[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
[April 3, 1998]
[Pages 501-507]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
April 3, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
February 3, 1998, to the present.
Introduction
For much of the period covered by this report, Iraq was engaged in a
serious challenge to the authority of the UNSC and the will of the
international community. As documented in my last report, Iraq refused
to allow U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to carry out their
work at a number of sites last December; Iraq's refusal to cooperate in
spite of repeated warnings continued until the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) between U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and
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Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on
February 23, and the enforcement of this agreement by the UNSC on March
2 when it adopted UNSCR 1154. Both the MOU and UNSCR 1154 reiterate
Iraq's commitment to provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted
access to UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
UNSCR 1154 also stresses that any further Iraqi violation of the
relevant UNSC resolutions would result in the severest consequences for
Iraq. Iraq's commitment is now in the process of being tested. A series
of UNSCOM inspections of so-called ``sensitive'' sites in early March
proceeded without Iraqi interference. On March 26, UNSCOM inspections of
the so-called ``presidential sites'' began under the arrangements agreed
to by UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler and
Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. The team of 60 UNSCOM
inspectors, accompanied by 20 diplomatic observers, is conducting
inspections of the so-called ``presidential sites'' through April 5.
Chairman Butler traveled to Baghdad in mid-March for discussions with
Iraqi officials concerning Iraq's missile and chemical weapons programs.
Throughout the crisis created by Iraq's refusal to cooperate with
U.N. weapons inspectors, the objective of my Administration was to
achieve effective inspections, preferably through a diplomatic solution.
Our vigorous diplomatic efforts were backed by the credible threat to
use force, if necessary. I consulted with our allies in the region as
well as with the other members of the U.N. Security Council. Secretary
of State Albright, Secretary of
Defense Cohen, U.N. Ambassador
Richardson, and other Administration
officials also pursued our objectives vigorously with foreign
governments, including several trips to the region and to relevant
capitals and at the United Nations. Our military forces responded
quickly and effectively to support our diplomatic efforts by providing a
credible military option, which we were prepared to use if Iraq had not
ultimately agreed to meet its obligation to provide full access to
UNSCOM and the IAEA.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
As a demonstration of U.S. resolve during the recent crisis with
Iraq, the aircraft carriers USS INDEPENDENCE, USS GEORGE WASHINGTON,
their accompanying battle group combatant ships, and additional combat
aircraft have remained in the region. United States force levels in the
region now include land- and carrier-based aircraft, surface warships, a
Marine amphibious task force, Patriot missile battalions, a mechanized
battalion task force, and a mix of special operations forces deployed in
support of USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout
the region, additional military security personnel are also deployed.
These U.S. forces were augmented by the HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and accompanying
ships from the United Kingdom.
In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other nations have
pledged forces to our effort to compel Iraq's compliance with its
commitments. Although all of the members of this international effort
seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis in Iraq, all have
shown their resolve to achieve our common objective by military force if
that becomes necessary. Without this demonstration of resolve to both
use military force and impose the severest consequences on Iraq for any
further Iraqi transgressions, it is unlikely that the MOU and UNSCR 1154
(see below) would have been achieved.
Twenty nations have deployed forces to the region or have readied
their forces for contingency deployment. Those countries currently
represented in the Gulf include Australia, Argentina, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, and the United
Kingdom. Another 12 nations have offered important access, basing,
overflight, and other assistance essential for the multi-national
effort. Still others have identified force contributions that are being
held in reserve for deployment should the need arise. United States and
Allied forces in the region are prepared to deal with numerous
contingencies, either conventional or weapons of mass destruction-
related. UNSCR 949, adopted in October 1994, demands that Iraq not use
its military forces to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq
and that it not redeploy troops nor enhance its military capacity in
southern Iraq. In view of Saddam's record of
brutality and unreliability, it is prudent to retain a significant force
presence in the region to deter Iraq. This gives us the capability to
respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression or threats against its
neighbors.
Until Iraqi intent to comply with the MOU is verified, it will be
necessary to maintain our
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current augmented force posture in the region. The ongoing inspections
of the so-called ``presidential sites'' mark the next critical phase in
the UNSCOM inspections process. Once Iraqi compliance is assured, we
will consider whether we can reduce our present force posture.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch. In response to a series of Iraqi no-fly zone violations
in October and November 1997, we increased the number of aircraft
participating in these operations. There have been no observed no-fly
zone violations during the period covered by this report. We have
repeatedly made clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other
relevant parties that the United States and coalition partners will
continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and that we reserve the right to
respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi provocations.
