[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
[June 19, 1998]
[Pages 1050-1058]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Interview With the Los Angeles Times, Bloomberg Business News, and
Business Week
June 19, 1998
Intervention To Support the Yen
Q. I wanted to talk to you a little bit, to start with, about the
different reasoning between the 1995 intervention for the dollar and the
1998 intervention for the yen. In '95 the thought was that the dollar
was out of line with the economic fundamentals and therefore needed to
be supported. In this particular case we have the yen, which doesn't
really seem to be out of sync with the fundamentals in the Japanese
economy, and yet we went in to intervene. Can you explain to me what the
different reasoning is?
The President. Well, first of all, I think the yen would be out of
line if you look at the fundamental productive capacity and the
[[Page 1051]]
strength of the Japanese economy and the prospect of genuine reform of
the financial institutions and appropriate economic policy. So that when
the Prime Minister had agreed to put out
the statement being clearer and more specific than before about the
kinds of things that the Japanese Government was prepared to do in those
areas, particularly around the institutional reform, we thought it was
the appropriate thing to do, especially since a continued movement in
the other direction in our view would have been unnecessarily
destabilizing and out of line with what we think is the reality of the
Japanese economic capacity.
Q. Let me just follow up this way if I could. Obviously, what needs
to happen in order for Japan to have a recovery would be that the
Japanese people need to open their wallets and start spending. Is there
anything that you can do to help Hashimoto inspire them to do that?
The President. I don't know. But I think that in order to get them
to change their well-known habits for incredible savings, even when it's
not the right thing to do, they have to first of all have confidence in
the long-term security and stability of the Japanese economy.
And so I think, you know, the reform of the financial institutions,
the sense that the world believes the Japanese policy is moving in the
right direction I think will at least inspire a greater degree of
confidence in the Japanese people to do that. Part of what has caused
the recent difficulties was the movement of money out of Japan by
Japanese citizens. In these other countries, it's normally what foreign
investors do or don't do. And so we hope that this will contribute to
that.
Now, in terms of changing the normal habits of Japanese consumers
that have built up over decades and that were forged at a time when they
did need an extremely high savings rate, that is something that will
probably have to take place more within their border than as a result of
discussion among the Japanese themselves. But first things first, you
have to get the right framework before people could be asked to do that.
Devaluation of the Yuan
Q. Bringing the currency question around to China, China has been
making noises that it might not be able to hold the line on devaluation.
I was wondering how worried you are about that and what you might be
able to do in the upcoming summit to ease their concerns or to help
solve that?
The President. Well, first of all, I think it's clear to everyone
that they don't want to devalue, and they've been taking extraordinary
actions to avoid devaluation. And I think in so doing they have helped
to contain and to stabilize the situation in Asia. And they deserve
credit for that. And I personally appreciate it.
I think the most important thing is to try to alter the conditions
which, if they continue to worsen, would make them feel compelled to
devalue. And I think, from our point of view, that they have to make the
policy call. The best thing we can do is to work with them, with Japan,
and with others to try to change the conditions so that they will--that
the pressure to devalue will decrease, rather than increase.
U.S. China Policy
Q. Mr. President, if I could ask broadly about your China policy.
How--at this point, as it's evolved, how does your policy now differ
from the policy followed by the Bush administration? And how do the
Republican criticisms of it--do they differ from the ways in which the
Democratic Party and you in the `92 campaign criticized the Bush
administration's policy?
The President. Well, first of all, I never felt that it was wrong to
engage China. I never criticized any President for going to China. I
always think you're better off talking whenever there's a possibility of
advancing the ball, if you will.
I thought it was important after Tiananmen Square that the United
States be clear, unambiguous, and firm, and to the extent I thought the
signals were not as clear or unambiguous as they should have been, I
tried to make that plain. Some people I think concluded from that that I
thought we ought to, in effect, launch a policy of isolation and try to
contain and isolate the Chinese and that that would be the best way to
get change. I never believed that.
