    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [March 11, 1999]
    [Pages 345-350]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange
    With Reporters
    March 11, 1999

        The President. Good afternoon. President Aleman, thank you for your words and your leadership.
    President Arzu, thank you so much for bringing
    us to this magnificent place and for hosting this very valuable meeting.
    To all my fellow leaders of the Americas, I thank you for the examples
    you are setting within your countries and by working together.
        As we see here in Guatemala and, indeed, in all the nations
    represented in this extraordinary region, they are blessed with natural
    and with man-made monuments of ancient grace and spectacular beauty. Now
    the people have built a new monument--also spectacular and, hopefully,
    just as enduring--the monument of peace.

    Kosovo

        Because of developments in Washington and in Europe, I hope my
    fellow leaders will forgive me if I take my only opportunity today to
    appear before the press to say something about another area in which we
    are working for peace--in Kosovo, where a serious civil conflict has
    been occurring and where much bloodshed might still occur.
        Today our House of Representatives in Washington is debating a
    resolution on the potential deployment of American troops. I hope the
    House will act in a way that supports our efforts to achieve a strong
    peace agreement. I have and will continue to work closely with the
    Congress as we seek to bring peace to Kosovo. As I have repeatedly said,
    a final decision on whether we would send our troops as part of a peace
    force depends upon the achievement of a genuine agreement, on an
    immediate cease-

    [[Page 346]]

    fire, on rapid withdrawal of most Serbian security forces, and
    demilitarization of the insurgents.
        Both sides must agree to a NATO force. Europe's troops must make up
    the great majority of the forces. And we must have a NATO strategy that
    includes a clear plan for bringing our forces home. If, and only if,
    these conditions are met, I strongly believe United States forces should
    contribute to securing the peace in Kosovo. We have a strong stake in
    bringing peace there, just as we have a strong stake in peace in Central
    America. If we don't end the conflict now, it will spread; and when it
    does, we will not be able to avoid participating in stopping it; and
    when we do, it will come at far greater risk and far greater cost.

    Central America Summit

        Now, let me talk a moment about what we have met about today, how to
    turn this region of peace and shared values into a region of joint
    endeavors and common progress. I have made it clear that the United
    States supports greater debt relief, and I outlined my proposal for
    that; that we support more open trade to create jobs and opportunity
    through an enhanced initiative of the Caribbean Basin, the countries of
    Central America and the Caribbean, and eventually through a free-trade
    area of the Americas.
        We also discussed other economic issues: what can be done to
    increase investment in tourism, what can be done in the environment. Our
    United States Agency for International Development, I am pleased to say,
    will contribute another $25 million to support CONCAUSA, the agreement
    we signed in 1994 in Costa Rica to promote environmental cooperation
    among us. This contribution will help the people of Central America to
    protect their forests and coastlands, to reduce industrial pollution, to
    fight climate change.
        We talked a lot about immigration, as you might imagine. I
    reaffirmed my intention to support our immigration laws fairly and
    justly but to work strongly for the elimination of any disparities in
    our law so that they treat Central Americans equitably, whatever their
    country of origin.
        We also spoke today about the danger of gangs and guns and drugs. In
    many ways, they represent the final stage of Central America's internal
    conflicts. We talked about what we could do together to combat them.
        Let me just say in closing that this has been a very moving trip for
    me, personally. When my wife came
    here a few months ago, in the aftermath of the hurricane, she came home
    and talked to me a lot about what she saw and what people were doing.
    But no description can adequately replace the personal experiences of
    what I have seen.
        In Honduras and Nicaragua, I met people who were devastated, but
    undaunted, determined to rebuild in a way that reinforces the
    transformation of this region. In El Salvador, and today in Guatemala, I
    have been privileged to see two nations that have found the courage to
    face a painful past and move forward to build a truly hopeful future.
        At this summit I have seen Central America's leaders working
    together for the future. And I have tried to demonstrate that for the
    future, beyond the service of my Presidency, America must be a partner
    and a friend, not only because it is the right thing to do, but because
    it is in our interest to do so.
        We have never been closer to realizing the dream of a hemispheric
    community based on genuine respect and genuine partnership. Something
    great has happened here in Central America in the last decade. As we
    move out of the past and away from the damage of the hurricanes, we do
    so in a way that we are determined to see this area emerge from
    adversity, in a way that places all of us on higher ground. I am proud
    to have been given the chance to be a part of it.
        Thank you very much.

