[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
[March 11, 1999]
[Pages 345-350]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange 
With Reporters
March 11, 1999

    The President. Good afternoon. President Aleman, thank you for your words and your leadership. 
President Arzu, thank you so much for bringing 
us to this magnificent place and for hosting this very valuable meeting. 
To all my fellow leaders of the Americas, I thank you for the examples 
you are setting within your countries and by working together.
    As we see here in Guatemala and, indeed, in all the nations 
represented in this extraordinary region, they are blessed with natural 
and with man-made monuments of ancient grace and spectacular beauty. Now 
the people have built a new monument--also spectacular and, hopefully, 
just as enduring--the monument of peace.

Kosovo

    Because of developments in Washington and in Europe, I hope my 
fellow leaders will forgive me if I take my only opportunity today to 
appear before the press to say something about another area in which we 
are working for peace--in Kosovo, where a serious civil conflict has 
been occurring and where much bloodshed might still occur.
    Today our House of Representatives in Washington is debating a 
resolution on the potential deployment of American troops. I hope the 
House will act in a way that supports our efforts to achieve a strong 
peace agreement. I have and will continue to work closely with the 
Congress as we seek to bring peace to Kosovo. As I have repeatedly said, 
a final decision on whether we would send our troops as part of a peace 
force depends upon the achievement of a genuine agreement, on an 
immediate cease-

[[Page 346]]

fire, on rapid withdrawal of most Serbian security forces, and 
demilitarization of the insurgents.
    Both sides must agree to a NATO force. Europe's troops must make up 
the great majority of the forces. And we must have a NATO strategy that 
includes a clear plan for bringing our forces home. If, and only if, 
these conditions are met, I strongly believe United States forces should 
contribute to securing the peace in Kosovo. We have a strong stake in 
bringing peace there, just as we have a strong stake in peace in Central 
America. If we don't end the conflict now, it will spread; and when it 
does, we will not be able to avoid participating in stopping it; and 
when we do, it will come at far greater risk and far greater cost.

Central America Summit

    Now, let me talk a moment about what we have met about today, how to 
turn this region of peace and shared values into a region of joint 
endeavors and common progress. I have made it clear that the United 
States supports greater debt relief, and I outlined my proposal for 
that; that we support more open trade to create jobs and opportunity 
through an enhanced initiative of the Caribbean Basin, the countries of 
Central America and the Caribbean, and eventually through a free-trade 
area of the Americas.
    We also discussed other economic issues: what can be done to 
increase investment in tourism, what can be done in the environment. Our 
United States Agency for International Development, I am pleased to say, 
will contribute another $25 million to support CONCAUSA, the agreement 
we signed in 1994 in Costa Rica to promote environmental cooperation 
among us. This contribution will help the people of Central America to 
protect their forests and coastlands, to reduce industrial pollution, to 
fight climate change.
    We talked a lot about immigration, as you might imagine. I 
reaffirmed my intention to support our immigration laws fairly and 
justly but to work strongly for the elimination of any disparities in 
our law so that they treat Central Americans equitably, whatever their 
country of origin.
    We also spoke today about the danger of gangs and guns and drugs. In 
many ways, they represent the final stage of Central America's internal 
conflicts. We talked about what we could do together to combat them.
    Let me just say in closing that this has been a very moving trip for 
me, personally. When my wife came 
here a few months ago, in the aftermath of the hurricane, she came home 
and talked to me a lot about what she saw and what people were doing. 
But no description can adequately replace the personal experiences of 
what I have seen.
    In Honduras and Nicaragua, I met people who were devastated, but 
undaunted, determined to rebuild in a way that reinforces the 
transformation of this region. In El Salvador, and today in Guatemala, I 
have been privileged to see two nations that have found the courage to 
face a painful past and move forward to build a truly hopeful future.
    At this summit I have seen Central America's leaders working 
together for the future. And I have tried to demonstrate that for the 
future, beyond the service of my Presidency, America must be a partner 
and a friend, not only because it is the right thing to do, but because 
it is in our interest to do so.
    We have never been closer to realizing the dream of a hemispheric 
community based on genuine respect and genuine partnership. Something 
great has happened here in Central America in the last decade. As we 
move out of the past and away from the damage of the hurricanes, we do 
so in a way that we are determined to see this area emerge from 
adversity, in a way that places all of us on higher ground. I am proud 
to have been given the chance to be a part of it.
    Thank you very much.

