    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [June 11, 1999]
    [Pages 924-929]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 924]]

    Interview With Jim Lehrer of PBS' ``NewsHour''
    June 11, 1999

        Mr. Lehrer. And now to President Clinton. Mr. President, welcome.
        The President. Thank you, Jim. I'm glad to be here.

    Balkan Peace Process

        Mr. Lehrer. Is the peace process, the withdrawal of the Serb troops
    and the other matters, proceeding on schedule today?
        The President. So far it's proceeding in an orderly way. The Serb
    forces are withdrawing. They're withdrawing in a fashion that appears to
    our commanders to be consistent with their commitment to be gone in the
    11-day time period. And General Jackson is
    readying our forces to deploy.
        Mr. Lehrer. When will that happen, do you think? First, NATO
    troops--when will they go in now?
        The President. I think it will be quite soon. It's his decision, and they are--I think there are a number of
    factors that are going into his thinking, but they'll have to be in
    there pretty soon because they're determined not to let some big vacuum
    develop. But they have a lot of plans to make, and they're mapping them,
    starting with a strategy for demining, and then dealing with the
    refugees that are brought back and those that want to come back on their
    own. And they're working that. But I would expect it would be quite
    soon.

    Russian Troops

        Mr. Lehrer. What's your reading of this Russian troop movement today
    that caused such a turmoil? The Russian troops came from Bosnia into
    Serbia, and there was some idea that they may go into Kosovo. What's
    going on?
        The President. Well, the last we heard was, I think, when Mr.
    Ivanov told Secretary Albright that they were just pre-positioning, but that
    they recognized that we had to work out the arrangements for their
    participation. And even as we speak, there are discussions going on
    about that.
        Mr. Lehrer. Do you foresee a major problem developing over this?
        The President. I don't really think so, but there are some factors I
    would imagine they'll have to work through. And I haven't received a
    detailed briefing. But, for example, we're going to have almost 30
    countries this time in this operation, and I would expect that in each
    one of the zones of responsibility, the areas of responsibility, there
    will be multiple countries. The Russians, I think, would like to play a
    major role, but they understand we have to have unity of command under
    General Jackson. That's the sine qua non of the
    whole thing.
        But we also know in every zone we have to have two things: First of
    all, there has to be the fact and the feeling of safety and security so
    the Kosovars will go home; secondly, in those sectors where there are
    Serbs, they have to know that we're committed to protecting them, too.
    And a lot of thought has been given to how that might best be done and
    how the Russians can make the strongest contribution there. So our
    commanders, their people, they're talking about it. They're talking it
    through, and I expect they'll resolve it.

    NATO Airstrike Campaign

        Mr. Lehrer. Mr. President, were you surprised that Milosevic hung in
    there as long as he did, for 78 days?
        The President. Not after the beginning. When we started this, I
    thought there would be one of three possible scenarios. First of all, I
    absolutely reject the theory that some people have advanced that what
    he did was worse than he would have done
    if we hadn't bombed as early as we did. I just simply don't believe
    that. He had this plan laid out; he was going to carry it into effect
    last October. He didn't do it because of the threat of bombing.
        So what I knew was that if he decided
    to behave as he had in Bosnia, that there would be a day or two of
    bombing, then we'd make this agreement that we made today, or a couple
    of days ago, and it would be over; but that there was a strong chance
    that it would not, because in the mind of Mr. Milosevic there was a big
    difference between Bosnia and Kosovo. Bosnia was something that he
    wanted badly that he didn't have. Kosovo was something that he had that
    he wanted to take absolute control of by running people out of.
        So once he decided to take the
    bombing, I was not surprised that he took it for quite a long while,
    because he kept looking for ways

