    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1999, Book II)]
    [November 10, 1999]
    [Pages 2050-2057]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Weapons of
    Mass Destruction
    November 10, 1999

    To the Congress of the United States:
        On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
    of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
    destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
    issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
    the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
    seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
    its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each
    anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the
    Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
    delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
    national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I
    am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency
    declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995,
    November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 1998, must
    continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999. Accordingly, I have
    extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as
    amended.
        The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
    section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
    regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
    declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
    and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in
    the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and
    Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
    provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
    102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most
    recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of
    the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
    of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
        On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of
    Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more
    effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass
    destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4
    strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The
    amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject
    entities to potential penalties under the Executive order. The original
    Executive order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts
    of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, design,
    produce, or stockpile chemical or biological

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    weapons; the amended Executive order also covers contributions to
    foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of
    delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands
    the original Executive order to include attempts to contribute to
    foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and
    broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include the
    prohibition of U.S. Government assistance to foreign persons, and the
    prohibition of imports into the United States and U.S. Government
    procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government
    greater flexibility and discretion in deciding how and to what extent to
    impose measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation
    programs.

    Nuclear Weapons

        In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear
    tests. World reaction included nearly universal condemnation across a
    broad range of international fora and multilateral support for a broad
    range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by
    international financial institutions unrelated to basic human needs and
    on aid from the G-8 and other countries.
        Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have
    worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the
    United Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps
    toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join
    multilateral arms control efforts and to conform to the standards of
    nonproliferation regimes, to prevent a regional arms race and build
    confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve
    their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security
    Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of
    concrete actions. The United States has focused most intensely on
    several objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an
    end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional ratification of the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); engagement in productive
    negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending
    their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for
    nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in
    development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and
    adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of
    sensitive materials and technology.
        Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and
    Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials
    have yielded little progress. In September 1998, Indian and Pakistani
    leaders had expressed a willingness to sign the CTBT. Both governments,
    having already declared testing moratoria, had indicated they were
    prepared to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions.
    These declarations were made prior to the collapse of Prime Minister
    Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, a development that has
    delayed consideration of CTBT signature in India. The Indian election,
    the Kargil conflict, and the October political coup in Pakistan have
    further complicated the issue, although neither country has renounced
    its commitment. Pakistan has said that it will not sign the Treaty until
    India does. Additionally, Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated publicly on
    September 12, 1999, that Pakistan would not consider signing the CTBT
    until sanctions are removed.
        India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on
    an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament
    session. However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 and
    we have no indications that India or Pakistan played helpful ``behind
    the scenes'' roles. They also pledged to institute strict controls that
    meet internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and have
    begun expert discussions with the United States and others on this
    subject. In addition, India and Pakistan resumed their bilateral
    dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign
    Secretary level. The Kargil conflict this summer complicated efforts to
    continue this bilateral dialogue, although both sides have expressed
    interest in resuming the discussions at some future point. We will
    continue discussions with both governments at the senior and expert
    levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in
    international fora. Efforts may be further complicated by India's
    release in August 1999 of a draft of its nuclear doctrine, which,
    although its timing may have been politically motivated, suggests that
    India intends to make nuclear weapons an integral part of the national
    defense.
        The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)
    continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities consistent with

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    the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which calls for the immediate
    freezing and eventual dismantling of the DPRK's graphite-moderated
    reactors and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United
    States has raised its concerns with the DPRK about a suspect underground
    site under construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities
    contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United States
    reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a team of U.S. experts to
    the facility. In May 1999, a Department of State team visited the
    underground facility at Kumchang-ni. The team was permitted to conduct
    all activities previously agreed to help remove suspicions about the
    site. Based on the data gathered by the U.S. delegation and the
    subsequent technical review, the United States has concluded that, at
    present, the underground site does not violate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed
    Framework.
        The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full compliance
    with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a process that also
    includes the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea. United
    States experts remain onsite in North Korea working to complete clean-up
    operations after largely finishing the canning of spent fuel from the
    North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
        The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone on the
    global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In May 1999, NPT Parties met in
    New York to complete preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
    The United States is working with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT
    Review Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and
    viable part of the global security system.
        The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
    on September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed and 51 have
    ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories conducted numerous
    meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to
    promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS)
    established by the Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held
    pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the
    entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that
    conference as an observer.
        On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
    requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret
    the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse its consent to
    ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security
    interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
    development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the
    development of advanced new types of weapons; contribute to the
    prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
    disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
    marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and
    to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at an
    appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in a manner
    that will ensure a fair and thorough hearing process and will allow for
    more thoughtful debate.
        With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely
    accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement. At its May
    1999 Plenary and related meetings in Florence, Italy, the NSG considered
    new members (although none were accepted at that meeting), reviewed
    efforts to enhance transparency, and pursued efforts to streamline
    procedures and update control lists. The NSG created an Implementation
    Working Group, chaired by the UK, to consider changes to the guidelines,
    membership issues, the relationship with the NPT Exporters (Zangger)
    Committee, and controls on brokering. The Transparency Working Group was
    tasked with preparing a report on NSG activities for presentation at the
    2000 NPT Review Conference by the Italian chair. The French will host
    the Plenary and assume the NSG Chair in 2000 and the United States will
    host and chair in 2001.
        The NSG is currently considering membership requests from Turkey and
    Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only agreement by Russia to join
    the intercessional consensus of all other NSG members. The United States
    believes it would be appropriate to confirm intercessional consensus in
    support of Turkey's membership before considering other candidates.
    Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and other members
    including Russia and the United States regarding its interest in
    membership and the status of its implementation of export controls to
    meet NSG Guideline standards. The United States will not block
    intercessional consensus of NSG members in support of NSG membership for
    Belarus, provided that

