[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
[April 15, 1999]
[Pages 551-561]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California
April 15, 1999

    The President. Thank you very much, Mr. Seaton, distinguished officers, and members of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors. I want to thank you for giving me the 
opportunity to address the crisis in Kosovo, why we're there, what our 
objectives are, how this fits in with our larger vision of the future.
    Since I'm here I can't help noting that one of the truly striking 
aspects of this moment is the stark contrast it illuminates between a 
free society with a free press, and a closed society where the press is 
used to manipulate people by suppressing or distorting the truth.
    In Belgrade today, independent journalists are being persecuted. 
This week, one brave editor was murdered in 
cold blood. Meanwhile, the Government-run press has constructed an 
alternative reality for the Serbian people in which the atrocities their 
soldiers are committing in Kosovo simply don't exist. Under those 
conditions, decent people can remain in denial, supporting policies that 
lead them to political and economic ruin.
    Thank goodness our press and free press throughout the world have 
tried to get at and get out the truth, to ensure that words like 
refugees, displacement, ethnic cleansing don't become stale and lifeless 
but remain causes for action.
    The tragedy in Kosovo is the result of a meticulously planned and 
long-premeditated attack on an entire people simply on the basis of 
their ethnicity and religion, an attack grounded in a philosophy that 
teaches people to dearly love a piece of land while utterly dismissing 
the humanity of those who occupy it.
    That is what Mr. Milosevic has been 
doing ever since Yugoslavia started breaking up in 1989. For a decade, 
he has been trying to build a Greater Serbia by using military force to 
rearrange the ethnic character of the nations which emerged from 
Yugoslavia. That is what he did for years in Croatia and, horribly, in 
Bosnia--what he is doing in Kosovo now.
    Last year he drove hundreds of 
thousands of people from their homes into the frigid mountains and let 
them back only after NATO threatened to use force. He is now determined 
to crush all resistance to his rule even if it means turning Kosovo into 
a lifeless wasteland.
    As these difficult days proceed, it is important to remember that we 
have no quarrel with the Serbian people. They were our allies in World 
War II; they have often been our allies. In a sense, they are victims of 
this tragedy, too. And we must understand the anguish of Serbian-
Americans who, like Albanian-Americans, are worried about their loved 
ones back home. Americans should not blame Serbs or look down on 
Serbian-Americans because we disagree with the Milosevic government. We must not let his ethnic cleansing 
provoke us to ethnic bias.
    We and our 18 NATO Allies are in Kosovo today because we want to 
stop the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing; because we want to build a 
stable, united, prosperous Europe that

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includes the Balkans and its neighbors; and because we don't want the 
21st century to be dominated by the dark marriage of modern weapons and 
ancient ethnic, racial, and religious hatred. We cannot simply watch as 
hundreds of thousands of people are brutalized, murdered, raped, forced 
from their homes, their family histories erased, all in the name of 
ethnic pride and purity.
    NATO was pivotal to ending the killing and ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia. We can do so again, and this time we have responded more 
quickly.
    Were we to stand aside, the atrocities in Kosovo would go on and on. 
Neighboring democracies, as you see, would be overwhelmed by permanent 
refugees and demoralized by the failure of democracy's alliance. The 
Kosovar Albanians would become a people without a homeland, a burden to 
host countries, a magnet for radical ideologies, a breeding ground for 
unending warfare in the Balkans. NATO would be discredited, yes, because 
it made promises not kept but, more important, because its values and 
vision of Europe would be profoundly damaged. Ultimately, the conflict 
in Kosovo would spread anyway, and we would have to act anyway.
    Now, when we decided to launch the air campaign, after Mr. 
Milosevic rejected peace, we believed 
there was at least a possibility that our readiness to act would deter 
him from moving forward as it had in the past. But we also understood 
clearly that with 40,000 troops and over 250 tanks massed in and around 
Kosovo he might intensify his repression and go on with his planned 
attack, as I made clear in my address to the Nation the night the 
airstrikes began.
    There was only one possibility that we and our NATO Allies were not 
willing to entertain, that the international community would look the 
other way in the face of this brutality.
    Now the NATO air campaign has been underway for 3 weeks, often 
interrupted or limited by bad weather. This is, however, a good time to 
assess what has been accomplished and where we're going.
    Mr. Milosevic's strategy has been to 
complete the ethnic cleansing, then break the unity of NATO by taking 
the bombs and offering phony concessions. But NATO is more united today 
than when the operation began. Whether they are Conservatives in Spain, 
Socialists in France, New Labor in Britain, or Greens in Germany, the 
leaders of Europe and the people they represent are determined to 
maintain and intensify our attacks until Mr. Milosevic's forces leave 
Kosovo and the refugees return under the protection of an international 
force or until his military is weakened to the point when he can no 
longer keep his vise-like grip on Kosovo.
    At the beginning of the operation, we focused, properly, on Serbia's 
highly developed air defenses, to reduce the risks to our pilots. There 
are still significant air defenses up, and therefore, there is still 
risk with every mission. But we have degraded the system to the point 
that now NATO can fly 24 hours a day, not simply at night. We've struck 
at Serbia's machinery of repression, at the infrastructure that supports 
it. We've destroyed all of Serbia's refineries, half of its capacity to 
produce ammunition. We've attacked its bridges and rail lines and 
communications networks to diminish its ability to supply, reinforce, 
and control its forces in Kosovo. Increasingly now, we are striking the 
forces themselves, hitting tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, 
radar missiles, and aircraft.
    As the allies have said, all of us, repeatedly, Mr. 
Milosevic can stop NATO's bombing by 
meeting these conditions: One, Serbian security forces must leave 
Kosovo; two, the displaced Kosovars must be able to return; three, there 
must be an international security force to protect all Kosovars, 
including the Serb minority there, as they work towards self-government.
    If he refuses, our military campaign 
will continue to destroy as much of his military capability as we can so 
that each day his capacity for repression will diminish.
    Meanwhile, his actions, though 
absolutely devastating to the civilian population and horribly 
burdensome to the frontline states of Macedonia and Albania, have not 
destroyed the armed opposition among Kosovars. Indeed, their numbers and 
determination are growing. Ultimately, Mr. Milosevic will have to 
choose, either to cut his mounting losses or lose his ability to 
maintain his grip on Kosovo.
    As for NATO, we are prepared to continue this effort as long as 
necessary to achieve our objectives. Our timetable will be determined by 
our goals, not the other way around.
    In the meantime, we must do more to aid the refugees. They are 
pouring out of Kosovo. We must help to preserve their lives and health 
and their hope of return. This week, NATO approved Operation Allied 
Harbor, under which