    [[Page 925]]

    to break the unity of NATO. He kept looking for ways to turn someone
    against what we were doing.
        Of course, the third scenario was that the bombing never worked and
    we had to take even more aggressive measures. But I always thought there
    was a much better than 50-50 chance that this bombing campaign would
    work. And I am gratified that it has achieved our objectives.
        Mr. Lehrer. What was it, or who was it, that convinced you that
    bombing alone would work?
        The President. Well, you know, when I talked to the American people
    about this in the beginning, I made it clear that there was no way that
    any bombing campaign could literally physically extract every Serbian
    soldier and paramilitary operative and put them back out of Kosovo. But
    I knew that our people had made dramatic progress in the last few years,
    even since Desert Storm, in precision-guided weapons and in the capacity
    of our planes to deliver them and to avoid even fairly sophisticated
    anti-aircraft operations. And I just felt that if we worked at it and we
    could hold the coalition together, that we'd be able to do enough damage
    that we could do it. And Secretary Cohen
    and General Shelton felt there was a better
    than 50-50 chance we could do it; Mr. Berger did.
        Mr. Lehrer. Better than 50-50 was as good----
        The President. Yes--Secretary Albright did. And I just--I've been dealing with Mr.
    Milosevic now a long time, you know, more
    than 6 years, and I think I have some understanding of the politics and
    the environment in Serbia. And I just felt if we kept pounding away that
    we could raise the price to a point where it would no longer make any
    sense for him to go on and where he could no longer maintain his
    position if he did.
        And I regret that he required his
    people to go through what they have gone through, to lower their incomes
    as much as they've been lowered and to erode their quality of life as
    much as it's been eroded and even to have the civilian casualties which
    have been sustained, although they're far, far less than they were in
    Desert Storm after the bombing, for example. Still, I hate it. But what
    we did miraculously resulted in no combat air losses to our people--we
    did lose two fine Army airmen in training--and minimized the losses to their
    people, to their civilians. But it did a terrible amount of damage. And
    finally, they couldn't go on; it didn't make any sense.
        Mr. Lehrer. Mr. President, as I'm sure you're aware, the fact of no
    casualties by NATO has been used as a criticism of the whole approach
    here--that yes, ethnic cleansing was bad in Kosovo; yes, we needed to do
    something; but it wasn't worth risking any American lives to do so.
        The President. Well, now, first of all, I never said that, that it
    wasn't worth risking any lives. We did risk lives, and I think the
    American people should know that. Our pilots, particularly the pilots in
    our A-10's, they were quite frequently fired upon by people holding
    these shoulder missiles, and they would deliberately position themselves
    in populated areas where there were civilians living. And over and over
    again, our pilots risked their lives by avoiding firing back, when they
    could easily have taken those people out who were firing at them. But to
    do so would have killed civilians. So there was risk to the lives. I
    remind you, we lost two airplanes and had to go in there and rescue two
    pilots. So that's not true.
        Secondly, if we had put a ground force in for an invasion, it still
    wouldn't be done today. That is, all this bombing we did, we would have
    had to do anyway. Let me take you back to Operation Desert Storm, where
    we deployed a half-million people in the theater; took, as I remember,
    4\1/2\ or 5 months to do it; bombed for 44 days there, but because of
    the terrain and the weather, they dropped more ordnance in 44 days than
    we did in our 79-day campaign.
        So we would have had to do everything we have done to do this. I
    told the American people at the time that we could not have mounted and
    executed an invasion that would have stopped this ethnic cleansing,
    because at the time the Rambouillet talks broke down, when the Kosovars
    accepted it and the Serbs didn't, keep in mind, he already had 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo, and
    nearly 300 tanks. So no force--there was no way to mobilize and implant
    a force quick enough to turn it back.
        And somehow the suggestion that our moral position would have been
    improved if only a few more Americans had died, I think is wrong.
    Believe me, fewer Serbs died than would die if we had had to invade. We
    would have had to deploy a force of about 200,000. We would have put
    them at great risk just getting them into the country. That was actually
    the biggest