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    consensus for Turkey's membership precedes it. Cyprus and Kazakhstan
    have also expressed interest in membership and are in consultation with
    the NSG Chair and other members regarding the status of their export
    control systems. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a
    member of the NSG, primarily because it has not accepted the NSG policy
    of requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear
    trigger list items to nonnuclear weapon states. However, China has taken
    major steps toward harmonization of its export control system with the
    NSG Guidelines by the implementation of controls over nuclear-related
    dual-use equipment and technology.
        During the last 6-months, we reviewed intelligence and other reports
    of trade in nuclear-related material and technology that might be
    relevant to nuclear-related sanctions provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms
    Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act of
    1945, as amended; and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.
    No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting
    period. The administrative measures imposed against ten Russian entities
    for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation with Iran remain
    in effect.

    Chemical and Biological Weapons

        The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
    Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and
    continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce, in consultation
    with other agencies, in order to control the export of items with
    potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery
    systems for weapons of mass destruction.
        Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
    security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
    the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
    Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
    Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States
    Signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among
    their number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified
    the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 8,
    1997. To date, 126 countries (including China, Iran, India, Pakistan,
    and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
        The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization For the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at entry-into-
    force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in
    The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for
    implementing the CWC. It consists of the Conference of the States
    Parties, the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).
    The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently
    has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained
    and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout
    the world. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 500 routine inspections
    in some 29 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken place. To
    date, nearly 170 inspections have been conducted at military facilities
    in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence
    at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah and Johnston
    Island.
        The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
    concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
    any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
    activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of
    possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide
    for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus
    making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more
    difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
        The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was
    enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus
    Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Fiscal
    Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). My Administration published an Executive
    order on June 25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and is
    working to publish regulations regarding industrial declarations and
    inspections of industrial facilities. Submission of these declarations
    to the OPCW, and subsequent inspections, will enable the United States
    to be fully compliant with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date
    has, among other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organization
    as well as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make
    complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
        Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated
    and prohibited by the

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    CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. The
    relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed to penalize
    countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the
    threat of chemical weapons.
        The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
    international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW).
    We participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties
    striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and
    enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
    Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
    and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons
    Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994
    BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in
    November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon
    as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in
    2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of
    national views and clarification of existing text. Five AHG negotiating
    sessions were scheduled for 1999. The United States is working toward
    completion of the substance of a strong Protocol next year.
        On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, I
    announced that the United States would take a leading role in the effort
    to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and
    use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to
    detect and deter cheating. The United States is working closely with
    U.S. industry representatives to obtain technical input relevant to the
    development of U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach
    international agreement on data declarations and onsite investigations.
        The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 30-
    member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons
    nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent
    annual AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, during which the Group
    reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the Group's
    viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members
    continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all
    governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on
    chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these
    Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national activities
    support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary, the Group continued to focus
    on strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address
    the threat of CBW terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to
    continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries,
    and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
    nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national
    policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in
    stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
        During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely
    intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and
    technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the
    Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
    1991. No new sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting
    period. The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG
    partners and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation
    concern.

    Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

        The United States continues carefully to control exports that could
    contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
    and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
    concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In
    March 1999, we imposed missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern
    entities for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control
    Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I missile sanctions imposed in April
    1998 against North Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from
    North Korea to Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the
    Ghauri missile remain in effect.
        During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
    information about proliferation problems with each other and with other
    potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also
    emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems.
    This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related
    materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
        In June the United States participated in the MTCR's Reinforced
    Point of Contact Meeting