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8,000 troops will work with relief agencies in Albania to establish 
camps, provide logistical support, deliver aid, and ensure security. 
Thus far, we have contributed in the United States $150 million to this 
effort.
    Conditions at the borders are beginning to improve. Now we are most 
concerned about the fate of the refugees, hundreds of thousands of them, 
trapped inside Kosovo. They are unable to leave but afraid to go home. 
Mr. Milosevic apparently wants to use 
them as hostages and human shields, and he's preventing relief groups 
from getting to them. People of good will all around the world today are 
trying to find ways to overcome this cruel and cynical manipulation of 
innocent human beings.
    Mr. Milosevic also continues to hold 
on to the three American servicemen his 
forces seized in Macedonia. He continues to flout his obligation to 
allow the Red Cross to visit them. I want to say again as clearly as I 
can: The United States will hold him personally responsible for their 
welfare.
    Now, the stand we have taken, first in Bosnia, now in Kosovo, 
against organized ethnic hatred is a moral imperative. But it is also a 
strategic imperative. And I'd like to talk with you a little about that 
and ask all of you to ask yourselves how you view the history of the 
last 50 years and how you imagine the next 50 years unfolding.
    The history of the United States, for a very long time, was 
dominated by a principle of nonintervention in the affairs of other 
countries, even when we strongly disagreed. Indeed, for most of our 
history, we have worn the principle of nonintervention as a badge of 
honor, beginning with George Washington's warning against entangling 
alliances.
    The 20th century changed all that, with two World Wars, the cold 
war, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Panama, Lebanon, Grenada, Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and others. Our steadily increasing involvement 
with the rest of the world, not for territorial gain but for peace and 
freedom and security, is a fact of recent history.
    During the cold war, it can be argued that on occasion we made a 
wrong judgment because we tended to see the world solely through the 
lenses of communism or anti-communism. But no one suggests that we ever 
sought territorial advantage. No one doubts that when America did get 
involved, we were doing what at least we thought was right for humanity.
    Now, at the end of the 20th century, we face a great battle between 
the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration, the forces 
of globalism versus tribalism, of oppression against empowerment. And 
the phenomenal explosion of technology, including that of advanced 
weaponry, might be the servant of either side or both.
    The central irony of our time, it seems to me, is this: Most of us 
have a vision of the 21st century world with the triumph of peace and 
prosperity and personal freedom; with respect for the integrity of 
ethnic, racial, and religious minorities within a framework of shared 
values, shared power, and shared plenty; making common cause against 
disease and environmental degradation, against terror, organized crime, 
and weapons of mass destruction.
    This grand vision, ironically, is threatened by the oldest demon of 
human society, our vulnerability to hatred of the other, those who are 
not like us. In the face of that, we cannot be indifferent at home or 
abroad. That is why we are in Kosovo.
    Kosovo is a very small place on a very large fault line, on the 
borderlands of Central and Eastern Europe, at the meeting place of the 
Islamic world and the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity, 
where people have settled in a complex patchwork of ethnic and religious 
groups and where countless wars have been fought over faith, land, and 
power.
    Kosovo is far from unique in its region. It is surrounded by nations 
with similar challenges of history and diversity. The only difference 
today is that they--think of them, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Bosnia--are now at least struggling to realize the vision 
of multiethnic democracy that Mr. Milosevic is struggling to kill.
    Much of the former Soviet Union faces a similar challenge, including 
Ukraine and Moldova, southern Russia, the Caucasus nations of Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the new nations of central Asia. These nations 
spent most of the last half century under Communist rule. In the years 
when Western Europe was overcoming its old animosities by integrating 
its economies and embracing democracy, in the years when Americans began 
confronting our own legacy of racial hatred through open debate and 
political activism, these nations saw their

