[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
[March 3, 1999]
[Pages 291-299]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



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Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
March 3, 1999

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
    Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the 
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to 
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). My last report, consistent with Public 
Law 102-1, was transmitted on December 18, 1998.

Overview

    As stated in my December 18 report, on December 16, United States 
and British forces launched military strikes on Iraq (Operation Desert 
Fox) to degrade Iraq's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and to degrade its ability to threaten its neighbors. 
The decision to use force was made after U.N. Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) Executive Chairman Richard Butler 
reported to the U.N. Secretary General on 
December 14, that Iraq was not cooperating fully with the Commission and 
that it was ``not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work 
mandated to it by the Security Council.''
    The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when the Iraqi 
government suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except on a limited-range of monitoring 
activities. On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all 
cooperation with UNSCOM. In response to this decision, the Security 
Council on November 5 unanimously adopted Resolution 1205, which 
condemned Iraq's decision as a ``flagrant violation'' of the Gulf War 
cease-fire Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions. Resolution 
1205 also demanded that Iraq immediately rescind both its October 31 
decision and its decision of August 5. This came after the passage on 
March 3, 1998, of Resolution 1154, warning Iraq that the ``severest 
consequences'' would result from Iraq's failure to cooperate with the 
implementation of Resolution 687.
    Iraq ignored the Security Council's demands until November 14, when 
U.S. and British forces prepared to launch air strikes on Iraq. Baghdad 
initially tried to impose unacceptable conditions on its offer of 
resumption of cooperation; however, the United States and Great Britain 
insisted on strict compliance with all relevant Security Council 
resolutions.
    Subsequently, Iraq agreed in writing in letters to the U.N. 
Secretary General to rescind its August 5 and October 31 decisions and 
to resume full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in accordance with 
Security Council resolutions. Iraq informed the Security Council on 
November 14 that it was the ``clear and unconditional decision of the 
Iraqi government to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.''
    On November 15, the Security Council issued a statement in which it 
stressed that Iraq's commitment ``needs to be established by 
unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and 
the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities provided for 
in their mandates.''
    UNSCOM and the IAEA resumed their full range of activities on 
November 17, but Iraq repeatedly violated its commitment of cooperation. 
As Chairman Butler's report of December 14 
details, Iraq has, over the course of the last 8 years, refused to 
provide the key documents and critical explanations about its prohibited 
weapons programs in response to UNSCOM's outstanding requests. It 
refused to allow removal of missile engine components, denied access to 
missile test data, restricted photography of bombs, and endangered the 
safety of inspectors by aggressively maneuvering a helicopter near them. 
Iraq failed to provide requested access to archives and effectively 
blocked UNSCOM from visiting a site on November 25.
    On December 4 and again on December 11, Iraq further restricted 
UNSCOM's activities by asserting that certain teams could not inspect on 
Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, despite 7 years of doing so and the fact 
that other inspection teams' activities were not restricted on Fridays. 
Iraq blocked access to offices of the ruling Ba'ath Party on December 9, 
which UNSCOM held ``solid evidence'' contained prohibited materials. 
Iraq routinely removed documents from

