Pakistan have 
further complicated the issue, although neither country has renounced 
its commitment. Pakistan has said that it will not sign the Treaty until 
India does. Additionally, Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated publicly on 
September 12, 1999, that Pakistan would not consider signing the CTBT 
until sanctions are removed.
    India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on 
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament 
session. However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 and 
we have no indications that India or Pakistan played helpful ``behind 
the scenes'' roles. They also pledged to institute strict controls that 
meet internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and have 
begun expert discussions with the United States and others on this 
subject. In addition, India and Pakistan resumed their bilateral 
dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign 
Secretary level. The Kargil conflict this summer complicated efforts to 
continue this bilateral dialogue, although both sides have expressed 
interest in resuming the discussions at some future point. We will 
continue discussions with both governments at the senior and expert 
levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in 
international fora. Efforts may be further complicated by India's 
release in August 1999 of a draft of its nuclear doctrine, which, 
although its timing may have been politically motivated, suggests that 
India intends to make nuclear weapons an integral part of the national 
defense.
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) 
continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities consistent with

[[Page 2052]]

the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which calls for the immediate 
freezing and eventual dismantling of the DPRK's graphite-moderated 
reactors and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United 
States has raised its concerns with the DPRK about a suspect underground 
site under construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities 
contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United States 
reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a team of U.S. experts to 
the facility. In May 1999, a Department of State team visited the 
underground facility at Kumchang-ni. The team was permitted to conduct 
all activities previously agreed to help remove suspicions about the 
site. Based on the data gathered by the U.S. delegation and the 
subsequent technical review, the United States has concluded that, at 
present, the underground site does not violate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed 
Framework.
    The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full compliance 
with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a process that also 
includes the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea. United 
States experts remain onsite in North Korea working to complete clean-up 
operations after largely finishing the canning of spent fuel from the 
North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone on the 
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In May 1999, NPT Parties met in 
New York to complete preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 
The United States is working with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and 
viable part of the global security system.
    The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
on September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed and 51 have 
ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories conducted numerous 
meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to 
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) 
established by the Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held 
pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the 
entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that 
conference as an observer.
    On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, 
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret 
the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse its consent to 
ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security 
interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the 
development of advanced new types of weapons; contribute to the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT 
marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and 
to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at an 
appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in a manner 
that will ensure a fair and thorough hearing process and will allow for 
more thoughtful debate.
    With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely 
accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement. At its May 
1999 Plenary and related meetings in Florence, Italy, the NSG considered 
new members (although none were accepted at that meeting), reviewed 
efforts to enhance transparency, and pursued efforts to streamline 
procedures and update control lists. The NSG created an Implementation 
Working Group, chaired by the UK, to consider changes to the guidelines, 
membership issues, the relationship with the NPT Exporters (Zangger) 
Committee, and controls on brokering. The Transparency Working Group was 
tasked with preparing a report on NSG activities for presentation at the 
2000 NPT Review Conference by the Italian chair. The French will host 
the Plenary and assume the NSG Chair in 2000 and the United States will 
host and chair in 2001.
    The NSG is currently considering membership requests from Turkey and 
Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only agreement by Russia to join 
the intercessional consensus of all other NSG members. The United States 
believes it would be appropriate to confirm intercessional consensus in 
support of Turkey's membership before considering other candidates. 
Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and other members 
including Russia and the United States regarding its interest in 
membership and the status of its implementation of export controls to 
meet NSG Guideline standards. The United States will not block 
intercessional consensus of NSG members in support of NSG membership for 
Belarus, provided that

[[Page 2053]]