    Global Strategy for Central America

        Q. Good afternoon to all the Presidents. My question is for the
    President of the United States, Mr. Clinton. What do you think of the
    statement by President Alvaro Arzu with regard to the need to have a
    global strategy, a long-term strategy for the Central American region?
        The President. I think he's right about
    that. One of the things that I pointed out in our morning meeting is
    that Central America, for all of its economic difficulties, basically is
    being well managed. And I believe that if there were a way for all these
    leaders together to demonstrate to the world that they are determined to
    avoid the kinds of financial problems and economic problems, for
    example, that have

    [[Page 347]]

    caused such trouble in Asia and, frankly, caused difficulties for all
    developing economies--caused the interest rates for funds even in
    Central America to go up--if there were a way for this region to say as
    a region, look, we know what caused those problems there; we're not
    going to do that here; this is a good place to invest--then I believe
    not just the United States but people in Europe, people in South
    America, people in Asia would be far more likely to invest here, to
    bring Central America not just into a better partnership with the United
    States but with all the world in a way that would lift the lives of
    people here.
        So I agree with President Arzu that there
    should be a global strategy. But I believe that because we're neighbors,
    for the foreseeable future, for the next 50 years, our major economic
    relationship should be one with another. And that imposes special
    responsibilities on the United States, but it also gives us a lot of
    opportunities.
        The President said to me, and I'd like to say to my fellow Americans
    not only here but those who might be listening to this press conference
    or who will hear the reports of it, that our trade with Central America
    far outstrips our trade with countries that are much, much larger than
    the combined population of Central America. And it has an enormous
    potential to benefit not just the people of this region but the people
    of the United States, as well.

    U.S. Congress and Kosovo/Apologies for Past Administrations

        Q. For President Clinton. Mr. President, particularly given that
    part of your reason for being down here is to express your regret and
    apologies for what past White Houses have done over the objections of
    Congress, can you please explain why it is that your administration has
    been so adamant about Congress not registering its opinion on the
    situation in Kosovo, and what exactly is your exit strategy if U.S.
    troops are sent over there?
        The President. Well, first of all, Congress has a right to express
    its opinion on anything it likes. I have two things to say about it. One
    is, it's premature. I do not believe that--until we know that we have
    maximized the chances for both sides to say yes to the peace agreement--
    it's not at all clear that they will--I do not believe that the Congress
    should take any action that will, in effect, preempt the peace process
    or encourage either side to say no to it. So I thought it was premature.
    I don't object to Congress expressing its opinion on anything. That's
    their job.
        Secondly, every President has reserved the right to both receive the
    advice and consent and support or endure the opposition of Congress, but
    not to give up the constitutional responsibility to deploy United States
    forces in peacetime. And I think that my predecessors were right about
    that.
        It's not that--what I apologized for has nothing to do with the fact
    that there was a difference between the policy of the administration and
    the Congress in previous years, going back for decades, and including
    administrations of both parties. It is that the policy of the executive
    branch was wrong. And what we're doing here is in the open; it's not a
    secret.
        What was your other question? Oh, the exit strategy. Well, the exit
    strategy should be defined by the missions. You will be able to see that
    we have an exit strategy if we define the missions properly--just as in
    Bosnia we defined the missions and we have cut, I think, reduced our
    troop strength by more than 70 percent now. And we continue to bring
    them down.
        I'm in a sort of a double bind here, you know. We tried in Bosnia to
    give a date certain for when we thought we could withdraw, based on what
    the Pentagon said they believed would happen in cooperation with our
    other agencies. We turned out to be wrong. Then people said, ``Well,
    maybe the President misled us about how long we would stay there.''
        So we decided in Kosovo the right thing to do was to say what the
    benchmarks of the mission would be, and the Congress has to approve
    money every year for such things so they would be able every year to see
    whether we were meeting the benchmarks, but we wouldn't mislead them
    about knowing in advance exactly how long it would take. So when we did
    it that way, then people said, ``Well, we're making an open-ended
    commitment.'' That's not true. I don't intend to make an open-ended
    commitment; I think that would be wrong.

    Guatemalan Peace Process

        Q. Question for the President of the United States, Bill Clinton.
    What is your personal opinion of the peace process of Guatemala?
        The President. Well, first of all, I think the fact that you had
    elections and that people are

    [[Page 348]]

    free to speak their minds, that I met with an elected Vice President of
    Guatemala, who is a representative of
    the indigenous population, yesterday, that the differences are freely
    expressed, and that according to President Arzu,
    you have a free and sometimes contentious and critical press--I'd say
    that's all healthy.
        I also think this commission report was a brave thing to do. And I
    think you know that the United States supports the peace process,
    including the effort to find the truth, even if it's not that favorable
    to the United States. We contributed a million and a half dollars to the
    work of the commission; we declassified 4,000 documents at the request
    of the commission. So I basically support what you are trying to do,
    strongly.
        No nation can tell another exactly how to come to terms with its
    past and to move into the future. And the answer will necessarily be
    different from nation to nation. What South Africa did, what Chile did,
    what El Salvador did will not necessarily work in Guatemala. Neither
    will what you do necessarily work for some other country. The main thing
    is, is there an honest effort being made to bring about reconciliation
    and the rule of law and human rights and genuine freedom? And I don't
    think there is any question that Guatemala has been moving in the right
    direction. And for that, all of us who believe in freedom and human
    rights can be grateful.

