    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1999, Book II)]
    [October 6, 1999]
    [Pages 1691-1694]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1691]]

    Remarks on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
    October 6, 1999

        Thank you very much. Let me begin by saying a profound word of
    thanks to Senator Glenn, to General
    Shalikashvili, to Dr. Townes, and to Secretary Cohen for what they have said. I thank General Jones and Admiral Crowe
    for being here. I thank all the other Nobel laureates who are here;
    Secretary Richardson and General
    Shelton and the members of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff; Mr. Berger and Mr.
    Podesta, the other people from the White
    House. And I thank Senators Biden and
    Dorgan for their presence here and their
    enormous leadership on this issue, and other committed American citizens
    who are in this audience.
        Let me say that I was sitting here thinking two things when the
    previous speakers were speaking. One is, it made me very proud to be an
    American, to know that our country had been served by people like these
    four, without regard to party. The second is that each in their own way
    represent a different piece of the American experience over the last 50
    years and bring a remarkable combination of intellect, knowledge,
    experience, and humanity to the remarks that they made.
        There's a reason that President Eisenhower said we ought to do this
    and a reason that President Kennedy agreed. They saw World War II from
    slightly different angles and different ranks, but they experienced the
    horror of the atomic era's onset in much the same way. I think you could
    make a compelling argument that this treaty is more needed now than it
    was when they advocated it, when there were only two nuclear powers. I
    think you could make a compelling argument that, given the events of the
    last couple of years, this treaty is more needed than it was when I
    signed it at the United Nations 3 years ago. Nuclear technology and
    know-how continue to spread. The risk that more and more countries will
    obtain weapons that are nuclear is more serious than ever.
        I said yesterday--I'd like to just stop here and go off the script.
    I am very worried that the 21st century will see the proliferation of
    nuclear and chemical and biological weapons; that those systems will
    undergo a process of miniaturization, just as almost all other
    technological events have led us to, in good ways and bad; and that we
    will continue to see the mixing and blending of misconduct in the new
    century by rogue states, angry countries, and terrorist groups. It is,
    therefore, essential that the United States stay in the nonproliferation
    lead in a comprehensive way.
        Now, if you look at what we're trying to do with the Biological
    Weapons Convention, for example, in putting teeth in that while
    increasing our own ability to protect our own people and protect our
    friends who want to work with us from biological weaponry, you see a
    good direction. If you look at what we did with the Chemical Weapons
    Convention, working in good faith for months with the Congress to ask
    the same question we're asking here--are we better off with this or
    without it?--and how we added safeguard after safeguard after safeguard,
    both generated out of the administration and generated from leaders of
    both parties in the Congress, that's how we ought to look at this.
        But we have to ask ourselves just the same question they all
    presented, because the nuclear threat is still the largest one, and are
    we better off or not if we adopt this treaty?
        I think we start with the fact that the best way to constrain the
    danger of nuclear proliferation and, God forbid, the use of a nuclear
    weapon, is to stop other countries from testing nuclear weapons. That's
    what this test ban treaty will do. A vote, therefore, to ratify is a
    vote to increase the protections of our people and the world from
    nuclear war. By contrast, a vote against it risks a much more dangerous
    future.
        One of the interesting things--I'll bet you that people in other
    parts of the world, particularly those that have nuclear technology, are
    watching the current debate with some measure of bewilderment. I mean,
    today we enjoy unmatched influence, with peace and freedom ascendant in
    the world, with enormous prosperity, enormous technical advances. And by
    and large, on a bipartisan basis, we've done a pretty good job of
    dealing with this unique moment in history.
        We've seen the end of the cold war making possible agreements to cut
    U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by more than 60 percent. We have
    offered the Russians the opportunity of

    [[Page 1692]]

