[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
[June 24, 1998]
[Pages 1044-1048]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



[[Page 1044]]


Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
June 24, 1998

Dear Mr. Speaker:    (Dear Mr. President:)
    Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the 
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to 
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
April 3 to the present.

Introduction

    During the 60-day period covered by this report, Iraq continued to 
provide access to U.N. weapons inspectors as required under the terms of 
the February 23 Annan-Aziz MOU and UNSC Resolution 1154. Travel 
restrictions on Iraq imposed under UNSC Resolution 1137 of November 12, 
1997 expired by their terms after UNSCOM Executive Chairman 
Butler reported that Iraq was complying with 
access requirements. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1134, regular 
sanctions reviews have resumed. However, Iraq's continued failure to 
meet its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687 and other relevant 
resolutions led the Security Council to conclude on April 27 that Iraq 
still had not met the conditions necessary to enable the Council to lift 
sanctions. Ongoing UNSCOM and IAEA inspections continue to test Iraq's 
long-term intentions with regard to providing full access and full 
disclosure to U.N. weapons inspectors.
    We continue to support the international community's efforts to 
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the 
``oil-for-food'' program and other humanitarian efforts. Resolution 
1153, which was adopted by the UNSC on February 20, expands the ``oil-
for-food'' program considerably by raising the ceiling of permitted 
Iraqi oil exports to $5.2 billion every 180 days and by authorizing 
repairs to Iraq's degraded petroleum, health, education, and sanitation 
infrastructure under strict U.N. supervision in accordance with a 
prioritized distribution plan.
    During the period covered by this report, the humanitarian needs of 
the Iraqi people were addressed through Phase Three of the original 
``oil-for-food'' plan in accordance with UNSCRs 986 and 1143. The Iraqi 
government only recently produced an acceptable distribution plan to 
implement UNSCR 1153.
    On May 1, I signed into law the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescissions Act. This legislation provides funding for Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty to initiate a surrogate broadcast service for the 
Iraqi people. It also provides funding for efforts to support the 
democratic Iraqi opposition in presenting a credible alternative to the 
present Iraqi regime and compiling information to support the indictment 
of Iraqi officials for war crimes. These new programs will enable us to 
redouble our work with the Iraqi opposition to support their efforts to 
build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule 
of law and respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq would have little 
trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and in the 
international community.
    The United States will keep a significant military presence in the 
region to provide the full range of military options necessary to deter 
Iraqi aggression, to ensure that UNSC resolutions are enforced, and to 
deal with other contingencies that may arise.

U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region

    In view of Saddam's record of brutality 
and unreliability, it is prudent to retain a significant force presence 
in the region to deter Iraq. United States and allied forces now in the 
region are prepared to deal with contingencies. This gives us the 
capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression or threats 
against its neighbors. As we make the force adjustments mentioned below, 
we are strengthening a rapid redeployment capability to supplement our 
forces in the Gulf. Our cruise missile force will be twice the pre-
crisis level. In addition, we will be able to double again our cruise 
missile force in days. Once these moves are completed, this capability 
will allow for a swift, powerful strike.
    The aircraft carrier USS JOHN C. STENNIS and her accompanying battle 
group combatant

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ships and combat aircraft remain in the region as United States force 
levels are being reduced. The aircraft carriers USS INDEPENDENCE and USS 
GEORGE WASHINGTON and their accompanying battle group combatant ships 
left the region, as scheduled. Once force level adjustments are 
completed, U.S. forces will include land and carrier-based aircraft, 
surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, Patriot missile 
battalions, a mechanized battalion task force and a mix of special 
operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT operations. To 
enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military 
security personnel are also deployed. During the crisis, U.S. forces 
were augmented by HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and accompanying ships from the United 
Kingdom.
    During our successful effort to compel Iraq's compliance with 
relevant UNSC resolutions earlier this year, the United Kingdom and a 
number of other nations pledged forces. Although all of the members of 
this international effort sought a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the 
crisis, all showed their resolve to achieve our common objective by 
military force if that becomes necessary.
    Twenty nations deployed forces to the region or readied their forces 
for contingency deployment. Another 12 nations offered important access, 
basing, overflight, and other assistance essential for the multinational 
effort. Still others identified force contributions that were held in 
reserve for deployment should the need arise. For those nations with 
forces deployed during the crisis, most of these governments redeployed 
their forces back home after the crisis in keeping with our own force 
adjustments. These nations have made clear their willingness to repeat 
this deployment should Iraq again challenge the international community.

Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation 
Southern Watch. In response to a series of Iraqi no-fly zone violations 
in October and November 1997, we increased the number of aircraft 
participating in these operations. Since then, there have been no 
observed no-fly zone violations. In early April, we restored the 
preexisting level of aircraft deployed to Northern Watch. We have made 
clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other relevant parties that 
the United States and coalition partners will continue to enforce both 
no-fly zones.

