    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [February 4, 1999]
    [Pages 167-171]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Congress Reporting on Efforts To Achieve a Sustainable
    Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
    February 4, 1999

    To the Congress of the United States:
        Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing this
    report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable
    peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This is the first semiannual
    report that evaluates progress in BiH against the ten benchmarks
    (``aims'') outlined in my certification to the Congress of March 3,
    1998. NATO adopted these benchmarks on May 28, 1998, as part of its
    approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military operations plan
    (OPLAN 10407). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council
    (PIC) subsequently adopted corresponding benchmarks in its Luxembourg
    Declaration of June 9, 1998.
        NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and my
    Administration have coordinated closely in evaluating progress on Dayton
    implementation based on these benchmarks. There

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    is general agreement that there has been considerable progress in the
    past year. The basic institutions of the state, both political and
    economic, have been established. Key laws regarding foreign investment,
    privatization, and property are now in place. Freedom of movement across
    the country has substantially improved. Fundamental reform of the media
    is underway. Elections have demonstrated a continuing trend towards
    growing pluralism. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done, in
    particular on interethnic tolerance and reconciliation, the development
    of effective common institutions with powers clearly delineated from
    those of the Entities, and an open and pluralistic political life. The
    growth of organized crime also represents a serious threat.
        With specific reference to SFOR, the Secretaries of State and Defense, in
    meetings in December 1998 with their NATO counterparts, agreed that SFOR
    continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of peace and
    stability and the provision of a secure environment in BiH, thus
    contributing significantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as a single,
    democratic, and multiethnic state. At the same time, NATO agreed that we
    do not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at current levels
    indefinitely, and in fact agreed on initial reductions, which I will
    describe later in this report. Below is a benchmark-by-benchmark
    evaluation of the state-of-play in BiH based on analysis of input from
    multiple sources.
        1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire. Considerable
    progress has been made toward military stabilization in BiH. Entity
    Armed Forces (EAFs) are in compliance with Dayton, and there have been
    no incidents affecting the cease-fire. EAFs remain substantially divided
    along ethnic lines. Integration of the Federation Army does not reach
    down to corps-level units and below. However, progress has been made
    through the Train and Equip Program to integrate the Ministry of Defense
    and to provide the Federation with a credible deterrent capability.
    Although it is unlikely to meet its target of full integration by August
    1999, the Federation Ministry of Defense has begun staff planning for
    integration. The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continues its relationship with
    the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army. Similarly, the Bosnian
    Croat element of the Federation Army maintains ties with Croatia. In
    both cases, however, limited resources impinge on what either Croatia or
    the FRY can provide financially or materially; the overall trend in
    support is downward. In some areas, the VRS continues to have certain
    qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Federation Army, but
    the Train and Equip Program has helped narrow the gap in some key areas.
    The arms control regimes established under Articles II (confidence and
    security-building measures) and IV (arms reduction and limitations) of
    Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Accords are functioning. In October 1997,
    BiH and the other parties were recognized as being in compliance with
    the limitations on five major types of armaments (battle tanks, armored
    combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) set
    forth in the Article IV agreement, which were derived from the Annex 1B
    5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic of Croatia, and BiH respectively. The
    parties have since maintained armament levels consistent with the
    limitations and are expected to do so in the future. A draft mandate for
    an Article V agreement (regional stability) has been approved;
    negotiations are due to begin in early 1999. Military stability remains
    dependent on SFOR as a deterrent force.
        2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured and
    democratic police force in both entities. There has been considerable
    progress to date on police reform due to sustained joint efforts of the
    International Police Task Force (IPTF), Office of the High
    Representative (OHR), and SFOR, which have overcome a number of
    significant political obstacles. So far, approximately 85 percent of the
    police in the Federation have received IPTF-approved training, as have
    approximately 35 percent of the police in the Republika Srbska (RS). All
    sides continue to lag in the hiring of minority officers and, as the
    IPTF implements its plans to address this problem, tensions will
    increase in the short-term. SFOR often must support the IPTF in the face
    of crime, public disorder, and rogue police. Monoethnic police forces
    have often failed to facilitate minority returns. In these types of
    scenarios, SFOR's use of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) has
    been a force multiplier, requiring fewer, but specially trained troops.
    At this point, SFOR's essential contribution to maintaining a secure
    environment, to include backing up IPTF in support of nascent civilian
    police forces, remains critical to continued progress.

