    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
    [May 6, 1999]
    [Pages 699-706]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 699]]

    Interview With European Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany
    May 6, 1999

    Objectives in Kosovo

        Q. Mr. President, let me first say, thank you for coming. It's great
    to have you here. We understand you do have a very tight schedule. For
    NATO it is a difficult and challenging time, so we do very much
    appreciate that you join us and discuss these matters and questions with
    us and we share your views on it.
        Just last week you said, ``We know what the final outcome in Kosovo
    will be. Serbian forces will leave. An international security force will
    be deployed. Refugees will return with security and self-government.''
    Why are you so optimistic? Have we actually come closer to that
    prospect?
        The President. I believe we have. First of all, we still have an
    Alliance that, if anything, is more unified than ever, after we met in
    Washington. I was yesterday in Brussels to get a report from General
    Naumann and General Clark on the progress of the campaign. I'm convinced that we are
    making good progress, that we are coming closer to our objectives. I
    think that Mr. Milosevic's military and
    economic apparatus of control in Yugoslavia has been weakened.
        I believe we're coming closer on the diplomatic front. I met for a
    long time with Mr. Chernomyrdin, and he
    met for several more hours with Vice President Gore in Washington this week. Russia had previously accepted
    the political terms of the agreement in Rambouillet that there ought to
    be security and autonomy for the people of Kosovo.
        So we're not there yet, but I think it's important, too, for the
    world community, and especially for the people of Europe, to have some
    perspective here. The campaign that Mr. Milosevic has carried out in Kosovo was meticulously planned
    many months in advance. It was almost implemented in October last year.
    He decided not to do it then in the face of the NATO threats, but he had
    40,000 troops on the ground and almost 300 tanks. So he could have done
    what he did at any time.
        What we have to do is to reverse the ethnic cleansing, and I believe
    it can be done. I am absolutely confident that as long as we all stay
    together, which we seem determined to do--I certainly am, and I feel
    very good about where the other European leaders are--this will prevail.
    It will happen. And it's just a question of our being patient and
    persistent and understanding what we're up against and what we have to
    do.

    Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing

        Q. Mr. President, we're going to take it in turn, so it will swing
    back and forth. My question is about your attitude, your thoughts about
    President Milosevic in Belgrade, and it's in a couple of parts. My first
    simple question is, do you believe that Milosevic should be held
    personally, directly responsible for the ethnic cleansing that you've
    described many times and for the massacres that you've described many
    times?
        The President. Well, of course, that ultimately is a decision to be
    made by the war crimes tribunal itself. It's a legal question----
        Q. But morally, as well as legally.
        The President. But I think, morally, there is no question that, not
    only here but earlier in Bosnia, what happened was the direct result of
    a carefully calculated campaign to first of all bring Mr.
    Milosevic to power and then to enhance
    his power based on an idea of Greater Serbia, which required the
    dehumanization, the delegitimization of the Muslim people, first of
    Bosnia and then of Kosovo; and that, following from that, there are lots
    of records that the International Red Cross and other humanitarian
    agencies have amassed, that the U.N. has amassed about the practices of
    Serbian troops, of the paramilitaries. Just in Kosovo, we have story
    after story, horrible stories of people being--men being tied up
    together and burned alive. And there has also been, beyond the murder
    and the rape and the dislocation, there's been a determined effort,
    first in Bosnia, now in Kosovo, to destroy the personal records of
    people's presence on their land, as well as the historical and cultural
    records and obviously the religious sites of a people. So I think we
    have a big record here.
        Q. But Mr. President, if that is the record and ultimately it lies
    at the doorstep of Mr. Milosevic, how can there be even an imagined
    settlement in which Mr. Milosevic essentially