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problems frozen in time, kept in place by a rigid system that allowed no 
talk of change.
    They projected to the world a picture of stability, but it was a 
false picture, a stability imposed by rulers whose answer to ethnic 
tensions was not to resolve them but to suppress and deny them. When the 
weight of Communist repression was lifted, these tensions naturally rose 
to the surface, to be resolved by statesmen or exploited by demagogues.
    The potential for ethnic conflict became, perhaps, the greatest 
threat to what is among our most critical interests: the transition of 
the former Communist countries toward stability, prosperity, and 
freedom. We are in Kosovo because we care about saving lives and we care 
about the character of the multiethnic post-cold-war world.
    We don't want young democracies that have made the right choices to 
be overwhelmed by the flight of refugees and the victories of ethnic 
hatred. We don't want to see Europe re-fight with tanks and artillery 
the same battles they fought centuries ago with axes and arrows. And 
because stability in Europe is important to our own security, we want to 
build a Europe that is peaceful, undivided, and free, a Europe where 
young Americans do not have to fight and die again to deal with the 
consequences of other people's madness and greed.
    Who is going to define the future of this part of the world? Who 
will provide the model for how the people who have emerged from 
communism resolve their own legitimate problems? Will it be Mr. 
Milosevic, with his propaganda machine 
and his paramilitary thugs, who tell people to leave their country, 
their history, and their land behind, or die? Or will it be a nation 
like Romania, which is building democracy and respecting the rights of 
its ethnic minorities, or Hungary, which has accepted that ethnic 
Hungarians can live beyond its borders with security and freedom, or 
Macedonia, which is struggling to maintain a tolerant, multiethnic 
society under the unimaginable pressures of the human and economic costs 
imposed by Mr. Milosevic's policies?
    Now, after our recent experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, it's easy to 
forget that despite all the violence and turmoil they have experienced, 
the people of this region have, in fact, found ways to live together 
through the years. If the nations of the Balkans had truly experienced a 
thousand years of unceasing ethnic cleansing, their ethnic makeup 
wouldn't be anything like what it is. They would be utterly homogeneous, 
not so diverse. Today, most of those countries are democracies. Most are 
trying to resolve their problems by force of argument, not force of 
arms.
    We cannot allow the Milosevic vision, 
rooted as it is in hatred and violence and cynicism, to prevail. But if 
we truly want a more tolerant, inclusive future for the Balkans and all 
of southeast Europe, we will have to both oppose his efforts and offer a 
better vision of the future, one that we are willing to help build.
    Now, what does all this mean for the future of Kosovo and the region 
as a whole, starting from where we are right now? What many Kosovars 
want is independence. That is certainly understandable. After what 
they've been through, it's only natural that they should equate 
sovereignty with survival. But I continue to think it is not the best 
answer. Kosovo lacks the resources and infrastructure to be viable on 
its own. Moreover, Yugoslavia's long-suffering neighbors fear that an 
independent Kosovo would be unstable and that the instability itself 
would be contagious.
    Finally, we must remember the principle we and our allies have been 
fighting for in the Balkans is the principle of multiethnic, tolerant, 
inclusive democracy. We have been fighting against the idea that 
statehood must be based entirely on ethnicity.
    Some people think the best way to solve Kosovo's problems, and 
Serbia's and Bosnia's, is to withdraw their borders and re arrange their 
people to reflect their ethnic distinctions. Well, first of all, a lot 
of people who say that haven't looked very closely at the maps. It is a 
problem of staggering complexity. Once it starts, it would never end. 
For every grievance resolved, a new one would be created. For every 
community moved to a new place, another community would, by definition, 
be displaced.
    If we were to choose this course, we would see the continuous 
fissioning of smaller and smaller ethnically based, inviable states, 
creating pressures for more war, more ethnic cleansing, more of the 
politics of repression and revenge. I believe the last thing we need in 
the Balkans is greater Balkanization.
    The real question today is not whether Kosovo will be part of 
Serbia. The real question is whether Kosovo and Serbia and the other 
states in the region will be part of the new