    [[Page 926]]

    risk. I don't think the combat, once in the country, was nearly as big a
    risk as the problems of deploying into Kosovo.
        But I just don't accept that. I don't think that--we moved
    aggressively. We were criticized by some people in the Congress and
    elsewhere for starting the bombing too soon. And those who say that we
    should have used ground forces, even if we had announced on day one we
    were going to use ground forces, it would have taken as long as this
    bombing campaign went on to deploy them, probably longer.
        Mr. Lehrer. What about just the threat of ground forces? You were
    criticized--you and your fellow NATO leaders were criticized for taking
    it off the table at the very beginning, telling Milosevic all he had to
    do was hunker down.
        The President. I was afraid that I had done that when I said to the
    American people that I did not intend to use ground forces. And shortly
    thereafter in an interview, I made it clear that I did not do that. And
    then repeatedly I said that, and I said I thought we ought to be
    planning for ground forces.
        So I think the differences, for example, between the British
    position and ours and others were somewhat overstated, because we had
    done quite a lot of planning for a ground force, and we had made it
    explicit that we weren't taking the option off the table. And Chancellor
    Schroeder from Germany was reported as
    having done so. When I talked to him and examined the German text of
    what he'd said, it was obvious that there had been a little bit of
    overstatement there.
        So I don't think--I think that the NATO--my own view is if this had
    not worked, NATO would have put ground forces in there and that we were
    determined not to lose this thing, that we were determined to reverse
    the ethnic cleansing. I think the Europeans were especially sensitive,
    as I was, to the fact that it took 4 years to mobilize an action against
    Bosnia and that there were all kinds of arguments used about it,
    including the fact that U.N. peacekeepers were there, diplomacy was
    going on, any action would have upset all that, and they didn't want
    that to happen this time.
        So the truth is that this action against ethnic cleansing was hugely
    more rapid and more responsive than what was done in Bosnia. And that's
    why there won't be nearly as many lost lives.

    President's Moral Authority

        Mr. Lehrer. On a more personal basis, Mr. President, some suggest
    when this operation began that the Lewinsky impeachment matter had
    weakened your moral authority to lead the country in a difficult
    situation like this. Were they wrong?
        The President. Oh, I think so. I think the American people have been
    very good to me, and my family's been very good to me. And we went
    through a process which resulted in a decision by the public and by the
    Congress that I should serve. No one--no thinking American wants to have
    a President of either party and any philosophy who cannot fully serve
    and does not fully do his job or her job. And so I did what I was hired
    to do by the American people. And I believe, as strongly as I can say,
    it was the right thing to do. It was the moral thing to do. And our
    children will have a better world because we have now stood against
    ethnic cleansing, and not only that, in this case, we're going to be
    able to reverse it and let those people go home.

    Congressional Support for Airstrikes

        Mr. Lehrer. What is your analysis of why, for instance, the
    overwhelming majority of the Republicans in the House of Representatives
    did not vote to support this air war in the beginning?
        The President. Oh, I don't know. I prefer to be grateful for those
    who did support it. And quite a number did. And we had very good
    support, a minority of Republicans in the Senate, but a substantial
    number supported us in a very vocal and effective way and were prepared
    to go even further to ground forces, as you know.
        So I'm grateful for the support that we did have. A lot of very
    serious, thoughtful Republicans said they thought we were doing the
    right thing. Speaker Hastert voted with
    us, and I would remind you that we got a very good vote early on, with
    the help of the Speaker, for the deployment of American forces in a
    peacekeeping operation. And then they voted to support the troops and to
    fund the air war. So I'm grateful for that, and I leave it to others to
    interpret why they did what they did.