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    climbs down, accepts the conditions that you've laid out, and is still
    the President of Yugoslavia and, ultimately, still holds sovereignty
    over Kosovo and the people who will return to Kosovo? Because you say
    you want them to live with security and dignity, but how is that
    conceivable?
        The President. Well, if there is an international force that has
    NATO at its core, but also has other countries--I would welcome the
    Russians' participation there; I think it's important--so that there is
    genuine protection for the people of Kosovo, and they have the genuine
    autonomy that they enjoyed under the constitution that Mr. Tito put in
    and that was taken away by Mr. Milosevic
    10 years ago, I think they can plainly do that.
        Q. Even with Milosevic in power?
        The President. Yes. Now, as long as he and Serbia pursue the course they have pursued and
    basically assert the right to destroy people's lives and heritage
    because of their religious and ethnic background, they will never be
    full partners in Europe. But we can protect the Kosovars, just as we
    have worked out a solution in Bosnia.
        And I think the alternative to your suggestion, sir, would be
    something that no one has suggested, and that is that the international
    community, in effect, declare war on Yugoslavia and march on Belgrade.
    If that is not to happen--and our goals never entailed that--our goals
    were bring the Kosovars home, let them live in security, let them live
    with the autonomy that clearly they deserve and have to have now to have
    any sense of a normal life--then those goals can be achieved with an
    enforceable agreement with Mr. Milosevic
    in Belgrade.
        To what extent he bears personal
    responsibility as a matter of law, that has to be dealt with by the
    tribunal. But the main thing that I would like people to understand is
    that throughout history we have had examples, throughout all history, of
    ethnic cleansing. In my own country, we had horrible examples of Native
    American tribes being moved off their land and killed in large numbers,
    with people claiming a religious mandate, over 100 years ago. And we're
    still paying for it; we're still trying to overcome it. We had the
    example of slavery that we're still trying to completely overcome.
        But this is the end of the 20th century, a century in which, if we
    didn't learn anything, we learned that we cannot tolerate this kind of
    behavior. We all have to learn to live together, to cherish each other's
    common humanity and celebrate our differences, not use them to
    exterminate each other. No modern country can define its greatness by
    its ability to dehumanize a group of people. And I think we can achieve
    what we're trying to achieve here if these conditions can be met.
        You know, people ask me all the time how this can be done, but we
    eventually--it took too long, and it's one of my great regrets that it
    did take so long in Bosnia, but it was done there. And we're acting far
    more quickly in Kosovo. And I think as a consequence of that, even
    though now it seems agonizingly slow, I think when this is over and you
    look back at it, you'll say it happened more quickly, and therefore, a
    higher percentage of the people did go home and went home much more
    quickly than has been the case in Bosnia.

    Serbian Release of Ibrahim Rugova

        Q. Mr. President, I have a longer question than my colleague from
    the BBC. It's a four-part question. Obviously, the subject is Mr.
    Rugova. Mr. President, were you consulted by the Italian Government
    prior to this initiative? And how do you consider this Italian
    initiative, as a positive development? Are you interested in meeting Mr.
    Rugova, and is Mr. Rugova at this point the best political interlocutor
    for the Allies? And finally, do you see Rugova's departure from Pristina
    as a good will gesture by Milosevic that should be reciprocated by the
    Allies?
        The President. Well, first, let me say Prime Minister
    D'Alema attempted to call me yesterday when
    I was making my rounds with the American troops, and I spoke with him
    early this morning. We had a very good talk, and I think he will have
    more to say later today.
        I have also met with Mr. Rugova in the White House, and I have a
    very high opinion of him, so I was very pleased that he was released.
        Q. What did you say to Mr. D'Alema, Prime Minister D'Alema?
        The President. That I was very pleased that he was released; I felt
    good that he had come to Italy; that Prime Minister D'Alema has been a very strong partner in what we have tried
    to do together; that I think that this could turn out to be quite a
    positive development, because I believe Mr. Rugova will again affirm his
    desire to see Kosovo be autonomous, be secure. I think he understands
    the need for an international

