[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
[February 4, 1999]
[Pages 167-171]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Congress Reporting on Efforts To Achieve a Sustainable 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
February 4, 1999

To the Congress of the United States:
    Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing this 
report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This is the first semiannual 
report that evaluates progress in BiH against the ten benchmarks 
(``aims'') outlined in my certification to the Congress of March 3, 
1998. NATO adopted these benchmarks on May 28, 1998, as part of its 
approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military operations plan 
(OPLAN 10407). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) subsequently adopted corresponding benchmarks in its Luxembourg 
Declaration of June 9, 1998.
    NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and my 
Administration have coordinated closely in evaluating progress on Dayton 
implementation based on these benchmarks. There

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is general agreement that there has been considerable progress in the 
past year. The basic institutions of the state, both political and 
economic, have been established. Key laws regarding foreign investment, 
privatization, and property are now in place. Freedom of movement across 
the country has substantially improved. Fundamental reform of the media 
is underway. Elections have demonstrated a continuing trend towards 
growing pluralism. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done, in 
particular on interethnic tolerance and reconciliation, the development 
of effective common institutions with powers clearly delineated from 
those of the Entities, and an open and pluralistic political life. The 
growth of organized crime also represents a serious threat.
    With specific reference to SFOR, the Secretaries of State and Defense, in 
meetings in December 1998 with their NATO counterparts, agreed that SFOR 
continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of peace and 
stability and the provision of a secure environment in BiH, thus 
contributing significantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as a single, 
democratic, and multiethnic state. At the same time, NATO agreed that we 
do not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at current levels 
indefinitely, and in fact agreed on initial reductions, which I will 
describe later in this report. Below is a benchmark-by-benchmark 
evaluation of the state-of-play in BiH based on analysis of input from 
multiple sources.
    1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire. Considerable 
progress has been made toward military stabilization in BiH. Entity 
Armed Forces (EAFs) are in compliance with Dayton, and there have been 
no incidents affecting the cease-fire. EAFs remain substantially divided 
along ethnic lines. Integration of the Federation Army does not reach 
down to corps-level units and below. However, progress has been made 
through the Train and Equip Program to integrate the Ministry of Defense 
and to provide the Federation with a credible deterrent capability. 
Although it is unlikely to meet its target of full integration by August 
1999, the Federation Ministry of Defense has begun staff planning for 
integration. The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continues its relationship with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army. Similarly, the Bosnian 
Croat element of the Federation Army maintains ties with Croatia. In 
both cases, however, limited resources impinge on what either Croatia or 
the FRY can provide financially or materially; the overall trend in 
support is downward. In some areas, the VRS continues to have certain 
qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Federation Army, but 
the Train and Equip Program has helped narrow the gap in some key areas. 
The arms control regimes established under Articles II (confidence and 
security-building measures) and IV (arms reduction and limitations) of 
Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Accords are functioning. In October 1997, 
BiH and the other parties were recognized as being in compliance with 
the limitations on five major types of armaments (battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) set 
forth in the Article IV agreement, which were derived from the Annex 1B 
5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic of Croatia, and BiH respectively. The 
parties have since maintained armament levels consistent with the 
limitations and are expected to do so in the future. A draft mandate for 
an Article V agreement (regional stability) has been approved; 
negotiations are due to begin in early 1999. Military stability remains 
dependent on SFOR as a deterrent force.
    2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured and 
democratic police force in both entities. There has been considerable 
progress to date on police reform due to sustained joint efforts of the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF), Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), and SFOR, which have overcome a number of 
significant political obstacles. So far, approximately 85 percent of the 
police in the Federation have received IPTF-approved training, as have 
approximately 35 percent of the police in the Republika Srbska (RS). All 
sides continue to lag in the hiring of minority officers and, as the 
IPTF implements its plans to address this problem, tensions will 
increase in the short-term. SFOR often must support the IPTF in the face 
of crime, public disorder, and rogue police. Monoethnic police forces 
have often failed to facilitate minority returns. In these types of 
scenarios, SFOR's use of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) has 
been a force multiplier, requiring fewer, but specially trained troops. 
At this point, SFOR's essential contribution to maintaining a secure 
environment, to include backing up IPTF in support of nascent civilian 
police forces, remains critical to continued progress.