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facilities prior to inspection, and initiated new forms of restrictions 
on UNSCOM's work. We also have information that Iraq ordered the 
military to destroy WMD-related documents in anticipation of the UNSCOM 
inspections.
    Iraq's actions were a material breach of the Gulf War cease-fire 
resolution (UNSC Resolution 687), the February 23, 1998, Annan-Aziz 
Memorandum of Understanding, and Iraq's November 14 commitment to the 
Security Council. The threat to the region posed by Iraq's refusal to 
cooperate unconditionally with UNSCOM, and the consequent inability of 
UNSCOM to carry out the responsibilities the Security Council entrusted 
to it, could not be tolerated. These circumstances led the United States 
and the United Kingdom to use military force to degrade Iraq's capacity 
to threaten its neighbors through the development of WMD and long-range 
delivery systems. During Desert Fox, key WMD sites and the facilities of 
the organizations that conceal them, as well as important missile repair 
facilities and surface-to-air missile sites, were attacked. Operation 
Desert Fox degraded Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors 
militarily.
    UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq on December 15 when 
Chairman Butler reported that inspectors were not able to conduct the 
substantive disarmament work required of UNSCOM by the Security Council. 
The United States continues to support UNSCOM and the IAEA as the agreed 
mechanisms for Iraq to demonstrate its compliance with UNSC resolutions 
concerning disarmament.
    Since December 18, the Security Council has discussed next steps on 
Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish three assessment panels to 
address disarmament issues, humanitarian issues, and Kuwait-related 
issues. The panels, under the chairmanship of the Brazilian Ambassador 
to the United Nations, are due to complete 
their reviews by April 15.
    The United States also continues to support the international 
community's efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. On November 24, 1998, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1210 establishing a new 
6-month phase (phase five) of the oil-for-food program (phase four ended 
November 25). In January, the United States announced its support for 
lifting the ceiling on oil sales under the oil-for-food program so that 
Iraqi civilian humanitarian needs can better be met.
    As long as Saddam Hussein remains in 
power, he represents a threat to the well-being of his people, the peace 
of the region, and the security of the world. We will continue to 
contain the threat he poses, but over the long term the best way to 
address that threat is through a new government in Baghdad. To that end, 
we--working with the Congress--are deepening our engagement with the 
forces for change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more effective 
voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Our efforts are discussed 
in more detail below.

U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region

    Saddam's record of aggressive behavior 
compels us to retain a highly capable force in the region in order to 
deter Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the 
reconstitution of its WMD program, or movement against the Kurds in 
northern Iraq. We demonstrated our resolve in mid-December when forces 
in the region carried out Operation Desert Fox to degrade Iraq's ability 
to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and its ability to 
threaten its neighbors. We will continue to maintain a robust posture 
and have established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our 
forces in the Gulf, if needed.
    Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based aircraft, 
surface warships, a Marine Expeditionary unit, a Patriot missile 
battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special 
operations forces deployed in support of U.S. Central Command. To 
enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military 
security personnel are also deployed. Because of the increased air-
defense threat to coalition aircraft, we have also added a robust 
personnel recovery capability.

Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern Watch and Operation 
Southern Watch. Since December 23, following the conclusion of Desert 
Fox, we have seen a significant increase in the frequency, intensity, 
and coordination of the Iraqi air defense system to counter enforcement 
of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U.S. and coalition aircraft

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enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject to multiple anti-aircraft 
artillery (AAA) firings, radar illuminations, and over 20 surface-to-air 
missile attacks. Subsequent to Desert Fox, Iraq significantly increased 
its air defense presence in both the north and south, but it has since 
returned to pre-Desert Fox levels. Despite the decrease, however, Iraq 
has not ceased threatening coalition aircraft.
    In response to Iraq's increased and repeated no-fly zone violations, 
and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense's advice, our aircrews have been authorized by me to respond 
to the increased Iraqi threat. United States and coalition forces can 
defend themselves against any Iraqi threat in carrying out their no-fly 
zone enforcement mission. On over 50 occasions since December, U.S. and 
coalition forces have engaged the Iraqi integrated air defense system. 
As a consequence, the Iraqi air defense system has been degraded 
substantially further since December.

The Maritime Interception Force

    The multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in 
accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions, enforces 
U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest 
component of the MIF, but it is frequently augmented by ships, aircraft, 
and other support from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Kuwait, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide logistical support and 
shipriders to the MIF and accept vessels diverted for violating U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful providing 
significant naval and coast guard assistance. Additionally, they 
accepted over 15 diverted sanctions violators.
    Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise most of 
the prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a growing number of 
ships smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in violation of U.N. 
sanctions and outside the parameters of the humanitarian oil-for-food 
program. In early December, the MIF conducted the latest in a series of 
periodic surge operations in the far northern Gulf near the major Iraqi 
waterways. These operations disrupted smuggling in the region. Kuwait 
and the UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts. Although 
partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra refinery 
inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact on Iraq's gas and 
oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
    In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile 
batteries to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The missiles in 
question, with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles, could reach far into 
the North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious threat to the MIF. The 
deployment of these missiles to a position from which they could engage 
coalition naval forces was carried out in concert with the increased 
attempts to shoot down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones and 
constituted an enhancement of Iraq's military capability in southern 
Iraq. Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the threat posed 
by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so as necessary.