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    security presence. So I see this as a positive development.
        I think--now, you asked me what were the motives; one of your
    questions were, why did Mr. Milosevic do
    this? I think for two reasons, probably. One is, he may be moving closer
    to accepting the basic conditions necessary to resolve this matter. And
    if so, he may want as many leaders as possible with whom to deal, and
    Mr. Rugova is known for his devotion to nonviolence, and therefore, he
    may see that as a positive event if he is going to make an agreement.
        Secondly, I feel the same way I did when the American soldiers were
    released. I think this should be evidence to all of you that the
    determination and unity of NATO to persist until this matter is resolved
    is having an impact in Belgrade.
        Q. So should this good will gesture be reciprocated by the Allies?
        The President. Well, I don't know that it's a good will gesture to
    release a nonviolent leader of a country who never did anything wrong in
    the first place and shouldn't have been, in effect, under house arrest.
    I think that Mr. Milosevic did this
    because he thought it was in his interest. And I'm glad Mr. Rugova is
    free, but I want over one million Kosovars to be able to go home.
        And I think we should do what is necessary--the most important good
    will gesture NATO can make, and the European allies, the United States,
    and Canada can make, is to do whatever is necessary to resolve this as
    quickly as possible. That's the most humane thing we can do, and that's
    what I intend to do.
        Q. And will you meet Rugova again?
        The President. If he would like to, I would be happy to meet him. I
    like him very much. I appreciate what he's tried to do. He's been
    through a lot. I think that there are--you asked another question that I
    don't think is for the United States to answer, or even for NATO to
    answer, which is whether he or anyone else should be the designated
    spokesperson for the Kosovars. That is for the--we believe in democracy.
    We believe there has to be some way for the people themselves to decide
    who speaks for them.
        And let me remind you, the thing that was important about the
    agreement that was reached in France is that all the elements of the
    Kosovars said, ``Okay, we'll lay down our arms. We'll stop the fighting.
    We will live in peace if we have the security of an international force
    to protect our autonomy and to protect our safety.'' If all elements do
    that--that is, if they also are still willing to meet our conditions,
    then the position of our country should be that we're trying to make
    self-government possible for these people, not to tell them who should
    govern them. That's not the right thing to do.
        Q. Mr. President, as you know, they are divided, the Kosovar
    Albanians are divided----
        The President. Of course, they are.
        Q. The KLA already said that Mr. Rugova has no mandate to negotiate.
    So whom do you regard as an interlocutor and as a representative of the
    Kosovar Albanians who will have to negotiate?
        The President. My position is that all the elements of leadership in
    Kosovo took a position at Rambouillet, and what we're trying to do is to
    fulfill the minimum conditions for that. After that--there is plenty of
    time after that for them to decide how to organize their internal
    political life, as long as all the parties remain committed to the
    principle that they will lay down their arms and they will be nonviolent
    if we have return of refugees, the security of an international force,
    and the withdrawal of the Serb forces. If those conditions are met--and
    then the other thing--I want to remind everyone of this--the other thing
    NATO committed to do, which is why I would welcome the Russians and
    others to participate, is we committed to protect the security and
    physical and personal integrity of all the people who live in Kosovo,
    including the Serb minority. Now, if everybody still wanted to live by
    that, then the Kosovars themselves will have to decide how to organize
    their political life after that is over. Our objective is to get them
    back, to get the Serb forces out, the Kosovars back in, and have the
    international security force there.

    International Security Force for Kosovo

        Q. Mr. President, you are here as the Commander in Chief of the
    last, if only one, superpower. Can you assure us today that there will
    be an international security force in Kosovo, and when? How many
    soldiers do you need to be in that force, whoever they are? Do you agree
    with Jacques Chirac that this force should be under the mandate of the
    U.N. Security Council? And last, who will be the lead for the force;