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    3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform program. 
Several key steps forward were taken in 1998, such as the signing of an 
MOU on Inter-Entity Legal Assistance on May 20, 1998, and establishment 
of an Inter-Entity Legal Commission on June 4, 1998. The Federation 
Parliament in July adopted a new criminal code. Nevertheless, the 
judicial system still requires significant reform. Judges are still 
influenced by politics, and the system is financially strapped and 
remains ethnically biased. Execution of judgments, in particular 
eviction of persons who illegally occupy dwellings, is especially 
problematic. The progress made in the area of commercial law is 
encouraging for economic development prospects.
    4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption. Aim: The 
dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. Corruption remains a 
major challenge to building democratic institutions of government. 
Structures for independent monitoring of government financial 
transactions are still not in place. Shadow institutions still need to 
be eliminated. The burden of creating institutions to combat fraud and 
organized crime falls mostly to the international community and in 
particular to the IPTF. SFOR contributes to the secure environment 
necessary for the success of other international efforts to counter 
these illegal activities.
    5. Media Reform. Aim: Regulated, democratic, and independent media. 
Approximately 80 percent television coverage has been achieved in BiH 
through the international community's support for the Open Broadcasting 
Network (OBN), which is the first (and so far only) neutral source of 
news in BiH. Several television and radio networks have been 
restructured and are led by new management boards. Most are in 
compliance with Dayton except for some regional broadcasts. The 
Independent Media Commission assumed responsibility for media monitoring 
from the OSCE on October 31, 1998. Progress has been significant, but 
BiH still has far to go to approach international standards. SFOR's past 
actions in this area are a key deterrent against illegal use of media 
assets to undermine Dayton implementation.
    6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National democratic 
institutions and practices. With the exception of the election of a 
nationalist to the RS presidency, the September 1998 national elections 
continued the long-term trend away from reliance on ethnically based 
parties. The two major Serb nationalist parties lost further ground and, 
once again, will be unable to lead the RS government. Croat and Bosniak 
nationalist parties retained control, but saw margins eroded 
significantly. In this regard, SFOR's continued presence will facilitate 
conduct of the municipal elections scheduled for late 1999 but, as has 
been the case with every election since Dayton, the trend of 
increasingly turning over responsibility for elections to the Bosnians 
themselves will continue.
    7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reforms. While the process 
of economic recovery and transformation will take many years, some 
essential groundwork has been laid. Privatization legislation and 
enterprise laws have been passed, and banking legislation has been 
partially passed. Fiscal revenues from taxes and customs have increased 
significantly. Nevertheless, the fiscal and revenue system is in its 
infancy. Implementation of privatization legislation is slow and the 
banking sector is under-funded, but there are signs of development in 
GDP. There has been a marked increase in freedom of movement, further 
enhanced by the uniform license plate law. SFOR's continued contribution 
to a secure environment and facilitating freedom of movement is vital as 
economic reforms begin to take hold.
    8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A functioning 
phased and orderly minority return process. While there have been some 
significant breakthroughs on DPRE returns to minority areas, such as 
Jajce, Stolac, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Mostar, and Travnik, the overall 
numbers have been low. In some areas where minority DPREs have returned, 
interethnic tensions rose quickly. Some nationalist political parties 
continue to obstruct the return of minority DPREs to the areas they 
control. Poor living conditions in some areas present little incentive 
for DPREs to return. The Entities are using DPREs to resettle regions 
(opstinas) that are of strategic interest to each ethnic faction. SFOR's 
contribution to a secure environment remains vital to OHR efforts to 
facilitate minority returns.
    9. Brcko. Aim: A multiethnic administration, DPRE returns, and 
secure environment. Freedom of movement in Brcko has improved 
dramatically. Citizens of BiH are increasingly confident in using their 
right to travel freely throughout the municipality and the region. 
Police and judicial elements have been installed, but the goal of 
multiethnicity in these elements