Global Strategy for Central America

    Q. Good afternoon to all the Presidents. My question is for the 
President of the United States, Mr. Clinton. What do you think of the 
statement by President Alvaro Arzu with regard to the need to have a 
global strategy, a long-term strategy for the Central American region?
    The President. I think he's right about 
that. One of the things that I pointed out in our morning meeting is 
that Central America, for all of its economic difficulties, basically is 
being well managed. And I believe that if there were a way for all these 
leaders together to demonstrate to the world that they are determined to 
avoid the kinds of financial problems and economic problems, for 
example, that have

[[Page 347]]

caused such trouble in Asia and, frankly, caused difficulties for all 
developing economies--caused the interest rates for funds even in 
Central America to go up--if there were a way for this region to say as 
a region, look, we know what caused those problems there; we're not 
going to do that here; this is a good place to invest--then I believe 
not just the United States but people in Europe, people in South 
America, people in Asia would be far more likely to invest here, to 
bring Central America not just into a better partnership with the United 
States but with all the world in a way that would lift the lives of 
people here.
    So I agree with President Arzu that there 
should be a global strategy. But I believe that because we're neighbors, 
for the foreseeable future, for the next 50 years, our major economic 
relationship should be one with another. And that imposes special 
responsibilities on the United States, but it also gives us a lot of 
opportunities.
    The President said to me, and I'd like to say to my fellow Americans 
not only here but those who might be listening to this press conference 
or who will hear the reports of it, that our trade with Central America 
far outstrips our trade with countries that are much, much larger than 
the combined population of Central America. And it has an enormous 
potential to benefit not just the people of this region but the people 
of the United States, as well.

U.S. Congress and Kosovo/Apologies for Past Administrations

    Q. For President Clinton. Mr. President, particularly given that 
part of your reason for being down here is to express your regret and 
apologies for what past White Houses have done over the objections of 
Congress, can you please explain why it is that your administration has 
been so adamant about Congress not registering its opinion on the 
situation in Kosovo, and what exactly is your exit strategy if U.S. 
troops are sent over there?
    The President. Well, first of all, Congress has a right to express 
its opinion on anything it likes. I have two things to say about it. One 
is, it's premature. I do not believe that--until we know that we have 
maximized the chances for both sides to say yes to the peace agreement--
it's not at all clear that they will--I do not believe that the Congress 
should take any action that will, in effect, preempt the peace process 
or encourage either side to say no to it. So I thought it was premature. 
I don't object to Congress expressing its opinion on anything. That's 
their job.
    Secondly, every President has reserved the right to both receive the 
advice and consent and support or endure the opposition of Congress, but 
not to give up the constitutional responsibility to deploy United States 
forces in peacetime. And I think that my predecessors were right about 
that.
    It's not that--what I apologized for has nothing to do with the fact 
that there was a difference between the policy of the administration and 
the Congress in previous years, going back for decades, and including 
administrations of both parties. It is that the policy of the executive 
branch was wrong. And what we're doing here is in the open; it's not a 
secret.
    What was your other question? Oh, the exit strategy. Well, the exit 
strategy should be defined by the missions. You will be able to see that 
we have an exit strategy if we define the missions properly--just as in 
Bosnia we defined the missions and we have cut, I think, reduced our 
troop strength by more than 70 percent now. And we continue to bring 
them down.
    I'm in a sort of a double bind here, you know. We tried in Bosnia to 
give a date certain for when we thought we could withdraw, based on what 
the Pentagon said they believed would happen in cooperation with our 
other agencies. We turned out to be wrong. Then people said, ``Well, 
maybe the President misled us about how long we would stay there.''
    So we decided in Kosovo the right thing to do was to say what the 
benchmarks of the mission would be, and the Congress has to approve 
money every year for such things so they would be able every year to see 
whether we were meeting the benchmarks, but we wouldn't mislead them 
about knowing in advance exactly how long it would take. So when we did 
it that way, then people said, ``Well, we're making an open-ended 
commitment.'' That's not true. I don't intend to make an open-ended 
commitment; I think that would be wrong.

Guatemalan Peace Process

    Q. Question for the President of the United States, Bill Clinton. 
What is your personal opinion of the peace process of Guatemala?
    The President. Well, first of all, I think the fact that you had 
elections and that people are

[[Page 348]]

free to speak their minds, that I met with an elected Vice President of 
Guatemala, who is a representative of 
the indigenous population, yesterday, that the differences are freely 
expressed, and that according to President Arzu, 
you have a free and sometimes contentious and critical press--I'd say 
that's all healthy.
    I also think this commission report was a brave thing to do. And I 
think you know that the United States supports the peace process, 
including the effort to find the truth, even if it's not that favorable 
to the United States. We contributed a million and a half dollars to the 
work of the commission; we declassified 4,000 documents at the request 
of the commission. So I basically support what you are trying to do, 
strongly.
    No nation can tell another exactly how to come to terms with its 
past and to move into the future. And the answer will necessarily be 
different from nation to nation. What South Africa did, what Chile did, 
what El Salvador did will not necessarily work in Guatemala. Neither 
will what you do necessarily work for some other country. The main thing 
is, is there an honest effort being made to bring about reconciliation 
and the rule of law and human rights and genuine freedom? And I don't 
think there is any question that Guatemala has been moving in the right 
direction. And for that, all of us who believe in freedom and human 
rights can be grateful.