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Europe. The best solution for Kosovo, for Serbia, for Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, and all the countries of southeast Europe is not the endless 
re-jiggering of the borders but greater integration into a Europe in 
which sovereignty matters but in which borders are becoming more and 
more open and less important in a negative sense. It is to affirm the 
principle that Mr. Milosevic has done so 
very much to undermine, that successful modern states make a virtue, not 
a blood feud, out of ethnic and religious diversity.
    That is the solution that Western Europe accepted--not too long ago, 
really, when you think of it--after Europe had been consumed by two of 
the bloodiest wars in all of human history, after the Holocaust almost 
erased an entire people from the face of the Earth.
    It is hard to visualize today, hard to remember, when you drive 
across Belgium and Holland, across the border between France and 
Germany, that twice in this century millions of people spilled blood 
fighting over every inch of that land. It is hard to imagine the 
immediate postwar Europe Winston Churchill described as a rubble heap, a 
charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate. But because of 
the changes which have occurred, it is not unimaginable today that the 
nations of southeastern Europe will choose integration and peace, just 
as their Western neighbors have.
    To achieve that future, we must follow the example of the World War 
II generation by standing up to aggression and hate and then by 
following through with a postconflict strategy for reconstruction and 
renewal. If we don't want people to remain mired in the miseries of 
yesterday, we must give them a better tomorrow to dream of and work for.
    Even as we fight this conflict, we must look beyond it to what the 
Balkans, southeastern Europe, indeed, the whole continent of Europe 
should look like in 10 or 20 years. We should try to do for southeastern 
Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War II, and 
for Central Europe after the cold war, to help its people build a region 
of multiethnic democracies, a community that upholds common standards of 
human rights, a community in which borders are open to people in trade, 
where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable.
    That is why my request to Congress for supplemental funding for our 
military and humanitarian operation in Kosovo will also support 
emergency assistance to Yugoslavia's neighbors, which do not want their 
dreams of democracy and integration undermined by a flood of refugees 
and the fear of violence. That is why we've been working to help the 
countries of the region consolidate democratic reform and build 
professional armed forces under civilian control.
    We need to intensify these efforts and to work with the European 
Union and the international financial institutions to mobilize more 
support for these countries. And we need to condition this help, just as 
we did with Western Europe 50 years ago, on closer cooperation among the 
beneficiaries and a new understanding of their sovereignty.
    This will take constant, steady American engagement, together with 
our European allies, old and new. It will demand keeping institutions, 
including NATO and the European Union, open to new nations who make the 
right choices. It will take money in the form of investment and aid. It 
will require a willingness to provide material and moral support to 
people and leaders across the region who are standing up for multiethnic 
democracy.
    Realistically, it will require a democratic transition in Serbia, 
for the region's democracies will never be safe with a belligerent 
tyranny in their midst. It will demand from us a recognition that there 
is no easy way out of the region's troubles, but there is a solution 
that advances our interests and keeps faith with our values if we are 
ready to make a long-term commitment.
    Of course, all of this will take time and effort. In the meantime, 
the people of Kosovo should have protection, security, and self-
government. That can only be assured by an international security force 
with NATO at the core.
    As in Bosnia, this force should also include members of NATO's 
Partnership For Peace that represent the whole range of ethnic groups in 
Europe. This is precisely the kind of mission we envisioned for the 
Partnership For Peace when it was created 5 years ago, and the kind of 
mission I very much hope Russia could join as well, just as it did so 
constructively in Bosnia.
    In the long run, our goal for Kosovo should not be independence but 
interdependence. Our watchword for the region should be integration, not 
disintegration. The ultimate answer for Kosovo, for Serbia, for Bosnia, 
Croatia, all the Balkans is not to withdraw behind barriers of

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mistrust and insecurity but to join a Europe where borders unite rather 
than divide, to build a richly textured fabric of civilization that 
lifts all God's children and resists those who would tear it apart by 
appealing to the dark recesses of the soul that lead only to dead ends.
    The Balkan war that began in Kosovo 10 years ago must end in Kosovo. 
It should be the last conflict of the 20th century. It should not be the 
defining conflict of the 21st century.
    The United States has the opportunity and the responsibility to make 
that decision come out right for our children and our grandchildren. We 
can help to lead to a new day for the people of this long-suffering 
region, a more peaceful time for Europe, and a better future for the 
United States.
    Thank you very much.
    Edward Seaton. The President has kindly 
agreed to take questions. You must be an ASNE member to ask a question. 
I would invite you to go to the floor mikes, as I see you're doing. 
Please identify yourself and your newspaper. We'll start over here with 
Rich Oppel.