The Maritime Interception Force
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the authority
of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S.
Navy is the single largest component of this international naval force,
but it is augmented by ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada,
Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Member
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing
logistical support and shipriders, and accepting vessels caught
violating sanctions.
Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted 15 sanctions violators
in the Gulf for a total of over 25,000 metric tons of illegal Iraqi
petroleum products. Ships involved in smuggling have often utilized the
territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have given
detailed reports of these illegal activities to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee in New York.
The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be decreasing.
There are indications, still preliminary, that the Government of Iran
may be takings steps to curb the flow of illegal petroleum products
through its territorial seas. While it is too early to tell if Iran will
completely and permanently stop this illegal traffic, we are hopeful
that Iran will help enforce the provisions of UNSCR 661 and other
relevant UNSCRs. In this regard, we note that the Iranian government has
recently played a helpful role in enforcing the sanctions of air travel
to and from Iraq by requiring that planes wishing to enter Iraq obtain
the appropriate approval from the U.N. Sanctions Committee before
overflying Iranian territory.
Recent actions by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will greatly
enhance our efforts to halt illegal exports from Iraq. After diplomatic
consultations with the United States and our MIF allies, the UAE has
significantly increased its level of cooperation with the MIF. These
efforts have resulted in a significant increase in the number of ships
caught with illegal cargoes. In addition, the UAE has prohibited the use
of tankers, barges, and other vessel types to transport petroleum
products to UAE ports and through its waters or to store such products
there. While it is still too early to determine the full effect of these
measures, we are hopeful that these actions will deal a significant blow
to sanctions-busting activity in the region.
While Iran and the UAE are taking positive steps, Iraq continues to
improve loading facilities in the Shatt Al Arab waterway, which gives it
the potential to smuggle even larger quantities of gasoil and fuel oil.
The U.S. Government will seek to address this problem in the context of
the expansion of the ``oil-for-food'' program approved under UNSCR 1153.
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: UNSCOM and the IAEA
Iraq's refusal to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM
and the IAEA, which are tasked with tracking down and destroying Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, was once again at the heart
of the latest crisis between the U.N. and Iraq.
On February 23, the United Nations Secretary General signed the MOU with the Government of Iraq reiterating
Iraq's obligation to cooperate fully and unconditionally with
inspections by UNSCOM and IAEA for weapons of mass destruction. The
agreement stipulates that Iraq will provide UNSCOM and IAEA weapons
inspectors with immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any
suspect site inside Iraq, including presidential palaces, and provides
for specific procedures for inspections at eight clearly identified
presidential sites.
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The recent crisis with Iraq was only the latest chapter in the long
history of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under
relevant UNSC resolutions. Iraq has persistently failed to disclose
fully its programs for WMD. Iraq has admitted, when confronted with
incontrovertible evidence, that it has repeatedly and consistently
concealed information from UNSCOM and the IAEA and has moved significant
pieces of dual-use equipment that are subject to monitoring in violation
of its obligations. Without full disclosure and free access to all sites
UNSCOM and IAEA wish to inspect, the ongoing monitoring and verification
mandated by relevant UNSC resolutions, including Resolutions 687, 707,
and 715, cannot effectively be conducted.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1154
On March 2, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
1154, which welcomed the MOU and reiterated that Iraq must cooperate
fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. In the clearest possible terms, the
Council warned Iraq in UNSCR 1154 that it will face the ``severest
consequences'' if it fails to adhere to the commitments it reaffirmed in
the MOU. This resolution is one of the strongest and clearest statements
the Council has made in 7 years with regard to what Iraq must do to
comply with its obligations, and what the consequences of failing to
meet those obligations will be. This strong language of UNSCR 1154 is
critical to ensuring that UNSCOM and IAEA can do their job and that Iraq
is held accountable to its agreement. We welcomed Resolution 1154 and
agreed with Secretary General Annan that, if
respected, honored, and sustained, the agreement ``could constitute one
of the U.N.'s most important steps in addressing the consequences of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 7 years ago.''