Chemical Weapons

    After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional cooperation 
with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the Iraqi promise. In a 
November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny that it ever weaponized VX 
nerve agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated 
confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory finding of stabilized VX 
components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Iraq alleges 
that the presence of VX was a deliberate act of tampering with the 
samples examined in the United States.
    On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM efforts to 
determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled with mustard chemical 
agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with such an effort when 
logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to cooperate in verifying the 
tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and in determining the precise locations 
of pits that had been used for the field storage of special warheads at 
Fallujah Forest and the Tigris Canal.
    On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to provide 
various documents Chairman Butler requested 
pertaining to Iraq's chemical weapons program. Included in this request 
was the Iraqi Air Force file of documents found previously by UNSCOM 
inspectors that details chemical weapons expended during the Iran-Iraq 
war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the file indicates that Iraq's 
official declarations to UNSCOM have greatly overstated the quantities 
of chemical weapons expended, which means that at least 6,000 chemical 
weapons are unaccounted.

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    In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons disarmament 
issues: VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air Force file of 
chemical weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled with CBW (field 
inspections needed); and chemical weapons production equipment (field 
verification is needed for 18 of 20 shipping containers UNSCOM knows 
were moved together). On monitoring, the report identified as priorities 
the ability to verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to 
detect construction of new dual-use facilities.

Biological Weapons

    Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for UNSCOM tests 
that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD missile warheads. Iraq has 
been claiming since 1995 that it put anthrax in only five such warheads, 
and had previously denied weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's 
explanations to date are far from satisfactory, although it now 
acknowledges putting both anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number 
of warheads.
    Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program--including SCUD missile BW 
warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, spray devices 
for BW, production of BW agents (anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, 
and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media--remains the ``black 
hole'' described by Chairman Butler. Iraq has 
consistently failed to provide a credible account of its efforts to 
produce and weaponize its BW agents.
    During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an undeclared 
Class II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses were discovered; 
these items are subject to declarations by Iraq and biological 
monitoring.
    On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler 
again asked Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister for information concerning 
Iraq's biological weapons programs. Iraq has supplied none of the 
information requested.
    In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological weapons 
disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on ``the whole scope of 
the BW program.'' The declarations are important because ``Iraq 
possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base, through which 
biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume.'' The 
report also identified the importance of monitoring dual-use biological 
items, equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at 250 listed 
sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is ``proportional to Iraq's 
cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored sites, and to 
the number of inspectors.''

Long-Range Missiles

    Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further its system 
for concealment of longer range missiles and their components, (2) 
refusing to provide credible evidence of its disposition of large 
quantities of the unique fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile, 
and (3) continuing to test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air 
missile components appear intended to enhance Iraq's capability to 
produce a surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted 
range of 150 km.
    While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 imported Soviet-
made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give UNSCOM a credible 
accounting of the indigenous program that produced complete SCUD 
missiles that were both successfully test-flown and delivered to the 
Iraqi Army.
    In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority missile 
disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional warheads; 500 tons 
of SCUD propellants, the destruction of which has not been verified; 7 
Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to the army, the destruction of which cannot 
be verified; truckloads of major components for SCUD production that are 
missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the lack of accounting for 
VX-filled war-heads. The report identified as priorities the capability 
to monitor declared activities, leaps in missile technology, and changes 
to declared operational missiles. There are 80 listed missile sites.

