[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1999, Book II)]
[October 5, 1999]
[Pages 1685-1688]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2000
October 5, 1999

    Today I have signed into law S. 1059, the ``National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.'' This Act authorizes FY 2000 
appropriations for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
military construction, and defense activities of the Department of 
Energy. Although I have serious reservations about some portions of this 
Act, I believe S. 1059 provides for a strong national defense, maintains 
our military readiness, and supports our deep commitment to a better 
quality of life for our military personnel and their families.
    The more we ask of our Armed Forces, the greater our obligation to 
give them the support, training, and equipment they need. We have a 
responsibility to give them the tools to take on new missions while 
maintaining their readiness to defend our country and defeat any 
adversary; to make sure they can deploy away from home, knowing their 
families have the quality of life they deserve; to attract talented 
young Americans to serve; and to make certain their service is not only 
rewarding, but well rewarded--from recruitment to retirement.
    This Act helps us meet that responsibility. It endorses my 
comprehensive program of improvements to military pay and retirement 
benefits, which add up to the largest increase in military compensation 
in a generation. The Act increases bonuses for enlistment and 
reenlistment, providing incentives needed to recruit and retain skilled 
and motivated personnel and to maintain readiness.
    The Act also helps make good on my pledge to keep our Armed Forces 
the best equipped fighting force on earth. It carries forward our 
modernization program by funding the F-22 stealth fighter, the V-22 
Osprey, the Comanche helicopter, advanced destroyers, submarines and 
amphibious ships, and a new generation of precision munitions. I commend 
the Congress for recognizing the need to improve the way we dispose of 
property at closing military bases. In April of this year, I requested 
the authority to transfer former military base property to communities 
at no cost if they use the property for job-generating economic 
development. This new policy of no-cost Economic Development Conveyances 
will allow us to speed the transfer of such property to local 
communities and minimize the time that the property lies fallow. In this 
way, we can give an economic jump start to affected communities and help 
to stimulate the investments necessary to attract new job-creating 
businesses.

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    I am pleased with the Act's support for missile defense 
capabilities. The Act authorizes important funding for both theater and 
national missile defense. I am particularly pleased that the Act 
authorizes full funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System 
cooperative program with Germany and Italy, authorizes funding for 
national missile defense military construction planning and design, and 
helps fix cost growth problems in the Patriot Advance Capability-3 and 
Navy Area Defense programs. The Act's requirement to develop Theater 
High Altitude Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide systems concurrently is 
being taken into account in the Department's review of its acquisition 
strategy for these upper-tier programs.
    Although I believe most provisions of the Act--especially the 
quality of life enhancements--are beneficial and support a strong 
national defense, I have strong reservations about a number of 
provisions of S. 1059.
    The most troubling features of the Act involve the reorganization of 
the nuclear defense functions within the Department of Energy. The 
original reorganization plan adopted by the Senate reflected a 
constructive effort to strengthen the effectiveness and security of the 
activities of the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories. 
Unfortunately, the success of this effort is jeopardized by changes that 
emerged from the conference, which altered the final product, making it 
weaker in enhancing national security. Particularly objectionable are 
features of the legislative charter of the new National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) that purport to isolate personnel and contractors 
of the NNSA from outside direction, and limit the Secretary's ability to 
employ his authorities to direct--both personally and through 
subordinates of his own choosing--the activities and personnel of the 
NNSA. Unaddressed, these deficiencies of the Act would impair effective 
health and safety oversight and program direction of the Department's 
nuclear defense complex.
    Other provisions of S. 1059 have been faulted by the Attorneys 
General of over 40 States as placing in question the established duty of 
the Department of Energy's nuclear defense complex to comply with the 
procedural and substantive requirements of environmental laws. Moreover, 
the Act removes from the Secretary his direct authority over certain 
extremely sensitive classified programs specified in the Atomic Energy 
Act, and establishes in the NNSA separate support functions--such as 
contracting, personnel, public affairs, and legal--that are redundant 
with those now within the Department. This redundancy even extends to 
the counterintelligence office reporting directly to the Secretary that 
was established in accordance with my Presidential Decision Directive 
61, and which was designed to be the single authoritative source of 
counterintelligence guidance throughout the Department. The Act 
establishes a companion counterintelligence entity within the NNSA, 
compounding simple redundancy with the blurring of lines of authority 
that can too readily result because the NNSA is largely immunized from 
outside direction within the Department.
    Experience teaches that these are not abstract deficiencies. As the 
Hoover Commission concluded half a century ago, the accountability of a 
Cabinet Department head is not complete without the legal authority to 
meet the legal responsibilities for which that person is accountable. 
The Act's provisions summarized above skew that authority. These 
provisions blur the clear and unambiguous lines of authority intended by 
Presidential Decision Directive 61, and impair the Secretary of Energy's 
ability to assure compliance at all levels within the Department of 
Energy with instructions he may receive in meeting his national defense 
responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act.
    The responsibilities placed by S. 1059 in the National Nuclear 
Security Administration potentially are of the most significant breadth, 
and the extent of the Secretary of Energy's authority with respect to 
those responsibilities is placed in doubt by various provisions of the 
Act. Therefore, by this Statement I direct and state the following:
    1. Until further notice, the Secretary of Energy shall perform all 
duties and functions of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.
    2. The Secretary is instructed to guide and direct all personnel of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration by using his authority, to 
the extent permissible by law, to assign any Departmental officer or 
employee to a concurrent office within the NNSA.
    3. The Secretary is further directed to carry out the foregoing 
instructions in a manner that assures the Act is not asserted as having 
altered the environmental compliance requirements,