And the reason I'm going to China now is that I think there have
been a lot of positive changes in the last 6 years. No, we don't have
all the problems solved; we still have differences with them over human
rights, over religious rights, over economic issues. In some ways we've
made the most progress in the nonproliferation area.
[[Page 1052]]
But if you look at what's happened in the 5\1/2\ years I've been
President, at the work the--you know, the Chinese agreeing to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; accepting the missile technology control
guidelines; agreeing not to cooperate in nuclear matters with India and
with unsafeguarded facilities, including those that are in Pakistan;
they're a member of the NPT--I think we've made significant progress,
even in the area of human rights. We've seen the release of Wang
Dan, Wei Jingsheng, Bishop
Zeng. And I hope there we will get a real
resumption of our dialog. I hope this whole legal systems cooperation
will continue where I think we can have a big impact in a positive way,
in the way China evolves legally and the way it deals with not just
commercial matters but also with matters of personal freedom. We've
clearly had a lot of security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, and
China has led these five-party talks in the aftermath of the nuclear
tests on the Indian subcontinent.
So I think that this trip is coming at a time when there have been
substantive changes which justify the kind of measured, principled
engagement strategy we've followed, and I think it's more than
justified. And if you ask me how it compares with the previous policy, I
would say that it may just be the passage of time, but I think there are
more elements to our policy. We're about to open a DEA office in
Beijing. And as I said, I hope very much that as a result of this trip
we'll wind up with a genuinely invigorated human rights dialog and
perhaps an NGO forum on human rights.
I don't think there's any ambiguity here about the extent to which
we have tried to put all the elements of our engagement in China into
our policy and pursue them all in the way we feel would be most
effective.
Q. And the Republican criticisms?
The President. Well, I think some of them are consistent, some of
them--some of the Members of the House, for example, in the Republican
Party have had a consistent posture on China. Some of it may just be
election year politics. But to whatever extent it exists, I think that I
should listen to whatever the critics say and see whether or not they're
right about any specific things they say.
But on the larger issue of our engagement in China, I think most
Americans agree with me. And the most important thing is I'm convinced
it's in the interest of the United States, and I'm going to pursue it as
clearly and effectively as I can.
Trade With China
Q. One of the things that the critics always point to, however, is
the trade deficit with China, particularly that our exports to China
dropped below $1 billion in April. Do you have a strategy? Obviously
there's going to be a yawning trade gap as things happen in Asia. Do you
have a strategy to sort of combat the isolationists who say that this is
bad for our country?
The President. Well, if you take the economic issues--first of all,
the volume of imports into our country is the function of the strength
of our economy combined with the weakness of the other Asian economies
which would normally be markets for China's products. And our people
have chosen to buy those products, and it has not weakened our economy.
After all, we had the lowest unemployment rate in 28 years. So that is
not, for me, the source of the problem. And we knew that the trade
deficit would worsen this year because of the weakness in Asia.
But I am concerned about the fact, even though our exports overall,
notwithstanding the April figures, our exports were up 7 percent in '97
over '98, and they're running about 17 percent--excuse me, '97 over '96;
they're running about 17 percent higher in '98 over '97. I do think that
the United States should have greater market access. And I think if we
had greater market access, then our exports would be increasing at least
proportionately to our imports.
However, my preference would be for China to take those steps that
would enable it to come into the WTO, not to give America any special
deals or special preference but to simply adopt a rigorous plan for
opening new markets. I think Americans would do just fine in a fair and
free and open market, competing with all other people who would like to
sell to China. And that's what I hope we can achieve. And I hope we'll
make some progress on that.
But in the meanwhile, I have to continue to press for more access
for American products, and I do have a strategy on it. But we will be
more vulnerable to those criticisms in this year for the simple reason
that our economy is especially strong and the problems in Asia are
especially acute. And the intersection of
[[Page 1053]]
those things mean we're taking on a lot more imports than we ordinarily
would.
Asian Economic and Nuclear Crises
Q. How have the problems, the economic crisis in East Asia, the
nuclear crisis in South Asia, and ongoing congressional hearings
affected the agenda for the summit? Has it changed since what you would
have conceived of at your meeting last year?