Chinese Nuclear Espionage and National Security Adviser Berger

    Q. President Clinton, did your administration ignore evidence of 
nuclear espionage by the Chinese in order to further your policy of 
engagement? And what do you have to say to Republicans calling for Sandy 
Berger's resignation?
    The President. Well, first of all, we did not ignore evidence. Quite 
the contrary; we acted on it. Let me say for the benefit of all the 
press, both American and others, looking at this issue there are two 
questions that need to be looked at separately. One is, did we respond 
in an appropriate, timely, and aggressive way to indications of 
espionage? The second is, is our policy toward China of engagement the 
right one?
    Now, the answer to the first question is, I believe the record is 
clear that we did respond in an appropriate way. In 1996 we were 
notified that there was some indication of a breach of security at one 
of the Energy labs and that the appropriate agencies were investigating. 
The appropriate congressional committees were notified at the same time. 
Since then, they have received at least 16 briefings on this issue.
    Now, in 1997, in July, we were notified that the scope of the 
potential espionage might be very broad and might be directly related to 
lax security at the Energy labs. At that time, we moved quickly and 
decisively not only with the continuing FBI investigation and with the 
CIA review but also with an intense review of the counterintelligence 
capacities of our Energy Department labs.
    As a result of that, in February of '98, I signed a Presidential 
directive to dramatically improve the counterintelligence capacities of 
the lab. In April of '98 we set up a counterintelligence office by the 
Energy labs, headed by a 35-year FBI veteran 
with a record of dealing with espionage. We doubled the 
counterintelligence budget. We raised the standards for foreign visitors 
to the labs; we said foreign scientists had to be accompanied to the 
labs. I think we began to polygraph DOE employees at some point. Only 
two agencies, DOE and the CIA, have their employees subject to 
polygraphs.
    Simultaneous with that, in terms of technology controls, we subject 
China to the tightest restrictions of technology transfer that we have 
on any country that is not on an embargo list for the United States. So 
I think the record is that we acted aggressively. I think Mr. 
Berger acted appropriately, and therefore, 
I would not release him or ask for his resignation. I just don't think 
there's any evidence to support that.
    Now, let me say, the second question--and this affects the welfare 
of everybody else in the world, if you realize how China is growing, 
both economically and the size of their population; this affects the 
welfare of every person in Central America--whether the United States 
and China are at odds in a conflict or have a constructive relationship 
that has honest disagreements, where nobody is under any illusions that 
the facts are different than they are.
    I would argue that our efforts to have an honest and open policy 
with China, so that they don't think that we have made a decision in 
advance to try to contain and limit them in their economic growth and 
their development as a nation, has paid dividends. I do not believe

[[Page 349]]

that China would have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; I do not believe they would have 
practiced the restraint they have practiced in the transfer of various 
dangerous materials to countries like Iran and Pakistan if we had not 
been constructively engaged with them.
    I do not believe that we would have had the level of cooperation in 
Korea in trying to limit North Korea's ability to develop nuclear 
capacity that we have had. I do not believe we would have had the 
cooperation we have had in trying to limit the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis, which has plunged tens of millions of people from the 
middle class into poverty in Asia and represents the biggest short-term 
threat to democracy and to stability in Asia. I do not believe those 
things would have occurred if we had not had an open, candid, honest 
relationship with China, aware of all the facts.
    Keep in mind, this is about a case that developed in the mid-
eighties. We have known about China's nuclear capacity and their 
capacity to pose a strategic threat and, more or less, what the 
dimensions of that were since the 1980's. And this raises the question 
of whether some espionage in the eighties was somehow related to that 
capacity. We have investigated it; we continue to investigate it. We 
have dramatically increased our counterintelligence. I believe we have 
taken all appropriate steps.
    I do not believe that that evidence justifies an isolated no-contact 
relationship with China when we have gotten the benefits, not only to 
ourselves but to the rest of the world, of our engagement policy.