    Criticism of President

        Mr. Lehrer. Senator Hagel, Republican from Nebraska, who voted for--
    --

    [[Page 927]]

        The President. He did.
        Mr. Lehrer. ----when it was in the Senate, was asked why there were
    so many Republicans who were not supporting this, and he said it had to
    do with trust. And he said, quote, ``This President has debased the one
    currency we each have in this business, and that's trust, and he'll
    never get it back,'' end quote. That's what--his explanation as to why
    Congress didn't support you any more than they did.
        The President. I think that's pretty self-serving: ``I'm not going
    to do what's right for my country because I don't like Bill Clinton.''
    You know, that's--I think that's pretty self-serving.
        You know, I was gratified when, a few years ago, a historian of the
    Presidency said that I had kept a higher percentage of my commitments to
    the American people than any of the last five Presidents who preceded
    me--an academic man at the time I'd never even met. And so I think that
    that element of the party devoted the better part of 7, 8 years almost--
    now 7 years, more than 7 years--to attacking me personally because they
    knew the American people agree with my ideas and the direction in which
    I was taking the country. And on one occasion, much to my eternal
    regret, I gave them a little ammunition. But I have been trustworthy in
    my public obligations to the American people, and I have been
    trustworthy in my dealings with them.
        I have--I don't agree with them, and when I don't, I tell them. But
    you know, we've gotten quite a lot done when they have put aside their
    personal frustration in not owning the White House. The truth is, those
    folks ought to lighten up. They believe they had--they say--a lot of my
    Republican friends, you know, they rail against the entitlement
    programs. They don't like the entitlement programs. But the truth is,
    for a long time they thought the White House was an entitlement program.
    They never thought there would be another Democratic President in their
    lifetime. And they're all gearing up again because they think they're
    entitled to the parking spaces outside here and to the office space and
    all.
        And this job here and this house, it doesn't belong to the
    Republican Party or to the Democratic Party. The American people own
    this place. And we're all just here for a little while. And they ought
    to just relax and realize I'm a temporary tenant and that we're all
    hired hands. And we ought to work for the American people, do our best,
    have the elections, and then let the people make their decision and go
    on again.
        I think--that's what a lot of this is. They were--they've just been
    mad ever since I won because a lot of them really never believed there
    would be another Democrat in their lifetime. And attacking--if you can't
    beat somebody on the ideas and the issues and the philosophy and the
    direction of the country and if the country is doing very well, so you
    just get madder and madder when the country does well, then all you have
    left is a personal attack and say, ``Oh, I just don't trust the guy.''
        But that's not good for America. And you know, I don't attack them
    personally. I'm not going to get into it. My door is always open; my
    phone is always open; and I'm going to keep working with them in every
    way I can.
        Mr. Lehrer. Since, just in the last 24 hours, since this thing has
    come to this critical concluding point, people who were criticizing this
    action, not just Republicans but pundits and people in the foreign
    policy establishment, they're still criticizing you. They--does that
    surprise you?
        The President. Gosh, no. I find that in Washington, in this sort of,
    what Professor Deborah Tannen has called this
    culture of critique, if I make a mistake, people want me to admit that I
    made a mistake. And I have tried to do that. I think it's quite
    therapeutic. It's hard to do, and I had to get hit upside the head to do
    it. But I did it, and it was good for me. But if they turn out to be
    wrong, they just change the subject or just keep insisting that it was,
    you know, just a fluke.
        I think the most important thing is, were we right to take a stand
    in Kosovo against ethnic cleansing? Were we right to do it more quickly
    that we did in Bosnia? Should we set up--have a principle that guides us
    which says: Okay, in a world where people are fighting all the time over
    racial or ethnic or religious problems, we can't tell everybody they've
    got to get along; we can't stop every fight, like the fight between
    Eritrea and Ethiopia, or the struggles in Chechnya; but where we can, at
    an acceptable cost--that is, without risking nuclear war or some other
    terrible thing--we ought to prevent the slaughter of innocent civilians
    and the wholesale uprooting of them because of their race, their ethnic
    background, or the way they worship God?