    [[Page 702]]

    will it be a U.S., an American general to lead the force in Kosovo?
        The President. First, I think it's important that there be an
    international security force, that NATO be at the core of it, because
    otherwise, I don't think the Kosovars will go home. And it would be a
    terrible thing to set this up and not have it work.
        I think other nations should be involved because of all the
    historical, cultural, religious elements involved in this region. I hope
    the Russians will be there, and I hope others will be. I would welcome a
    U.N. sanction. It would be far better if the United Nations embraced
    this. And it would be most likely to work, I think, if it worked
    something like what has happened in Bosnia.
        So, in terms of how many and who does what, those are things that
    would have to be worked out by the people who are in a better position
    to do that and particularly the military people who would know what is
    necessary to maintain security not only for the Kosovars but for the
    people who will be asked to go there and whose lives will be put at
    risk. But I think that could be worked out rather easily if we can get
    broad agreement that it will be done, that there will be broad
    participation. And I think, if that can happen, then I believe the
    United Nations Security Council and the U.N. as a whole would endorse
    it.

    Group of Eight Agreement

        Q. But when you will leave Germany tonight, can you be determined
    and can you assure us that there will be in agreement today? As you
    know, there will be a G-8 meeting. Do you think there will be an
    agreement on the principle of that force and that this force will go to
    Kosovo at some point before the end of the summer or even earlier?
        The President. Obviously, I don't know exactly what day it will
    occur, because that depends upon what happens in the days ahead, on the
    diplomatic front, on the military front, and that depends in part on
    what happens in the weather, in the skies above us. But I can tell you
    this: I have no intention of changing policies until the basic
    conditions are met.
        I will stay at it for as long as it takes. And therefore, I can tell
    you that, insofar as the United States and our Allies have anything to
    do about it, the Kosovars will go home.
        Now, you asked me today, can I assure you that the G-8 will make an
    agreement today? I think they're getting closer. Obviously, it depends
    upon where the Russians will be today and because they're part of the G-
    8. But they've worked very hard to reach a common understanding. They're
    getting closer. And I wouldn't be surprised if it happens today. If it
    doesn't happen today, I think it will happen soon. I think we're working
    very hard to work through this.
        And the thing I have asked the Russians to consider is not to treat
    these basic conditions of ours as if they are negotiable, because they
    are basically what is--it's not about politics. This is about what would
    be necessary to actually have this thing work. You have over a million
    people who have left their homes. Why would they go back? What will it
    take to get them back? What will it take to relieve the pressure on
    Macedonia, on Albania, on the other frontline states? What would it
    take, once they got back, for people to actually live in peace? That's
    all these conditions do. There are lots of other things that we can talk
    about, but these basic conditions are necessary to make it work.
        And since it is obvious that politically it would work better if the
    Russians were a part of it, just as they have been an integral part of
    what happened in Bosnia, giving real credibility to the international
    force there, I think there's a good chance we can get a G-8 agreement.

    NATO Conditions for Bombing Pause

        Q. There would be no pause then before this force will go to Kosovo
    in the bombing--there will be no pause in the campaign of bombing until
    there is agreement for that?
        The President. Well, at the NATO Summit we adopted a position on
    that, and I think I should just simply repeat our position. Our position
    is that in order to have a pause in bombing, there would have to be an
    agreement to an international force with NATO at the core, an agreement
    for the Serb forces to withdraw, for the refugees to return, and the
    beginning of a withdrawal. That is the position that NATO adopted. And I
    want to just restate what our common position is. Nineteen countries
    took it, and I have to honor it.

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    Vision for Southeast Europe