    Chinese Nuclear Espionage and National Security Adviser Berger

        Q. President Clinton, did your administration ignore evidence of
    nuclear espionage by the Chinese in order to further your policy of
    engagement? And what do you have to say to Republicans calling for Sandy
    Berger's resignation?
        The President. Well, first of all, we did not ignore evidence. Quite
    the contrary; we acted on it. Let me say for the benefit of all the
    press, both American and others, looking at this issue there are two
    questions that need to be looked at separately. One is, did we respond
    in an appropriate, timely, and aggressive way to indications of
    espionage? The second is, is our policy toward China of engagement the
    right one?
        Now, the answer to the first question is, I believe the record is
    clear that we did respond in an appropriate way. In 1996 we were
    notified that there was some indication of a breach of security at one
    of the Energy labs and that the appropriate agencies were investigating.
    The appropriate congressional committees were notified at the same time.
    Since then, they have received at least 16 briefings on this issue.
        Now, in 1997, in July, we were notified that the scope of the
    potential espionage might be very broad and might be directly related to
    lax security at the Energy labs. At that time, we moved quickly and
    decisively not only with the continuing FBI investigation and with the
    CIA review but also with an intense review of the counterintelligence
    capacities of our Energy Department labs.
        As a result of that, in February of '98, I signed a Presidential
    directive to dramatically improve the counterintelligence capacities of
    the lab. In April of '98 we set up a counterintelligence office by the
    Energy labs, headed by a 35-year FBI veteran
    with a record of dealing with espionage. We doubled the
    counterintelligence budget. We raised the standards for foreign visitors
    to the labs; we said foreign scientists had to be accompanied to the
    labs. I think we began to polygraph DOE employees at some point. Only
    two agencies, DOE and the CIA, have their employees subject to
    polygraphs.
        Simultaneous with that, in terms of technology controls, we subject
    China to the tightest restrictions of technology transfer that we have
    on any country that is not on an embargo list for the United States. So
    I think the record is that we acted aggressively. I think Mr.
    Berger acted appropriately, and therefore,
    I would not release him or ask for his resignation. I just don't think
    there's any evidence to support that.
        Now, let me say, the second question--and this affects the welfare
    of everybody else in the world, if you realize how China is growing,
    both economically and the size of their population; this affects the
    welfare of every person in Central America--whether the United States
    and China are at odds in a conflict or have a constructive relationship
    that has honest disagreements, where nobody is under any illusions that
    the facts are different than they are.
        I would argue that our efforts to have an honest and open policy
    with China, so that they don't think that we have made a decision in
    advance to try to contain and limit them in their economic growth and
    their development as a nation, has paid dividends. I do not believe

    [[Page 349]]

    that China would have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; I do not believe they would have
    practiced the restraint they have practiced in the transfer of various
    dangerous materials to countries like Iran and Pakistan if we had not
    been constructively engaged with them.
        I do not believe that we would have had the level of cooperation in
    Korea in trying to limit North Korea's ability to develop nuclear
    capacity that we have had. I do not believe we would have had the
    cooperation we have had in trying to limit the impact of the Asian
    financial crisis, which has plunged tens of millions of people from the
    middle class into poverty in Asia and represents the biggest short-term
    threat to democracy and to stability in Asia. I do not believe those
    things would have occurred if we had not had an open, candid, honest
    relationship with China, aware of all the facts.
        Keep in mind, this is about a case that developed in the mid-
    eighties. We have known about China's nuclear capacity and their
    capacity to pose a strategic threat and, more or less, what the
    dimensions of that were since the 1980's. And this raises the question
    of whether some espionage in the eighties was somehow related to that
    capacity. We have investigated it; we continue to investigate it. We
    have dramatically increased our counterintelligence. I believe we have
    taken all appropriate steps.
        I do not believe that that evidence justifies an isolated no-contact
    relationship with China when we have gotten the benefits, not only to
    ourselves but to the rest of the world, of our engagement policy.