The President. Well, I think the first two matters have made the
importance of the summit, the importance of the trip even greater
because I think they illustrate in graphic terms that relate to the
security and the welfare of the American people why a constructive
partnership with China is important if we can achieve it.
If you just look at the economic issues--you asked the question
about Chinese devaluation. The Chinese have tried to be constructive in
working with us on the whole Asian economic crisis.
If you look at the Indian subcontinent, just imagine how much more
tension there would have been after the India and Pakistan tests if
China hadn't signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then responded
with a test of its own, since India asserted that it was really doing
this because of China and not because of Pakistan. And now, you know,
the Chinese headed the five-party talks we had with the Permanent Five,
and they adhered to every statement we made. And I think that's
important. And it's really--you can't imagine any scenario in which we
can unravel the difficulties between India and Pakistan without China
playing a major role. So I think that's very important.
Now, as to the congressional hearings, I think you have to--or
investigations, the only one that I think has any bearing on the trip--
it won't have any bearing on the trip, but it has a bearing on our
relationships with China--is all the inquiries into the question of
whether any elements of the Chinese Government attempted to influence
the last election by channeling money into either my campaign or the
campaign of various Members of Congress.
As I have always said, that is a serious issue. I have raised it
with the Chinese, from the President on down.
They have vigorously denied it. And I have asked them to, please to
cooperate in every way with the investigation that we have to conduct
into this--that is, ``we'' the executive branch, and ``we'' the United
States through the Congress. And we will continue to express that view
on this trip. But that will not--that doesn't in any way undermine the
importance of the trip or the need for this kind of partnership against
the background of the economic and security issues you mentioned.
China's Political System
Q. Mr. President, would you like to see the end of communism in
China, and is that a goal of American policy?
The President. Well, of course I would like to see China adopt a
more open, freer political system in which basic political and civil
rights would be recognized. The Chinese have expressed their intention
to sign the covenant. I think that's very important. And I believe that
the Chinese people will, over time, understand and will come to embrace
the notion that they can only achieve their full greatness in the world
of the 21st century if they allow the widest possible latitude for
personal imagination and personal freedom, and that there is a way to do
that and still preserve the coherence and stability of their society.
And so I think there will be a process of evolution here as China
becomes a more involved and constructive partner with the rest of the
world, has a bigger say in regional affairs, and also comes to grips
with the basic elements of what it takes to succeed in the modern world.
I believe that. And I believe that we can further that by pushing in
that direction and by actually having a dialog in which the Chinese
leaders really have to imagine the future and what it's going to be like
and understand what life is like. You know, they're going to have--what
do they have, 400,000 people on the Internet now, they're going to 20
million before you know it. So I would like to see a China that is more
open and more free, and I believe--and also that is more accommodating
to difference.
I think this--if you look at the question of Tibet, I see this as a
great opportunity for China, not some great problem that threatens
instability. I think the symbolic importance of the Dalai Lama saying that Tibet just seeks to be genuinely autonomous
region but not separate from China, and then having a President of China
agree to meet with the Dalai Lama--I think the benefits to China would
be sweeping, enormous, and worldwide. And I don't think it would lead to
greater instability.
[[Page 1054]]
And that relates to, you know, you've got--China has a substantial
Muslim population. China has a not insubstantial and growing Christian
population. I think, you know, this--the religious leaders who went to
China at my request, after President Jiang and I
worked out the opportunity for them to go, came back and made their
report to me and their recommendations yesterday. And we had an
announcement about that here.
I think all this is going to be a big part of China's future. And I
think that--I think they will--let me just say this. Any society in
change has to find a way to reconcile the realities it faces, its
highest hopes for the future, with its biggest nightmare. And every
country with any kind of history at all has a nightmare.
When we worked out with the Russians--I'll give you something in a
different context--when we worked out with the Russians how we were
going to relate Russia to NATO and what the terms of NATO expansion
would be, I kept telling people over and over again, ``You've got to
understand what their nightmare is. We were never invaded by Hitler and
all that. And you could say there's nobody alive in Russia today that
remembers Napoleon and not all that many remember Hitler, but that's not
true. Those things, they seep into the psyche of a people. And you have
to understand that.''