April 14 Attack on Kosovar Albanians

    Q. Mr. President, Rich Oppel, Austin American-Statesman. Would you 
help us sort out what happened yesterday on the road from Prizren to 
Kukes? According to press accounts--you had your choices, I guess--NATO 
aircraft either bombed a convoy that includes refugees or the Serbs 
attacked the Albanians in response to our bombing.
    Did we screw up? Can the prosecution of this war be sustained--can 
it sustain the support of Americans if the newspapers of this country 
are publishing front-page stories showing dead civilians? And what word 
went out from you and Sandy Berger today to the Pentagon and to the NATO 
High Command about yesterday's events?
    The President. Well, first of all, what we believe happened is that 
the pilot thought it was a military convoy and that there were 
apparently civilians in the convoy who were killed. That is regrettable. 
It is also inevitable in a conflict of this kind, with planes traveling 
at high speeds, doing their best to fulfill their mission.
    And if the requirement is that nothing like this can ever happen, 
then we're saying it's okay with us if Mr. Milosevic displaces over a million Kosovars, kills and rapes 
thousands upon thousands of them. And keep in mind, in Bosnia there were 
more than 2 million refugees and a quarter of a million people killed.
    You cannot have this kind of conflict without some errors like this 
occurring. This is not a business of perfection. I ask you to think 
about the hundreds and hundreds of sorties which have been flown in the 
last 3 weeks and the small number of civilian casualties. It should be 
obvious to everybody in the world that we are bending over backwards to 
hit military targets, to hit security targets, even to hit a lot of 
targets late at night where the losses in human life will be minimized. 
These efforts have been made, and they have been remarkably successful.
    So, certain regrettable things will happen. We will do our best. The 
military will evaluate this incident, as it does every other one; so 
will the NATO command. But I have to tell you, if anyone thinks that 
this is a reason for changing our mission, then the United States will 
never be able to bring military power to bear again, because there is no 
such thing as flying airplanes this fast, dropping weapons this 
powerful, dealing with an enemy this pervasive who is willing to use 
people as human shields, and never have this sort of tragic thing 
happen. It cannot be done.
    I believe when the scales are weighed, it will be obvious that this 
is a result of Mr. Milosevic's policies. 
If he doesn't want this to happen, he ought to get out of Kosovo, let 
the Kosovars come home, and let people come in there who can protect 
them. That is the answer to this.

Effectiveness of NATO Strategy

    Q. Mr. President, thank you very much for coming to speak to us. I'm 
Dave Seaton of the Winfield Daily Courier in Kansas. If the people, the 
hundreds of thousands of people hiding in the hills in Kosovo, the 
Albanian Kosovars, perish from natural causes or as a result of this 
slaughter of paramilitary forces, won't NATO's hoped-for victory from 
bombing be hollow? And won't we have failed to prevent the kind of 
repeat of the Holocaust that you've said is what we don't want to enter 
the 21st century with?
    The President. Well, first of all, I believe that our strategy will 
prevail. We do have, as I said, a very difficult problem here, to figure 
out what to do about the refugees within Kosovo. We are working at it. 
The international relief agencies are working at it. A lot of countries 
that have some relationship with Serbia are working

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at it. And we are doing our best to try to figure out how to resolve it.
    I think the answer is, what is the alternative? So far, we still 
don't have as many refugees and nowhere near as many people dead as we 
did in Bosnia. And I think it's because we have moved more quickly. I 
think we have a chance to put this back together without having as much 
wreckage as we had there. And we are working as hard as we can to do it. 
It is a difficult situation, but we are working as hard as we can. And 
we are doing it while keeping this NATO Alliance together.
    And keep in mind, that is also very important, I think, that this is 
not an action by the United States alone. This is not one we engineered 
or dominated. This is a decision we made as partners with the 18 other 
NATO Allies, and we are doing our best to deal with it. And I assure you 
that we're trying to deal with all the contingencies. I do not think it 
is--including trying to figure out what's the worst thing that can 
happen and how to avoid it. But we're doing our best to deal with that.
    It's not possible to fly helpless cargo planes over and do airdrops 
to people, for example, if we know there is a better than 50 percent 
chance they won't get the supplies in the first place and a much better 
than 50 percent chance that the planes would be shot out of the air, 
even though they are not warplanes at all. So we're struggling to come 
to grips with this. But I think we moved very quickly, and we've made a 
lot of progress in a short time in dealing with the massive refugee 
problem on the borders in the other countries, and I hope in the next 
few days we'll have some progress to report on this.

President's Response to Criticism

    Q. Mr. President, Ken Bunting with the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. I 
haven't listened to any talk radio today, but, I apologize, I do often. 
And I'm often reminded of your wife's comment about the rightwing 
conspiracy, the critics who want to get at you for anything and 
undermine your Presidency and discredit you, personally. But there is a 
common drumbeat on the airwaves now, and it is that you personally lack 
the moral authority to be Commander in Chief.
    And certainly, I guess there is a powerful inclination to ignore 
those criticisms. But if you had to address it to an Air Force pilot, 
who had listened to the same radio shows and perhaps been persuaded to 
that point of view, how would you address that?
    The President. Well, I don't have to address it to the Air Force 
pilot. I am his Commander in Chief, and they swore an oath to the 
Constitution, and they have performed admirably. And they don't deserve 
to hear that.
    I just have seen a lot of our Air Force pilots. I just went down to 
Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana. I spent endless 
amounts--I spent hours talking to the families, the friends, the people 
that were there, encouraging people to say what they think. One person 
said something critical. Several hundred said, ``We believe in what 
we're doing. It is the right thing to do. Thank you for doing it. We are 
proud to do it. This is what we signed on for.''
    This is a democracy, and people can say whatever they want to say. 
But I have found that the American people, vast majorities of them, at 
least, appreciate it when I don't spend my time responding to them, and 
instead I spend my time working for the American people and trying to do 
what I think is right. I let other people be their judge about whether 
they think I should or shouldn't do something. But I have no response, 
except to get up every day and try to do my job.
    And I think that this country is in a better place than it was 6 
years and 3 months ago because we have followed that policy, instead of 
being totally consumed with spending all of our time answering our 
critics. I'd rather work on what I can control, and the opinion of some 
of the talk show people is something that's way beyond my control and 
happily so. [Laughter]
    Mr. Seaton. We have time for only one more 
question, and if I could, I'd like to break the line over here.
    Q. I really have an important question, if I may.
    Mr. Seaton. Okay, but if Len Downey would get his question right 
afterward.