Nuclear Weapons

    After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of 
noncooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the Iraqi pledge 
of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei's December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation 
stated: ``The Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary level of 
cooperation to enable the above-enumerated activities [ongoing 
monitoring] to be completed efficiently

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and effectively.'' In its 6-month report to the Security Council on 
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a ``technically coherent'' view 
of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that time, the IAEA also stated its 
remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear program can be dealt with 
within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) effort. In the 
IAEA's February 8 report to the U.N. Security Council it reiterated this 
position.
    Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in response to 
the Security Council's May 14 Presidential Statement. This statement 
noted that the IAEA continues to have questions and concerns regarding 
foreign assistance, abandonment of the program, and the extent of Iraqi 
progress in weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal legislation 
prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to Resolution 687.
    In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council 
President, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized previous IAEA assessments of Iraq's compliance 
with its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. The report 
restates that ``Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures 
and enact penal laws, to implement and enforce compliance with Iraq's 
obligations under Resolutions 687 and 707, other relevant Security 
Council resolutions and the IAEA OMV plan, as required under paragraph 
34 of that plan.'' The IAEA states that the three areas where questions 
on Iraq's nuclear disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation, 
lack of information on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear 
weapons program, and lack of information on Iraq's abandonment of its 
nuclear weapons program) would not prevent the full implementation of 
its OMV plan.
    The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and verification 
under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report, the IAEA restated that 
monitoring must be ``intrusive'' and estimated annual monitoring costs 
would total nearly $10 million.

Dual-Use Imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor 
Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit 
before it imports specific items that can be used in both weapons of 
mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must 
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items. 
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is no 
monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has presented new 
challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and is taken into 
consideration in the approval process.

The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    We continue to support the international community's efforts to 
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the oil-
for-food program. Transition from phase four to phase five (authorized 
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four, 
Iraq is again authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 
180 days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was only 
able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of oil during 
phase four. Since the first deliveries under oil-for-food began in March 
1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and over $497 million worth of medicine 
and health supplies have been delivered to Iraq.
    As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food program, 
contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth of humanitarian 
goods for the Iraqi people have been presented to the U.N. Office of the 
Iraq Program for review by the Sanctions Committee; of these, contracts 
worth over $1.6 billion have been approved; most of the remaining 
contracts are being processed by the Office of the Iraq Program. As of 
February 4, the United States had approved 584 contracts in phase four 
and had placed 28 on hold pending clarification of questions about the 
proposed contracts.
    With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and equipment to 
increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333 contracts with a total value 
of nearly $178 million have been approved; 94 contracts are on hold. In 
January, the United States released a number of holds on oil spare parts 
contracts. Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase four of the 
oil-for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment to increase 
Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available humanitarian funding. The 
United States had requested holds on contracts that did not directly 
boost oil exports. As the current phase of oil-for-food again sets aside 
$300 million for this purpose, the United States decided to remove holds 
on lower priority contracts.

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    The Security Council met in January to discuss the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq. The United States supported an examination of the 
current situation and exploration of ways to improve the humanitarian 
situation, particularly with regard to vulnerable groups such as 
children under age five, and pregnant and nursing women. The United 
States has expressed its support for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil 
exports under the oil-for-food program, and has suggested some 
streamlining of approval of food and medicine contracts in the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee.
    Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi 
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's obligations 
regarding Kuwait. The panels are expected to complete their work by the 
middle of April.
    Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program for 
northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in 
consultation with the local population. This program, which the United 
States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds 
generated under the oil-for-food program. The separate northern program 
was established because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the 
humanitarian needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of 
northern Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of 
repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not 
exercise control, the oil-for-food program has been able to operate 
relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are setting aside their 
differences to work together so that Resolution 1210 is implemented as 
efficiently as possible.
    The United Nations is required to monitor carefully implementation 
of all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The current phase marked by 
Resolution 1210 anticipates infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil 
export capacity, generation of electricity, and water purification. The 
U.N. monitoring regime is presented with increasing challenges, as 
UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
    Humanitarian programs such as oil-for-food have steadily improved 
the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions (who, for example, 
now receives a ration basket providing over 2,000 calories per day, a 
significant improvement in nutrition since the program began) while 
denying Saddam Hussein control over oil 
revenues. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the 
Security Council, and others in the international community to ensure 
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while denying 
any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