For the Chinese--the word instability to us may mean a bad day on
the stock market, you know, demonstrations out here on The Mall or the
Ellipse, because we're a very long way from our Civil War and we think
that such a thing is unthinkable. But to them, instability in the
context of their history is something that was just around the corner,
only yesterday. And it becomes a significant problem.
So what we have to do is to figure out a way to press our
convictions about not only what we think is right, morally right, for
the people now living in China but what we believe with all of our
hearts is right for the future of China and the greatness of China in
terms of openness and freedom. And we have to find a way to do it so
that they can accommodate it to their psyche, which is very much seared
with past instabilities.
Trade, National Security, and Human Rights
Q. Your administration, since you've been in office, has
aggressively pushed U.S. exports, U.S. companies and products, in the
global marketplace. Some have argued that there's a danger and an
emphasis on commercialism that could cloud national security or human
rights interests. What's your view on the matter and how do you deal
with that, both in China and in a broader sense?
The President. Well, I think they are two different issues. I think
on the human rights issue, I think it only undermines human rights if
you basically just do it with a wink and a nod and it's obvious that you
don't care about human rights or other issues of liberty or human
decency. This is not just with China but generally.
I think on balance the evidence is that greater economic prosperity
and greater economic openness leads to more open societies and to
greater freedom and to a higher quality of life across the board. So I
think that--I don't see them as fundamentally in conflict. I just think
that as long as you recognize that there is--as long as we in the United
States and the Government recognize that we have an obligation to pursue
a coherent and full policy, that everything we do to open a country
economically and to bring in new ideas, new information, and new people
and to bring people from those countries out of their own environs, that
that's a good thing, and it advances the cause of human rights and
liberty over the long run--and sometimes over the very short run.
Now, on the national security issues, very often these questions
require a lot of careful judgment by people who know all the facts, and
even there it's not always clear what should be done because technology
is becoming more universally available in so many areas. I think we have
very clear rules and guidelines on nonproliferation, and we've made a
lot of progress with the Chinese on nonproliferation.
On the question of the satellites--if you just want to take the
satellites. The issue there, we have a system now where in every
decision all the relevant agencies, including the national security
agencies, are all involved; if the satellites are purely commercial, the
initiative comes out of the State Department, the initial approval, but
everybody else gets a say in almost a de facto veto. If there can be
some interconnection between the satellite and rocket that goes up, then
it initiates out of State, but everybody else gets a say. And I think
the system has worked quite well for the United States and has advanced
our interests without undermining our security. I've not seen any
evidence of any case
[[Page 1055]]
where there's been a national security interest that's been compromised.
Q. What about Sikorsky helicopters? The new ones can be sold, but
the parts and the services cannot. Do you see that sanction--it's a
leftover, I guess, '89 sanction--do you see that being lifted anytime
soon?
The President. Well, first of all, as you know, in the Tiananmen
sanctions there are five categories of sanctions. The only one we've
actually lifted outright is the one on nuclear cooperation in exchange
for the comprehensive agreement we made with the Chinese on nuclear
cooperation. And I think that's been quite a good thing.
On the satellite issues, that's a case-by-case thing, initiated in
1988 and then implemented by President Bush and
by me. On the others, most of them have to be reasoned on a case-by-case
basis. And we'll have to look at it, and we'll do the right kind of
national security review and make the best judgment we can on it.
Q. What's the reason behind not lifting the sanctions on the
Sikorsky's?
The President. Well, I can't--I don't want to talk about it now. I
mean, I'll be glad to get some sort of answer to you, but I think what--
all I can say is that we have to--we deal with these things on a case-
by-case basis, and we do the best we can with them.
Japan
Q. Mr. President, I wanted to ask about Japan. Why aren't you
visiting Japan on this trip, and can you respond to the criticism that,
based on that, that in some way American policy is tilting towards China
and is giving a lower priority to its allies in Asia?