    Central American Immigrants

        Q. I have a question for President Clinton. What are the commitments
    that the U.S. has acquired with Central America with regard to the
    migratory problem?
        The President. Well, as you know, for one thing, I stayed all the
    deportations for all the countries affected by the hurricanes. I had to
    lift the stay for all the countries, other than Honduras and Nicaragua,
    because under our law a temporary stay because of the collapse, in
    effect, of the national infrastructure of a country due to natural
    disaster is very specific in our law.
        The fundamental problem with American law is that, essentially, with
    regard to people who have been in the United States a long time, is that
    we treat people from different Central American countries differently
    based on the source of the oppression of human rights, rather than
    whether people had hardships that caused them to come to the United
    States.
        The commitment I made was twofold: One, that within the law--and I
    brought Doris Meissner, our Immigration
    Commissioner here with me--that within the law, I would do all I could
    to avoid a disruptive return to people because of the law that I think
    we all admit is unfair; but that in the end, to fix the problem
    entirely, we would require legislative change, and I would seek that
    from the Congress. And I believe there is support from Members of both
    parties for that sort of change.
        Now, beyond that, I recognize that most of the people who might
    still want to come to the United States, particularly in the aftermath
    of the hurricanes, are not by nature lawbreakers. They're people looking
    for a better life for themselves and for their families. But we have to
    enforce our immigration laws. And if we don't, it's not fair not only to
    people in other parts of the world but to other Central Americans. There
    are thousands and thousands of Central Americans who have registered to
    come to our country, under the laws that exist now, in a lawful way.
    There is no reason that people who line up like that and try to do it
    should be deprived of their legal right to come to the United States as
    a result of a reaction in our country because of the large flow of
    illegal immigrants.
        So I made a commitment to try to be as reasonable as possible under
    the existing law, but I have to uphold the law. I made a commitment to
    try to change the law to treat all people from all Central American
    countries the same. And finally, let me say, I believe the most
    important commitment that I made is the commitment on debt relief, to
    pass our aid package to help the reconstruction effort--which is a
    genuine emergency--to try to expand trade, to try to develop the
    economy. In the end, economic development at home will stem the flood of
    illegal immigration--genuine opportunities for people--more than
    anything else we can do. So those were the commitments that I made.

    NATO and Kosovo

        Q. President Clinton, you've said often that NATO is prepared to act
    if the Serbs attacked

    [[Page 350]]

    ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Violence is now on the rise. Why isn't NATO
    responding, and what are you doing to keep the peace talks from
    collapsing there?
        The President. Well, as you know, Senator Dole
    has just come back from Kosovo, also I think quite frustrated. The real
    problem, of course, is--I don't want this to be misinterpreted. There is
    no, in my view, moral equivalence between what has been done by the
    Serbs and what has been done by the Kosovar Albanians to try to secure
    the autonomy which was unlawfully stripped from them a decade ago. But
    it is clear that in this interim period, when they went home from
    Rambouillet and they're arguing about whether they should take this
    peace agreement, there are a lot of tensions and crosscurrents.
        The consensus among our NATO Allies now is that in the next few days
    we should be doing everything we possibly can to get these people on
    both sides to realize that this is--it is crazy for them to go to war,
    to kill each other, to compromise their children's future, when they
    have an agreement which, from the point of view of Mr.
    Milosevic, only requires him to do what
    the law requires him to do anyway, to respect the autonomy of the
    Kosovar Albanians; which, from the point of view of the Kosovars, avoids
    a bloody war and gives them a chance to establish the mechanisms of
    self-government without foreclosing or guaranteeing a future of
    independence, to see how they do in the next 3 years.
        It seems to me that a present war is the worst of all circumstances.
    Now, if the prospect of the agreement were totally destroyed by an
    outright military offensive, I would be the first to argue that our NATO
    Allies have to take action and take action now. But the situation is,
    frankly--even though you're absolutely right; there have been some
    actions by the Serbs--the situation is sufficiently murky and the
    present status of the peace agreement and whether either side can bring
    itself to agree is sufficiently shaky that all the NATO Allies at this
    moment on this day believe that we should devote all of our energies
    trying to get the agreement.
        But I can speak for myself and, I believe, at least for most of my
    NATO Allies, that if this thing come apart at the seams, we still have a
    commitment. And I'm determined to honor our commitment.

    Note: The President spoke at 4:07 p.m. in the Casa Santo Domingo,
    Convention Center. In his remarks, he referred to President Arnoldo
    Aleman of Nicaragua; President Alvaro Arzu and Vice President Luis
    Alberto Flores of Guatemala; Edward Curran, Director of
    Counterintelligence, Department of Energy; former Senator Bob Dole; and
    President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
    (Serbia and Montenegro). The President also referred to the Joint
    Central American-United States Declaration (CONCAUSA) and Presidential
    Decision Directive (PDD) 61.