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        3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform program.
    Several key steps forward were taken in 1998, such as the signing of an
    MOU on Inter-Entity Legal Assistance on May 20, 1998, and establishment
    of an Inter-Entity Legal Commission on June 4, 1998. The Federation
    Parliament in July adopted a new criminal code. Nevertheless, the
    judicial system still requires significant reform. Judges are still
    influenced by politics, and the system is financially strapped and
    remains ethnically biased. Execution of judgments, in particular
    eviction of persons who illegally occupy dwellings, is especially
    problematic. The progress made in the area of commercial law is
    encouraging for economic development prospects.
        4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption. Aim: The
    dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. Corruption remains a
    major challenge to building democratic institutions of government.
    Structures for independent monitoring of government financial
    transactions are still not in place. Shadow institutions still need to
    be eliminated. The burden of creating institutions to combat fraud and
    organized crime falls mostly to the international community and in
    particular to the IPTF. SFOR contributes to the secure environment
    necessary for the success of other international efforts to counter
    these illegal activities.
        5. Media Reform. Aim: Regulated, democratic, and independent media.
    Approximately 80 percent television coverage has been achieved in BiH
    through the international community's support for the Open Broadcasting
    Network (OBN), which is the first (and so far only) neutral source of
    news in BiH. Several television and radio networks have been
    restructured and are led by new management boards. Most are in
    compliance with Dayton except for some regional broadcasts. The
    Independent Media Commission assumed responsibility for media monitoring
    from the OSCE on October 31, 1998. Progress has been significant, but
    BiH still has far to go to approach international standards. SFOR's past
    actions in this area are a key deterrent against illegal use of media
    assets to undermine Dayton implementation.
        6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National democratic
    institutions and practices. With the exception of the election of a
    nationalist to the RS presidency, the September 1998 national elections
    continued the long-term trend away from reliance on ethnically based
    parties. The two major Serb nationalist parties lost further ground and,
    once again, will be unable to lead the RS government. Croat and Bosniak
    nationalist parties retained control, but saw margins eroded
    significantly. In this regard, SFOR's continued presence will facilitate
    conduct of the municipal elections scheduled for late 1999 but, as has
    been the case with every election since Dayton, the trend of
    increasingly turning over responsibility for elections to the Bosnians
    themselves will continue.
        7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reforms. While the process
    of economic recovery and transformation will take many years, some
    essential groundwork has been laid. Privatization legislation and
    enterprise laws have been passed, and banking legislation has been
    partially passed. Fiscal revenues from taxes and customs have increased
    significantly. Nevertheless, the fiscal and revenue system is in its
    infancy. Implementation of privatization legislation is slow and the
    banking sector is under-funded, but there are signs of development in
    GDP. There has been a marked increase in freedom of movement, further
    enhanced by the uniform license plate law. SFOR's continued contribution
    to a secure environment and facilitating freedom of movement is vital as
    economic reforms begin to take hold.
        8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A functioning
    phased and orderly minority return process. While there have been some
    significant breakthroughs on DPRE returns to minority areas, such as
    Jajce, Stolac, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Mostar, and Travnik, the overall
    numbers have been low. In some areas where minority DPREs have returned,
    interethnic tensions rose quickly. Some nationalist political parties
    continue to obstruct the return of minority DPREs to the areas they
    control. Poor living conditions in some areas present little incentive
    for DPREs to return. The Entities are using DPREs to resettle regions
    (opstinas) that are of strategic interest to each ethnic faction. SFOR's
    contribution to a secure environment remains vital to OHR efforts to
    facilitate minority returns.
        9. Brcko. Aim: A multiethnic administration, DPRE returns, and
    secure environment. Freedom of movement in Brcko has improved
    dramatically. Citizens of BiH are increasingly confident in using their
    right to travel freely throughout the municipality and the region.
    Police and judicial elements have been installed, but the goal of
    multiethnicity in these elements