The Maritime Interception Force

    The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the authority 
of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. 
Navy is the single largest component of this multinational force, but it 
is frequently augmented by ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Today in 
the Gulf, ships from Canada, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
have joined with us in maritime patrols. Member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical support and 
shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for violating U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq.
    Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted several vessels 
involved in illegal smuggling from Iraq. Although petroleum products 
comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has recently diverted 
vessels engaged in date smuggling as well. Ships involved in smuggling 
have often utilized the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF 
inspections. We have provided detailed reports of these illegal 
activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
    The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be in a state 
of flux. For several weeks, Iran ceased allowing gasoil smugglers to use 
its territorial seas to avoid the MIF inspections, causing a dramatic 
decrease in the level of gasoil smuggling. In recent weeks, however, we 
have noted ships once again using Iranian waters with the apparent aid 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces that operate in small boats 
near the mouth of the Shatt Al Arab waterway. It is too early to tell 
what the long-term policy of Iran will be in this matter, although we 
are hopeful that it will take the necessary steps to curb U.N. sanctions 
violations occurring within its territorial seas.
    Our forces continue to benefit from recent actions by the United 
Arab Emirates that make it difficult for sanctions violators to operate 
in UAE territory. We will continue to work with the Emirates to find 
ways to thwart the significant sanctions-busting trade which has 
historically been bound for UAE ports. As noted in my last report, the 
UAE has significantly increased its level of cooperation with the MIF.

[[Page 1046]]

These efforts have resulted in an increase in the number of ships caught 
with illegal cargoes. In addition, the UAE has prohibited the use of 
tankers, barges, and other vessel types to transport petroleum products 
to UAE ports and through its waters or to store such products there. 
While it is still too early to determine the full effect of these 
measures, we are hopeful that these actions will deal a significant blow 
to sanctions-busting activity in the region.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most troubling 
issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature of the 
technology; it can easily be hidden within civilian industries, such as 
the pharmaceutical industry for biological agents and the pesticide 
industry for chemical agents. Iraq continues to resist making a full and 
complete declaration of its biological weapons programs, as required by 
UNSCR 707.
    Following its March technical evaluation meetings, UNSCOM concluded 
that Iraq has not provided a clear statement of the current status of 
the programs. Iraq's declaration still contains major mistakes, 
inconsistencies, and gaps. It may substantially understate Iraq's 
production of bulk biological weapons agents. UNSCOM is still unable to 
verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled with biological 
agents--anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin--have been destroyed. 
UNSCOM also suspects Iraq may be concealing additional, as-yet 
undisclosed, biological weapons research or development programs.

Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

    On May 14, the UNSC adopted a Presidential Statement on the most 
recent UNSCOM and IAEA reports about Iraq's nuclear program. The 
Statement notes that the IAEA's investigations over the past several 
years have yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine 
nuclear program, but that all outstanding unanswered technical and 
substantive questions must be answered before the UNSC will authorize 
the IAEA to move from inspections to ongoing monitoring and verification 
in the nuclear field. While the bulk of its resources are now devoted to 
monitoring, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to investigate 
any aspect of Iraq's nuclear program. The IAEA, in a recent report, 
points out that Iraq still has not provided information requested about 
certain sites, that concerns remain as to the completeness, accuracy, 
and internal consistency of Iraq's nuclear declaration and that Iraq has 
failed to enact laws prohibiting certain activities.

Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms

    From March 26 to April 2 UNSCOM conducted inspections of the so-
called ``Presidential Sites.'' The inspectors reported that the sites 
appeared to have been ``sanitized'' prior to their visits, and, as 
anticipated, they discovered no materials related to Iraq's WMD programs 
during these inspections. In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, 
UNSCOM and the IAEA must be allowed to continue to investigate all 
aspects of Iraq's prohibited programs until they can verify that all 
relevant components have been destroyed under international supervision, 
and that all remaining capabilities have been eliminated. Without such 
verification, Iraq could develop the ability to strike at any city in 
the region--and beyond the region--with devastating biological, 
chemical, and possibly even nuclear weapons.

Dual-Use Imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor 
Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit 
before it imports specific items which can be used in both weapons of 
mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must 
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
    We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are extremely 
porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its neighbors. There is 
significant potential for evasion of sanctions by land routes, giving 
additional weight to our position that UNSCOM must have full and 
unconditional access to all locations, and be allowed to inspect and 
monitor Iraqi compliance over time.

The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    On February 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1153, which 
raises from $2.0 billion to $5.2 billion the amount of oil Iraq is 
authorized to sell every 180 days. Resolution 1153 provides that the 
nutritional and health requirements of the Iraqi people are the top 
priority. My Administration's support for Resolution 1153 is fully 
consistent with long-standing U.S. policy.