Northern Iraq: Kurdish Reconciliation

    Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary 
Albright in September, Massoud 
Barzani, President of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, 
Chairman of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have met three times 
to continue their work towards full reconciliation. Both parties have 
condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain from violence in 
settling their differences, and resolved to eliminate terrorism by 
establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's borders. Our deep concern 
for the safety, security, and economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, 
Sunnis, and others who have been subject to brutal attacks by the 
Baghdad regime remains a primary focus of our Iraq policy.
    On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom 
joined us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative achievement of 
Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states reiterated the importance of 
preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and noted, with 
pleasure, the prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this principle. 
We also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny sanctuary to 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to eliminate all PKK bases from the 
region, and to safeguard the Turkish border. The parties believe that 
key decisions on Iraq's future should be made by all the Iraqi people 
together at an appropriate time and in a regular political process. 
Their work to achieve the principles embodied in the Ankara Statements 
are thus meant to implement a framework of regional administration until 
a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq is achieved.
    On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S., U.K., or Turkish 
interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq. They reiterated their 
determination to implement the September agreement, made concrete 
progress on key issues of revenue sharing and closing down PKK bases, 
and agreed to stay in close contact.
    The United States is committed to ensuring that international aid 
continues to reach the north, that the human rights of the Kurds and 
northern Iraq minority groups, such as the

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Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and that the no-
fly-zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is observed. The United 
States will decide how and when to respond should Baghdad's actions pose 
an increased threat to Iraq's neighbors, to regional security, to vital 
U.S. interests, and to the Iraqi people, including those in the north.

The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause 
for grave concern. As I reported November 5, the Iraqi army has stepped 
up repressive operations against the Shia in the south. In mid-November, 
we received unconfirmed reports from the Iraqi opposition that 150 
persons had been executed at Amara, with three bodies left hanging on 
the city's main bridge over the Tigris River as a warning to those who 
oppose the regime. An additional 172 persons, some detained since 1991, 
were reported to have been summarily executed in Abu Gharaib and 
Radwaniya prisons; as in prior waives of summary prison killings, bodies 
showing clear signs of torture were reportedly returned to their 
families. Reports reached us in December that a mass grave containing at 
least 25 bodies was found near the Khoraisan River in Diyala province, 
east of Baghdad.
    The Iraqi government continues to work toward the destruction of the 
Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique ecology of the southern marshes. 
In the past 2 months, 7 more villages were reportedly destroyed on the 
margins of the marshes, with irrigation water cut off and the vegetation 
cut down and burned. Those who could not flee to the interior of the 
marshes--particularly the old, infirm, women, and children--were said to 
have been taken hostage by regime forces.
    On February 19, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr was murdered in Iraq along with several of 
his relatives. Opposition sources indicate this murder was the work of 
the Saddam regime. The regime also violently suppressed demonstrations 
that followed in Baghdad and other cities opposing the murder.
    In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government 
continues the forced expulsion of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk 
and other cities. In recent months, hundreds of families have reportedly 
been expelled from Kirkuk with seven new Arab settlements created on 
land seized from the Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-controlled areas 
where the displaced persons are received indicate that they are forced 
to leave behind almost all of their personal property. Due to a shortage 
of housing, they are still living in temporary shelters.
    A conference on the research and treatment of victims of chemical 
and biological weapons attacks in northern Iraq, organized by the 
Washington Kurdish Institute and sponsored by the Department of State 
was held on November 18-19, 1998. The conference focused on the long-
range effects of the Iraqi chemical attack on the village of Halabja, 
where nearly 5,000 persons were killed in 1988. According to panelists, 
the hideous combination of mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, tear gas, and 
possibly aflatoxin that the Iraqi military used in the attack has 
resulted in dramatically increased rates of cancer, respiratory 
problems, heart failure, infertility, miscarriages, and possibly genetic 
damage in the surviving population.
    On December 1, the London-based INDICT organization announced that 
12 senior Iraqi officials--including Saddam Hussein, his sons Uday and 
Qusay, his half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, Vice President Taha Yasin 
Ramadan, and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz--would be the focus of its 
campaign for prosecution by an international tribunal.
    The Iraqi government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to 
account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who 
disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the 
occupation of Kuwait, despite a Security Council resolution requiring it 
to do so. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent human rights 
monitors to enter Iraq, despite repeated requests by U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel. 
The U.N. Human Rights Commission has issued a strong condemnation of the 
``all-pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government.