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still has not been realized. About 1,000 Federation families have 
returned to the parts of Brcko on the RS side of the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line, but few Serb displaced persons have left Brcko to return 
to their pre-war homes. SFOR support will be a critical deterrent to the 
outbreak of violence during the period surrounding the Arbitrator's 
decision on Brcko's status anticipated for early in 1999.
    10. Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim: Cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to The Hague for trial. Thanks to 
action by the Congress, the Secretary of State now has the ability to 
offer rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest 
or conviction of PIFWCs. Of the 81 people indicted publicly by the 
Tribunal, only 29--36 percent--are still at large. The two highest-
profile indictees, Karadzic and 
Mladic, are among them. Bosniaks are 
cooperating with the ICTY, but the failure of the RS to support the ICTY 
is a major obstacle to progress. Bosnian Croats have cooperated with 
respect to the surrender of all but two public indictees, but have not 
cooperated fully with respect to the Tribunal's orders that they turn 
over documents needed for the fair trial of a number of indictees. SFOR 
continues to provide crucial support in the apprehension of PIFWCs and 
for ICTY exhumations.
    In my report to the Congress dated July 28, 1998, I emphasized the 
important role that realistic target dates, combined with concerted use 
of incentives, leverage, and pressure on all parties, should play in 
maintaining the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an 
enduring peace.
    The December 1998 Peace Implementation Council Declaration and its 
annex (attached) offer target dates for accomplishment of specific tasks 
by authorities in BiH. The PIC decisions formed the background against 
which NATO Defense Ministers reviewed the future of SFOR in their 
December 17 meeting. Failure by Bosnian authorities to act within the 
prescribed timeframes would be the point of departure for more forceful 
action by the OHR and other elements of the international community. 
Priorities for 1999 will include: accelerating the transition to a 
sustainable market economy; increasing the momentum on the return of 
refugees and displaced persons, particularly to minority areas; 
providing a secure environment through the rule of law, including 
significant progress on judicial reform and further establishment of 
multiethnic police; developing and reinforcing the central institutions, 
including adoption of a permanent election law, and the development of 
greater confidence and cooperation among the Entity defense 
establishments with the goal of their eventual unification; and pressing 
ahead with media reform and education issues.
    In accordance with the NATO Defense Ministers' guidance in June 
1998, NATO is conducting a series of comprehensive reviews at no more 
than 6-month intervals. The first of these reviews was completed on 
November 16, 1998, and recently endorsed by the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) Foreign and Defense Ministers. In reviewing the size and shape of 
SFOR against the benchmarks described above, the United States and its 
Allies concluded that at present, there be no changes in SFOR's mission. 
NATO recommended, however, that steps begin immediately to streamline 
SFOR. The NAC Foreign and Defense Ministers endorsed this recommendation 
on December 8, 1998, and December 17, 1998, respectively. The Defense 
Ministers also endorsed a report from the NATO Military Authorities 
(NMAs) authorizing further adjustments in SFOR force levels--in response 
to the evolving security situation and support requirements--to be 
completed by the end of March 1999. While the specifics of these 
adjustments are still being worked, they could amount to reductions of 
as much as 10 percent from the 6,900 U.S. troops currently in SFOR. The 
6,900 troop level already represents a 20 percent reduction from the 
8,500 U.S. troops deployed in June 1998 and is 66 percent less than peak 
U.S. deployment of 20,000 troops in 1996.
    The NATO Defense Ministers on December 17, 1998, further instructed 
NMAs to examine options for possible longer-term and more substantial 
adjustments to the future size and structure of SFOR. Their report is 
due in early 1999 and will give the United States and its Allies the 
necessary information on which to base decisions on SFOR's future. We 
will address this issue in the NAC again at that time. Decisions on 
future reductions will be taken in the light of progress on 
implementation of the Peace Agreement. Any and all reductions of U.S. 
forces in the short or long term will be made in accordance with my 
Administration's policy

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that such reductions will not jeopardize the safety of U.S. armed forces 
serving in BiH.
    My Administration values the Congress' substantial support for 
Dayton implementation. I look forward to continuing to work with the 
Congress in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.

                                                      William J. Clinton

The White House,

February 4, 1999.

Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
February 5.