The President. Well, I think--first of all, I think that would be a
huge mistake to say that. I have been to Japan on more than one occasion
since I've been President. I intend to go to Japan again before I leave
office. I have had the Japanese Prime Ministers here. And Prime Minister
Hashimoto is coming here very soon after I
get back from China. We talk to each other all the time on the
telephone, and we had a conversation just the other day.
It's interesting, I think sometimes we can read too much into this.
I'm going to China because I think--we moved the trip up, you remember,
at the recommendation of Ambassador Sasser,
after the national security team looked at it and said they thought he
was right because there's so much going on in Asia and because President
Jiang had a good constructive trip here. And we
wanted to try to build on our relationship with China.
We have made clear to the Japanese that it will in no way undermine
the importance of our relationship with Japan, which, as you know, has
got long security, economic, and political components to it. And I think
it would be really a stretch to try to interpret the fact that I'm going
to China and not to Japan at this particular time as having any
significance other than the fact that I've been President nearly--well,
5\1/2\ years, now--and I think it's time to go to China. And I think
it's important to devote a significant amount of time to it and for it
to be a trip that stands on its own, just as President Jiang's trip here
stood on its own. But it is in no way a derogation of the Japanese
relationship. And we've--we certainly, as you know, spent a lot of time
working on U.S-Japanese issues and Japanese economic issues in the last
few weeks, and we're going to spend a lot more.
China's Financial Markets
Q. How important do you think it is for the U.S. to help China
develop its own financial markets, whether it be bond markets or housing
or Fannie Mae? And what are you going to do during this trip to help
them do that?
The President. The answer to the first question is, I think it's
quite important. I think that developing these kinds of markets and
giving international capital access to them, I think, is quite important
and will continue the process bringing China into the global economy in
a way that I think is good. The Chinese may be a little reluctant now
because they think, you know, they see what's happened in some other
countries.
But as long as they've got good, stable financial policies and
significant cash reserves and follow a prudent course, I think they'd be
very much advantaged by having more sophisticated and various markets. I
haven't decided exactly what, if anything else, I can do on that. I'm
going to Shanghai. And while there, I expect to have a lot of
discussions about the financial markets, how they're structured, and
where we're going from here. But I don't have anything specific to say
about that.
[[Page 1056]]
China-U.S. Business Meeting
Q. Often there are CEO delegations that accompany trips of this
kind, and it doesn't appear that there will be this time. Is there a
particular reason for that?
The President. Well, we are going to have a U.S.-China business
meeting in Shanghai, and a lot of American CEO's are going to be there.
And I have--some who have mentioned to me their interest in this trip,
just in passing, I've encouraged, if they've got an interest in China,
to participate in that.
But frankly, since this is the first trip an American President has
made in quite a long while and since there are issues other than
economic issues that also have to be front and center, I thought it was
better this time just to take our delegation. There is another practical
problem; it would probably be impolitic for me to admit it, but there is
a practical problem here, which is that there are now so many American
businesses involved in China, you'd have a hard time figuring out who to
take and who to leave if we did it. [Laughter]
So we decided since we had this big event planned in Shanghai, we
would just tell everyone to please come and try to do the trip with a
smaller delegation.
Most-Favored-Nation Status for China
Q. Mr. President, is it your goal to at some point grant China
permanent most-favored-nation status?
The President. I think it would be a good thing if we didn't have to
have this debate every year, yes. I don't think--I think that even a lot
of the people that feel for whatever reason they have to vote against
it, recognize that we're better off having normal trading relations with
China and that we don't need to have this debate every year. And if some
future, terrible problem arose between the two of us which would call
into question whether we should continue that, then there certainly
would be--Congress would have the option to debate and to legislate in
that area.
But I don't think this debate every year serves a particularly
useful purpose. It might actually have for a few years after Tiananmen
Square when there was uncertainty about what our policy was going to be
and where there was no systematic way of dealing with human rights and
other concerns. But I think now that there is and there will continue to
be a systematic way of dealing with that, and I hope that there are
other ways for Congress to be involved in China and to make their views
known. I think it would be better if we didn't have to have this debate
every year.