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    still has not been realized. About 1,000 Federation families have
    returned to the parts of Brcko on the RS side of the Inter-Entity
    Boundary Line, but few Serb displaced persons have left Brcko to return
    to their pre-war homes. SFOR support will be a critical deterrent to the
    outbreak of violence during the period surrounding the Arbitrator's
    decision on Brcko's status anticipated for early in 1999.
        10. Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim: Cooperation with
    the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
    leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to The Hague for trial. Thanks to
    action by the Congress, the Secretary of State now has the ability to
    offer rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest
    or conviction of PIFWCs. Of the 81 people indicted publicly by the
    Tribunal, only 29--36 percent--are still at large. The two highest-
    profile indictees, Karadzic and
    Mladic, are among them. Bosniaks are
    cooperating with the ICTY, but the failure of the RS to support the ICTY
    is a major obstacle to progress. Bosnian Croats have cooperated with
    respect to the surrender of all but two public indictees, but have not
    cooperated fully with respect to the Tribunal's orders that they turn
    over documents needed for the fair trial of a number of indictees. SFOR
    continues to provide crucial support in the apprehension of PIFWCs and
    for ICTY exhumations.
        In my report to the Congress dated July 28, 1998, I emphasized the
    important role that realistic target dates, combined with concerted use
    of incentives, leverage, and pressure on all parties, should play in
    maintaining the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an
    enduring peace.
        The December 1998 Peace Implementation Council Declaration and its
    annex (attached) offer target dates for accomplishment of specific tasks
    by authorities in BiH. The PIC decisions formed the background against
    which NATO Defense Ministers reviewed the future of SFOR in their
    December 17 meeting. Failure by Bosnian authorities to act within the
    prescribed timeframes would be the point of departure for more forceful
    action by the OHR and other elements of the international community.
    Priorities for 1999 will include: accelerating the transition to a
    sustainable market economy; increasing the momentum on the return of
    refugees and displaced persons, particularly to minority areas;
    providing a secure environment through the rule of law, including
    significant progress on judicial reform and further establishment of
    multiethnic police; developing and reinforcing the central institutions,
    including adoption of a permanent election law, and the development of
    greater confidence and cooperation among the Entity defense
    establishments with the goal of their eventual unification; and pressing
    ahead with media reform and education issues.
        In accordance with the NATO Defense Ministers' guidance in June
    1998, NATO is conducting a series of comprehensive reviews at no more
    than 6-month intervals. The first of these reviews was completed on
    November 16, 1998, and recently endorsed by the North Atlantic Council
    (NAC) Foreign and Defense Ministers. In reviewing the size and shape of
    SFOR against the benchmarks described above, the United States and its
    Allies concluded that at present, there be no changes in SFOR's mission.
    NATO recommended, however, that steps begin immediately to streamline
    SFOR. The NAC Foreign and Defense Ministers endorsed this recommendation
    on December 8, 1998, and December 17, 1998, respectively. The Defense
    Ministers also endorsed a report from the NATO Military Authorities
    (NMAs) authorizing further adjustments in SFOR force levels--in response
    to the evolving security situation and support requirements--to be
    completed by the end of March 1999. While the specifics of these
    adjustments are still being worked, they could amount to reductions of
    as much as 10 percent from the 6,900 U.S. troops currently in SFOR. The
    6,900 troop level already represents a 20 percent reduction from the
    8,500 U.S. troops deployed in June 1998 and is 66 percent less than peak
    U.S. deployment of 20,000 troops in 1996.
        The NATO Defense Ministers on December 17, 1998, further instructed
    NMAs to examine options for possible longer-term and more substantial
    adjustments to the future size and structure of SFOR. Their report is
    due in early 1999 and will give the United States and its Allies the
    necessary information on which to base decisions on SFOR's future. We
    will address this issue in the NAC again at that time. Decisions on
    future reductions will be taken in the light of progress on
    implementation of the Peace Agreement. Any and all reductions of U.S.
    forces in the short or long term will be made in accordance with my
    Administration's policy

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    that such reductions will not jeopardize the safety of U.S. armed forces
    serving in BiH.
        My Administration values the Congress' substantial support for
    Dayton implementation. I look forward to continuing to work with the
    Congress in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and
    Herzegovina.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    February 4, 1999.

    Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on
    February 5.