        Q. Mr. President, you are fully right saying this is not about
    politics. Something about politics, sir: People in Macedonia, both
    Albanians and Macedonians, are very much concerned for their future. And
    I think all nations from the Balkans are very much concerned for the
    perspectives of the region. We are seeing that you're confronting Mr.
    Milosevic for almost a decade on the tactical level. What we are not
    seeing is that anyone is offering to the region any kind of a plan for a
    wider integration.
        It's not only of money; it's not only a Marshall plan; it's
    something that people will have to hope for, something which will show
    their perspectives as a region. Do you think about some kind of
    developing of a plan?
        The President. Yes.
        Q. Will you elaborate a little bit, sir?
        The President. Yes. As I have worked on this over the last 6 years,
    first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, it has become clear to me that the
    United States and Europe have spent perhaps--well, I wouldn't say too
    much time because we had to do it, but we have spent most of our time
    trying to keep bad things from happening, or if something bad happens,
    to try to either reverse it or minimize it. We have spent too little
    time imagining how to make good things happen in the Balkans and in
    southeastern Europe. And yet, much good has happened.
        The President of Bulgaria said at the
    NATO meeting, he said, ``The problem we have is that we have freedom,
    but we have no prosperity, and we don't have a vision of where we're all
    going together in the future.'' And I think that there are a lot of
    myths about your part of the world that have caught on in Europe and in
    the United States--you know, that, ``Well, the Balkans people have
    fought for centuries, and there will always be contention, and it's just
    a problem to be managed.'' And that, I think, is a violation of, first
    of all, the accurate history of the region and, secondly, of the
    integrity and potential of the people.
        So several weeks ago, for about a week before the NATO Summit, I
    went out to San Francisco and talked to the American newspaper editors
    and said that we could never hope to have the right sort of future for
    all of Europe until we had a positive vision for southeastern Europe
    that included not only an economic revitalization package that would
    embrace, obviously, the people who are in conflict today but the larger
    region of southeastern Europe, but a political package that would both
    tie the free nations closer to the rest of Europe and bring them closer
    to each other.
        I think that one of the things we have learned in the aftermath of
    the cold war is that there are plenty of things, forces that will pull
    people apart if they're exploited--religious and ethnic differences--and
    it's no good for me or anyone else just to stand up and keep giving a
    sermon about how, well, people should be nice to each other and they
    should pull together. There needs to be a magnet, a stronger force
    pulling people together than the forces pulling people apart. That means
    there has to be an economic revitalization program that embraces the
    region. That means there has to be a political strategy to integrate the
    region more closely to Europe and to bring people together.
        Think about it. Think about Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania,
    all the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the independent republics
    within it. If you think about it, if they were working together, think
    how much better they would all be, including the Serbs, if they were
    working together and if they were making money together and if they
    thought they had a future with Europe, with the United States, and with
    Russia. If there was some integrated vision, then you would fight this
    total rush to disintegration we've seen over the last decade.
        Q. Are there any deadlines in this kind of vision----
        The President. Well, I think, first of all, to implement it, I think
    we should begin as soon as possible. And the Europeans are working on it
    now. We have to decide what will the role of the EU be, what will the
    role of the OSCE be, what will the role of the United States be. But I
    feel very strongly about it.
        You know, we spent--the United States has invested, just in the last
    month, almost $90 million in humanitarian aid. And we have a package
    moving through the Congress now that has about $700 million more. And I
    believe we should do this. And I worry very much about the burdens that
    this crisis impose on Macedonia and Albania in particular. But the truth
    is that it would be better for all of us if we were free to spend the
    money to build a long-term economic future for Macedonia, a long-term
    economic future for Albania. Especially--