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    (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners held in-depth discussions of regional
    missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on Iran, North
    Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed steps Partners can take to
    further increase outreach to nonmembers. The Partners agreed to continue
    their discussion of this important topic at the October 1999 Noordwijk
    MTCR Plenary.
        Also in June, the United States participated in a German-hosted MTCR
    workshop at which Partners and non-Partners discussed ways to address
    the proliferation potential inherent in intangible technology transfers.
    The seminar helped participants to develop a greater understanding of
    the intangible technology issue (i.e., how proliferators misuse the
    internet, scientific conferences, plant visits, student exchange
    programs, and higher education to acquire sensitive technology), and to
    begin to identify steps governments can take to address this problem.
        In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the MTCR
    Annex. The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve clarity and
    uniformity of implementation of MTCR controls while maintaining the
    coverage of the previous version of the MTCR Annex.
        The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, The
    Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners shared
    information about activities of missile proliferation concern worldwide.
    They focussed in particular on the threat to international security and
    stability posed by missile proliferation in key regions and considered
    what practical steps they could take, individually and collectively, to
    address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. During their
    discussions, Partners gave special attention to DPRK missile activities
    and also discussed the threat posed by missile-related activities in
    South and North East Asia and the Middle East.
        During this reporting period, the United States continued to work
    unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat
    missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly
    and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage international focus
    on missile proliferation issues, the USG also placed the issue on the
    agenda for the G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in an undertaking to examine
    further individual and collective means of addressing this problem and
    reaffirming commitment to the objectives of the MTCR. Since my last
    report, we continued our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China
    (interrupted after the accidental bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy),
    India, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In
    the course of normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such
    discussions with other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the
    Middle East.
        In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth round of
    missile talks to underscore our strong opposition to North Korea's
    destabilizing missile development and export activities and press for
    tight constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. We
    also affirmed that the United States viewed further launches of long-
    range missiles and transfers of long-range missiles or technology for
    such missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the
    United States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that message at
    every available opportunity. In particular, we have reminded the DPRK of
    the consequences of another rocket launch and encouraged it not to take
    such action. We also have urged the DPRK to take steps toward building a
    constructive bilateral relationship with the United States.
        These efforts have resulted in an important first step. Since
    September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK will refrain
    from testing long-range missiles of any kind during our discussions to
    improve relations. In recognition of this DPRK step, the United States
    has announced the easing of certain sanctions related to the import and
    export of many consumer goods.
        In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
    sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and
    nuclear development programs, the United States continued its high-level
    dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia
    can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's
    ballistic missile development program. During this reporting period,
    Russia's government created institutional foundations to implement a
    newly enacted nonproliferation policy and passed laws to punish
    wrongdoers. It also passed new export control legislation to tighten
    government control over sensitive technologies and began working with
    the United States to strengthen export control practices at Russian
    aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian government's
    nonproliferation and export control

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    efforts, some Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's
    ballistic missile program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran
    beyond the Bushehr reactor project. The administrative measures imposed
    on ten Russian entities for their missile- and nuclear-related
    cooperation with Iran remain in effect.

    Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

        United States national export controls--both those implemented
    pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented
    unilaterally--play an important part in impeding the proliferation of
    WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export controls'' refer to
    requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations
    on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to certain
    destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that
    also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, export controls
    are only one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
    nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation norms, informal
    multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdicting shipments of
    proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance, redirection
    and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and
    diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls as
    part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
        Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because
    every proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology
    from other countries. Proliferators look overseas because needed items
    are unavailable elsewhere, because indigenously produced items are of
    insufficient quality or quantity, and/or because imported items can be
    obtained more quickly and cheaply than producing them at home. It is
    important to note that proliferators seek for their programs both items
    on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and
    nerve gas ingredients on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items
    (like lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition,
    many of the items of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use.
    For example, key ingredients and technologies used in the production of
    fertilizers and pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons;
    vaccine production technology (albeit not the vaccines themselves) can
    assist in the production of biological weapons.
        The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or even
    denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology
    for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national
    export controls--and similar controls of our partners in the Australia
    Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--
    have denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best
    equipment and technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek
    less capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many
    instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have forced
    proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements even from
    nonmember suppliers, taking time and money away from proliferant
    programs.
        United States national export controls and those of our regime
    partners also have played an important leadership role, increasing over
    time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation export
    controls. For example, none of the following progress would have been
    possible without the leadership shown by U.S. willingness to be the
    first to apply controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32
    member countries; several nonmember countries have been persuaded to
    apply export controls consistent with one or more of the regimes
    unilaterally; and most of the members of the nonproliferation regimes
    have applied national ``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the
    U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. (Export controls
    normally are tied to a specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex.
    ``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items
    not on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile programs.)
        United States export controls, especially ``catch-all'' controls,
    also make important political and moral contributions to the
    nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal obligations the
    United States has undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
    (Article I), Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical
    Weapons Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD
    activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints''
    on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our
    friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely
    and unambiguously against WMD/missile proliferation, even against the
    prospect of

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    inadvertent proliferation from the United States itself.
        Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and
    enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use
    export to proceed under circumstances where, without export control
    scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help
    build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in
    turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation
    regimes, for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each
    member not to make an export that another has denied for
    nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it first
    consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy
    make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
    members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for exporters.

    Threat Reduction

        The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise
    has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia
    and other Newly Independent States, causing concern. My Administration
    gives high priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation
    through programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons
    scientists to civilian research and technology development activities. I
    have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the
    Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative that would support activities in
    four areas: nuclear security; nonnuclear WMD; science and technology
    nonproliferation; and military relocation, stabilization and other
    security cooperation programs. Congressional support for this initiative
    would enable the engagement of a broad range of programs under the
    Departments of State, Energy, and Defense.

    Expenses

        Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
    U.S.C. 1641 (c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly
    attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
    of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during
    the period from May 15, 1999, through November 10, 1999.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    November 10, 1999.

    Note: The notice of November 10 is listed in Appendix D at the end of
    this volume.