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Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf War, the United States has held 
that the international community's dispute is with Iraq's leadership, 
not its people. The Security Council proposed an ``oil-for-food'' 
program in 1991 (UNSCR 706/712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program 
(UNSCR 986) was eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We supported the 
expansion of the ``oil-for-food'' program under UNSCR 1153 because it 
will provide additional humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, 
under strict U.N. supervision, without benefiting the regime.
    Since the beginning of the ``oil-for-food'' program, we have 
consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member states to find 
ways to improve the program's effectiveness to better meet the 
humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian population. Iraq, however, has 
frequently failed to provide the full cooperation necessary to ensure 
that the program functions smoothly. For example, during calendar year 
1997, the Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for 
more than three months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the United 
States for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine which it had 
caused. The Iraqi government, after much prodding by the U.N. Secretary 
General's office, finally submitted a satisfactory distribution plan to 
the U.N. as called for by UNSCR 1153.
    Resolution 1153 calls for an independent assessment of Iraq's oil 
infrastructure to determine whether it can export $5.2 billion in oil in 
a 180-day period, as provided for in the resolution. This report, which 
was submitted to the UNSC on April 15, recommended that the Sanctions 
Committee approve up to $300 million worth of repairs to Iraq's oil 
infrastructure during the period covered by UNSCR 1153. The United 
States has expressed its intention to support those oil infrastructure 
repairs needed to fund the expanded humanitarian program, provided these 
repairs can be carried out in a manner fully consistent with the 
humanitarian objectives of UNSCR 1153, and that the U.N. is able to 
properly monitor all aspects of the repair process. We are continuing to 
work with members of the Security Council to resolve these concerns.
    Resolution 1153 also maintains the separate program for northern 
Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with the local 
population. This program receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds 
generated under the ``oil-for-food'' program. The United States strongly 
supports this provision. The separate northern program was established 
because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian 
condition of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern 
Iraq and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression 
against them. The well-documented series of chemical weapons attacks a 
decade ago by the government against civilians in the north is only one 
example of this brutality. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not 
exercise control, the ``oil-for-food'' program has been able to operate 
unhindered. The Kurdish factions are seeking to set aside their 
differences to work together so that UNSCR 1153 is implemented as 
efficiently as possible. As a result, the contrast between the north and 
the rest of the country is striking.
    The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of Resolution 1153. 
The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting 
of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record of noncompliance with 
its obligations under relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was 
unanimously acknowledged during the Security Council's 38th sanctions 
review on April 27. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, 
the Security Council, and others in the international community to 
ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while 
denying any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause 
for grave concern. Summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions 
remain a primary concern. On March 10, U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 
Max Van der Stoel, reported that his 
ongoing investigation had revealed that ``there is strong evidence that 
hundreds of prisoners have been executed in Abu Gharaib and Radwaniyah 
prisons since August 1997.'' According to credible reports, many of 
those killed were serving sentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as 
insulting the regime or being members of an opposition political party. 
Families in Iraq reportedly received the bodies of the executed which 
bore, in some cases, clear signs of torture. In April, the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission issued a strong condemnatory resolution describing 
these and other

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ongoing Iraqi human rights violations. The resolution extended the 
Special Rapporteur's mandate and condemned the ``all-pervasive 
repression and oppression'' perpetrated by the Government of Iraq.
    In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the Shi'a 
population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique 
ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, outside the Kurdish-
controlled areas, the government continues the forced expulsion of tens 
of thousands of ethnic Kurds and Turkomans from Kirkuk and other cities. 
The government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for 
more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at 
the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait. 
In the course of recent prisoner exchanges brokered by the ICRC, Iraq 
has released more than 300 Iranian prisoners of war taken during the 
Iran-Iraq war in exchange for 5,600 Iraqi POWs. Yet the Government of 
Iraq shows no sign of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq 
cease the repression of its own people.

Northern Iraq: PUK-KDP Relations

    In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish parties, 
established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. efforts, continues to 
hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have 
made positive, forward-looking statements on political reconciliation, 
and talks between the two groups are now entering their sixth round. We 
will continue our efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation through 
mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq find the 
permanent, stable settlement which they deserve, and to minimize the 
opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves into the 
conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region. Baghdad continues 
to pressure the two groups to enter into negotiations.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established 
pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq 
arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC 
has issued almost 1.3 million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of 
the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, and 1143 
have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to 
finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in 
the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are authorized 
for awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved them, in 
installments of $2,500. To date, 757 U.S. claimants have received an 
initial installment payment, and payment is still in process for 
approximately another 58 U.S. claimants.

Conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I 
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations 
under UNSC resolutions. The United States looks forward to the day when 
Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding 
member.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall 
continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
        Sincerely,

                                                      William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the 
Senate.