[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
[June 23, 1998]
[Pages 1027-1029]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
Legislation on Missile Proliferation Sanctions
June 23, 1998
To the House of Representatives:
I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the ``Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''
H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign
individuals and companies if there is ``credible information indicating
that'' they transferred certain items or provided certain types of
assistance that contributed to Iran's missile program, or attempted more
than once to transfer such items or provide such assistance. These
sanctions would last at least 2 years and would prohibit sales of
defense articles and services; exports of certain dual-use items; and
United States Government assistance.
[[Page 1028]]
My Administration unequivocally supports the critical objectives of
fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the transfer of missile
technology to nations whose foreign policy practices and
nonproliferation policies violate international norms. This legislation,
however, is indiscriminate, inflexible, and prejudicial to these
efforts, and would in fact undermine the national security objectives of
the United States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 risk a
proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.
Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the credibility of
U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering U.S. nonproliferation
objectives. Indeed, the sweeping application of sanctions likely would
cause serious friction with many governments, diminishing vital
international cooperation across the range of policy areas--military,
political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global leadership
depend.
Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of sanctions
based on an unworkably low standard of evidence: ``credible information
indicating that'' certain transfers or attempted transfers had occurred.
Such a low standard of evidence could result in the erroneous imposition
of sanctions on individuals and business entities worldwide--even in
certain instances when they did not know the true end user of the items.
The bill would also hinder U.S. efforts to enlist the support of other
countries to halt the objectionable activities by imposing an
unreasonable standard for waiving the bill's sanctions. In addition, the
sanctions proposed by the legislation are disproportionate. A minor
violation (e.g., the transfer of a few grams of aluminum powder) would
carry the same penalty as a transfer of major proliferation
significance. This, too, undermines U.S. credibility and increases
foreign opposition to U.S. policy.
H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it will affect
that country. The legislation does not allow flexibility sufficient to
reflect the progress made by the Russian government in formulating
policies and processes whose goal is to sever links between Russian
entities and Iran's ballistic missile program. At the urging of the
United States, President Yeltsin, the Prime
Minister, Russian security services Chief
Kovalev, and Russian Defense Minister
Sergeyev have all made clear that
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a serious
threat to Russia's security. They have called for strict control of
sensitive technologies and stressed the strict penalties that will be
imposed for violations of Russian law. On January 22 of this year, the
Russian government issued a ``catch all'' executive order providing
authority to stop all transfers of dual-use goods and services for
missiles and weapons of mass destruction programs, and on May 15
published detailed regulations to implement that order. They have
recently developed and circulated a list of end users of concern in
Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. In the course of regular and
active discussion of this issue with the Russian government, the United
States has raised problem cases involving cooperation between Russian
entities and the Iranian missile program. We have seen progress in this
area, and a number of these cases are no longer active concerns.
Precisely because Russia needs to take effective enforcement steps
to control the flow of technology, the United States needs to be able to
work cooperatively with the Russian government to assure further
progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut the cooperation we have worked to
achieve with the Russian government without helping us solve the problem
of technology transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature could also
hurt our increasing cooperation with Russian government agencies in
other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and
combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would interpret this
law as an infringement of its sovereignty, affecting our ability to work
with Russia on broader U.S. policy goals and on regional and global
issues.
Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law, such as
the missile technology control provisions of the Arms Export Control
Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing sanctions to prevent
missile proliferation to Iran and elsewhere.
I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress attached
Title II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1997,'' to this problematic and counterproductive bill. Because Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation legislation has not been
enacted, the United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations
under the CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong bipartisan
support, and should be passed by the Congress as a free-standing bill
without further delay. I note, however, that sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii),
213(e)(3)(B)(v), and 213(f)
[[Page 1029]]
of Title II could interfere with certain of my exclusive constitutional
powers, and I urge the Congress to correct these constitutional
deficiencies.
For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709 without
my approval.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
June 23, 1998.