Q. Will you propose legislation or legislative action to----
The President. I would want to have consultations with Congress. We
discussed this last year. I discussed this with a number of leaders in
Congress last year, and the consensus was that it wasn't the right time
to propose it because the Congress wasn't ready to deal with it. But
let's see how the trip goes and, when I get back, see how people are
feeling about it.
International Monetary Fund
Q. Another issue that's languishing on Capitol Hill is the IMF. And
the Senate passed it months ago and overwhelmingly, but the House has
been holding it up. Some of the social conservatives want to add
abortion language. Dick Armey wants strict conditions before there would
be approval. Newt Gingrich has even suggested that unless the
administration is more cooperative in his mind on some of their
hearings, that he would hold it up.
How important do you think it is to do this, do it quickly? And how
has the economic trouble of Asia made it more important if you believe
it is?
The President. I think the economic trouble in Asia has made it more
important in two ways, one symbolic and one practical. Symbolically it's
more important because the United States needs to be seen as doing
everything possible to be a responsible player in the international
economy and because we have a huge stake in what happens in Asia. A big
percentage of our exports go to Asia; a significant percentage of our
own economic growth has been fueled by that export market. There is a
practical reason that's important, which is so many countries got in
trouble at the same time, the IMF is going to need the money pretty
soon. And we can't expect to lead the world when all these huge
interests are at stake and then say, but I'm sorry, there are 15 or 20
members of the Republican majority in the House of Representatives who
have said that if this administration won't change its family planning
policy, that they're prepared to see us lose our vote in the United
Nations and
[[Page 1057]]
have no influence over the International Monetary Fund and not do our
part there.
I think this is part of a dangerous move toward kind of both
unilateralism and isolationism that you can also see in some of the
budget proposals for foreign assistance. Some Members of the House
appear to want to sanction everybody in the world who doesn't agree with
us on anything and not invest in anybody in the world who does agree
with us and can be our partner in the future and can build a better 21st
century for their children.
I just completely disagree with this whole approach, and I'm hoping
we can find a way out of it. The Speaker's is
in a little bit of a political bind because of the way his caucus works,
and I feel badly about it. But he knows good and well we ought to pay
our way to the IMF and the U.N.
Tobacco Legislation
Q. I just wanted to ask you a question actually about tobacco. At a
press conference about a month ago, I asked you--and this was before
tobacco had actually blown up--I asked you if you thought you could
convene a tobacco summit of some sort to bring the companies back into
the fold at the time the companies were saying they couldn't accept the
McCain bill.
Have you discussed with anybody bringing up some sort of tobacco
summit to try and get everybody back at the table and try and work out a
compromise? And if so, when would something like that happen?
The President. Let me tell you, what we're doing now is we're
exploring every conceivable alternative for how we could come up with a
bill that can actually pass the Congress that would do the job of
reducing teen smoking. The only thing I have ruled out, which I did
earlier today in my press conference, was just taking some slimmed-down
bill that would make a mockery of the process so that Congress could say
it did something.
I believe that the central reason the tobacco companies pulled out
was not so much the money but was the uncertainty as to whether there
would be some liability cap. And there was an unusual coalition of
liberals and conservatives, for an unusual set of reasons, who voted
against that, which is why, after consultation with Senator Lott, I came out and clearly said that I would be prepared
to accept one and I thought they ought to vote for it. And I still
believe that.
And the reason is clear. Whether you're philosophically opposed to a
liability cap or not as part of the settlement, under prevailing Supreme
Court decisions, I think it's clear that if we want the tobacco
companies to limit their advertising and marketing, in order to do that
they're going to have to understand to some extent what their financial
exposure is in the future.
So for me, I have no problem with that, and I think if you talked to
anybody who really wants a bill, they will tell you that in the end, if
we're going to get a bill, it will have to have some kind of liability
cap on it. So it ought not to be too generous to tobacco companies; it
ought to be something they still feel, if they continue to do the wrong
thing.