    further cuts if they will ratify START II. But we know the nuclear peril
    persists and that there's growing danger that these weapons could spread
    in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, in Asia, to areas where our
    troops are deployed. We know that they can be present in areas where
    there are intense rivalries and, unlike at least the latter years of the
    cold war, still very much the possibility of misunderstanding between
    countries with this capacity.
        Now, let me say the reason I say that I think other countries will
    be looking at this, one of the concerns that I have had all along is
    that the countries we need to get involved in this, India, Pakistan, all
    the other countries, will say, ``Well, gosh, when we all get in this
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Americans have a big advantage,
    because they're spending $4.5 billion maintaining the integrity of their
    nuclear stockpile.'' And I always thought that, too. And I think that's
    a good thing, because people around the world know we're not going to
    abuse this responsibility we have.
        But it is strange to me and I'm sure strange for people in foreign
    capitals analyzing the debate going on in Washington that there are
    people against this treaty who somehow think we will be disadvantaged by
    it. So instead, they propose to say, well, we--they don't, any of them,
    say we should start testing again. So the message of not ratifying this
    treaty is, ``Okay, we're not going to test, but you guys have a green
    light.''
        Now, forgive my less than elevated language, but I think we've got
    to put this down where everybody can get it. And I don't think we ought
    to give a green light to our friends in India and Pakistan, to the
    Chinese or the Russians, or to people who would be nuclear powers. I
    think that would be a mistake.
        I think we ought to give them an outstretched hand and say, let us
    show common restraint. And see this in the framework of our continuing
    work with the Russians to secure their own nuclear materials, to destroy
    nuclear weapons that are scheduled for destruction, and to continue our
    effort to reduce the nuclear threat.
        The argument, it seems to me, doesn't hold water, this argument that
    somehow we would be better off, even though we're not going to start
    testing again, to walk away from this treaty and give a green light to
    all these other countries in the world.
        Now, I sent this test ban treaty up to the Senate over 2 years ago.
    For 2 years, the opponents of the treaty refused to hold any hearings.
    Suddenly, they say, ``Okay, you've got to vote up or down in a week.''
    Now, this is a tough fight without much time, and there are lots of
    technical arguments can be made to confuse the issue. But I would like
    to just reiterate what has already been said by previous speakers and
    make one other point.
        There are basically three categories of arguments against the
    treaty. Two have been dealt with. One is, ``Well, this won't detect
    every test that anybody could do at every level,'' and General
    Shalikashvili addressed that. We will
    have censors all over the world that will detect far more tests than
    will be detected if this treaty is not ratified and does not enter into
    force. And our military have repeatedly said that any test of a size
    that would present any kind of credible threat to what we have to do to
    protect the American people, we would know about, and we could respond
    in an appropriate and timely fashion.
        The second argument is, no matter what all these guys say, they can
    find three scientists somewhere who will say--or maybe 300, I don't
    know--that they just don't agree and maybe there is some scenario under
    which the security and reliability of the nuclear deterrent in America
    can be eroded. Well, I think that at some point, with all these Nobel
    laureates and our laboratory heads and the others that have endorsed
    this--say what they say, you have to say, what is the likelihood that
    America can maintain the security and reliability of its nuclear
    deterrent, as compared with every other country, if they come under the
    umbrella of this and the treaty enters into force?
        The same people say that we ought to build a national missile
    defense, notwithstanding the technological uncertainties, because our
    skill is so much greater, we can always find a technological answer to
    everything. And I would argue that our relative advantage in security,
    even if you have some smidgen of a doubt about the security and
    reliability issue, will be far greater if we get everybody under this
    tent and we're all living under the same rules, than it will be if we're
    all outside the tent.
        Now, there's a third sort of grab-bag set of arguments against it,
    and I don't mean to deprecate them. Some of them are actually quite
    serious and substantial questions that have been

