    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [June 5, 1999]
    [Pages 892-894]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 892]]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United
    States Forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo
    June 5, 1999

    Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
        Since my previous reports to the Congress under section 8115 of the
    Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), the
    continuing humanitarian crisis created by Belgrade's repression of its
    own citizens has resulted in thousands of additional refugees fleeing
    into neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are now 443,000 Kosovar refugees
    in Albania, 246,000 in Macedonia, and another 68,000 in Montenegro. In
    addition, there could be as many as 700,000 displaced persons still
    remaining within Kosovo. In both Albania and Macedonia, the number of
    refugees continues to over-tax the limited resources of the host
    countries. Efforts by military personnel, in support of civilian
    assistance efforts, have been critical to establishing refugee camps and
    necessary infrastructure.
        In light of the continuing crisis, I have directed that additional
    U.S. forces be deployed to Albania to assist in refugee relief
    operations, including to improve airfield ramp and off-load
    capabilities, upgrade key roads and bridges to facilitate movement of
    refugees to safe areas and transportation of relief supplies, and to
    assist in the provision of additional shelter for refugees.
         In parallel with the military support for refugee relief, we are
    continuing to increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept NATO's conditions, while simultaneously
    preparing for success. Belgrade's recent acceptance of the document
    delivered by Finnish President Ahtisaari
    and Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin
    is an encouraging development, though we are taking a very cautious
    approach until the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY's) intentions
    are clear.
        In line with this strategy, I have increased the number of U.S.
    military personnel assigned to support Task Force HAWK, our deep strike
    task force in Albania. I have authorized the deployment of a significant
    contingent of military personnel to Kosovo as part of an international
    security presence (KFOR), including some forces that may be pre-
    positioned in Macedonia prior to entry into Kosovo, as well as the
    deployment of other military personnel to the region, including
    Macedonia, as a national support element for U.S. forces in KFOR.
    However, forces will not enter Kosovo unless it is clear that Belgrade
    has adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces.
        In regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am providing
    the following information:
        1. & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that the
    deployment of additional forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo as
    described above is necessary in the national security interests of the
    United States. The deployments will provide additional relief for the
    refugees and help to return them to their homes with security and self-
    government. In doing so, the deployments serve our national security
    interests by promoting peace and stability in this volatile region, by
    strengthening NATO, and by demonstrating to other would-be aggressors in
    and around Europe that the United States and the Alliance will not stand
    by idly while they commit war crimes or seek to spread instability.
        3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel to be deployed cannot be
    definitively provided at this time since planning for the deployments is
    ongoing. For relief operations, it is anticipated that the number of
    additional personnel should be approximately 4,000, bringing the total
    number of U.S. personnel associated with relief operations in Albania to
    approximately 5,000. This is in addition to the total of approximately
    5,500 personnel that will be associated with the deep strike task force
    now deployed to Albania. In addition, if it is clear that Belgrade has
    adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces, I anticipate
    that approximately 7,000 personnel will be deployed as part of KFOR and
    approximately 1,500 personnel will be deployed as part of the national
    support element in the region, including Macedonia, to facilitate the
    flow of support to KFOR.
        I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a timely manner
    concerning any significant changes to the deployments described in this
    report when such information is available.

    [[Page 893]]

        4. Mission/Objectives. Our overall objective is to return the
    refugees to their homes with safety and security, to provide necessary
    refugee relief in the interim, and to promote peace and stability in the
    region. The specific missions of the forces involved are:

        Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE: To facilitate military
                operations by assisting the UNHCR in providing emergency
                relief to refugees in Albania.
        Task Force HAWK: To provide a deep strike force capability
                in support of NATO air operations and to be ready for use
                against FRY forces at a time and manner of our choosing.
        Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR): To deploy a military
                presence in a permissive environment to deter renewed
                hostilities, and, if necessary, enforce a cease-fire and the
                demilitarization of Kosovo, and to establish a secure
                environment for the stabilization of the humanitarian
                situation and the establishment and operation of an
                international provisional administration.

        5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine how long
    NATO operations in the region will need to continue, nor how long U.S.
    forces will be needed to assist in refugee relief operations, and
    therefore how long these deployments will need to be maintained.
        6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. military
    presence will depend on the course of events, and in particular, on
    Belgrade's actions.

        For Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, military support to
                refugee relief may need to continue for some time, even if a
                settlement allows for refugees to begin to return.
                Ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be
                transferred to the UNHCR, other humanitarian organizations,
                and host countries.

                 Some elements of Task Force HAWK may deploy as initial
                elements of KFOR. In this case, the exit strategy for Task
                Force HAWK will become the same as that for KFOR. The
                remaining elements will continue deployment in support of
                NATO operations until no longer required.

                 For Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, after the withdrawal of all
                Serb forces from Kosovo and an initial stabilization period,
                KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security situation
                permits and local police forces are established. At a time
                to be determined, KFOR will transfer responsibilities to the
                international provisional administration and local
                institutions and ultimately transition to a different set of
                security arrangements.

        7. Costs. The costs of operations in the Kosovo region will
    initially be paid from the FY 99 Defense appropriations in the
    supplemental appropriations bill recently enacted. As we further refine
    the detailed plans for KFOR, and as attendant costs become better known,
    I will consult with Congress as to how any additional costs should be
    covered.
        8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. These deployments
    affect morale, retention and readiness in a positive way because they
    demonstrate U.S. commitment of necessary resources to maximize
    operational effectiveness toward achievement of the important U.S.
    objectives in Kosovo. Given the importance of these deployments, we
    anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and
    effectiveness while fulfilling the range of military objectives
    encompassed by these deployments, including refugee relief operations
    and the anticipated contribution to the international security force in
    Kosovo. Indeed, it has been our experience that personnel serving in
    these important and demanding positions experience higher retention
    rates than in other, less challenging assignments. The Department of
    Defense has underway extensive and effective programs to do what is
    necessary to manage personnel and other resources so as to reduce
    problems such as extended family separation and other burdens military
    service. As with any operational deployment, the effects on readiness
    are mixed. In this case, however, it is expected that many of the U.S.
    forces will be conducting operations as they were trained to perform,
    which will provide an unparalleled opportunity to apply their skills in
    an active environment. The Administration is committed to ensuring that
    America's armed forces maintain the high levels of readiness necessary
    to safeguard America's national security.
            Sincerely,

                                                          William J. Clinton

    [[Page 894]]

    Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
    House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.
    This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on June 7.