Central American Immigrants

    Q. I have a question for President Clinton. What are the commitments 
that the U.S. has acquired with Central America with regard to the 
migratory problem?
    The President. Well, as you know, for one thing, I stayed all the 
deportations for all the countries affected by the hurricanes. I had to 
lift the stay for all the countries, other than Honduras and Nicaragua, 
because under our law a temporary stay because of the collapse, in 
effect, of the national infrastructure of a country due to natural 
disaster is very specific in our law.
    The fundamental problem with American law is that, essentially, with 
regard to people who have been in the United States a long time, is that 
we treat people from different Central American countries differently 
based on the source of the oppression of human rights, rather than 
whether people had hardships that caused them to come to the United 
States.
    The commitment I made was twofold: One, that within the law--and I 
brought Doris Meissner, our Immigration 
Commissioner here with me--that within the law, I would do all I could 
to avoid a disruptive return to people because of the law that I think 
we all admit is unfair; but that in the end, to fix the problem 
entirely, we would require legislative change, and I would seek that 
from the Congress. And I believe there is support from Members of both 
parties for that sort of change.
    Now, beyond that, I recognize that most of the people who might 
still want to come to the United States, particularly in the aftermath 
of the hurricanes, are not by nature lawbreakers. They're people looking 
for a better life for themselves and for their families. But we have to 
enforce our immigration laws. And if we don't, it's not fair not only to 
people in other parts of the world but to other Central Americans. There 
are thousands and thousands of Central Americans who have registered to 
come to our country, under the laws that exist now, in a lawful way. 
There is no reason that people who line up like that and try to do it 
should be deprived of their legal right to come to the United States as 
a result of a reaction in our country because of the large flow of 
illegal immigrants.
    So I made a commitment to try to be as reasonable as possible under 
the existing law, but I have to uphold the law. I made a commitment to 
try to change the law to treat all people from all Central American 
countries the same. And finally, let me say, I believe the most 
important commitment that I made is the commitment on debt relief, to 
pass our aid package to help the reconstruction effort--which is a 
genuine emergency--to try to expand trade, to try to develop the 
economy. In the end, economic development at home will stem the flood of 
illegal immigration--genuine opportunities for people--more than 
anything else we can do. So those were the commitments that I made.

NATO and Kosovo

    Q. President Clinton, you've said often that NATO is prepared to act 
if the Serbs attacked

[[Page 350]]

ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Violence is now on the rise. Why isn't NATO 
responding, and what are you doing to keep the peace talks from 
collapsing there?
    The President. Well, as you know, Senator Dole 
has just come back from Kosovo, also I think quite frustrated. The real 
problem, of course, is--I don't want this to be misinterpreted. There is 
no, in my view, moral equivalence between what has been done by the 
Serbs and what has been done by the Kosovar Albanians to try to secure 
the autonomy which was unlawfully stripped from them a decade ago. But 
it is clear that in this interim period, when they went home from 
Rambouillet and they're arguing about whether they should take this 
peace agreement, there are a lot of tensions and crosscurrents.
    The consensus among our NATO Allies now is that in the next few days 
we should be doing everything we possibly can to get these people on 
both sides to realize that this is--it is crazy for them to go to war, 
to kill each other, to compromise their children's future, when they 
have an agreement which, from the point of view of Mr. 
Milosevic, only requires him to do what 
the law requires him to do anyway, to respect the autonomy of the 
Kosovar Albanians; which, from the point of view of the Kosovars, avoids 
a bloody war and gives them a chance to establish the mechanisms of 
self-government without foreclosing or guaranteeing a future of 
independence, to see how they do in the next 3 years.
    It seems to me that a present war is the worst of all circumstances. 
Now, if the prospect of the agreement were totally destroyed by an 
outright military offensive, I would be the first to argue that our NATO 
Allies have to take action and take action now. But the situation is, 
frankly--even though you're absolutely right; there have been some 
actions by the Serbs--the situation is sufficiently murky and the 
present status of the peace agreement and whether either side can bring 
itself to agree is sufficiently shaky that all the NATO Allies at this 
moment on this day believe that we should devote all of our energies 
trying to get the agreement.
    But I can speak for myself and, I believe, at least for most of my 
NATO Allies, that if this thing come apart at the seams, we still have a 
commitment. And I'm determined to honor our commitment.

Note: The President spoke at 4:07 p.m. in the Casa Santo Domingo, 
Convention Center. In his remarks, he referred to President Arnoldo 
Aleman of Nicaragua; President Alvaro Arzu and Vice President Luis 
Alberto Flores of Guatemala; Edward Curran, Director of 
Counterintelligence, Department of Energy; former Senator Bob Dole; and 
President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro). The President also referred to the Joint 
Central American-United States Declaration (CONCAUSA) and Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD) 61.