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    raised about various countries' activities in particular places and
    other things. The point I want to make about them is, go back and look
    at the process we adopted in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Every
    single other objection that has been raised or question that has been
    raised can be dealt with by adding an appropriately worded safeguard to
    this treaty. It either falls within the six we've already offered and
    asked for or could be crafted in a careful negotiation as a result of a
    serious process. So I do not believe that any of these things are
    serious stumbling blocks to the profound argument that this is in our
    interest.
        Look, 154 countries have signed this treaty--Russia, China, Japan,
    South Korea, Israel, Iran, all our NATO Allies--51 have already
    ratified, 11 of our NATO Allies, including nuclear powers Britain and
    France. But it can't go into effect unless the U.S. and the other
    designated nations ratify it. And once again, we need American
    leadership to protect American interests and to advance the peace of the
    world.
        I say again, we're spending $4\1/2\ billion a year a protect the
    security and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. There is a reason
    that Secretary Cohen and Secretary
    Richardson and our laboratory heads believe
    that we can do this. Once again, I say the U.S. stopped testing in 1992.
    What in the world would prevent us from trying to have a regime where we
    want other people to join us in stopping testing?
        Let me just give one example. Last year the nuclear tests by India
    and Pakistan shook the world. After those tests occurred, they had a
    serious confrontation along the line of control in Kashmir. I spent our
    Independence Day, the Fourth of July, meeting with the Pakistani Prime
    Minister and his senior government officials in
    an intense effort to try to help defuse this situation.
        Now, both of these countries have indicated they will sign this
    treaty. If our Senate defeats it, do you think they'll sign it? Do you
    think they'll ratify it? Do you think for a minute that they will forgo
    further tests if they believe that the leading force in the world for
    nuclear nonproliferation has taken a U-turn? If our Senate defeats the
    treaty, will it encourage the Russians, the Chinese, and others to
    refrain from trying to find and test new, more sophisticated, more
    destructive nuclear weapons? Or will it give them a green light?
        Now, I said earlier we've been working with Congress on missile
    defense to protect us from a nuclear attack should one ever come. I
    support that work. And if we can develop a system we think will work, we
    owe it to the American people to work with the Russians and others to
    figure out a way to give our people the maximum protection. But our
    first line of defense should be preventing countries from having those
    weapons in the first place.
        It would be the height of irresponsibility to rely on the last line
    of defense to say, ``We're not going to test. You guys test. And we're
    in a race to get up a missile defense, and we sure hope it will work if
    the wheels run off 30 or 40 years from now.'' This argument doesn't hold
    water.
        People say, ``Well, but somebody might cheat.'' Well, that's true,
    somebody might cheat. Happens all the time, in all regimes. Question is,
    are we more likely to catch them with the treaty or without?
        You all know and I am confident that people on the Hill have to know
    that this test ban treaty will strengthen our ability to determine
    whether or not nations are involved in weapons activities. You've heard
    the 300 sensors mentioned. Let me tell you what that means in practical
    terms. If this treaty goes into effect, there will be 31 sensors in
    Russia, 11 in China, 17 in the Middle East alone, and the remainder of
    the 300-plus in other critical places around the world. If we can find
    cheating, because it's there, then we'll do what's necessary to stop or
    counter it.
        Let me again say I want to thank the former chairs of the Joint
    Chiefs who have endorsed this. I want to thank the current
    Chair, and all the Joint Chiefs, and the
    previous service chiefs who have been with us in this: Lawrence
    Eagleburger, the Secretary of State
    under President Bush; Paul Nitze, a top
    Presidential adviser from Presidents Truman to Reagan; former Senator
    Nancy Kassebaum Baker; many
    Republicans and Democrats who have dealt with this issue for years have
    stayed with us. John Glenn, from Mercury to
    Discovery--are you going up again, John?--has always been at the cutting
    edge of technology's promise. But he's also flown fighter planes and
    seen war.
        The Nobel laureates who are here, Dr. Ramsey, Dr. Fitch, both part of the
    Manhattan Project; Dr. Ramsey, a young scientist, Dr. Fitch, a teenage
    soldier, witnessed the very first

    [[Page 1694]]

    nuclear test 54 years ago in the New Mexico desert. Their letter says,
    ``It is imperative''--underline imperative--``that the test ban treaty
    be ratified.''
        Let me just say one other thing. There may be a suggestion here that
    our heart is overcoming our head and all that. I'd like to give you one
    example that I think refutes that on another topic. One of the biggest
    disappointments I've had as President, a bitter disappointment for me,
    is that I could not sign in good conscience the treaty banning
    landmines, because we have done more since I've been President to get
    rid of landmines than any country in the world by far. We spend half the
    money the world spends on demining. We have destroyed over a million of
    our own mines.
        I couldn't do it because the way the treaty was worded was unfair to
    the United States and to our Korean allies in meeting our
    responsibilities along the DMZ in South Korea and because it outlawed
    our antitank mines while leaving every other country's intact. And I
    thought it was unfair.
        But it just killed me. But all of us who are in charge of the
    Nation's security engage our heads, as well as our hearts. Thinking and
    feeling lead you to the conclusion that this treaty should be ratified.
        Every single serious question that can be raised about this kind of
    bomb, that kind of bomb, what this country has, what's going on here,
    there, and yonder, every single one of them can be dealt with in the
    safeguard structure that is normally a product of every serious treaty
    deliberation in the United States Senate. And I say again, from the time
    of President Eisenhower, the United States has led the world in the
    cause of nonproliferation. We have new, serious proliferation threats
    that our predecessors have not faced. And it is all the more imperative
    that we do everything we possibly can to minimize the risks our children
    will face.
        That is what you were trying to do. I thank the Senators who are
    here with us today and pray that they can swell their ranks by next
    week.
        Thank you very much.

    Note: The President spoke at 3:43 p.m in the East Room at the White
    House following a meeting with supporters of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
    Test-Ban Treaty. In his remarks, he referred to former Senator and
    astronaut John Glenn, who introduced the President; former Chairmen of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA (Ret.), Gen.
    David C. Jones, USA (Ret.), and Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN (Ret.);
    Nobel Physics Prize recipients Charles H. Townes (1964), Norman F.
    Ramsey (1989), and Val L. Fitch (1980); and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
    of Pakistan.