Iraq's compliance with the agreement is now being tested. Since the
beginning of March, UNSCOM has pursued an intensive agenda of
inspections, including inspections of so-called ``sensitive'' sites and
``presidential sites'' to which the Iraqis had previously blocked
access. Iraq has not significantly obstructed access to any sites UNSCOM
and the IAEA wished to visit since the MOU was signed. This may mean
Iraq will comply with the relevant UNSC resolutions, but the testing
process must continue until UNSCOM and the IAEA are fully satisfied. We
have consistently stressed that full, unconditional, repeated access by
UNSCOM to all sites, personnel, equipment, documents, and means of
transportation provides the only means by which the world can make
certain Iraq does not maintain or develop WMD. We have full faith and
confidence in UNSCOM and its Executive Chairman.
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most troubling
issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature of the
technology; it can easily be hidden within civilian industries such as,
for biological agents, the pharmaceutical industry and, for chemical
agents, the pesticide industry. UNSCOM is still unable to verify that
all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled with biological agents--
anthrax and botulinum toxin--have been destroyed.
Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems
The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should ``close
the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But there are still many
uncertainties and questions that need to be resolved. Iraq has never
provided a full and accurate account of its indigenous efforts to
develop nuclear weapons and prohibited long-range missiles. Among the
many problems, Iraq has failed to answer critical questions on nuclear
weapons design and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge enrichment;
failed to provide a written description of its post-war nuclear weapons
procurement program; and failed to account for major engine components,
special warheads, missing propellants, and guidance instruments that
could be used to assemble fully operational missiles. Until Iraq
complies with its obligation to provide a full accounting of these and
other relevant aspects of its program, the questions must remain open.
Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms
The U.N. Special Commission's work must include vigorous efforts to
expose Iraq's ``Concealment Mechanism.'' During the last 60 days, but
before signature of the MOU, UNSCOM launched two special inspection
teams that once again targeted this mechanism in order to ferret out WMD
programs and documents that UNSCOM--and we--believe Iraq stubbornly
retains. Unfortunately, it became clear that the Iraqi government had no
intention of cooperating with these inspections as specifically called
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for in the most recent UNSCRs on the topic--resolutions 1134 of October
23, 1997, and 1137 of November 12, 1997. The teams were stopped en
route, denied access, and prevented from videotaping equipment movement
or document-destruction activity at suspect sites.
In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, UNSCOM and the IAEA
must be allowed to continue to investigate all aspects of Iraq's
prohibited programs until they can verify that all relevant components
have been destroyed under international supervision, and that all
remaining capabilities have been eliminated. Without such verification,
Iraq could quickly develop the ability to strike at any city in the
region--and perhaps even as far as Europe--with weapons of mass
destruction.
Dual-Use Imports
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 established a joint
UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire proscribed
weapons. Iraq must notify the unit before it imports any items that can
be used in both military and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N.
members must provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such
dual-use items.
We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are extremely
porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its neighbors. There is
significant potential for evasion of sanctions by land routes, giving
additional weight to our position that UNSCOM must have full and
unconditional access to all locations and be allowed to inspect and
monitor Iraqi compliance over time.
The U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program
On February 20, the Security Council adopted resolution 1153, which
expands to $5.2 billion the amount of oil Iraq is authorized to sell
every 6 months. The previous amount was $2.0 billion every 6 months.
Resolution 1153 states that the nutritional and health requirements of
the Iraqi people are the top priority and allocates $1 billion to
rebuild hospitals, schools, water, and sanitation facilities. My
Administration's support for resolution 1153 is fully consistent with
long-standing U.S. policy. Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf War,
the United States has held that the international community's dispute is
with Iraq's leadership, not its people. We proposed an ``oil-for-food''
program in 1991 (UNSCR 706/712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program
(UNSCR 986) was eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We supported the
expansion of the oil-for-food program under UNSCR 1153 because it will
provide additional humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, under
strict U.N. supervision, without benefiting the regime.