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    Macedonia has recently resolved a lot of its difficulties with Greece;
    there is more trade and investment going on here. This is the direction
    of the future.
        So when we get the Kosovo crisis behind us, we should be focusing
    much more on the future we imagine for southeastern Europe. This is
    also--to go back to your question--this is particularly important for
    Italy, because Italy has paid a big economic price for this crisis.
        Q. Is the plan going to include Serbia? Are you going to offer some
    kind of perspective for Serbia, as well, because it seems to be
    important?
        The President. Well, first of all, I think it would be better if it
    did, long-term, because Serbia is a big part of southeastern Europe and
    a big part of the Balkans. I think the extent to which the plan can
    include Serbia depends almost entirely on how the Serbians behave.
        You're not going to have--let's just take Romania, Bulgaria,
    Macedonia, and Albania--and Bosnia is still in a lot of trouble. Just
    take those countries. Here they are without anything like the industrial
    base of Serbia, anything like the wealth. And they're struggling to be
    democratic, to be free. Romania solves its problems with Hungary. They
    make their border and their ethnic resolution and under much more
    adverse circumstances. And the Serbs are continuing to promote ethnic
    cleansing when these other countries are promoting diversity, respect
    for human rights, democracy.
        Now, it would be much better--how can you have the Balkans without
    Belgrade? It would be much better if they were a part of it. But it
    depends on their conduct. They cannot be part of something that they
    don't share the values of. The principles of this cooperation have to be
    respect for the independence of countries, respect for the integrity of
    people, respect for human rights, respect for religious and ethnic
    diversity, and then a common respect for economic cooperation, and then
    some framework for it.
        But I would far rather be in a position to see the United States
    investing in the growth and prosperity and cooperation of the region
    than building temporary housing for a million refugees. And unless we
    have a positive vision for the Balkans, we will be back with a crisis
    like this again in a few years.
        Q. In 5 years.
        The President. Yes.

    Future Political Status of Kosovo

        Q. Mr. President, how does the American administration see the
    future political status of Kosovo? Do you still oppose independence?
        The President. The NATO Alliance voted to support, in effect, an
    international protected autonomous status for Kosovo. And I believe that
    that is the best thing to do now, because I believe that it would be
    very difficult--I see the struggles of Albania, I see the struggles of
    Macedonia. I think it would be even more difficult for Kosovo to be
    economically and politically self-sufficient. And I think that if there
    were a big independence movement now, you would have this whole
    counterfear that, ``Oh, well, we used to be worried about Greater
    Serbia; now is it Greater Albania?'' You would have all these arguments
    back and forth.
        And I believe the best outcome for Kosovo, the best outcome, would
    be to prove that the people of Kosovo could live together in peace and
    harmony and security. There is a Serb minority in Kosovo, as you know. I
    think this will be hard now because a lot of the people will go home,
    and they will say their neighbors turned their backs on me when I was
    run away. And the Kosovars will have to find a lot of forgiveness in
    their heart to live with their neighbors. I'm sure of that. But if you
    accept the vision for the future that we just discussed, that we want to
    try to bring the people of the Balkans and southeast Europe together and
    then to bring them closer to the rest of Europe, economically and
    politically, I think we can more likely further that vision if Kosovo is
    protected by an international force in its integrity as an independent
    or an autonomous part of Serbia. That's what I believe.
        Now, again, what happens over the long run in Kosovo will depend a
    great deal on how the Serbians behave and how the government behaves.
    But I believe that the position that the NATO Allies unanimously took to
    support autonomy and a protected status is the better course, based on
    where we are now and the kind of future we're trying to build. Whether
    it can be sustained over the long run--and I know what you're thinking
    by the implication of your question--whether it can be sustained over
    the long run will depend upon how the Serbs conduct themselves.
        Q. Mr. President, I understand, unfortunately, our time is up. So
    let me say thank you for

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    joining us and answering our questions. And have a good day and a great
    visit.