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both procedural and substantive, previously imposed by Federal law on 
all the Department's activities.
    4. In carrying out these instructions, the Secretary shall, to the 
extent permissible under law, mitigate the risks to clear chain of 
command presented by the Act's establishment of other redundant 
functions by the NNSA. He shall also carry out these instructions to 
enable research entities, other than those of the Department's nuclear 
defense complex that fund research by the weapons laboratories, to 
continue to govern conduct of the research they have commissioned.
    5. I direct the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to 
work expeditiously with the Secretary of Energy to facilitate any 
administrative actions that may be necessary to enable the Secretary to 
carry out the instructions in this Statement.
    The expansive national security responsibilities now apparently 
contemplated by the Act for the new Under Secretary for Nuclear Security 
make selection of a nominee an especially weighty judgment. Legislative 
action by the Congress to remedy the deficiencies described above and to 
harmonize the Secretary of Energy's authorities with those of the new 
Under Secretary that will be in charge of the NNSA will help identify an 
appropriately qualified nominee. The actions directed in this Statement 
shall remain in force, to continue until further notice.
    I am concerned with the tone and language of a number of provisions 
of S. 1059 relating to China, which could be detrimental to our 
interests.
    China is undergoing a profoundly important but uncertain process of 
change, and I believe we must work for the best possible outcome, even 
as we prepare for any outcome. The Act's provision requiring annual 
reports on Chinese military power, similar to those previously produced 
on Soviet military power, assumes an outcome that is far from 
foreordained--that China is bent on becoming a military threat to the 
United States. I believe we should not make it more likely that China 
will choose this path by acting as if the decision has already been 
made. The provision establishing the Center for Study of Chinese 
Military Affairs is troubling for the same reason. The Secretary of 
Defense will ensure that the Center is held to the highest standards of 
scholarship and impartiality and that it explores a wide range of 
perspectives on the Chinese military.
    Our long-term strategy must be to encourage China to grow into a 
more prosperous and open society; to integrate China into the 
institutions that promote global norms on proliferation, trade, the 
environment, and human rights; to cooperate where we agree, even as we 
defend our interests and values with realism and candor where we do not. 
We cannot do that simply by confronting China or seeking to contain it. 
We can only do that if we maintain a policy of principled, purposeful 
engagement with China's government and China's people.
    I intend to implement the China provisions of the bill in a manner 
consistent with this policy, including, where appropriate, combining 
several of the reporting requirements.
    Further, I am disappointed that S. 1059 contains damaging 
restrictions on our threat reduction programs in the former Soviet 
Union. Since 1992, these programs have helped to deactivate almost 5,000 
nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union; eliminate nuclear weapons 
from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; strengthen the security of 
nuclear weapons and materials at over 100 sites in the region; tighten 
export controls and detect illicit trafficking; engage over 30,000 
former weapons scientists in civilian research; and purchase hundreds of 
tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian weapons.
    Restrictions on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and new 
certification requirements on the Nuclear Cities Initiative threaten to 
slow the pace of Russian disarmament, which is contrary to our national 
interests. I urge that future appropriations for the Nuclear Cities 
Initiative not be conditioned on this certification. I also urge the 
Congress to reverse its current ban on chemical weapons destruction 
assistance to Russia.
    In order to avoid any confusion among our allies or elsewhere 
regarding the new NATO Strategic Concept, I feel compelled to make clear 
that the document is a political, not a legal, document. As such, the 
Strategic Concept does not create any new commitment or obligation 
within my understanding of section 1221(a) of the Act, and therefore, 
will not be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
    I am concerned about section 1232, which contains a funding 
limitation with respect to continuous deployment of United States Armed

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Forces in Haiti pursuant to Operation Uphold Democracy. I have decided 
to terminate the continuous deployment of forces in Haiti, and I intend 
to keep the Congress informed with respect to any future deployments to 
Haiti; however, I will interpret this provision consistent with my 
constitutional responsibilities as President and Commander in Chief.
    A number of other provisions of this bill raise serious 
constitutional concerns. Because the President is the Commander in Chief 
and the Chief Executive under the Constitution, the Congress may not 
interfere with the President's duty to protect classified and other 
sensitive national security information or his responsibility to control 
the disclosure of such information by subordinate officials of the 
executive branch (sections 1042, 3150, and 3164). Furthermore, because 
the Constitution vests the conduct of foreign affairs in the President, 
the Congress may not direct that the President initiate discussions or 
negotiations with foreign governments (section 1407 and 1408). Nor may 
the Congress unduly restrict the President's constitutional appointment 
authority by limiting the President's selection to individuals 
recommended by a subordinate officer (section 557). To the extent that 
these provisions conflict with my constitutional responsibilities in 
these areas, I will construe them where possible to avoid such 
conflicts, and where it is impossible to do so, I will treat them as 
advisory. I hereby direct all executive branch officials to do likewise.
    Finally, S. 1059 provides for participation in the Thrift Savings 
Plan by full-time members of the uniformed services and reservists, but 
subject to my proposing and the Congress' passage of separate 
legislation to pay for the costs of their participation. I shall 
consider this proposal when determining my Fiscal Year 2001 Budget.
    Notwithstanding the concerns noted above, I believe that the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as a whole, 
will enhance our national security and help us achieve our military and 
related defense objectives. By providing the necessary support for our 
forces, it will ensure continued U.S. global leadership well into the 
21st century.

                                                      William J. Clinton

The White House,

October 5, 1999.

Note: S. 1059, approved October 5, was assigned Public Law No. 106-65.