    [[Page 928]]

        I think that's an important principle, myself. I think it's a noble
    thing. I think the United States did a good thing. Now, they may argue
    that I did it--went about it in the wrong way. They may--I've answered
    that, I hope. At least I'm confident that I did the right thing in the
    right way. And that's what--historians can judge that based on the long-
    term consequences of this. But I believe what we did was a good and
    decent thing. And I believe that it will give courage to people
    throughout the world, and I think it will give pause to people who might
    do what Mr. Milosevic has done throughout
    the world.
        I feel awful that we were not equipped and able and on the job to
    stop what happened in Rwanda. And since then, I have done everything I
    could to train this Africa Crisis Response team, military from different
    countries in Africa, so that if that starts again--God forbid--
    somewhere, they can move in and stop it.
        I think the world--the freedom-loving nations of the world need to
    be organized to try to stop this sort of thing. I mean, don't you think
    it's interesting that we're on the verge of a new century, and you're
    going to have all these millennial celebrations, and we're all going to
    talk about how 100,000 websites get added to the Internet every day, and
    we're going to unlock the mysteries of the human gene, and what a
    modern, rapid world we're going to be living in, and here we are bogged
    down everywhere in the world by the oldest problems of human society: We
    fear people who are different from us; pretty soon we hate them; once we
    start hating them, we dehumanize them; then it's easy to kill them.
        Now, it seems to me if we're going to reap the promise of the 21st
    century, if we don't want to go to Europe or some other place and have a
    bunch of Americans die in a bloody war, where we can nip this stuff in
    the bud we ought to do it. And that's what I've tried to do. And I think
    it was the right thing to do.

    President's Accomplishments and Goals

        Mr. Lehrer. As we sit here right now, Mr. President, is this the
    best moment of your Presidency?
        The President. Oh, no, I wouldn't say that. I don't know--you know,
    there's so many things that have happened here at home that have been
    important to me, passing the economic plan, passing the Brady bill and
    the assault weapons ban. So many things have happened internationally,
    the role that I was fortunate to be able to play in the peace process in
    the Middle East and in Ireland. But this could have the biggest long-
    term positive consequences if we do it right.
        But frankly, I haven't--sometimes people say, ``Well, do you feel
    vindicated?'' The answer is no. I think America has been vindicated. I
    think what we stand for has been vindicated. But keep in mind, there
    have been lots of times in the past where people win a conflict and then
    squander the peace. So a lot of our work is still ahead of us. We've got
    to get those folks home. We've got to get those landmines up. We've got
    to work out these details on who's going to be involved in this
    peacekeeping mission. We then have to get this--we've got to organize
    police forces and a civil government for the Kosovars.
        And then the really big thing over the long run--our European
    friends want to take the lead in this, but we ought to help them--we've
    got to get the World Bank and all these other people involved in a
    development plan for the Balkans that involves not just Kosovo but
    Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and, I hope some day, Serbia, if
    they have a government that respects freedom and democracy and human
    rights, so that these people have something pulling them together
    instead of these ancient ethnic troubles pulling them apart.
        Now, if we get all that done, it might be perhaps the most
    satisfying thing because it might prove that people can lay down their
    hatreds of people who are different.
        I basically think free people will figure out a way to make the most
    of their lives and work out their problems if they can get the rules of
    engagement right. That's why I gave somewhat of an extended answer to
    what you said about the Republicans, because I think--you know,
    differences are good. Nobody's got the whole truth. But you've got to
    get the rules of engagement right. And I think what we did in Kosovo was
    profoundly important.
        Mr. Lehrer. Mr. President, thank you very much.
        The President. Thank you.

    Note: The interview began at approximately 6 p.m. in the Oval Office at
    the White House. In his remarks, the President referred to Lt. Gen.

    [[Page 929]]

    Mike Jackson, British Royal Army, Commander, Kosovo International
    Security Force; Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of Russia; CW3 David A.
    Gibbs, USA, and CW2 Kevin L. Reichert, USA, Apache helicopter pilots
    killed in a training accident in Albania on May 5; Chancellor Gerhard
    Schroeder of Germany; Deborah Tannen, professor, Georgetown University;
    and President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
    (Serbia and Montenegro).