consensus for Turkey's membership precedes it. Cyprus and Kazakhstan 
have also expressed interest in membership and are in consultation with 
the NSG Chair and other members regarding the status of their export 
control systems. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a 
member of the NSG, primarily because it has not accepted the NSG policy 
of requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear 
trigger list items to nonnuclear weapon states. However, China has taken 
major steps toward harmonization of its export control system with the 
NSG Guidelines by the implementation of controls over nuclear-related 
dual-use equipment and technology.
    During the last 6-months, we reviewed intelligence and other reports 
of trade in nuclear-related material and technology that might be 
relevant to nuclear-related sanctions provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act of 
1945, as amended; and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. 
No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting 
period. The administrative measures imposed against ten Russian entities 
for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation with Iran remain 
in effect.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and 
continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce, in consultation 
with other agencies, in order to control the export of items with 
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States 
Signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among 
their number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified 
the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 
1997. To date, 126 countries (including China, Iran, India, Pakistan, 
and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization For the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at entry-into-
force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in 
The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for 
implementing the CWC. It consists of the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). 
The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently 
has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained 
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout 
the world. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 500 routine inspections 
in some 29 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken place. To 
date, nearly 170 inspections have been conducted at military facilities 
in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence 
at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah and Johnston 
Island.
    The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for 
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related 
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of 
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide 
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus 
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more 
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was 
enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). My Administration published an Executive 
order on June 25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and is 
working to publish regulations regarding industrial declarations and 
inspections of industrial facilities. Submission of these declarations 
to the OPCW, and subsequent inspections, will enable the United States 
to be fully compliant with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date 
has, among other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organization 
as well as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make 
complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and prohibited by the

[[Page 2054]]

CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. The 
relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed to penalize 
countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the 
threat of chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in the 
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). 
We participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties 
striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and 
enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons 
Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 
BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in 
November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon 
as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in 
2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of 
national views and clarification of existing text. Five AHG negotiating 
sessions were scheduled for 1999. The United States is working toward 
completion of the substance of a strong Protocol next year.
    On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, I 
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the effort 
to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and 
use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to 
detect and deter cheating. The United States is working closely with 
U.S. industry representatives to obtain technical input relevant to the 
development of U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach 
international agreement on data declarations and onsite investigations.
    The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 30-
member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons 
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent 
annual AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, during which the Group 
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the Group's 
viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members 
continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all 
governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on 
chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national activities 
support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary, the Group continued to focus 
on strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address 
the threat of CBW terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to 
continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, 
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and 
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national 
policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in 
stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and 
technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 
1991. No new sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting 
period. The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG 
partners and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation 
concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States continues carefully to control exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, 
and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation 
concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In 
March 1999, we imposed missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern 
entities for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I missile sanctions imposed in April 
1998 against North Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from 
North Korea to Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the 
Ghauri missile remain in effect.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share 
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other 
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also 
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems. 
This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related 
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
    In June the United States participated in the MTCR's Reinforced 
Point of Contact Meeting

[[Page 2055]]

(RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners held in-depth discussions of regional 
missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on Iran, North 
Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed steps Partners can take to 
further increase outreach to nonmembers. The Partners agreed to continue 
their discussion of this important topic at the October 1999 Noordwijk 
MTCR Plenary.
    Also in June, the United States participated in a German-hosted MTCR 
workshop at which Partners and non-Partners discussed ways to address 
the proliferation potential inherent in intangible technology transfers. 
The seminar helped participants to develop a greater understanding of 
the intangible technology issue (i.e., how proliferators misuse the 
internet, scientific conferences, plant visits, student exchange 
programs, and higher education to acquire sensitive technology), and to 
begin to identify steps governments can take to address this problem.
    In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the MTCR 
Annex. The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve clarity and 
uniformity of implementation of MTCR controls while maintaining the 
coverage of the previous version of the MTCR Annex.
    The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, The 
Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners shared 
information about activities of missile proliferation concern worldwide. 
They focussed in particular on the threat to international security and 
stability posed by missile proliferation in key regions and considered 
what practical steps they could take, individually and collectively, to 
address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. During their 
discussions, Partners gave special attention to DPRK missile activities 
and also discussed the threat posed by missile-related activities in 
South and North East Asia and the Middle East.
    During this reporting period, the United States continued to work 
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat 
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly 
and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage international focus 
on missile proliferation issues, the USG also placed the issue on the 
agenda for the G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in an undertaking to examine 
further individual and collective means of addressing this problem and 
reaffirming commitment to the objectives of the MTCR. Since my last 
report, we continued our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China 
(interrupted after the accidental bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy), 
India, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In 
the course of normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such 
discussions with other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the 
Middle East.
    In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth round of 
missile talks to underscore our strong opposition to North Korea's 
destabilizing missile development and export activities and press for 
tight constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. We 
also affirmed that the United States viewed further launches of long-
range missiles and transfers of long-range missiles or technology for 
such missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the 
United States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that message at 
every available opportunity. In particular, we have reminded the DPRK of 
the consequences of another rocket launch and encouraged it not to take 
such action. We also have urged the DPRK to take steps toward building a 
constructive bilateral relationship with the United States.
    These efforts have resulted in an important first step. Since 
September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK will refrain 
from testing long-range missiles of any kind during our discussions to 
improve relations. In recognition of this DPRK step, the United States 
has announced the easing of certain sanctions related to the import and 
export of many consumer goods.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire 
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and 
nuclear development programs, the United States continued its high-level 
dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia 
can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's 
ballistic missile development program. During this reporting period, 
Russia's government created institutional foundations to implement a 
newly enacted nonproliferation policy and passed laws to punish 
wrongdoers. It also passed new export control legislation to tighten 
government control over sensitive technologies and began working with 
the United States to strengthen export control practices at Russian 
aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian government's 
nonproliferation and export control

