    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [March 25, 1999]
    [Pages 456-458]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United
    States Forces to Macedonia
    March 25, 1999

    Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
        This is a report under section 8115 of the Department of Defense
    Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), to inform you of my
    decision to send certain U.S. forces to Macedonia to enhance force
    protection for U.S. and other NATO forces in that nation, to support
    U.S. and NATO military activities in the region, to deter attacks on
    U.S. and NATO forces already in Macedonia, and to assist in preparing
    for a possible NATO peace implementation force in Kosovo. Over the past
    several weeks, non-U.S. NATO countries began a consensual deployment of
    national forces to Macedonia to prepare to implement a peace agreement
    in Kosovo, should one be signed. Approximately 10,000 non-U.S. NATO
    forces are now deployed to Macedonia and have been placed under NATO's
    operational control.
        As you know, the mandate for the U.N. Preventive Deployment
    (UNPREDEP) expired on February 28, 1999. Approximately 400 U.S.
    personnel are currently stationed in Macedonia in Task Force Able Sentry
    (TFAS). We expect that some elements of these forces will redeploy out
    of the area and that others, together with certain

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    of the enabling forces described below, will continue to maintain the
    current TFAS infrastructure and will begin to prepare Camp Able Sentry
    as a potential staging area in Macedonia for a U.S. contribution to a
    NATO-led implementation force in Kosovo, if it is decided to provide
    one. Operational control of these forces for force protection purposes
    only has been transferred to NATO, as has been the case for the forces
    of certain other nations whose forces are participating in UNPREDEP.
        NATO, during the past month, decided to deploy elements of the
    Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters (ARRC HQ) Rear Command Post to
    provide a command element in Macedonia and to ensure that there will be
    unity of command and a single NATO commander on the ground who will be
    in a position to allocate infrastructure, coordinate training
    facilities, and provide a single point of contact for liaison with the
    Macedonian authorities. In addition, the ARRC commander has been
    designated as the NATO commander responsible for protection of forces
    and reaction to possible threats in Macedonia. The ARRC HQ's Rear
    Command Post element includes approximately 30 U.S. personnel who occupy
    key positions on the staff, but who have not yet deployed to Macedonia
    to assume their roles there. Having those officers serving in their
    regular positions will enhance the safety of U.S. and other friendly
    military personnel and increase the effectiveness of the NATO presence.
        Sound military planning may also call for sending a limited number
    of additional U.S. military personnel to Macedonia in support of ongoing
    operations including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), intelligence
    support, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, and
    logistical support, and selected forces and equipment to deter Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) attacks on NATO personnel in Macedonia. In
    addition, it may be become advisable to send U.S. military personnel to
    Macedonia as part of an enabling force in anticipation of the possible
    signing of a peace agreement, which remains our ultimate objective.
    These forces could include (besides those U.S. forces attached to the
    ARRC HQ), logistical support and survey elements and liaison officers,
    CSAR, intelligence support, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and
    control, as well as U.S. forces conducting rotational training at
    facilities in Macedonia. Their presence would not commit the United
    States to participating in a possible NATO-led peace implementation
    force; but prudent and limited preparatory activities in Macedonia would
    enhance the effectiveness of such a force, should we decide to
    participate, as well as enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign
    and protection of the U.S. forces in TFAS that are already there. In
    regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am providing the
    following information:
        1 & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that the
    deployment of additional personnel to Macedonia as described above is
    necessary in the national security interests of the United States. These
    actions will preserve and protect critical infrastructure and Camp Able
    Sentry facilities, and will enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air
    campaign by ensuring U.S. forces are fully integrated into the ARRC HQ
    command and control structure; improving CSAR, reconnaissance and
    surveillance, and other capabilities to support the air operations by
    enhancing force protection from U.S. and other NATO personnel in
    Macedonia by helping deter attacks on Macedonia and NATO forces there,
    and by strengthening U.S. leadership in NATO.
        3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel who will assume their
    functions in the ARRC HQ is approximately 30. At this point, no
    decisions have been made on numbers of personnel who would be deployed
    for other functions. I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a
    timely manner about such additional deployments described in this report
    if these prove necessary. If U.S. personnel were sent as part of an
    enabling force, the number would likely not exceed 2,000.
        4. Mission/Objectives. The overall objective of our efforts with our
    allies is to maintain stability in the region and prevent a humanitarian
    disaster resulting from the ongoing FRY offensive against the people of
    Kosovo. The specific military mission of the forces to be deployed would
    be to enhance force protection both for NATO (including U.S. former
    UNPREDEP) military personnel in Macedonia and for allied fliers
    participating in the air operations, to contribute to the effectiveness
    of those operations, and to help deter FRY attacks on Macedonia and on
    NATO (including U.S.) forces in Macedonia. In addition, these forces
    will likely assist in preparations necessary for a NATO-led
    implementation force to be effective, if a decision were

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    made to deploy one, after an agreement was reached.
        5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine how long
    NATO air operations will need to continue, and therefore how long the
    support and deterrence functions will need to be maintained. However, it
    is important to be clear that it is the U.S. position, shared by our
    allies, that NATO will continue air operations as long as necessary to
    meet the military objectives to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's
    purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of
    reversing course; to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent
    civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian
    military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.
        6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. military
    presence in Macedonia will depend on the course of events, and in
    particular, on Belgrade's reaction to the air operations. So long as air
    operations continue, force protection, support for those operations, and
    deterrence from possible FRY acts of violence will continue to be
    required.
        7. Costs. The costs of the deployments covered by this notice like
    other costs of the air operations will be paid initially from FY99
    Defense O&M appropriations. An estimate of likely costs for these
    limited deployments is being prepared, and I will ensure that it is
    provided to the Congress as soon as it is available.
        8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. In the first instance,
    these deployments will have a positive effect on morale, retention and
    readiness because they will demonstrate the commitment of the necessary
    resources to maximize force protection for our personnel engaged in the
    air operations. United States forces participating in Task Force Able
    Sentry, as well as U.S. forces deployed to other locations in the
    region, are dedicated professionals serving with great pride and
    enthusiasm. Given the importance of the mission in Macedonia, we
    anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and
    effectiveness, just as they have in respect to other missions in the
    Balkans. Indeed, it has been our experience that personnel serving in
    these important and demanding positions experience higher retention
    rates than in other, less challenging assignments. However, we recognize
    that even deployments for the best of reasons increase the periods of
    separation from family and add other burdens to military service. The
    Department of Defense has underway extensive and effective programs to
    do what is necessary to manage personnel and other resources so as to
    reduce these problems. As with any operational deployment, the effects
    on readiness for other operations are mixed. On the one hand, the
    personnel involved gain invaluable real world experience. On the other
    hand, normal training programs are interrupted. The numbers of personnel
    covered by this report are sufficiently limited, however, that any
    effect on the overall readiness of our U.S. Armed Services to meet other
    requirements, including major theater war contingencies, will be
    marginal. Finally, in accordance with sections 8115(b)(2) and (c), I
    have determined that it is necessary to order a Marine FAST team to
    Skopje, Macedonia, to protect our Embassy and U.S. persons at the
    Embassy. This team will remain deployed for as long as is necessary to
    protect our Embassy and U.S. persons.
            Sincerely,

                                                                Bill Clinton

    Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
    House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.
    This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on March
    26.