The Iraqi Opposition

    We are deepening our engagement with the forces of change in Iraq, 
helping Iraqis inside and outside Iraq become a more effective voice for 
the aspirations of the people. We will work toward the day when Iraq has 
a government worthy of its people--a government prepared to live in 
peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its 
citizens, rather than represses them. On October 31, I signed

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into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It provides significant new 
discretionary authorities to assist the opposition in its struggle 
against the regime. On January 19, I submitted to the Congress a 
notification of my intent to designate certain groups under the Act; I 
designated those groups on February 4. The assessment of additional 
groups that may qualify for assistance under the Act is progressing. 
Also on October 31, Radio Free Iraq began operations. Its broadcasts are 
being heard in Iraq and its message profoundly displeases the regime.
    On November 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs, Martin Indyk, met with 17 London-
based representatives of the Iraqi opposition. He heard the full range 
of views of the parties present, and outlined the new U.S. policy toward 
the opposition. Indyk urged them to work together toward the common 
purpose of a new government in Baghdad; the United States will help, but 
the opposition itself must take the lead. He urged them to do all they 
could to get a message to the people of Iraq that there is an 
alternative to Saddam Hussein, adding that 
the United States will support the campaign to indict Saddam as a war 
criminal.
    Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi outlined a number of agreed points to Indyk. The group: 
1) welcomed the new U.S. policy toward the opposition; 2) will work to 
create a democratic government in Iraq; 3) will redouble efforts to get 
all groups to work together; 4) wants the opposition to serve as an 
interlocutor for the Iraqi people with the international community; and 
5) expressed thanks for the U.S. role in the recent Kurdish 
reconciliation.
    On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the appointment of Frank 
Ricciardone as Special Representative 
for Transition in Iraq (SRTI). He will abbreviate his current tour as 
Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara, and take up his new responsibilities 
in early March. He traveled with the Secretary of State to London, 
Riyadh, and Cairo in late January to discuss U.S. policy on this issue. 
He outlined U.S. intentions to help Iraq resume its rightful place in 
the region--a goal the United States believes can only be achieved under 
new Iraqi leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis--who 
alone can make this happen--inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as well as 
with Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives.
    There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These 
include the maintenance of Security Council support for efforts to 
eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and missile programs, and economic 
sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute 
those threats to international peace and security. United States support 
for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those 
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be attuned to 
what Iraqis can effectively make use of as it develops over time.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established 
pursuant to Resolutions 687, 692, and 1210, continues to resolve claims 
against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3 million awards worth approximately 
$7 billion. Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted 
by Security Council resolutions have been allocated to the Compensation 
Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of the UNCC. Pursuant to 
decisions of the UNCC Governing Council, certain small claims are to 
receive initial payments of $2,500 toward the amounts approved on those 
claims before large claims of individuals and claims of corporations and 
governments may share in the funds available for claims payments. As 
money from Iraqi oil sales is deposited in the Compensation Fund the 
UNCC makes these initial $2,500 payments on eligible claims in the order 
in which those claims were approved by the UNCC. To date, the United 
States Government has received funds from the UNCC for initial 
installment payments on approximately 1435 claims of U.S. claimants.

Conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I 
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations 
under Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward to 
the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and 
law-abiding member. I appreciate the support of the Congress for our 
efforts and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.

[[Page 299]]

        Sincerely,

                                                      William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of 
the Senate.