[[Page 2056]]

efforts, some Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's 
ballistic missile program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran 
beyond the Bushehr reactor project. The administrative measures imposed 
on ten Russian entities for their missile- and nuclear-related 
cooperation with Iran remain in effect.

Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

    United States national export controls--both those implemented 
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented 
unilaterally--play an important part in impeding the proliferation of 
WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export controls'' refer to 
requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations 
on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to certain 
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that 
also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, export controls 
are only one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its 
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation norms, informal 
multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdicting shipments of 
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance, redirection 
and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and 
diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls as 
part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
    Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because 
every proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology 
from other countries. Proliferators look overseas because needed items 
are unavailable elsewhere, because indigenously produced items are of 
insufficient quality or quantity, and/or because imported items can be 
obtained more quickly and cheaply than producing them at home. It is 
important to note that proliferators seek for their programs both items 
on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and 
nerve gas ingredients on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items 
(like lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, 
many of the items of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. 
For example, key ingredients and technologies used in the production of 
fertilizers and pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons; 
vaccine production technology (albeit not the vaccines themselves) can 
assist in the production of biological weapons.
    The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or even 
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology 
for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national 
export controls--and similar controls of our partners in the Australia 
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--
have denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best 
equipment and technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek 
less capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many 
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have forced 
proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements even from 
nonmember suppliers, taking time and money away from proliferant 
programs.
    United States national export controls and those of our regime 
partners also have played an important leadership role, increasing over 
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation export 
controls. For example, none of the following progress would have been 
possible without the leadership shown by U.S. willingness to be the 
first to apply controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 
member countries; several nonmember countries have been persuaded to 
apply export controls consistent with one or more of the regimes 
unilaterally; and most of the members of the nonproliferation regimes 
have applied national ``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the 
U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. (Export controls 
normally are tied to a specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. 
``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items 
not on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile programs.)
    United States export controls, especially ``catch-all'' controls, 
also make important political and moral contributions to the 
nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal obligations the 
United States has undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(Article I), Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical 
Weapons Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD 
activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' 
on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our 
friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely 
and unambiguously against WMD/missile proliferation, even against the 
prospect of

[[Page 2057]]

inadvertent proliferation from the United States itself.
    Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and 
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use 
export to proceed under circumstances where, without export control 
scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help 
build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in 
turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation 
regimes, for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each 
member not to make an export that another has denied for 
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it first 
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy 
make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime 
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for exporters.

Threat Reduction

    The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise 
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia 
and other Newly Independent States, causing concern. My Administration 
gives high priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation 
through programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons 
scientists to civilian research and technology development activities. I 
have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the 
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative that would support activities in 
four areas: nuclear security; nonnuclear WMD; science and technology 
nonproliferation; and military relocation, stabilization and other 
security cooperation programs. Congressional support for this initiative 
would enable the engagement of a broad range of programs under the 
Departments of State, Energy, and Defense.

Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641 (c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during 
the period from May 15, 1999, through November 10, 1999.

                                                      William J. Clinton

The White House,

November 10, 1999.

Note: The notice of November 10 is listed in Appendix D at the end of 
this volume.