Serb Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Q. Chris Waddle, executive editor of the Anniston Star. Mr. 
President, we're a center for chemical warfare training and storage in 
Anniston, Alabama, and Pentagon officials confirm to us the chemical 
weapons capability of the former Yugoslav forces. How does that 
availability of weapons of mass destruction among the Serbs impact 
American and NATO operations in the Kosovo conflict? And what is your

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administration's policy of response or retribution in the however 
unlikely event of enemy use of such weapons of mass destruction against 
insurgents or refugees or even the NATO Alliance?
    The President. My response would be swift and overwhelming. And we 
have, obviously, intelligence about the capabilities of the Serbs in a 
number of areas militarily, just as we do with other countries. But I 
think they are quite well aware of the dangers of overly escalating 
this. And I think that's all I should say about it right now.
    Mr. Seaton. Mr. President, I'm told we 
have to--you can take one from Len.
    Q. I'm the only woman in line, so I'd like--[laughter]----
    The President. I'll take a couple more.
    You know what's going on, don't you? The people that help me don't 
trust you not to write a story that's about something other than Kosovo, 
and they think the longer I stay up here, the greater my chances of 
screwing up. [Laughter] That's really what's going on here. And it's 
wonderful when you're not running for anything, you can say just exactly 
what's on your mind. [Laughter]
    But--have at it, go ahead. [Laughter]

Human Rights in Afghanistan

    Q. Okay, great. Thank you. I'm Narda Zacchino with the Los Angeles 
Times. Knowing your interest in human rights and having had you refer to 
all God's children, I'd like you to focus some attention for just a 
moment on some of God's children in Afghanistan. And what I'm speaking 
about is, this is a country that's under the harsh rule of the Taliban, 
some of whose leaders we helped finance and arm in their fight against 
the Soviet Union.
    In Afghanistan today, there are 11\1/2\ million women and children, 
women and girls, who are virtually under house arrest. Male doctors are 
not permitted to treat women and girls, and female doctors are not 
allowed to practice. Women are kept in their homes and may only leave if 
they're in the company of a brother, a father, or a husband. Windows of 
homes where women live are painted black so that no man may, per chance, 
see them without their burkha. When they go outside, they're totally 
shrouded. A 70-year-old woman was beaten severely because her ankles 
showed to a man. A teenage girl was almost stoned to death because her 
ankles showed when she was riding her bicycle. Women in this country are 
not permitted to do anything except stay in their homes, unless they 
leave in the company of a man.
    It's a terribly repressive regime. And a number of people think that 
we have some obligation to these 11\1/2\ million women and girls, 
because of our relationship--former relationship to these people who are 
in power. What do you think?
    The President. Well, I absolutely do, and I think we would even if 
we hadn't supported the Taliban on ``the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend'' principle years ago. I think, independent of that, we do. I 
think that what has happened to the women and children of Afghanistan is 
atrocious.
    The First Lady and I had an event at the White House to highlight 
that on Human Rights Day, including having two Afghan women there who 
talked to the press about what was going on. I met with a group of 
leaders from the Feminist Majority the other day and talked about how we 
could do more to bring more to the United States, what other things we 
could do to put pressure on Taliban and on other states, other 
countries, to try to help us to change conditions.
    And I think it is very, very important to do. I think it is one of 
the worst examples of systematic human rights abuses in the world today, 
and a terrible perversion of Islam.
    Mr. Seaton. We asked Len Downey to raise a 
question that was of concern to ASNE, so I invite him to do so if he 
could.

Availability of Information

    Q. Len Downey of the Washington Post. Mr. President, a growing 
number of newspaper editors and broadcast news executives are very 
concerned about the relatively little reliable information and specific 
information that has been released so far by the Defense Department 
about the bombings and the other military activities so far during 
Operation Allied Force--much less information, for instance, than was 
provided daily during the Persian Gulf war or Operation Desert Fox. In 
view of the need, Mr. President, that you discussed today to have the 
American people support this military action, will you instruct the 
Defense Department to provide us and the American people with more 
specific information about the bombing?

