    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [May 4, 1999]
    [Pages 693-694]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 693]]

    Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National
    Broadcasting Corporation Aboard Air Force One
    May 4, 1999

    Russian Peace Initiative for Kosovo

        Mr. Brokaw. Mr. President, diplomatic flurry may be an
    overstatement--there's something percolating, obviously. Is there
    anything that you find encouraging at all in what we've seen in the last
    couple of days with the Russian connection?
        The President. Yes. I am encouraged because, first of all, I think
    it's a good thing for the Russians to be aggressively involved in trying
    to find a diplomatic solution, as long as it's a real solution to the
    problem. The conditions that we and our NATO Allies have laid out are
    not designed to win some victory over Serbia; they're designed to
    establish the minimum necessary for the mission to succeed, for the
    Kosovars to go home to live in security and autonomy.
        To do that, you've got to get the Serb forces out, and you have to
    have an international force there with NATO at its core, so it will
    work, so the Serbs will come back, so the armed elements within the
    Kosovar Albanians--excuse me, so the Albanians will come back, the
    Kosovars will come back, and so the armed elements there will disarm and
    will accept the peace.
        Now, that's what's necessary to happen. And I think if the Russians
    get to the point where they can truly embrace that position and argue it
    to the Serbs, I think that will be very helpful.
        Mr. Brokaw. But does Chernomyrdin buy your scenario?
        The President. Well, what he's tried
    to do, obviously, is to assess what he thinks Mr. Milosevic will buy. But there's a subtext here I think is
    important to get out, too, which is this shows that the Russians are
    more than willing, themselves, to be involved in a peacekeeping force,
    and that others coming out of that neck of the woods who share religious
    and ethnic ties to the Serbs may be willing to participate, as well,
    which will give the right feel and look and substance to this. You know,
    I've always said we would only go in there if we were permitted to
    protect the Serb minority as well as the Kosovar Albanians.
        So I think that this is basically helpful. But I don't want to
    oversell it because there's been no kind of diplomatic breakthrough
    here. It cannot be a bad thing to have a man of Mr.
    Chernomyrdin's stature, his obvious
    closeness to President Yeltsin, vigorously
    doing what he's doing out there. I think that's important.
        Mr. Brokaw. But there's not even a small light at the end of the
    tunnel at this point?
        The President. I wouldn't say that. I think the Russians have a much
    clearer understanding of why we have taken the position we have taken.
    And as they've gotten into the details of it, I think they understand
    what it would take actually to have this work. As I said to
    Mr. Chernomyrdin, I said, ``You know, if
    we try to do this the way Mr. Milosevic
    originally said he wanted it done, we'd be back here in 8 months having
    the same meeting all over again.''
        Mr. Brokaw. If you were an Albanian refugee--and there are now about
    a million, we think, altogether--would you go back home without the
    United States as the guarantor of your safety?
        The President. No. I wouldn't go back home without the United States
    and NATO, without our allies being involved there, not after what
    they've been through.
        And it's very important--I keep saying this to the American people--
    it's very important, you can't divorce what happened in Kosovo from what
    happened for 4 years in Bosnia. These people know what not just ethnic
    cleansing but religious cleansing is. The Muslims know what they've been
    subject to. And they want to go home, and it's soon enough from the
    expulsions that they will go home eagerly if they know they're going to
    be safe, if they know they're going to have their autonomy.
        And I think it's just imperative to the Russians, the more they come
    to grips with what it would take to make this work--instead of thinking
    about winners and losers--what would it take to make this work? Because
    they say they're for having the Kosovars go home, being safe, having
    autonomy--they understand that--

    [[Page 694]]

    then these conditions are what is necessary to make it work.
        You say, well, what's in it for the Serbs? Well, first of all, they
    shouldn't be rewarded for ethnic cleansing. But secondly, there is
    something in it. What's in it is that the Russians and others can be
    involved in the peacekeeping force, so it's not just the United States
    and NATO. Secondly, there's going to have to be a huge effort not only
    at rebuilding but at building a whole different future for the Balkans
    and southeastern Europe that bring these folks together around common
    economic goals. None of that can happen until this gets done.

    Expenses Incurred in Kosovo Action

        Mr. Brokaw. Do you think that the United States--do you think that
    the American people have a full appreciation of just how long and
    expensive now our investment in the Balkans will be as a result of
    what's happened just in the last few months?
        The President. Well, I believe that they--first of all, the lion's
    share of our expense is being borne out because they're carrying a
    majority of the military burden, and we're paying quite a lot for the
    humanitarian assistance, which I think the American people want us to
    do, and the American citizens have been very generous in their private
    donations. I believe that the Europeans will carry the lion's share of
    the burden, the rebuilding and building an economic unit there that can
    relate to the EU and grow together.
        But it's in our interest to participate in that. That's a lot
    cheaper than having another European war. This is a lot cheaper than
    having another European war of the kind that we saw in the 20th century.
    And so I wish we didn't have to spend the money on this. I'll be happy
    to support contributing to the reconstruction of the area, and I think
    it will repay itself many times over in avoided problems and in new
    economic partners.
        Mr. Brokaw. A lot of people in the United States are now saying, how
    in the world can we have the Russians represent our interests there?
    We've spent 50 years trying to keep them out of the Balkans; now we're
    inviting them in. It's not in the interest of the United States to do
    that, they say.
        The President. But it is, if we all have the same goals. The
    Russians have worked with us side-by-side, our militaries, in Bosnia. We
    have worked well there together. We have served in the same area. The
    Russians have been willing to work with an American commander; they have
    related well to each other. The Russians have a relationship with NATO.
    We've done joint training exercises together.
        So if the Russians, who, after all, are now a democracy, will
    embrace the same objectives and will go in there in a way that ensures
    that there's no discrimination against the Serb minority in Kosovo, we
    can make a lot of progress, and we can work together.
        That's what we want. I've been working for a partnership for a
    democratic Russia since the day I got here, and I believe before I was
    here--I think that's what President Bush wanted
    to achieve with President Yeltsin. That
    enables us to keep reducing our nuclear stockpile. That enables us to
    secure the safety of their nuclear weapons. That enables us to work with
    them in positive ways to keep the transfer of dangerous technology from
    countries that shouldn't have it.
        So all these things I think are very important. There is a way that
    we could get a very large benefit here by strengthening our partnership
    with Russia over the long run. But the basic conditions have to be met,
    because without the basic conditions being met, the mission will not
    succeed; we'll never get the Kosovars back home; we'll never have real
    security and autonomy. We'll have continuing military uprisings among
    the Kosovars, unless the basic conditions are met.

    Note: The interview began at 6:36 p.m. aboard Air Force One en route to
    Brussels, Belgium. In his remarks, the President referred to Viktor
    Chernomyrdin, Special Envoy and former Prime Minister, and President
    Boris Yeltsin of Russia; and President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The transcript was
    released by the Office of the Press Secretary on May 6. A tape was not
    available for verification of the content of this interview.