Since the beginning of the oil-for-food program, we have
consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member states to find
ways to improve the program's effectiveness to better meet the
humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian population. Iraq, however, has
frequently failed to provide the full cooperation necessary to ensure
that the program functions smoothly. For example, during calendar year
1997, the Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for
more than 3 months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the United States
for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine that it had caused. We
will be watching closely to determine how the Government of Iraq
performs under UNSCR 1153. The Iraqi government refused to provide
appropriate input to the Secretary General's report of January 30 on
Iraq's humanitarian needs, which provided the basis for determining
allocations under UNSCR 1153. On February 5, Iraq sent its official
``observations'' on that report to the Secretary General, rejecting many of its proposals and recommendations to
alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people without stating whether or
not the Government of Iraq would ``accept'' the resolution. The U.N.
Secretariat continues to work to reach agreement with Iraq on
implementing UNSCR 1153.
Among its other provisions, UNSCR 1153 calls for an independent
assessment of Iraq's oil infrastructure to ascertain whether it can
export enough oil to cover the $5.2 billion oil export ceiling. Based on
this report, the Secretary General will recommend
to the UNSC whether repairs to Iraq's oil infra-structure will be needed
to meet the new export target. The United States is prepared to support
only those oil infrastructure repairs needed to fund the expanded
humanitarian program.
The U.N. must carefully monitor how Iraq implements resolution 1153.
The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting
of the sanctions regime, despite its record of non-compliance with its
obligations under relevant U.N. resolutions. Saddam Hussein has exploited the suffering he himself has imposed on
his people to build sympathy for Iraq and
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its government and to create pressure to lift the sanctions. In the
meantime, he has continued to build lavish palaces that benefit only the
elite within his regime.
War Crimes and The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause
for grave concern. U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der
Stoel, is investigating credible reports
from numerous independent sources that the Government of Iraq may have
summarily executed hundreds--perhaps thousands--of political detainees
in November and December 1997. According to these reports, many of those
killed were serving sentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as
insulting the regime or being members of an opposition political party.
Families in Iraq reportedly received the bodies of the executed that
bore, in some cases, clear signs of torture. In addition, the
possibility that the government used humans as experimental subjects in
its chemical and biological weapons programs remains a grave concern.
In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the Shi'a
population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, the government continues
the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Kurds from Kirkuk
and other cities. The government continues to stall and obfuscate,
rather than work in good faith toward accounting for more than 600
Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at the hands of
Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait, and the
nearly 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war taken prisoner by Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq shows no sign of complying with
UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its own
people. The U.N. Special Rapporteur
reported to the General Assembly his particular concern that
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the practice of
torture continue to occur in Iraq.
The INDICT Campaign
The INDICT campaign continues to gain momentum. Led by various
independent Iraqi opposition groups and nongovernmental organizations,
this effort seeks to document crimes against humanity and other
violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Iraqi
regime. We applaud the tenacity of the Iraqi opposition in the face of
one of the most repressive regimes in history. We take note of, and
welcome, Senate Resolution 179 of March 13 expressing the sense of the
Senate concerning the need for an international criminal tribunal to try
members of the Iraqi regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
March 16, 1998, marked the tenth anniversary of the Iraqi military's
devastating chemical attack on the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja. As
many as 5,000 civilians were killed. More than 10,000 were injured. The
Iraqi regime never expressed remorse for Halabja. In fact, the regime
defended its use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran by claiming,
``every nation has the right to protect itself against invasion,'' even
though a 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which Iraq is subject, outlaws the use
of chemical weapons. Ten years after the massacre, the people of Halabja
still suffer from the effects of the attack, including much higher rates
of serious diseases (such as cancer), birth defects, and miscarriages.
The sympathies of the United States are with the people of Halabja and
other victims of Iraqi chemical attacks as we remind ourselves and the
international community that the U.N. must remain vigilant to stop Iraq
from reacquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Northern Iraq
In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish parties,
established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. efforts, continues to
hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have
made positive, forward-looking statements on political reconciliation,
and talks between the two groups have commenced. We will continue our
efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation through mediation in order
to help the people of northern Iraq find the permanent, stable
settlement that they deserve, and to minimize the opportunities for
Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves into the conflict and threaten
Iraqi citizens in this region.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq
arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC
has issued
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almost 1.3 million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of the
proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, and 1143 have
been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance
operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in the
Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are authorized for
awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved them, in installments
of $2,500. To date, 457 U.S. claimants have received an initial
installment payment, and payment is in process for an additional 323
U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward
to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and
law-abiding member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of
the Senate. This letter was released by the Office of the Press
Secretary on April 6.