[[Page 559]]

    The President. Well, Mr. Downey, you 
know, late last week the Defense Department had a big, long briefing. 
And there are basically two issues here, and we're trying to resolve 
them. I actually had a rather extended conversation yesterday with two 
of the other leaders of the NATO alliance about this because I think 
it's important, not just in the United States but throughout Europe, to 
get more information out more quickly.
    There have been two problems from the point of view of the Pentagon: 
One is trying to work through the NATO command structure and let them do 
the daily briefings and try to determine by consensus, if you will, what 
should be gotten out and how; and then to have the Pentagon play a 
supporting role in that.
    The other problem is a practical one, which is sometimes it takes--
in the Gulf, when we fought in Iraq in Desert Storm and later when we 
had our actions there, neither the weather nor the terrain presented the 
barriers to actually assessing quickly what the impact of the action was 
that is presented in the Balkans. So sometimes there is just an 
inevitable delay, which is one of the reasons that--last week I talked 
to Secretary Cohen and General 
Shelton about having the Pentagon do a big 
briefing to be much more detailed about what, in fact, had happened and 
what conclusions we drew from it.
    So all I can tell you is, I'm aware that this is a difficulty. I 
agree that we should try to do more, more simultaneous with the actions. 
And I am working on it and trying to get NATO to do more as well. Unless 
there is some specific security-related reason that some issue shouldn't 
be talked about, I think the more information we can get out there the 
more quickly, the better off we are.
    Q. Thank you.
    The President. But I know that whenever there's a conflict between 
any Government and the press, there's always the assumption that there 
is some deliberate scheme at work here. And I don't think that's the 
case here. I think really, we're trying to work through--NATO has never 
done this kind of operation before, in this way, and there are a lot of 
things that have to be worked through. But I am working on it, and I 
hope that most of you will be generally satisfied within the next few 
days.
    Do you want to take a couple more?
    Mr. Seaton. We could; it's up to you.
    The President. He's been standing there a long time. [Laughter]

President's Legacy

    Q. I have. And I'm the only resident from Vancouver, Washington, 
standing here, so--[laughter]--Tom Koenninger, the Columbian, Vancouver, 
Washington. Mr. President, my question has two parts. The first is, as 
you near the end of your second term in office and deal with such issues 
as the Balkans, what legacy do you believe you are leaving to the 
American public? Secondly, would you be specific, sir, in telling us 
ways in which America is better off for your Presidency?
    The President. Well, I think, first of all--let me answer the first 
question first. I think others will determine the legacy of this 
administration, and most of it will have to be done when all the records 
are there and time passes and people without an axe to grind one way or 
the other have a chance to have their say.
    I can only tell you what I have tried to do. I have tried to lead 
America into a new century and into a whole new era in the way we work 
and live and relate to each other and the rest of the world. And I have 
tried to help build a world that was more peaceful, more prosperous, and 
more secure.
    I think that among the things that people will say this 
administration did and made progress on was, we gave the United States a 
modern economic policy and got out of 12 years of horrible deficit 
spending during which we quadrupled the debt. I think that the work we 
did to support the solution of social problems, in reducing the welfare 
rolls by half and reducing the crime rate and putting 100,000 police on 
the street, would be important. I think the work we did in education 
will be important.
    I think the systematic effort we made to promote reconciliation 
among people of different racial groups will be important. I think the 
work we have done in the Middle East to Northern Ireland in promoting 
peace will be important. I think the work we've done in Latin America 
through the Summit of the Americas and the work we've done with our 
allies in Central America will be important. I think there are a lot of 
things that will altogether add up to preparing America for the 21st 
century, building a stronger American community, and repairing the 
social fabric.

[[Page 560]]

    And let me just say one thing. When I got off the airplane today 
there were a bunch of young people who are AmeriCorps volunteers. That's 
a program we started back in the second year of my Presidency. And one 
young woman said to me, ``I'm 30 years old. You're the first President I 
ever voted for. I've kept up. You did what you said you'd do, and it's 
worked.'' And her saying that to me meant more than just about anything 
any American could say.
    When I was in New Hampshire for the seventh anniversary of the New 
Hampshire primary, there were schoolchildren along the highway waiting 
in the cold rain. And person after person said to me, ``You had to come 
to these little town meetings in 1991, and we listened to you, and 
you've done what you said.''
    So what I think will also happen is people will see Americans can 
solve their problems. Government has a role to play, and it can produce. 
So I think there's a sense of possibility, a sense of optimism, a sense 
of eagerness about the future that the present difficulties in Kosovo 
cannot begin to overshadow. And I think the country is clearly better 
off than it was 6 years ago.
    Q. Thank you.