    Objectives in Kosovo

        The President. I would just like to say one thing before I close,
    because you all represent, well, a broad spectrum of European opinion,
    and I know this has been a frustrating and difficult thing for Europe,
    as well as agony for the people of southeastern Europe. But I think
    there are a lot of things to be hopeful about here. After all, this
    endeavor in which NATO has been involved, we never had to do anything
    like this before. We had to do something like this in Bosnia, but not so
    much was involved by the time we actually moved in '95.
        I think that all of us felt when the Kosovo situation came up, we
    had our nightmares of Bosnia. And we all wondered if we had moved more
    quickly, if we could have saved more lives and avoided more difficulty
    there. And so here you have this unusual situation where you're trying
    to get 19 countries, all with their own political situations, all with
    their own dynamics in the country, all with their history of relating to
    the various countries in the region, to get together and pursue a common
    policy consistent with the facts on the ground. And I don't think you
    should be discouraged by the fact that instant results were not
    obtained.
        But we are fighting for a very important principle. The 21st century
    world will either be dominated by greater economic and political
    cooperation and harmony among peoples of different backgrounds, or it
    will be dominated by a disintegrationist vision of religious and racial
    and ethnic exclusivity. And you see it in most of the conflicts in the
    world today.
        So this is a very important thing that is being done here. And we
    have to prevail because I would like the troubles of the Balkans to be
    viewed as the last typical conflict of the 20th century, rather than the
    first typical conflict of the 21st century. So we have to be patient and
    firm and understand that this is a highly unusual thing for 19 countries
    to be trying to work their way through this.
        Q. When do you see the end of the war, Mr. President? Everybody is
    worried in Europe, when is the war over?
        The President. Well, that's the wrong worry. That's the wrong worry.
    What the people of Europe need to know is that their governments are
    doing the right thing and that it will be over, and that when it
    finishes, it will finish in a way that will permit Europe to be united
    and democratic and free for the first time in the history of the
    continent. Now, that is quite an achievement. And it is worth waiting
    for.
        It will not drag on for years. We're not talking about endlessly.
    But we cannot expect an instantaneous result. This is worth--I would say
    to the people of Europe, support your leaders. After all, look at this:
    We have the governments of the left and governments of the right and all
    coming together to support this, because they understand they can make
    this the last war of Europe's 20th century, not the typical conflict of
    the 21st century. This is very important. It's worth waiting for. I'm
    not talking about years, but we shouldn't say, ``Well, it's not finished
    by next Wednesday, we want to quit.'' We can't do that.
        Q. Mr. President, some people would say it's worth not only fighting
    for, because of the principles you've outlined, but also fighting very
    hard for. And some people wonder if you have the right strategy and the
    right contingency plans if Milosevic proves more difficult to move.
        The President. Well, we're updating our contingency plan. We
    authorized the military committee of NATO to upgrade their assessment of
    what would be required if we had to send in forces in a nonpermissive
    environment, and what is happening.
        Q. You mean that's the ground force debate that everybody constantly
    talks about?
        The President. Yes. We authorized that. But you have to understand,
    we believe, I believe this strategy will work. This is not something,
    ``Oh, we're doing this because we can't do that.'' And there are--what
    the NATO powers are struggling for is to achieve our objective in
    Kosovo, to do it in a way that brings Europe closer together and, as I
    said--I think it's helpful to think--makes this the last typical
    conflict of the 20th century, not the first representative conflict of
    the 21st century.
        That means we're trying to do it in a way that preserves our unity
    to the maximum extent possible. Keep in mind, we have Greece still in
    NATO. This is a very difficult problem. It's hard in Italy, but it's
    really hard in Greece. And they are staying in NATO, right there, going
    along here. And we are working with Russia to try to effect through
    diplomacy these basic conditions and then something like what we had in
    Bosnia. So the strategy we are pursuing is

    [[Page 706]]

    not because the United States or Britain or some other country says,
    ``Oh, we're afraid of ground forces.'' It's because we believe, A, it
    will work, and B, if it works, this is the method most likely to assure
    long-term European unity.
        And so again I say, be patient with your leaders and be persistent
    and be determined. This will work. And it is worth paying the price of a
    little time, because the stakes are very high.
        Q. Mr. President----
        The President. I've got to go.
        Q. ----thanks a lot.
        The President. Thank you.

    Note: The interview began at approximately 9:23 a.m. at the air base. In
    his remarks, the President referred to Gen. Klaus Naumann, chairman,
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee; Gen. Wesley K.
    Clark, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe; President Slobodan
    Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
    Special Envoy and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia;
    Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema of Italy; Ibrahim Rugova, leader,
    Democratic League of Kosovo; President Petar Stoyanov of Bulgaria. The
    President also referred to the European Union (EU); and the Organization
    for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).