But if you look at--there are three elements. All the studies show
there are three elements which has led to a very high rate of teen
smoking, even though it's illegal in every State to sell cigarettes to
teenagers. One is the price. If the price were higher, kids wouldn't be
as likely to buy them. Two is the advertising. And three is the access.
So we've got to try to deal with all three of those things. Then we need
the bill to deal with the public health issues. And we need something
for the tobacco farmers. And everything else, as far as I'm concerned,
can be subject to negotiations.
So I'm looking at--we've discussed three or four or five different
ways that we can get this thing back on track. But the Senate knows what
the parameters are. They could--we could send them up a bill tomorrow
that would pass the Senate if they decided they were going to do it.
Q. Do you have a bill? I mean, a White House bill.
The President. No, we don't, because we thought it was better--in
consultation with the Republicans, we thought it was better to let them
have a committee bill. So they voted this bill out 19 to one, and some
of the people who voted for the bill voted against it on the floor
yesterday--the day before yesterday.
Q. So you can't see a scenario, giving them political cover, of
having a White House bill?
The President. Oh, I don't mind giving them political cover. Don't
misunderstand me. I don't mind--to me, this is about the kids. If there
is an agreement and there are members--there
[[Page 1058]]
are Democrats who are worried about being attacked because they gave a
liability cap or Republicans who are worried about being attacked
because they voted for a bill that would increase the price of
cigarettes a buck a pack or however much it is in the bill, or they want
to have some differences in the particulars as it's implemented, I don't
mind doing that.
I think that this administration, I think because of the stand that
I have taken and the stand the Vice President has taken, I think that our credibility on this is pretty
strong. People know we really believe in this, and we really believe it
ought to be done. And I think everyone understands that any complicated
piece of legislation has to represent a series of compromises.
So I'm more than happy to do all that, but I just--I'm not prepared
to adopt a bill that I don't think will do the job and that no reputable
public health authority believes will do the job. That's my only bottom
line.
I don't--I'm not interested in gaining any political benefit from
this except insofar as it's necessary to induce people to ultimately
pass the right kind of bill. That's my only objective here. I think this
is a public health opportunity of a generation for the United States,
and to squander it because there was $40 million in unanswered
advertising by the tobacco companies, to which there are very good
answers, is a great--it would be a great pity. And I think in the end
it's a misreading of the political opinions and character of the
American people for the Republican majority to think that they've gotten
some big victory here. I just don't agree with that, and I hope we can
work it out.
Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia
Q. One quick last China question. Did China's help for Pakistan's
nuclear program--was that a contributing factor in these tests, as the
Indians claim?
The President. Well, of course that has its roots in the war that
China fought with India over 35 years ago. And so China quite
rationally, from its point of view, developed a security relationship
with Pakistan.
But the important thing is that the Chinese have agreed now not to
give assistance to nonsafeguarded nuclear facilities, which would
include the ones in Pakistan. They're in the comprehensive test ban
regime. And equally important, since deliverability of missiles is a big
issue, deliverability of nuclear weapons is a big issue, they've agreed
to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and
to work with us in improving both of our abilities to deal with those
issues.
So China--India can blame China or say that this is a Chinese issue,
but the truth is, we need to find a way out of this which leaves the
Indians more secure, not less, leaves the Pakistanis more secure, not
less, and puts the India-China relationship back on the path it was on
before this last change of government and the testing occurred.
We got to start from where we are, but I think the Chinese
commitment on that going forward was the important thing, and we have
it, and I think they will honor it.
Q. Thank you.
The President. Thank you very much.
Note: The interview began at 3:44 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White
House. The following journalists participated in the interview: Jim
Mann, Los Angeles Times; Dina Temple-Raston, Bloomberg Business News;
and Rick Dunham, Business Week. In his remarks, the President referred
to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan; Chinese political
dissidents Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng; Chinese Roman Catholic Bishop
Zeng Jingmu; and President Jiang Zemin of China. This interview was
released by the Office of the Press Secretary on June 25. A tape was not
available for verification of the content of this interview.