Success of Post-Cold-War Policies

    Q. Mr. President, my name is Dave Zeeck. I'm the editor at the 
newspaper in Tacoma, Washington, the News Tribune. And part of a little 
known function of this convention is to help train young journalists. 
There are some journalists here who produce the AS&E report. I'd like to 
ask them to stand because they gave me this question. If you all would 
stand, please.
    Their question was--and you made an indirect reference to this in 
your speech--you didn't mention the Marshall plan by name, but that 
seemed to be what you were talking about as a way to resolve this later. 
And their question was, could a greater effort have been made after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall to do more along the lines of a Marshall plan, 
particularly in the Balkans, and might that have prevented something 
like we're facing today?
    The President. Perhaps. I wasn't President then, and I don't know. I 
don't say that in a blameworthy sense; I just wasn't. And I don't think 
it's fair for me to make judgments where I don't have all the facts, and 
I can't say. I don't mind saying that I missed the boat somewhere if I 
know it, or if I know enough about somebody else to say that, but I 
don't know the answer to that.
    Let me say it in another way. I am convinced that after communism 
fell, that the work that--we had a chance after the Berlin Wall fell, 
after the end of communism, to build a Europe that was united, 
democratic, and at peace for the first time in history. You go back; 
since the rise of nation-states on the continent of Europe, that had 
never been true before. There had always been some conflict; there had 
always been some division; there had always been some absence of 
democracy--never before possible.
    At that moment there were three great challenges, I would argue, to 
that vision. One is, what happens to Russia? Does Russia become a 
democracy? Does it become stable? Can it be prosperous enough in the 
painful transition? The other was, what happens to all the states around 
that were Communist, non-Russian states, basically the Balkans and 
Central Europe and southeastern Europe--second question. Third question 
is, would there be a conflict between Islam and the Orthodox branch of 
Christianity, manifest most obviously in the tension between Greece and 
Turkey but also up in the Balkans? If those three things could be 
resolved in a satisfactory way, then we could build a Europe that was 
united, democratic, and at peace.
    Now, what happened? The Germans took on East Germany, in an act of 
patriotism and generosity and costliness of staggering proportions. 
They're still paying the economic price today, but it was a brave and 
good and generous thing to do.
    The major countries in Europe supported the European Union. NATO 
took in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. There was a massive 
effort made to try to deal with Russia. The United States put a lot of 
money into the denuclearization program and other things.
    After all is said and done, where are we? And we dealt with the 
Balkans in a more halting way. I think everyone would have to admit 
that. And we've continued without great success to resolve the 
difficulties between Greece and Turkey, but they haven't gotten worse, 
either. And we may have some Americans of both heritages here today that 
could have some ideas about that.
    So where are we today? Today, we're concerned that Russia has 
maintained its democracy, but its economy has been so burdened,

[[Page 561]]

it's caused all kinds of other problems, and that takes a lot of time 
for us. We're working on that. We're trying to maintain our strategic 
partnership with them even as we disagree about the conflict in the 
Balkans.
    Central Europe is in very good shape, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic. Romania, Bulgaria, a lot of other countries--Slovenia--are 
doing better than most people would have imagined they would do. But the 
Balkans are in trouble, and the trouble in the Balkans has exacerbated 
the tensions with Russia, at least in the short run.
    And all I can tell you is, I don't know whether we could have done 
more before. I always prefer to look to tomorrow. I'm not blaming 
anybody for what happened before. I can't do that. I don't know enough 
to know. Everybody had their hands full, and there were so many changes 
going on at once, I'm not sure anyone could have figured out more to do.
    But I can tell you that if you want to think about what you want 
your children to live like, you imagine what do you want to happen in 
Asia; how are we going to work out our relationships with China and deal 
with the remaining security threat in North Korea and try to help Japan 
and the other countries come back? How are we going to have the 
strongest possible alliance in Latin America? What kind of new 
partnership can we have with Africa? But it all could come a cropper 
unless we have a united, democratic, and free Europe. And the three 
things are what I said: our relationship with Russia; what happens in 
the Balkans and southeastern Europe; and will Islam and Christianity be 
able to coexist in a positive way in the underbelly of Europe.
    And so I would say, maybe more could have been done; I don't know. I 
just know now, right now, all those people are fighting over smaller and 
smaller pieces of land. It's like life is a zero-sum game. You kick me 
out of my village; I'll kick you out of your village.
    The Bible says, wisely, ``Where there is no vision, the people 
perish.'' We need to have an alternative vision. They need to be brought 
into the vision of a prosperous Europe. They need to have more to gain 
by working together than they do by having constant fights with one 
another. They need to have--and we need to reach out and lift up, there.
    So, however this conflict ends, or whenever it ends--I think I know 
how it's going to end--but whenever it ends, we have some building to 
do. They have to have something to live for. You just can't tell people 
what they can't do; they've got to have something to be for, something 
to dream of, a future to build. And we ought to be a part of it.
    Thank you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:05 p.m. in the Grand Ballroom at the 
Fairmont Hotel. In his remarks, he referred to Edward Seaton, president, 
American Society of Newspaper Editors; assassinated Serbian publisher 
Slavko Curuvija; President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and Staff Sgt. Andrew A. Ramirez, 
USA, Staff Sgt. Christopher J. Stone, USA, and Specialist Steven M. 
Gonzales, USA, infantrymen in custody in Serbia.